Get Ready for a More
Aggressive Turkey
Erdogan’s new partner in parliament — the ultranationalist MHP —
will make Ankara a more belligerent and intransigent ally.
BY SINAN ULGEN
| JULY 2, 2018, 5:04 AM
A pedestrian lights a cigarette as he walks past banners with portraits of Turrkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) and the leader of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli
in Istanbul on June 19. (ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)
Turkey’s June 24 elections ushered in a new constitutional order with
significant ramifications for the country’s international role. Recep Tayyip
Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected executive president with 53
percent of the national vote. He will enjoy a range of unalloyed executive
prerogatives with full and exclusive responsibility for policymaking. He will be
responsible for the conduct of foreign policy as well, unlike in the previous
system, where the now vanished office of the prime minister had been
entrusted with executive authority.
This systemic transformation will have a huge impact on the conduct of
foreign policy. For many years, Turkey’s highly regarded foreign service was
composed exclusively of career diplomats who charted and guided the
implementation Turkey’s foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry was thus seen
as one of the three key pillars of the Turkish state along with the military and
the Finance Ministry — institutions distinguished by their allegiance to the
nation rather than the ruling party. Since the beginning of Erdogan’s first
presidential term in 2014, the Foreign Ministry gradually lost its influence to
the benefit of the executive branch.
Since the beginning of Erdogan’s first
presidential term in 2014, the Foreign
Ministry gradually lost its influence to the
benefit of the executive branch.
The foreign service also witnessed a growing number of political
appointees. Today, 10 percent of Turkey’s ambassador-level
representatives in 151 missions are noncareer diplomats.
This trend will accelerate with the transition to a presidential system. The
Turkish diplomatic corps is likely to be remodeled along the lines of the U.S.
system, with a combination of political appointments and career officers. This
redesign of public administration will also replace the top bureaucratic
position of the permanent undersecretary in all ministries with politically
appointed deputy ministers. One key and near-term challenge for Turkish
diplomacy will therefore be the shaping of a new institutional culture that can
manage this process of politicization within the diplomatic ranks without
endangering the foreign service’s integrity and performance.
In addition to this structural transformation, Turkish foreign policy will also
be affected by another electoral consequence: The ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) lost its outright parliamentary majority. Even with
its diminished role under the new constitution, the control of parliament is
critical for the effective functioning of the political system.
The AKP’s new ally in parliament will be its elections partner, the
ultranationalist National Movement Party (MHP). But this alliance will not be
restricted to parliamentary affairs. The MHP will leverage its position as
kingmaker and seek influence over all policymaking. This tacit alliance with
the MHP will create a new set of difficulties for Erdogan in foreign policy.
The MHP is defined by its heavy focus on Turkish nationalism. At home, its
agenda prioritizes national security concerns over personal freedoms. The
party has opposed lifting the state of emergency in place since the July 2016
failed coup (although recent reports suggest that Erdogan may be planning to
lift it). The MHP also champions a heavy-handed approach to the Kurdish
problem. For the MHP leadership, democratic freedoms can easily be
sacrificed for law and order.
For the MHP leadership, democratic
freedoms can easily be sacrificed for law
and order.
Its worldview is a Hobbesian one, and it is informed by a firm belief
that Turkey has no friends at the international level.
The MHP’s deep suspicion of internationalism is bolstered by a siege
mentality that regards Turkey’s national interests as constantly under threat
by foreign actors. Unlike the AKP, which traces its roots to political Islam and
essentially views the West as the ideological other, the MHP vision is less
discriminatory. It nurtures an equal disdain for all foreigners. Erdogan’s
necessary partnership with the MHP will therefore open Turkish foreign
policy to the influence of the party’s ideology, with significant consequences
for Turkey’s relations with its global and regional partners.
An alliance with the MHP will severely constrain Erdogan’s room for
maneuver on the Kurdish issue, as a security-driven outlook will crowd out
options for a political settlement. The commendable effort by the AKP
government back in 2015 to launch a dialogue with the political
representatives of the Kurdish constituency — incidentally with the support of
the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan — is
likely to remain a distant memory. This will further incline Turkey to view
Syria from the perspective of containing Kurdish influence. Turkey will want
to prevent the emergence of a constitutionally recognized and autonomous
Kurdish region in Syria. This overriding objective will also impact Turkey’s
relations with the United States. An MHP-influenced Turkish foreign policy
will become even more confrontational on the issue of U.S. support to Syrian
Kurdish groups, including the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which are justifiably viewed in Turkey as
being linked to the PKK, a terrorist entity.
The MHP’s influence will lead to a more reactionary Turkish foreign policy,
where disagreements will be more likely to escalate.
The MHP’s influence will lead to a more
reactionary Turkish foreign policy, where
disagreements will be more likely to
escalate.
The party’s hypernationalism, combined with an already acute level of
anti-Americanism in the country, will complicate efforts to manage the
many existing bilateral disagreements, such as the case of the exiled
Pennsylvania-based cleric Fethullah Gulen and the proposed U.S.
sanctions against Turkey linked to Ankara’s planned acquisition of S400 air defense systems from Russia. The possibility of a severe fine
against the state-owned Halkbank for past violations of Iran sanctions
and Ankara’s refusal to comply with the renewed set of secondary
sanctions against Iran are other areas with potential for escalation.
Turkey’s relationship with Europe will become more complicated, too. The
MHP is deeply skeptical of Turkey’s European Union membership drive.
During the election campaign, the MHP leadership even called for an end to
these aspirations. Even if the Erdogan government is not necessarily intent on
ending EU accession talks, it will nonetheless be hamstrung by the lack of
resolve and support for any large-scale democratic reform agenda by its
chosen partners in parliament.
Progress with the EU is now conditioned on democratic reform and the full
restoration of the rule of law. The most recent EU statement on Turkey, issued
on June 26, extended this conditionality beyond the framework of the
accession talks to the start of a new round of trade negotiations. Visa
liberalization for Turkish citizens visiting the EU will continue to be delayed as
Turkey will very likely continue to resist changes to its anti-terrorism
legislation, which has suppressed freedom of expression in the country. And
the prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus conflict will evaporate thanks to
an MHP leadership that views any deal as treason.
Under these circumstances, Turkish-EU relations could become purely
transactional, covering only a few areas of mutual interest such as the refugee
deal — whereby, in return for the EU’s financial assistance, Turkey commits
itself to keeping the more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory from
moving across EU borders — and counterterrorism cooperation, rather than
having a basis in any shared values. Narrowing cooperation with the EU will
lead Turks to question these ties, and the pretense of Turkish accession will
eventually need to be dropped. And in the absence of an alternative framework
to structure a collaborative future, Turkey’s political estrangement from the
EU will be complete.
The cost of complete alienation from the West would be prohibitive for a
Turkish economy that is heavily reliant on international funding to the tune of
$250 billion a year. Turkey’s growth is also intimately linked to access to
Western markets and inflows of foreign direct investment and technology. So,
in many ways, the legacy of past generations of Turkish leaders who
consciously chose to advance Turkey’s economic integration with the West
may yet prove the strongest factor keeping the country anchored to the West
despite a darkening political outlook.
Turkish disengagement from the West is not a foregone conclusion. It is the
probable outcome of growing MHP influence on Turkish foreign policy. But
ultimately Turkey’s future ties with the United States and Europe will depend
on whether the MHP leadership prefers to use its political leverage to achieve
domestic or foreign-policy objectives. It will also depend on how Erdogan
chooses to satisfy the MHP’s political aspirations. And eventually an
uncompromising MHP could compel the Erdogan administration to jettison
its partner and seek new alliances in parliament. This unstable equilibrium,
caused by the nascent internal struggle for power between Erdogan and the
MHP leadership, will determine the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy.
The Contemporary Turkish Neighbourhood Policy:
The realpolitik behind AKP’s foreign policy choices?

BY FAIR OBSERVER

• MARCH 20, 2011
The incumbent foreign minister of Turkey and professor of international relations, Dr.
Ahmet Davutoğlu, has systematically developed ideas around Turkey’s potential in the
current international system and more specifically on how Turkey can become a global
actor. The main idea of his analysis is that “Turkey is not a bridge but it should become
a central country [merkez ülke]”. This can be achieved if Turkey utilises its history and
geography and implements five main principles in its “new foreign policy”. The second
idea that Dr. Davutoğlu mentions is that of“zero problem policy towards its neighbours”.
According to his analysis, Turkey should save itself from the psychological burden of
believing that it is continuously surrounded by enemies and thereby developing
defensive reaction. He also argues that this principle will be implemented in its totality in
combination with the first principle, namely finding balance between security and
democracy. Furthermore, he adds a third principle that refers to the development of
relations with the neighbouring regions and beyond which complements the “zero
problem” concept. However, given the instability, complexity and interconnection that
characterise regional politics in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, one
can legitimately raise the question whether the “zero problem policy” and the
subsequent enhancement of relations are a dream, an overture or an applicable policy
with tangible benefits. Especially the challenge of interconnection in highly polarised
areas is reminiscent of a myth about the advice Great Alexander received from a wise
man about how to govern his vast empire. The wise man asked Alexander to step on
the one side of a desiccated hide of a billy-goat. When Alexander did that, the other side
of the hide was lifted indicating how difficult it would be to maintain peace in all parts of
his empire. Thus, how it is possible for Turkey to equally form good relations with Iran
and Israel, Armenia and Azerbaijan and play important role in the Arab affairs and in the
Palestinian problem, more specifically without creating antagonism with Egypt are some
of the cases that question the applicability of the enterprise.
Although probing into the empirical results of Turkish foreign policy since AKP came into
power and trying to make sense of the achievements and the new challenges that arose
would be revealing as far as the way Turkey’s contemporary neighbourhood is evolving,
this analysis is mainly preoccupied with AKP’s decision to develop a new vision of
foreign policy in the first place. More specifically, the central question is what explains
the inclusion of the “zero problem policy towards neighbours” in the core of AKP’s
foreign policy thinking? International, regional but also domestic parameters are taken
into account to arrive at a comprehensive answer.
Turkey’s Neighbourhood Policy in Flashback
In order to obtain a good sense of the extent to which the ‘zero’ problem policy towards
neighbours is an innovative concept for Turkish foreign policy and not just a historical
legacy of previous leaderships, a short summary of Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis its
neighbourhood is necessary. To begin with, Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish
Republic, set the main parameters for the function and development of the nascent
nation state. Among others he put forward a ‘modernisation’ project whose success was
interwoven with establishing strong ties with ‘Western’ countries. His national project
was supported by his pro-peace approach in foreign policy matters as it was expressed
in his famous quote, “Peace at Home, peace in the World” (Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh).
What is relevant to underline is that Atatürk supported the idea of Turkey as a status
quo power. Certainly, the main concern at the time in the political circles of Turkey was
nation building. External shocks of any kind could complicate the process. In a sense,
one can claim that the seeds of the ‘zero’ problem policy were planted at the time but in
fact most of the problems with neighbouring countries had been resolved through the
results of wars and more specifically under the terms of the peace treaty of Lausanne
(1923). So, the main aim was to sustain the results of the Lausanne Treaty.
Atatürk’successors followed similar policies keeping Turkey away from actions that
would endanger the country’s territorial integrity, such as in the case of the Second
World War when President Inönüdid not succumb to pressures for participation on the
side of one of the two coalitions. Everything changed during the Cold War when Turkey
put aside policies of neutrality and allied with NATO in 1952. The country played crucial
operational role during that period because of its proximity to the Soviet Union.
However, while Turkey had an upgraded role in international politics and high profile
among its ‘Western’ allies, it cannot be argued that this was the case vis-à-vis
neighbouring countries. This period is the low point in Turkey’s neighbouring relations.
More specifically, relations with the Arab world were characterised by mutual distrust,
such as with pro-Soviet Syria whereas relations with Iran were far from flourishing.
Furthermore, the Caucasus and a large part of the Balkan area were in the sphere of
Soviet influence. Even relations with its neighbouring NATO ally – Greece – were
hostile because of the frictions over the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute.
Turkey indeed was an important US ally but did not have any strong interaction with its
neighbourhood whatsoever.
This starts to change in the early 1990s when the President of the Republic, Turgut
Özal, and former Prime Minister decided to engage Turkey in active foreign policy
regarding regional matters. The aim was not necessarily to develop a comprehensive
neighbourhood policy that would be based on specific premises but to counterbalance
the potential geopolitical downgrade of Turkey that loomed large after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Thus, Özal himself engaged Turkey in the first Gulf War supporting
the US, such as in implementing embargo on the exports of Iraqi oil and providing
logistical support through the use of Turkish military bases. Furthermore, he favoured
strong relations with the nascent Turkic Republics in the early 1990s, namely
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. Although these
countries did not border Turkey, they resided in close proximity and most importantly
shared some cultural characteristics, such as the language and, to some extent,
religion. President Özal, optimistic about the role that Turkey could play as a bridge
between the ‘West’ and the Turkic world, spoke about the dawn of the ‘Turkic century’.
These two cases constitute a first indication that Turkey started to depart from the logic
of a secluded anti-Soviet stronghold and be more pro-active and open to opportunities
for involvement in regional affairs. However, the country’s problematic relations with
neighbouring countries, such as Greece and Syria, did not see any improvements. On
the contrary, Turkey came to the brink of war with Greece in 1996 and with Syria in
1998. Nonetheless, few years later, in 1999, Turkey would be designated as EU
candidate country and relations with Greece would start to improve.
In 2002, the Justice and Development party (AKP) won the elections in Turkey and a
new political elite with pro-Islamic ideological background started to become powerful.
The formulation and implementation of a new vision in foreign policy was one of AKP’s
main goals. The architect of this new vision has been Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, former
Chief Advisor to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and incumbent foreign minister. More
specifically, he has been theorising about how Turkey could play a significant role in
international relations. To that end, he has put forward five principles. The first is about
the “balance between security and democracy”, the second refers to the “zero problem
policy towards Turkey’s neighbours”, the third to the “development of relations with the
neighbouring regions and beyond”, the fourth to “adherence to a multi-dimensional
foreign policy” and the fifth to “rhythmic diplomacy”. Each of these five principles
constitutes part of the whole, i.e. the new vision, but he does not make direct references
abouthow the different parts are complementary to each other. One can assume from
Dr. Davutoğlu’s analysis thateach premise has an intrinsic value for Turkey’s interests.
However it seems that two of the premises are straightforwardly complementary and
both refer to Turkey’s neighbourhood policy. Going backwards, in order to develop
relations with neighbouring regions, one can assume that issues that create significant
frictions between Turkey and its neighbours should be solved first. Therefore, the ‘zero’
problem policy should not be probed only for its intrinsic value but also for its
complementarities to other concepts.
It is noteworthy that from this concise historical summary one can argue that
neighbourhood policies had never been in the epicentre of the analytical toolkit of the
executive in Turkey as much as they are today. AKP seems to be preoccupied in
enacting a neighbourhood policy, which, for all its novelty and inclusiveness, raises
questions about its applicability and the specific advantages it can deliver to Turkey.
“Zero Problem”: The realpolitik behind the concept
No matter how much the “zero problem policy towards neighbours” concept is
reminiscent of pro-peace ideas, state policies are never a sole reflection of universal
ethical standards. One has to search for answers in international and domestic
developments and examine how these developments might have been perceived by the
state actors themselves. In the case of Turkey, I will look into the effects of the post-War
era and Turkey’s European Union candidacy as well as what AKP’s rise in power
signifies in terms of foreign policy.
Starting the analysis from a macro perspective, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s meant the inevitable end of the Cold War and a rapid metamorphosis of the
international system. The monolithic agenda of the two global hegemons during the
Cold War, i.e. the US and the Soviet Union, for global deterrence of the ‘enemy’ that
had usurped external and internal aspects of many nations’ political life has become
irrelevant in the post-Cold war era. Most importantly, the perceived life-and-death threat
of a global war that forged by and large the cohesive alliances of the Cold War, namely
NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organisation, has not been replaced with a new mutually
perceived threat(s). Thus, although the US came out victorious from the Cold War, the
international system looks more fragmented in terms of how states but also international
organisations, such as the European Union, comprehend and deal with global
challenges, such as the global economic crisis, environmental degradation and
asymmetric threats, such as terrorism. This is not to suggest that cooperation between
states is diminishing but that states which aspire to play regional or/and global role have
to actively interact with other countries in order to formulate common goals and
practices.
In the first years of the post-Cold war era, Turkey found itself in the difficult position of
trying to defend its geopolitical significance. Its location had been unique for US Cold
war calculations. Bordering the Soviet Union directly, in close proximity to the rich
oilfields of the Middle East and with strong historical and cultural ties with the Muslim
populations of the Balkan region, such as that of the pro-Soviet Bulgaria, rendered
Turkey the most important anti-Soviet outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean. Taking into
account the aforementioned macro analysis about the newly emerging international
environment, one would expect Turkey to engage more in regional affairs and attempt
to create more legitimacy for its aspirations employing ‘soft’ power. However, what the
empirics illustrate with regard to Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s is the use of hard
power when it comes to bilateral relations, such as in the case of Greece and Syria and
the lack of a systematic neighbourhood policy. Even Turkey’s engagement in the First
Gulf War seems to be path dependent. President Özal taking the matter upon himself
decided to assist the US against Iraq disregarding domestic opposition. Turkey could
prove to its allies once more how valuable its location on the map was for their interests.
However, the development of neighbourhood policy was of secondary importance at the
time. Thus, it seems that this macro analysis does not account for the timing when the
‘zero problem’ concept was put forward one decade later. Therefore, probing into the
possible reasons why AKP has chosen to consider its neighbourhood as central to
Turkey’s foreign policy becomes relevant.
When AKP won the elections in 2002 very little was known about their foreign policy
agenda. Much had been speculated given on their pro-Islamic background. The main
question at the time was whether AKP’s control of the government would be tolerated
by the Turkish army given its secular reflexes in the 1990s. Needless to say that
imagining the party to have some kind of influence on foreign policy decisions when the
army controlled the National Security Council, the main foreign policy institutional body,
seemed premature. Nevertheless, AKP started to unfold its vision in foreign policy right
from its early days in power. There are three potential factors that explain AKP’s
eagerness to include neighbourhood policies in the core of its foreign policy vision. The
first is Turkey’s EU membership, the second is AKP’s relationship with the Turkish army
and the third is AKP’s ideological background.
To begin with, Turkey had been designated as EU candidate country three years before
AKP came to power. The previous coalition government had started reforms but more
was expected to be done for Turkey to secure a date for the commencement of
accession negotiations. In terms of foreign policy, the EU had not set a framework of
foreign policy conditions with the exception of the Greek-Turkish relations and the
Cyprus problem and some generic overtures for peaceful resolution of bilateral
problems. Hence, one can argue that the EU factor is irrelevant to AKP’s ‘benign’
theorisation of neighbourhood policy. However, for the divisive debate in European
Union political circles about whether Turkey should and could join the EU, the country
has to prove more than any other candidate country of the past enlargement rounds that
it will be an asset and not a liability. Thus, the geopolitical liability of bordering unstable
regions, such as the Middle East and Caucasus, and having bilateral problems with EU
members and third countries had to be transformed into geopolitical asset by playing
the role of a stabilising power that promotes peace.
Certainly the high prospect of EU membership is a relatively strong exogenous force
that pushes countries to change when their foreign policy is in stark contradiction with
the values and practices of EU member states. However, the question remains. Why
was AKP emphatic even at the beginning of its tenure that there was a need for a ‘zero
problem’ neighbourhood policy when the previous coalition government that started the
pre-accession negotiations with the EU was not showing evidence of a major shift in its
neighbourhood policy with the exception of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999?
One can develop numerous other hypotheses based on observations about how
international opportunities and/or challenges have an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy
but the important part of this analysis is why AKP and its top ranking officials chose to
depart from the previous isolationist neighbourhood policy. Domestic politics seems
more likely to have rendered ‘zero problem’ concept a choice of realpolitik in the case of
AKP.
There are mainly two domestic factors that are possible explanations. The first is the
growing polarity between political Islam and the Turkish army since the early 1990s and
the second is the intrinsic value of AKP’s ideological background. More specifically, the
hawkish policies of the army towards pro-Islamic parties especially when in government,
such as the army ultimatum to the Welfare party (Refah partisi) and the subsequent
collapse of the coalition government and the closure of the party in 1997, indicate that
AKP was in a narrow path of political survival. When it formed a single party
government in 2002, there were two options, namely either to develop an acrimonious
anti-western and anti-secular rhetoric as the Welfare party did, or to seize the
opportunity to enhance its political legitimacy by supporting Turkey’s EU bid and
subsequently start to change civil–military relations through democratising domestic
institutions, such as the National Security Council and de-securitising foreign policy.
Both policies could entail short, medium and long term goals with the medium and long
term ones referring to the de-securitisation of Turkey’s foreign policy. Thus, AKP would
remain in office while expanding its leverage on Turkish politics by delegitimizing the
Turkish army in the eyes of the Turkish public, the EU and neighbouring countries.
Therefore, the ‘zero problem’ concept that was introduced very early in AKP’s tenure
can be seen as part of a multifarious domestic policy for the survival of AKP and its
attempt to expand its legitimacy while removing or transforming structural elements,
such as Turkey’s highly introverted and securitised neighbourhood policy which fostered
favourable conditions for the Turkish army’s interference in Turkish politics.
Nevertheless, one can also argue that AKP’s ‘zero problem’ neighbourhood policy
derives from its ideological background, a combination of political Islam and, more
specifically, its romantic view of Pax Ottomanica, the apogee of the Ottoman empire in
the Eastern Mediterranean. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated in
his speech in Sarajevo in 2009, “like in the 16th century, the rise of Ottoman Balkans as
the centre of world politics, we will make the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East
together with Turkey as the centre of world politics in the future. This is the objective of
Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve this”. In other words, the foreign minister
presents a transnational ideal about the prospect the three regions to re-emerge as one
of the world’s epicentres. Dr. Davutoğlu has not specified how this can be achieved but
what becomes apparent is that AKP takes a holistic approach about the future of the
three regions without making ethnic or religious distinctions in principle. Interestingly
enough, there is no other contemporary political organisation or institution in these three
different regions that echoes such an ideal citing the Ottoman legacy or any other
empire’s legacy. On the contrary, there are analysts inside and outside the country who
perceive AKP’s rhetoric as an indication of neo-Ottomanism. Although there is no
consensus about what neo-Ottomanism represents, it is assumed to refer to AKP’s
aspiration for Turkey to become the hegemon of Eastern Mediterranean as the Empire’s
“true” heir. The Turkish foreign minister has declined the characterisation of his foreign
policy actions in the region as neo-Ottoman and he has maintained that “Turkish
Republic is a modern nation state and it is in the equal status with the countries in the
region. We can build diplomatic relations with any big or small countries, which
previously were in Ottoman geography in an equal status”.
Whether AKP’s neighbourhood activism, including the ‘zero problem’ policies, aims at
elevating Turkey’s position in the international system by gradually subduing countries
of its neighbourhood remains to be seen. However it is relevant to note that the “zero
problem” concept has enabled the AKP to extend its neighbourhood policy to include
Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria and Iran that had been neglected by the
secular establishment. Neither the EU nor the US and nor other pre-existing domestic
vested interests seem to have directly influenced AKP to consider cooperation with
these countries. The political identity of the party as largely representing Turkish political
Islam is the reason why AKP put forward a plan to initially solve bilateral problems or
reduce mutual suspicion and then enhance Turkey’s political, economic and cultural
ties. Polarisations in the identity politics of Turkey have rendered foreign policy another
important tool for the cultivation of external sources of legitimacy for the parties in
power. Thus, in the case of AKP, rationalising its highly controversial political identity
especially in the first years of its tenure was an absolute necessity for its survival.
Solving bilateral problems and developing economic and cultural ties with Middle
Eastern countries, such as Syria and Iran would create vested interests that could form
a counterbalance to long-standing external sources of legitimacy for the Turkish secular
establishment, such as trade with, and the prospect of “modernisation” deriving from
good relations with the West. Although ties with Western and Middle Eastern countries
are not mutually exclusive, as vivid international political life has illustrated, the
tendency in the political circles of Turkey especially when tension runs high is to present
one option against the other depending on the identity they want to promote.
AKP’s “zero problem” policy has been -at least during the first years of their tenure- an
agonising attempt to survive and expand their political agenda in a way that would
balance the military influence in the domestic political affairs of the country.
Furthermore, its political identity was a positive factor for considering a systematic
neighbourhood policy that would include countries of the Middle East that had been
neglected by the secular establishment. Furthermore, the international and regional
environment including Turkey’s EU bid had been favourable and encouraging for AKP
to present a new vision in foreign policy. Interestingly, the factors that explained AKP’s
neighbourhood policy in first place have been changing rapidly the last 5 years and the
way neighbourhood policy has been implemented has changed too. The systematic
applicability of the “zero problem” has always raised questions. Can Turkey develop
relations with Iran without Israel changing its position towards Turkey as opposed to
what happened in the myth of Alexander and the desiccated hide of the billy-goat?
SNAPSHOTJuly 5, 2017From the ArchivesTurkey
Turkey's Patchwork
Foreign Policy
Between Islamism and Pragmatism
By Aykan Erdemir and Merve Tahiroglu
Turkey’s steady descent into authoritarianism
under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been accompanied
by an erratic foreign policy. Since coming to power in 2002,
Erdogan has combined neo-Ottoman rhetoric at home with
pan-Islamist ambitions abroad, patronizing the Muslim
Brotherhood globally and, more recently, supporting jihadist
proxies in Syria. Yet shifting domestic alliances and foreign
policy failures have constrained the Turkish strongman’s
ability to act on ideological principles alone. The resulting
tension—between Erdogan’s Islamist zeal and his forced
pragmatism—helps explain Ankara’s patchwork foreign policy
in the Middle East and beyond.
STATES OF CHANGE
Over the last four years, Erdogan has survived two attempts to
oust him: a landmark corruption scandal in 2013 and a bloody
coup attempt last summer. The Gulen movement, Erdogan’s
closest political ally between 2002 and 2013, played a key role
in both. The vicious infighting within Turkey’s ruling bloc
has led Erdogan to purge the country’s political and
bureaucratic elite, replacing Gulenists with ultranationalists.
Meanwhile, the failure of Ankara’s attempt to resolve its
conflict with Kurdish groups in 2015 and the rise of jihadist
groups in neighboring Syria have led to periodic terror
attacks in Turkey, producing unprecedented casualties. As a
result, both the Turkish people and their leader have lately
become more paranoid and nationalistic.
Turkey’s neighborhood, too, has been transformed. The
Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Islamists who seemed
ascendant during the Arab Spring now appear to have been
exiled to the margins of Middle Eastern politics by the
region’s staunchly anti-Brotherhood heavyweights—
namely, Saudi Arabia and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s
Egypt. This summer’s Gulf crisis, which culminated in a
coordinated diplomatic assault on Qatar, the Brotherhood’s
top patron alongside Turkey, was yet another setback for
political Islam. Ankara, having sided with the Islamists from
the onset of the Arab Spring only to see them fail to hold
power, has found itself on the losing end of regional
diplomacy. Since 2013, Turkey’s relations with Egypt and
Libya have been antagonistic, and those with the Gulf’s Saudiled bloc have been strained. Turkey and Qatar-backed factions
continue to fight a proxy war against Egypt and United Arab
Emirates–backed forces in Libya. Erdogan’s forceful support
for Qatar in the latest crisis will only further isolate Turkey in
the greater Middle East. Erdogan’s nationalist turn,
born out of necessity, has not eliminated the
enduring Islamist undertones of his foreign
policy.
The most pressing concern for Ankara, however, is in
neighboring Syria. As the country descended into civil war, its
Kurdish-majority areas obtained de facto autonomy under the
leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), an affiliate
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist
organization that has fought a 40-year insurgency against the
Turkish state. The rise of jihadist militants, including the
Islamic State (also known as ISIS), meanwhile obliged the
PYD’s defense units to protect themselves by expanding their
control beyond Syria’s Kurdish regions into majority-Arab
towns. From Ankara’s point of view, the political and military
advance of Rojava, as the self-governing Kurdish statelet in
northern Syria is called, is an unwelcome inspiration for
Kurds on the Turkish side of the border. Turkey’s security
bureaucracy, moreover, sees PYD-dominated Rojava as
a launching pad for the PKK and thus an existential threat to
Turkey—all the more so since Ankara’s 2015 resumption of its
intermittent war with Kurdish insurgents.
THE NATIONALIST TURN
The rise in anti-Kurdish sentiment within Turkey, as well as
the perceived danger posed by Rojava to the Turkish state, has
coincided with the rise of a new existential threat to Erdogan’s
one-man rule, represented by last summer’s coup attempt.
The coup only reinforced the perils of the president’s break
with the Gulenists and pushed Erdogan to make nice with
Turkey’s ultranationalist, relatively secular political and
security establishment, which he had previously rebuffed.
Indeed, this new alliance is the biggest constraint on pursuing
his ideal domestic and foreign policy. Erdogan, the first
Turkish leader to seek a comprehensive political solution to
the conflict with the Kurds, is now waging a brutal
campaign in the Kurdish-dominated south and painting
Rojava as Turkey’s top security threat.
UMIT BEKTAS / REUTERS Downtown
Istanbul, July 2017.
The practical meaning of all this is that Turkey’s policy in
Syria is now obsessed with containing the Kurds’ political
progress there—a major reversal of Erdogan’s earlier
ambitions. At the outset of the unrest in Syria, Erdogan
pursued a proactive Islamist policy aiming for a quick regime
change, going so far as to fund and arm jihadists to oust
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Today, Erdogan is willing
to keep the Syrian strongman in place and is redirecting his
threats toward Rojava, to the delight of hard-line Turkish
nationalists.
But Erdogan’s nationalist turn, born out of necessity, has not
eliminated the enduring Islamist undertones of his foreign
policy. To be sure, what appeared in 2011 as a coherent,
proactive, pan-Islamist grand strategy has given way to a
reactive and patchwork approach. Yet the ideology informing
that original grand strategy persists, restrained only by
tactical needs and the threats to Erdogan’s rule. In the short
term, until he can fully consolidate his position, Erdogan will
be beholden to the nationalist fixations of his newfound allies.
In the long term, however, those allies will dampen but not
end Erdogan’s pan-Islamist designs.
PLAYING THE LONG GAME
The persistence of this pan-Islamist vision is most evident in
Turkey’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before
the Islamists’ ascent to power in Turkey, Ankara and
Jerusalem cooperated closely in intelligence, defense, and
security affairs. Despite Erdogan’s best efforts to undermine
that, which culminated in the downgrading of diplomatic ties
in 2011, Turkey’s security bureaucracy still sees Jerusalem as a
key resource, especially in light of resurgent Kurdish
nationalism and growing Iranian influence in the region.
Hence today’s Turkey, newly anxious about security, has
sought to improve its relations with Israel, pushing Erdogan
toward last year’s rapprochement, whereby Ankara agreed to
reinstate ambassadors and acquiesced to Israel opening a
permanent mission at NATO headquarters. But although
Erdogan will continue to accommodate the Israelis, he will
never disown his comrades in Hamas, which he has continued
to support and whose exiled members he has sheltered in
Turkey. Beyond his ideological common ground with Hamas,
the patronage of the Palestinian cause is indispensable for
Erdogan’s publicity campaigns in Turkey and the Muslim
world.
Another example of Erdogan’s patchwork approach is in
Turkish policy toward Iran. Historically, Ankara has been
wary of Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. Yet
Erdogan and his fellow Turkish Islamists have traditionally
been sympathetic to Tehran and under the right conditions
would probably be willing to partner with Iran to challenge
the Western-led liberal world order. That sympathy led
Ankara to oppose the 2010 UN sanctions against Iran’s
nuclear program, despite the significant threat a nuclear Iran
could pose to Turkey. Ankara’s Iran-skeptic security
apparatus, however, has long viewed Tehran as one of
the main supporters of the PKK. Combined with deepening
sectarian rivalries in Iraq and Syria, this skepticism will
continue to undermine Erdogan’s hopes for building a
strategic partnership between the two countries. Even so,
Iranian-Turkish cooperation is poised to endure in the fields
of energy, trade, and illicit finance.
Ankara’s patchwork foreign policy looks contradictory now—it
champions Erdogan’s pan-Islamist partners while also
working with their rivals. This confusion stems from a forced
pragmatism prompted by a number of challenges to Erdogan:
backstabbing allies at home, resurgent Kurdish nationalism,
and the global reversal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s fortunes
since the Arab Spring. But Erdogan is a savvy politician and a
resolute survivor. He will do whatever it takes to stay in
power, but he has not lost his Islamist zeal. For now, Erdogan
will continue to make compromises to protect his rule, hoping
for the favorable winds of another spring.