The Early Years (1824 – 1936) Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) –Congr. power is broad NOT Commerce Trademark Cases (1879)—not legit E.C. Knight (1895) – Sugar monopoly o Production/Manuf. v. Commerce o Direct v. Indirect o National v. Local Labor o Carter Coal (1936) … Not Interstate Shreveport Rate Case (1914) o Intrastate BUT subst. economic effects test + instrumentality of commerce Schechter (1935) State Sovereignty Limiting Congress Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) products made by child labor too atten. National Police Power Champion v. Ames (1903)—lottery tix move in interstate Hipolite Egg (1911)—contaminated eggs Hoke v. US (1913) –women for immoral purposes Caminetti (1917) –underage women Unstoppable Commerce Power (1937-1994) NLRB v Jones (1937) –FLSA, lumber shipped interstate US v. Darby (1941) –FLSA, regulated intrastate with subst. effect on interstate is enough (Overrules Hammer) Wickard v. Filburn (1941) –aggregation approach Regulatory Hodel v. VA Surface Mining (1981) –strip mining (local) Scarborough v. US (1977) –guns owned by felons Civil Rights Heart of Atlanta Motel (1964) Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) Ollie’s BBQ Title VI of Civil Rights Act Criminal US v. Perez (1971)—loan sharking Reining in the Commerce Power (1995-Present) US v. Lopez (1995) –guns in school zones Limits US v. Morrison (2000) –Violence Against Women Act Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) –CSA/commerce can’t impede OR’s Death With Dignity Act But see… Gonzales v. Raich (2005) –med marijuana Spending Power In contrast, Congress can regulate indirectly under the Spending Clause by attaching certain conditions to its appropriations. Congress thus "regulates" via conditions on federal funds; but federal fund recipients can always reject the funds and thus avoid the regulation. (Read the Spending Clause here.) Note that Congress's authority under the Spending Clause may reach farther than its authority under the Commerce Clause, because spending conditions need not relate only to interstate commerce. Congress's authority to regulate under the Spending Clause is nevertheless always indirect--as a condition on its spending-whereas its regulatory authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause is always direct. The Early Years (18XX – 1905) Munn v. Illinois (1887)—grain elevators, public interest Mugler v. Kansas (1887)—can outlaw booze Allegeyer v. Louisiana (1897)—insurance K ax state lines o legitimate interest in the public health, safety, morality, or welfare o real and substantial relation from means to public interest LOCHNER (1905) The right to purchase or to sell labor (“freedom of contract”) is part of the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment economic regulations need to (a) have a legitimate end, + (b) direct relationship between means chosen and that end in order to satisfy substantive DP. Lochner Era [Non-deferential] 1905-1934 Bodily Integrity Cases Jacobson (1905)- mandatory vaccinations Mental Institutions o Buck v. Bell (1927)—sterilization Bailey (1911) Services rendered for payment of debt Selective Draft Cases (1918) Labor Muller (1908)—women in factories Bunting (1917) —all factory workers Adkins (1923)—min wage for women West Coast Hotel—overrules Adkins Unions o o o Adair (1908)—railroad workers Coppage v. Kansas (1915) New State Ice (1932) the Supreme Court did not distinguish between “fundamental” and “nonfundamental” rights. …..it had not yet discerned an “equal protection component” in the Fifth Amendment. “due process of law” required that deprivations of life, liberty or property not be “unreasonable, unnecessary, arbitrary”, which brought the correlative requirement that there be a reasonable relationship between the regulation and some public goal of health, safety or morals. New Deal/Warren Court Era [Deferential] 1934-? Economic Issues Nebbia v. NY (1934) –state minimum milk price West Coast hotel (1937)—overrules Adkins Carolene Products (1938) o Minimum hypothetical rationality Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955) Katzenbach v. McClung Minimum hypothetical rationality (Carolene Products) Challenges are to the substance of the law…SDP applies when a right is taken from everyone 4 Step Analysis (Chemerinsky) 1. Is there a fundamental right? 2. Is that right infringed? 3. Is the government action justified by sufficient purpose? 4. Are the means sufficiently related to the goal sought? Fundamental Rights Two tests: Strict scrutiny (Rochin) and Balancing test (minor impositions like vaccines) 1.Balancing: balance the state interest against the magnitude of the right infringed to discern due process a.4th Amendment: Winston v. Lee b.8th Amendment: Youngsberg v. Romeo Bodily Integrity Cases Minimum Wage o o Whether the government’s interference is justified by sufficient purpose Maximum hours o o ISSUE: Rochin (1952)- stomach pumped for evidence Mental Institutions o Donaldson (1972) comm. w/o evidence o Youngberg v. Romero (1982)—reasonable care Euthanasia o Cruzan (1990)—height. std for fd tube rem o Glucksberg (1997)—WA state asst. su. Ban Family Educating Children o o o Marriage o o o o Meyer v. NE (1923) teaching non-English Pierce Sisters (1925) man. public school Plyler v. Doe (1982) Edu in itself is not a fund right Loving v. VA (1967) interracial Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) m. when paying child sup. Turner v. Safley (1987) m. while in prison Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) gay marriage Who is Family? o o o Moore v. East Cleve (1977) zoning, gma Michael H v. Gerald D (1989) prsm prod of marriage Troxel v. Granville (2000) no gparent vis rights Privacy – Contraception Skinner v. OK (1942)- can’t sterilize hab. Criminals Griswold v. CT (1965) –married couples get contrac o Privacy in the penumbras of 14 Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)—everyone gets contrac Carey v. Popula. Servcs (1977) –minors get contrac o Strict scr to all things re: childbearing Privacy – Abortion Roe v. Wade (1973) –no rest. 1st tri, 2nd: reg mom health PP v. Casey (1992)—no undue burden Stenberg v. Carhart (I) (2000) –no partial ban Ayotte v. PP (2006) need exception for mom health Gonzales v. Carhart (II) (2007) fed par. birth ban upheld Sexual Freedom Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) –sodomy law upheld Lawrence v. TX (2003) sodomy law unconst. Race (Facially neutral) Yick Wo (1886) EPC covers non-citizens Plessy (1896) separate but equal Strict Scrutiny Does the law further a compelling government interest Is it narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose? Voting Rights Guinn and Beal (1915) grandfather clause Lane v. Wilson (1939) registration, 3-day window Gomillion (1960) gerrymandering ---Voting Rights Act of 1965-- Hunter v. Underwood (1985) disenfranch. when crimes of moral turpitude (not inclu white collar crimes) Juries Strauder (1880) black men must be includable Batson v. KY (1986) can’t strike bc of race Justice System MN v. Russel (1991) crack cocaine Johnson v. CA (2005) prison cell assignments Employment/Contracts Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) Title VII, proof of intentional discrim not required for violation Wash. v. Davis (1976) need racial hostility motivation, not just disparate impact (th impact can indicate intent) War Powers Hirabayashi (1943) curfew../ odious but necc. Korematsu (1944) internment camps Ex parte Endo (1944) detainment Families/Housing McLaughlin v. FL (1964) interracial cohabitation Loving v. VA (1967) interracial marriage Hunter v. Erickson (1969) fair housing ordinance Arlington Heights (1977) refusal to rezone Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) mom custody, remarried to black man, law cannot give effect to private bias TX v. Inclusive Comm (2015) disp impact bc of FHA Education Brown (1954) desegregating schools Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) DC segregated school o EPC applies to federal government through DPC Lau v. Nichols (1974) ESL classes for Chinese speakers Heightened scrutiny is warranted when a classification is based on a person’s immutable characteristics (race, gender, (married/immigrant) status of parents. Traits that a person did not choose and that the individual cannot change, as well as a history of discrimination and the class’s ability to protect themselves using the political process may all be considered. EPC Analysis (Chemerinksy) 1. What is the classification 2. What level of scrutiny applied 3. Does the gov’t action meet the level of scrutiny? Affirmative Action Employment/Contracts Fulilove (1980) upheld minority % gov’t contractors Wygant v. Jackson BOE (1986) can’t say no reduc in divers w/layoffs, role models not compel, not narrowly t Richmond v. J.A. Croson (1989) history of discrim not enough to justify minority set aside Adarand (1995) overrules Fulilove, strict scrutiny Education Lau v. Nichols (1974) ESL classes for Chinese speakers Bakke (1978) Grutter (2003) Gratz (2003) Ricci v. DeStefano (2009) Schuette (2014) Fisher v. TX (2013, 2016) Citizenship Federal action state action Yick Wo (1886) EPC covers non-citizens Education Ambach v. Norwick (1979) public school teacher, low scr Plyler v. Doe (1982) Undoc. pub sch tuition, undoc status is chosen, interm scru, but no underclass Toll v. Moreno (1982) undoc can have in-stat tuition Justice System Wong Wing v. US (1896) –due process, Const. applies Wong Kim Ark (1898)—citizen=born in US, 14th Amd Sing Tuck (1904) Chinese need witnesses Employment/Contracting Sugarman v. Dougall (1973) policy functs, lower scru Mow Sun Wong (1976) civil service< policy, high scru Foley v. Cannelle (1978) state trooper, rat. Relationship Ambach v. Norwick (1979) public school teacher, low scr Bernal v. Fainter (1983) notaries are not policy maker Probation officer Benefits Graham v. Richardson (1971) welfare, aliens discrete ins Mathews v. Diaz (1976)—can limit Medicaid to perm 5+ Cabell v. Chavez-Salido (1982) political classification ok when narrowly tailored and heart of repres. gov’t Strict Scrutiny when state gov’t discrim against non-citizens Intermed Scru: undocumented children Rational basis: federal goven’t.... Cong has plen power to reg immigration Rational basis: gov’t discrim non-cit, democratic process/policy Intermediate Scrutiny Is the use of sex-based criteria substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest? Gender Voting Rights Minor v. Hapersett (1874) state can limit voting to men Juries J.E.B. v. AL (1994) unconst. to challenge jurors on gend. Education MS Univ. for Women v. Hogan (1982) can’t exclu males w/o “exceedingly persuasive justification” US v. VA (1996) VMI Employment/Contracting Bradwell (1873) women can’t be adm to IL bar Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) bartenders lic Real Differences Geduldig (1974) CA insur can exclude pregnancy [RB] Feeney (1979) veterans pref trmt, no discrm intent o Foreseeable disparate impact is OK as long as it is in spite of not bc of sex Michael M (1981) males punished for stat rape [Int Sc] Rostker (1981) selective service Boerne. How is purpose inferred? (Arlington Heights). o It may be inferred by: o specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, o departure from normal procedure, o history, o testimony of legislatures, and sometimes o statistics What is the virtue of equal protection? To deny arbitrary actions and distinctions among groups. To deny distinctions that treat one group as less valuable than another. To allow some distinctions that are justifiable to achieve a legitimate end; differentiation made on the basis of relevant criteria. To make sure that similarly situated individuals are treated in a similar fashion. Demonstrating that there is a classification: 1. Classification exists of the face of the law OR 2. Facially neutral law w/ discriminatory impact and discriminatory purpose (Or… neutral statute being administered in a discriminatory way) How to determine “suspect” classifications? o One approach that was rejected considers the Carolene Factors. (Marshall in San Antonio). Provides limited guidance for legislatures. o INSTEAD A class is suspect if it does not pertain to legitimate political aims. (White in Cleberne). o In other words, when a classification so rarely has a rational relationship to legitimate state interests that there is a presumption of prejudice (ex. race). EPC Analysis (Chemerinksy) 1. What is the classification 2. What level of scrutiny applied 3. Does the gov’t action meet the level of scrutiny? Other Classifications [rational basis] Wealth, Disability, Sexual Orientation, Age, Classes of One, Economic City of Cleburne (1985) B With animous = BITE Illegitimate children intermediate scrutiny State Sovereignty There are some limits. Like the right to decide where your capital is (Coyle) Generally all good. Except: NLC, Butler. Time periods: 1936-1976: Just a truism. (US v. CA; Darby; Wirtz) 1976-1985: Definitional (Usery) 1985 - Back to Garcia and political process as only check Three Approaches Definitional (Usery 1976) See if it is a traditional areas of state function See in Federalist 39 – Limited enumerated objects of authority. However, still a question of what fits here? Political Process (Garcia 1985) Modern approach. As long as not in conflict with an enumerated power, courts should let the political process deal with it Some states will lose out but that’s okay. Bonds (S. Carolina v. Baker) Two questions: Commandeering (need to add case about paying public employees as part of larger federal regulation) Affirmative obligation (not okay) but a negative prohibition on conduct is (Reno v. Condon) Can’t force a state to regulate people (Printz 1992) Compel them to pass a law (NY v. US) You can use spending or commerce to push them to comply (SD v. Dole) but not over the limit (NFIB) Worry of accountability here. Will people be able to hold the right people accountable? (NY v. US) Commandeering doctrine doesn’t apply to the reconstruction amendments Who should be regulating this? Congress or Judges. Whether 10th is its own substantive limit? Taxing and Spending Independent Power (Butler) Condition pursues general welfare (substantial deference) (SD v. Dole) Condition is unambiguous and meetable (SD v. Dole) Condition is related to the federal interest of the grant (SD v. Dole) Must be constitutional (SD v. Dole) Must not too coercive (SD v. Dole) Can be too coercive if they terminate current grants (NFIB v. Sebelius II) What if it regulates both private and public: Because this law regulates both public and private sector it is unclear how that will be viewed under NFIB. If we follow the logic of Justice Roberts in the majority then because this is applying to both private and public schools it is not commandeering. Additionally, there was some indication that Medicare was a special issue because of the amount of money involved, so that will also weigh against finding this law to be a violation of the 10th amendment. However, based on the Scalia concurrence it seems the issue is more that the federal government was trying to use spending to infringe into areas that should be reserved to the states. If this is the reading the court takes moving forward, than this law violates the 10th amendment. End result o o o o Can’t require states to make laws (NY v. US). Can’t require state officials to regulate people outside the state (Printz). However, allows the state to keep house in particular kind of order (Reno v. Condon) and allows Congress to provide incentives that are likely to persuade most states to go along (SD v. Dole). Garcia has not been overruled, Usery has not been reinstated, and the FLSA still applies to state employees (subject to Alden v. Maine which held that sovereign immunity precludes suits against state govs to enforce the FLSA).