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Mause I 404/405
Environmental policy/Economic Theory: from the
point of view of economic theory, a central
regulation is only desirable in the case of
spatially homogeneous environmental protection
preferences, cross-border damage effects
(regional spillover effects) or implementationrelated cost degression effects. (1)
Apart from that, a more regional structure is to
be welcomed, as it not only offers the possibility
of better implementation of the subsidiarity
principle in the national distribution of
competences (Döring and Voigt 2006, p. 206 (2)),
but also the chance of increased federal
>
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competition in the field of environmental
Economic Environmental protection (Mammen 2007, p. 125 (3); Koch and
Theories Policy
Krohn 2006 (4).
Vs: a fragmentation of environmental legislation
could lead to a "race to the bottom" with a
multitude of environmental standards (Benz et
al. 2008 (5); Ingerowski 2006 (6)).
Market forces can do little to mitigate
environmental damage. (See Environmental
goods/Economic theories). The reason is the
free rider problem (see Prisoner's
Dilemma/Ostrom):
Free riders: For example, if the installation of a
catalytic converter costs 1,00.00 Euros and the
individual benefit from clean air is evaluated at
the same time at 1,500.00 Euros, then it is
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Economic
Theories
Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und
Wirtschaft: Ein
integratives
Kompendium
Wiesbaden 2018
Economics Dictionary of Arguments
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rational for the individual not to install the
catalytic converter. This even applies if everyone
else dispenses with installation.
For society as a whole, this leads to the worst
result. Therefore, in most cases, the state must
intervene to contain environmental damage.
(Nordhaus 1993, p. 18) (7), Hartwig 1992, p.
132) (8). See Externalities.
1. Klaus W. Zimmermann & Walter Kahlenborn,
Umweltföderalismus. Einheit und Einheitlichkeit
in Deutschland und Europa. Berlin 1994.
2.Thomas Döring & Stefan Voigt. 2006.
Reforming federalism German style.
Intereconomics 41: 201– 208.
3. Lars Mammen. 2007. Der neue Typus der
konkurrierenden Gesetzgebung mit
Abweichungsrecht. Die öffentliche Verwaltung 9:
376– 379.
4. Hans-Joachim Koch, &Susan Krohn. 2006.
Umwelt in schlechter Verfassung? Der
Umweltschutz nach der Föderalismusreform.
Natur und Recht 28: 673– 680.
https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007%2Fs10357-006-1144-3
5. Arthur Benz, Arthur, Hans-Joachim Koch,
André Suck & Anna Fizek, Verwaltungshandeln
im Naturschutz: Herausforderungen und Folgen
veränderter Rahmenbedingungen. Münster
2008..
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6. Jan B. Ingerowski, J2006. Die
Föderalismusreform: Chance auf ein
stringentes, an den aktuellen
Herausforderungen des Umweltschutzes
orientiertes Umweltrecht vertan. KGV-Rundbrief
3 + 4/ 2006.
7. William D. Nordhaus. 1993. Reflections on the
economics of climate change. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 7: 11– 25.
8. Karl-Hans Hartwig, Umweltökonomie. In
Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie
und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Dieter Bender,
Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch,
Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath,
Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme
und Manfred Willms, Bd. 2, 5. Aufl., 122– 162.
München 1992.
_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the
source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The
corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an
addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German
edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
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