THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: The Pioneer Political Universal International Organization by: Dr. Essien Ukpe Ukoyo Ukpe INTRODUCTION "International organization is the process by which states establish and develop formal, continuing institutional structures for the conduct of certain aspects of their relationships with each other" (Gale, 1968:211). It is an attempt to counter the extreme parochialism and individualism of the states system. The constantly increasing complexity of the interdependence of states requires cooperation among them. International organizations therefore are manifestations of the organizing process at the international level to foster such independence and enhance interchange among nations. The membership of international organizations is made up of sovereign States or nations. They are essentially created and sustained by the member-States collectively. Although they are created by States, these organizations have come to co-exist with or even supersede their creators as dominant actors in the international system. It must be emphasized that although international organizations are essentially associations of states, they are more than a mere aggregation of states. They represent “something greater than the sum of the members” by assuming the status of a world property whose declarations or edicts have the semblance of bindingness and compulsion (Hallerberg, et. al., 2001:145). Prior to World War II, nations were the principal actors in international politics. After World War II, international organizations came to acquire the status of actors in international politics. But after the war, the scope of actors was expanded to cover international organizations such as Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) now known as African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), etc; supra-national organizations or bloc actors such as the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) and the defunct Warsaw Pact; Nongovernmental organizations such as World Council of Churches (WCC), and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) such as Exxon-Mobil. Subnational groups or rebel movements also acquired the status of actors in international politics. These include organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Finally, individuals whose influence within the nation enables such nation achieve its external goals also became actors in international politics (Lakhany, 2006:37). Recent articles by some scholars on international organizations collected and edited by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett and titled, appropriately enough, The New International Actors (1970), have cited the United Nations and the EEC (now European Union) as examples of some international organizations that have emerged on the international scene as significant and new international actors in their own right. The Book declares: Since the Second World War, international organizations have become integral features of the international scene. Only two of them, however, have emerged as significant international actors in their own right: the United Nations and the European Economic Community. They can and do exert influence on a similar scale to that of many medium-sized powers and are certainly more influential internationally than most newly independent, small, underdeveloped states (Cosgrove, et. al. 1970). The book identifies three mutually interdependent acid tests, which determine an international organization's capacity to act in international affairs (test of actorness) as: (i) (ii) (iii) The degree of autonomous decision-making power embodied in the central institutions of the international organizations. The extent to which it performs significant and continuing functions which have an impact on inter-state relations; and most importantly. The significance attached to it in the formulation of the foreign policies of states, particularly those of it members. A capacity to influence other actors (or to resist influences from other actors) is the function of the resources, which accrue independently to the organizations - in terms of finance, expert information, popular support/legitimacy, decision-making capacity, enforcement capabilities and diplomatic skills. This, therefore, explains why some international organizations are more highly developed and why they exert more forceful impact on the international system than others. International organizations are classified into 3 types: sub-regional, regional and universal international organizations depending on the scope of their membership. However, the Commonwealth, the Francophone Association and, perhaps, the Arab League suggest a fourth type of association of sovereign States which were recently independent from colonial rule. International organizations could also be classified as political, religious, military/security or economic or social depending on the focus of their operations. Thus, some of the organizations mentioned above are political in nature. These include the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), etc; The North Atlantic Organization (NATO) and the defunct Warsaw Pact are examples of military or security international organizations. World Council of Churches (WCC) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) are religious in nature, while Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) is an example of a social international organization. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS The League of Nations was the first known universal political international organization in existence. The Covenant of the League of Nations was ratified by 42 nations in 1919 and it came into effect on January 10, 1920. The formation of the League of Nations was an expression of the desire of nations for the maintenance of peace and the prevention of future wars. This was the reaction of the world to the shock and devastation which World War I, which was regarded as the most costly war ever fought before 1914, occasioned. The chain of events that led to the outbreak of World War I was sparked off by a political assassination in Sarajevo. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew of Emperor Franz Josef and heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was shot to death along with his wife by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia. This compounded the already tense political situation in Europe and resulted in the outbreak of the First World War. The outbreak of the war destroyed "…the old European order" (Tams, 2006:2). Due to the carnage during the ensuing war, prominent figures "…in the United States and Britain began calling for the establishment of a permanent international body to maintain peace in the postwar world" (Taboola, 2016:1). Outstanding among these anti-war advocates was President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America. Others include Lord Phillimore, Leon Bourgeois, Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil and South African General Jan Smuts. The idea of the League was first popularized by Jan Smuts in the pamphlet, "The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion." In 1918, Wilson presented a 14-point proposal to end the war. This included: "…the abolition of secret treaties, a reduction in armaments, an adjustment in colonial claims in the interests of both native peoples and colonists, and freedom of the seas, …, the removal of economic barriers between nations, the promise of “self-determination” for those oppressed minorities, a secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the then Ottoman Empire, an independent Polish State for territories occupied by Polish populations and a world organization that would provide a system of collective security for all nations (United States Archives, 1918). In this proposal, he presented a sketch of the envisaged international organization that would maintain international peace and order and prevent future occurrence of war. The Paris Peace Conference was convened by Wilson to draft "…the new organization's founding document…" (Tams, 2016:2). This led the Central Powers to agree to an armistice to halt the killings in World War I in November 1918. Two months later, the Allies met with conquered Germany and Austria-Hungary at Versailles to hammer out formal peace terms. President Wilson urged a just and lasting peace, but England and France disagreed, forcing harsh war reparations on their former enemies (Taboola, 2016:1). The League of Nations was approved, however, and in the summer of 1919 Wilson presented the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations to the United States' Senate for ratification. Unfortunately, the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty and the Covenant due to their belief that the treaties reduced U.S. authority. Additionally, the Senate majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican from Massachusetts, drafted 14 reservations to counter President Wilson's 14 Points. Lodge's 14 counter reservations were strengthened by the opposing votes of the “irreconcilables,” led by William Borah (The Learning Network, 2012). However, the League of Nations proceeded without the United States. Its first meeting was held in Geneva on November 15, 1920. During its formation, President Woodrow Wilson was careful to incorporate the collective security provision into the Covenant of the League. THE STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF THE LEAGUE The principal organs of the League as provided in Article 2 of the Covenant included the Assembly, the Council and a permanent Secretariat located at Geneva. Although the League established a number of commissions, committees or organizations, bodies like the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) should not be regarded as organs of the League because they were not provided for in the Covenant of the League but were "…set up independently of the League." (Tams, 2006:4). Some of the commissions and organizations established by the League's Assembly and Council include the Economic and Financial Organization, the Communications and Transit Organization, the Health Organization, the Refugee Organization and the Committees on Traffic in Opium, Traffic in Women and Children and on Intellectual Cooperation. The establishment of these organizations expanded the scope of activities of the League beyond the primary goal of international peace and security to includes mandates and trusteeship of former colonies of the defeated powers, the protection of minorities and functional cooperation, including the codification of international law. These nonetheless did not obscure the primary goal of maintaining international peace and security. Article 10 of the Covenant provides that “the respect for and the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of each member-State shall be incumbent on all other members” (Bennett, 1991:25). It, thus, became obligatory for all members to shun aggression while being ready to assist victims of aggression. While Article 11 made war a general concern of all the members, Article 16 recommends a general economic boycott and the application of military measures upon the recommendation of the Council as the obligation of the League members. Members were, however, free to maintain neutrality in matters pertaining to the application of military sanctions. This has caused critics to see the Covenant of the League as a toothless bulldog. It is self-evident that the framers of the Covenant of the League were “unwilling to create the conditions that can realistically control aggression and the resort to war” (Bennett, 1991:32). Apart from giving the liberty to members to back-out of military commitments to the organization, the Covenant created loopholes on which veto was also a great stumbling-block to the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant. The organization, therefore, became a failure from its inception (Bennett, 1991:134). In the words of Inis Claude: The Covenant was far from a perfect design for collective security. It imposed inadequate legal restrictions upon potential aggressors and exacted insufficient commitments for enforcement action from member states. The League which it created was deficient in legal authority and practical competence of the management of a collective security system (Claude, 1965:240-241). The weakness of the Covenant of the League notwithstanding, the major problem of the organization was the power politics played by Great powers who were members of the League. This paper will therefore adopt the Theory of Power as theoretical framework. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK International politics is generally regarded as the games the stronger and more powerful members of the international system play. Adjectives such as “stronger” and “more powerful” usually refer to military power or capacity as well as indicate that power is a relationship. One, power is identified with military capacity. Power is also seen as a relationship. This implies that power is a relational variable, not an absolute one. What matters therefore is not a nation’s absolute power but its relative power. Proponents of the theory of power or realism include Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau represent the Twentieth Century Classical Realism while Kenneth Waltz is a representative of the Neo-realists. In his postulations, Thucydides (460–411 B.C.E.) considered the importance of power. He saw "…politics as involving moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice" (Stanford, 2013:2). Machiavelli on his part presents a critique of the moral tradition while Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the anarchic state of nature. Among the Classical Realists, E. H. Carr challenges the utopian idealism and Hans Morgenthau presents the realist principles that States think and act in terms of interest defined as power. In summary, international relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides (Stanford, 2013:2). It is also present in the writings of the other realist writers. The core of the realist doctrine is therefore the acquisition, maintenance and use of power in international politics. In all of political science and international relations, attention has been paid to all types of power, mostly political, economic and military, and to the elements or components of national power. Military power is usually measured by the number of men in uniform and by the number and types of weapons a nation has. Countries with large populations tend to have large armed forces, though not in proportion to their populations. But it must be emphasized that apart from size, other factors such as degree of military preparedness (combat readiness) morale and discipline are also very important. Possession of superior military power or not, soldiers and their political superiors must know the kind of war they are entering. The commonsensical advice of Carl von Clausewitz that “No one starts a war––or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so––without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” is still pertinent today (Howard, et. al., 1976:223). Apart from military might, a common standard for the comparison of national power in the industrial age is wealth or degree of economic development. There is a relationship between wealth or economic power and military power. The richest states can afford to purchase the most devastating military power, and indeed power of all kinds, which is important to the calculation of powers. The superpowers can mobilize both large nuclear and conventional forces and other kinds of power, such as economic and technical assistance that could serve as diplomatic tools, while weak or poor states cannot. With the possession of both credible military and economic powers, the Great-Power members of the League felt they did not need the organization to achieve their political and diplomatic goals in the international system. However, due to the benefits collective security affords, which they did not want to lose, they could not jettison collective security. But due to the cost of collective security which they wanted to avoid, the League became stocked in-between the decision to uphold or to abandon it. This attitude of the Great Powers is evident in the resolutions passed after the ratification of the Covenant. These resolutions weakened the collective security provision of the instrument. The League then had to rely on other ad hoc pronouncements like the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the Geneva Protocol for strengthening obligation for the enforcement of the peace (Claude, 1965:240-241). These ad hoc pronouncements were responsible for it successful resolution of, at least, 30 disputes during the first decade of its existence. Some scholars show that the League succeeded in resolving more than half of the disputes that came to its attention. These successes were due, apart from improvisations, to the harmonious state of the international political system of the time, the need for rapprochement with Germany and the fact that the cases in question did not involve Great Powers (Couloumbis, et. al., 1986:286). THE LEAGUE’S FAILURES The 1920s was a period of optimism in international relations. From Locarno in 1925, to the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928 and the commencement of the World Disarmament Conference in 1932, there had been a sense of international cooperation and accord, which was manifest in the new League of Nations organization. During this period (the 1920s), the League, with its headquarters in Geneva, incorporated new members and successfully mediated minor international disputes but was often disregarded by the major powers. To start with, the League was not popular in the defeated allied countries, especially Germany, because its foundation was linked to the 'unjust' post-war settlement. The League, therefore, never really enjoyed the full support of all the great powers (Tams, 2006:2). Germany which joined the League in 1926 withdraw from the organization in 1933. Japan also left in 1933, while Italy pulled out in 1937 (Lowe, et. al., 2008:10). Having left the League, these nations began to challenge the authority of the League by carrying out acts of aggression. Great Powers aggression against other nations greatly undermined the credibility of the League and this resulted in the failure of collective security. 1. Failure of Collective Security in The League: The League of Nations was established as a collective security system. It was therefore principally meant to maintain international peace and security by pooling the powers and resources of its members to corporately police aggression. The incidents listed below prove that the League was ineffective as a collective security system. Some scholars and historians lay the blame for the failure of the League on Adolf Hitler's ambition to control ‘race and space" (racial purity and Lebensraum). However, the weaknesses of the League to maintain peace by collective security had been tested and found wanting before Hitler came to power in Germany. Quoting Palmer and Perkings, Ebegbulem (2011:26) observed that the League of Nations was a complete failure as an instrument for enforcement of collective security. He traced this failure to the refusal of the USA to join the League from the onset, the rise of the Soviet Union as a major power outside, and the the open defiance of Japan, Italy and Germany. The international disturbances that revealed the ineffectiveness of the collective machinery of the League began with the Japanese extension of military control over Manchuria in 1931. This was followed by the Italian campaign in Ethiopia in 1935 and Adolf Hitler's demands that the "fetters of Versailles" be smashed and that the German nation be allowed lebensraum (living space) for expansion. In 1936, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland (where, by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, it was not supposed to have armed forces) and in 1938 annexed Austria. Czechoslovakia followed in 1939. Faced with this determined assault on the post– World War I boundaries, diplomats in western Europe and in the Soviet Union, which joined the League in 1934, sought to make the machinery of the League an effective tool of war prevention by means of collective action against "aggression." The attempt was not successful. Although Japan received a verbal rebuke from the League in 1933 for its behavior in Manchuria, it simply resigned from the League and did not end its forward policies in China, which may even have been stimulated by what was construed in Japan as a hypocritical insult. Following the eloquent appeal of emperor Haile Selassie for aid during the Ethiopian incident, the League, under British leadership, tried to organize economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, but that did not prevent the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and probably helped move Benito Mussolini closer to Hitler's side. The embargo was not sufficiently enforced to be effective. This fiasco, which ended in a British-French retreat from high principles to offer Italy a compromise deal (the Hoare-Laval proposals), did much to diminish enthusiasm for collective security through the League of Nations. Direct negotiations between the major European powers during the tense crises of 1938 and 1939 bypassed the machinery of the League. One of such negotiations include the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy was named after the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand (1862–1932) and his US counterpart, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (1856–1937), was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928. The Pact which was initially signed and ratified by 15 States, including Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and acceded to by an additional 48 States, bringing the total number to 63, to include all members of the League of Nations with the exception of Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Uruguay was another attempt at collective security and therefore, an alternative to the League of Nations (Lesaffer, 2010:2). But many have come to believe that a more vigorous and less selfish support of the League might have checked the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany and prevented World War II. 2. The Corfu Case. In August 1923 Italians forming part of an international boundary delegation were murdered on Greek soil. This led the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini to order a naval bombardment of Corfu. In the aftermath of the Italian bombardment and occupation, many of its buildings and other landmarks were destroyed. In response, the Greeks appealed to the League of Nations. The League ordered the Italians to evacuate the city, but Greece was forced to pay Italy an indemnity (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009:1). 3. 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China. The first great test to the League came on September 18, 1931 when Japan attacked Manchuria on the pretext of “protecting their rights involved in their lease of railway property". With this excuse, Japan conquered Manchuria and established a puppet government there and re-named the new state “Manchukuo” (Bennett, 1991:33). By the end of 1931 Japan had destroyed the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18 of that year (Kim, 1996:2). The League’s Council could not take effective action to stop the aggression since that was against the interest of the major powers: Great Britain, France and the United States. The last, as shown above, was not even a member of the League (Bennett, 1991:33). Thompson attributes the lack of interest of the West in this case to a psychological hatred and resentment which the West, particularly British trading communities, haboured against these victims of Japanese aggression. They, therefore, took a vicarious pleasure in the punishment of the Chinese by the Japanese (Thompson, 1968:567). Japan also used its veto power to forestall an attempt to send a commission of inquiry under Article 2 of Covenant to investigate the case. But due to China’s insistence and appeal to Article 15, a five-man member group, the Lytton Commission was dispatched after seven months to Manchuria. The outcome of this effort was a report which was a mere condemnation of the Japanese Military aggression. Nothing was done by the League members to compel Japan to comply with its recommendations. This clearly revealed the League’s weakness as a toothless bulldog and emboldened potential aggressors in their expansionist campaigns (Bennett, 1991:33-34). Hence, Italy under Mussolini rose up and overran Ethiopia in 1935. 4. 1935 Italian Invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Italian aggression against Ethiopia can be regarded as the greatest challenge to the League's political effectiveness. "The Italian invasion of Ethiopia began on October 3rd, 1935 and culminated in the fall of Addis Ababa on May 5th, 1936. The Emperor, Haile Selassie, had fled abroad three days earlier. This conflict was an imperial grab for Africa and a rude dismissal of the ambitions of the League of Nations to achieve permanent peace and justice through collective security" (Bosworth, 2014:1). When Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League’s Council, Britain and France did not only hinder speedy consideration of the case by the Council, but also encouraged Mussolini in his “African ambitions” (Bennett, 1991:34). This emboldened Italy to carry out a full scale attack on Ethiopia with modern mechanized equipment, squadron bombers and mustard gas. This high-handed attack on a very weak and poor country by a Great Power was inhumane. Due to the devastation caused by the attack, the Council reluctantly identified Italy as an aggressor for violating the covenant and Article 16 was invoked calling on members to impose sanctions on Italy. This was the first time that the collective security provision of the Covenant was invoked under the League. Even though Article 16 demanded automatic application of sanctions, however, only 50 of the 54 member merely endorsed co-operative action against Italian aggression (Bennett, 1991:34). Inis Claude unapologetically remarked that “this surprising initiative did not represent a genuine rededication to the principles of collective security enshrined in the Covenant (Claude, 1965:241). Not only was the action taken insufficient to stop Italian military action against Ethiopia, but the sanctions were abandoned prematurely. League members did not have strong national wills to see to the full implementation and/or effect of the sanction on Italy. Diplomatic relations were never cut off from Italy and, to make matters worse, the Hoare-Laval Accord which gave Italy control of most of Ethiopia was signed in December 1935 to the shock of public opinion in most of the world. Mussolini was permitted to triumph in contempt of the League. About May 1936, he arrogantly assumed the title “Emperor of Ethiopia” after his announcement of victory. Neither did the League members refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the Italian hegemony over Ethiopia (Bennett, 1991:35,135) Hence, he League failed and “the first great attempt to created a collective security organization was for all practical purposes terminated. Members of the League themselves lost faith in the collective security provision of the Covenant and so rallied back to “the traditional devices of national policy and diplomacy for their security (Claude, 1965:241-242). The last straw that completely revealed the League's ineffectiveness was Hitler’s abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact through the remilitarization of Rhineland. His invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia and Japanese second invasion of China in 1937 did not meet with enough opposition from the League. This culminated in World War II (Bennett, 1991:35). In 1946, the League of Nations was officially dissolved with the establishment of the United Nations. The United Nations was modeled after the former but with increased international support and extensive machinery to help the new body avoid repeating the League’s failures. 5. The Treaty of Versailles The Treaty of Versailles which was signed on November 11, 1918, after four years of war, was facilitated by the United States’ President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”. Wilson's proposal was accepted by Germany. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Versailles sharply differed from Wilson’s points, and Germany, which felt betrayed, denounced the treaty as morally unjust (Atkinson, 2002:1). Some scholars believe that the treaty gave Europe and Western cooperation a bad start. The reparation provisions, the territorial arrangements and the military clauses provided the worst possible basis for cooperation and reconciliation with Germany. Apart from the unjust terms of the treaty, the political environment also contributed to the impossibility of attaining the post war peace settlement. Quoting Henig, Atkinson (2002:2) argues that “'the peace conference was held at a time of unprecedented political, social, economic and ideological upheaval. Any peace settlement would have to operate within highly unstable international and domestic environments… (and) this international instability made the attainment of a lasting peace so difficult.'” The goal following World War I was to restore European stability and maintain everlasting peace. However, these goals were recognized by all of the leaders as not easily achievable. French Prime Minister Clemenceau commented on the day the Versailles treaty was signed, “We have won the war: now we have to win the peace, and it may be more difficult” (Atkinson, 2002:2). The French politician Marshal Foch, as the Versailles Treaty was being signed, stated rather prophetically, “This is not peace; it is an armistice for 20 years.” Exactly 20 years after, World War II broke out. Indeed, Foch was absolutely correct. The Versailles Treaty did little to shape any sort of long-term peace from the results of World War I. Instead, the treaty which was hastily put together and vague, exposed the Allies’ inability to cooperate toward an agreement, and fueled German nationalism from resentment over her treatment by the Allies in the treaty. Hobsbawm argues that “the Versailles settlement could not possibly be the basis of a stable peace. It was doomed from the start, and another war was practically certain” (Atkinson, 2002:3). The principal reasons for the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to establish a long-term peace include the following: (1) the Allies did not agree on how best to treat Germany; (2) Germany refused to accept the terms of reparations; and (3) Germany’s refusal to accept the “war-guilt” clause, Article 231, led to growing German resentment and nationalism. The Versailles Peace Conference exposed the ideological rift growing between the Allies. Throughout Versailles and after, Henig argues that Britain and France had “contradictory viewpoints” regarding the treatment of Germany. While public opinions of both nations were strongly in favor of seeing Germany pay to the fullest extent, only France saw Germany as a potential threat to the future security of European stability. Thus, while Britain saw Germany as a “barrier-fortress against the Russians” and an economically strong nation with which to engage in international trade, the French viewed Germany as a threat to French security. France feared that not levying harsh enough penalties upon Germany would only make her stronger and she would eventually rise up against France in revenge. So while the British felt that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh on Germany, France felt as though it were not harsh enough. On their part, the perceived severity of the treaty meant that Germans, even democratic ones, wanted to reverse the settlement. Most Germans could not accept the severe losses, particularly of territory to Poland. In addition, German commitment to making reparation payments was limited. Between 1933 and 1935, Hitler therefore set about revising the Treaty of Versailles, a process that led to tension in Europe and placed pressure on the League of Nations. Most of Hitler’s demands, at least initially, were seen in the context of ‘revising the Treaty of Versailles’, a treaty that many British saw as being too harsh anyway. It was believed that once the unfairness of the treaty had been redressed, Hitler might be content. His attack on the Treaty of Versailles and those who had signed it meant that many Germans believed he and the Nazis would restore Germany’s international prestige through crushing the treaty. Hitler began by attacking reparations. Although repayment of reparations had been suspended before Hitler came to power, in 1933 he announced that the Nazis would not resume payments. The declaration was good propaganda, but was not a major cause of international friction, as most powers had already accepted this. What did increase tension was Hitler’s intention to rearm Germany (Gakurin, 2007:114). 6. Failure of the Disarmament Conferences A major contributor to the First World War was arms race. There was therefore need for the reduction in arms if international peace and security was to be secured. Disarmament therefore featured prominently in Wilson's Fourteen Points and it was an important goal of the League of Nations. This was intended to reduce the threat of a future war. A permanent advisory Commission on armaments was appointed by the League. This resulted in three disarmament conferences in the 1920s and early 1930s. The first was the Washington Naval Conference of November 1921 to February 1922. The Washington Naval Conference was convened at the instance of President Warren G. Harding of the United States. There where two reasons for which the conference was called. First, Japan and the UK could not afford the costs of the arms race and the United States wanted to reduce its own costs. Secondly there was growing tension between Japan and the United States in Asia and the United States wanted to avoid conflict which could involve many countries. The primary objective of this conference was to inhibit Japanese naval expansion in the waters of the west Pacific. Three major treaties emerged out of the Washington Conference: the Five-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty, and the Nine-Power Treaty. The Four-Power Treaty which was reached on December 13, 1921 between Britain, France, Japan and the United States contained an agreement to recognize each other’s possessions in the Pacific and if problems arose there was an agreement to reach a diplomatic solution. The Five-Power Treaty was between the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy. The five powers agreed to maintain a fixed constant ratio of naval armaments. The US was to maintain 5 (Based on 525,000 tons), Britain 5, Japan 3, France 1.67, and Italy 1.67. Limits were placed on tonnage, gun size and number of battleships and aircraft carriers. No new naval armaments where to be constructed for the next ten years. The United States and Britain were not allowed to build new naval bases in the western Pacific. The Nine-Power Treaty was signed on February 6, 1922. The signatories included the Big Four, plus Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. The treaty endorsed the Open Door Policy – a concept in foreign affairs, which usually refers to the policy around 1900 allowing multiple Imperial powers access to China, with none of them in control of that country. By this policy, the major powers pledged mutual respect for Chinese territorial integrity and independence. The Washington Naval Treat was the most successful of the disarmament conferences. It led to an effective end to building new battleship fleets and those few ships that were built were limited in size and armament. Numbers of existing capital ships were scrapped. Some ships under construction were turned into aircraft carriers instead. The Geneva Disarmament Conference of February 1927 was a conference held to discuss naval arms limitation, in Geneva, Switzerland. The conference had delegates from sixty countries. The conference was to consider reductions in armaments, with particular emphasis on offensive weapons. Germany, whose army and navy already were limited by the Treaty of Versailles, demanded that other states disarm to German levels and, in the event that they refused to do so, claimed a right to build up its armed forces. France, which feared the revival of German power, argued that security must precede disarmament and called for security guarantees and the establishment of an international police force before it would reduce its own forces. Talks dragged on for nearly six weeks while tensions rose among the former Allies. In early August, the delegates adjourned without reaching any significant agreement. This brought a deadlock of the conference. The conference was therefore adjourned. Before the conference reconvened in February 1933, Adolf Hitler had assumed power in Germany (World Digital Library). The London Naval Treaty was an agreement between the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on April 22, 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. It was a revision and an extension of the Washington treaty. The five powers; US, Japan, Britain, Italy and France met in London to review the ratio of capital ships. The ratio was increased from 5:5:3 for the US, Britain and Japan respectively to 10:10:7. France and Italy did not take part in this agreement however they did agree to continue to not build new naval armaments for the next five years. Agreements on the numbers of submarines, cruisers and destroyers that each country could have were made more strict. The Treaty was to remain valid until 1936. Apart from the Washington Naval Treaty that was successful, the last three were not so successful. France refusal to accept general disarmament emboldened Hitler who was already determined to rearm Germany to accord it immediate military parity with other Western powers. Hitler manipulated the reluctance of France towards embracing general disarmament to justify Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference in 1933. German military spending in the year 1934–35 increased fivefold when compared to that of 1933–34 (Gakurin 2007:114). In 1935, after the Saar plebiscite, Hitler announced he would introduce compulsory military service in Germany. This step, again, was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time he announced the increase of his armaments programme. Hitler then declared the existence of an army of more than 500,000 men, and had admitted the existence of an air force. The other powers were deeply concerned, but continued to hope that a revision of Versailles would satisfy the more moderate elements of German society (Gakurin 2007:116). 7. The Effect of the Great Depression: The Great Depression undermined both the League’s ability to resist aggressor states, and the willingness of member states to work together. For instance, the reality of the British economy at the time made rearmament an unattractive policy and the cost of then waging a drawn-out war with Germany very difficult. Moreover, the general political atmosphere at the time did not also support the declaration of war. In order to get the necessary material and human resources to fight a general war, Britain needed to convince its imperial domains of the ‘just’ and inescapable nature of war with Germany. But due to the memory of the horrors of World War I which still haunted most Europeans, it was difficult to receive popular support to engage in another conflict of this scale. The impact of the global economic crisis was particularly dramatic in Weimar Germany. The mass unemployment and despair that followed assisted Hitler’s rise to power. Indeed, the Nazi Party’s success at the polls directly correlated with the degree of unemployment in Germany; the more unemployed there were, the more successful the Nazis were in elections. 8. Weaknesses in the Covenant of the League: The League Covenant was written into the controversial Treaty of Versailles. This was to ensure that all those who signed the treaty would become members of the League. The Covenant was made up of 26 articles. The most important one was Article X which stated that "all members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League" (IB Guides, 2013:1). This was the idea of collective security enshrined in the Covenant. It means that if one nation was under threat, the others would have to defend it even if it was of no interest to themselves and regardless of the outcome. Member nations were expected to sacrifice money, material and men (military staff) if ever one nation was under threat. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 9. Effect of the Absence of Major Powers The non membership of major powers greatly undermined the effectiveness of the League. The United States of America never joined, and USSR and Germany were excluded from being members of the League. As a result of their exclusion, USSR and Germany did not support the Versailles Treaty nor the League and Germany was consistently blamed for starting the war. This created tension instead of a reconciliation that Wilson had proposed. The USSR was weak after the war but once it regained its strength it potentially became a major threat due to its exclusion from the League and wanting to recover the territory it had lost during the War. Because the League excluded the defeated nations it angered the USSR and Germany and both of these saw the League as an enemy which undermined the goal of peace keeping. The exclusion of Germany and the USSR and their desire to recover their lost territory once they regained strength made it impossible to discuss the terms of the settlement and negotiate a compromise with these major powers, instead it led to an inevitable conflict. As soon as the USSR and Germany regained their strength, the new small states in Europe came under threat. The exclusion of these two countries emboldened them to sign the Treaty of Rapallo. The Treaty of Rapallo was a fallout of the Genoa Conference in 1922 where France and Britain tried to trade tsarist debts for German reparations. Worried that such a scheme was meant only to pit the two powers against each other, the Soviet delegation invited their German counterparts for a secret meeting at Rapallo. On 16 April 1922, the two foreign ministers concluded an agreement in which Soviet-Russia and Germany established diplomatic and consular relations, renounced claims against each other and granted each other most favoured nations status. The Rapallo Treaty together with the opening speech of Russian foreign minister Georgi Chicerin at the Genoa Conference was an important step towards the rapprochement between the two states, which both had a major interest in revising the territorial arrangements of the peace treaties in East and Central Europe. The Treaty of Rapallo therefore was a major threat for the League as these two countries were both major powers that now were co-operating economically and militarily. It also undermined the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as Germany could increase its armament and train military staff in the USSR without the League knowing. Since Germany was now producing arms in the USSR, the effectiveness of the disarmament process that the League had worked on was greatly reduced. The absence of the USA however had the most devastating effect on the League. It was the only country which had emerged stronger after the end of the war. All other countries where in debt while the USA was still economically strong. It had the greatest power to intervene in case of tension between countries which could lead to possible conflicts. Its absence in the League therefore affected the purpose and power of the organization. The refusal of the USA refused to be part of the League and provide guaranteed military support also led France and Britain to also withdraw from the military guarantee. The USA and Britain went back into isolationism. This greatly diminished the effectiveness of the League. France and Britain had very different mind sets about the treaty and Germany. Britain wanted Germany to rebuild its economy for the purpose of trade and France wanted to make it as hard as possible for Germany to recover economically as it was worried about a German attack in the future. This created conflict within the League. More important countries dropped out of the League between 1919 and 1939, this included Italy and Japan. This weakened the League even further Political and Humanitarian Successes of The League Although the League failed, it nonetheless made some modest achievements. At the onset, the League showed clear initiatives for the peaceful settlement of disputes between smaller states. The League, in conjunction with the Supreme War Council of the victorious powers, was also able to mediate in disputes concerning the delineation of borders between some states. These include settlement of the Swedish-Finnish dispute over the Åland Islands (1920–21), guaranteeing the security of Albania (1921), rescuing Austria from economic disaster, settling the division of Upper Silesia (1922), and preventing the outbreak of war in the Balkans between Greece and Bulgaria (1925). In addition, the League extended considerable aid to refugees; it helped to suppress white slave and opium traffic; it did pioneering work in surveys of health; it extended financial aid to needy states; and it furthered international cooperation in labor relations and many other fields (Infoplease, 2012:1). In 1940, the League took positive action against Soviet Union's aggression on Finland by expelling Soviet Union. Politically, it was able to establish "a forum for the exchange of views, for informing the official agencies and for maintaining private contacts in Geneva" (Lowe, et. al., 2008:478). The League made significant achievement in the "financial and economic issues connected with the founding of new nations states, health and industrial safety regulations, anti-slavery, refugees, minorities, the protection of intellectual work, women's rights, as well as drug traffic" (Lowe, et. al., 2008:478-479). Other achievements of the League include its successful completion of the 15-year administration of the Saar territory by conducting a plebiscite under the supervision of an international military force in 1935, the establishment of institutions for multilateral cooperation, facilitation of transnational relations within the League's framework which encouraged the founding of several Non-Governmental International Organizations (NGOs) in Geneva. Under the Paris Peace Treaties, the German city of Danzig and the Saarland were administered by international governmental commission accountable to the League. Under Article 22 of the Covenant, mandated former colonies of the defeated powers were successfully prepared for independence. The League also served as a forum for public debate and diplomacy, and a forum for seeking global solutions for common problems of nations in issues like the preservation of educational and ecological standards, scientific discourse, humanitarian cooperation, protection of minorities rights, establishment of norms for the treatment of indigenous populations in the colonies as well as norms in humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Finally, the Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) established under the framework of the League laid the foundation for a European Economic system (Lowe, et. al., 2008:479). THE EVALUATION OF THE LEAGUE The League of Nations had more chances of succeeding as a collective security system than the United Nations because the international system at the time was characterized by a considerable diffusion of power than today. States of great power rank were numerous, and in that case aggressors were more vulnerable to economic sanctions. This power configuration would have made the League more successful, but it failed. Couloumbis and Wolfe do not, however, believe that the League was such a dismal failure as it is painted today. According to them, its present evaluation is due to the magnitude of the cases which it failed to resolve relative to the ones it successfully resolved. Moreover, the League’s failure was due to the fact that it did not meet the objective requirement of universality which would have added to the favourable distribution of power to make it more successful. Crucial to this limitation was the United States’ abstention from the League’s membership. This destroyed the League’s security base envisaged when it was planned and weakened the hands of the other powers who were the pillars of the League. Ultimately, it weakened the foundation of the organization (Claude, 1965:249). A Leroy Bennett has argued that the organization was ill-equipped to accomplish its goals. The principles upon which it was based could not assure peace and co-operation (Bennett, 1991:38). THE LEAGUE AND AFRICA One of the major factors that contributed to the failure of the League is that the victorious powers of World War 1 used the League to maintain their hegemony by arrogating to themselves the colonies of the defeated Axis powers. The territories that hitherto belonged to imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire that were considered unable to function as independent states were placed under the Trusteeship of the League of Nations and supervised by some Allied powers. This arrangement was incorporated into the Covenant of the League. Three types of mandates were created by the League's Covenant (Boddy-Evans, 2009). Article 22 of the Covenant delineated Class A mandates to covered territories that were considered to be ready to receive independence within a relatively short period of time. These territories were all in the Middle East: Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, administered by the UK; and Lebanon and Syria, administered by France. Class B mandates covered territories for which the granting of independence was a distant prospect. These territories were all in Africa: the Cameroons and Togoland, each of which was divided between British and French administration; Tanganyika, under British administration; and Ruanda-Urundi, under Belgian administration. To the territories classified under Class C mandates virtually no prospect of self-government, let alone independence, was held out. These territories included South West Africa, administered by the Union of South Africa; New Guinea, administered by Australia; Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand; Nauru, administered by Australia under mandate of the British Empire; and certain Pacific islands, administered by Japan (Nations Encyclopedia). This clearly shows that the Allied powers did not consider any African colony advanced enough to be given independence in the foreseeable future. All Class A mandates gained full independence by 1949 (Boddy-Evans, 2009). No country in Africa was or hoped to be a member of the League in the foreseeable future. The League was dominated by European States and was conceive to preserve European peace and security interpreted as international peace and security at the time. Unfortunately, World War I did not only shatter the balance of power in Europe, it also destroyed the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires (Encyclopedia of the New American Nation). This unsatisfactory status quo that the founders of the League established in Europe blocked all avenues for peaceful change. Added to this, the unfavourbale changes in the international environment like the Great American Depression and the spread of Fascism in Europe contributed to the failure of the League. Moreover, mistrust between some of the victorious powers like France and Britain and the underestimation of Germany’s geometrical growth in power (Couloumbis, 1986:287) also acted as catalyst to the fall of League. The League “never achieved a comprehensive control of international co-operative activities which was envisaged in Article 24 of the Covenant”. However, Claude has argued that “the League did serve generally to covert international organizations into organs of an organization”. It also provided what has been referred to as a ‘hub’ or a “roof’ element, giving the modern world its first taste of institutional centralization” (Claude, 1965:39). Tams (2006:2) argues that the League should not be pushed aside as a complete failure because, at its foundation, the organization "…generated an unprecedented level of hope and faith in international progress, … became the first international organization with general competence and, for at least 15 years, functioned as a permanent forum of international cooperation." Moreover, the League's recognition of "the importance of economic and social questions" influenced "modern forms of international cooperation." Tams (2006:2) therefore conclude that the League can justly be described as "a forward leap of unprecedented extent and speed, accompanied by extraordinary changes in the conduct of international relations." It formed the foundation for the foundation of the United Nations. LESSONS DERIVED FROM THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS As mentioned above, the League provided a foundation upon which the United Nations was formed as an improved international cooperation. An interpretation of the strengths of the UN in international peace security is that it had a predecessor that it was modeled after. The UN Security Council is comparatively stronger than the League's Council because the founders of the UN were able to avoid some of the flaws contained in the Covenant that established the Council. Some of these flaws that have been corrected following lessons learned from the League include drawing up a Charter that was more attractive to major powers to join and remain in the organization, ensuring the compatibility of the UN with the cause of decolonization by emphasizing equal rights and self-determination of peoples, inclusion of all the major powers in the Security Council, limiting veto power only to the permanent members of the Security Council, clear definition of aggression and consequent enforcement action, empowering the Security Council to use force where necessary and not merely recommending enforcement action to member-States, making the contribution of armed personnel and equipment to the command of the Security Council when necessary peremptory on memberStates, and finally, cautiously dealing with Disarmament (Lowe, et. al., 2008:10-12). REFERENCES Atkinson, J. J. (2002). 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