CERC-Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India

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Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Discussion Paper
on
Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
No RA-14026(11)/2/2018-CERC
Prepared by Staff of
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
3rd and 4th Floor, Chanderlok Building,
36, Janpath, New Delhi-110001
Website: www.cercind.gov.in
July, 2018
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Disclaimer
The issues presented in this discussion paper do not represent the views of the
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, its Chairman, or Individual Members, and
are not binding on the Commission. The views are essentially of staff of CERC and
are circulated with prime aim of initiating discussions on various aspects of redesigning real time electricity market and soliciting inputs of the stakeholders in this
regard.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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Contents
1. Current Market Operation in India ...............................................4
2. Issues around real time energy imbalance system ...................6
3. Emerging Scenario and Need for market reforms ................... 11
4. Market Design Options .............................................................. 12
5. Suggested intra-day/real time market design for India............ 17
6. Benefits of Real Time Markets for the DISCOMs...................... 24
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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1.
Current Market Operation in India
1.1
Generation and transmission assets are created much ahead in time for the
distribution companies (Discoms) to plan their power procurement. Electricity market
design needs to ensure that the objectives of system operation (to maintain system
security) and power market operation (to serve power at the most efficient cost) are
aligned. Pursuit to align these twin objectives is central to market reforms in power
sector across geographies. Power procurement planning (in long-term, medium-term
and short-term time horizons); dispatch of energy in day ahead and real time
horizon; and handling of last mile system imbalances are essential ingredients to
market operation and system operation.
1.2
In India, the duration for which power procurement planning occurs is shown
in the figure below.
Figure 1 Power Procurement Planning in India
Power Procurement Planning, Scheduling & Dispatch
Day Ahead Scheduling
Long Term (12 – 25 years)
Through Power Purchase Agreements
Medium Term (upto 5 years)
Short Term Advanced / First Come First Serve Transaction
Short Term Day Ahead Bilateral
Short Term Day Ahead Market (PX)
Short Term Day Ahead Contingency (PX)
Real Time
Real Time DSM / AS
Real Time Intra-Day Contingency Transaction
Real Time Intra-Day Market (PX)
Real Time Re-scheduling
Source: Based on the data from the MMC Report of CERC (2016-17)
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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1.3
The Long-term contracts are entered through Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs) for duration up to 25 years. The Long Term Contracts constitute 90% and
form the largest share of power procurement portfolio of the discoms and the
remaining part is met through Medium Term and Short Term contracts.
1.4
Most of the contracts in India are physical contracts and on a day-ahead
basis, the discoms self-schedule based on such contracts. This implies that a day in
advance, the discoms specify the quantum of power required to be scheduled from a
generating station with which they have entered into a contract, without declaring the
price of power under such long-term bilateral contracts. Almost 90% of the day
ahead scheduling is based on this principle of self-scheduling1. The remaining 10%,
are traded through traders, direct bilateral between the discoms and through power
exchanges. There is another window of scheduling through Day ahead Contingency
market segment of the power exchanges but its share is almost negligible at present.
1.5
After the day ahead scheduling as explained above, intra-day energy
requirement as well as system imbalances are generally managed through Deviation
Settlement Mechanism (DSM) and Ancillary Services (AS) Mechanism. In addition,
the power exchanges also operate intra-day energy market (based on continuous
trade) but it is not liquid enough as of now. Another option to manage the real time
energy imbalances is by way of revision of schedule (four time blocks) before the
actual dispatch. The generators can revise schedule themselves; so can the
discoms, closer to real time (four time blocks/hour ahead) to manage their real time
imbalances, and there is no financial liability for such revision. This is often termed
as the right to recall2. The timeline of transmission access, and the scheduling and
dispatch on day ahead and real time is depicted below in Figure 2.
1.6
Essentially, beginning a few days before the actual delivery, discoms plan
procurement of power given their expectations about time-block wise chronological
demand, generation from various sources especially wind, solar and run of the river.
There could be surprises as the time approaches the day of actual dispatch and
hence such planning is executed repeatedly till electricity is delivered reliably. This is
the essence of power procurement planning and scheduling and dispatch of power
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across seams of time. The processes as described above, especially of real time
energy imbalance management in India have, however, thrown certain challenges
and are being discussed in the subsequent section.
Figure 2 Transmission Access and Scheduling Prices in India
Long Term Access (> 7 Years)
Medium Term Open Access ( 3 Months to 5 years)
Short Term Open Access ( upto 3 Months in advance )
First/Current Month (M0)
DL-10
DL-5
DL
Second
Month (M1)
Third Month
(M2)
DL
DL
DL + 5
Advance
Application for
M1
Dop-4
12
13
Day
14
15 16 20 23 24
DAM
auction
Day
Ahead
Contracts
Legend:
Dop : Date of Operation may start from 1st
Approvals for M3
00 10
Day Ahead Market for
Dop+1
First Come
First Serve
(FCFS) contract
Advance Application
for M2,
Approvals for M1
Advance Application for M3,
Approvals for M2
Fourth Month (M3)
Dop-3
to
Dop-1
Provisional
Solution to
NLDC
Dop
Day Ahead
Contingency
contracts
NLDC informs PX
Congestion/Sche
duling limit
PX send Final solution
to NLDC
day of each month and terminates at last day
of that month
DL : Last day of the Month
NLDC send Scheduling
files to RLDCs
Intra Day Contracts
Source: Based on Regulations of CERC
2.
Issues around real time energy imbalance system
2.1
At present real time energy imbalance is managed in India by means of – (i)
Deviation Settlement Mechanism3 (DSM) and Ancillary Services4 (AS) Mechanism;
(ii) intra-day bilateral contingency transactions (iii) Intra-day market segment of the
power exchanges; and (iv) Re-scheduling / Revision of Schedule four time blocks
ahead (Right to recall).
2.2
The DSM is meant to handle the last mile system imbalances. The frequency
linked deviation prices and the allowable permissible band of deviation render the
DSM to be a decentralized mechanism of managing grid frequency. The discoms
and the generators tended to use DSM as an avenue for real time energy
procurement and sale. The Commission has over the period been taking measures
to discourage the market participants from using DSM as a trading platform.
Recently, the Commission has proposed amendments to DSM Regulations seeking
to link deviation price vector to day ahead average clearing price of the power
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exchange(s) and also proposing mandatory zero crossing (deviation sign change) in
six time blocks and consequent penalty for failure to do so5.
2.3
In
2015/2016,
the
Commission
introduced
Ancillary
Services
(AS)
mechanism, providing for the first time a centralized instrument (unlike the DSM
which is a decentralized tool) of managing grid frequency. This enabled the system
operator (POSOCO, operating the National Load Disptach Centre) to stack the unrequisitioned/un-dispatched surplus of the CERC regulated generators in merit order
and use them as reserves for frequency control in real time. The generators called
upon to provide such ancillary support are paid their fixed and variable charges plus
a mark-up of INR 0.50/kWh. The payment to the generators is made from the DSM
surplus pool. The implementation experience of AS, as reported by the POSOCO,
however, reveals a number of challenges in the existing design6. For instance, it was
reported that “On 25th June-16, before 18:00 Hrs there was a falling trend in the
demand met just prior to the evening peak hours and hence, regulation Down
was implemented from 17:30 Hrs to 18: 15 Hrs (Figure – 26). Maximum
regulation down implemented was 603 MW. From 18:15 Hrs the All India
demand met started ramping up. To have sufficient generation in grid for
meeting the demand as per trend of load, Regulation Up was implemented
from 18:45 Hrs to 24:00 Hrs During this period Kahalgaon-II was given
Regulation Up for (maximum 178MW).”
2.4
There are also some other instances reported when the ancillary services
have been used for a still longer period. Use of regulation down or up services for
such a long duration induces passive dependence of the discoms on this mechanism
for their real time energy need. Such passivity is further accentuated as the AS costs
are not “directly” incident on the utilities that were responsible for causing deviation.
When demand is increasing in real time, the states whose demand is increasing
should ideally buy power in the Intraday Market. Ancillary services or DSM/UI cannot
and should not act as substitute for energy trade at intra-day time horizon.
2.5
POSOCO has also emphasized the need for intraday portfolio optimization.
“It is emphasized that all the RRAS instructions highlighted above should not
be construed as a substitute for proper load and wind/solar forecasting at
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state level and scheduling resources appropriately. The need for DISCOMs to
fully capitalize on the 24 x 7 electricity market for intra-state transactions
cannot be over emphasized.” The Commission is already working on the next
generation reforms in the Ancillary Services mechanism.
2.6
From the above discussion, it transpires that DSM and AS are not meant for
real time energy management. Intra-day market in the power exchange was
specifically introduced to address the need for meeting energy requirements closer
to real time. However, the performance of this segment of the market has not been
encouraging so far. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 3 Intra-day Market Operation in Power Exchanges
Source: MMC Report (January, 2015 to June, 2018), CERC
2.7
It is observed that the volume traded under the segment of intra-day market
has remained static over the period and at a very miniscule level of less than 1%. A
number of factors are cited to be responsible for such low response to this market
segment - e.g., inertia of discoms and absence of delegation of decision making
power at operators’ level etc. On the design aspect, the price discovery methodology
viz., continuous trading based on pay as you bid principle (as against the auction
based on uniform clearing price) is also believed to be restricting the growth of this
market. Yet another reason cited is absence of gate closure (- a system where the
gate for schedule revision closes at a fixed time before the actual delivery, and the
system operator takes over and schedules ancillary services). This brings us to the
discussion on the next element of intra-day market segment viz., re-scheduling /
provision for revision of schedule or the right to recall.
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2.8
This provision of right to recall is meant to provide flexibility to the generators
to adjust their output and the discoms to meet their contingent demand closer to real
time. But the fallout is that sanctity and firmness of schedule is affected in the
process. Seen from the generator’s point of view, any generation capacity which
remains un-utilised on day-ahead horizon cannot participate in the intra-day market
as the original beneficiaries (discoms) have the right to recall such contracted
generation at any time. Given that the discoms commit to bear the fixed cost for such
plants, they claim to have inherent right to recall and any such request is to be
honoured from the fourth time block ahead. While the rationale is appreciated, it
remains a fact that this often leads to sub-optimal utilisation of generation resources
and also limits liquidity for the intra-day market. The un-requisition surplus remaining
available and un-dispatched over the period (please see the figure below) bears out
this point.
Figure 4 Un-dispatched surplus power during April 2014- March 2016
Source: POSOCO Report on RRAS implementation- Half year Analysis (Nov-16)
2.9
Further, the Tariff Policy, 2016 also specifies that the load serving entity shall
declare its un-requisitioned generating capacity to the generators at least 24 hours
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before 00.00hrs of the day of dispatch. The Policy also provides for sharing of gains
realized from sale of such un-requisitioned capacity in the ratio of 50:50 between the
generator and the distribution utility. The relevant extract of the Tariff Policy is
provided below.
“6.2 Tariff Structuring and Associated Issues
(1)
……
Power stations are required to be available and ready to dispatch at all times.
Notwithstanding any provision contained in the Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA), in order to ensure better utilization of un-requisitioned generating capacity
of generating stations, based on regulated tariff under Section 62 of the Electricity
Act 2003, the procurer shall communicate, at least twenty four hours before
00.00 hours of the day when the power and quantum thereof is not
requisitioned by it enabling the generating stations to sell the same in the
market in consonance with laid down policy of Central Government in this regard.
The developer and the procurers signing the PPA would share the gains realized
from sale, if any, of such un-requisitioned power in market in the ratio of 50:50, if
not already provided in the PPA. Such gain will be calculated as the difference
between selling price of such power and fuel charge. It should, however, be
ensured that such merchant sale does not result in adverse impact on the original
beneficiary(ies) including in the form of higher average energy charge vis-à-vis
the energy charge payable without the merchant sale. For the projects under
section 63 of the Act, the methodology for such sale may be decided by the
Appropriate Commission on mutually agreed terms between procurer and
generator or unless already specified in the PPA.” (emphasis added)
However, absence of gate closure stands in the way of implementation of the above
provision in true sense.
2.10
Apart from the issues highlighted above, it has also transpired that the intra-
day market in its present form is not adequate to address the emerging needs of
time, as is being discussed in the next section.
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3.
Emerging Scenario and Need for market reforms
3.1
India has set a target of 175 GW of renewable energy (RE) capacity addition
by 2022. RE is variable and uncertain and large scale integration of such RE throws
multiple technological and commercial challenges. While RE achieved grid parity, in
India, the share of installed capacity of renewable energy out of the overall capacity,
has increased from 9% in 2010 to 20% by 2018.7
3.2
Increasing penetration of renewable energy has the potential of adversely
impacting system operations and planning processes unless complemented by a
market re-design which aids their integration. Real-time wind and solar availability is
weather-dependent, uncertain, and variable. Another problem associated with the
use of renewable resources is that they can increase the ramp in the net load profile
(i.e., demand less renewable output). This effect of renewable generation can
increase the need for flexible dispatchable resources that can ramp their output up
and down quickly. This can also result in ‘over-generation’ situations, in which the
system must curtail the output of renewable generators to maintain load balance.8
3.3
On the demand side, power systems are also undergoing important demand-
side changes. These include:
•
Growing adoption of distributed energy resources by end customers including
roof top solar, RE sources connected at distribution and sub-transmission
voltage levels. These resources are largely ‘uncontrollable’ by system operators
even at the state level. In addition to the issues of being weather-dependent,
uncertain, and variable that utility owned and operated renewable resources do,
distributed renewable generators raise an additional ‘visibility’ issue. Discoms
seldom have separate meters to monitor and are rarely able to forecast their
real-time output.
•
Novel uses of electricity (e.g., for electric vehicles, battery charging), can also
increase demand uncertainty.
•
On the brighter side, distributed energy resources and novel uses of electricity
may also lead to greater demand-side flexibility in some power systems, which
can mitigate some of the challenges associated with renewable integration.
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3.4
The market models and structures are largely required to coordinate the
supply and demand sides of the system and to keep pace with the same. However,
owing to constraints thrown up by substantial growth in RE generation along with
issues related to its integration, over-dependence on DSM / UI by the utilities,
excessive reliance on ancillary services for longer durations etc., the system does
not appear to absorb the shocks, thereby necessitating changes in the electricity
market design..
4.
4.1
Market Design Options
In this section we explore market design options under two broad heads, viz.
International experience and India specific experience.
International Experience
4.2
Two alternative market designs which are followed in developed power
markets are as follows9:
•
An integrated market in which the system operator centrally optimizes the
scheduling and dispatch of resources, and
•
An exchange-based market in which energy companies trade day-ahead and
throughout the day at prices that clear the market.
4.3
Integrated markets (where system operation as well as market operation is
managed together by the system operator) are typically a characteristic of all US
wholesale electricity markets, which operate day‐ahead forward market and real‐time
imbalance market. Most European and the Australian markets follow largely
exchange based market operation designs (where market operation is carried out at
the exchange and system operation is handled by the system operator). Key
difference between an integrated market and an exchange based market is in terms
of how the unit commitment and dispatch processes take place and the extent to
which the decisions are centrally coordinated. The exchange based designs rely on
individual generating firms to manage the constraints on the operation of their
generating units and to internalize operating costs such as start-up and no-load
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costs, while in the system operator based integrated model these optimisations are
done by the system operator.
4.4
Both the integrated markets and exchange based markets rely on day-ahead
and real-time markets. The day-ahead market typically clears at about midday on the
day before the operating day in question. In both these markets market players use
forecasts of demand and supply conditions on the operating day to provide market
participants with day-ahead schedules and corresponding prices.9
4.5
The real-time market clears much closer to the actual operating period. The
primary purpose of the real-time market is to allow for changes in production and
consumption schedules, to accommodate differences between day-ahead forecasts
of system conditions and actual conditions that are observed in real time. During the
initial years of multi-settlement electricity markets, real time markets cleared hourahead. Advances in computational capabilities over time have enabled many
markets to evolve towards fifteen- or five-minute-ahead real-time markets.
4.6
In the exchange based markets, while day-ahead markets are typically settled
through auctions (for each hour/discrete time block), intra-day markets are settled
using continuous trading mechanisms where orders are matched as soon as they
arrive in the market orders book subject to their price and volume constraints.
Continuous trading implements a pay-as-bid matching algorithm. In uniform pricing
as followed in the integrated markets of US, auction participants receive the market
clearing price so that the optimal strategy in competitive environments is to bid at
marginal cost. In comparison, the pay-as-bid scheme used for continuous trading
implies that market participants have to anticipate the clearing price and accordingly
mark up their bids.
4.7
In December 2014, EPEX (power exchange in Europe) introduced an
additional auction for 15 minute time slots at the beginning of the intraday trading
session at 3 pm. The 3 pm auction is a uniform price auction for the 96 quarters for
following day. Neuhoff et. Al10. have studied whether implementation of the Intraday
15 Minute Call Auction increased the efficiency in the German electricity intraday
market and found that the trade volume was higher and the variation of the price
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difference was lower after implementation of the new auction. Key findings of the
research and a note on the intra-day continuous trade in Europe are detailed at
Annexure-I.
4.8
Another important feature of advanced markets is the concept of Gate
Closure. This is common in Europe as well as US markets. This implies that at some
point
before
real-time,
contracts
(schedules)
are
frozen/finalized
for
the
Delivery/Settlement Period. The point of time that the freeze/finalization occurs for a
Delivery/Settlement Period is called Gate Closure. After Gate Closure, forward
looking data for the Delivery/Settlement Period, such as physical information to the
System Operator and contract (schedules) volumes, cannot be changed and the
system operator takes over the responsibility for balancing the system. This is
considered essential for the sake of ensuring reliability11. An illustration of gate
closure (as in US/PJM Market) is depicted below:-
Figure 5 Gate Closure in PJM
Source: EPEX Spot- European Power Market Summit, 2016
India specific Experience
4.9
In India over the period various options to manage intra-day energy imbalance
have been explored. The Forum of Regulators (FoR), through its Standing Technical
Committee12, examined the challenges facing the electricity market along with the
options available for changes in market design through appropriate regulatory
interventions. The Forum discussed the following seven different options for Intraday/Hour Ahead transactions:
i. Banking: When there is higher generation in one State, it could bank its power
with another State / utility and get the same quantum of energy back when it has
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high demand. This does not involve any price transaction. This is, however, an
adhoc arrangement of meeting intra-day energy imbalance. Further, this option is
bilateral in nature and is opaque to other cheaper options. The true marginal cost of
meeting the demand is not known in this mechanism, and gain or loss arising out of
the transaction cannot be ascertained.
ii. Power Exchange (Day Ahead Market (DAM) price as reference) : As against
settlement in kind (in energy terms), this option uses, the Day Ahead price on the
power exchange as the reference price for intra-day bilateral settlement. This is an
improvement over the banking arrangement as energy settlement is done based on
price. However, it still remains bilateral, Also the liquidity of power remains an
issue, as chances of availability of generation source in real time with marginal cost
equivalent to or less than DAM price are very remote.
iii.
Pool
based
on
Regulator
determined
Variable
Cost
(VC)
and
transaction/trade on payment of variable cost: In this option, the generation
resources in a region remaining undispatched on day ahead horizon could be
pooled together by the RLDCs and stacked in merit order, for utilization to meet
energy imbalance in real time in the region. If dispatched in real time, the resource
could be paid based on its cost as approved by the Regulator. This provides
greater visibility of all available options in real time and helps to make an informed
purchase decision. However, in this option, the power is still transacted on its cost
and does not capture its value. As variable cost of merchant plants is not
determined by the regulator, such plants cannot participate in such transactions.
iv. Pool based on Regulator determined VC and transaction/trade on payment
of Marginal Cost: This option is an improvement over the third option as it
captures the value of electricity (as payment is made on the variable cost of the
generator on the margin, and not as per its cost). But it still remains “administered”
in nature. Again, as the tariffs of merchant plants are not determined by regulator,
these plants cannot participate in the transaction. There was a realization that this
option or for that matter the earlier three options are administered and regional in
nature. The surplus and deficit scenario within a region might not be matching to
meet the energy imbalance requirement of all the players in the region. Need for a
national level market based product was therefore reiterated.
The next three
options are an outcome of such need.
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v. Pool based on auction for intra-day for the rest of the day: This option
provides for a national level market platform for discovering price based on auction
at intra-day. The intra-day transaction, in this case is ‘for rest of the day’. This
implies that any time during the day of operation, one can use this platform for
meeting its real time energy need for the rest of the day. This is definitely an
improvement over the administered mechanism discussed earlier. But, ‘transaction
cleared for the rest of the day’ ignores the definitive time boundary (gate closure)
for system imbalance handling.
vi. Pool based on auction for intra-day on hourly basis: This option seeks to
address the shortcoming of option-v, as discussed above. It provides for a market
platform for hourly auction. In other words the intra-day market in this case could
be operated every hour during the day for clearing volumes and price. The market
participants would get opportunity to balance their energy portfolio continuously
during the day.
After the auction for any specific hour is completed and the
transactions cleared, the schedules for that particular hour are frozen. No more
schedule revision is allowed for that hour (gate closure). Deviation, if any, during
that hour is managed by the respective market participants using their own
resources (such as by varying intra-state generation) and/or by the System
Operator using Ancillary Services.
vii. Pool based on auction for intra-day on intra-hour basis i.e for 15 min.
block-wise: This option is an improvement over the sixth option by facilitating
auction for intra-day on intra-hour basis i.e. 15 minute block time. This is closest to
the real-time operation. Gate closure element is a pre-requisite.
4.10
The Forum of Regulators deliberated upon all the above options and
recommended implementation of option 6, i.e. Pool based auction for intra-day on
hourly basis. In order to operationlize this option, appropriate regulatory interventions
through amendments to the existing electricity market framework, are required to be
considered.
4.11
To summarise, the following options for real time market design emerge
based on international and national experience: (i) US type integrated system and
market operation with auction based on uniform clearing price and gate closure; (ii)
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Europe type exchange based continuous trade with pay as you bid principle and
gate closure; (ii) various options tried/contemplated in India, viz., banking,
administered bilateral/multi-lateral transactions, market based intra-day auctions.
4.12
India having adopted the exchange based model cannot suddenly move to
the integrated approach of market and system operation. The costs will far outweigh
the benefits. But while retaining the exchange based model India can certainly move
from continuous trade to auction based model in the intra-day segment for ensuring
greater efficiency in price discovery and increasing the depth of the market. This is
also in line with the current thinking in Europe. Lastly, the concept of gate closure
can also be introduced for guaranteeing firmness and sanctity of schedules in intraday trades. The recommendations of the Forum of Regulators are also on these
lines. The next section discusses this in detail.
5.
Suggested intra-day/real time market design for India
5.1
Discussion in the previous sections reveals the following position in so far as
intra-day load generation management is concerned.
Table 1 Intra-day Load Generation Management
Market Operation – Framework
Categories
of Market
Day Ahead
Market (DAM)
Real Time Market
(RTM)
System
Imbalance/Ancillary
Services Market
Purpose
Energy Trade
Energy Trade
Inadvertent deviation
management
Market Operation – India
Current
Desirable
DA (selfscheduling +
Power Exchange
(PX))
DA (selfscheduling + PX)
Deviation settlement Mechanism (DSM) +
Ancillary Services (AS) + Intra-Day (PX) +
Re-Scheduling (4 time blocks prior to
dispatch)+ Intra-day contingency
Real Time Market
DSM + AS
(Hourly), with gate
closure
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The current framework manages real time energy imbalances as well as inadvertent
system imbalances primarily through DSM / AS mechanism, and partly through rescheduling and intra-day market in the power exchanges.
This has thrown up
challenges that call for changes in market design. The recommendation that has
evolved is for drawing a line of demarcation between ‘energy trade’ and ‘system
imbalance’ handling.
There is definitely a case for co-optimization of the two
segments, but this should not imply mixing up the two and managing them jointly
through a mechanism (of DSM / AS) which is meant for handling only system
imbalances. Further, because of the provision of rescheduling, it becomes difficult to
maintain firmness of day-ahead schedule. Hence, the need for a clearly identified
real time / intra-day energy market with improved processes in the form of auction
and gate closure.
5.2
In India we have followed the European model of exchange based market
model. As a corollary, for the intra-day segment of the market as well, the exchanges
have followed continuous trade based pay as bid model as against the auction
based uniform pricing model.
5.3
However, as we observed in the previous section, continuous trade based on
pay as you bid model suffers from inadequacies and even in Europe there is re-think
on this design. The intra-day market segment in India also therefore needs to move
to the next phase of reforms from continuous trade to auction based on uniform
pricing mechanism. We have already witnessed its success in the day ahead
segment. The discoms (which are predominantly public utilities) have posed faith in
this system where they quote a price and are cleared either at that price or at lower
than that price. Another important change suggested is in the form of introduction of
the concept of gate closure. The real time market redesign suggested for India,
therefore, seeks to encompass two elements viz., change over from continuous
trade to uniform auction in the intra-day market of the power exchange and
introduction of the concept of gate closure, as depicted below.
5.4
Key features of the existing intra-day electricity markets in the power
exchanges are:
•
Region specific 20 hourly intra-day contracts for delivery on the same day.
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Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
•
The contracts are available for trading from 00:30 hrs to 20:00 hrs on a daily
basis through continuous trading process.
•
Since, under the extant processes, the difference between the trading end
time and commencement of the delivery period is required to be three hours,
the delivery period commences at 04:00 hrs. Similarly, the last intraday trade
for the hour 23:00-24:00 ends at 20:00 hrs.
5.5
Proposed Real-time Market design: It is proposed to re-design the intraday
market mechanisms as follows: The markets shall be based on double sided closed auctions with uniform
market clearing price.
 The real time market shall be conducted once in every hour for delivery in four
fifteen minute blocks in each hour. Such faster transaction/settlement
requires automation, and the Commission has already initiated action on this
(through amendments in regulations to implement National Open Access
Registry).
 Timelines for Real Time Markets (RTM): RTM will involve double sided closed
auctions with Uniform Market Clearing Price, with following timelines:Table 2 Timeline for Proposed Real Time Market
RTM
Auction
Start Time
22:30 Hrs
(of the
previous
day)
23:30 Hrs
(of the
previous
day)
…
07:30 Hrs
…
21:30Hrs
RTM
Auction End
Time
RTM Clearing
Interval
Communicatio
n with
RLDC/SLDC
and Schedule
Preparation
Delivery Period
(Delivery on the Same
Day, MCP and MCV
will be discovered for
each 15 minute block)
23:00 Hrs
(of the
previous
day)
00:00 Hrs
(of the
delivery day)
23:00 Hrs –
23:30 Hrs (of
the previous
day)
00:00 Hrs
00:30 Hrs
23:30 Hrs
24:00 Hrs
– 00:00:00 - 01:00:00
- 00:30 Hrs
01:00 Hrs
– 01:00:00 – 02:00:00
08:00 Hrs
08:00 Hrs
08:30 Hrs)
- 08:30 Hrs
09:00 Hrs
– 09:00:00 – 10:00:00
22:00Hrs
22:00 Hrs
22:30 Hrs
– 22:30 Hrs
23:00 Hrs
– 23:00:00 – 00:00:00
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Pictorially, the above schedule is reflected as:Figure 6 Schematic of Proposed Real Time Market
Source: CERC Staff
As it is evident, the energy trade for the first hour (00.00 Hrs. to 01.00 Hrs.) of the
day starts at 22.30 Hrs. of the previous day and is repeated every hour thereafter.
5.6
For operationalizing real time markets, the schedules decided at the end of
RTM clearing have to be both financially and physically binding. For this, the concept
of Gate Closure is to be introduced. For each fifteen minute block in one hour, those
with demand for electricity or discoms or traders will assess in advance what the
demand will be. They’ll then place their bids in the RTM for that volume of electricity.
Similarly generators / traders will place their offers. To ensure firmness of such bids
and offers, the gate for schedule revision will close before the start of the auction, as
depicted below in Figure 7.
In this illustration, the gate for schedule revision for the hourly trade for 00.00 – 01.00
Hrs closes at 22.30 Hrs of the previous day.
The auction is conducted for the
delivery period 00.00 – 01.00 Hrs. This process is continued every hour thereafter.
The gap between gate closure and delivery period will be reduced gradually as
automation of the process improves.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Figure 7 Concept of Gate Closure
Source: CERC Staff
5.7
Settlement in the proposed Real Time Market: All day-ahead schedules (as
a matter of principle) are “firm financial commitments”. Firm‐financial commitment
means that a supplier (generator or trader) receives revenue from day‐ahead
schedules regardless of real‐time output of its generation unit.
 If a supplier is scheduled 40 MWh on day ahead at a price of INR 2500 / MWh, it
receives INR 1,00,000 for sales. Any shortfall or surplus from day‐ahead
generation schedule shall be rebalanced in real‐time market (unlike in the
existing system where such deviations are settled through DSM). If a supplier
produces only 30 MWh in real time, it must purchase 10 MWh (to match
day‐ahead commitment) from real‐time market at real‐time price. This “purchase”
by the generator is not for sale to the discom – this must be construed as
generator making up for shortfall from its day-ahead commitment (day ahead
schedule).
 Same logic applies to a discom / buying entity. If it is scheduled (day ahead) to
draw 100 MWh for INR 4000/MWh (contract price) it pays INR 4,00,000
regardless of real‐time consumption. If the discom / buying entity consumes 110
MWh, it must buy additional 10 MWh in real‐time market at real‐time price.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
 If the load‐serving entity consumes 90 MWh, it sells 10 MWh not consumed in
real‐time market at real‐time price
 Real Time Markets must, therefore, be such that they allow generators / discoms
to correct their positions in the real time markets, but with financial commitment
for each such transaction.
 RTM is an energy only market and as such the play in this market is around the
variable or marginal cost. The fixed cost liability will be borne / settled as per the
existing contract. In the event of such generator earning revenue over and above
the regulated variable cost, the gain shall be shared in the ratio of 50: 50 with the
beneficiary as per the stipulation in the tariff policy.
 Illustrations of various scenarios to explain the concept of RTM have been
provided in the box below.
Box 1: Scenarios for settlement in proposed RTM
Scenario 1: Case with significant intermittent resources
o Suppose a thermal unit is scheduled 100 MWh at price of INR 5000/MWh in
day‐ahead and wind resource is scheduled 80 MWh in day‐ahead at same
price
o In real‐time, significantly less wind is produced than was scheduled
o Wind produces 50 MWh, so must purchase 30 MWh from real‐time market at
INR 9000/MWh
o Thermal unit must maintain supply and demand balance, which explains high
real‐time price - Sells 30 MWh at real‐time of INR 9000/MWh
o Average price paid to thermal and intermittent units
•
INR 5923.08 / MWh= (100 MWh*INR 5000/MWh + 30 MWh* INR
9000/MWh)/130 MWh)
• INR 2600/MWh =
9000/MWh)/50 MWh
(80
MWh*
INR
5000/MWh
–
30
MWh*INR
o Dispatchable unit rewarded with higher average price than non‐dispatchable
intermittent unit
Scenario 2: Case of unexpectedly high intermittent resource output
o Wind resource is scheduled 50 MWh in day‐ahead market and thermal unit is
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
scheduled 130 MWh. Both have a contract price of INR 5000/MWh
o Intermittent resource produces 80 MWh, which implies that it sells 30 MWh in
real‐time market at INR 2000/MWh
• Low real‐time price because of unexpectedly large wind output
o Thermal resource buys back 30 MWh in real‐time at INR 2000/MWh
o Average prices paid to thermal and intermittent units
• INR 5900 / MWh = (130
MWh*INR2000/MWh)/100/MWh
MWh*INR
• INR 3875 / MWh = (50
MWh*INR2000/MWh) /80 MWh
MWh
5000/MWh
–
30
*INR5000/MWh
+
30
o In this case, dispatchable unit is rewarded with higher average price than
intermittent unit because it can reduce its output
Scenario 3: Case of generators and discoms tied up in a long term PPA:
o If a discom does not requisition / schedule power on day-ahead and until the
gate closure, from a generator (with whom it has entered into a long term
contract and has committed to pay fixed cost), such generator can sell the unrequisitioned surplus in the Real Time Market.
o The net revenue earned by such generator, over and above its variable cost,
shall be shared with the discom in the ratio of 50:50. However, the fixed cost
liability in respect of such generator shall continue to be borne by the discom
as per the existing contract.
o Before the Gate Closure for any hourly transactions, the discom itself could
also choose to sell in the RTM, the un-requisitioned power from the generator,
and earn the entire revenue accruing from the sale of such power.
o In case, the discom has not, on day–ahead / until the gate closure,
requisitioned / scheduled power from the generator and the generator has
already sold such un-requisitioned power in the RTM, and the discom needs
power closer to real time, then the discom, instead of schedule revision or
exercising right to recall the generator, need to go to the RTM to meet its
contingency requirement.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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5.8
Transmission Corridor Allocation and Congestion Management :
Given the shorter duration of transaction in the Real Time Market, it would be
desirable that POSOCO declares in advance the transmission corridor margin
available for real-time transaction. Accordingly, Power exchanges shall factor in the
said margin available while clearing the market in Real time. The congestion
management shall be handled as per the existing practice including by way of
market splitting.
5.9
Treatment of Deviation from Real Time Schedule: The real-time market is
financially and physically binding. 13 Resources (Generators / DISCOMs / Traders /
OA Consumers) must follow dispatch instructions. Failure to follow will attract
charges under Deviation Settlement Mechanism (which eventually need be indexed
to RTM prices as the next step to linking DSM price vector to DAM price).
5.10
•
Mitigation of Abuse of Market Power or dominant position
The Commission shall monitor competitive constraints14 to ascertain if:
o Any player has a dominant position on the export end of a transmission
constraint
o Any player has a dominant position on the import end of a constraint
o Any player has the ability to individually cause a constraint and alter
market prices (i.e. is pivotal)
•
The constraints may be defined inter alia in terms of market concentration
(measured in terms of HHI, or Pivotal Supplier Index)
•
In case the constraints are violated, the Commission may take appropriate
actions under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003.
6.
Benefits of Real Time Markets for the DISCOMs
6.1
Many states operate costly generators to meet demand during system peak
hours (within the states) and run these plants at technical minimum during the rest of
the day. This results in overall high cost of system operation. Though existing
intraday markets provide opportunities to the states to replace such costly
generators with cheaper resources in other states, such transactions are rarely
observed. It has been estimated that if each state were to replace its costly
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
generation with cheaper resources available (in Real Time) in other states, the total
daily power purchase cost of the country would reduce substantially.
Lack of such
trades in the extant setup is primarily due to poor liquidity in intraday markets. It is
expected that liquidity in the proposed RTM will increase because of the design
change in the form of auction and gate closure.
The discoms have developed
confidence over the period in the auction method of DAM. Further, strong deterrent
against deviation (already initiated by way of amendment to CERC DSM
Regulations) would drive the market participants towards organized markets which
eventually would increase depth of RTM. Greater awareness and capacity building
will definitely ease and quicken the process.
6.2
India has unique characteristics of variation in demand pattern in different
region due to its climatic, and socio–cultural diversity. The following figure 8 shows
when the maximum demand met in Northern region (July to August) coincides with
minimum demand met in Western Region and vice versa15. This diversity in the
demand pattern can be utilised effectively with national level organised market given
the fact that electricity is more difficult and expensive to store. With National level
organised market, possibility of resource optimization across regions to take
advantage of cheap resources would increase significantly.
Figure 8 Average Demand Met in Northern and Western Region
Source: POSOCO report on ‘Electricity Demand Pattern Analysis (2016)’
6.3
Currently discoms have the right to recall 4 time blocks ahead of actual
despatch. Once the real time market with gate closure is introduced, the flexibility to
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
revise schedule will undergo change.
While the gap between gate closure and
delivery period will be reduced with automation of the process, such change should
not be construed as disadvantageous to the discoms.
Rather this framework is
expected to benefit the discoms on the following counts:(i)
The discoms would have access to larger pool of generation resources to
meet their contingent requirement in real time as against the existing bilateral
resources (under the right to recall) to meet contingencies;
(ii)
Prices discovered in such real time market are likely to be more efficient than
the cost of procurement of power from the bilateral arrangement under the right to
recall;
(iii)
In the event the generation resources (with which the discoms have contracts)
sell the un-requisitioned surplus in the real time energy market, the net gains shall
be shared with the discoms in the ratio of 50:50;
(iv)
Alternatively, the discoms themselves can sell the surplus power from their
contracted generation sources in the real time market and earn the revenue in full.
7.
Way forward: Given the constraints in existing market operation and system
operation and the challenges facing energy imbalance in real time, it is high time the
country brought about changes in the market design in the real time segment as
suggested above.
-
X -
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Annexure-I
Intra-day Continuous Trade in Europe
In the exchange based markets as in Europe, while day-ahead markets are
typically settled through auctions (for each hour/discrete time block), intra-day
markets are settled using continuous trading mechanisms where orders are matched
as soon as they arrive in the market orders book subject to their price and volume
constraints. Continuous trading implements a pay-as-bid matching algorithm. In
uniform pricing as followed in the integrated markets of US, auction participants
receive the market clearing price so that the optimal strategy in competitive
environments is to bid at marginal cost. In comparison, the pay-as-bid scheme used
for continuous trading implies that market participants have to anticipate the clearing
price and accordingly mark up their bids.
Neuhoff et. al. have studied whether implementation of the Intraday 15 Minute Call
Auction at EPEX increased the efficiency in the German electricity intraday market.
Key findings of the research are as under.
 With the intraday auction much higher volumes (within a certain price range)
are offered to the market.
 The authors attribute the increased depth to the following rationale: “In a
uniform price auction, market participants can offer all available capacity at
marginal costs and the uniform clearing price ensures remuneration at the
value the capacity is required by the system. In contrast, in a continuous
auction, market participants have to anticipate/negotiate the market clearing
price and incorporate accordingly a mark-up in their offers in order to capture
the value of generation assets to the system. However, this value to the
system may change, for example if scarcity increases with the failure of a
power station. Therefore, market participants only submit limited order for a
fraction of their available capacity so that they can submit additional limited
orders with adjust mark-ups should the supply-demand balance change.”
(Emphasis added)
 The total trade volume for 15 minute intervals was higher after the
implementation of the new auction.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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 Authors also observe that the variance of the price was lower for observations
after the implementation of the auction compared to similar observations
before the implementation. Thus Neuhoff et. al. conclude that the new auction
at 3 pm sets a strong price signal and reduces the variance of the price”.
The prices discovered in Uniform Price Auctions serve as a better reference for
derivative products as compared to average index price (computed by EPEX based
on volume weighted price of all trades during the last three hours before gate
closure). This is because actual sale/buy transactions are “discrete” and hence if the
prices discovered in these discrete transactions are different from the index price, a
basis risk is introduced. Using the EPEX data, Neuhoffet. al. conclude that
“However, as can be seen the basis risk is significant. In 5% of the transactions the
basis risk is more than 86 €/MWh. Altogether, this indicates that the cap futures
referenced to an index based on continuous trading only offers limited capacity to
hedge against price risks. In contrast, if a similar option contract would have been
referenced to a uniform price auction, then it hedges market participants trading in
this auction without basis risk.”(Emphasis Added).
Auctions allow block bids and complex bids. It has been observed that the number of
matched block bids is significantly lower than the number of matched blocks in the
auction. This is because in continuous trading such matching becomes intractable
for instantaneous immediate execution. Auctions allow for longer computation times
and thereby ensure better execution/matching of blocks. This allows bringing full
flexibility to the market.
Market results can further be made more efficient and full flexibility realized if the
format of multi-part bids for generators is introduced. Quoting Budishet. al., Cramton
reports that “Continuous trading is unworkable in electricity markets, because
combinatorial optimization is required to establish the feasibility of trade and this
requires significant computation time (on the order of minutes). Thus, continuous
trading results in unacceptable backlogs in order processing. A more sensible
approach is intraday auctions, say every 15 minutes that would allow sufficient time
for computation.” Budish et. al. advocate for replacement of continuous trading by
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
frequent batch auctions. Appropriate frequency of intra-day auctions remains an
important design question.
Implications for allocation of Transmission: Transmission capacity in intraday is
allocated on a first come first serve basis in the present bilateral trading and
exchange based continuous trading – both in India and Europe. Thus, the potential
scarcity value of transmission capacity is captured by the first mover reserving the
capacity explicitly or by the best offer on the exchange screen. The first come first
serve rule on the explicit allocation, therefore, favours rapid traders instead of
efficient ones.
Technically correct representation of the transmission network has huge implications
for market efficiency. Practical experience in the US markets demonstrates that
ignoring the transmission network or misrepresenting it (i.e., through a zonal model)
creates inefficiencies, gives poor pricing properties, causes cross subsidies, and
raises incentive issues. Given the advances in computational capabilities, tractability
of problems is not an issue.
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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References:
1. Report on Short-term Power Market in India: 2016-17
2. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Indian Electricity Grid Code)
Regulations, 2010.
3. Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters Regulations, 2014
4. Ancillary Services Operations Regulations 2015
5. Draft
Central
Electricity
Regulatory
Commission
(Deviation
Settlement
Mechanism and related matters) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2018.
6. Report on “RRAS Implementation in Indian Grid – Half Year Analysis and
Feedback”, November, 2016
7. Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2017 – year end review
8. National Load Dispatch Centre (NLDC), SCADA data, 2016-17
9. Wilson, R. (2002), ‘Architecture of Power Markets’, Econometrica, 70(4), 1299–
340
10. Neuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Salah-Abou-El-Enien, A., and Vassilopoulos, P. (2016),
‘Intraday Markets for Power: Discretizing the Continuous Trading?’, Discussion
Paper, DIW Berlin
11. Budish, E., Cramton, P., and Shim, J. (2015), ‘The High-frequency Trading Arms
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 130(4), 1547–621, November.
12. First Report of FOR Technical Committee on Implementation of framework for
Renewables at the State Level – Covering the proceedings from December, 2015
– November, 2017
13. AJ Conejo, R Sioshansi - International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy,
Rethinking restructured electricity market design: lesson learnt and future needs
- Elsevier 2018
14. Peterson, P., Biewald, B., Johnston, L., Gonin, E., and Wallach, J. (2001). Best
Practices in Market Monitoring. Synapse Energy Economics
15. POSOCO report on ‘Electricity Demand Pattern Analysis (2016)’
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Discussion Paper on Re-designing Real Time Electricity Markets in India
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