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H. Putnam on Internal Realism - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be
attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question
of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference
system, conceptual schema, immanence.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of
problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. –
Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Item
Summary
VI 389
Internal Realism/Putnam: empirical theory collective spokesperson-behavior. - In contrast,
metaphysical realism: not empirical, but a model.
(like billiard balls).
VI 400
Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is
understood" cannot be discussed within the
theory itself. - Whether the theory has a clearly
>
> Putnam,
intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. Internal
Hilary
Metaphysical Realism: asks for a theoryRealism
independent fact in regards to what a term refers
to within a theory. - internal realism: our use of
"cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. - This
works but only with a verificationist approach of
understanding - not with a truth-conditional hence the use is already explained.
--I (a) 18
Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a
Meta data
Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem
realistischen
Standpunkt, Vincent C.
Müller, Reinbek 1993
Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal
Realist and a
Transcendental
Idealist (at the Same
Time) in: R. Haller/W.
Grassl (eds): Sprache,
Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
Search
Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be
attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question
of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference
system, conceptual schema, immanence.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of
problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. –
Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Item
Summary
theory) - here use and reference are linked.
--I (e) 151
Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to
its anti-Realism, but truth is not identified with
justification but with an idealization of justification.
- Quine: the justification conditions change with
our corpus of knowledge.
I (f) 156ff
Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theorydependent - truth: rationalized acceptability brains in a vat are no possible world, because
they are only assessable from God's perspective
- observation through a "different world" is
excluded by definition. - The internal realism
recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme",
within which objects exist. - Internalism: "Rabbit"
refers just to rabbit.
I (f) 159
ExternalismVs: the does not tell us what
reference is. - Internalism: tautologies are
Meta data
Logik und Philosophie,
Akten des 4.
Internationalen
WittgensteinSymposiums, 1979
In
Von einem
realistischen
Standpunkt, Vincent C.
Müller, Reinbek 1993
Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason",
Proceedings of the
American
Philosophical
Association (1976) pp.
483-98
In
Truth and Meaning,
Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
Search
Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be
attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question
of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference
system, conceptual schema, immanence.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of
problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. –
Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Item
Summary
Meta data
sufficient for reference (> Meaning Postulates)
Paul Horwich,
causality irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to Aldershot 1994
aliens - ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us
by association with "not from this earth" and that
is ultimately causally mediated. - E.g. Natural
type: basic concept for future horses.
I (f) 160
InternalismVs "of the same kind" does not make
sense out of a category system. - Everything is
kind of the same kind-. There are no extra facts
that make true that horses are horses, there are
just horses. - VsInternalism: but so are selfidentifying objects accepted (and the world
arranges itself). - Putnam: ultimately, there are
self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist
sense. - Solution: objects are made and
discovered - then they have intrinsic labels (but
they are not mind-independent).
_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the
Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
Search
Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be
attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question
of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference
system, conceptual schema, immanence.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of
problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. –
Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Item
Summary
Meta data
source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The
corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an
addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German
edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Internal Realism
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