FAMILIES 2NC
1.
ON CASE
a. Additional restrictions prevent family reunification
Demleitner ‘4
(Nora V., dean and pr ofess or of law at H ofstr a U ni versity School of Law, H ow M uch do Western Democracies Value F ami ly and Marriage?: Immigrati on Law’s C onflicted Ans wers, p. 283- 284
www.hofstr a.edu/PDF/l aw_lawrev_deml eitner _vol32no1.pdf, acc ess ed 8/20/10 DKM)
Many countries of immigration have set up financial requirements
The sponsoring family member has to show that s/he is able to provide for the
incoming migrant. Without such documentation, entry will be denied.
Family
members who have infectious diseases
may not be able to immigrate.52 Other
ways to restrict family migration are through regulations upon arrival.
While most of these restrictions are currently based on the family status and
characteristics of the immigrant,
, increasingly the sponsor’s suitability has
been questioned. In the United States this has been done primarily through
financial requirements for sponsorship
Admi nistrati ve delays and q uotas ac count for s ome of the tempor ar y s eparation of coupl es and families but are not the s ol e reas on.
befor e s pous es c an follow.
51
Other restrictions exis t or ar e under c onsi der ati on.
or vi olent or drug- rel ated convicti ons
F or example, in some countries, joi ning famil y members are not granted the right to work.53
such as health or crimi nal bac kgrounds
whic h were made legall y enforceable thr oug h the 1996 immigration legisl ation. 54 C anada is c onsi dering legislation that would ban a potential
b. No solvency – Trump’s executive agencies are increasing
vetting processes and denying requests. Adding a
preferential category doesn’t change what Trump is doing
to increase restriction.
Rosenberg,
Reuters r eporter c overi ng immigration and c orres pondent in Lati n Americ a,
01/04/18
Mic a, Fewer famil y vis as appr oved as Trump toughens vetti ng of i mmigrants : R euters revi ew, https ://www.reuters.c om/article/us-tr ump- effec t-immigrati on/fewer-famil y- visas- appr oved-as-trump-toughens- vetti ng-of-i mmigrants-reuters-review-i dUSKBN 1ET15I , acc. 7/13/18, VX
Trump is ramping up calls on the U.S. Congress to stop legal immigrants from
sponsoring extended family members
Even without legislative action,
however, the number of immigrants approved for family-based visas has dropped
this year to the lowest level in more than a decade,
All immigrants undergo security
vetting and can face years-long waits before they are given a green light. focus
on chain migration has been accompanied by an overall slowdown in
adjudications of family-based visas,
The number of approvals dropped by
nearly a quarter
despite a similar number of applications
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Pr esident D onal d
who want to move to the Uni ted States, sayi ng s o-call ed “c hai n migrati on” poses a threat to nati onal s ec urity.
a Reuters revi ew of U.S. Citiz ens hip and Immigration Ser vices (USCIS) data shows. The drop has not been previ ousl y repor ted. The Tr ump adminis trati on has taken a s eries of meas ures to more clos el y s cruti nize leg al i mmigration. Thes e steps have been overshadowed by Tr ump’s mor e public efforts to crac k down on illegal i mmigrati on, s uc h as his c alls for a wall al ong the M exic an border and
more arres ts of people li ving in the c ountr y ill egall y.Latel y though, Trump has incr easingl y been taki ng ai m at chain migration, s aying it all o ws a si ngle i mmigrant “to bring in doz ens of i ncreasi ngly distant r elations,” with “ no real s elec tion criteria.” He sai d a Ba nglades hi man who set off a homemade pipe bomb i n a cr owded New Yor k City c ommuter hub i n D ec ember was a prime exampl e of the dangers of the s ys tem. Immigrati on advoc ates c ounter that no one automatic all y qualifi es for a vis a becaus e a rel ati ve is already i n the Uni ted States.
The intensifi ed
known as I-130s , the R euters r evi ew s hows .
in the first ni ne months of 2017 to ar ound 406,000 compar ed to the s ame period a year earlier when appr ovals wer e more than 530,000,
during both p
c. Inefficiency of the court system, too few attorneys, and
bureaucratic influence mean that immigrants can’t get into
the country
Lee,
Record politic s reporter
, 17
[Rick, 6/14/17, Yor k D ail y R ec ord, “Immigration court s ystem is ' a tr ain wr ec k,' r etired j udg e s ays”, https://www.ydr.c om/stor y/news/2017/06/14/i mmigration-court-s ys tem- a-trai n- wrec k-retired-judge-says/370102001/, acces sed
The nation's immigration court system "is on the verge of collapse,"
the Department of Homeland Security is shifting money away from legal
assistance for undocumented immigrants
the burgeoning case backlog, a shortage of judges, an
insufficient number of defense attorneys and projected cuts to immigration legal
advocacy groups has the court on the path to being about as inefficient as it
longtime i mmigrati on Judge Paul Wic kham Schmi dt rec entl y told i mmigration advoc ates i n Yor k County.
At the s ame ti me, Presi dent Trump is expanding efforts that woul d detai n more i mmigrants, and
toward crime vic tims of illeg al i mmigrants . But even before that, the Immigrati on C ourt s ystem had bec ome " an expr ess trai n running full throttl e into an earlier trai n wr ec k and no attempt has been made to cl ear the trac k," Sc hmidt told the advocates .
His ass ess ment draws from 13 years of experi enc e on the bench. In the l ate 1990s, he was among those who established the mission and vi sion of the i mmigrati on court. He ser ve d as an immigration c ourt judge until 2016. At banquet for the Penns yl vania Immigrant R esourc e Center, a Yor k C ounty- based l egal advoc ac y organiz ation, he s ai
could possibly be.
Currently, there
are about 600,000 pending immigration cases.
There are not enough pro
bono and low bono (legal representation at reduced costs) attorneys for all
immigration court defendants.
there are 250 to 300 immigration judges
nationwide to handle that caseload.
The average
length of time to appoint an immigration court judge is two years.
the court system was not created and was never intended to handle this many
cases.
Immigration court is civil court and so,
defendants do not have a right to court-appointed counsel.
The first cas ualty i n the bur eaucr atic mess, Sc hmidt s aid in an inter vi ew befor e the banquet, was due proc ess - the right of ever y pers on under the U .S. C ons titution, regar dles s of citiz ens hip, to expect and recei ve fair tr eatment in court. "The problem has been allowed to fes ter and gr ow by the politici ans ," Schmi dt said. "T he BIA (Bur eau of Immigrati on Appeals) has s kewed as yl um law ag ains t as ylum seekers." Politic al offici als i n the las t three administr ati ons have hijac ked the missi on of t he i mmigration c ourts." Sc hmidt lai d out the problem faci ng the i mmigration c ourt by the numbers:
Accor ding to ICE, ther e are more than 41,000 detai nees curr entl y bei ng held in cus tody.
Only 14 percent of the detainees hel d i n c ustody nationwide by ICE have leg al repres entation. D epending on the source,
The Exec uti ve Offic e of Immigration R evi ew, whic h overs ees the judges and c our t s ys tem, cl ai ms 250 acti ve j udges. The Gover nment Acc ountability Offic e, referred to as the " congressi onal watc hdog," counts more than 300 j udg es. The average wait for an ICE detainee c ase to be completed is 670 days. T he aver age wait i n Penns yl vani a is 496 days .
And, compoundi ng those pr obl ems, ac cor ding to Sc hmidt: T he immigration c our t s ys tem has become a pros ec uti on tool of the Department of Homeland Sec urity and the exec uti ve branc h. T oo much
emphasis is gi ven to detention. mF or the las t 16 years, R epublic ans and Democr ats " have largel y stood by and watched the unfol ding due process dis as ter ... without doing anythi ng about it, and i n s ome cas es ac tuall y m aking i t wors e." Al most 88 perc ent of i mmigrati on judges c ome from a g overnment i mmigration pros ec uti on bac kground. DH S Secr etar y J ohn Kelly, a Trump appointee, dir ected ICE to reallocate any and all r esourc es used to advoc ate on behalf of illegal aliens to the new VOICE Office - Vic tims of Immigrati on Cri me Engagement.
Schmi dt says
He said c as es are sc heduled and r esc heduled with s ome detainees being hel d in c ustody for years whil e their cas es dr ag out. "If a case i s hanging ar ound for si x, s even, eig ht years, how can you do j ustic e?" he s ays . One reas on for the bac kl og is that the c as es have grown mor e c ompl ex and contentious , he sai d. Another is the s hortag e of attorneys willing to take i mmigrati on cas es .
Most are l eft to fend for thems el ves. Sc hmidt s aid immi gration law is s o c omplic ated that even i ts prac titioners have
d. No solvency – they neither add visas nor remove the per
country cap, meaning that the new visas will never be used
NIF 12
National Immigrati on For um, Immigration Bac klogs are Separ ating American F amilies, https://immigrationforum.org/articl e/i mmigrati on- bac kl ogs-s eparating-american-famili es/, ac c. 7/14/18, VX
Family immigration categories and per-country limits
All “immediate relatives” plus all of the family preference categories
must fit within an overall ceiling for family-based immigration of 480,000,
So, when immediate relative immigration is more than 254,000 the
overall ceiling is “pierced.”)
This is the heart of the backlog
problem with family preference immigration.
Our famil y i mmigrati on s ystem plac es peopl e who want to i mmigrate to the U.S. i nto vis a c ategories ( mos t with numeric al limits) acc ordi ng to the cl oseness of the relations hip and the citiz ens hip status of the U.S. famil y member. As the table above shows , there is no numerical cap for spouses , unmarried minor c hildr en, and par ents of U .S. citiz ens. This categor y is
called “i mmediate rel ati ves of U .S. citiz ens.” F or all other rel ations , however, there are strict limits on the total number in eac h c ategor y.
but this ceiling can be exceeded due to the fact that there is a “fl oor” of 226,000 for the famil y preferenc e
(480,000 – 226,000),
categories (non-i mmedi ate rel ati ves) c oupl ed with the fact that immediate r elati ves ar e not c apped. (
For many years now, there have been no more than 226,000 visas alloc ated to the famil y preferenc e c ategories bec ause immediat e r elati ve immigration has been mor e than 254,000 per year.
2.
JRADS CP
a. Children cannot sponsor their parents
Leopold 17
Leopold, D avid. “ Why Can't U ndoc umented Immigrants Jus t Get Legal ? – D avid Leopold – Medium.” Medium.c om, M edi um, 20 Apr. 2017, medium.com/@D avi dLeopold/why-c ant-undoc umented-immigrants-j ust-get-l egal-bde44557b7c 1.
Children Cannot Sponsor Parents for Green Cards It’s a common misconception
In fact, an undocumented parent seeking to obtain
citizenship through his or her child faces an arduous 36-year slog: 21 years for
the child to be able to sponsor the parent, 10 years of banishment from the United
States because of their previous unlawful presence, and five years waiting as a
green card holder to be eligible for U.S. citizenship.
Bottom Line:
Obtaining Legal Status Is Nearly Impossible
once
someone enters the country illegally or overstays their visa, the law prohibits
them from applying for legal immigration status from inside the United States.
— falsel y pushed
by anti-immigrant extr emists — that U.S.-citiz en c hildr en can s ponsor their parents for leg al i mmigration s tatus. D uring the R epublic an primar y, c andi date Trump r aile d agains t “birthright citiz ens hip” — the cl aus e i n the 14th Amendment that grants U.S. citiz enshi p to chil dren bor n on U.S. s oil — clai ming it was the “biggest mag net for illegal i mmigrati on.”
When you consi der the time it takes to obtai n a green c ard, the clai m that women c ome to the United States illegall y to gi ve birth and gai n l egal s tatus is patentl y abs urd.
for Most Undocumented Immigrants T he outdated, rigid, and poorl y struc tur ed i mmigration l aw makes it nearl y i mpossibl e for most undoc umented i mmigrants to fi x their status in the United States. T his is true r egar dless of whether a pers on arri ved in the c ountr y on a l awful vis a and l ater fell out of s tatus , or whether they entered the c ountry without lawful i nspec tion by U.S. immigration offic ers. That’s bec aus e
b. JRAD’s key to making sure people aren’t deported and are
legally binding
CADE 15
Jason Cade, Retur n of the JRAD, 90 N.Y .U. L. Rev. Online 36 (201 5).
it represented the possibility of equitable relief in an otherwise
highly regulated system, and it is a loss we may rue in the future. Here the history
of JRADs may be instructive. The JRAD history begins with an acknowledged
need for discretion in a harsh system, continues through a period of uneven use
of the discretionary power, and is followed by elimination of the power.
The JRAD definition cites no criteria,
And yet, s omethi ng important is bei ng los t, beyond even the humanitarian c onc ern we might have for many of the i mmigrants in the li mbo s pac e. 41 While deferred ac tion was under-utiliz ed in the preD AC A and D APA era,
42 The JRAD histor y ends with regret for its abs enc e. JRAD s offered the s entenci ng judge i n cri minal c ourt the ability to deter mine whether
the indi vi dual s houl d (as a matter of discreti on) be deported. 43 As the 1917 l egislati ve histor y expl ains : When the alien is before the j udg e c harged wi th a crime and the time for sentence comes, nec ess arily the question of whether he s hall be deported or not must be pres ented to the c ourt, and when all the fac ts are before hi m, and both sides have been h ear d by the c our t, that is the ti me when that i mportant matter s houl d be deci ded. 44 T his is a pri me example of indi vidualiz ed discretion, unfettered by the ki nds of criteria we see with D ACA or DAPA.
and has onl y
one l ater-added exclusi on (JRADs wer e made unavailable for narc otics convicti ons). 45 Instead, it foc us es on the pr oc edure of judicial decisi on- making to r ec ommend ag ains t depor tati on after putting i nteres ted par ties (i mmigrati on authorities, the pr osecutor, and s o forth) on notice s o that they might weigh i n. 46
Thus,
like pr e-2014 deferr ed ac tion,
we see a broad authority with minimal
substantive guidance.
Congress removed the provision allowing for JRADs.
scholars see it as an underutilized discretionary
tool whose usefulness would have boomed in the over-criminalized post-1996
era.
The provisi on was littl e known, and r elati vel y s el dom invoked, as M argaret Tayl or and R onal d Wright have s ho wn. 47 T heir 2002 articl e, which argued for a merger between crimi nal and i mmigration s entenci ng, l ooked at this JRAD his tor y in great detail. 48 T hey note how, for much of its exis tenc e si nce 1917, JR ADs operated i n a c ontext where deportations of i m migrants for cri me-rel ated reas ons wer e ver y l ow, and ther efore the need for JR ADs was l ower. 49 The authors note that, " [p]er haps the most nota ble feature of JR ADs was the extent to whic h 'the exis tenc e of this r emedy and its tremendous amelior ati ng effect ... was neither wi del y known nor understood.' -50 Much like pre2014 deferred ac tion, then, this was a pr ovision that had rel ati vel y littl e r eal-
world i mpac t. In 1990, after s eventy- thr ee years i n the l aw,
51 This removal was an unheral ded moment in immigration law at the ti me, and the provisi on dis appeared without a trace of leg islati ve his tor y explai ning i ts departur e. 52 Per haps its under- use c ontributed to this silenc e; i t was a tr ee that did not fall i n a forest, maki ng it irrel evant whether we coul d hear it or
not. It is this irrelevanc e that I had in mind as I c onsi dered the s heer numbers of D ACA and DAPA eligibl e people as compar ed to the li mited us e of deferred action i n the pre-DAC A and DAPA er a. H owever, in hi ndsig ht, as the 1990s dr amati call y i ncreas ed the inters ecti on between the crimi nal justic e s ystem and i mmigrati on enforc ement, the departure of JR ADs has been rued. 53 Now
5 4 As advoc ates grapple with the fate of 4.5 million or more immigrants in limbo pos t2014, it is possi ble that we will simil arl y regret the narrowi ng, and functi onal eli minati on, of the tool of deferred acti on.
c. JRAD’s were specifically prevent the separation of families,
reinstating them solves the aff without necessitating a visa
BANKS 13
Angela M. Banks , T he Nor mati ve and His toric al Cases for Pr oporti onal D eportation, 62 EMOR Y L.J . 1243, 1267-69, 1278 ( 2013)
members of Congress thought that such separation could constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 188 Congress recognized that deporting noncitizens would
have an impact on families.
which were seen as undesirable and potentially
disproportionate outcomes. To limit the occurrence of such outcomes, Congress
provided for individualized review of deportation decisions.
judges issued judicial recommendations against deportation
They had faith in the judiciary to determine when deportation
would be disproportionate. 192
Judicial recommendations
against deportation remained a part of U.S. immigration law until 1990,
immigration judges exercised their power to provide
discretionary relief from deportation.
Congress
recognized that noncitizens may be “ours” based on their connections to the
United States and that deportation could be a disproportionate response
and provided for individualized review.
Other
even
Deportati on could c aus e financial har ds hips and famil y s eparation,
D. Protecting Proportionality C ongres s utilized two types of dis creti onar y r elief to li mit dispr oporti onate outc omes in crime-bas ed deportati on cases . Cri minal trial judges gr anted one type of relief and i mmigrati on judges gr anted a s ec ond type of relief Crimi nal trial
(JRADs). Members of Congress suc h as R epr es entati ves Goldfogle, Sabath, Küs ter mann, and O’C onnell saw JR ADs as a critic al feature of any post-entr y crime-bas ed deportati on regi me. 189 At first they wanted trial j udges to affir mati vel y recommend deportation to
the Secr etar y of Labor. 190 T hey beli eved that the trial j udg e was “ bes t abl e to tell whether the offens e is of a charac ter so grave, aggravated, and seri ous as will warr ant depor tation.” 191
They beli eved that trial j udges were s uffici entl y publicl y oriented to rec ommend deportation when i t was nec ess ar y to pr otect public safety. 193 By 1916 the H ous e Immigration and N aturaliz ati on Committee agreed to all ow tri al judges to iss ue rec ommendations agai nst deportati on to the Secretar y of Labor . 194
yet they did not have the mi tigati ng effect envisioned by Repres entati ve Sabath. 195 T he potential power of JR ADs was never r ealiz ed
bec aus e judicial authority to iss ue a JR AD was not wi del y known and was therefor e rar el y used. 196Pr ofess ors T aylor and Wright have r eported that in mos t j urisdicti ons JR ADs were “‘virtually unheard of.’” 197Whil e cri minal trial judges di d not pl ay a signific ant rol e in ens uring that depor tati ons were pr oportional,
The 1952 INA pr ovided two ways in whic h i mmigration j udg es c ould provi de relief fr om deportation in c ases wher e depor tati on w oul d be dis proportionate—Secti on 212(c) relief and s us pensi on of deportation. Secti on 212(c) r elief was a vail abl e to LPRs who had resided in the U nited States for at leas t s even cons ecuti ve years. 198Sus pensi on of deportati on was availabl e to any noncitiz en who had been conti nuousl y pres ent i n the Uni ted States for s even years, had good mor al c har acter, and whos e deportation woul d c ause extreme har ds hip to the noncitizen or his or her citi zen or
LPR spouse, par ent, or c hild. 199 T o make thes e determi nations, i mmigration j udg es were direc ted to “balanc e the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s undesir ability as a per manent r esident with the s oci al and humane consi der ations pr esented in his [or her] behalf to deter mi ne whether the g ranti ng of . . . reli ef appears in the best interest of thi s c ountr y.” 200 Immigrati on judges wer e tr usted to bal anc e the severity of the crimi nal ac t and the c onnecti ons to the U nited States to deci de if deportation was warranted. Immigrati on judges ser ve d as gatekeepers ensuring that deportati on was a pr oporti onate r esponse to a s pecific noncitiz en’s cri minal acti vity. T he deportati on regi me intr oduc ed in the 1917 Immigration Act was bas ed on two ideas—the jus nexi princi ple and proporti onality.
to crimi nal acti vity. T o addres s this c oncer n, the cri me-bas ed deportati on r egime adopted that year created
statutes of limi tation for deportable crimi nal offens es
d. NO PERM – NEED TO AVOID COURT CLOG
e. AND, THE PLAN IS BAD MIGRANTS WOULD FIRST HAVE
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO REENTER FOR UP
TO 10 YEARS THIS ALONE IS A REASON TO VOTE NEG
EXTEND LEOPOLD 17, POONIA 16, Moccio and Hammel
2009
3.
Ableism K
a. Their futurity forwards contradictory narratives of disability
as vector for incapacity and opportunity for biocapitalist
intervention.
Fritsch 16 [
Edel man c alls on queers to
Kell y Fritsc h, Banting Pos tdoctor al Fell ow at the Women and Gender Studies Institute and Tec hnos cience Research U nit, U ni versity of Tor onto. Fritsc h hol ds a doctorate i n Social and Political Thoug ht from Yor k Uni versity and is c o-editor of Keywor ds for R adicals : T he Contested Voc abul ar y of Late Capitalist Struggle, “Cripping N eoli ber al F uturity: M ar king the Elsewhere and Els ewhen of D esiring Other wise”, F eral F eminisi ms Untimel y Bodi es: F uturity Resis tanc e, and Non-Nor mati ve Embodi ment, Iss ue 5, Spring 2016]
embrace the negative
and to “fuc k the s ocial order and the C hild in whos e name we’re c ollecti vel y terrorized” ( 2004, 29), s uggesting that the ethic al value of q ueerness is precis el y i n “accepti ng its figural status as resistanc e to the viability of the s oci al” (2004, 3). For Edelman, q ueers who s eek gay marriage, militar y ser vic e, or adopti on thus “jump on the band wagon of repr oducti ve futuris m” (McR uer 2008) and repr oduc e “the conditions of queer abjec tion” (White 2013, 23). Instead, Edel man c alls on queers to “acq uies ce to the charge that we are society’ s worst nightmare and to embr ace our figur ati on as the negati ve forc e wor king agai nst the soci al order” (McRuer 2008) , for “queer nes s c an never defi ne an i denti ty; i t c an onl y disturb one” (Edel man 2004, 17).
Edel man thus provoc ati vel y as ks : “ whil e not s eeki ng to r efute the lies that per vade [...] familiar right-wi ng di atribes [about our capacity to destr oy s oci ety], do we als o have the courag e to ac knowledge, and even embr ac e, their c orrelati ve truths ?” (2004, 22). Whil e asser ting that his anti-social s trateg y “ promis es, i n more than one s ense of the phr ase, abs ol utel y nothi ng” (2004, 5) and further noti ng that his pr oject is “i mpos sibl e” (2004, 4), he does argue that embraci ng queer negati vity “can have no j usti fication if j usti fication req uires i t to r einforc e s ome positive s oci al value; i ts value, ins tead, r esides i n its c hall eng e to value as defi ned by the s oci al, and thus i n its radical challenge to the ver y value of the s oci al its elf” ( 2004, 6). F or “queer nes s expos es the obliqui ty of our rel ation to what we experience in and as s ocial r eality, alerti ng us to the fantasies str ucturall y nec ess ary in or der to sustain i t and eng aging thos e fantasi es through the figural logics, the li nguistic str uctures , that s hape them” (2004, 6- 7). Edel man sugges ts that q ueerness is what c an
chall eng e “futurism’s unquesti oned good” (2004, 7) and als o r esist the i dea that if there is no baby ther e is no future, and that wi thout a future, s ocial organiz ation, coll ecti ve r eality, and life itself is undone ( 2004, 13). Edelman ass erts “that we do not intend a new poli tics, a better soci ety, a brighter tomorrow” and c hoos e i nstead to “not choose the Chil d” and “insis t that the future stop here,” for the future is “is mer e r epetiti on and just as l ethal as the past” ( 2004, 31). Commenti ng on Edel man’s negati on of the future, J ose Esteban Muñ oz writes i n Cruisi ng Utopia: T he Then and T here of Queer F uturity: “ When I neg otiate the ever -incr easi ng sidewal k obs tacles pr oduc ed by oversiz ed baby s trollers on par ade i n the ci ty in whic h I li ve, the s heer magnitude of the vehicl es that flaunt the incredibl e mandate of reproducti on as worl d- his torical virtue, I c ould not be mor e hail ed” (2009, 92) by the queer imperati ve to not fight for the chil dren. Yet M uñ oz als o notes : “As str ongl y as I r eject reproducti ve futurity, I nonethel ess r efus e to gi ve up on c oncepts such as
the future of the child as futurity is different from the
future of actual children,
futurity
politics , hope, and a futur e that is not kid stuff” ( 2009, 92), for “all chil dren are not the pri vileged white babies to whom contempor ary s ociety c aters ” (2009, 94). M uñoz further eluci dates: “Racializ ed ki ds, q ueer ki ds, are not the sover eign princ es of futurity.
Although Edel man does indic ate that
his frami ng nonetheless acc epts and r epr oduc es this monolithic figure of the c hild that is indeed al ways alr eady white” (2009, 95). In addition to McRuer’s critique of the Chil d as always alr eady able- bodied, other queer and dis ability studies sc hol ars have ec hoed M unoz’s critique. F or example, Kafer writes that “ this alw ays already w hiteness is a whitenes s fr amed by and understood through r egi mes of health and hy gi ene” w her eby raci alized and queer ki ds c as t out of reproductiv e futurity “ have been and c ontinue to be fr amed as sic k, as pathol ogic al, as contagious,” marking the c o-c ons titution of r ac e, cl ass , and disability as deli mi ting repr oductiv e futurity (2013, 32). T his c onclusion is als o echoed in the wor k of M el C hen ( 2011)
and D ebor ah Cohler ( 2014). Kafer and Muño z agree that “it is important not to hand over futurity to normati ve white r epr oducti ve futu rity” (M uñ oz 2009, 95), for “[t]he dominant model of futurity is i ndeed ‘ winning,’ but that is all the more reason to call on a utopi an politic al i magina tion that will enabl e us to glimpse another time and pl ace: a ‘not- yet’ where q ueer youths of c ol our actuall y get to grow up” (96). Indeed, M uñoz comments that “[t]he way to deal wi th the as ymmetri es and vi olent frenzi es that mar k the pres ent is not to forget the futur e. T he her e-and- now is si mpl y not enoug h” (2009, 96), l eadi ng Kafer to s uggest that the tas k at hand is to “i magine dis ability and dis ability futures other wise” (2013, 34). F ollowi ng Muñ oz (2009) and Kafer (2013), it is i mportant to fight for the future, but to do so requir es addres sing the ways by whic h neoliberal
depends upon both negating the futures of disability while also promoting
particular inclusions of disability.
Thus, while the ableis m that underlies the ways i n which Kafer’s future i s written on her body and the ways i n which dis abled li ves are not tractable, these acc ounts do not mar k the ways in whic h neoliberal futurity promotes and c apaci tates cer tai n di sabled li ves so as to affir m partic ular forms of bioc apitalis m and incl usi on that have i mplic ati ons for the way in whic h dis abilit y can bec ome i n the world. It is not enoug h then, to i nvest i n the neoliberal bi ocapitalist for ms of enhanc ed futures of dis a bled people. Rather, i t is i mper ati ve to tur n away from the myth of the future that forecl os es the possibility of other worlds . In
2014, Kristin Nels on’s radio doc umentar y tol d the stor y of Paige C unliffe, a 21- year- old woman li ving i n Ontario, C anada who became devel opmentall y dis abled after a bout of meningitis at the ag e of 13 months. F or mos t of Paig e’s life her mother Pam was her pri mar y car egiver , but Pam found that she was no longer able to car e fullti me for Paige onc e Paige bec ame an adult. After wai ting on a list to be plac ed in a group home for over 10 years, Paige was i nstead pl aced i n a l ong -term nursing c are home. Paig e was not alone in this pl ac ement; between 2008- 2012 i n Ontario, over 5000 people with developmental dis abiliti es under the age of 65 wer e admitted to long-ter m c are homes. While l ong-ter m c are is designed for people who req uire 24/7 c are, mos t of the residents of l ong -ter m c are facilities ar e el derly pati ents who ar e not i deal peers for a s oci al and energetic 21- year-ol d s uc h as Paig e. Within the car e home, ther e are few ac ti vities avail abl e that s uit Paige’s needs and i nteres ts and, with a c aretaker-to-resident ratio of 1:11, Pam notes that
Paige is often left si tting alone i n s oiled cl othing for hours. The waiting lis t for a group home in Ontario i ncludes over 12,000 devel opmentall y disabled people. In a group- home setting, Paige would be with peers, engaged i n acti viti es, and have a wor ker-to-resi dent rati o of 1:3. With s uc h a l ong list, N elson notes that Paig e may be li vi ng with the ver y sic k and the el derl y for up to 20 years . H owever, Paige’s withering, li ke the witheri ng experienced by many disabl ed people, is not simpl y a s tor y about a lac k of material resourc es that woul d allow for the flourishing of disabl ed li ves. Rather, wi thering and flourishi ng ar e not si mpl y a matter of resources (pers onal or state) but als o i nvoke forms of futurity that pri vileg e onl y cer tai n for ms of the futur e for disability and dis abl ed peopl e. Di sabled people who c an be easil y acc ommodated, i ncluded , enhanc ed, and c apacitated by for ms of bi oc apitalis m are muc h more likel y to thrive. Suc h thri ving, however, mus t s till contend wi th the way in whic h neoliberal futurity is embedded within the l ogic of the s uffering
The ambiguity by which neoliberal futurity mobilizes the
suffering disabled child as both a site of no future and a site of enhancement
marks disability as contested terrain.
disability produces only a
diminishing and dependent child with no future, so it is imperative to invest in a
biocapitalist future that can overcome
embracing the withering opens
possibilities that are not readily apparent when advocating for a future,
disabled chil d who is not expected to grow up. Paige’s witheri ng, then, is r elated to the enhanc ement of others ; si mpl y c apacitati ng Paige wi thi n the c ontext of neoli ber al futurity does not addr ess the myri ad ways in whic h dis ability func tions withi n neoliberal ec onomies.
Through the exampl es tr ac ed in this articl e, neoli ber al futurity i s depl oyed slightl y differ entl y. F or Clar e nce, there c an be no futur e for her dis abl ed chil dren. For C ure SM A,
SMA. J erry’s Ki ds are pr esented as havi ng no futur e, even when c onfronted with grown-up renegades . T he telethon and c ontemporar y fundr aising i nitiati ves enc ourage a hope and investment i n proc ess es of enhanc eme nt and cur e as the onl y possi ble future for dis ability. F or Rapp, there is no futur e for particul ar dis abled c hildr en, but there is hope in having another c hild. The M WF mar ks dis abl ed c hildren as having no fut ure, but gives the chil d hope for life today, whic h is utilized for medic al c ompli ance that might prol ong the chil d’s life. With all this foc us on
the c hild, it is no wonder that Paige is an unantici pated adult: while there now exists a vacci ne to pr event Paige’s conditio n, i t is too l ate for Paige to rec ei ve the future pr omised by this vaccine (N elson 2014). Paige is not as king for anything that the tel ethon, fundrais ers, or the M WF c an provi de —Paige did not di e and Paige c annot overcome her condition. There ar e c ompelling r eas ons to foll ow Edel man towards negating th e C hild and the futur e when thi nking thr ough the forms of neoliberal futurity open to disability. Consi der, for example, if
of Paige
especiall y a future that is entrenc hed i n c ure and enhanc ement? Is there a way to read Paige as failure, dysfunction, los s, tr agedy, or
suffering s o as to avoi d turni ng her i nto a for m of differenc e that c an be capacitated or si mpl y l eft to wither ? T her e are good r easons to embrac e Paige’s s uffering as a way of affir ming that the tr actable futur es available to some dis abl ed adults are not enough. Sufferi ng can be mobiliz ed as a way to highlight the ways in whic h not all forms of disability c an be easil y acc ommodated or adapted by neoliberal for ms of capacitati on. Using sufferi ng to dra w attenti on to for ms of wi thering that s ome disabled people experience can be a hel pful politic al str ateg y, but must be us ed with c aution gi ven the historical mobiliz ati on of s uffering as a way to mar k dis abl ed li ves as those not worth li vi ng. A politics of s uffering is one way to bridge q ueer and crip theor y to hig hlight the differenti al ways i n which not all disabl ed peopl e s uffer equally, thus exposing the s tructural forces at play in the c apaci tation and withering of disabl ed bodi es. Some dis abled people ar e c apacitated in ways that are counterproducti ve to r adic all y r efiguring the world, whereas others are
Disability,
through neoliberal biocapitalist processes of capacitation and withering,
participates in the formation of the figure of the Child, and is thus an important
site of contestation.
debilitated thr oug h vi olent process es that s hould not be c elebr ated. There is no one way to experi enc e suffering, nor can we r educ e or tri vializ e partic ul ar ins tanc es of suffering. Although it is not pos sibl e to entirel y esc ape the frame in whic h dis ability-r elated s uffering has been hi storic ally s haped and mobilized to r ender li ves as not wor th livi ng, s hared s ocial experiences o f s uffering can push us to t hink mor e critic all y about the ways i n whic h s uffering is mobilized and to whos e benefit. However, as this articl e has s hown, dis ability c annot operate in a full neg ation of the figure of the Chil d or unequi vocall y embrac e “ no future,” as dis ability is al ways already embedded i n the production of the futur e as a future of tec hnol ogical and medic al advanc es— a futur e to be found through the s avi ng grac e of bioc apitalism. T he future is ac ces sible, happy, hopeful, and i nclusi ve, even when it is not (Fritsc h 2013).
b. There can’t be a perm. We reject their framing of trauma as
the ultimate harm. Our disabled story telling allows us
access to ways of being that can’t exist in the 1AC
MORRIGAN 17
Morrigan, C. (2017). Tr auma time: The q ueer tempor alities of the traumatiz ed mi nd. Somatec hnic s, 7(1), 50-58.
The queer temporalities of my traumatized mind are not a problem, a tragedy, or
an unfortunate condition requiring a cure. Instead, they are a different way of
being in the world, a creative, flexible, and nonlinear way While my experience
of time was queered by violence, that does not mean that my resulting lived,
embodied experience of the world is bad or wrong.
Yet most
representations of the embodied experience of trauma position it as an
undesirable way of being, This brings me to
is
critiquing a ‘curative imaginary, an understanding of disability that not only
expects and assumes intervention but also cannot imagine or comprehend
anything other than intervention’
While I admit that flashbacks are
exhausting, nightmares are horrifying, dissociation can be uncomfortable,
disorientation can be confusing, and hypervigilance can be extremely
inconvenient, I also must assert that I love my embodied experience of queer
trauma time.
While
this time traveling can be painful, they
also describe it as motivation for different ways of being.
the queer temporalities of trauma time seek justice for children, and
other survivors of violence, while creatively and imaginatively finding ways to
survive and thrive in a violent world. The queer time travel of trauma resists
linearity and causality as the only right, or natural ways to relate to time, and
of r elati ng to ti me.
Rather , I sugges t that my experience of queer temporaliti es opens up possi bilities for di fferent ways of bei ng in the world, and refutes the appar entl y obj ecti ve natur alness of linear time.
Kafer’s noti on of ‘c urati ve ti me.’ Cur ati ve ti me r efers to the way that experi enc es of dis ability are temporall y fr amed i n r elati on to a future, potenti al c ure. Kafer uses ‘cur ati ve’ rather than ‘cur e’ to i ndic ate that the problem is a compuls or y orientati on toward c ure, not the vari ous feeli ngs or desires whic h i ndi vi dual dis abl ed peopl e may have i n r elati on to the pos sibility of a cur e. Kafer
in need of a cur e.
(2013: 27) . I was onc e s peaki ng to s omeone about my experi enc es wi th diss oci ation. I was tol d that I s houl d resist dis sociatio n at all c osts bec ause engaging i n it was wors ening my condition. The underlyi ng messag e is that I s houl d s trive to have a nor mati ve rel ati ons hip to ti me. I do not have a nor mati ve rel ations hip to ti me. T he way that I experienc e ti me is ver y queer. I c annot easil y plac e myself i n the her e and now, nor do I understand the here and now as having a straightforward rel ati ons hip to t he pas t or the future. The past c an over take my pr es ent. T he future can move bac kwar ds i nto the past. M emori es c an exi st on
different ti me li nes or can fail to exis t at all. Ti me is a dis orienting and confusi ng pl ac e, but mainl y bec aus e I am expecte d to r elate to it i n partic ular ways. I have s tarted the pr actic e of repl ying to the s mall tal k q ues tion ‘ What di d you do thi s weekend?’ with the honest ans wer of ‘I don’t know.’ People look per plexed when I s ay this bec aus e they are expecti ng that I have a str ai ght forward rel ations hip to the i mmediate past. I do not. In fact, ther e is nothing s traight about my r elati onshi p to the past, pr es ent, or future, as I do not experienc e them as disti nct entiti es with predictable c aus al rel ations hips.
Not being attac hed to linear, nor mati ve ti me has produced a flexi ble, i maginati ve way of being i n the world. In ‘With Love & R age’ Starchil d Stel a writes ‘ See, for some people, li ke me, bei ng a trauma s ur vi vor als o makes you a ti me-tr aveller [sic]’ (2015: no pagination).
Starc hild Stel a ac knowl edg es that
For Starc hild Stel a this l ooks li ke creati ng incredibl e works of art whic h enc ourage communities of s upport for s ur vi vors, and speak bac k ag ains t vi olenc e. I too experienc e the ti me tr avel of trauma as a c all for justic e, as moti vati on to pr oduc e futur es which ar e not repetiti ons of tr aumatic pasts. T he queer ti me travel of
trauma c an be a means of queer, mad, world- maki ng. R ather than an anti-futurity which pr oclai ms ‘fuc k the c hild,’
instead opens up time as a space that can be moved through in any direction,
affirming the pain of violent pasts, and dreaming of just futures.
we begin our engagement with by turning to narratives of
embodied experience with illness
Ferri,
As sociate Profess or, The Ce nter on H uma n Poli cy, Law, and Disability Studies, Syracuse University,
11
(Bet h, Teachers College Re cord, “Disa bility Life Writing and the Politics of Knowing”, Volume 11 3 Number 1 0, http:/ /syr.aca demia. edu/BethFerri/ Papers /6612 49/Disa bility_Life_ Writing_and_the_ Politics_ of_ Knowing, access ed 7/1 2/12 )
A more critical reading of contemporary disability life writing has the potential to
render these works not simply as individualistic trauma narratives, but as
important sites of social action and critique
life writing
helps to complicate the disability/impairment distinction
disability life writing can and should be read as challenging a tangle of
oppressive ideologies and destabilizing any claim to a normative or fixed center.
(Couser, 2005). As Mar k Sherr y ( 2005) stated, attendi ng to these texts , which situate the body at the "inters ecti on of biol ogical and the disc ursi ve" (p. 168), forces us to consider how dis ability is " simultaneousl y a very pers onal and an intensel y s oci al experienc e" (p. 164). In other wor ds,
that has been rightl y critiqued for ignoring the ways that i mpairment itself is c onstructed and for er asi ng the experi ences o f peopl e with chr onic illness and other nonobvious dis abiliti es. Multi pl y si tuated and grounded i n embodied experienc e, muc h of contempor ary