valley finals 1 interpretation – debaters must delineate all theoretical paradigm issues. E.g. a 1ar paradigm is fine as its own but not things like neg interps are counter interps in the 2nr theory bad argument 1] norming 2] resolvability 2 Interpreation – The Aff must defend theory interpretations and arguments unconditionally as presented in the 1ac. In other words, the aff may not run cx checks or [___READ SPIKE___]. Violation – his first spike [1] Theory recourse – CX checks (a) causes sidestepping, encouraging you to have hidden abusive args since I either call you out on it in cx and you kick it or I concede it and you win, which makes debates innocuous and is empirically confirmed with Jake Steirn, (b) causes ambiguity – what constitutes a sufficient “check” is unclear. Even if we isolate the abusive practice in CX, the aff can still go for the arg and establish new parameters for checking, and (c) prep skew – even if you don’t kick the abuse, you get extra time to prep my interp since you know what I’ll indict. That gives you nearly double the time to prep and creates irreciprocal burdens. Theory recourse is key to any voter since it ensures I can check back abusive strategies. [2] Value of CX – There’s a big difference between cross-examining a position and clarifying what the aff is. The point of CX is to do former. Your norm encourages debaters to not work at becoming good at questioning their opponents. Also no reason we need to use CX as clarification – you had 6 minutes to clarify what you defended. That’s key to education since CX and the ability to ask good questions is one of the most unique skills garnered in LD. Key to fairness because it allows aff to waste negative CX time and keeps the neg from gaining concessions. 3 Permissibility flows neg – A] statements are more likely false then true, since there are an infinite number of ways a statement can be false but only one where it is true B] the rez says ought so if they don’t prove an obligation they’re not meeting their burden. C] negate means to deny the truth of so anything that renders the aff false is sufficient to negate The meta-ethic is practical reason since – A] inescapability – denying reasons authority is already a form of reasoning – other metrics that aren’t self-justifying collapses to regress and source obligations in contingencies. B] action theory – reasoning unifies action since it takes infinitely divisible parts and explains them as a wholistic end – action theory outweighs since morality determines right or wrong actions. Next, reasoning means we set and pursue ends which results in maxims which must be universalizable, or it terminates in contradiction which justifies other agents impeding on our ends. A reason for one agent is a reason for another agent. I can’t say 2 + 2 = 4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent. Thus, the standard is respecting liberty – prefer since its key to culpability – if I was coerced to take an action, I’m not responsible for it. Culpability outweighs, if people aren’t held responsible it justifies any action being permissible. Respecting freedom concludes the omnilateral will – there needs to be an entity that sets laws that guarantees agents don’t unilaterally violate other’s ends. Anything else terminates in the state of nature which guarantees no rights. No perms: Uniquely non-sensical in a method debate: a] It assumes a notion of fiat that doesn’t make sense without a plan. The 1AC role of the ballot forefronts the performative and methodological which a permutation steals away b] non-T affs shouldn’t get perms since they can defend literally anything in the world – thus the burden is on them to prove their advocacy is the best solution to the problem they propose. negate – The aff has a deontological obligation to be topical. Nebel 15: Jake Nebel,"The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutionalsemantics-by-jake-nebel/ A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution subsection). (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.
