Enforceable Promises Outline
Consideration:
 Rule: Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
o A promise = the party will act or refrain from acting.
o Performance = not a promise; an act, or forbearance.
*Issue statement must tell someone who knows nothing about the case, why the parties are in
court. What is the problem the parties are trying to solve.
 Requirements: Rule, facts specific to the case.
Cases:
(Consideration)
Hamer v. Sidway
 Facts:
o Uncle promised nephew he would pay him $5,000 if he refrained from drinking
liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money.
o Nephew does refrain until the age of 21.
o Uncle says he would love to pay nephew but says he will hold onto the money
until nephew was capable of taking care of the money. Nephew agreed and
money remained in bank acquiring interest.
o Uncle died without paying the money.
o Nephew signed the money over to his wife who then signed it over to Hamer.
o Hamer sued (the executor of Uncle’s estate) for the money.
 Issue:
o Whether consideration was present when the uncle promised to pay $5,000 if
the nephew refrained from smoking, drinking, gambling, etc. until the age of 21.
o Whether consideration was present when the uncle promised to pay his nephew
$5k, if his nephew relinquishes his legal right to drink liquor, smoke tobacco,
swear, and play cards or billiards for money.
 Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Hamer)
 There is consideration.


The promise was to pay $5,000 in exchange for refraining from smoking,
etc. (something he had a legal right to do).
 The facts show that the uncle intended to pay, but died before he could.
o Defendant (Sidway)
 There is not consideration.
 The promisee by refraining from the use of liquor and tobacco was not
harmed but benefited.
 That which he did was best for him to do independently of his uncle’s
promise, and insists that it follows that unless the promisor was
benefited, the contract was without consideration.
Holding:
o There was consideration.
 The nephew gave up something he had a legal right to do, and the uncle
was benefited because his nephew is a productive member of society and
does not have a drinking problem (benefit could just be happiness).
 It does not matter whether one party actually received a benefit
or whether the thing which forms the consideration is of any
substantial value to either party.
 Adequate consideration depends on the promisee’s voluntary
limitation of his legal rights or freedoms (to drink and smoke) in
exchange for his uncle’s promise of $5,000.
 It is irrelevant whether his uncle actually received any benefit
from Story’s actions.
 Story’s voluntary agreement to incur these limitations constitutes
adequate consideration to form a valid and enforceable contract
with his uncle.
Kirksey v. Kirksey
 Facts:
o Sister Antillico’s husband died, and her Brother in Law wrote to her telling her
she could move 60 miles to his land and he would give her a place to raise her
family.
 The Defendant put her in a comfortable house, and gave her land to
cultivate for two years.
 After the two years he moved her to an uncomfortable house in the
woods.
 Then he required her to leave.
 Issue:
o *Whether there is consideration when a party promises to provide free land as
residence to the other party and the promise is fulfilled for a finite amount of
time and then revokes such promise.* (not detailed to the case)



o Whether there was consideration when the brother in law Kirksey offered his
home to sister antillico to raise her kids and after two years kicked them out.
Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Sister Antillico)
 There was consideration.
 She gave up her old home and moved based on the promise that
her brother in law would give them a place to live.
 She is now homeless and at a disadvantage based on her
detrimental reliance on his promise.
o Defendant (Brother in Law)
 There was no consideration
 He made a promise but it wasn’t bargained for.
o She didn’t have to do anything in exchange.
 This was just a gift.
 He never intended to be bound.
o He showed this by kicking them out.
Holding:
o There was no contract because it wasn’t done in exchange for anything (no
bargain for exchange). Brother in law meant it as a gift and didn’t intend to be
bound.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
 Facts:
o Wood entered into a contract with LDG, whereby LDG agreed to grant Wood the
exclusive right to place her endorsement on others’ clothing designs.
o She also granted Wood the exclusive right to market her designs and sell them.
o In return, LDG would receive 50% of the profits from Wood’s efforts with regard
to her endorsements and designs.
o Wood agreed to keep records of all accounts and to take out all patents,
copyrights, and trademarks necessary to protect LDG’s designs.
o LDG later entered into a contract with another company whereby she placed her
endorsement on others’ clothing designs.
o Wood filed suit, claiming breach of contract.
 Issue:
o Is a contract unenforceable for lack of consideration if the contract does not
clearly require a performance from one of the parties, but a promise to make a
reasonable effort is implied?



o Does the contract lack consideration if the contract does not explicitly require a
performance from one of the parties.
o *Whether consideration is present when the promise to market is unclear.
o Whether consideration is present when Wood’s promise to market was unclear.
o Whether consideration is present when Lucy gave up exclusive rights to Wood
for half of the profits derived from her designs and Wood’s promise to market
was unclear (implicit).
Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Wood)
 There is consideration.
 He made a promise to market, license, copyright, etc.
o Defendant (LDG)
 There is no consideration.
 Woods never made a promise.
 When he made a promise to market, license, copyright, etc., that
promise was illusory. He didn’t affirmatively have to do anything.
Holding:
o Every contract has an implicit duty of good faith, implied that you will fulfill the
promise even if it isn’t explicit  the plaintiff will use reasonable efforts to fulfill
his promise.
Mattei v. Hopper
 Facts:
o Mattei bought hopper’s land.
o Their agreement:
 Mattei was to pay a deposit of $1,000, after which he had 120 days to
examine the title and pay the rest of the purchase price, subject to
“obtaining leases satisfactory to the purchaser.”
 Issue:
o Whether there was consideration when Mattei promised that they would buy
the property from Hopper as long as they can get satisfactory leases.
 Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Mattei)


There is consideration
 Mattei made a promise to purchase with satisfactory leases in
exchange for Hopper’s promise to sell the property.
o Defendant (Hopper)
 There is no consideration:
 Mattei promised nothing in exchange for Hopper’s promise to sell
the property.
 The promise to get satisfactory leases is illusory.
o How do you determine satisfactory?
Holding:
o In good faith have to interpret satisfactory leases, that the leases will be
profitable based on the market.
o The contract was neither illusory nor lacking in mutuality of obligation because
the parties inserted a provision in their contract making plaintiff’s performance
dependent on his satisfaction with the leases to be obtained by him.
Batsakis v. Demotsis
 Facts:
o On April 2, 1942, Batsakis offered Demotsis 500,000 drachmas if she would sign a
letter agreeing to pay him back the sum of $2,000 in American currency at a
future date, with 8% interest per year added from 1942.
o Batsakis is suing to recover the money owed to him.
 Issue:
o Is a promise to pay $2,000 after the war when the other party only paid $25
protected by/under consideration.
o *Whether there is consideration in the case of an unequal currency exchange.*
 Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Batsakis)
 There is consideration.
 Demotsis promised to repay $2,000 in exchange for a loan of $25.
o Defendant (Demotsis)
 There is no consideration.
 $25 does not equal $2,000
 It is an unfair deal and courts should not enforce.
 Holding:
o Debtor must pay because mere inadequacy of a contract will not void a contract.
o If there are all the elements of a contract, mere inadequacy will not void the
contract.
o We value autonomy  court shouldn’t structure the deal.

There would be no lenders to begin with if they had no chance of getting
repaid.
Ricketts v. Scothorn
 Facts:
o Scothorn’s grandfather wanted her to quit her job as a bookkeeper because he
did not want any of his grandchildren to work.
o To help her quit her job her grandfather gave her a promissory note promising to
pay her $2,000 on demand and 6% interest.
o In light of this Scothorn quit her job as a book keeper.
o Neither the terms of the note nor her grandfather’s statements obligated her to
quit her job in order to receive the promised money.
o Grandfather paid one year’s interest on the note, but then was unable to
continue the payments. At the time of his death he had not paid the balance.
o Scothorn sued Rickets for breaching the terms of the promissory note.
 Issue:
o Whether equitable estoppel will make a gratuitous promise, that lacks
consideration, enforceable if the promisee detrimentally relied on the promise.
 Rule:
o Consideration is a bargain for exchange which is shown by a promise in exchange
for a promise and a promise in exchange for a performance.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Skothorn)

o Defendant (Ricketts)

 Holding:
(Promissory Estoppel)
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.
 Facts:
o (1910) Plaintiff began working for the defendant, a manufacturer of
pharmaceuticals, when she was 17 years old.
o (1947) She had attained the position of bookkeeper, office manager, and
assistant treasurer of the defendant.
o (December 27, 1947) Higher ups of company resolved that the salary of the
Plaintiff be increased from $350 to $400 per month and that she be afforded the
privilege of retiring from active duty in the corporation at any time she may elect




to see fit so to do upon retirement pay of $200 per month for the remainder of
her life.
 Plaintiff testified that she had no prior information that such a pension
plan was contemplated, that it was a surprise, and that she would have
continued her employment whether or not such a resolution had been
adopted.
 *It is clear from the evidence that there was no contract, oral or written,
as to plaintiff’s length of employment, and that she was free to quit, and
the defendant to discharge her, at any time.
o (June 30, 1949) Plaintiff retired (based on knowledge of $200 payment)
Issue:
o Whether a gratuitous promise, that lacks consideration, is made enforceable by
the plaintiff’s detrimental reliance on the promise.
Rule:
o Promissory Estoppel requires a promise, which induces a reasonably foreseeable
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee that the promisee relies on,
and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Feinberg)
o Defendant (Pfeiffer Co.)
 The resolution adopted by its Board of Directors was a mere promise to
make a gift, and that no contract resulted either thereby, or when
plaintiff retired, because there was no consideration given or paid by the
plaintiff.
 A promise to make a gift is not binding unless supported by a legal
consideration.
 The only apparent consideration for the adoption of the foregoing
resolution was the “many years of long and faithful service”
expressed therein.
 That past service are not a valid consideration for a promise.
Holding:
o The decision of the trial court is affirmed because Feinberg’s detrimental reliance
is sufficient consideration to transform Pfeiffer’s gratuitous promise into an
enforceable contract.
 There was a promise:
 To pay, upon retirement, $200 for life.
 It did induce an action upon the promisee:
 A benefit upon retirement.
 She did rely on it:
 She retired.
 It would be an injustice to not pay her:
 Unlikely she can get a new job, she got sick, and she can’t go back
to work (too old and too sick).
Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co.
 Facts:
o Hayes was an employee of the corporation from 1947 until his retirement in
1972 at age of 65.
o Starting in January 1973 and continuing until January 1976, Hayes received the
annual sum of $5,000 from Plantations.
 Hayes instituted this action in December 1977, after the then company
management refused to make any further payments.
o Hayes testified: he could not have retired had he not expected to receive a
pension. After he stopped working for Plantations, he sought no other
employment.
o *He had announced his retirement before he was told about his pension.
 Issue:
o Whether there is consideration when a promise does not require a promisee to
act, but the promisee acts voluntarily without regarding the promise.
 Rule:
o Promissory Estoppel requires a promise, which induces a reasonably foreseeable
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee that the promisee relies on,
and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Hayes)
 The work he performed during the week between the promise and the
date of his retirement constituted sufficient consideration to support the
promise.
 Even if Plantations’s promise was not the product of an exchange, its
duty is grounded properly in the theory of promissory estoppel.
 In the absence of a bargained-for promise the facts require application of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
 He retired voluntarily while expecting to receive a pension. He
would not have otherwise retired. Nor did he seek other
employment.
o Defendant (Plantations Steel Co.)
 There is no consideration, and the Plantations’ promise to pay Hayes a
pension was merely a gratuity, and not enforceable.
 Hayes intention to retire was arrived at without regard of a pension.
 Plantation did not actively seek Haye’s retirement. They did not want
Hayes to retire.
 Holding:
o Hayes has not incurred a detriment by relying on Plantations’
promise and is not entitled to recover based on the equitable remedy
of promissory estoppel. The decision of the trial court granting
recovery to Hayes against Plantations is reversed.

There was a promise:
 They would take care of Hayes ($5,000 a year)  an annual sum
of money after retirement.
 It did not induce an action on the promisee
o Hayes has already announced his retirement.
 No reliance
o He chose to retire with no knowledge of the annual sum.
 It would be an injustice:
o Too old, but different from Feinberg.
**If Feinberg went into her boss’ office and tried to bargain for a raise and pension, he would
have probably said yes because they were going to anyway  could have bargained. (Like
Ricketts)
**Haye’s boss would not have bargained  not even close to consideration.
(Past Consideration)
Webb v. McGowin
 Facts:
o On August 3, 1925, appellant (Webb) saved J. Greeley McGowin (apellee’s
testator) from death or great bodily harm.
 In doing so Appellant sustained bodily injury crippling him for “life”
o In consideration of the services rendered and the injuries received by appellant,
McGowin agreed to care for him the remainder of appellant’s life.
 The amount to be paid being $15 every two weeks.
o McGowin complied with this agreement until he died on January 1, 1934, and
the payments were kept up to January 27, 1934, after which they were
discontinued.
 Issue:
o Whether there is consideration when the undertaking of a detriment by a
promisee, resulting in a material benefit to the promisor, is given in exchange for
a promise to pay based on the detriment.
 Rule:
o There is past consideration when there is a promise, a previously conferred
benefit, and it is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Webb)
 There is a contract.
o Defendant (McGowin)


There is no contract.
Holding:
o When a promisor receives a material benefit from a promisee, the promisor is
morally bound to compensate the promisee for services rendered.
o McGowin’s promise to pay bi-weekly payments to Webb is a valid, enforceable
contract and is not barred by the statute of frauds. The judgment of nonsuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded.
o **McGowin would have bargained if he could have (Like Feinberg – use rickets)
 McGowin promised to pay Webb in exchange for the moral obligation for
a previously conferred benefit.
 Probably would have kept paying if
Mills v. Wyman
 Facts:
o On February 5, 1821, Mills came upon Levi Wyman.
 Levi was 25 years old and had just returned from a voyage at sea.
 He was extremely ill, and was taken in and cared for by Mills, a stranger,
for fifteen days.
 Levi then died.
 His father, Wyman, lived in Massachusetts and wrote to mills upon
hearing of Levi’s death.
 Wyman promised to pay Mills for the expenses he incurred while taking
care of Levi.
 However, Wyman later refused to pay and mills brought suit to enforce
Wyman’s promise.
 Issue:
o Whether a promise made based on a moral obligation but without legal
consideration may be considered an enforceable contract.
o Was Wyman’s promise to reimburse Mills for the cost of caring for Levi
enforceable?
 Rule:
o There is past consideration when there is a promise, a previously conferred
benefit, and it is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff (Mills)
o Defendant (Wyman)
 Holding:
o The promise made by Wyman to pay for Mills’ expenses is without legal
consideration and thus unenforceable.
 A promise based on a moral obligation but made without legal
consideration does not constitute an enforceable contract unless it is tied
to a preexisting legal obligation.





A promise may be tied to a preexisting legal obligation if the original legal
obligation was based on consideration.
 Ex: when one promises to assume the debt of another who
cannot pay, this promise is enforceable because of the
consideration originally provided by the initial debtor to the
lender.
 Ex: A parents promise to pay the debts of his minor child is
enforceable based on the preexisting legal duty of parents to
provide for their children’s expenses.
Levi Wyman fully reached adulthood and had long been out of his
father’s care.
Thus, his father is no longer obligated to pay his debts based on a
preexisting parent-child relationship.
Additionally, no original promise supported by valid consideration existed
between Levi and Mills such that his father’s promise to assume Levi’s
debts could be tied to his preexisting legal obligation.
Thus, Wyman’s promise to pay the expenses incurred by Mills while
caring for his son, while perhaps a moral obligation was not supported by
legal consideration and does not constitute a valid and enforceable
contract.
Harrington v. Taylor
 Facts:
o Taylor and his wife got in a fight so his wife went to Harrington’s house for
safety.
o Taylor found his wife in Harrington’s house and began assaulting his wife.
o Taylor’s wife was about to kill him with an axe when Harrington intervened and
the axe struck Harrington’s hand instead.
o Taylor orally promised to pay Harrington for her damages.
o Taylor then paid a small amount to Harrington and refused to pay any more.
 Issue:
o Case: Whether there was consideration recognized by the law as sufficient to
support the promise.
o Quim: Whether a voluntary humanitarian act constitutes sufficient consideration
to support a contract.
o Whether there is consideration when a party promises to compensate another
party for a voluntary humanitarian act.**
 Rule:
o There is past consideration when there is a promise, a previously conferred
benefit, and it is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.
 Each Party’s argument:

o Plaintiff (Harrington)
o Defendant (Taylor)
Holding:
a. A humanitarian act of this kind, voluntarily performed, is not such consideration
as would entitle to recover at law. Taylor’s promise to compensate Harrington
for her damages is not enforceable because it is not supported by sufficient
consideration from Harrington.
b. A voluntary humanitarian act does not constitute sufficient consideration to
support a contract.
c. This is true despite the level of moral obligation the recipient of the
humanitarian act has to repay the volunteer for his or her actions.
d. Harrington acted voluntarily stepping in between Taylor and his wife for the
purpose of saving Taylor’s life.
e. This humanitarian act, performed voluntarily and without solicitation from
Taylor, does not constitute sufficient consideration to support Taylor’s promise
to compensate Harrington for her damages.
(Quasi Contract)
Bailey v. West
 Facts:
o West bought a racehorse that turned out to be lame. He tried to return it but
they wouldn’t take it back, so the horse was shipped instead to the farm of
Howard Bailey.
o Upon the horse’s arrival, Bailey was aware that there was a dispute regarding
the horse’s owner. Nevertheless, Bailey boarded and took care of the horse.
o Bailey sent month bills to West for the maintenance and care of the horse.
o As soon as he received the first bill, West replied that he did not own the horse
and would not pay for any boarding.
o Bailey brought suit against West to recover for his services.
o Bailey claimed both had a contract implied in fact and a quasi-contract.
 Issue:
o Whether there is a contract
 Rule:
o There is a Quasi-Contract when there is a benefit conferred (received),
appreciation (acknowledgment) of that benefit, and it is unjust to retain.
 Each Party’s argument:
o Plaintiff
o Defendant
 Holding:
Synthesized:
(Consideration)
Hamer v. Sidway
 Uncle promised nephew 5K if nephew does not drink, smoke (forbearance); uncle
intends to pay but saving for interest; nephew transfers interest to wife then to
Hamer; uncle dies without paying nephew; Hamer sues Sidway’s estate for 5K
 Consideration present; 5K <--> forbearance; in favor of Hamer
Kirksey v. Kirksey
 Brother-in-law sends letter to widow saying sell land, come stay with kids; bro kicks
out widow and kids
 Consideration not present; house <--> nothing; in favor of bro; bro no intention to
be bound
Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon
 Lucy employs Wood exclusively to market and sell dresses for 50/50 profit; Lucy
sells own dresses and does not tell or share profits with Wood
 Consideration present; market/sell dress <--> 50/50 profit; in favor of Wood
Mattei v. Hopper
 Mattei wants to buy land from Hopper; agreement via deposit receipt and
satisfactory leases; good-faith clause
 Consideration present; leases <--> property; in favor of Mattei
Batsakis v. Demotsis
 Demotsis writes letter to Batsakis acknowledging received 2K USD and will pay back
with interest; Batsakis sends money that equates to 25 USD
 Consideration present; 2K USD <--> 25 USD; in favor of Batsakis; “mere inadequacy
of consideration will not void a contract”
(Promissory Estoppel)
Ricketts v. Scothorn
 Scothorn sues Ricketts estate for money grandfather promised in note; Scothorn
quits job with reliance on grandfather’s intent to pay
 PE present so enforceable; in favor of Scothorn
Feinber v. Pfeiffer Co
 Employer (board of directors at meeting) promises to pay D $200/month for life for
retirement; D retires; new accounting firm stops retirement payments
 Promise ($200/month retirement); induced action (benefit upon retirement);
reliance (retirement); injustice (too old/sick to work)
 PE present
Hayes v. Plantation Co
 D tells company retiring months before; boss tells D wants to take care of but first
and only conversation between the two, unofficial; D receives some checks but each
time asks when could expect the next, D uncertainty re continued pension
 Promise ($5K annual retirement); induced action (none); reliance (none); injustice
(old)
 PE not present
(Past Consideration/Material Benefit/Moral Obligation)
Webb v. McGowin
 P saves D from injuries/death and cripples self for life by doing so; D says will pay
$15 biweekly for rest of P life; D dies and P sues testator
 Moral obligation sufficient to support promise to pay where promisor received
benefit without duty or liability on promisor
 P injured and D benefited
 Enforceable
 Compare to Ricketts
Mills v. Wyman
 Wyman son becomes ill and Mills take care of son for two weeks; son dies; D writes
to P promising to pay for expenses incurred; D changes mind, does not pay
 Kindness and services of P towards D son was on own, Good Samaritan
 Not enforceable
 Compare to Kirksey
Harrington v. Taylor




D assaults wife; wife seeks refuge at P house; D goes to P house and assaults wife; P
intervenes and D wife injures P with axe; D promises to pay P but fails to continue
after small sum
Humanitarian act was voluntarily performed
Not enforceable
Compare to Kirksey
(Quasi Contract)
Bailey v. West
 D buys horse; horse is lame; D attempts to return; D tells trainer does not want to
care for or incur boarding expenses; P boards horse aware ownership disputed; P
unsure if in contract because sends bill to D and breeder; no business transaction
 Court says if performance rendered by one person without request by another, very
unlikely person under any legal duty to pay compensation; person not required to
deal with another unless they desire to (D did not want to deal with P)
 P volunteered to board horse at own risk with full knowledge might not be
reimbursed for expenses
 Not enforceable, in favor of D
Enforceable
 Hamer v Sidway ($5K <--> forbearance drinking, smoking)
 Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon (sell dresses <--> profit)
 Mattei v. Hopper (property <--> satisfactory leases)
 Batsakis v. Demotsis (loan money <--> repayment)
 Ricketts v. Scothorn (money to not work, PE)
 Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co ($200/month retirement, PE)
 Webb v. McGowin (injured to save life, life payments)
 Lucy v. Zehmer (bar tab contract re farm selling)
Not Enforceable
 Kirksey v. Kirksey (house gift)
 Hayes v. Plantation Co (retirement PE)
 Will Tramp (walk for fur coat gift)
 Mills v. Wyman (voluntary care of son)
 Harrington v. Taylor (humanitarian act re assault)
 Bailey v. West (horse care)