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Fake News - Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Economics Dictionary of Arguments
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Kranton I 421
Misinformation/Fake News/Kranton: ((s) the term “fake
news” is not used by the cited authors). Agents’
individual payoffs depend on a collective decision, such
as election of a candidate or authorizing the use of a
new technology. Collective decision making is modeled
as a stylized “vote” that reflects each agent’s expected
utility from the decision. Some agents are unbiased
and prefer that the decision correctly matches the true
state of the world. (>Terminology/Kranton). Other
agents are biased and prefer a particular decision
regardless of the true state. (Such agents might
personally benefit, say, from the decision.) Agents
>
have prior beliefs as to the true state. One agent,
Kranton, >
selected at random, possibly receives precise
Rachel Misinformation information about the true state. This agent, whose
identity is not known, can create a false or true
E.
message—a rumor—of the state of the world. Biased
agents have the incentive to create a false message.
Agents who receive a message make an inference as
to the veracity of the message and decide whether or
not to pass it along to influence how others will vote on
the collective outcome. >Misinformation/Economic
Theories.
Kranton I 423
In one set of models, opinions spread like diseases;
that is, individuals become infected (adopt an opinion)
by contact with another agent with that disease (see,
e.g., chapter 7 of Jackson, 2008)(1). Such diffusion
processes are also studied in computer science,
Meta data
Kranton I
Rachel E.
Kranton
Francis
Bloch
Gabrielle
Demange,
Rumors And
Social
Networks
2018
Kranton II
Rachel E.
Kranton
George A.
Akerlof
Identity
Economics:
How Our
Identities
Shape Our
Work,
Wages, and
Well-Being
Economics Dictionary of Arguments
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statistical physics, and sociology. In such models,
biased agents are always better off when there are
more biased agents (…).
In a second set of models, opinion formation in social
networks builds on DeGroot (1974)(2). Agents, with
possibly different initial priors, repeatedly “exchange”
their beliefs with their neighbors and adopt some
statistic (the weighted average, say) of their neighbors’
opinions. Such agents fail to take into account the
repetition of information that can propagate through a
network, leading to a persuasion bias as referred to by
DeMarzo et al. (2003)(3).
Kranton I 436
General
Networks/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton:
We identify three key simplifying assumptions that
render the analysis of the general network similar to
the analysis of a tree.
1. If agents transmit a message, they send the
message to all their neighbors (except the one from
whom they have received a message). Communication
is multicast, and agents cannot endogenously choose
which route to send the message along.
2. The time it takes a message to travel along a path is
proportional to the length of the path. This assumption
is needed to guarantee that agents can identify the
agents from whom they receive the message the first
time as those agents who are at a shortest distance in
the network. Absent this assumption, agents would
have to make complex computations to identify the set
of agents from whom they receive the message the
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Princeton
2011
Economics Dictionary of Arguments
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first time.
3. (Most importantly) agents only decide whether or not
to transmit the message the first time they receive it;
that is, although a message could reach an agent
along several paths and an agent could therefore
receive several messages, they ignore all messages
but the first one. >Network Models/Kranton,
>Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication
Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Economic Theories,
>Terminology/Kranton.
1. JACKSON, M., Social and Economic Networks
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
2. DEGROOT,M. H., “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal
of the American Statistical Association 69 (345) (1974),
118–21.
3. DEMARZO, P. M.,D.VAYANOS, AND J. ZWEIBEL,
“Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and UniDimensional Opinions,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113 (3) (2003), 909–68.
Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton,
2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International
Economic Review, Department of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University
Institute of Social and Economic Research Association,
vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.
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Economics Dictionary of Arguments
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_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source,
arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding
books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the
sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition
from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified,
the page numbers refer to this edition.
Authors A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Z
Concepts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Z
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