VI. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. Justifying circumstances (Art. 11, RPC)
1. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers
Manaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
150723, 11 July 2006
FACTS:
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o’clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista, a father
and a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of
difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There, the doctors prescribed certain
medicines to be purchased. Needing money therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had
taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw
some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because he could
not effectively withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the machine. For
said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and asked him
what the problem was. Bautista complained that his ATM was retrieved by the
machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had checked the receipt, he
informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong
and advised him to just return the next morning. This angered Bautista all the more
and resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban then urged him to calm down and
referred him to their customer service over the phone. Still not mollified, Bautista
continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him,
he fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his
ire against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a
shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista.
ISSUE:
WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable
HELD:
Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove
self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal
liability are: a.) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; b.) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and c.) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. Unlawful
aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical
injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude, which shown by
Baustista, is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and
menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury and there must be an
actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the
defendant’s life in real peril. In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim. The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when
he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Aggression presupposes that the
person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is
imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to one’s life
or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or
inflicting injuries on another.
Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004.
Facts: That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o'clock in the morning in Barangay Zarah, San
Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack,
assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Leon Lumasac by then and
there stabbing him with a bladed weapon locally known as "kolonyal" at the different parts
of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of self-defense.
Trial Court finds accused Exequiel Senoja GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide for the death of victim Leon Lumasac.
As for appellant's injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in the course of the victim's
attempt to defend himself as shown by the lacerated wound on the victim's left palm, a
defensive wound.
CA affirmed with modification, the decision of the RTC.
The petitioner contended that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts which, if considered, would
probably alter the result of this case on appeal finding appellant's plea of self-defense
credible.
People v. Decena, G.R. No. 107874, 4 Aug. 1994, 235 SCRA 67
Issue: Whether the accused acted in self-defense or not.
People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 389 (see also dissents of J.
Abad Santos and J. Gutierrez, Jr.)
Ruling: No, the accused didn’t act in self-defense.
Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an
inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill
or injure the former aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following
up his adversary to take his life. The conflict for blood should be avoided if possible. An
assault on his person, he cannot punish when the danger or peril is over. When the danger
is over, the right of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not retribution.
It is the well-considered finding of Supreme Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased
being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the
unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation. It bears mentioning that
appellant contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it
was to pacify Leon and the second reason was that he was going home.
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 128359, 6 Dec. 2000, 347 SCRA 100
People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946, 76 Phil. 174
Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, 9 March 2007, 518 SCRA 35
People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 Aug. 2006, 499 SCRA 64
Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, 12 Sep. 2006,
501 SCRA 533
People vs. Catbagan, G.R. No. 149430-32, 23 Feb.
2004
2. Avoidance of greater evil
People v. Ricohermoso, L-30527-28, 29 Mar 1974, 56
SCRA 431
People v. Norma Hernandez, CA-G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 Apr. 1959, 55 OG 8465
3. Fulfillment of duty
People v. Delima, L-18660, 22 December 1922, 46
Phil. 738
People of the Philippines vs. Delima
L-18660, 22 December 1922
Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in
the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance,
and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman
dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The
criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. These peace officer went after him and
fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and
the accessory penalties.
Issue:
Whether the Felipe Delima is criminally liable for the death of Lorenzo Napilon.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was
under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to
commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman
to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the
circumstances.lawphil.netUnder Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code, Felipe Delima
committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio.
entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2
Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and saw a man who
they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun
once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras who is not the suspect died of
the gunshot wound. According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the
policemen to the lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the
deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly
exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot
him. The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark
rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run.
Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!” whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe
towards Mamangun’s head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police
claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him.
Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen here.”
Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator Hernando
Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. The petition was brought to Supreme court.
Issue:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of
his duty
Held:
People v. Lagata, L-1940-42, 24 March 1949, 83
Phil. 150
Mamangun v. People, G.R. No. 149152, 2 February
2007
Facts: Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his
fellow police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras
was heard shouting, which prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding
the petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal
liability. Per Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and
biased with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because after supposed introductions and
forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human experience for a man
(who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns. Acts in the
fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal
gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which
leads to the failure of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a
privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the
injury was caused by necessary consequence of due performance of duty.
1. Insanity
People v. Taneo, L-37673, 31 March 1933, 58 Phil.
255
People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 Aug. 2006,
499 SCRA 64
People v. Bonoan, L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64
Phil. 87
4. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199
SCRA 860
People v. Rafanan, L-54135, 21 November 1991, 204
SCRA 65
People v. Beronilla, L-4445, 28 February 1955, 96 Phil. 566 Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 Feb. 1997, 268 SCRA 332
People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000,
332 SCRA 99
B. Exempting Circumstances (Art. 12, RPC)
People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002,
382 SCRA 581
People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March
2004, 425 SCRA 654
Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016
Facts:
On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill, assault and stab ROMEO B.
PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused his death. Before the incident, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were
at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report
that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. Afterwards they had a
confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a
tricycle and stopped at the drug store as Maynard intended to buy a baby supplies and the
victim also followed him, on his way the accused stabbed Romeo on the left side of the
victim’s back twice and his shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted
to attack him as well, he defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero
at the chest. Ronnie meanwhile got into the Police station to seek assistance, Verdadero was
arrested and Romeo was rushed into Cagayan Valley Medical Center, however he is dead
on arrival. Prior to the incident, Solomon Verdadero was notably going in and out of CVMCs
Psychiatric Department, in the year 1999, 2000, 2003, and March of 2009, Doctors contended
that he suffers a chronic mental disease called Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied
by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental
disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. On May 30, 2013, the
RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The RTC ruled
that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial
court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting
circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he
was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound
mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA. In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld
Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed that the defense was able to
establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable to prove that
he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the
decision states:
In view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED on May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated December 15, 2014.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
RULING:
Supreme Court contends Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of
insanity. He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind
when they were at the police station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that
Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. AndresJuliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse at the time of the
stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537 RA 9262 (Re: Battered Woman
Syndrome)
A Landmark Case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome The wife had suffered maltreatment from her
husband for over eight years. She was 8 months pregnant when, one evening, her husband
came home drunk and started to batter her.Shouting that his wife "might as well be killed so
there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun,
but was not able to open the drawer because it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his
wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into another
room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband had been inflicting on her, and
thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the
gun. She shot her husband, who was by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and
convicted for parricide. In appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of selfdefense.
FACTS: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and
wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did
not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant
said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because
'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant herein can validly invoke the "battered woman syndrome" or
not.
HELD: No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the
appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed.
The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression
does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated? Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault
at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack
before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'
Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630
People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 Sept. 1939,
68 Phil. 580
People vs. Valentin Doqueña
G.R. No. 46539 (1939)
FACTS:
Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarag (‘Epi’) were playing volleyball in their
school. Valentin (‘Val’), a 7th grade pupil, joined them, but he hit Juan with the
ball in the stomach. Juan chased, slapped, and punched Val on the face. Juan
returned to Epi and played, and Val took a knife. Val stabbed Juan to death.
Val is one of the brightest in school and always obtained excellent remarks.
Thus, the trial court is convinced that Val committed the act with discernment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Val committed the act with discernment?
RULING:
Yes. Discernment pertains to mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. Such capacity should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts, circumstances, appearance, attitude, comportment
and behavior of the minor.
Note: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, RA 9262 (Anti Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of the said law provides that
“Victim-survivors who are found by courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome
do not incur any criminal liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under Revised Penal Code.”
2. Minority
Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, 20 July
2011.
3. Accident
US v. Tañedo, L-5418, 12 February 1910, 15 Phil.
196
saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had
gone a few moments before. She claimed it was hers.
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 Jun 2007,
526 SCRA 215
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the
appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house
and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts,
the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own
bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been
living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had
previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the
appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at
the time and on the date above-stated.
People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10
December 2003
Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, 29 Sep. 2004,
439 SCRA 439
4. Irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a greater injury
US v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905, 4
Phil. 350
People v. Loreno, L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA
311
People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 Apr.
1999, 305
SCRA 740
5. Insuperable cause
People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September
1936, 63 Phil.
530 (see also: separate opinion of J. Villareal)
FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket
apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the
thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her
house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom
Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed
willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act
or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair
with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three
years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he
considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the
pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child.
The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she
was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take her child from the
thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the
danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of
giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with
no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been
accused of.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is
exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies, which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been
exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she
deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because
according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the act punishable by law
is performed with deliberate intent. uffering from fever and from dizziness, the appellant
under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she
could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was
ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held
that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience
in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural — she
might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a
psychological defect of a person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the
pernicious consequences of his willful act.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although
the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity accidentally provoked the
delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of
the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the
accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her
accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of
said child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh
exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to
perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause,
because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be
complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive
which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its
exposure to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the
accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission
punishable by law with regard to the child.
C. Other exculpatory causes
1. Instigation
People v. Lua Chu, G.R. No. 34917, 7 Sept. 1931, 56
Phil. 44
People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 Jan. 1999, 301
SCRA 668
2. Pardon (Art. 266-C and Art. 344)
3. Absolutory circumstances
a. Art. 6 (3), RPC
b. Art. 20, RPC
c. Art. 247, RPC
d. Art. 280, RPC
e. Art. 332, RPC
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v.
People, G.R. No.
181409, 11 Feb. 2010