189.
The Office of the Mayor of Las Pinas refused to issue permit to petitioners to hold rally a rally in
front of the Justice Hall of Las Pinas on the ground that it was prohibited under Supreme Court En Banc
Resolution dated July 7,1998 in A.M. No. 98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of
Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All
Other Courts." Petitioners thus initiated the instant proceedings. They submit that the Supreme Court
gravely abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in promulgating those
guidelines.
Held: We shall first dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the rules constitute an
abridgment of the people's aggregate rights of free speech, free expression, peaceful assembly and
petitioning government for redress of grievances citing Sec. 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution that
"no law shall be passed abridging" them.
It is true that the safeguarding of the people's freedom of expression to the end that individuals may
speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes
of education and discussion, is essential to free government. But freedom of speech and expression
despite its indispensability has its limitations. It has never been understood as the absolute right to
speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of public
discussion can be constitutionally controlled. [T]he better policy is not liberty untamed but liberty
regulated by law where every freedom is exercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the
rights of others.
Conventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a complex society preclude an absolutist
interpretation of freedom of expression where it does not involve pure speech but speech plus physical
actions like picketing. There are other significant societal values that must be accommodated and when
they clash, they must all be weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the
ultimate objective. In balancing these values, this Court has accorded freedom of expression a preferred
position in light of its more comparative importance. Hence, our rulings now musty in years hold that
only the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are specifically tailored to serve an important
governmental interest may justify the application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of the
people's right of free speech and expression. Where said regulations do not aim particularly at the evils
within the allowable areas of state control but, on the contrary, sweep within their ambit other activities
as to operate as an overhanging threat to free discussion, or where upon their face they are so vague,
indefinite, or inexact as to permit punishment of the fair use of the right of free speech, such regulations
are void.
Prescinding from this premise, the Court reiterates that judicial independence and the fair and orderly
administration of justice constitute paramount governmental interests that can justify the regulation of
the public's right of free speech and peaceful assembly in the vicinity of courthouses. In the case of In
Re: Emil P. Jurado, the Court pronounced in no uncertain terms that:
"x x x freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x" (In Re: Emil P. Jurado, 243
SCRA 299, 323-324 [1995])
It is sadly observed that judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice have been
threatened not only by contemptuous acts inside, but also by irascible demonstrations outside, the
courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly, spoil the ideal of sober, non-partisan proceedings before a
cold and neutral judge. Even in the United States, a prohibition against picketing and demonstrating in
or near courthouses, has been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting effect on the
exercise by the public of their liberties. X x x
The administration of justice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair and it is the duty of
this Court to eliminate everything that will diminish if not destroy this judicial desideratum. To be sure,
there will be grievances against our justice system for there can be no perfect system of justice but these
grievances must be ventilated through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. Such a mode is
in keeping with the respect due to the courts as vessels of justice and is necessary if judges are to
dispose their business in a fair fashion. It is the traditional conviction of every civilized society that courts
must be insulated from every extraneous influence in their decisions . The facts of a case should be
determined upon evidence produced in court, and should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies. (In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC - Ricardo C.
Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R.
No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998)
190.
Did the Supreme Court commit an act of judicial legislation in promulgating En Banc Resolution
A.M. 98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other
Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts?"
Held: Petitioners also claim that this Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating the
assailed resolution. They charge that this Court amended provisions of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 880,
otherwise known as "the Public Assembly Act," by converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of
two hundred (200) meters from every courthouse from a public forum place into a "no rally" zone. Thus,
they accuse this Court of x x x violating the principle of separation of powers.
We reject these low watts arguments. Public places historically associated with the free exercise of
expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be public
fora. In other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature inherent in
them. But even in such public fora, it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict speech
plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.
Contrary therefore to petitioners’ impression, B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among
other places, as public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in
public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public
assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or
sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly.
The existence of B.P. Blg. 880, however, does not preclude this Court from promulgating rules regulating
conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly
administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure,
friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass
actions within a 200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general
restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the
resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two
sets of regulatory measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution complement each
other. We so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule
and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible. (In Re:
Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC - Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29,
1998)