transaction costs and uncertainty, and the provision of information. In
turn, these benefits make it easier for states to strike agreements. On
the whole, Keohane stresses that regimes are useful to states, in the
sense of being a functional solution to a common problem.
One upshot of this argument is that cooperation may be more difficult
to establish than to maintain, as existing arrangements reduce uncertainty and have proven utility, whereas untested mechanisms do not.
However, this logic also suggests that regimes may persist beyond their
founding mandate, as the costs of establishing new regimes mean that
states are less willing to do so. Writing soon after 9/11, Keohane was
struck by the extent to which the Bush administration had turned to
multilateral institutions, especially the UN Security Council, as part of its
response. This would “provide a fruitful test for institutionalist theory,”
especially in light of the apparent unilateralist proclivities of administration members.27 For Keohane, this move rather underscored the value
of liberal approaches, as it provided evidence for a key institutionalist
claim, that institutions work by “altering the costs of state strategies.”28
In other words, as states contemplate action on any issue, prevailing
multilateral arrangements are likely to figure in their calculations and,
subsequently, in their negotiations. Where states anticipate that multilateralism will be mutually beneficial, those negotiations ought to yield
cooperation.
Keohane’s interpretation of the United States’ engagement of international organizations after 9/11 would be viewed more skeptically by
realists. By itself, the starting assumption of realist theory that states
face an unrelenting “security dilemma” as a result of the anarchic nature
of the international system suggests that cooperation will be the
exception rather than the rule. It is unsurprising, then, that realists
discuss multilateralism less than liberals and constructivists. Still, two
realist arguments can be discerned.29 The first of these, generally associated with neo-realism, takes the skeptical claim to the extreme. This
approach suggests that instances of cooperation are either imposed by
powerful states, or worse, are empirically inconsequential.30 The analytical foundation of the former claim is compelling and addresses a
shortcoming in the liberal position. Namely, liberals suggest that states
are able to achieve mutual benefits through cooperation, i.e. that the
gains from cooperation are “absolute” (all parties gain something). But
if we take the security dilemma seriously, surely states would be concerned that their partners would gain more from cooperation relative to
themselves. After all, under conditions of anarchy, today’s partner may be
tomorrow’s adversary. In negotiating the terms of cooperation, then,
states should be concerned about “relative gains” more than “absolute
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gains” and that, in turn, is a fundamental constraint upon achieving consensus.31 This is especially so
if we accept that, in cooperating on any particular issue, there may be multiple different agreements
that could be negotiated and achieving consensus on the terms of a deal (that benefits everyone,
equally) is more problematic than liberals admit.32 Again, the barriers to multilateralism are likely to be high
where cooperation has distributive consequences: that is, where the terms of cooperation benefit some
states more than, or relative to, others.
Subsequent realists have built on these claims in a more pragmatic way, acknowledging the volume
of international cooperation in world politics today. Beyond simply explaining the failure to cooperate,
they analyze patterns of international cooperation. Again, their emphasis is on relative power and they
see cooperation as a tool or tactic that states can use to advance their interests.33 This approach offers an
account of why states seek cooperation (to advance interests), how they do it (by acting through fora
amenable to their influence) and how others respond. Regarding the latter, if cooperation has distributive
consequences, we should expect less powerful states to resist attempts at cajoling them into joint action.
That resistance might itself trigger forms of cooperation and, consequently, “forum shopping,” where
states utilize different cooperative mechanisms to preserve their interests or ameliorate the consequences
of being bound by others.34 Overall, the dynamics of cooperation tend here to resemble a form of
“posi- tional conflict,” as states compete for influence.35 Where cooperation canadvance or defend states’
interests, we ought to observe them pursuing “tactical multilateralism” in this way.36
As this brief overview confirms, scholars disagree about the paths to multilateralism. This difference
of opinion extends to explanations of the form that cooperation takes. In this regard, as an empirical
matter,several observers have noted a trend towards increasing diversity in the way that states cooperate,
beyond formal international organizations alone: “Over the past several decades, a range of innovative
modalities has emerged in the form of hybrid institutional arrangements … inter- agency coordinating
mechanisms … new inter-governmental coalitions … public-private partnerships … and private sector
initiatives.”37 More- over, as Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor point out, multiple coop- erative
mechanisms may arise within a single issue domain, giving rise to what they call “regime complexes,”
i.e. “an array of partially over- lapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area
… [and] marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct
fora with participation of dif- ferent sets of actors.”38 Among this diversity, it is useful to note recent