HLSC/15-W
WP/65
In
nternational Civil Aviatio
on Organizattion
27/1/15
English only
WORKING
W
PAPER
SECOND
S
HIGH-LEV
H
VEL SAFE
ETY CONF
FERENCE 2015 (HLS
SC 2015)
PLANNIN
P
G FOR GL
LOBAL AV
VIATION SAFETY IIMPROVE
EMENT
Montréal, 2 to 5 Februaary 2015
nt situation
Theme 1:: Reviewing the curren
Topic 1..2: Emerging
g safety issuees
AIRCRAF
FT TRACKIING SYSTEM
MS AND EX
XTENDED C
CVRS DURATION
(Presentted by Latviaa on behalf off the Europeann Union and iits Member State1
and thee other Memb
ber States of the
t European Civil Aviatioon Conference2;
and by EUROCONTR
ROL)
UMMARY
SU
Recent even
nts, such as th
he accident to Flight AF44
47 and the dissappearance oof Flight MH370, have shoown that
there is a neeed to be able to determine the position of
o an aircraft at any time. A
Actions undeertaken by ICA
AO have
to be supported. This working pap
per recomm
mends trackinng aircraft aand outlines the in-deveelopment
medium-term
m solutions to
o meet this neeed by means of autonomouus aircraft poositioning equuipment.
Recent even
nts have also emphasized the
t need to in
ncrease cockppit voice recoorder (CVR) recording duuration in
order to prev
vent the loss of relevant data.
d
Because of the majorr role played bby the CVR in investigatiions and,
therefore, in
n the preventiion of aviatio
on accidents,, it is essentiial to ensure without delaay an increasse in the
duration of CVR
C
recordin
ng and that eff
ffective meanss are in place to preserve thhe recorded ddata.
Action: The conference is invited to:
a) endo
orse the prop
posed high-llevel objectiv
ves introduceed in this w
working paper, in particcular the
impllementation of
o aircraft traccking systemss;
b) evaluate the neceessary changees in the field
d of aircraft tr
tracking, searrch and rescue (SAR) and develop
perfo
formance-baseed amendmen
nts to the apprropriate ICAO
O Standards; and
c) supp
port the proposed amendm
ments from th
he Flight Reccorder Panel (FLIRECP) concerning eextended
CVR
R recording duration
d
for large
l
aeroplan
nes and the pproposed am
mendments forr protection oof safety
inforrmation.
1
Austria, Belgium,
B
Bulgariia, Croatia, Cyprrus, Czech Repu
ublic, Denmark, Estonia, Finlandd, France, Germ
many, Greece, Huungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liithuania, Luxem
mburg, Malta, Netherlands,
N
Polland, Portugal, Romania, Slovvakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden an
nd United Kingd
dom. All these 28
2 States are also
o Members of EC
CAC.
2
Albania, Armenia, Azerb
baijan, Bosnia and Herzegovin
na, Georgia, Iceeland, Republicc of Moldova, Monaco, Monteenegro,
Norway, San
S Marino, Serb
bia, Switzerland
d, The former Yu
ugoslav Republicc of Macedonia,, Turkey and Ukkraine.
(4 pages)
HLSC.2015
5.WP.065.en.doccx
HLSC/15-WP/65
1.
-2-
INTRODUCTION
1.1
There are a growing number of large long-range aeroplanes that fly over oceans,
connecting distant continents, and of helicopters that connect offshore stations. It is important to improve
the ability to quickly locate missing aircraft, in order to save lives and prevent accidents.
1.2
Safety investigations show that the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is a precious and even
essential tool in analyzing the flight crew’s behaviour and work organization or in identifying actions that
are not recorded on the flight data recorder (FDR), even following events after which it is possible to
interview those involved. However, investigations seeking to determine the causes of serious incidents to
large commercial aeroplanes have at times been hampered by there being no audio recording of the
relevant flight phases. The investigations of a number of accidents have shown the present CVR recording
duration of two hours to be insufficient. Moreover, at the time this working paper was written, the
wreckage and the flight recorders of Boeing 777 flight MH370 that disappeared on 8 March 2014 had yet
to be found. The expected duration of that flight, of more than seven hours, is such that no CVR recording
of any initial actions related to its disappearance is likely to have survived.
1.3
To address the issues raised by the accidents to Flights AF447 and MH370, the following
high-level objectives have been proposed in European Union (EU) WP/05 presented at the
Multidisciplinary Meeting on Global Tracking convened by ICAO in May 2014. They include
survivability, safety investigation and accident prevention, as well as the intentional disconnection of
aircraft systems. Regarding survivability, the issue to be addressed is the loss of an aircraft in an area not
covered by ATM ground surveillance. In such a case, search and rescue means are not alerted in a timely
manner and they do not have sufficiently accurate location information to make possible the saving of
life. Regarding safety investigations, if the aircraft wreckage and the flight recorders cannot be found, the
causes of the accident will remain unknown and corrective actions cannot be taken. Finally, the issue of
intentional disconnection needs to be addressed as an aircraft can go missing in areas without primary
radar surveillance by simply disabling communication systems and the transponder. The measures would
have the objective of preventing an aircraft becoming invisible to air traffic management as a
consequence of certain systems being inoperative.
2.
AIRCRAFT TRACKING
2.1
The ICAO Multidisciplinary Meeting mentioned above (12-13 May 2014) concluded that
global tracking should be pursued as a matter of priority, to provide early notice of and a response to
abnormal flight behaviour. ICAO has defined a concept of operations (CONOPS) on aircraft tracking for
the development of performance-based provisions to support the location of an accident site in a timely
manner for the purpose of search and rescue and accident investigation. The Ad hoc Working Group
(AHWG) has been developing a concept of operations on aircraft tracking. This CONOPS has four layers
to cover all types of situations.
2.2
The ICAO’s Flight Recorder Panel (FLIRECP) was tasked by the Air Navigation
Commission (ANC) to propose amendments to Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft regarding the
development of performance-based provisions for locating, within a reasonable timeframe, the accident
site and flight recorders when an aircraft is lost in an inaccessible, hidden or otherwise difficult to find
location. The proposed amendments are taking into account the recommendations of the Global
Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS) produced by the ICAO AHWG.
2.3
Operators should implement aircraft tracking systems to continuously monitor flights,
identify abnormal flight behaviour and provide alerts, as recommended by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) Aircraft Tracking Task Force. In addition, when an emergency situation is detected,
-3-
HLSC/15-WP/65
the on-board system should be able to provide sufficient information to the ground to define the position
of the aircraft. This capability should also, to the extent possible, be robust both to loss of normal
electrical power on board, and to any attempt to disable it during the flight. Keeping in mind the
robustness of aircraft tracking, the European Union is considering amending its legislation on flight
recorders, underwater locator devices and aircraft tracking systems, highlighting that there should be a
structure to support the function of aircraft tracking at the level of the operator. This function could also
be delegated to another operator or entity as long as the aircraft’s 4D positions are monitored on a
continuous basis when they are flying in areas not covered by ATM ground surveillance. Whilst aircraft
tracking does not equate to an ATS surveillance service, it can also be a source of information to provide
early warning and response to abnormal flight behaviour, which encompasses security-related situations.
2.4
It is recommended that the conclusions of the ICAO Multidisciplinary Meeting on Global
Tracking for the mid-term be followed, and in particular that:
a) ICAO performance-based provisions be developed, using a multidisciplinary
approach, on aircraft tracking to support alerts in case of an abnormal flight
behaviour, and the localization of the accident site for the purpose of search and
rescue and accident investigation; and
b) COSPAS-SARSAT be invited to continue to investigate, within its own programme
and in partnership with the industry, the means of improving the performance and
detection of emergency locator transmitter (ELTs), particularly in locating an aircraft
in distress while in-flight.
3.
MANDATE EXTENDED DURATION CVR RECORDING
3.1
The FLIRECP was also tasked by the ANC with proposing amendments to Annex 6
regarding the development of provisions and operational procedures for very long duration CVRs.
3.2
In many air accident and incident investigations, CVR data for the critical phases of flight
are not available. This illustrates the necessity to increase, sometimes significantly (15 to 25 hours), the
duration of CVR recordings. New types of solid state CVR (SSCVR) already have long-duration
capability. This is the result of obsolescence of memory leading to increased duration with new types of
memory without changing the crash-protected enclosure.
3.3
It is proposed that a Standard be introduced requiring extended duration CVR recording
for large aeroplanes first issued with an individual Certificate of Airworthiness after an appropriate date.
In order to address this issue, the FLIRECP proposed the introduction of CVR with a recording duration
of 25 hours for aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass (MCTOM) of over 27 000 kg
manufactured after 1 January 2021. The aforementioned EU initiative highlighted in paragraph 2.3
includes a CVR extended duration for future installation.
3.4
Because of the major role played by the CVR in investigations and therefore in the
prevention of aviation accidents, it is essential to ensure without delay that effective means and
procedures are in place to preserve the recorded data without creating a burden on readouts from the
aircraft involved. Considering the constant and rapid technical progress in the area of computer memories,
a simple method would consist of an increase in their capacity in order to significantly increase the
duration of recordings.
3.5
To further protect CVR recordings from being used for other purposes than maintaining
or improving aviation safety, it is considered important that the possibility to erase the recording
HLSC/15-WP/65
-4-
following a flight without any event remains on the aircraft. In addition, CVR recording protection during
day-to-day operations should be reinforced, as proposed by the ICAO Safety Information Protection Task
Force (SIP TF), and as included in the Group of Experts on Protection of Accident and Incident Records
(GEPAIR) recommendation for Annex 6 amendments. On this matter, EU intends to enhance its rule with
the view to further protect CVR recordings.
— END —