I.
1. City of Manila vs. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January 1968
Facts:
In 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading
and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. When a jeepney came along to a stop, he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney but he fell inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons pulled him out of the manhole
and one of them brought him to the hospital, where his injuries were treated. Thereafter, he sued for damages, under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer,
and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against him but the CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay
damages. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall
not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a
special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national
highway.
Issue:
Is the City of Manila liable?
Held:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law and that the charter of Manila is a special
law while the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to
persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions." There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. Upon the other hand, Article
2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 of the charter of Manila refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged
defective
condition
of
a
road,
said
Article
2189
is
decisive
thereon.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for
reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national
highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so
long as it is under the City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective
conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico
fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.
2. JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded with ankle-deep water.
As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty rainwater.
A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of1½ inches. His left leg
swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not operate his
school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana had been
placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract. TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable
and absolved City of Manila.
ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec
HELD: YES
RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manila is invoking in this
case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to
“defective streets, public buildings and other public works” in particular and is therefore decisive in this case. It was also
held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the
defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such province, city or
municipality.
In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under the control of the City as evidenced
by:
1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of the City is still needed in the
operations.
2.Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec. Virata (“The City
retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets…)
3.City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision
and control of that particular public market
4.Sec. 30 of Tax Code “The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision, administration and control
over public markets…
It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people
frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to
minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls rather than the
passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. It was evident that the certain opening
was already uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that during
floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by
the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.
Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they
were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is
the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Asiatec and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable
3. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan
FACTS: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when she
accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuing
difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby losing her income. She
also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial self since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and
other activities. She filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the
ground that the manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan.
ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.
HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over
the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and
sewers. The charter of Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and
alleys and sidewalks and the regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter
clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is
located.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
A contract for the installation of water service connections was entered into by the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System ("MWSS") and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction ("KC"). MWSS
South Sector Office gave KC a job order to effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road in San Juan.
This was in preparation for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water
concessionaires.
KC thus dispatched five (5) workers to conduct such digging operations. Project Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. was in
charge. In addition, they installed four (4) barricades using GI pipes welded together (1.3m W x 1.2m H). Digging
operations ended at 3:00 PM, with only ¾ of the job done. At around 10:00 to 11:00 PM that same day, respondent
Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa ("Biglang-awa") was riding a Toyota Crown car being driven by Priscilla Chan
at a speed of thirty (30) KPH.
It was raining hard and the road was flooded. Suddenly the left front wheel of the car fell into a manwhole which the KC
workers earlier excavated. As a result, Biglang-awa fractured her humerus (bone extending from the shoulder to the
elbow). She was brought to the Cardinal Santos Hosiptal by her husband who immediately arrived at the scene after
being contacted by Ms. Chan.
According to Police Officer Felix Ramos of the Traffic Division of the San Juan Police Station, he did not see any
barricades when he investigated the scene of the accident. According to the attending physician, Biglang-awa's injury
was expected to heal in four (4) to six (6) weeks, with rehabilitation. Dr. Antonio Rivera issued her a Medical Certificate
on her injuries.
Though Biglang-awa sustained no deformity in the injured area, she could not sleep on her right side because she could
still feel pain there. Due to her injuries, Biglang-awa filed a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of
San Juan ("San Juan") and a number of San Juan municipal officials.
She amended her complaint twice, and included in her second amendment, KC Waterworks as one of the defendants.
The RTC held in favor of Biglang-awa and declared the MWSS and San Juan to be solidarily liable to Biglang-awa. Unable
to accept judgement, both Biglang-awa (she probably wanted the officials to be liable too) and San Juan appealed to the
CA. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision, holding KC, MWSS, and San Juan to be solidarily liable to her,
without prejudice to MWSS' right for reimbursement from KC Waterworks.
Aggrieved, San Juan appealed to the SC. Hence this petition.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WON petitioner Municipality of San Juan is liable for the injury sustained by Biglang-awa. – YES, SAN JUAN IS LIABLE.
a. [SAN JUAN] San Juan tried to defend itself by citing Section 149(1)(z) of BP 337 (the LGC of 1983) and
Section 8, Ordinance 82-01.
i. Using Sec. 149, San Juan tried arguing that it is only responsible for municipal roads, Santolan, being
a national road is therefore beyond its responsibility.
ii. San Juan also contended that the aforesaid ordinance, only the project engineer of KC and MWSS
can be held liable for the same accident.
b. [SC] San Juan is liable. Article 2189 of the Civil Code states that it is sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control of a road for it to be liable for torts caused by the same.
i. San Juan's argument that per Section 149 of LGC 1983 it has only control or supervision over
municipal roads is erroneous. Nowhere in this section is its control or supervision modified by the
term "municipal road". Neither can it be inferred that the same provision only applies to activities to
be performed in municipal roads.
ii. The municipality's liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of
the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the
drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its
territorial jurisdiction.
iii. San Juan's use of Section 8 of Ordinance 82-01 also does not hold water. Such Ordinance makes the
excavator liable for injury or death or damages caused by non-completion of works or failure to
implement precautionary measures. However, nowhere in said Ordinance does it state that
municipalities in Metro Manila are exempt from liabilities caused by their own negligent acts.
Therefore, nothing prevents the municipality from being liable by the application of other laws.
5. Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands
FACTS:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to
the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.
6. Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme
FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due
to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against
the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of nonsuability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.
ISSUES:
1.
Are
municipal
corporations
suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?
HELD:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant
cannot
recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get
a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was
performing
duties
or
tasks
pertaining
to
his
office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.
7. SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME VS. RODRIGO APOSTOL, ET AL.
FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel
Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South
Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication
that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
ISSUE:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to
Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had
authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England
Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over
the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a
mere passenger at the time of the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence,
immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held
that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the
registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual
owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third
persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.
8. Torio vs. Fontanilla
Facts:
On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for management of the
town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The
council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the
cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died
in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The
defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, defendant
municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the
holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the
negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the
municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as
such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised
due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due
diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held
all defendants solidarily liable for damages.
Issues:
1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the
municipality?
2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?
3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the death of
Fontanilla?
Held:
1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the
purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact
that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town
inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless
it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other
capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of
two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo
material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they
failed take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.
Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage.
The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on
entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the
Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.
3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the
municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality,
separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible
in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that municipal
councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.
9. City of Manila vs IAC
Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however
from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years,
the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of
Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another
lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio’s remains were
removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega.
Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline
Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's
predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The
court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award
of damages in favor of the private respondents.
Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.
Held:
Proprietary
Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as
stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a
political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be
caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered
into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its
officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations
to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue
and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political
on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public
and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New
Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further
enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all
other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court
declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contractu.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer,
the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the
purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of
dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its
proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a
lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
10. Rama v. CA, 148 SCRA 496
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated
July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal
employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight”
appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack
of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the
Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and
approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9
of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain
in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Noncompliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the
agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
11. Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a
resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose
of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution
was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is
not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed
through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental
State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power
of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or
order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other
available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the
expropriation case is valid.
12. Constantino v. Desierto, 288 SCRA 6534
13. PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
While Cebu Governor Espina was in Manila, Vice-Governor Almendras and three provincial board members
enacted a Resolution donating to the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots. The donation was later approved by the
Office of the President.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as illegal and immoral the action of donating
practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu.
The officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League along with some taxpayers, filed a case seeking to have
the donation declared illegal, null and void. But this was dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs did not have the legal
capacity to sue.
Cebu City Mayor Osmeña intended to borrow funds from PNB with the donated lots as collaterals. Gov. Espina
went to court to annul the deed of donation. He engaged the services of respondent Atty. Garcia in his behalf and in
behalf of the Province.
Subsequently when Gov. Espina’s term ended, the Provincial Attorney entered his appearance as additional
counsel for the Province of Cebu and as counsel for the new Governor, Vice-Governor and Board Members.
The Provincial Attorney filed a complaint in intervention and adopted Gov. Espina’s causes of action, claims, and
position stated in the original complaint. Subsequently, a compromise agreement was reached between the Province
and the City of Cebu.
For services rendered, Atty. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien. Petitioner Province of Cebu opposed it
stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and
settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province.
The Court of First Instance found in favor of Atty. Garcia and against the Province of Cebu, declaring that the
former is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount at P30,000.00.
Both parties appealed. Atty. Garcia sought to get 30% of the value of the properties. The Intermediate Appellate
Court held that Atty. Garcia is entitled to recover attorney's fees but at 5% of the market value of the properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Garcia is entitled to his attorney's fees and incidental expenses.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with the lower court’s determination of reasonable fees for the Atty. Garcia on the basis
of quantum meruit (i.e., not 30% of the value of the properties involved). In other words, his compensation is fixed at
P30,000.00 with reimbursement of actual expenses in the amount of P289.43.
Representation
by a private attorney
of
a
municipality
Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The
provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality, or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality, or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of
the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council
As complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent as when he represents the province
against a municipality.
The reasons for the general rule are the following: (1) the local government should not be burdened with the expenses
of hiring a private lawyer; (2) the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigations; (3) the municipal attorney and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's
interests; (4) as civil service employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty.
However, every rule is not without an exception. The Court held that an exceptional situation is obtained in the
case at bar.
It was argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial Board, through a board resolution, to
employ Atty. Garcia as counsel of the Province of Cebu.
However, in the case at bar the Provincial Board would never have given such authorization. As elucidated by
the lower court, the provisions of Sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplate a normal
situation where the adverse party of the province is a third person. In the present case, the controversy involved the
Provincial Governor on one hand and the members of the Provincial Board on the other hand. Hence, it is unthinkable
for the Provincial Board to adopt a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia to act as counsel for the
Province for the purpose of filing and prosecuting a case against the members to the same Provincial Board.
Considering that the members of the Provincial Board are the very ones involved in this case, they cannot be
expected to direct the Provincial Fiscal the filing of the suit on behalf of the provincial government against themselves.
Moreover, even if the Provincial Fiscal should side with the Governor in the bringing of this suit, the Provincial Board
whose members are made defendants in this case can simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case or
by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation.
The provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of special counsel becomes
impossibility.
II.
1. Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]
Facts:
Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the
ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not
“impressed with voluntariness.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American
citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after
his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election
did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and
the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held:
No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic
restoration of his Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act
of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged
2. Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
Facts:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him
by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to
return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of
the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the
Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo
had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates
that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
3. ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC
that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration
is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date
he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
4. Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo
City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of
Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He
said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez from running as
Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay
Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later
on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a
public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance
before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the same is not enough to
allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary
leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.
5. JACOT vs. DAL
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the , affirming the Resolution dated 12
June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his US citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of
petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued and Identification
Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running
for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law for persons seeking public
office.
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the
Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because these are distinct requirements to be complied with
for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing
therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,
to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
6. MERCADO VS. MANZANO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared the winning candidate; however its
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered
an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is
considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and
in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
7. Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC
Facts:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner
Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt
sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to
Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he
filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a resolution, on the
ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.
Held:
No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence
to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001
elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must be a
“…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the
election…”
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return.
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
8. COQUILLA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he
was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out
a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in
2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19,
2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May
14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two
years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a
false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is
a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation
of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
9. Torayno v. COMELEC
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill
the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as
governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and
subsequently ran for mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement.
HELD:
Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He bought
a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.
10. TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO, ET AL., 475 SCRA 290
Facts:
The petitioner who is the daughter of Rep. Tomas Dumpit, 2nd District of La Union, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union for the May, 2004 elections. The respondents filed a case for her disqualification on
the ground that she is a registered voter of Naguilian , La Union and only transferred her registration as a voter to San
Julian West, Agoo, La Union, on October 24, 2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only
after her certificate of candidacy. Barangay officials claimed in an affidavit that she is not a resident of the said Barangay.
The petitioner countered that she acquired a new domicile in San Juan West when she purchased from her father a
residential lot on April 19, 2003 and she even designated a person as caretaker of her residential house.
Held:
While residence and domicile are synonymous, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, the following requisites must be present:
1.
an actual removal or actual change of domicile;
2.
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3.
acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the case of petitioner while she bought a parcel of land in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on April 19, 2003, property
ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or voted for an office.
To effect a change of residence, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to
remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, change of domicile or residence must be
voluntary and the residence a the place chose for the new domicile must be actual.
In the case at bar, what was constructed by the petitioner on said lot was a beach house which is at most a temporary
place of relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Finally, in the Special Power of attorney designating
a caretaker with a monthly salary of P2,500.00, it was shown that she is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union
and No. 6 butterfly St., Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Memtro Manila. This shows that she has a number of residences and the
acquisition of another one does not automatically make the recently acquired residence her new domicile.
Tess Dumpit-Michelena’s cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union, is therefore
valid.
III.
1. Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
Facts:
Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime
becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an
offense involving moral turpitude.”
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the
probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of
the crime of fencing.
Issue:
WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held:
Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft
which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful
taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft
invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they owe their
“fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”
Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle
that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as
mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstance.
2. Moreno vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the
latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition
and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and
end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not
affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who
have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which
applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay
allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE:
Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to
the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that
he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is
a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.
3. Lim v. People, 340 SCRA 497
FACTS:
Petitioner bought various jewelries worth P300,000.00 and P241,668.00 on separate dates from Maria Antonia Seguan’s
store. She issued a two separate checks for the payment of these.
When Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank, they were returned with a notice of dishonor because
petitioner’s account was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.
Both the RTC and CA found petitioner guilty of violating BP 22 and was sentenced to one year imprisonment for each of
the two violations and ordered to pay two fines, each amounting to P200,000.00
Petitioner’s defense was that the checks were never issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction. The
checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she
was to sell on consignment basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both the RTC and CA rendered the appropriate penalty to Rosa Lim? – YES but with slight modifications
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals. We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of
imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months. We DELETE the award of moral damages and attorney's
fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against petitioner.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material,
and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection
of the social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine
double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good
faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the
trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term." We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the
ends of criminal justice.
Editor’s notes:
The elements of B. P. Blg. 22 are:
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and
to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining
culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.
Unlike in estafa, 25 under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that
there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system.
4. VACA VS. CA
Facts:
Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vaca’s son-in-law, is the firm’s
purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection and Security
(GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers failed to pay within the time given (7 days from notice). A few days
later, however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored
check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check. Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit
against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P10,000 and costs.
Issue [1]:
Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check
Held [1]:
Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer fails to maintain
sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Herein, the second
check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two separate bills, and was issued 15 days
after notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate the presumption that the drawers knew of the insufficiency of funds.
Issue [2]:
Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability
Held [2]:
The claim — that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and the drawers and that the
security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check — is flimsy. Even if the payee suffered no
damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be
denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in BP 22.
Note: In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national economy; and that to
serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of double the amount of the check involved
was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.
5. People vs. Tuanda
FACTS:
Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez. Respondent appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the
suspension from the practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted respondent’s Notice of Appeal and advised her “to
address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum.” In the said motion, responded stated:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court’s
penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant’s action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court
has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to
cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.
HELD:
NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.
RATIO:
[T]he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of the land.” Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense.
6. VILLABER vs. COMELEC
Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the
First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of
candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this
crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any
public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify Villaber as a candidate
for and from holding any public office.
Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who has been
sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
7. MAGNO V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Magno ran for MAYOR of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in 2001.
Private Respondent filed a petition for disqualification of Magno because he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4
counts of Direct Bribery and sentenced. Magno applied for probation and was discharged on March of 1998.
COMELEC disqualified petitioner based on a provision of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) disqualifying a candidate
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude until after the lapse of 5 years from the service of sentence.
Magno claims Sec 40 (a) RA7160 (Local Government Code) should apply instead of BP 881: A person convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude may run after the lapse of 2 years after the service of sentence.
Sonia Isidro was declared Mayor while the case was pending.
HELD:
First, Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as ‘an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men or society in general…’ Direct bribery contemplates
taking advantage of his position and is a betrayal of the trust reposed to him by the public.
Second, he is not qualified.
RA 7160 should apply. First, RA 7160 is the more recent law. It impliedly repeals BP 881 should there be any
inconsistencies. Second, RA 7160 is a special law applying specifically to local government units. BP 881 applies for the
election of any public office. Special law prevails. Since he was discharged on March 1998, Magno’s disqualification
ceased on March 2000.
*Court declared that it could not rule on Magno’s prayer for his proclamation as winner of the mayoralty race, it being
outside its jurisdiction.
8. GREGO V COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a
candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed
office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his
opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been “removed
from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995,
petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.
COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution
was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.
The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not
override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed
the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in
its rules.
9. MERCADO V. MANZANO
Facts:
Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during the May 11,
1998 elections.
A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is an American
citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.
COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on May 7, 1998 on
the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Goverment Code from running any elective
position.
Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even after the election.
The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by the private
respondent.
On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of the COMELEC's Second
Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice mayor of Makati.
Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers proclaimed
private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.
Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.
Issues:
1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.
2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?
Reasons:
Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention"
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril
(who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was Mercado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene
at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646 or
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention
was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari.
NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code
(which declares as “disqualified from running for elective local position… Those with dual-citizenship”), Congress has
“command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office.” Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or
marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s
volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual
citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question of which state’s law must apply to him/her,
therefore posting a threat to a country’s sovereignty. Hence, “dual citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification
clause must mean “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons
with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Naturalborn”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be
elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.
10. MARQUEZ versus COMELEC
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the
Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal
or non-political cases here or abroad.
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States
and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s
Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a
foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”
Held:
No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such
definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those
who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term.
11. CAASI vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of
January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence,
a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18,
1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null
and void.
12. Gayo vs. Verceles Case Digest
Facts:
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that election. Her proclamation was
however questioned for the reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.
Ruling:
Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard holder” status when she surrendered her alien
registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior to
her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer
disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country.
IV.
I.
Laceda v. Limena
Facts:
Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted
that when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third
term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit,
the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.
Issue:
Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he was accordingly entitled
to run for two more terms.
Ruling:
While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into
a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the
purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon
City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the
same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom
Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda’s
term.
II.
COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ
FACTS:
When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was passed,
questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2 which states that “No barangay elective official shall
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of
Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as
it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out that
there consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides: “Nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and
term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a 3year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or
any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No
equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
III.
Latasa vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that
he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's
candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that
this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that
he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was
not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation
did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and
ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor,
it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately
after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city
mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution,
if not abhorred by it.
IV.
Borja vs Comelec
Facts:
Jose Capco Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in the 1988 election. On September 2, 1989 he became mayor, by
operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor. He was elected for mayor in the 1992 election and was reelected in the 1995 election. He filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor relative to the upcoming 1998 elections.
Petitioner who was a candidate for mayor sought the disqualification of Jose Capco Jr. on the ground of the three-term
limit rule under the constitution and local government code.
Capco got the majority of votes and was proclaimed as mayor of Pateros.
Issue:
Whether or not Capco Jr. is eligible to run for mayor.
Ruling:
Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. In relation to this it is not enough that a person has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the succession by operation of law by
Capco does not count as a term in counting the three-term limit rule.
V.
Ong v. Alegre
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the
May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule.
Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and
discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre filed
an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, but the
decision came out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004
term as mayor-elect.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’ certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the
First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said petition of Alegre.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution6 reversing the resolution of the
COMELEC’s First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004"; (b)
ordering the deletion of Francis’ name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of
election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his
brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be
denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates.
ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as
full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring
petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommel’s certificate of
candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
HELD:
a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from
running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at
all.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the
COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
VI.
Facts:
Adormeo vs Comelec
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections,
Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in
May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in
2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in
violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for
reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
Issue:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the 2000
recall elections.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His
election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third
term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary
renunciation” contemplated by the law.
VII.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested
by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election
last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was
proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the
ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was
later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three
term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the
petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for
only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of
one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few
months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered
as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
Held:
No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No local elective official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.”
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
VIII.
Rivera vs Comelec
FACTS:
The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick
de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the
second highest vote after Morales.
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June
30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared
void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-­graft case
from January to July 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales violated the three-­­term limit rule when he ran for re-­election as mayor in the 2004 elections.
HELD:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as
mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth
term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June
30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the
second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-­term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive
accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him
SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
IX.
Montebon vs. Comelec
Facts:
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and
2004 elections. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vicemayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal
councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his
answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule because his second term
was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-­mayor due to the retirement of elected vice­mayor Petronilo
Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be
considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor.
Issue:
Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?
Held:
Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice
mayor.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of
the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-­ranking councilor is permanently unable to
succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official
concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor
cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some
reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-­performance of which exposes said official to possible
administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is
therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus,
Montebon's assumption of office as vice-­mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-­2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been
by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
X.
Bolos vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms
(1994,1997, 2002).
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004
leaving his post as Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for
the same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of
three­ term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his
part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National
and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary
renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as
Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
his last term of service.
Pending the resolution of the case before the COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum three
consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation
of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the
post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
YES. The three-­term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.”
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang
kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay
officials.
XI.
Latasa vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that
he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's
candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that
this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that
he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was
not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation
did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and
ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor,
it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately
after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city
mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution,
if not abhorred by it.
XII.
Socrates vs Comelec
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995,
1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same
mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term,
Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE:
WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule
HELD:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-­term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is no
longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September
24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During
the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of
Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
V.
1.
Victoria v. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269
Facts: Under the LGC, the position of vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sanggunian member, and
for purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district.
In the Elections, petitioner candidate Victoria from the 2nd district garnered 32, 918 votes and respondent candidate
Calisin from the 1st district garnered 28, 335 votes.
The COMELEC issued a resolution certifying respondent as 1st in the order of ranking with petitioner as 2nd ranking
member pursuant to the provisions above.
Petitioner claims that the ranking should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total
number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.
Issue: Whether or not the proportion of the the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district shall
be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.
Held: No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sangguninan shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district.
2. Farinas v. Barba, 256 SCRA 396
3. Navarro v. CA, 355 SCRA 672
4. Menzon v. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251
5. Gamboa v. Aguirre, GR No. 134213, 20 July 1999
VI.
1. Atienza v. Villarosa, 458 SCRA 385
2. Angobung v. Paras, 269 245
3. Paras v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the
petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the
election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a
petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996,
rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the
pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government
Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the
authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the
“regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
4. Claudio v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388
FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
Contested Law/Ordinance:
Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Sometime in May 1999,
the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs
of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall
was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas throughout the City.
Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was filed within one
year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was convened within the 1 year
prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the
petition for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition
was filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed on time. Thereafter,
COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the Local Government
Code
HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC
The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election itself) which is vested
with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to such exercise of recall such as
the proceedings of the PRA.
VII.
1. Catu v. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, 19 February 2008
2. Javellana v. DILG, 212 SCRA 475
VIII.
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568
IX.
1. Maderazo v. People, 503 SCRA 234
FACTS
Verutiao (offended party) had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market and paid a monthly rental of
P200.00. She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and
the Municipal Treasurer.
Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development of the public market, in the
absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other structures for
commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to
the monthly rentals when occupied for business.
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall but was not reimbursed by the Municipality of her
expenses.
Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract, renewable every year with a monthly rental of
P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its
cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired.
The Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall. However,
considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her
rent.
Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays and returned a month
after. She and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall
within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall and the cancellation of the lease
contract.
An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging grave coercion against the municipal mayor,
members of the Sangguniang Bayan, and the Police Station Chief among others because of the seizure and confiscation
of the inventory goods of the offended party.
The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and Victor
Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused.
ISSUE
W/N the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust vexation
HELD
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner
Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The bail bond posted by him for his provisional liberty is cancelled.
No costs.
RATIO
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and
Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation
In unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a
charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether the
offender's act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed.
The purpose of law penalizing coercion or unjust vexation is to enforce the principle that no person may take the law
into his hands and that our government is one of the law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own
hands the administration of justice
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought
to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary
that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.
Although petitioners are found guilty of unjust vexation, the Court finds Perido deserving an acquittal for he was at the
stall to merely witness the inventory and ensure peace and order.
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3.
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Nicart v. Sandiganbayan, 495 SCRA 73
Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
Malinao v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616
Salalima v. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
Pablico v. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601
Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, NV v. Punong Barangay Martinez
Calingin v. CA, 434 SCRA 173
Don v. Lacsa, GR No. 170810, 07 August 2007
Laxina v. Office of the Ombudsman, 471 SCRA 542
Gov. Lapid v. CA, 334 SCRA 738
13.
14.
15.
16.
Barata v. Abalos, GR No. 142888, 06 June 2001
Herrera v. Bohol, GR No. 155320, 05 February 2004
Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768
Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica