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Mahan’s Naval Strategy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century
Associated Press
Mahan’s Naval Strategy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century
By Francis P. Sempa
August 01, 2017
Mahan’s Naval Strategy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century
Associated Press
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One hundred six years ago, the world-renowned naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote
Naval Strategy, which updated and revised his lectures at the Naval War College from 1887
to 1911. It is one of the least remembered of Mahan’s books, but it contains historical
analyses and geopolitical insights that remain relevant to 21st century world politics.
Mahan had served in the Union Navy during the American Civil War and aboard several
different ships during the 1870s, but he gained international recognition and fame for his
writings while teaching at the Naval War College, especially his second book, The Influence
of Sea Power upon History (1890). Two years later, he wrote a two-volume sequel, The
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, and several years later he
wrote Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812, another two-volume work. He wrote
several other books and numerous articles about history, sea power, and geopolitics, and all
three subjects are present in Naval Strategy.
Mahan began the book by asserting that the principles of
naval strategy were unchangeable, and could be learned by the study of history combined
with experience. History, he wrote, is “experience recorded,” and experience is “[h]istory in
the making.” “The past,” he explained, “has done much for us. That which we call history
has recorded illustrations, and from those illustrations has formulated principles, ready for
our use.”
Naval strategy, he explained, must be formulated and implemented with an “appreciation of
international conditions.” He urged his fellow seamen to be statesmen, too. Diplomacy and
the sword, he noted, are “the two chief instruments of international relations.”
Naval Strategy was broadly divided into chapters on “Historical Illustrations and
Comments,” “Foundations and Principles,” and “Application of Principles.” Mahan added
two chapters at the end of the book on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and coastal
fortifications.
Mahan’s key geopolitical insight was his appreciation of the pivotal nature of the Eurasian
landmass to international relations and the centuries-old struggle between insular sea powers
(and their continental allies) and predominant land powers. He reviewed the successive
attempts at continental hegemony by the Austrian-Spanish Hapsburgs under Charles V and
France under Louis XIV, the French Revolutionary regime, and Napoleon Bonaparte. In
each instance, a coalition of lesser powers, anchored by the sea power of the Netherlands
then England, defeated at great cost the potential continental hegemons.
Mahan understood that the security of the insular powers of Great Britain and the United
States depended on the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. Continental rivalry and naval
superiority among the insular nations was essential to the overall balance of power.
Writing in 1911, Mahan foresaw the geopolitical circumstances that led to a world war three
years later. He noted Germany’s growing industrial power, her relative population growth
vis-à-vis France, her increased naval power, and her continental alliance with AustriaHungary. “Austria and Germany,” he wrote, “form a substantially united body, extending
from water to water, from the North Sea to the Adriatic, wielding a military power against
which, on the land, no combination in Europe can stand.” He concluded that the “Balance of
Power no longer exists.”
Germany’s growing power, he warned, affected not only Europe but also the United States.
“[S]hould a naval disaster befall Great Britain, leaving Germany master of the naval
situation,” Mahan wrote, “the world would see again a predominant fleet backed by a
predominant army . . .” Mahan recognized that America’s first line of defense at that time
was the British navy. America’s two principal security doctrines of the time—the Monroe
Doctrine and the Open Door—would not survive a Eurasian hegemon that used the
resources of the continent to become the world’s leading sea power.
Mahan’s geopolitical analysis in Naval Strategy applies to the 21st century world, with the
added elements of air, space and cyber power. The United States must ensure that the
Eurasian landmass remains politically divided. It is in our interest to foster rivalries between
China, Russia, India, and other regional powers. China’s moves in the South China and East
China seas, the Indian Ocean, and across Central Asia into Europe (“One Belt, One Road”),
Russia’s moves in Eastern Europe, and Iran’s expansionist aims in the Middle East (a term
coined by Mahan) are all cause for concern, especially if one or more of those powers were
to form an alliance against the United States.
There are well-respected observers of international relations who claim that Mahanian
geopolitics is obsolete; that the era of great power wars is over. Such claims were also made
in 1911 when Mahan wrote Naval Strategy. Those claims, Mahan wrote in a separate article,
were based on a “profound misreading of human action” throughout history. Three years
later, the world was engulfed in what at the time was the most destructive war in history,
involving most of the world’s great powers.
Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century,
America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War, and
Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat Soldier’s Journey through the
Second World War. He has written lengthy introductions to two of Mahan’s books, and has
written on historical and foreign policy topics for The Diplomat, the University Bookman,
Joint Force Quarterly, the Asian Review of Books, the New York Journal of Books, the
Claremont Review of Books, American Diplomacy, the Washington Times, and other
publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes
University, and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy.
Related Topics: East China Sea, South China Sea, India, Open Door, Monroe Doctrine,
Germany, Geopolitics, One Belt, One Road, Iran, Russia, China, Eurasia, Austria-Hungary,
Austria, Great Britain, Hegemon, Military History, History, Sea Power, Naval Strategy,
Alfred Thayer Mahan
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