lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts-2015 F - Summary Contracts&Jud Decision Making Contracts&Jud Decision Making (Dalhousie University) Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 1 CONTRACTS CANS PART ONE – MAKING A SIMPLE CONTRACT CHAPTER ONE – MUTUAL ASSENT: HOW A BARGAIN IS MADE Secion One – Essenial Elements of an Ofer The Invitaion to Dinner Case (Ficional) Need Intent to Be Bound For a Contract to Be Binding Facts: Mr. Patrick is having dinner with Professor Thomas, whom he hopes will give him a job. He knows that the Professor is a fan of bridge, and that you need three people to play bridge. He invites Mr. David to come to dinner, and to stay to play bridge aterwards, and Mr. David agrees. Just before dinner, Mr. David gets a call to go play poker with his friends and decides not to go to Mr. Patrick’s – however, he tells his wife that he is sill going to Mr. Patrick’s. The bridge game fell through, the professor let, and Mr. Patrick did not get the job. Proceeding: Mr. Patrick sued Mr. David for breach of contract, asking for $25,000 in lost wages from the job that he did not get and $10,000 for the mental distress. Issue: Was there an intenion for the invitaion to create a legally binding contract? Analysis: Here it is obvious that an ofer was made, and that it was accepted. There is even consideraion as Mr. David was to receive his favorite dinner. However, it is also clear that when the ofer was made there was no intenion of it creaing a legally binding contract. This idea only arose ater Mr. David did not show up. Although Mr. David might have had a moral obligaion to atend the dinner, he had no legal obligaion to do so. Outcome: The case is dismissed; no legally binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: In order for a contract to be formed both paries must intend to be legally bound by the terms at the ime when the negoiaion is made. Weeks v. Tybald (1605, UK) Pay for My Dumped Son; Contracts Need Intent; Ofers Need Oferees Facts: The plainif and the daughter of the defendant were in talks of marriage. The father of the plainif and the defendant also talked about marriage, and the defendant said he would give 100 pounds to anyone who married his daughter as a dowry. The two did not end up geing married. Proceeding: The plainif sued staing that a contract for the 100 pounds had been made. Issue: Can an ofer be made with no speciic oferee in mind? Was there intent to be bound? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 2 Analysis: The courts state that a legally binding contract was not formed for two reasons: (1) there was no clear oferee, and (2) the paries did not intend to be legally bound at the ime of the discussion. Outcome: The case is dismissed; no legally binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: An ofer must be made with serious intenion, and must be intended to create legal consequences. An ofer must be made to a speciic oferee. Randall v. Morgan (1805, UK) Confusing Leter from Father in Law; Ofers Cannot be Qualiied, Must be Unequivocal Facts: The defendant entered into an agreement with his wife’s father staing that £2000 would be paid to the defendant from the father in law’s estate when he died. In the document, the father in law says that if his daughter gets married then he may bind himself to pay the principal when he dies. The man dies, and the defendant is an executor of his will. He takes the money. Proceeding: Other paries in the estate do not think that the defendant should have the money, and they sue him. Issue: Did the father in law’s leter amount to an ofer, or was it too uncertain? Analysis: The judge states that the ofer was uncertain, and the right to determine what would happen was sill on the table. Therefore the ofer was qualiied, and was not a true ofer at all. Outcome: The defendant must give the money back; there was no legally binding contract formed. Notes/Raio: There is no legally binding ofer when a declaraion is qualiied. Where the oferor retains the power to change his mind, a true ofer is not made. An ofer must involve an absolute, unequivocal commitment given at the ime the ofer is made. Balfour v. Balfour (1919, UK) Sick Wife Wants Monthly Payments; Husband-Wife Agreements Generally Are Not Contracts Facts: Mr. Balfour and his wife went to England for vacaion, and his wife became ill and needed medical atenion. They struck a deal, and the wife was to remain behind in England when the husband returned to Ceylon. They had this understanding when they were in a good relaionship; however things turned sour later on down the road. At the ime of their departure, Mr. Balfour said that he would give his wife £30 a month. Proceeding: The wife is suing the husband claiming that he owes her £30 a month indeinitely. Issue: Was Mr. Balfour’s ofer intended to be legally binding? Does the fact that they were husband and wife mater? Analysis: The law of contracts is not made for personal family relaionships. In the irst trial, the judgment was given to the wife, however upon appeal the judgment was given to the husband, as there was no intent to be legally bound when the agreement was agreed upon. The judges say that if they were to allow all wives to come to court when agreements had been broken with their husbands then the courts would be overrun with frivolous cases. One of the judges also says that there was no bargain made on the part of the wife, and therefore no contract could have resulted. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 3 Outcome: Mr. Balfour’s appeal is allowed, he does not owe his wife the monthly payments as no legally binding contract was made. Notes/Raio: Arrangements made between husbands and wives are not ordinarily contracts because the paries did not intend to be legally bound by the agreements. Grant v. Province of New Brunswick (1973, NB AC) Condiional Ofer for Disposing of Potatoes; Meeing Condiions = Acceptance Facts: The province passed an act staing that you would receive compensaion from the province for your potatoes if you destroyed them in a paricular manner. You had to apply and be accepted by the government. Grant illed out the forms, and saisied himself and the members of the commitee that everything needed had been done. Everything appeared to be all right. However, Grant was refused compensaion because he was told that he was not the owner of the potatoes, Proceeding: Defendant is appealing the earlier decision staing that they had to pay the plainif for their destroyed potatoes. Issue: Did the Province make an open ofer to all potato farmers, or was it an invitaion to treat, meaning that the ofer was made by the farmer? Analysis: The government argues that they made an invitaion to treat, and it was Grant who made the ofer. The court goes back to the invitaion, and says that it has every condiion necessary for an ofer. They introduce us to the concept of condiional ofer, and Grant met the condiions in the ofer. They decide that there was an ofer to purchase made by the province to certain people, not an ofer to sell by the plainif. To come to this decision, the court used the objecive test. They decided that this is what a reasonable person would decide in the case – a contract had been formed. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; a binding contract was made on the basis of the Province’s ofer. Notes/Raio: Condiional ofers lay out speciic condiions that must be met by potenial acceptors of the ofer. If the condiions are met, then the party accepts the ofer through their performance and a contract is formed. If they are not met, then no contract is formed. Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. (1923, UK CA) In Business Relaionships, Assume Contract is Intended; You Can Contract out of a Contract Facts: Plainifs were the defendants’ American distributor for their new paper product. In their legal agreement there was a clause included staing that the contract would not be legally binding. The defendants cancelled the agreement because they were unhappy with the Americans’ proceedings. Proceeding: The defendants are appealing the decision of the trial court staing that a contract did exist, and atemping to negate the damages. Issue: Can a clause be put in a contract saying that it is not legally binding, or is there a contract anyway? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 4 Analysis: Although in business relaions it is generally assumed that a contract has been intended, here there is a speciic clause staing the intenion of the paries not to be bound in a legal contract. It is the intenions of the paries that maters, and here they are clearly stated. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; no legally binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: If you can impliedly assume that people in business relaionships intend to be bound, then if they expressly state that they do not wish to be bound you must respect their actual intenions. Jones v. Padavaton (1969, UK CA) Mother Gives Daughter Money for School and a House; Family Relaionship ∴ No Contract Facts: The plainif is the defendant’s mother. The mother tells her daughter that she will pay for her to go to law school if she comes back from the US to go to law school in England. She comes back, and the mother ends up buying a house for her to live in, along with other tenants. There is no express agreement made – the daughter furnishes the house, but the mother never receives the money that the other tenants pay for rent. The mother tried to sell the house and the daughter claimed that she was enitled to some of the money based on the work she had put into it. Proceeding: The mother sued the daughter irst for possession of the house, but then the daughter counter-claimed for the money that she had spent on the house. The trial judge found for the daughter. Issue: Has a legally binding contract been formed? Did the paries intend to be bound? Analysis: This agreement is of a family nature, and thus there is no basis for the daughter to say that her mother has given away her legal right in the house. Further, employing the objecive test, there was the discrepancy in the amount of money given which was never addressed (US vs. Trinidad Dollars) – if it had been a true contract, this would have been an issue. Further again, the condiions are so vague that this could not be considered a contract even if it was intended to be one. If they really wanted a contract to be formed, the contract would have been made much more speciic. This is perhaps the most important point. Outcome: The mother’s appeal is granted; no binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: “Family relaionships” in contract extend farther than husband-wife – at least to motherdaughter. If one of the paries in a family relaionship claims that a binding contract was formed, then the onus is on them to prove that the paries intended to enter into a legally binding contract regardless of their family relaionship. Gould v. Gould (1970, UK CA) Broke Husband Can’t Pay Ex-Wife; Vague Terms Mean No Intent ∴ No Contract Facts: A husband and wife split up, and the husband agreed to pay the wife £12 a week. They got back together, and then broke up again; they made a verbal agreement that the husband would pay £15 a week for “as long as he could manage”. He paid for a while, but eventually he stopped paying and said that he could no longer aford to. Proceeding: The wife sued for the money that she claimed she was owed. She was successful at trial. Issue: Was there a legally binding contract? Does Mr. Gould’s condiion make a diference? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 5 Analysis: In the dissent, Lord Denning difereniates this case from Balfour v. Balfour because the husband and wife have already split up here at the ime the agreement was made. Therefore they should be seen as two separate paries not in a family relaionship. Davies agrees that the probability that a contract was formed here is higher than in Balfour; however he states that the terms were too vague to be considered a contract. If they had really intended to enter into a contract, the terms would have been clariied. Furthermore, there was no consideraion on the part of the wife. Outcome: The appeal is allowed and the husband does not have to pay his wife as no contract was formed. Notes/Raio: The terms of a contract must be clear enough to indicate that the paries intended to enter into a legal relaionship. Edwards v. Skyways Ltd. (1964, UK QB) Pilot Wants Pension He Paid Into; Agreement Made Ex Graia By Employer, Sill Have To Pay Facts: Pilots were laid of from their jobs before they earned their pension. There was an agreement between the union and the company that they would receive pension that they had paid into. However, the company failed to come through on this bargain and refused to pay the pension. The company was supposed to make a payment equivalent to the defendant’s pension payment ex graia (i.e. without legal obligaion). Proceeding: The plainif is one of the pilots who is suing for the pension that he paid into. Issue: Was the promise binding, or does the fact that it was made ex graia free the company from all liability? Analysis: This is a clear case of where the objecive test could be applied – however, there are limitaions on the objecive test here – this is a complex negoiaion between 12 corporate and trade union representaives, so extensive background knowledge would be needed. The court says that ex graia means that the company had no legal sipulaion to pay the laid of workers before they made the promise, but does not mean that this promise is not binding. In making the promise it is clear that both paries intended to be bound. Outcome: The pilot is successful and receives his money because the promise amounted to a contract. Notes/Raio: The courts give consideraion to the fact that the negoiaing paries are not equal in this case – the principle of equity. In commercial contracts the court does not ordinarily inquire whether paries intended to be bound. The onus is on the party who claims that no legal consequences were intended – the company (same reasoning as in Jones v. Padavatan). McGugan v. Smith (1892, SCC) Super Granddaughter Gets No Love; Quantum Meruit Employed So She Gets What She Deserves Facts: This is a family relaionship between a grandfather and his granddaughter. He said that he would provide for her as amply as he did for his daughters as long as she lived with him unil he died, or she got married. She lived with him unil she got married, then he dies shortly ater and let signiicantly less money to her in his will than he did to his daughters. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 6 Proceeding: The granddaughter sues and claims that a contract had been formed. Issue: This was a family relaionship, but the granddaughter performed acts far outside of a typical family relaionship expecing reimbursement. Does this mater? Analysis: The family relaionship does not mater here because she did things that were far beyond her duies to her grandfather. Her acions were beyond any reasonable expectaions for this type of relaionship. The services of the plainif are so extreme that she is enitled to recover quantum meruit. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the daughter gets her original legacy plus $1000. Notes/Raio: Quantum meruit is a term in equity. It means “pay the person equivalent to what they have worked for”, and is employed to avoid unjust enrichment. Here, if the grandfather had goten away with this, then his estate would have gained money that it did not deserve, which is not fair. Matheson v. Smiley (1932, Man. CA) Estate Doesn’t Want to Pay for Surgeon Because No Contract; Quasi Ex Contractu Obligaion Applies Facts: A man shoots himself, and the neighbours summon a doctor. The doctor summons a specialist surgeon who does everything possible to save the man’s life, but he died. The surgeon presented his bill to the estate, but the estate says that is will not pay it. Proceeding: The case was found for the plainif in the lower court. This is the defendant’s appeal. Issue: Can you enter into a contract with someone who was in such a state, and has no control of his thoughts? There is no consensus ad idem (meeing of minds). Analysis: The court inds that there was no contract here, and also that there was no implied contract. However, “whenever necessiies are supplied to a person who by reason of disability cannot himself contract, the law imposed an obligaion on the part of such a person to pay for such necessiies out of their own property”. This is called an obligaion quasi ex contractu, (“arising almost like a contract”). Outcome: The appeal is dismissed and the estate must pay the surgeon’s fees. Notes/Raio: Quasi ex contractu obligaions arise in speciic circumstances, including: paying for the necessiies of life, paying for burial of a dead body, situaions involving people who are insane or are not in control of their mind, and intervenions in medical emergencies. Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. and Constanineau (1954, SCC) Aunt’s Estate Won’t Give Nephew House; He Gets Wages Quantum Meruit Despite No Contract Facts: The aunt tells her nephew (the plainif) that if he performs some paricular duies, then she will leave him a home in her will. He does these duies, but when she dies she does not leave him the house in her will. Proceeding: The nephew was successful in the lower courts; the aunt’s estate appealed. Issue: Can resituion be provided quantum meruit when no legal contact is in place? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 7 Analysis: It is clear that there is no legally binding contract because there is no agreement in wriing and the Statue of Frauds requires contracts dealing with the sale of property to be in wriing. The court states that they cannot order reimbursement on the basis of speciic performance because there is no contract. However, it is clear that the acts were no performed gratuitously and the nephew expected to be paid for them. Thus, he should be reimbursed on the basis of quantum meruit because the Statute of Frauds does not say anything about resituion to prevent unjust enrichment. Although he cannot be awarded the house because of the Statutes of Frauds, he in enitled to the wages that he should have been paid for his performance. Outcome: The appeal is partly allowed, and the reimbursement of the nephew is changed to $3,000, which is the esimated cost of his work. Notes/Raio: When no legally binding contract applies, plainifs can sill recover for earnings that they are enitled to in order to prevent unjust enrichment. B.C. Atorney General v. Parklane Private Hospital Ltd. (1974, SCC) Confusing Hospital Rates; No Contract with City but Quantum Meruit Prevails Facts: Prior March 1968 the hospital had an agreement with the city at the rate of $5.05 per paient per day. The hospital made a fresh ofer to the city @ rate of $9.50 per diem and asked the city to remove its paients if not agreeable. The city did nothing, kept paying the old rate of $8.05. City resoluion airmed its unwillingness to pay the hospital’s new rate. The hospital warned that their coninued acceptance of paients did not imply an agreement with the city’s posiion. The city made no acion and coninued to refer paients to the hospital. In June 1971, the hospital served the city further noice of an increase to a rate of $11.50, and threatened that if the city disagreed then all the social welfare paients would be removed by the end of June, failing which the courts will be asked to enforce a payment at the reasonable rate of $11.50 per paient per day. The City coninued to be silent, and coninued to send paients. Proceeding: Originally the City was successful, however the hospital was awarded the appeal. This is the City’s appeal to the SCC. Issue: Did the city imply acceptance of the ofers given by the hospital by coninuing to send them paients? Analysis: The courts imply that there was no contract because the paries had never reached a clear agreement on the level of payment; however Vancouver has beneited from the services of the hospital and to allow them to escape on the basis that there was no contract would amount to unjust enrichment – thus the hospital had a right to reimbursement in quantum meruit. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed, and the City must pay “reasonable rates” to the hospital. Notes/Raio: Someimes silence can consitute acceptance, but it depends on the facts of the case. Re Jacques (1968, NS Co. Ct.) Singy Old Woman; Obligaions Arise Quasi Ex Contractu Facts: Two people (Ms. Kidston & Ms. Morine) are claiming on the estate of a singy old woman for services that the performed without receiving compensaion. A third party (Lindsay) told both of the women that they would be paid for their work. The woman also promised Ms. Kidston that if she stayed Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 8 with her, then she would be paid for her services. The services were given in an atempt to help the old woman, and were done so beyond any reasonable expectaions, to say the least. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Can plainifs recover when they are taken advantage of, even when a contract is not present? Analysis: For Morine, there was only evidence of direct representaion by the 3 rd party who had no binding authority. Although the taxi service was obviously iniiated by the deceased, there was no intent to pay – and thus no contract. Therefore, her remedies come completely from quantum meruit. For Kidston, in addiion to the third party representaion, the deceased directly made a promise to her. She fulilled her duies in this promise and stayed beyond the expectaions. The deceased had the opion to terminate the contract, but did not, and hence her claim is founded upon a contractual liability against the deceased’s estate. Overall, the acts went far beyond expectaions for a reasonable neighbour or member of the community, and the women should be reimbursed to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant. This obligaion arose quasi ex contractu. Outcome: Judgment for the plainifs. Notes/Raio: It is an axiom of the law that no person will be permited to take advantage of his own fraud, and accordingly a promise of remuneraion is implied where one person induces another to perform a service without intending to pay for it, and the obligaion so created may be enforced in the same way as if it were an obligaion arising out of an express contract [quasi ex contractu]. The “Moorcock” (1889, UK CA) Ship Runs Aground At Dock; Safety of Riverbed Implied In Contract Facts: The plainifs made a deal to unload their cargo at the defendant’s dock. When the ied went down, the boat sustained damage when it hit the hard botom of the river beneath the mud. The defendants did not expressly state that the ground would be safe during unloading. Proceeding: The defendants were held liable at trial; this is their appeal. Issue: Was the term that the riverbed would be safe implied in the contract? Analysis: The courts state that is goes without saying in the circumstances that the only way that the cargo would be unloaded was during low ide, and thus it was assumed that the ground would be safe. Both paries must have known that if the ground was not safe, then the unloading could not proceed. Thus the term of the safety of the ground was implied in the contract, as it could not have been formed without the agreement. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the defendants are sill liable. Notes/Raio: In cases of implied terms, the courts almost always raise an implicaion from the presumed assumpion that the paries that are subject to the transacion are seeking eicacy (or a “fair deal”). Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 9 Wood v. Lady Duf-Gordon (1917, NY CA) “Martha Stewart” Deals Outside her Agent; His Best Eforts to Sell Were Implied Facts: Defendant was a celebrity who atached her name to products to help them sell in return for payment. She employed the plainif to help her do her business, and gave him exclusive right to license out her name and he was going to give her 50% of the proits he earned. Right ater the contract was signed, she went out on her own and did her own dealings and did not pay Mr. Wood. Proceeding: The lower court gave the decision to the defendant saying that there was no enforceable contract. This is his appeal. Issue: Is there an enforceable contract even when there is no express promise by one of the paries? Analysis: The defendant claimed that there was no corresponding request to her promise – she did not request anything from the plainif, there was no consideraion. The plainif did not bind himself to anything, and therefore there was no contract. However, the court said that it goes without saying that anyone who contracts to do this type of thing will do his or her best. The plainif’s promise to render accounts and to give the defendant one-half of the proits inherently implied that he would use reasonable efort to implement the agreement. Outcome: The appeal is allowed and the plainif is successful. Notes/Raio: For a term to be implied in a contract it has to be very obvious. A promise may be lacking, and yet there might be “insinct with an obligaion” imperfectly expressed. Oicious Bystander Test Is a Term Implied in the Contract? The oicious bystander measures the threshold required for the court to imply a term to a contract. The oicious bystander is not necessarily a reasonable person invoked in the object test of intenion. In this test an arbitrator or invesigator tries to ascertain what would have been the reply of the contracing paries if a nosy-bystander had then asked them “Do you intend to include the term ‘x’ in the contract?” If the paries under the circumstances prevailing at that ime would have answered “Yes, deinitely!” then the term can be implied into the contract. Secion Two – Invitaions for Ofer There are a few things that always consitute invitaions to treat, and are not ofers. Some of them are: Quotaion of lowest price Display of goods in a self-service store Adverisements Tender/bids (toughest ones) Aucions (we don’t really deal with this one) Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 10 Why is this disincion important? It is important because if you accept an invitaion to treat then there is no contract – you are in fact making an ofer which must be accepted by the other party. Harvey v. Facey (1893) Quotaions of Lowest Price = Invitaion to Treat, Not an Ofer Facts: The plainif sent a telegram to the defendant staing, “Will you sell us BHP? Telegraph lowest cash price”. The defendants replied “Lowest cash price for BHP £900”. The plainif wired their acceptance, however the defendant would not sell BHP. Proceeding: The plainif sued claiming that they had accepted an ofer and a contract had been formed. Issue: Do quotaions of a lowest price consitute an ofer? Analysis: The courts said that the defendant only quoted the lowest price, which does not amount to an airmaive answer to the 1st quesion. Quotaion of lowest price does not amount to an uncondiional ofer to sell. Outcome: The case is dismissed; no contract was formed. Notes/Raio: Quotaions of lowest price are invitaions to treat, not ofers. Harty v. Gooderham (1871) Language in Price Quote Can Imply Ofer Facts: The defendants told the plainifs that “£xx is our lowest price, we shall be happy to have an order from you, to which we will give prompt atenion.” The plainifs accept the ofer; however the defendants refuse to sell the good to them. Proceeding: The plainif sues claiming that a contract had been formed. Issue: Does the speciic language mater when giving a price quote – can it consitute an ofer? Analysis: The court holds that a contract was indeed made here. In doing this they look at the speciic language used. “We shall be happy” and “order from you” imply that they are speciically ofering it to the plainif. Outcome: The plainif is successful; a legally binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: The circumstances and the nature of the transacion are important in determining whether a contract was formed – speciically the language used. Canadian Dyers Associaion Ltd. v. Burton (1920, Ont. SC) Def. Keeps Cheque & Makes Deed; Wording and Acions Can Lead to a Quote of Price Being an Ofer Facts: The defendants own a property that the plainif wishes to buy. The defendants quoted a price to the plainif, who responded that he would like to hear the very lowest ofer. To this the defendant replied “the last price I gave you is the lowest price I am prepared to accept. In fact, I feel that under the present condiions that is excepionally low and if it were to any other party, I would ask for more”. The plainif then sent a deposit cheque for £500 to indicate acceptance, and asked for a deed. The Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 11 defendants sent a drat deed to the plainif, but then cancelled it and returned the cheque claiming that no contract had been made. Proceeding: This is the iniial trial. The plainif is suing claiming that a contract was made. Issue: Was this simply an invitaion to treat, or truly an ofer made by the defendants? Analysis: The court said that the defendant’s reply was more than a quotaion of price already named – emphasis should be placed on “if it were any other party I would require more”. Surely, this is an ofer. Also, the defendant’s acions were inconsistent with no contract having been formed – he kept the money, and made a drat deed. Here, both the language and the conduct of the party help to show that a contract was formed. Outcome: The judgment is decided for the plainif; a contract had been formed. Notes/Raio: A mere quotaion of price is not an ofer, however if either the language used or the defendant’s conduct (or both) are consistent with the view that a true ofer has been made then it will be considered an ofer. Pharmaceuical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (1952, UK QB) Self Serve Store = Invitaion to Treat, Not Ofer Facts: The defendant was a self-serve drug store with a pharmacy department. Patrons would pick up priced drugs and bring them to the counter to purchase. Dispensing of drugs pursuant to statute has to be under the supervision of a registered pharmacist. The pharmacist’s oice is located near the cashier; he was in a posiion to prevent the customer from removing the drugs. Proceeding: This is the original trial; the plainif claims that the defendant is making sales against the rules of the statute, and that the sales are made when the patrons pick up the drugs from the shelves. Issue: At what point does the sale take place in a self-service store: when the customer picks up the good, or at the ime and place of payment? Who makes or accepts the ofer as between customer and the shop owner/cashier? Analysis: The court holds that in cases like this it is the purchaser who is making the inal ofer on the product, and the cashier accepts their ofer to make the sale. “It is a well-established principle that the mere exposure of goods for sale by a shopkeeper indicates to the public that he is willing to treat but does not amount to an ofer to sell. The principle is not reversed merely because there is a self-service scheme.” Also look at public policy implicaions – if sale was made when patrons picked up products from the shelves in stores then the stores could not work. Outcome: The judgment is for the defendants; the contract is not made unil the cashier accepts the ofer. Notes/Raio: Self-serve stores are not ofering their goods for sale; they are giving an invitaion to treat. Fisher v. Bell (1961 UK QB) Illegal Knife in Window with Price tag; Invitaion to Treat, Not Ofer Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 12 Facts: Defendant displayed a lick knife with a price (icket) in his shop window. The police charged the defendant with the ofence of contravening the Restricion of Ofensive Weapons Act as a person ofering for sale the lick knife, which was a prohibited weapon. Proceeding: In the iniial trial the defendant was successful; this is the appeal by the Crown. Issue: Does the exhibiion of a good with a price icket in a window consitute an ofer for sale? Analysis: The display of the good is an invitaion to treat, not an ofer. The ofer is made by the purchaser when they bring the good to the cashier. Thus, although the knife was an illegal weapon, the store owner was not violaing the statute because it only says that it is illegal to ofer to sell prohibited items. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; no ofence was commited. Notes/Raio: Displaying priced goods in a window is the same as in a self-serve store; it is an invitaion to treat. This is a case where the legislature should intervene; clearly the intent of the ofence was there. R. v. Dawood (1976, Alberta AC) Blouse Swap! Contracts Induced by Fraud are Not Binding Facts: Defendant, in a self-serve store, removed the price tag and swapped clothing onto a hanger with lower price tag. She proceeded to the cashier, paid the lower price, and let. She was charged and convicted for thet/larceny. Proceeding: The defendant appealed the convicion – admited that she obtained by false pretence, not thet or larceny. Issue: Was thet commited? Was an enforceable contract made? Was it voided by fraud? Analysis: It is obvious that there was consent here on the part of the cashier, and therefore it was not thet – which needs to have taking of a good without consent. If property passes with the consent of the owner (represented by the cashier), then it does not amount to thet or larceny. A contract of sale has been consummated (hence the property passed to the defendant). The defendant made the ofer to buy, the cashier accepted the ofer, and hence a contract was formed, even if it is viiated by fraud. The contract was voidable, and can be voided on the basis of fraud. She knew the price to be false, and knew that the cashier had the authority to accept the ofer, thus the contract was induced by fraud and is voidable. Outcome: The convicion is overturned. She did not commit thet; however the sale contract is voided because it was induced by fraud. Notes/Raio: Contracts induced by fraud will not be legally enforceable. Aucions Sale is Complete When Aucioneer Drops Hammer - The Aucioneer’s call = invitaion to treat - Bidder’s response = ofer - Fall of the hammer = acceptance (so aucioneer makes acceptance) Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 13 Georgian Co. v. Bloom (1921, Georgia AC) Falsely Adverised Cheap Scarves; Newspaper Ads Are Invitaions to Treat Facts: The plainif inserted an adverisement for the defendant; however they listed the price as $5 instead of $15 for the furs/scarves for sale. The defendant sold at the adverised price and lost money. Proceeding: The defendant refused to setle the plainif’s bill and counterclaimed for his loss. Issue: Did the adverisement bind the defendant to sell at $5, or was it an invitaion to treat, allowing him to negoiate price with customers? Analysis: Despite the mistake, they were not bound to sell at the misleading price. This was an invitaion to treat, and they could have refused the ofers of the people willing to buy the scarves for $5. Outcome: The plainif is not liable for the defendant’s losses. Notes/Raio: A general adverisement in a newspaper for the sale of an indeinite quanity of goods is a mere invitaion to enter into a bargain, rather than an ofer. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893, UK CA) Smoke Ball Doesn’t Cure Flu; Unilateral Contract Deined – Performance = Acceptance Facts: The adveriser promised to pay £100 to any person that contracted inluenza ater using the smoke ball as directed. Adveriser deposited £1000 in a named bank as evidence of good faith. Mrs. Carlill purchases and uses the smoke ball as adverised, and sill catches the lu. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial; the defendant appealed staing that no contract was formed. Issue: Was the advert an ofer capable of acceptance? Did the adveriser raise expectaions as to create legal consequences? Analysis: This was a special type of ofer, and this is a unilateral contract – a contract where performance can consitute acceptance of an ofer and there does not need to be an exchange. As long as you comply with the terms of the ofer, then you accept and a contract is formed. Further, the defendant acted as though they intended to be bound – they deposited money in a bank and said that if the product did not work, you would receive a sum of money. Here the Carbolic Company is the oferor and any member of the public and be the acceptor as long as they follow the performance as instructed. The consideraion is the inconvenience sustained by one party at the request of the other. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; a binding contract was formed and the defendant must pay the £100. Notes/Raio: In unilateral contracts, as long as you comply with the speciic provisions then you accept the ofer made to the general public and a contract is formed. Goldthorpe v. Logan (1943, Ont. CA) Hairy Woman Distressed When Removal Fails; Guarantee in Ofer is a Term of the Ofer Facts: The defendant put out an adverisement for their hair removal staing that it was safe and that the results were guaranteed. The plainif goes in for assistance and is further guaranteed of the results by a Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 14 nurse. The plainif underwent the procedure, but the result was not realized and she became distressed. Proceeding: The defendant was successful at trial; this is the plainif’s appeal claiming that a contract had been formed. Issue: Was there a contract between the paries? Did the defendant’s adverisement consitute an ofer? If so, what is the efect in law? Analysis: The defendants were careless in their promise – they did not suggest that “results may vary” – they suggested no excepions for their guarantees. The court states that the defendant pandered to the weakness of a distressed client; the strong cannot be allowed to prey on the weakness of the weak, the gullible, or the misguided. There is an allusion to inequality in bargaining powers. This was an ofer made to the public, which the plainif accepted by submiing to the procedure. However, the defendant did not live up to the terms of their ofer and thus breached the contract. Perhaps they made the ofer negligently, however either way they breached their contractual obligaions. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; a binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: An adverisement will be construed as an ofer where in its plain meaning it could be understood by the public as guaranteeing saisfactory result in return for submiing to a paricular procedure. R. v. Ron Engineering & Construcion (Eastern) Ltd. (1981, SCC) Contractor Enters Bid without Labour Cost; Deposit Forfeited; Tenders Have Two Contracts (A&B) Facts: The plainif contractor submited a tender for construcion to the owner defendant. Aterwards, plainif realized that his tender was too low as he forgot to include labour costs. Te tender did not allow bids to be removed ater the deadline for 60 days. The contractor claimed that he was not revoking his bid, but only that the owner could not accept it as it was. The owner disagreed and provided the contractor with the construcion agreement at his quoted price, which he would not sign. Proceeding: The owner insisted that the contractor had forfeited his deposit because he did not accept the construcion contract within the 7 day limitaion period. The owner was successful at trial, and then overturned on appeal, and this is his appeal to the SCC. Issue: Could the contractor revoke its ofer? Could the owner insist that the contractor is contractually bound to enter into Contract B (construcion contract) failing which contractor forfeits its deposit? Analysis: Generally, calls for tenders are invitaions to treat. However, in cases like this where speciic language and condiions are used then it becomes a unilateral ofer. “Contract A” was accepted by the contractor when he submited his bid in accordance with the terms, and it states that he has an obligaion to enter into “Contract B” – the construcion contract. Acceping Contract A binds the contractor to enter into Contract B. The deposit was to ensure the performance of the contractor of its obligaions under Contract A, which it failed to live up to. Outcome: The appeal is allowed, and the owner is allowed to keep the deposit. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 15 Notes/Raio: Bids at once become irrevocable if iled in conformity with the terms and condiions under which the call for tenders was made, if such terms so provide. The principal term of contract A is the irrevocability of the bid and the corollary term is the obligaion of both paries to enter into contract B upon the acceptance of the ofer. M.J.B. Enterprises Ltd. V. Defence Construcion Ltd. (1999, SCC) Qualiied Bid Cannot Be Accepted; Privilege Clause Allows Owner to Contract as Desired Facts: The defendant owner tendered for construcion bids according to 11 speciic documents. There was an indicated privilege clause which stated “the lowest or any other tender shall not necessarily be accepted.” One of the four bidders (Sorochan) submited a bid suggesing an alternaive cost (in efect qualifying their bid). The owner accepted this. The plainif contractor had the next lowest bid. Proceeding: The defendant sues staing that Sorochan’s bid was not in accordance with the terms and condiions as it was qualiied, and therefore their bid should be accepted as it was the next lowest and the custom in tenders is to accept the lowest bid. Issue: Is it implied that only complying bids will be accepted? Does the owner have to accept the lowest bid, even when there is a privilege clause? Analysis: The court holds that it is an implied term in tenders that only complying bids will be accepted, and that Sorochan’s bid did not comply with the terms – therefore, it cannot be accepted. In acceping the qualiied bid the owner is in a breach of Contract A with the other bidders Although the privilege clause does not overrule this obligaion to only accept compliant bids, it does allow the owner to not simply accept the lowest bidder. Therefore, the owner was under no obligaion to contract with the plainif. Outcome: The contract with Sorochan is not binding. However, the plainif does not get the contract because of the terms in the privilege clause. They get the damages that were setled on out of court, but not the contract to do the building. Notes/Raio: Contract A is not always a unilateral contract – it is not always formed upon the submission of a tender – it depends on the terms and condiions of the ofer for tender. In the absence of a privilege clause, you are most likely to be bound to accept the lowest ofer. Harvela Investments Ltd. V. Royal Trust Co. of Canada Ltd. (1986, UK House of Lords) Fixed Bid Sale; Qualiied Ofer Cannot be Accepted Facts: The defendant owner issues an ofer for tender to the plainif Harvela and Sir Leonard Outerbridge. Harvela ofered $2,175,000; Sir Leonard ofered $2,100,000 or “$101,000 in excess of any other bid you receive”, whichever was higher. The defendant accepted Sir Leonard’s ofer at $2,276,000, which was $101,000 higher than Harvela’s bid. Proceeding: The plainif is suing claiming that Sir Leonard was not allowed to make such a qualifying ofer. Harvela was successful at trial, but overturned on appeal. This is the inal appeal. Issue: In a ixed bidding sale, can a bidder adjust his bid or must it be deinite at the ime of the bid? Whose bid is the vendor bound to accept? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 16 Analysis: The ofer only invited ixed bids – the vendor chooses between a ixed bidding sale and an aucion sale. In a ixed bidding sale the bidders submit their bid in accordance with the maximum amount of money that they wish to pay. Using the reasonable man test, the judge states that the ofer simply asked the two bidders to submit their highest bids, which was not hard to understand. Harvela’s bid was higher than Sir Leonard’s. In a ixed bid sale, the owner is calling for a unilateral contract. Outcome: The appeal is allowed, and the vendors were bound to accept Harvela’s ofer. Notes/Raio: The vendor decides whether they want to sell in an aucion or with ixed bids. In an aucion the bidders can haggle with their bids, however in a ixed bid sale the bidders must simply submit the highest amount that they are willing to pay and hope that it is the highest of all the paries. In ixed bid sales, the owner makes the ofer and invites a unilateral contract. Secion Three – Certainty: “Court Cannot Make a Contract” Hillas & Co. v. Arcos Ltd. (1932, UK House of Lords) Timber Sale with Condiion for Next Year; Confusing Contracts to Enter Into Contracts? Facts: The plainifs were merchants purchasing imber from the defendants. They reached an agreement to purchase 22,000 standards of imber, under the speciic condiion that the plainifs should also have the opion of entering into a contract with the defendants to purchase 100,000 standards the following year with a 5% reducion on price. The defendants refused to sell them the 100,000 standards. Proceeding: The plainifs were successful at trial; the defendants won the appeal. This is the inal appeal. Issue: Was the term negoiaing the future sale a condiion of the contract? Can you make a contract to enter into another contract? Was this one? Analysis: The court inds that there was a binding contract for the subsequent sale of 100,000 standards. They say that this term indicated more than an agreement to make an agreement, and was an ofer that merely had to be accepted by the plainif. The only thing that had to be negoiated was the price, but this was because prices change yearly. In his judgment, Lord Wright talks more about agreements to enter into agreements, and says that they are in strict terms enforceable contracts, however his reasoning is very unclear. Outcome: The appeal is allowed – they hold that there was a binding contract to sell the 100,000 standards. Notes/Raio: Contracts to enter into contracts might be binding? Part performance of a contract gives rise to diferent judicial treatment because it shows that paries intended to be bound by the contract. Courts favor a contract when there has been reasonable reliance by the paries on its existence. Foley v. Classique Coaches, Ltd. (1934, UK CA) Gas Staion Agreement; Lack of Deinite Price Make Contract Too Vague? Not here! Part Performance! Facts: The plainif owns a gas staion. He sells a piece of land atached to the illing staion to the defendant to use for their business on the condiion that the defendants purchase all of their gas from the plainifs as long as they can supply it. They did not indicate price in the contract, however there was Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 17 a clause staing that any arguments should be setled by arbitraion. Ater three years, a lawyer for the defendant claims that because there was no stated price, the contract is not valid. The defendants then begin to purchase gas from other venders. Proceeding: The plainifs were successful at trial; it was found that the contract was binding. This is the appeal by the defendants. Issue: Did the fact that no price was quoted mean that the contract was not binding – was it too vague? Analysis: The judge states that there was a binding contract. The two paries acted for three years as if there was a contract, so the defendants cannot simply decide not to adhere to it all of a sudden. Further, if there was an issue with the price it should have been setled by arbitraion as was laid out in the contract – the defendants breached the contract by going to other vendors. The judge also states two important things: (1) an agreement to make an agreement does not consitute a contract, and (2) the wrongful repudiaion of a contract by one party relieves the other party from the performance of any condiions of the contract. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed. The plainifs are successful; there was a binding contract. Notes/Raio: An agreement to make an agreement does not consitute a contract. The wrongful repudiaion of a contract by one party frees the other party from the terms of the contract. Part performance will indicate that a contract is binding. Courtney & Fairbairin Ltd. V. Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd. (1975, UK CA) Plainif Can’t Find Acceptable Contractor to Build Hotel; Contracts to negoiate are not contracts! Facts: Plainif ofered to help the defendant ind a contractor to help him build the hotel that he desired. They entered into a contract staing that if the defendant’s quality supervisor approved the price that the plainif was able to ind, then the plainif would receive 5% as payment. The plainif found a potenial builder, however the defendant’s quality supervisor would not accept his terms. The defendant found another contractor without the help of the plainif and used him to build his project. Proceeding: The plainif sued claiming breach of contract and that the defendant was bound to use the company that he had found. The plainif was successful at trial; this Is the appeal. Issue: Was the contract to enter into a contract valid? Analysis: Lord Denning says that it is clear that no binding contract was present here. He discusses the terms of the contract that clearly state that the quality surveyor must negoiate the price with the plainif’s contractor before a contract is reached. Without an agreed price, it is unconceivable that a construcion contract can be established. With the absence of such an important condiion there can be no binding contract. He also states that in general an agreement to enter into an agreement is not a binding contract, as it is too vague to enforce – damages would be impossible to calculate. Lord Diplock further states that Lord Wright’s statement in Hillas & Co. v. Arcos Lt. was bad law. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; no binding contract was formed for the use of the plainif’s contractor unil the quality surveyor had negoiated the price with him. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 18 Notes/Raio: Contracts to negoiate are not contracts! De Laval Co. v. Bloomield (1938, Ont. CA) Milk Machine Installed; Terms of Pay Uncertain – Contract Sill Binding Facts: There was a contract for sale of a milking machine at a price of $400. It was said that $200 was due on November 1st, and that the rest of the balance was to be arranged at a later ime. The machine was installed; however the defendant refused to pay on November 1 st and wanted to return the machine because it was not saisfactory. Proceeding: This is an appeal. The plainif was successful at trial. Issue: Is the contract void for lack of certainty? Analysis: The court examines many previous cases and determines that the omission of the paricular form of payment, and/or the ime that payment is due does not necessarily invalidate a contract of sale. Here it is only the mode of payment that the defendant claims renders the contract uncertain – the price was already set. Outcome: The plainif is successful, the contract is binding. Notes/Raio: Contracts with uncertain terms concerning the mode of payment or price are not necessarily invalid. Friesen et al v. Braun et al (1950, Man. KB) Land Sale States Price To Be Setled Upon Sale, Not Done – Contract Void Facts: The plainifs agree to sell land to the defendants, who are currently leasing the land from the plainifs. In the contract for sale it is stated that the terms of the sale will be discussed “upon the paries at the date of acceptance”. The defendants accepted the contract, but no discussion of price was made at the ime. The defendants refused to pay for the property. Proceeding: This is the original trial. The plainifs seek speciic performance or damages. Issue: Did the lack of seing the price at the ime of sale void the contract? Analysis: The judge states that although this seems very unjust, the decision must be for the defendant. It is clearly stated in the contract that the price would be discussed at the ime the contract was made, and this was not done. This was a condiion of the contract that was not saisied, and therefore the contract is void. Outcome: Judgment for the defendant. Notes/Raio: If a contract states that price will be setled upon the sale, and this is not done, the contract is void. Nicolene, Ltd. v. Simmonds (1953, UK CA) Sale of Reinforcing Bars; Meaningless Terms Have No Efect on Validity of Contract Facts: The plainif makes a contract with the defendant to purchase three thousand tons of reinforcing bars on very speciic terms. The defendant accepts the terms, and states, “the usual condiions of acceptance apply”. The defendant also makes promises about the amounts that will be delivered by Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 19 speciic dates. The defendant fails to deliver the goods on ime, and the plainif sufers losses as they had agreed to sell the goods to another party. The defendants claim in defence that these condiions were not part of a “normal acceptance”. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial; this is the appeal by the defendant. Issue: Does this clause make the contract uncertain and render it void? Analysis: Lord Denning clearly states that there are two types of uncertain clauses in contracts. There are those that indicate that a clause has yet to be agreed, and there are those that simply have no true meaning at all. The former can mean that there is no contract at all because the paries have not agreed on all the essenial terms. The later have no efect on the overall validity of the contract, but are themselves unenforceable and stricken from the contract. The clause in this case is of the later disincion, and thus the contract as a whole remains binding. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the contract is binding. Notes/Raio: Meaningless clauses in contracts have no efect on the validity of the overall contract as long as there is nothing let to negoiate in the contract. Calvan Consolidated Oil & Gas v. Manning (1959, SCC) P’s Develop Land Instead of Sell; Second Contract Formed; Future Consideraions Not Certain Facts: Calvan had the authority to deal with a permit in which the defendant had a 20% interest. However, it was also envisaged that the plainif could wish to develop the land itself instead of selling it. In the original contract it was casually stated that if this were the case, an arbitrator would be appointed – but a formal agreement would come soon ater. A few days later a clause was added to the contract that formally stated this. The defendants do not wish to use an arbitrator to setle a price, and claim that the contract is not binding. The plainif sued. Proceeding: The defendants were successful at trial, but overturned on appeal. This is the SCC appeal. Issue: Was the arbitraion clause an enforceable condiion of the contract? Analysis: The defence claims that the contract is not enforceable on two grounds: (1) the terms of the agreement had not been setled, and (2) the reference to a later contract indicated that the irst was not meant to be binding. The judge says on the irst point that it was not necessary to lay out speciic terms for the eventual sale in the original contract because it was not known if it would deinitely happen. To hold that it was necessary would mean that paries would have to account for all possible future negoiaions at the beginning of a relaionship that is ridiculous from a policy perspecive. On the second issue, he states that the paries were bound by the original agreement, and that it was not a qualiied ofer. There was a formal contract formed, and another formal contract was to follow. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the plainifs are successful and the second contract was binding. Notes/Raio: Statements about possible future negoiaions do not have to be certain in the original contract. If a contract can operate independently of a second contract discussed, it will be binding. Knowlton Realty v. Wylder (1971, BCSC) Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 20 Realtor Wants his Fees; Contract Dependent on Future Contract That Didn’t Happen – Not Binding Facts: The plainif is a real estate agent working to help a building developer (Wyder – the defendant) sell loors of his planned building to Zurich Insurance Company. There are a series of leters passed between the two companies; the last stated that the terms of the contract were “subject to the execuion of the lease”. Troubles in development occurred, and the building was never constructed, therefore the lease documents were never completed. The plainif claims realtor’s fees, however the defendant claims that the event on which the commission was payable (the lease) never occurred. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Was the term staing that the terms of the contract relied on the signing of the lease a condiion in the contract, or merely a statement of desires and the transacion had already been completed? Analysis: The judge relies on the precedence from Rossdale v. Denny: “Where you have a proposal or agreement made in wriing expressed to be subject to a formal contract being prepared, it means what it says; it is subject to and is dependent upon a formal contract being prepared.” As the formal contract (lease) was never prepared in this case, the proposal never turned into a binding contract. Therefore the sale never truly took place, and the realtor cannot recover his fees. Outcome: The acion is dismissed; a contract was not formed. Notes/Raio: When a contract states that its terms are subject to the signing of another formal contract, the original contract does not come into efect unil the second formal contract has been formed. This is the opposite of what happened in Calvan, where the two contracts could operate in isolaion of each other – here the irst is reliant on the second. Subrook Trading Estate v. Eggleton (1983, House of Lords) Lessor Doesn’t Want to Appoint Valuer; Paries Intended Fair Price – So One Must be Established Facts: Lessees were given opion to purchase the land they were leasing if they gave the lessor noice in wriing. The price was not to be less than £12,000, and is to be agreed upon by two valuers: one to be appointed or nominated by the lessor and the other by the lessee, and in default of such agreement by an umpire appointed by the valuers. The lessees exercised their opion but the lessor refused to appoint a valuer. Proceeding: The lower courts found for the plainif lessee; this is the appeal. Issue: Were the paries agreeing to sell at a fair valuaion, i.e. at a reasonable price? Was their mode of ascertaining the price of the essence of the contract? (If yes, the vendor is not bound to sell because the mode of ascertaining the price was not fulilled). Analysis: The majority rules that the paries were indeed agreeing to sell at a reasonable price, and their valuaion formula was merely a suggesion of a method to achieve a fair price. Seeing as the intent was to arrive at a fair price, the speciic mode of coming to this price is not an essenial condiion. However, in the dissent the judge states that by seing a “reasonable price” the court is efecively wriing a contract for the paries, which is exactly something that they stated that they would not do. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 21 Outcome: The appeal is dismissed, the contract is sill binding and a reasonable price will be set by valuers despite the defendant’s unwillingness. Notes/Raio: When it is evident that the intenion of the paries in a business relaionship is to establish a reasonable price in a sale, the speciic manner in which this price is reached is not an essenial condiion of the contract – even if a manner is suggested in the actual contract. R. v. CAE Industries Ltd. (1986, FCA) Aircrat Hanger; Not Enough Hours; Courts Make Efort to Find Meaning in Vague Clauses Facts: The respondent wished to take over and run an aircrat maintenance base no longer required by Air Canada and the Government. An agreement was made, which contained many vague statements, but essenially stated that although the base usually generated 700,000 man-hours per annum, the Government could not commit to guaranteeing more than 40-50,000 – although they would use their “best eforts” to increase this number. The contract was formed, however the hours fell below 40,000 and the respondent sued. Proceeding: The purchaser was successful at trial; this is the appeal. Issue: Are the terms in the contract so uncertain that they render the contract unenforceable? Analysis: First, the judge determines that the paries deinitely intended to enter into a contract – paricularly because they acted as if they did unil the respondent brought this acion (part performance – grant). The onus is on the Government to prove that the paries did not intend to enter into a contract (as per Edwards v. Skyways) and they failed to prove this. Then the judge carefully scruinizes all of the “uncertain” clauses cited by the appellants and determines that none of them are so vague as to render no meaning to the contract. He states that in business relaionships the courts must make every efort to interpret vague terms and determine their intended meaning at the ime the contract was formed. He determines that the Government guaranteed a certain amount of work, and this was not provided; therefore, the Government breached the contract. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the contract was binding despite its vagueness. Notes/Raio: In business relaionships, the courts will make every efort to apply deinite meaning to vague terms in a contract so as not to render it unenforceable. This is especially true if it is obvious that the paries intended to enter into a binding relaionship, or if there was part performance. Secion Three – Construcive Communicaion: Ticket Cases L’Estrange v. Graucob (1934) Cigarete Machine Contract With Small Print; Signature = Consening to All Terms Facts: The plainif purchased a cigarete vending machine from the defendant. The plainif signed the standard form contract that was issued to them. There were several terms on the back of the contract, which the plainif did not read, that were in small print and excluded the defendant’s liability in negligence. The defendant was negligent. Issue: Does it mater that the plainif did not read the exclusion clauses? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 22 Analysis: It does not mater that the plainif did not read the terms. When one signs a contract they can be assumed to assent to all of the terms on the contract even if he did not read the clauses, or did not know that they existed. Outcome: The defendants are successful; they were excluded from liability. Notes/Raio: A party signing a contractual document, including one containing exclusion or limitaion clauses, is bound by it even if he or she does not read it or does not know the clauses existed. On its face (i.e. the absence of fraud) a signature is conclusive proof of consent. Hollier v. Rambler Motors Ltd. (1972) D’s Negligence Causes Fire in Parking Lot, But They “Weren’t Liable For Fire”; Ambiguity – Liability! Facts: The plainif’s car was damaged by ire while parked in the defendant’s parking lot. There was an exclusionary clause in the contract staing that the defendant was not liable for damage caused by ire to cars while parked in the parking lot. The ire started as a result of the defendant’s negligence. Issue: Does it mater that they exclusionary clause did not exclude the defendant from liability resuling from their own negligence speciically? Analysis: The court held that there was ambiguity present, and the exclusionary clause did not exclude the defendants from liability stemming from their own negligence speciically, but only “ires”. There was no statement made concerning the cause of these ires. In this case the weaker party must be protected. Outcome: The defendant was held liable for the damages resuling from the ire. Notes/Raio: Exclusionary clauses must be very speciic, as any ambiguity will be interpreted in favor of the weaker party – generally the party acceping the exclusionary clauses. Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Company (1877, UK CA) Lost Bags on Train; Small Print on Ticket; Don’t See = Not Bound; See = Bound if Reasonably Delivered Facts: Two plainifs checked their luggage on a train. They were given ickets with a number on one side, and small print on the other side. The small print stated that the railway would not be responsible for bags lost worth more than £10. Both plainifs had received the ickets before but had never read the small print. They both lost their bags, and brought acions against the defendant for the value of the bags and their contents – both were greater than £10. Proceeding: In the lower court both plainifs were successful; this is the appeal by the defendant. Issue: Are the plainifs bound by the terms on the back of the ickets? Analysis: The court states that there is no deinite law in situaions like this, for it depends on the speciic circumstances. If the person receiving the icket does not know that there is wriing on the back of the icket, then he cannot be bound by its condiions. However, if he knew that there was wriing and he either neglected to read it, or read it and did not think that it contained condiions of the contract then he is bound by the terms as long as the icket was delivered to him in a manner that gave him reasonable noice that there were condiions on it. Thus the judge states that a new trial must be awarded and the jury must determine if there was reasonable noice that the wriing contained condiions. The second Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 23 decision agrees, but goes further to state that if the plainif sees the wriing and either does not read it, or reads it and does not object, he must be held to consent to its terms and be bound. He states that this is a quesion of law, and therefore is not for a jury to decide – he states that the verdict must be given for the defendants here. Outcome: The appeal is essenially allowed – a new trial is awarded with new direcions for the jury. Notes/Raio: If a plainif does not see wriing that contains “condiions” of the contract and no reasonable efort was made to ensure he was aware of it, then he is not bound by its terms. If he does see it and either does not read it, or does not think that it contains condiions, then he will be bound by its terms so long as the defendant delivered it in a manner that gave him reasonable noice that there were condiions on the icket. Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd. (1949, UK CA) Condiions in Noice on Back of Hotel Room Door are NOT Binding; Weren’t Known at Signing Facts: The plainifs checked into the defendant’s hotel and paid for a week in advance. When they got into their room they noiced that there was a noice on the back of their door staing that “the proprietors will not hold themselves responsible for aricles lost or stolen, unless handed to the managers for safe custody”. When the plainifs let for the day they handed their key to the front desk, however when they were out someone took the key and stole valuables from the room. Proceeding: The judgment was given for the plainifs at trial, and the iniial appeal was dismissed. This is another appeal by the defendant. Issue: Were the terms of the noice posted in the room binding condiions of the contract? Analysis: Lord Denning states clearly that the hotel owners had a duty to take reasonable care to see that the key to the room was not taken by a third party when the plainifs handed it in at the start of the day, and that they failed to live up to this duty. Therefore, at common law they are liable for the loss. But, if the contract is binding then they could have freed themselves from their common law duies. In order for a contract that negates the defendant’s common law duies to be valid the intenion to create the speciic legal relaion must be evident. This is best done by having the other party of the contract sign in wriing at the ime the contract is formed, hand them a clear statement of the condiions at this ime, or by making a prominent public noice that is reasonably noiceable at the ime the contract is signed. Nothing short of these three opions will suice. Therefore, because the noice in the bedroom was not noiceably unil ater the contract had been signed and the hotel had accepted the plainifs as guests it cannot be deemed to be part of the original contract, unless the guests clearly agree to be bound. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the hotel is liable for the losses. Notes/Raio: Condiions of contracts must be a) on the signed contract; b) handed to the party signing the contract at the ime of the contract, or c) be displayed publically and noiceably at the ime and locaion of the signing. If none of these circumstances were the case, then the party signing the contract cannot be bound by the condiions in quesion unless the clearly agree to be bound. Union Steamship Ltd. v. Barnes (1956, SCC) Family on Ship; Man Hurt Negligently; Condiions Removing Liability on Ticket – No Liability! Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 24 Facts: The plainif and his family boarded the defendant’s boat very early in the morning. The icket was not purchased unil ater the boat had started on its voyage. On the front of the icket there was red wriing that stated that the purchaser was bound by the icked was issued subject to the condiions on the back of the icket. On the back it stated that the shipping company was not liable for any personal injury caused on board by negligence of the company or its agents, and that the holder of the icket agreed to the sipulaions listed. The plainif fell and injured himself as a result of the negligence of the shipping company. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial, and the decision was upheld upon irst appeal. This is the SCC appeal. Issue: Is the plainif bound by the condiions on the back of the icket? Analysis: The majority states that the burden of proof lies on the defendant to show that it has done all that it could reasonably be required to do to bring the limiing condiions to the plainif’s noice. They ind that the shipping company made a reasonable efort to let the plainif know the condiions by including the noice on the front of the icket. The plainif submited that he had seen that there was wriing on the icket, but he did not read it. There were no other reasonable methods suggested, and the statement that a verbal statement must be made was rejected in a precedent case. The dissening judge states that the circumstances are more important – this was very early in the morning, the icket could not be purchased unil ater the ship had started to move, and there was no adverisement made at the ime of purchase that these condiions existed. He states that the only reason why no such adverisement was made was because it would deter customers, which is not a valid excuse. Therefore he states that the company did not make a reasonable efort to let the plainif know of the condiions. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendant is not liable for the negligent damages. Notes/Raio: Placing noice on the front of a icket staing that it is subject to the condiions on the back is suicient noice to bind the purchaser to these condiions. No verbal statement must be made. McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd. (1964, House of Lords) Ship Sinks on Day Plainif Doesn’t Sign Long Contract; Didn’t Know Terms; Past Dealings Irrelevant Facts: The plainif has shipped things with the defendant’s company many imes before. Each ime previous he had signed a very long contract which he had never read – he was unaware what was in the contract. On the day in quesion the ship sank due to negligence and the plainif lost a car that was on board. The plainif did not sign the contract on this day. Proceeding: The defendants were successful in the lower courts; this is the appeal by the plainif. Issue: Is the plainif bound to the contract, despite not having signed it that day, because he knew the condiions from signing it before? Analysis: The judge states that there can be no condiions in any contract unless they are brought into it by expression, incorporaion, or implicaion. In this speciic case there was not contract formed on the day of the negligent acion, and there was no efort made by the defendants on that day to inform the plainif of the intended condiions of the contract. The fact that the plainif had signed the contract on imes previous was of no relevance in the case – paricularly because the plainif had never read it, and Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 25 did not know the contract. Previous dealings are relevant only if they prove knowledge of the terms and assent to them, which was not the case here. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendant is liable for the damages. Notes/Raio: Previous dealings are only relevant if they prove i) actual knowledge of the terms of the contract and ii) agreement to them. Briish Crane Hire Corp. Ltd. v. Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd. (1974, UK CA) Crane Sinks In Mud; Contract Not Signed But Sill Enforceable! Facts: The plainif and defendant are both in the business of rening out large machinery. In this case the plainif rented a large crane to the defendant. They had done similar business in the past. There were two “mishaps”. In the irst, the negligence of the driver (an employee of the plainif) caused the crane to be stuck in the muddy ground, and costs were incurred in the removal. In the second, it was the negligence of the defendant that caused the crane to get stuck and it was very expensive to remove it. In this instance the defendants had not signed the contract with the limiing condiions on it. Proceeding: The plainifs were successful at trial; this is the appeal by the defendant. Issue: Were the defendants bound to the terms of the contract, even though it was not signed? Analysis: Lord Denning adopts the view that in this case, although the contract was not signed, the adherence to its condiions was implied. There are a few reasons for this. First, the two companies are in the same business and use similar condiions in their contracts, so the defendants knew what the condiions were. Further, the defendants had agreed to the condiions in previous dealings. Lastly, the defendants tesiied that it was not unusual in rushed situaions like this for the condiions to be delivered ater the fact for signing. Thus, it is clear that the defendants knew what the condiions were and knew that their acions were going to be governed by them. However, the irst incident remained the fault of the plainif, as it was their employee who acted negligently. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the defendants were bound despite not having signed the contract. Notes/Raio: If it can be proven that a party knew the condiions of the contract, and reasonably knew that their acions were going to be governed by these condiions, then they may be bound to the condiions even without having signed the contract. It helps if they have had past dealings and are very familiar with the situaion. This case is not decided on the basis of the previous dealings. Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. (1971, UK CA) Parking With Auto Ticket Dispenser; Contract Formed When Money Inserted – No Later Condiions! Facts: The plainif parked his car in the defendant’s parking lot while he was at a musical performance. He received a icket from an automaic machine. On the icket was printed the ime of issue, and a statement that the icket is issued subject to the condiions posted in the parking lot. These condiions were posted in the oice where you had to pay upon departure, and on the wall opposite the icket machine, however the poster was not very prominent. The condiions included exemping the defendant’s from any liability for injury caused to the customer while their car was in the parking building. The plainif was seriously injured when placing goods in his trunk before leaving by another car. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 26 Proceeding: At trial the judge found that the plainif was 50% responsible for the act, but awarded him 50% damages from the defendant. Issue: Is the agreement subject to the posted condiions? Does the fact that the icket was dispensed automaically mater? Analysis: Lord Denning states that this case difers from the preceding cases because the icket is issued automaically and not from a clerk. Therefore, there is no chance to look at the condiions, reject them, and get your money back. Efecively the ofer is made by the defendant in having the machine posted with the prices, and this ofer is accepted when the driver places money in the machine. This contract cannot be subject to condiions that are presented ater this ime. The wriing on the icket staing that it was subject to the condiions was not visible unil ater the contract had been formed, therefore the contract is not truly subject to the condiions. The icket is simply a receipt showing that the contract had been formed. Further, the defendant did not make do what was reasonably suicient to give noice of the condiions to the plainif – a driver would have to wander around the parking lot to discover them, which is more than can be asked of a sensible patron. The second judge agrees, but focuses exclusively on the fact that the defendant did not give reasonable noice rather than the formaion of the contract prior to the condiions being delivered. The third judge agrees, and states that in cases involving an automaic icket machine there is something disinctly irrevocable about the ofer made by the company owning the parking lot. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the defendants remain liable for 50% of the damages. Notes/Raio: In cases with automaic icket dispensers, the contract is formed when the plainif inserts money into the machine and receives the icket. Condiions that are not seen unil ater this ime are not binding as the contract has already been agreed upon without the condiions. In these cases, the ofer made is irrevocable and cannot be altered ater the plainif has accepted it. Tilden Rent-a-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978, Ont. CA) Renter Paid For Extra Coverage; Drunk, Accident; Exclusionary Clauses Don’t Apply, Not Known About! Facts: The defendant rented a car from the plainif company. He paid an extra $2 a day for addiional coverage, which he believed exempted him from all possible damage caused to the car unless it was caused by a criminal acion on his part. It stated on the contract that he signed that the agreement was subject to the condiions on the back of the contract, however the defendant did not read them and the plainif’s clerk made no efort to inform him of their content. One of these condiions read that the defendant would be liable for any damage caused ater he had consumed any amount of alcohol. The defendant was in an accident – while swerving to miss an oncoming care he ran into a pole and damaged the car. He had been drinking, and had pled guilty to a charge of impaired driving. Proceeding: The defendant was successful at trial; this is the appeal by the plainif. Issue: Whether the defendant is liable for the damage caused to the car while being driven by him by reason of the exclusionary provisions that appear in the contract. Analysis: The majority states that it is clear that the plainif’s clerk knew that the defendant had not read the exclusionary condiions before he signed the contract, and therefore the plainif cannot rely on these condiions as they had no reason to believe that the defendant had assented to them. This disinguishes this case from the L’Estrange rule, which states that a party is bound by all the terms of a Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 27 signed contract, even if he has not read them as long as the contract was not entered into on the basis of fraud or misrepresentaion. The judge states that the party seeking to rely on the exclusionary clauses should not be able to do so without taking reasonable measures to noify the other party of them. If these measures have not been taken, then the signer does not need to prove misrepresentaion or fraud to not be bound by the condiions. The trial judge found that the L’Estrange rule applied, however that the contract was entered into upon a misrepresentaion by the plainif’s clerk and therefore the defendant was not bound by the condiions. The majority disagrees, staing that the L’Estrange rule does not govern here but simply that the defendant is not bound by the condiions because no efort was made to ensure that he was aware of them. The dissening judge believes that these condiions are reasonable and not unusual, and therefore that they are binding for the defendant. He says that the common law only strikes out clauses from contracts if they are so unreasonable to amount to fraud, or are irrelevant to the object of the contract. As this is not the case here, the defendant is bound by the contract. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the defendant is not bound by the exclusionary condiions. Notes/Raio: If a party wishes to have exclusionary condiions included in a standard form contract then the onus is on them to prove that they made a reasonable efort to inform the other party of these condiions before the contract is signed. The principle in L’Estrange concerning signatures in writen contracts is subject in Canada to consensus ad idem. Secion Five – Request for Promise or Performance: Bilateral and Unilateral Ofers Dawson v. Helicopter Exploraion Co. (1955, SCC) Exploring Potenial Mines in BC; Party Cannot Prevent Performance of Other Party - Breach! Facts: There were a series of leters exchanged between Dawson and Springer (employee of the defendant) discussing a contract to explore a certain area of B.C. and decide whether or not it was worth mining there. When they set the terms, it was agreed that Springer would noify Dawson when he had obtained a pilot for his helicopter so that Dawson could leave his post with the military and come with them to show them the area, and was enitled to a percentage of the earnings if they decided to develop the land. When a pilot became available Springer noiied Dawson, however he also stated that based of of third party advice they would probably not be exploring the area that year. Dawson did not reply. Without noifying Dawson, the defendants explored the region and later contracted with another party for the development of the land. Proceeding: In the lower court the defendant was successful as it was found that no contract had been formed. This is the SCC appeal. Issue: Was there a contract formed, and, if so, did the defendant’s acions violate the contract? Analysis: In the dissent, the Chief Jusice argues that no contract was formed. However, all of the other judges agree that a unilateral contract was indeed formed. They state that the performance that was required of the defendant was noifying the plainif that a pilot was ready, and taking him along on the exploraion. However, by their acions the defendants prevented the complementary performance of the plainif that would have enitled him to his share of the earnings, and in doing so they breached the contract. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 28 Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the case is sent back to the BCSC to determine the damages for the plainif. Notes/Raio: Where a complementary acion is contemplated for both paries, the oferor in a unilateral contract cannot revoke the contract for want of performance if he or she fails to discharge his or her complimentary obligaion to perform. In such case, the oferor is not a passive oferor but an acive one with obligaion to facilitate the oferee’s performance. CHAPTER TWO – MUTUAL ASSENT: HOW A BARGAIN IS MADE Secion One – Problems of Acceptance: Who Can Accept an Ofer Williams v. Carwardine (1833, King’s Bench) Sister Gives Evidence on Brother’s Murder; Intent Is Not Necessary As Long as Reward is Known! Facts: The plainif’s brother was murdered, and the defendant put out a reward for £20 to anyone who gave evidence that led to a convicion. Two men were tried and acquited. The plainif was severely beaten by Williams and made a convicion to clear her conscience that led to his convicion for murder. Proceeding: The lower court said that she was enitled to the money; this is the appeal by the defendant. Issue: Can someone accept an ofer for reward even if the intent of his or her acions is not to recover the reward? Analysis: All of the judges agree that the speciic intent of the plainif does not mater in this case. The ofer was made to anyone who provided evidence that led to a convicion. The plainif did this, and therefore she is owed the £20. It does not mater that she was not seeking the money when she made the statement, because she sill completed the speciic performance necessary for acceptance. The judges ind that she must have known of the reward, because posters were printed all over the pplace where she lives. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the plainif is given the money. Notes/Raio: The intenions of an acceping party are of no importance; if they complete the speciic performance necessary of acceptance then a contract is formed regardless of their intenions. However, they must be aware of the award. They don’t have to be acing to get the reward, but they must know of the reward before their acion. Gibbons v. Proctor (1891, Queen’s Bench) Oicer Gives Convicing Info Before Reward Ofered, Received Ater It is ofered – Enitled to It! Facts: A reward of £25 was ofered to anyone who gave informaion leading to the convicion of someone in the sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl to a speciic police superintendant. A police oicer gave informaion that led to a convicion, and delivered it to the superintended through two agents. When the oicer irst gave the informaion, the reward had not yet been ofered. However, by the ime it reached the superintendant the reward had been ofered. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 29 Proceeding: The case was dismissed in the lower court; this is the appeal by the plainif. Issue: Which ime is more important – when the oicer made the statement, or when it reached the superintendant? Analysis: The judges state that the important fact is that when the informaion reached the superintendant he was aware of the reward. Therefore, the ofer was accepted upon the superintendant’s receipt of the informaion. The police oicer had saisied the performance necessary for the reward. Outcome: The plainif is successful, and is enitled to the reward of £25. Notes/Raio: An ofer is accepted when word of the acceptance is received, not when it is made. The Crown v. Clarke (1927, Australia High Court) Accused Gives Statement That Convicts Other Man; Not Enitled To Reward; Need Intent to Accept Facts: There was an ofer for a reward of £1,000 made to anyone who gave informaion leading to a convicion in a murder case. There were two suspects apprehended and quesioned. In order to clear his own name, the defendant gave a statement that led to the other man being convicted, and him being cleared of all charges. He did not intend to do this for reward, he was simply trying to prove his innocence – he was not thinking of the reward at the ime that he made the statement. Aterwards, he made a claim to the reward. Proceeding: In the iniial trial the decision was for the crown, however it was overturned on appeal. This is the inal appeal. Issue: Does a party have to intend to accept an ofer in order for there to be true acceptance, and a contract formed? Analysis: The judge makes it very clear that the rule laid out in Williams v. Carwardine no longer applies. He says that because consensus ad idem is a fundamental necessity of a contract, the party acceping must know of the ofer and be intending to accept it in order for a binding contract to be formed. In acceptance there must be assent of the ofer, and there can be no assent without knowledge of the ofer. Outcome: The appeal is allowed, and the Crown is successful. The defendant does not get the reward. Notes/Raio: The acceping party must know of the ofer, and intenionally assent to it in order for a binding contract to be formed. The mental state of the acceping party must be considered. Con-Force Products Ltd. v. Rosen and Boyle (1967, Sask. QB) P thinks Contract is with D; D is Acing for Corporaion; Objecive Test Favours P – D is Liable Facts: The plainifs were a construcion company who made steel supports. They heard of a new motel being built by the defendants, and inquired as to whether their services could be rendered for a fee. The engineering irm whom put the plainifs in contact with the defendants told them that Rosen and Boyle were the owners of the hotel. They did not tell them that Rosen, Boyle and another man had incorporated a new company to own the hotel. The plainifs sent a bid to Rosen personally, who thought he was acing on behalf of the corporaion when he had an agent send the plainifs the acceptance. There was a term in the plainif’s bid saying that the defendant’s acceptance would create Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 30 a contract valid unil all of the details were worked out. Eventually, the defendants refuse to hire the plainifs. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Is the agreement with Rosen binding, even though he thought he was acing on behalf of the corporaion? Analysis: The judge says that it is clear that the plainifs believed they were dealing with Rosen personally, and that Rosen believed that he was acceping on behalf of the corporaion. The judge employs an objecive test to determine that the onus is not on the plainif to inquire further into the situaion, as he was led to believe that Rosen was a personal owner by one of Rosen’s agents. Therefore, the onus was on Rosen to let the plainifs know that he was acing on behalf of a corporaion – this would have created a new situaion and allowed the plainifs to back out of the deal if they wanted to. Looking at the situaion objecively yields a decision that the defendants accepted in their personal capacity. Outcome: Rosen is liable for damages for the breach of contract between the plainif and himself. Notes/Raio: When determining what the paries intended when entering into a contract, you must employ an objecive test to determine what a reasonable man would conclude. The quesion in the objecive test is “not what the paries had in their minds, but what reasonable third paries would infer from their words and conducts”. The defendants intended to contract in their personal capacity, employing this test (similar to Grant v. NB). When there is diiculty in inding acceptance because the paries do not understand each other’s intenions, you use an objecive test to resolve the issue. Blair v. Western Mutual Beneit Associaion (1972, BCCA) Woman Takes Minutes Staing She Will Get A Bonus; Reires, Doesn’t Get It – Need Intent for Ofer Facts: The plainif was a secretary, and reired ater many years working for the defendant. Towards the end of her employment, she was given oral minutes of a meeing of the board of directors that she copied down into print. In these minutes was a discussion that if she were to reire, she would be given approximately two years’ pay as a bonus for her long service. She does reire, but does not get this money. She sues the company for the lost wages claiming that a contract was formed. Proceeding: The case was dismissed at trial; this is the appeal by the plainif. Issue: Was this an ofer that was capable of acceptance by Miss Blair? Analysis: The irst judge states that this is not a contract for three reasons: (1) no promise was made and accepted for consideraion, (2) no change in the exising relaionship took place, and (3) there was no evidence of an intenion to change the relaionship to create new legal obligaions. He says that a “bare resoluion” that is delivered, such as here, cannot be considered to indicate an intenion to create a legal obligaion capable of acceptance. It is not unequivocal. This could be refuted if the plainif could show something to indicate the intent of the defendant to be bound, but nothing could be shown to this efect. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 31 The second and third judges agree with the decision. The second judge says that another problem is there is not suicient connecion between the resoluion and Miss Blair’s reasons for reirement to imply that she accepted the ofer through her performance (reiring) – which is what she claimed (that this was a unilateral contract). The third judge simply says that this publishing cannot be considered to be an ofer, as a reasonable person would not think that the employer intended to be bound. Quantum meruit is also denied as the woman did not rely on the terms of the “contract” in any of her acions, and therefore sufered no losses. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the plainif does not get the money. Notes/Raio: A party must intend to make an ofer for it to be an ofer capable of acceptance, and it must be communicated to the party to whom it is directed in order to prove that the oferor intended to be legally bound. It makes no diference if the oferee knows about the ofer by another means – it must be deliberately communicated to them by the oferor. Campbell v. Inverness (County) (1990, NSSC TD) Resoluions Are Not Binding Contracts! Notes/Raio: A resoluion passed by a board of directors in a corporaion, or a municipal corporaion does not give rise to a contractual obligaion. Regulaions are not passed with the intent to enter into contractual obligaions; they can be reconsidered, amended and rescinded. Wilson v. Belfast Corporaion Unauthorized Communicaion of Ofers, Even in the Media, Cannot be Accepted Notes/Raio: Acceptance of an “ofer” cannot be premised upon unauthorized communicaion of the ofer, even where the ofer is published in the media. Secion Two – Time Limits on the Power of Acceptance: Life of an Ofer Cooke v. Oxley (1790, UK KB) P asks D to Keep Ofer Open Unil 4 PM; Ofers Need Consideraion to Be let Open Facts: The defendant proposed to sell some good to the plainif. The plainif asked to have unil 4:00 PM to decide, and the defendant agreed. Before 4:00 the plainif said that he would like to purchase the goods. The defendant did not deliver them. Proceeding: The plainif was successful in trial; this is an appeal (I think!). Issue: Was a contract for sale formed? Analysis: In this case the judge overrules the previous decision and states that there is clearly not a contract here. He says that to sustain a promise, there must be damage to the plainif or an advantage given to the defendant as a result of the acions, and this did not occur here. There was no consideraion for keeping the ofer open unil 4 pm. He rejects the idea that the contract of sale was complete when the plainif agreed to purchase them, for the defendant sill has to agree to sell them. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; there was no contract of sale. Notes/Raio: Ofers need consideraion in order to be let open. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 32 Adams and others v. Lindsell and Another (1818, UK KB) Wool Sale Gets Lost in the Post; Acceptance Happens When Oferee Accepts Ofer, Not When Oferor Received Noice! Mailbox Rule of Acceptance! Facts: The defendants are wool dealers who wish to sell wool to the plainifs. The send a leter to the plainifs staing the terms of the deal, and say that acceptance must be given by a certain date. However, as a result of the defendant’s negligence, the leter gets lost in the post and arrives late to the plainifs. They accept the ofer, and mail it before the deadline, but it does not reach the defendants unil ater the deadline has passed. Thinking that the plainifs had not accepted the ofer, the defendants sold to wool to another party. The plainifs sued. Proceeding: The defendants were held liable at trial because it was their negligence that caused the delay; they appealed. Issue: When does acceptance come into force – when it is given, or when it arrives at the oferor? Analysis: The judge states that acceptance must be deemed to be given at the instant that oferee accepts the ofer and puts it in the mailbox. This was before the deadline; therefore a contract was made. If it was not really accepted unil the oferor received noice, then the plainifs ought not to be bound unil they received noice of the defendant’s receipt, and so on ad ininitum. Outcome: A contract is formed; the defendants are liable. Notes/Raio: An acceptance comes into force at the instant that the oferee puts the acceptance in the mail, not when the noice of acceptance is received by the oferor. Barrick v. Clark (1951, SCC) Ofer of Land Let Open For Reasonable Time – Acions of Paries Help Determine Reasonable Time Facts: Barrick owned farmland that Clark wanted to buy. They entered into negoiaions, which resulted in Clark making an ofer of $14,500. Barrick wrote back staing that the price was $15,000. However, at this ime Mr. Clark was away on a huning trip. His wife received the leter and responded asking Mr. Barrick to hold the ofer open unil her husband returned – in about 10 days. Mr. Barrick did not reply. Thirteen days later, Clark sold the property to someone else for $15,000. Mr. Barrick did not return for 20 days ater his wife received the ofer. Proceeding: The case was dismissed at trial, but reversed for Clark on appeal. This is the SCC appeal by Barrick. Issue: What is the reasonable amount of ime that the ofer must be let open for? Analysis: The judge states that the reasonable ime that this speciic ofer must be let open for is longer than for goods that luctuate in price (stocks), or perishable goods. The ields could not be used unil Spring anyway, which must be considered. However, through his acions and insistence on replying to Mr. Barrick’s leters by wire Clark indicated that he did not have a Spring date in mind, but wanted to get the sale done, or go of to pursue other opions. Further, Barrick did not respond to Mrs. Clark’s leter, so he was not bound to any paricular period of ofer. Therefore leaving the ofer open for thirteen days was reasonable ime, as Clark had indicated that he wanted to accept and close the sale ASAP. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 33 In the concurring judgment, the judge discusses the fact that much of the Appeal Court’s reasoning was based of claims that Mr. Barrick made concerning his intent to sell as soon as possible outside of his communicaion with Clark. The judge states, “an intenion not expressed or communicated to the other party is immaterial in deciding whether there was an agreement. Outcome: The appeal is allowed, Clark gets nothing and Barrick’s sale to the third party goes through. Notes/Raio: Courts will take the acions of the paries into account when determining what a reasonable ime for an ofer to remain open will be. Goods that luctuate in price or perish obviously have a shorter window. Statements made outside of a contract have no bearing in deciding whether there was an agreement. Manchester Diocesan Council for Educaion v. Commercial and General Investments Ltd. (1969, UK) Sale of School Needs Gov’t Approval; Objecive Test Used to Determine if Time was Reasonable Facts: The plainifs owned a school that they had the right to sell, upon approval by a government oicial. Ater receiving interest, they decided to create a tender for sale. The defendants placed the highest tender, and conirmed this in a leter on Sept. 15 th. All that was let to do ater this was obtain approval from the government oicial. This was completed on December 23 rd, and communicated to the defendant. The defendant’s lawyers said that they did not wish to accept the ofer and they were not bound by the contract. The plainif delivered oicial word of the acceptance of the contract, with consent from the government, on January 7th. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: When did acceptance occur? If not unil January, was this reasonable amount of ime to leave the ofer open? Analysis: The judge states that he believes that the contract was completed on September 15 th, and that waiing for government approval had no impact on the status of the contract. However, he goes on to say that if he was wrong, and the contract was not completed unil January 7 th, then the contract is sill enforceable. The defendants gave no noice of their intent not to be bound unil they received a leter informing them that the approval had been obtained, and that the deal could be oicially closed. The plainif had no reason to expect that the defendants did not intend to be bound, as they did not act in a way that made this apparent – in fact, they acted to make the opposite seem likely. The test that should be applied is not one of considering what a reasonable ime is from either the oferor or oferee’s point of view, but an objecive test that determines whether or not the oferee could fairly be deemed to have refused the ofer. Employing this test involves looking at the acions of the oferee for indicaion of their intenion, and these acions show no intent to reject the ofer unil ater they had been told that it was complete. Outcome: The plainif succeeds, and the defendant must purchase the school. Notes/Raio: An objecive test should be used to determine if the ime that an ofer was let open is reasonable. This should include analyzing the acions of the paries to determine their intenions. Secion Three – Revocaion of the Ofer: Withdrawal of Power to Accept Dickinson v. Dodds (1876, UK CA) Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 34 Ofer “Open Unil Friday”, Oferor Not Bound; Oferor Can Revoke Any Time Before Acceptance Facts: Dodds delivered an ofer to sell to Dickinson on Wednesday, staing that the ofer was to stay open unil 9:00 AM on Friday. Dickenson apparently decided to accept the ofer on Thursday, but didn’t say anything to Dodds because he thought he had unil Friday morning. However, he was informed that Dodds had sold the property to someone else on Thursday evening and tried to reach Dodds. When he did, the next day, he was told that the property was already sold. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial; this is the defendant’s appeal. Issue: Was the leter more than an ofer? Was Dodds bound to not revoke the ofer and sell to someone else? Analysis: The two judges agree that the leter was merely an ofer, and nothing more. When an ofer has been made, the oferor is as free to revoke it as the oferee is to accept or reject it. The plainif tries to contend that the only way the oferor can revoke the ofer is by explicit communicaion to the oferee, but this is rejected. It is clear in law that an ofer does not amount to an agreement, and can be withdrawn at any point. Even though it was said that the ofer was to remain open unil Friday, this did not bind Dodds. There must be a “meeing of the minds” at the ime the contract is formed, and this obviously could not occur here, so there could be no contract. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; Dodds can sell the property to the third party. Notes/Raio: Oferors are free to withdraw their ofer at any point unil the oferee has accepted it, so long as the oferee has not provided any sort of consideraion. They do not need to communicate this withdrawal to the oferee. Paterson v. Patberg (1928, NY CA) P Wants to Buy Out Mortgage to Save $; Ofers in Unilateral Contracts Can Be Revoked Any Time Before Performance has been Completed Facts: The defendant agrees to give the plainif $780 of his mortgage if he completely pays for it by a certain date. The plainif comes to pay for the rest of the mortgage before this date, but the defendant refuses to take his money and tells him that he has sold the mortgage to someone else. Now, if the plainif wants to purchase the mortgage he will have to buy it from the third party and pay the extra $780. Proceeding: The judgment was for the plainif at trial; this is the appeal by the defendant. Issue: In a unilateral contract, does the acceptor have to complete his obligaion before he is enitled to what he was promised? Analysis: The majority states it is elementary to contract law that a unilateral ofer can be revoked at any ime before the performance is complete. The promise of the contract does not become binding unil the party has completed their performance. Here, because the plainif had not completed his performance the contract is not binding. The dissening judge says that if the reason that the plainif was not able to complete his performance is because the defendant would not accept payment, then this is not fair and should not be held against the plainif. Further, the defendant intended to be bound by the terms at the ime the contract was formed, even though it was subject to condiions. He goes on to say that even though the Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 35 promise does not have to be followed through unil the performance is complete, part performance must count for something, and the defendant cannot withdraw the ofer while the plainif is in the middle of compleing his performance. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendant can sell the property and the plainif has to purchase it from the third party and lose the $780. Notes/Raio: Ofers made in unilateral contracts can be revoked at any ime before the speciic performance has been completed. Errington v. Errington and Woods (1952, UK CA) Father Buys Mortgage For Son & His Wife; He Dies; House is Sill Theirs If they Complete Payments Facts: A father bought a house for his son and daughter in law. He borrowed money to buy it, and told the couple that once they paid of this mortgage then the house would be theirs. They made the payments regularly as requested, however other rates eventually arose that were too much for the couple to pay. The father agreed to pay these extra fees, and the couple coninued to pay the mortgage. The father dies, and his wife sued for the house. Proceeding: The defendants were successful at trial; this is the father’s estate’s appeal. Issue: Does the couple have a contractual right to coninue paying installments, and upon compleion of payments, take itle of the house? Does their agreement remain binding despite the father's death? Analysis: Denning states that this is a unilateral contract, and once the couple began to perform their part of the bargain neither the father, nor his estate could withdraw the ofer. As long as the couple coninues to make their payments on ime then the house will transfer to their name when the mortgage is paid of. This protects the interests of the party who is acing on the promise of the oferor (the couple, in this case). Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the couple can sill own the house if they coninue to make their payments. Notes/Raio: Within a unilateral contract, there is an implied promise not to revoke once performance has commenced. The promisor cannot retract his promise if the promisee has begun to complete his performance, even if it is not inished, when the ofer requires coninuing performance and there is no evidence that the oferee is going to stop their performance. Secion Four – Problems Concerning Communicaion of Acceptance Re Irvine (1928, Ont. CA) Man Accepts Contract on Deathbed; Son Mails it Ater Death; Acceptance Not Valid – Wife Gets Dower Facts: The Crown is trying to prevent the widow plainif from recovering dower ater her husband’s death – they claim that he did not have itle to the land when he died, and therefore that he cannot pass it on. The husband signed the acceptance of the ofer for the land on his deathbed and gave it to his son to mail. However, the son did not mail the acceptance unil ater his father had died. Proceeding: The lower courts held that the woman could recover the dower; this is the Crown’s appeal. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 36 Issue: Was the deceased man the itleholder of the property, or had a contract been formed? Analysis: The judge states that the deceased is enitled to the land because there was no contract. The acceptance had not technically been given at the ime of the man’s death, so he sill had itle to the land. A test to determine whether or not someone has itle is to ask if the person brought an acion for the enforcement of the contract, based upon the facts at the ime of death, would it be enforced? In this case the judge says that it would have been successful, and therefore the man sill has itle. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the woman is sill enitled to the dower. Notes/Raio: Acceptance can be revoked up unil the ime that it is mailed, and cannot be enforced unil this ime that the acceptance is entered. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893, England CA) In Unilateral Contracts Acceptance doesn’t need to be communicated to Oferor to Create a Contract Notes: Here the judge is talking about what is needed for acceptance. As a general rule, you need to inform the oferee of the acceptance in order to guarantee that there is a “meeing of the minds”. However, in some unilateral contract noiicaion does not need to be given as the oferor’s willingness to enter into a contract with anyone who accepts the ofer in implied. This is paricularly the case with adverisements to the general public for speciic performance. Think of a reward for a lost dog – when someone brings the dog to you, are you going to turn him (and the dog) away because you don’t want to grant his acceptance? No – your willingness to be bound was implied in the adverisement. Other things that you can look at when the case isn’t so clear are looking at the wording of the ofer, and the character of the transacion. Saint John Tug Boat Co. Ltd. v. Irving Reining Ltd. (1964, SCC) Tugs Used Ater Deadline; Don’t Want to Pay; (Objecive) Implied Acceptance in Allowing Work Silence + Conduct may Imply Acceptance Facts: The plainif had a deal with the defendant to supply them the use of their tugboats for assising incoming oil tankers to their shipyard. However, eventually the plainif stated that they would only have two boats available, and advised the defendants to look elsewhere for help. The plainifs ended up inding two more tugs, and told the defendants that they could use them if they paid $450/day to have them “on call” unil a certain date. This date passed, and the plainif coninued to keep the tugs on call, and the defendants coninued to use them for a few months. However, when billed for these months ater the original end of the contract, the defendants refused to pay. Proceeding: The defendants were held liable for all of the payments at trial, however on appeal the charges past the original end date were taken away. This is the plainif’s appeal. Issue: Did the defendant, in their acion, imply acceptance? Were they therefore bound by the contract unil the very end? Analysis: The judge says that ater the original deadline passed, the plainifs were essenially serving the defendants with a new ofer every ime they sent them an invoice and kept the tugs on call, and that the defendant coninued to imply acceptance by their coninuaion of using the service. The defendants must have known that the tug was sill standing by, and that the plainifs expected to be paid for their services. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 37 Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendants are liable for all of the costs. Notes/Raio: If A allows B to work for him under such circumstances that no reasonable person would suppose that B meant to do the work for nothing, then A will be liable to pay for it. The doing of the work is the ofer; the permission to do it, or the acquiescence in its being done, is the acceptance. Silence can consitute acceptance when combined with conduct. Carr v. Canadian Northern Railway Co. (1907, Man. KB) D’s Build Railway on P’s Property; Acceptance Implied through Acion – Followed Direcions to Accept Acceptance By Conduct! Facts: The defendants wanted to build railway tracks on the plainif’s land. The negoiaions did not come to an agreement. Eventually, the plainif worked up a large and very speciic list of what he wanted in return for allowing them to build upon his land. He handed this to the defendants and said that if they came on his land and began construcion then he would assume that they had accepted the ofer, because he would not let them enter on his property on any other terms. The defendants began to build the railway, and two weeks later told the plainif that they were not going to be bound by his terms. Proceeding: This is the original trial Issue: Did the defendants, in their acions, accept the condiions of the contract? Analysis: The judge says that it is clear that the defendants knew of the terms of the ofer, and that the plainif would not allow them to build upon any other terms. Further, the plainif told them a way to accept the ofer – by beginning to build. Conduct or an acion can accept an ofer as long as the party acceping follows the indicated mode of acceptance. Here the indicated mode of acceptance was beginning to build the track, and the defendants did that. In doing this they accepted the plainif’s ofer and entered into a binding contract. Outcome: Judgment for the plainifs in full. Notes/Raio: An oferee can accept an ofer through his or her own acions so long as the acions are the ones indicated in the ofer as the mode of acceptance. There is an element of objecivity required to show that acceptance has occurred. Dominion Building Corp. Ltd. v. The King (1933, Privy Council) Gov’t Won’t Give Land to P Despite Order in Council; No Noice Necessary When Acceptance Implied Facts: The plainif wanted to purchase two adjacent plots of land for the purpose of building a high-rise building. The Crown owned one of the plots. He gave them a very speciic ofer that they had discussed, including terms that they would be able to rent some loors for oices. In the ofer he said that that if the ofer was “accepted by the Governor in council” then a binding contract shall ensue. The government never actually sent the plainif acceptance, but they forwarded him an Order in Council that approved the terms. When he tried to take possession of the land the Crown would not let him. Proceeding: In the original trial the plainif was successful. In the SCC appeal the appeal was allowed because there was not writen contract, and the Order was only permission to accept, not acceptance in itself – however the deposit was returned. This is the inal Privy Council appeal. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 38 Issue: Did the defendants imply acceptance in their acions? Was acceptance even needed? Analysis: The Privy Council inds that the defendant did imply acceptance through their forwarding of the Order staing that the government had approved the terms. However, in this case the delivery of acceptance was not necessary because all that was needed for acceptance was the creaion of an Order in Council, which was created. This creaion was the speciic performance required to consitute acceptance. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendant has to give the plainif the property. Notes/Raio: When acceptance has been implied through conduct, it is not necessary to deliver noiicaion of that acceptance to the oferor. It is the SCC precedent that stands ater this case. Subsequent cases have relied on the SCC decision and not the Privy Council one. Felthouse v. Bindley (1862, UK Court of Common Pleas) Nephew Thinks He Sold Horse to Uncle; Didn’t Noify or Act Like It; Therefore No Acceptance! Facts: The plainif negoiated to purchase a horse from his nephew. There was a mix-up with the price, as the uncle ofered less than the nephew desired. The uncle gave a deinite ofer to the nephew in January, however no acceptance was given, and no acions were performed as the horse remained in the possession of the nephew. In February the nephew sold all of his farm stock in an aucion, including the horse. Ater this he acknowledged that he thought he had sold the horse to his uncle. The plainif tried to sue the aucioneer in conversion to recover the horse. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial; this is the defendant’s moion for a non-suit. Issue: Did the nephew accept his uncle’s ofer, or was the horse sill his property at the ime of the aucion? Analysis: The judge says that it is clear here that nothing had been done at the ime of the aucion to imply that the property had changed hands to the uncle, and the nephew had given no acceptance. Therefore, with no acceptance or implied acceptance through acions the property remained that of the nephew at the ime of the aucion, and the uncle has no case against the aucioneer for selling goods that were not owned by the nephew – because the nephew sill owned the horse! If the nephew wanted to enter into the contract he must have given clear indicaion of his acceptance. Outcome: The appeal is allowed – the case is thrown out. Notes/Raio: Acceptance cannot be assumed if there is not noiicaion of acceptance, or implied acceptance through acion present. Without either of these, a contract cannot be created. You cannot impose obligaions on an unwilling party. Vollmer v. Jones (2007, Ont. Sup. Ct.) Divorce Setlement; Husband’s Silence Indicates Acceptance in Common Sense – He had to say No! Facts: The plainif and defendant were going through a divorce. Ater many hours of negoiaion, the plainif wife accepted a huge decrease in her child support payments in order to meet the terms of the defendant. At this point the paries shook hands and it was said that they “had a deal”. However, when Ms. Vollmer tried to enforce the contract, Mr. Jones said that he had never accepted – he had remained completely silent. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 39 Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Whether the verbal agreement was merely an “agreement to agree”, or whether it was a binding contract. Analysis: The judge looks at the history of cases where silence was deemed to be considered acceptance, however he gets the basis of his decisions from Canadian Contract Law, which essenially states that common sense rules must apply. In this case, ater several hours of negoiaions, one can only assume that shaking and agreeing that “a deal was had” indicates an acceptance of the ofer. At the very least, remaining silent does not indicate an unwillingness to accept. In this instance, common sense would indicate that Mr. Jones and/or his lawyer were required to noify the other party if they did not accept the ofer – however they did nothing. The oferor (wife) here can assume that her ofer had been accepted on the basis of common sense rules. Outcome: Judgment for the plainif wife. Notes/Raio: Silence can consitute acceptance. When the oferor can reasonably rely on the oferee’s acceptance as a mater of common sense, then the oferee must inform the oferor is he or she does not accept the ofer, or a binding contract is formed. Wheeler and Another v. Klaholt and Another (1901, Mass. SC) Shoe Sale; Defendants Had Duty to Accept/Return; Failed to Live up to Duty – Contract Enforced Facts: The plainif sent a large number of shoes to the defendant, thinking that a contract had been formed. However, it became apparent that no contract had been formed. The plainifs told the defendants that they could have the shoes for a certain price, or that they should return them immediately. The defendants wrote back with a drat for paying at a discount of four percent. The plainifs did not accept this, and told the defendants to either pay in full or send the shoes back. The defendants sent the shoes back ater a long ime, but they were defaced when they arrived. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Has a contract been formed because the defendants did not accept, or return the goods in a reasonable ime? Does it mater that the paries had done business before? Analysis: The judge states that it is a general rule that a party cannot send goods to a stranger and send a noice that will end up with the stranger being a purchaser without will. However, in this case the two paries knew each other and had done deals like this in the past. He states that the defendants therefore had a duty to return the goods in a reasonable ime or pay for them, which they failed to live up to. The fact that the defendants didn’t do anything when the plainifs said to accept/return at once indicates that they accepted. Outcome: The plainif is successful. Notes/Raio: If a duty is created upon an oferee to accept an ofer or return the goods ofered, then a failure to live up to this duty will result in the contract of sale being binding. Secion Five – The Efecive Time of Acceptance Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 40 Household Fire & Carriage Insurance Co. v. Grant (1879, UK CA) D Buys Shares in P Company, Doesn’t Receive Noice of Acceptance; D Liquidates, P Won’t Pay – MAILBOX RULE! Facts: The defendant had negoiated to purchase shares in the plainif company. His applicaion was accepted, and his name was added to the list of registered shareholders. However, the leter informing the defendant of this never reached him. The defendant never paid for the shares. His earnings from dividends were credited to his account. Eventually the plainif company went into liquidaion and the liquidator applied for money from the defendant. He refused to pay on the grounds that he was not a shareholder – he didn’t know that he was because he had never received the noiicaion in the mail. Proceeding: The plainif was successful in court and recovered the funds; this is the defendant’s appeal. Issue: Is there a legally binding contract formed even without the noice of acceping being received? When do acceptances becoming binding when they are sent in the mail? Analysis: The trial judge found that the defendant implied that the plainif was to send him the noiicaion that he had been issued the shares in the mail, and therefore they were not to be penalized for sending the noiicaion that way. The majority agrees with his decision that the contract was formed when the acceptance was mailed. They discuss the pros and cons of this rule, and decide that the pros outweigh the cons. They state that the oferor can always choose to make the acceptance binding only upon his receipt of the noiicaion that it has been accepted. However, to state that this must happen in all cases would reduce the eiciency in the business world. The contract is complete and absolutely binding upon the transmission of acceptance through the mail as long as that is a medium of communicaion that the paries contemplated. The dissening judge disagrees, and gives several examples of situaions where he believes that the postal rule would hinder transacions. He says generally that the noice of acceptance must reach the party who made the ofer before it can be considered binding. He says that if the rule proposed in the majority is accepted then it must be adhered to in all instances of noices via mail. For example, if you mail money to someone in an acceptance, then you have paid…even if the money never reaches the other party. Is this logical? No. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed. Notes/Raio: A contract becomes binding the instant that the acceptance is put in the mail, so long as the paries have contemplated the mail as a viable means of communicaion in their dealings. Henthorn v. Fraser (1892, UK CA) P Mails Acceptance Before He Receives D’s Noiicaion of Withdrawal; Contract Formed Postal Rule Does Not Apply to Revocaion of Ofer Facts: The plainif wanted to purchase houses from the defendant. A secretary for the defendant ofered to sell them to him for £750, and said that he would have 14 days to decide whether to accept the ofer. The same day, a third party ofered to purchase the houses for £760. The defendant said that it would be accepted so long as they could noify and withdraw their ofer to the plainif. They mailed a leter to the plainif around noon saying that their ofer was revoked, but it did not arrive at his place unil between 5 and 6 PM, and he did not receive it unil about 8:00 PM. Meanwhile, the plainif’s lawyer had mailed a leter of acceptance at 3:50 PM that arrived at the defendant’s at 8:30 PM, and opened the next morning. The secretary replied saying that the ofer had been withdrawn. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 41 Proceeding: The trial judge dismissed the claim; this is the plainif’s appeal. Issue: Was the acceptance in efect before the ofer was revoked? Analysis: The judge says that if the rule that acceptance comes into force at the moment it is mailed, then this withdrawing of the ofer is inefectual. He says that a person who makes an ofer must be thought of as coninually making it unil he has brought the knowledge to the other party that it has been withdrawn. The trial judge said that there was no explicit statement that mail was to be used to communicate, as the ofer was made in person. However, the judge in this court says that the usage of the mail was implied as being approved, as the plainif lived in a diferent town. Any reasonable person would have concluded that he would accept by mail from his home. The mailbox rule stands, and the contract for sale is binding. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; a binding contract was formed. Notes/Raio: Where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplaion of the paries that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicaing the acceptance of an ofer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is posted. The postal rule does not apply to noices of revocaion of an ofer! Holwell Securiies Ltd. v. Hughes (1974, UK CA) 6 Month Ofer Requires “Noice In Wriing” – Noice Lost in Post; Postal Rule Doesn’t Apply When Speciic Means of Acceptance Required by Contract Facts: The defendant granted the plainif a six-month opion to purchase a property, and stated that the opion had to be exercised “by noice in wriing”. Before the six months were up, the plainif’s lawyer wrote to the defendant’s lawyer staing that his client was exercising his opion, and also included a cheque for the deposit. This leter was hand delivered. The plainif’s lawyer also sent a copy of the leter to the defendant, but it was never delivered. The defendant refused to sell the property to the plainif. Proceeding: The lower courts found for the defendant; this is the plainif’s appeal. Issue: Was there a contract here? Does the postal rule apply? Analysis: If the postal rule applies, then there is a contract as the agent of the plainif mailed the acceptance. Here the judges say that although the paries intended to use the post as the means to communicate acceptance, they have not displaced the general rule of acceptance – that it requires communicaion. The use of the words “noice in wriing” meant that the defendant required actual noice of acceptance. The postal rule does not apply when the terms of a contract point to the necessity of actual communicaion, even if the post is the desired medium of communicaion. The recipient doesn’t actually have to read or understand the acceptance; it must just arrive and be seen by the oferor. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; there is no contract. Notes/Raio: The postal rule does not apple in situaions where a speciic means of acceptance has been speciied. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 42 List of Excepions to Postal Rule (p. 204) The rules do not apply: - Where the oferor speciies actual receipt of acceptance. - Where it will result in “manifest inconvenience and absurdity” (note the examples). - Wider principles: the rule does not apply if, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature of the subject mater under consideraion, the negoiaing paries cannot have intended that there should be a binding agreement unil the party acceping an ofer or exercising an opion had in fact communicated acceptance or exercise to the other. - The court has to look at the nature of the transacion to determine whether or not the postal rule applies. - Note how these excepions relect the dissent from Household Fire. Charlebois v. Baril (1928, SCC) D Hand-Delivers Ofer; P Accepts By Post; Leter Gets Lost – Postal Rule Doesn’t Apply, Postal Acceptance Not Implied as Being OK! Facts: The defendant hand delivered his ofer to the plainif. When the plainif accepted the ofer he sent it in the mail, but the defendant claims to have never received it. The plainif received a leter withdrawing the ofer in the mail the day ater he posted his leter of acceptance. Proceeding: The plainif was successful in the lower courts; this is the defendant’s appeal. Issue: Is there a contract here? Does the postal rule apply? Analysis: The lower courts held that the postal rule did apply, and therefore that there was a contract because acceptance occurred when the plainif mailed his leter of acceptance. However, the SCC disagrees and states that using the post to accept a hand-delivered leter is not a proper form of acceptance. If postal acceptance cannot be implied by the nature of the transacion or the conduct of the paries, then the postal rule does not apply. In this case there was nothing to consitute an implicaion that the post should be used, and therefore the general rule of acceptance applied – actual communicaion was required. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; there is no binding contract and the postal rule does not apply. Notes/Raio: The postal rule only applies if postal acceptance is implied by the nature of the transacion or the conduct of the paries. If it doesn’t apply, then the general rule of acceptance applies and communicaion of the acceptance is necessary – the oferor has to receive noice. Milinkovich v. Canadian Mercanile Insurance Co. (1960, SCC) P Burns Down House; D Insures him for $10K; D Mails P Form, P Mails it Back, It Gets Lost, Postal Rule! Facts: The plainif accidentally set ire to a building and caused a great deal of damage. The defendant insured him for $10,000. He tried to contact them several imes unsuccessfully, and eventually he hired a lawyer to do it for him so that he could get the insurance money. The defendant’s lawyer mailed form Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 43 of proof of loss to the plainif’s lawyer and requested them to be returned when inished. The plainif illed them in, and his lawyer mailed them back. The defendant never received the forms. Eventually the plainif sued, and the defendant objected, staing that this was premature, as they had never received the proof of loss forms. Proceeding: The plainif was successful at trial, but overturned on appeal. This is his SCC appeal. Issue: Did the plainif have to wait unil the defendant received his forms unil he had a cause of acion? Analysis: The judges say that the defendants virtually invited the plainif’s lawyer to send the forms in the mail, because they sent them in the mail themselves! The plainif’s lawyer’s obligaions were fulilled the minute he mailed the forms. Therefore the acceptance of the ofer was made at the ime and place that the acceptance was mailed. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; the defendants must reimburse the plainif. Notes/Raio: If the oferor uses the post to make an ofer, then the postal rule applies because their acions imply that the oferee can accept also using the post. Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. (1955, UK CA) Telexes Between London and Amsterdam; Instantaneous Communicaion = Contract Formed Where & When Acceptance is RECEIVED [Postal Rule Does Not Apply!] Facts: The plainif, located in London, telexed an ofer to the defendant in Amsterdam. The defendant telexed their acceptance back to the plainif in London. The defendant is allegedly breaching the contract, and the plainif wants to sue in London, but is unsure which jurisdicion applies. Proceeding: The lower court found that England has jurisdicion. This is the defendant’s appeal. Issue: Where was the contract completed? Where the acceptance was sent (Amsterdam), or where it was received (London)? Analysis: Denning says: “The contract was made in England. Unlike the postal rule, in case of acceptance by telex what is required is the actual communicaion of acceptance. There is no acceptance unil it was actually received by the oferor in the place where he is located. That place is the place of contract. In this case, it is England and English courts have jurisdicion.” Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; the contract was formed in England. Notes/Raio: In cases of instantaneous communicaion, the contract is only complete when the acceptance is received by the oferor: and the contract is made at the place where the acceptance is received. This also applies to the telephone, and other similar ways of communicaing. Re Viscount Supply (1963, Ont. SC) Canada Adopts Entores Raio Re: Instantaneous Communicaion! Facts: There was an instantaneous contract formed between a party in Quebec and a party in Toronto. The oferor was in Toronto, and the acceptance took place in Toronto. There is a dispute over which province has jurisdicion. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 44 Proceeding: The lower court found that Quebec had jurisdicion; this is the oferor’s appeal. Issue: Which province has jurisdicion? Where was the contract formed? Analysis: The lower court found that Quebec had jurisdicion because it did not wish to follow the decision in Entores. This judge says that Denning’s decision must be applied, and therefore the acceptance took place in Ontario, meaning that the contract was formed there, and that Ontario has jurisdicion. Outcome: The appeal is allowed; Ontario has jurisdicion. Notes/Raio: Canada adopts the Entores raio. In instantaneous communicaion, the contract is formed at the ime and place where the acceptance is delivered to the oferor. Also note that telegrams follow the postal rule, similar to leters. Brinkibon v. Stahag Stahl (1983, UK HL) Helpful Reminder Facts: The plainifs, located in London, telexed their acceptance of the ofer to the defendants in Vienna. The plainifs wanted to serve the defendant with a writ claiming damages for breach of contract in England. Proceeding: The lower courts didn’t allow this, as Austria had jurisdicion. This is the plainif’s appeal. Issue: Which country has jurisdicion? Where was the contract formed? Analysis: This case follows the raio of Entores, and therefore, as the acceptance was delivered to the oferor in Vienna, Austria has jurisdicion over the issue. Lord Wilberforce goes on to discuss the implicaions of the rules of instantaneous communicaion at length. He essenially states that no universal rule of acceptance can cover all cases of instantaneous communicaion – they must be resolved with references to the intenions of the paries, and the speciic circumstances of the case. Outcome: The appeal is dismissed; Austria has juridcion. Notes/Raio: The Entores raio is applied again. There is no universal rule of acceptance in cases on instantaneous communicaion; they must each be decided based on the intenions of the paries and the circumstances of the paricular cases. Secion Five – Electronic Contracts Rudder v. Microsot (1999, Ontario) Microsot Wants Washington Law to Apply; Terms of E-Contract Are Not Small Print! Facts: The plainifs launched a class acion suit against Microsot’s MSN Corporaion in Ontario claiming that they fraudulently breached the terms of their contracts by charging them without noice. There was a clause in the electronic contract that stated that by signing the contract the paries were agreeing to be subjected solely to the laws of the state of Washington. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 45 Issue: Is this clause binding? Analysis: The plainifs argue that the clause was similar to “ine print” in writen contracts, which must be brought to atenion, and that it was not suiciently noiceable to be considered a binding term of the contract. However, the court disagreed, staing that it was no more diicult to ind than any other terms in the contract, and that by clicking “I Agree” the paries accepted all of the terms of a contract. Although the enire contract could not be viewed on one screen, the Court said that this was no diferent than a muli-page document. Outcome: The case is dismissed; the laws of Washington are all that apply. Notes/Raio: If all of the terms of a contract appear in the same format, and are accepted, then they cannot be treated as “small print”, and require express noiicaion. Muli-page e-contracts are OK! Kanitz et al. v. Rogers Cable (2002, Ontario Superior Court) Rogers Posts Amendments on Website as Said in Contract; This Term Is Binding! Five Clicks Isn’t Too Many! Facts: The plainifs tried to launch a class acion suit against Rogers because they made amendments to their user contract and only posted noice on their website. They posted an amendment saying that any lawsuits could only be iled in arbitraion and not through the courts. The plainifs tried to say that this was insuicient noice, and further that they were simply trying to prevent class acion suits. However, a term of the original contract stated that this is the method that would be used. It took ive navigaions from Rogers’ homepage to get to the amendments. The plainifs signed up for the contracts online. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Is this noiicaion binding? Analysis: The plainifs try to parallel this case with Tilden Rent-a-Car, where it was stated that paries must not be seen as always acceping all of the terms of a contract when it is very long and not gone through completely with the oferor. The court rejects this argument, and stated that the raio from that case only applied in cases where the defendant was trying to contract out of liability. Here, the Court states that the paries agreed to all of the terms of the contract when they signed them originally, and therefore it was reasonable to expect them to visit Rogers’ website periodically. They found that navigaing to the actual site of amendments was not unreasonable. The fact that the plainifs signed up for the contract online implies that noice via the Internet was acceptable. Outcome: The case is dismissed. Notes/Raio: Oferees are deemed to accept all of the terms of an electronic contract when they sign it, so long as all of the clauses are displayed in an equally reasonable manner. Requiring actual acive acts from the oferees is also permited as long as they are reasonably implied in the contract. Robet v. Versus Brokerage Services Inc. (2001, Ont. Sup. Ct.) Defendant Broker Tries to Escape Liability for Inaccurate Purchases; Illogical One-Sided Clause Cannot be enforced Facts: The plainif was a customer of the defendant’s online stock brokerage business. He sufered losses because of inaccuracies in the company’s purchases compared to the desired purchases that he Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 46 entered. The defendants had a clause in the contract staing that they were exempt from all liability resuling from inaccuracies. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Is this clause enforceable? Analysis: The judge says that this clause cannot be enforceable because of the obvious one-sidedness that it creates. There is no possible way that there could be a meeing of the minds with respect to this clause, as it deies common sense. Outcome: The plainif is successful; the defendants are liable for the plainif’s losses. Notes/Raio: Clauses in e-contracts cannot be so one-sided that there could not be said to be a meeing of the minds. If they are, then they are not enforceable. Zhu v. Merrill Lynch HSBC (2002, BC Prov. Ct.) P Gets Noice of Cancellaion, Sill Charged – One Sided Liability Exempions Cannot Stand! Facts: The plainif used the defendant’s online brokerage business. He placed an order to sell shares from his RRSP, but immediately cancelled the transacion. He received noiicaion of his cancellaion, but he was forced to buy back his shares at a higher price and lose a signiicant amount of money. There were a number of disclaimers on the site that limited the defendant’s liability. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Were the liability limiing clauses enforceable? Analysis: The judge says that the limitaion of liability clauses cannot be given efect, because the very nature of the defendant’s business requires them to adhere to a higher duty of care and performance than ordinarily expected because of the high risk of loss of a customer’s investments. This clause was too one-sided to be enforced. Outcome: The plainif is successful; the defendants are liable for his loss. Notes/Raio: One-sided clauses cannot be eliminated from liability in e-contracts, similar to writen contracts. Specht v. Netscape Communicaions Corp (2002, NY District Court) Browse Wrap Doesn’t Bind Ps to License; Oferees Need To Accept Terms – Usually Acively! Facts: The plainifs were visitors to the defendant’s website. Upon visiing the site they downloaded sotware that did not make them accept a license agreement before downloading. The only reference to the license agreement simply required the user to scroll to the next screen, which requested for other terms of agreement to be accepted before downloading. The license agreement contained a clause requiring all disputes to be iled in arbitraion in California. Proceeding: This is the original trial. Issue: Were the terms of the license agreement enforceable? Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com) lOMoARcPSD|2828621 Contracts 2015 47 Analysis: The court says that the plainifs would only be bound to the arbitraion clause if they had agreed to it. Therefore, they had to determine whether the plainifs had given assent through their acions, and whether the website gave suicient noice of the existence of the license. The defendants argued that the downloading of the sotware indicated assent, but the court disagreed and said that an acive acion such as clicking an “I Agree” buton was required. Without this, there was no meeing of the minds and mutual assent to the terms of the contract. Outcome: The plainif is successful; the terms of the license do not apply. Notes/Raio: In order to accept terms in e-contract, you must agree to them – this is usually achieved through the acive performance of an acion such as clicking an “I Agree” buton. Distributing prohibited | Downloaded by Justin K (justinhockey750@gmail.com)