Defense and Diplomacy in the Brazilian Strategy for Maintenance of
Order in South America
Mariana Fonseca Lima*
Introduction
For Brazil, South America has a prominent position in all policies that are
related to the country’s foreign relations. The region has become a priority for Brazil in
the international context and one of his main platforms for its foreign policy since the
military regime until today. Although facing with world changes and also internal
transformation, South American region remained as priority of Brazil's foreign
policy. Moreover, defense policy has been also concerned with the border region, and
has consolidated understanding about the importance of neighboring countries
to the defense and sovereignty of Brazil.
So the first look of Brazil beyond its borders is to South America and the
Brazilian strategy for subcontinent influences other country international performance.
Brazil plays an undoubtedly important role in South America either because of
its economic, geographic, demographic weight or because its political influence. So it is
in economic integration themes as well as security themes. In this paper we will
consider both areas – integration and security – extremely interconnected, according to
Brazilian perception, as we will see further. Therefore, the conceptions of regional
security, regional order or even regional governance should also be understood in a
comprehensive perspective in this work. Thus, how to setup the security complex or
regional order in South America and what is the Brazilian’s position to its
configuration?
We intend to respond these questions by using concepts and theories largely
known, as the idea of order from the English School – particularly, from Hedley Bull –
and the theory of regional security complex from Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver . In
addition, the Brazilian domestic perspective will be analyzed in order to understand its
role in regional configuration. For such, two major areas are necessary to understand the
country’s strategy to maintenance of order in South America: defense and diplomacy.
Policies and acts towards the region, concerning political integration and security, are
formulated fundamentally in these two areas.
South America regional order
This paper seeks to unravel which are policies and actions of Brazilian defense
and diplomacy for maintenance of order in South America. Namely, what is the
Brazilian strategy for regional order. Hence, before analyze Brazilian strategy, it is
necessary to define what we understand by order in South America.
Hedley Bull, in his book The Anarchical Society, provides contributions for the
definition of order. According to him, there are three elementary objectives for order in
any society: 1) protection of life; 2) compliance with agreements, and 3) guarantees of
property1. Besides these elementary objectives, Bull suggests other objectives for
international order: 1) preservation of system and society of states; 2) maintenance of
*Master student in International Relations in the University of Brasilia (UnB)
1
BULL, Hedley, A sociedade anárquica. Brasília: Editora da UnB, 2002, p. 9
independence or sovereignty of individual states; 3) maintenance of peace2. Thus, it can
be inferred that order is a situation of minimum stability in a society.
In Bull’s conception, order is closely linked to the idea of international society.
That international society occurs “when a group of states, conscious of certain common
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves
to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in
the working of common institutions” 3. Differently, an international system occurs
“when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient
impact on one another decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure –
as part of a whole”4. The concept of international society encompasses the concept of
international system, but the inverse does not occur.
In an international society, order is consequence of common interests established
to formulate the elementary objectives of rules and institutions, as mentioned above. In
turn, order can occur in international system as a system of balance of power. In other
words, a mechanism of order that works, even if randomly. In the international system
there are not, necessarily, common interests, nor rules or institutions.
This notion of order, related to the major concept of international society, is
useful for the understanding of the Brazilian and South American vision concerning
regional order. If the logic of international society was adapted to regional society and,
similarly, to the regional order, it would be reasonable to think, for the South American
case, in common interests, rules and regional institutions. These factors contribute to
regional order and possibly for the formation of a South American society.
Thus, we will seek to assess the role and position of Brazil in the formulation
and maintenance of the South America regional order, taking into consideration Bull’s
perception about order and society. It is possible to highlight some of the principles that
the country recognizes as important for the maintenance of order, since they are in a
vast literature and they are largely widespread. Among the elements that compose the
Brazilian perception about regional order, it is important to mention its concerning
about avoiding institutional breakdowns, social development, democracy, promotion of
dialogue instances, establishment of common values in defense matter, prevention of
regional conflicts, creation of a peace zone. These principles are consistent with Bull’s
view.
Although Bull has mentioned security as an elementary objective of order, the
author does not list the international security among the aspects that promote order in
the international society. For him, the common interests, rules and institutions would be
enough to generate the order. Though agreeing with the perspective presented by the
author and believing that it is useful to understand Brazil position, it is fundamental to
include security aspects in the maintenance of regional order. Among the elementary
objectives to establish regional order, one is violence containment. Therefore, regional
security cannot be separated from a characterization of regional order. Thus, which are
the security elements that compose the regional order?
2
Bull, p. 23-25
Bull, p.19
4
Bull, p.15
3
South America has a particular dynamic related to security, compared with
traditional realist explanation for international security which is based in territorial and
sovereignty threats, as well as the seek for power and balance of power. Since there
were not many or great wars between states, or even a great South American power able
to affect decisively regional order, the main challenges were not and still are not related
to dichotomy between war and cooperation. Moreover, the region has been influenced
by the long historical of interventions by the United States. Although these maneuvers
had not been linear, they evidence a great global power on the table game, against
which South American countries could not contain. Finally, the region faces nonconventional security challenges, such as poverty, public violence, and economic
development. All these factors contribute to structure the security framework in South
America and then provide information about the regional order.
Regarding the South America complexity and the relatively low explanatory
reach of realists theory concerning international security and order, we will use a
perspective that privileges the regional logic of security. The regional complexes theory,
developed by Buzan e Wæver5, suggests an analytical logic based on the regional
security. In our point of view, this approach is more elucidative about security logic an
order in South America, in comparison with traditional perspectives regarding this
topic. According to the authors, countries which divide borders, geopolitical
similarities, and challenges in the same region (complex) would have more security and
defense concerns than countries in different regions. Thus, security issues would be
better explained in a regional level.
Still according to the authors, the South American complex is divided in two
sub-complexes: the Southern Cone, which is close to a security community, and the
Andean North, that faces traditional conflicts. Although there is a regional distinction,
South America has an unusual balance among the four levels of analysis used in the
book, the domestic, the regional, the inter-regional and the global one. For the authors,
the future of South American regional security complex depends on the presence of
Brazil in the region and the interrelationship between the different integrationist
schemes6.
Both factors can be considered a binomial for the formulation and maintenance
of order in South America: the presence of Brazil in the region and integration schemes.
Brazil has a real ability to influence the political situation in South America, as well as
to apply measures of maintenance stability in the region. Besides having the largest
territory in the region, partial energetic autonomy, economic stability and effective
possibility of using military force, Brazil has a significant diplomatic influence in South
America. The second binominal element, integration arrangements, has to do with
regional economic and political dynamics, as well as interactions and relations among
states. These regional dynamics and interaction can contribute substantially to the
regional ordering. In the case of South America, most of the integrationist initiatives
were suggested by Brazil, mainly by its diplomatic service. This observation enables us
to establish a link even greater between Brazil and integration for regional order.
5
BUZAN, Barry & WÆVER, Ole. Regions and Powers: the structure of International Security.
Cambridge-UK, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
6
BUZAN & WÆVER, p.338-339
From what has been said, it is reasonable to think of a Brazilian performance for
the maintenance of regional order and it is expected that the mechanisms of integration
are the primary instrument for this. The predominant type of integration proposed and
developed until the beginning of the century had been one of commercial-economic
style. However, this picture has been changing, specially, since the creation, in 2008, of
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a body created for strictly political
purposes, including aspects of defense and security. It is hardly controversial that the
initiatives more close to economic aspects have contributed to the field of political
integration, but UNASUR has been established with mechanisms that focus political
integration. Hence, it would make consensus feasible among South America countries.
The new institution should be a framework for convergence of interests, making them
common, as well as abet order in the region.
The South American Defense Council (CDS), one of UNASUR’s councils, can
be considered an effort to conciliate interests and visions on defense and thereby
contribute to the formation and maintenance of regional order. This perspective is
presented as CDS’s goals, established in its statute. Among the CDS’s goals, it can be
mentioned the converge of views, the promotion of cooperation on defense matters, the
creation of a South American identity on defense and the establishment of a South
American peace zone.
Taking into account these broader definitions of regional security and the
essential role of Brazil, it is necessary to understand which are the country’s
perspectives about this issue. For this, we will analyze the visions of Brazilian
diplomacy and defense, both involved, interested and largely responsible for
formulating the international position of Brazil.
Foreign Policy and Defense Policy and maintenance of order – Brazil’s perspective
Principles and practices of Diplomacy
In this section we will seek to assess the Brazilian outlook for order and security
themes in the South America region. The starting-point is from Brazil’s domestic
policies of defense and foreign relations through which the country guidelines and plans
of action are formulated and largely executed. Thereby the principles and practices of
both policies could evidence the Brazilian general strategy for the South American
order.
In Brazil, the responsibility for formulating the foreign policy is shared by the
President and the Ministry of External Relations. In practice, Itamaraty, as the Ministry
is known, is almost the only formulator and executer of the foreign policy. Just to
mention some of the reasons for this expressive participation in the Brazilian external
relations, it worthy to highlight its historical tradition, as well as its worldly recognized
competence.
The historical tradition of Itamaraty has contributed to develop and consolidate
foreign policy principles. In Brazil, some principles remain as guidelines of foreign
policy for decades. Just to mention a few, we could list pacifism, non-intervention,
peaceful settlement of conflicts. Some of these principles were incorporated into the
Federal Constitution of Brazil (1988), which Article 4 established the principles that
should guide the international relations of Brazil7.
According to these principles, Brazil preferred mechanisms for building a
political and legal international order, under which international organizational and
treaties on disarmament and nonproliferation are enhanced. Brazil “unlike the logic of
great powers, [...] has always thought that the increase of weapons promotes insecurity
and not guarantees of security; that the balance of power does not ensure the
achievement of peace; that no defense or war effort can substitute the construction of a
political and legal international order”8.
Regarding these subjects and also security issues, foreign policy appreciated a
political order based on cooperation and multilateralism. Thus, Brazil has acceded to
hemispheric security institutions. Among them, we can mention the Organization of
American States (OAS) and its meetings of Ministries of Defense, as well as the InterAmerican Defense Board (IADB), an international forum, composed by soldiers from
the member states, which provides technical advices on military affairs to the OAS.
Although Brazil has participated of multilateral mechanisms on hemispheric security
and defense, the priority of the country turned up to bilateral treaties9. In the Brazilian
view, these treaties could assure the increasing of autonomy in decision-making
process, when compared with hemispheric multilateral structures.
In addition to the traditional principles, the Brazilian foreign policy has been
incorporating new prisms in order to adapt itself to the changes imposed by the
transformation in international relations, specially since the end of the Cold War. In the
1990s, economic issues and regional integration initiatives have prevailed and then they
have expanded with trade and financial opening in the process of globalization.
Concerning international security issues, there was a change from the position of
the Brazilian foreign policy proposals for hemispheric security and from bilateral
agreements to proposals made by the country for the maintenance of order in South
America. As described by Paulo Pereira Pinto, Brazil's position tended not to agree with
7
Constituição Federal brasileira de 1988 - Art. 4º A República Federativa do Brasil rege-se nas suas
relações internacionais pelos seguintes princípios: I - independência nacional; II - prevalência dos direitos
humanos; III - autodeterminação dos povos; IV - não-intervenção; V - igualdade entre os Estados; VI defesa da paz; VII - solução pacífica dos conflitos; VIII - repúdio ao terrorismo e ao racismo; IX cooperação entre os povos para o progresso da humanidade; X - concessão de asilo político. Parágrafo
único. A República Federativa do Brasil buscará a integração econômica, política, social e cultural dos
povos da América Latina, visando à formação de uma comunidade latino-americana de nações.
8
ALMINO, João. Inserção Internacional de Segurança do Brasil: A Perspectiva Diplomática. In:
BRIGAGÃO, Clóvis; PROENCA JUNIOR, Domicio. Brasil e o mundo: novas visões. Rio de Janeiro:
Francisco Alves & Cia, 2002, p. 34
9
Some agreements in cooperation on defense: Bolivia – Brasil: Acuerdo sobre Cooperación (2007).
Brasil – Colombia: Acuerdo sobre Cooperación (2003 - 2008). Brasil – Ecuador: Acuerdo sobre
Cooperación (2007). Brasil – Perú: Memorándum para la Vigilancia y Cooperación de la Amazonia
(2003). Acuerdo Marco de Cooperación (2006). Mecanismo de Consulta y Cooperación entre Ministerios
(2006). Cooperación en materia de Vigilancia del Amazonas (2006). Acuerdo Marco para el
Establecimiento de Sistemas de Control Integrado en los Pasos de Frontera (2009). Brasil – Colombia –
Perú: Comisión Tripartita (2004). Argentina – Brasil: Memorándum de Entendimiento de Consulta y
Coordinación (1997). Colaboración para Fabricaciones Militares (1997). Acuerdos de Cooperación
Tecnológica (1999, 2002, 2003, 2005). Acuerdo Marco y Protocolo sobre Cooperación (2005 – 2008).
Brasil – Chile: Grupo de Trabajo Bilateral (2000). Acuerdo sobre Cooperación (2007). Brasil – Paraguay:
Acuerdo de Cooperación Militar (1995). Acuerdo Marco sobre Cooperación (2007). Mecanismo
Binacional de Consulta Estratégica (2007). Brasil – Uruguay: Acuerdo sobre Cooperación (2010). Ver
este acordo com o uruguai, o único com um país em nível de cooperação ampla depois da criação do cds
Source: Resdal.
the American attempt to create a multilateral, more securitized, and military alliance in
the hemisphere. For this reason, Brazil adopted a low profile and relatively passive
decisions in hemispheric initiatives10.
The changes in Brazilian (low) engagement in the hemispheric security
proposals – largely suggested by the United States – can be, in part, attributed to three
mainly reasons. Firstly, Brazil intended to formulate its own proposal to South
American security and order. Secondly, Brazil showed low inclination in dealing with
the issue of security and order in a broader level, the hemispheric one. Thirdly, there
was a change in Brazilian foreign policy attitude which became more assertive to South
American initiatives. In this field, Brazil has more visibility and more influence than in
the hemispheric zone. The Brazilian relative passivity in defense issues was, to some
extent, due to the lack of a well organized defense instance, such as a Ministry of
Defense, created only in 1999. Thus, the Ministry of External Relations was largely
responsible for drafting the Brazilian position on external defense, an issue that was not
among the priorities of Itamaraty.
Besides the transformation in international context, this change in Brazil's
external position was due to the emphasis of foreign policy in the South American
region. South America began to gain larger dimension in the Brazilian foreign agenda
since the late 1980s, when Brazil and Argentina established closer relations. The
process of creation and consolidation of Mercosur in the 1990s accelerated the scope of
the regional perspective in the Brazilian external agenda. As an Argentine-Brazilian
initiative, Mercosur is an important institutional arrangement which has consolidated
the process of mutual confidence that had started with treaties in previous decades. Even
if it had among its main objectives the economic and commercial issues, which has
undoubtedly contributed to the process of confidence building, the block also raised a
political dimension and expanded the scope of the trust.
In this context, the First Meeting of Heads of State of South America, held in
Brasilia in 2000, after a Brazilian initiative, an important step toward consolidation of
security and order in the region. At this meeting, besides the establishement of
mechanisms to promote physical integration, South American Presidents agreed to
create a Zone of Peace in South America, a mechanism without institutionalization. In
this sense, the presidents of each country should be responsible for “equally stimulating
the deepening of dialogue on security issues in South America, taking into account the
human, economic and social aspects of security issue”11. Thus, Brazil passed from a
position of low activity on hemispheric security to an active performance in security and
order in South America, based on integration initiatives.
In the first decade of this century, particularly during Lula’s government, the
integration of the region turns into “Brazilian foreign policy’s top priority”12. According
10
PINTO, Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade. Diplomacia e Política de Defesa. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco,
2000, p. 183.
11
COMUNICADO DE BRASÍLIA. Primeira Reunião de Chefes de Estado Sul-Americanos, Brasília,
2000. In this sense, some measures in the economic blocks were adopted: la Declaración Política del
MERCOSUR, Bolivia y Chile como Zona de Paz sudamericana, adoptada en la II Reunión de Presidente
de América del Sur, el 27 de julio de 2002, y ratificada por la Resolución A/RES/57/13 de la Asamblea
General de las Naciones Unidas, de 14 de noviembre de 2002; y la Declaración de San Francisco de
Quito, sobre el Establecimiento y Desarrollo de la Zona de Paz Andina, de 12 de julio de 2004, ratificada
por la Resolución A/RES/59/54 de la Asamblea General de la ONU, de 2 de diciembre de 2004. – Artigo
Nelson Jobim. Documento CDS, p.18
12
AMORIM, Celso, Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview. In: Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional.Brasília: IBRI 2010, p. 227
to the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, “closer economic and political relations
contibute to growth and stability. It also increases our (Brazil’s and South America’s)
clout in global negotiations”13. Hence, South America is seen, by different points of
view, as a strategic region to Brazilian external projection. Therefore, for this purpose,
being in a stable region with a higher level of convergence on international issues is
crucial.
In this context, it was proposed mechanisms of political integration in the region,
here understood as measures for establishment and maintenance of regional order.
Under this scope, it was created the South American Community of Nations (CASA), in
2004, in order to organize South American integration in political, social, economic,
environmental and infrastructure areas. Afterwards, CASA originated UNASUR,
founded in 2008, with similar objectives to its predecessor, however with a degree of
institutionalization that lacked in the subjects of political integration. These integration
initiatives differ from the goals of integration in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s,
and also from Mercosur and Andean Community of Nations (CAN) initiatives. Both
CASA and UNASUR have a geographical focus on the entire South America, and have
as their objective political integration, from which would be consolidated a regional
order capable of transcending its sphere of influence from the regional to the
international. According to Brazilian former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, “the
consolidation of South America as a political actor is an important step toward the
broader integration of Latin America and caribbean”14.
In that sense, the UNASUR becomes a way to build a common vision among
South America countries, since shared rules and interests were established. Because of
this, it is possible to see the connection between UNASUR as a mechanism for political
dialogue and attempt to establish a regional order, based on common interests, rules and
institutions. In fact, the UNASUR aims to be a unifying mechanism of policy initiatives,
therefore it would be reasonable to think in this mechanism as proposal to build a
regional society. Looking by security side,
“Unasur gave an autonomous answer within South America’s security
complex, addressing a problem whose dynamics is internal to that
complex. […] In the case, mainly for Brazil, the success of Unasur’s
mediation passed the first test, and confirmed its conviction according
to which the process of regional integration needs multilateral
mechanism to be speedily accessed in particular moments of crisis
which threaten the process of integration”15
The creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS) in 2008, under the
UNASUR, also converges with this line of reasoning, once among the objectives of
CDS are to build a common South American identity and to strengthen regional
cooperation in defense matters. Similarly, the other Councils of the UNASUR support
the idea that the organism is an important means of regional synchronization as well as
a collective gain.
Brazil has a historical position in not limit its decision-making autonomy.
Although the country has encouraged initiatives of integration and achievement of a
13
AMORIM, Celso. p. 227
AMORIM, Celso. p. 230
15
VILLA, Rafael Antonio Duarte & VIANA, Manuela Trindade. Security issues during Lula’s
administration: from the reactive to assertive approach. In: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional.
Brasília: IBRI 2010, p. 107
14
larger space for dialogue on defense and security in South America, Brazil has
mobilized little toward a larger institutionalization of these initiatives. It is not in the
Brazilian list of proposals and actions to undertake formal mechanisms that may curtail
the autonomy of Brazilian international decision or strategy. This thought is applied
whether in the traditional spheres of integration, such as Mercosur, whether in recently
created spheres, as UNASUR and the South American Defense Council.
Defense principles and practices
From the Brazilian re-democratization to the formulation of the first Plan of
National Defense in 1996, the prospect of the defense about order and security in South
America was not as clear as the measures of performance of foreign policy. Until the
creation of the Ministry of Defense, in 1999, each Military Force prepared its goals and
plans concerning external defense. Thus there was decentralization of initiatives and to
some extent also of principles.
The Plan of National Defense (I PND), 1996, for the first time addressed the
national defense strategy as one which should be applied by the three Military Forces.
The document formulated contained only very general goals and guidelines, a
demonstration of a certain weakness of the document itself. Among the goals, the idea
of integrating the strategic visions of social, economic, diplomatic and military merges
with the principles of defense and diplomacy as well. It is noteworthy that South
America was mentioned in the I PND from a very close perspective to diplomacy, since
the region was not seen as conflict-prone area16. The PDN broaches Brazilian defense
performance largely in the international and hemispheric fields than in the regional field
The creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD) contributed to Brazilian defense
sought a unique position on the defense issues, so that this position would generate a
strategy to address the interests and challenges of defense and national security.
Collaboration with other institutions, including with Itamaraty, was also buoyed by the
creation of the MD. Whether it was necessary to articulate a dialogue with three
ministers, representatives of the three Military Forces, from the creation of the MD, this
effort would turn on only one minister. Although this factor has been important, it was
not enough to build consensus and change the predominant view of diplomacy.
According to John Paul Alsina Junior,
“if, over almost the entire twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy
waived of the armed backing as part of the external action, it would be
surprising if a constant so entrenched was modified simply by a
declaratory document on defense and the deployment of an
administrative structure responsible for the unified treatment of
military-themed” 17.
It is likely that after the creation of the MD has not been a liaison with the
diplomacy and that the Ministry and its Military Forces have not generated an
autonomous position of diplomacy, as stated Alsina. However, this situation seems to
16
“2.6 A América do Sul, distante dos focos mundiais de tensão, é considerada a região mais
desmilitarizada do mundo. A redemocratização ocorrida no continente tende a reduzir a probabilidade de
ocorrência de conflitos. Os contenciosos regionais têm sido administrados em níveis toleráveis”.I PDN,
1996.
17
ALSINA JÚNIOR, João Paulo Soares. Política externa e política de defesa no Brasil: síntese
imperfeita. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Centro de Documentação e Informação, Coordenação de
Publicações, 2006, p. 140.
change in the 2000s. It was developed the second Plan of National Defense in 2005
which has a theoretical ripeness compared with the precedent plan. In the II PDN, there
was recognition of multilateralism as a promoter of stability, the influence of non-state
actors and new threats in the international environment. The most relevant to our work
is that the document had a specific section on South America, which was described as
Brazilian regional strategic environment. The description of the security situation in
South America was more cautious than in I PDN, demonstrating more awareness in the
formulation of the document18. In addition to these innovations, it is possible notice an
origin of principles and objectives that guided the creation of mechanisms that promote
regional order with the following understanding of the regional situation:
The security of a country is affected by the degree of instability in the
region where it operates. Thus, it is desirable that occur: consensus;
political harmony, and the convergence of actions among neighboring
countries, aiming to achieve the reduction of transnational crime, in
search of better conditions for economic and social development that
will make the area more cohesive and strong. [...] Because of its
geopolitical situation, it is important for Brazil to deepen the process
of integrated and harmonic development in South America, which is
naturally extended to the defense and regional security19.
Once the II PND has recognized the regional situation, the plan defines among
the objectives of Brazilian National Defense the promotion of regional stability.
It was important the recognition by the Brazilian defense that South American
region is not necessarily a conflict-free zone. Based on this new premise, Brazil has
changed the way that it operates in the region. It is difficult to know exactly how far the
defense would be following the new assumptions of Brazilian diplomacy or whether it
would be otherwise, diplomacy being influenced by new visions of defense. Given the
initiatives of political integration of Brazilian diplomacy prior to the II PND, as the
formulation of CASA and the reorientation of foreign policy itself, it is possible to note
a closer view of the defense to Itamaraty’s view. Moreover, the Ministry of External
Relations, much traditional in formulating principles and foreign policies, even if the
defense matters, would have more precedent for this shift than the MD.
It should be emphasized the effort of the Brazilian defense in thinking about
long-term strategies and at the same time make public the direction of defense policy.
While the decision to publish the PNDs was a superior political decision, to which the
militaries had to follow, its disclosure demonstrates a degree of awareness that the
defense policy is a public policy20, as well as the foreign policy. However, the Brazilian
foreign policy has not undergone in a similar process. Itamaraty has high autonomy of
developing and implementing this policy.
The recent initiative of the Brazilian defense policy was to establish the National
Defense Strategy (END) in 2008. The END was the document produced by the
18
“3.2 A América do Sul, distante dos principais focos mundiais de tensão e livre de armas nucleares, é
considerada uma região relativamente pacífica. Além disso, processos de consolidação democrática e de
integração regional tendem a aumentar a confiabilidade regional e a solução negociada dos conflitos” II
PDN, 2005.
19
II PDN, 2005.
20
WROBEL, Paulo S. e HERZ, Mônica. A Política Brasileira de Segurança no Pós-Guerra Fria., In:
BRIGAGÃO, Clóvis; PROENCA JUNIOR, Domicio (Org.). Brasil e o mundo: novas visões. Rio de
Janeiro: Francisco Alves & Cia, 2002, p. 289
Brazilian authorities about national defense that is the more likely to a White Paper on
Defense. Still, the END is not enough to replace it in importance.
Regarding South America, the END explicitly linking Brazil's defense to
regional integration. There is also mention to the South American Defense Council,
which has not been created at the time that END was publicized. According to the
document, the Council will “prevent conflict and promote military cooperation and
integration of the defense industrial bases, without participation of outside country of
the region” 21. Contributing to regional stability, together with diplomacy, is one
measure, among others, to implement the END22. Thus, END recognizes and combines
many of the principles of Brazilian foreign policy, and has established mechanisms of
communication between the defense and diplomacy in relation to security23.
The most important step in defining the policy of the Brazilian defense has not
yet been reached. It is the White Paper on National Defense. However, internally we
walk to the formulation of this document which is essential either to the country as to
the confidence-building measures at regional level. According to the Complementary
Law No. 136/2010, it was established which should be included in the White Paper,
addressing mainly: I - strategic scenario for the XXI Century; II - national defense
policy; III - national defense strategy; IV - modernization of the Armed Forces; V rationalization and adaptation of defense structures; VI - economic support of national
defense; VII - the Armed Forces: Navy, Army and Air Force; VIII - peacekeeping
operations and humanitarian aid24.
In addition to these principles outlined by the defense strategies of Brazil, some
speeches from the Minister of Defense of Brazil, Nelson Jobim, highlight the Brazilian
position in relation to security in South America and the establishment of mechanisms
to ensure the regional order:
the security of a country is affected by the level of instability of the
region in which it is located, in this case South America. Therefore, in
order to achieve the desired degree of stability um region, it is also
desirable: consensus, political harmony and convergence of activities
among South American countries. These are the essential conditions
that favor the economic and social development and, consequently,
will make the region more cohesive and stronger25.
According to Oscar Filho, from the 1990s, proposals of regional security
arrangements have began to emerge in response to U.S. hegemony. The author mentions
three distinct agendas with proposals for regional planning: from Mercosur, the
Bolivarian and the Brazilian26. The agenda from Mercosur would be of liberal nature,
21
END, 2008, p.17
“O Ministério da Defesa e o Ministério das Relações Exteriores promoverão o incremento das
atividades destinadas à manutenção da estabilidade regional e à cooperação nas áreas de fronteira do
País”, END, 2008, p.64.
23
Besides de mention of South American Defense Council and the cooperation between Ministry of
Defense and External Relations, the END and UNASUR are also mentioned as na important mechanism
for cooperation among South American defenses.
24
LEI COMPLEMENTAR Nº 136, de 25 de agosto de 2010
25
JOBIM, Nelson. Presentación del Ministro de Defensa de Brasil. In: El Consejo de Defensa
Suramericano de la Unasur : crónica de su Gestación. Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional
de Chile. Grupo de Trabajo del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, 2009, p. 6
26
FILHO, Oscar Medeiros. Entre a cooperação e a dissuasão: políticas de defesa e percepções militares na
América do Sul. Tese de Doutorado. Universidade de São Paulo, 2010, p.79
22
and a regional security arrangement would be a "natural" consequence of regional
integration. The Bolivarian proposal is in response to extra-regional threats, particular
from the United States. Finally, the Brazilian proposal would be a collective system of
defense27.
As mentioned above, by the early twenty-first century, Brazil had prioritized a
regional security arrangement based on bilateral agreements. After this moment on, the
country has shown a greater tendency to promote a regional security consonance. It is
possible to observe in public demonstrations of both the defense and diplomacy which
indicated, besides a higher profile involvement in this issue, the slope in creating a
mechanism of collective security. This observation is based on the experiences of
CASA and UNASUR. Therefore the proposal of a mechanism of collective security was
prominently political rather than military. These measures of collective political
consensus, the so-called Brazilian agenda, proposed by Filho, have prevailed over the
other agendas in the formation of a South American order.
Returning to the argument, which gained strength here, that there was a change
of the Brazilian position and posture based on bilateral agreements to the position of
supporting institutions of regional ordering, it can also be mentioned other factors that
motivate this change. In a lesser extent, the change in the Brazilian position can be
attributed to two events related to defense: on one hand, the resumption of U.S. military
presence in South America, with the U.S. Fourth Fleet and with the proposal to establish
military bases in Colombia; and on the other hand, the Venezuelan (or Bolivarian)
proposal regional security. The Fourth Fleet of the U.S. Navy was reactivated in 2008,
after 50 years, and this has raised suspicions, especially in the Brazilian government:
“we sent a letter saying that we did not see with good eyes the idea of the Fourth Fleet
because it seems that its territorial row is almost on top of our pre-salt” 28. The Brazilian
government also declared himself opposed to the deployment of U.S. bases in
Colombia, while respecting the sovereignty of this country and its decision. Another
motivating factor for a more assertive Brazil's position in relation to South American
regional ordering was a reaction to the Venezuelan proposal to build a regional
collective security system more similar to the model of NATO. This proposal layered
the union of national military forces, which is inconsistent with the external principles
and guidelines of Brazil.
Initially, the central measures of the Brazilian defense were to endorse, before
anything else, an internal thought on national defense. In this sense, the Ministry of
Defense, with civilian ministries, was created and the Plans of National Defense, of
1996 and 2005, were prepared as well as National Defense Strategy of 2008. Therefore,
even not having a Defense White Paper, the country seeks to adapt its military
institutions to democratic principles. In addition to the domestic endorsement, make
public defense strategies creates a greater reliability among neighboring countries. Thus,
the Brazilian defense policy evidences its plans and worries about South America or
with issues that are directly or indirectly relate to the region.
27
FILHO, Oscar Medeiros, 2010, p.79-81
President Luís Inacio Lula da Silva in report of O Estado de São Paulo newspaper. Lula diz que é
necessário discutir Quarta Frota com EUA.
Available at: http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,lula-diz-que-e-necessario-discutir-quarta-frotacom-eua,411046,0.htm.
28
While Brazil takes on a unique international position, which is apparently
concocted, internally the formulation of this position is not always coordinated.
Therefore the position is not always consistent with the perspectives of defense or
diplomacy. The foreign policy has prioritized bilateral measures for maintaining order
in South America until the mid-twenty first century. And it also has kept a low profile
role in matters of hemispheric security. The change of foreign policy to the axis of
establishing order through regional political integration took place mainly from 2004. In
turn, the defense policy, has been little role in the formulation of the Brazilian position
until the creation of the Ministry of Defense. Since the creation of the MD, it has been
signed country’s preference for collective actions in South American. The change in
foreign policy has favored a convergence between the tendency of collective defense
initiatives and the proposition of integration policy, from foreign policy initiative. Just
as UNASUR came from a Brazilian diplomacy proposal, the South American Defense
Council came from a Brazilian defense proposal. As these bodies are institutionally
interconnected, they also demonstrate a necessary interaction between the defense and
diplomacy spheres of Brazil.
We wonder whether it is possible to establish the main Brazilian’s principles and
actions since there is not a national plan for its international strategy. Taking account
the principles and initiatives of foreign policy and foreign defense, Brazilian perspective
privileges, harmony, non-hegemonic leadership, democracy, development, stability and
balance in regional order to its international projection.
The South American Defense Council: a Brazilian mechanism for maintenance of
regional order?
Regarding Brazilian foreign policy and defense policy and the assumptions that
we take about country principles and actions concerning regional order, it is important
to analyze a case which should be a mechanism of order preservation in South America.
This section is motivated by two main questions: why Brazil proposed the creation of
South America Defense Council and what does the country intend with the Council’s
initiatives?
The motivations of the Brazilian initiatives in creating a South America Defense
Council could be found, in some degree, in the measures formulated and taken by the
Brazilian foreign and defense policies. As mentioned in the last section, South America
is a priority area for the foreign policy and for defense policy due to it geopolitics and
economics importance to Brazil. What calls attention is the gradual change in the
Brazilian strategy of bilateral agreements to other of security cooperation. In both, the
main principles were the same: regional stability, development, construction of common
interests, etc.
Though a document has never been elaborated, with the purpose to let the debate
happen, the Brazilian proposition to constitute a Defense Council had already some
initial suggestions, said by the Defense Minister in travels at the South America region
to present the Brazilian idea and promote a regional debate. According to the Brazilian
Defense Minister, “the objective of this council is that every South America country has
only one word about defense in international forums. [..] The countries can promote
more joint military exercises and formulate a regional defense strategy”³¹. Another
aspect emphasized by the Minister was the difference between this South American
agreement and those traditional security mechanisms as OTAN³². It means, the South
America Defense Council would not be a military coalition against a common enemy,
but a structure in which the member countries could cooperate in the defense area,
exchanging information and experience and building mutual confidence.
Some principles that would rule such organism and part of its operation have
been also presented by the Brazilian Defense Minister to its neighbors countries,
“goal that has motivated the proposal of a South American
Defense Council, under UNASUR: a cooperative, balanced and
democratic forum, where the decisions are made by consensus; a
forum that respect the diversities, the desires, the values and the
traditions of each nation, and chiefly, that be able to adapt itself to
new situations”29.
Brazil has already recognized its material and political capacity to lead the
establishment of a regional mechanism of security. The change to a posture more
proactive coincide with the change in the country attitude and its new foreign priorities.
So, beyond commercial and economical integration, the country is now acting
politically in the region, as the Defense Minister has shown in its announcement:
Brazil considers that it has responsibility to participate as an
catalyzing element of the initiatives of integration in South America,
seeking to create an environment of cooperation necessary to
guarantee stability, peace and security for everyone, in a juncture of
harmonious coexistence with its neighbors30.
Besides the explicit motivations, it is possible to list some other implicit reasons
for the Brazilian initiative. The first one is linked with the objective of the country to
have a bigger international presence concomitantly with the reforms of underrepresented international organisms, such as the UN Security Council. As Brazil intends
to become a permanent member of this council, the country is adopting measures and
initiatives in order to achieve this goal. Among those, it is the increasing of the
Brazilian participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations31, the creation of G-4 – an
alliance among Brazil, Germany, India and Japan with the intention of promote the
reform of the Council. The proposition of creating a South American Defense Council
contributes to the Brazilian intention of becoming a UNSC permanent member. That is
because the experience and the exchange of information in the CDS could contribute to
the Brazilian desire.
Brazil’s proposal to create a South America Defense Council may also be
considered a measure of reaction or counterbalance US presence in South America and
Venezuelan proposal of a collective security mechanism for the region. This is the same
argument that was mentioned above. Although these motivations seem to be less
important, coincidentally, Brazil has assumed a more assertive position since these
events have occurred.
So we can note that the Brazilian proposition to create a Defense Council was
consistent with its principles of foreign policy, but not so much with its practice towards
29
30
JOBIM, Nelson, p.9
JOBIM, Nelson, p.9
its neighbors until then. Therefore, the CDS can be justified based on principles of the
Brazilian foreign policy, which were also consistent with the other South America
countries principles. In one hand, the CDS also would be an experiment to Brazil itself
and to its political ability to deal with a multilateral mechanism, in which several
interests are taken at the same time. In the other hand, it would be a test to the whole
region and its capacity to maintain the order, since the South America countries were
proposing to deal with its own problems without the interference of extra-regional
powers.
After the proposal for a multilateral organization of defense was accepted for
most South American countries, it was launched a Working Group among the countries
of the region, which took charge of planning and implementation the proposal creation
of the South American Defense Council32. The External Ministry was invited by the
Ministry of Defense to participate in the Brazilian delegation formed for this Working
Group. That demonstrates some degree of institutional coordination between these
institutions and, ultimately, the preservation of a position consistent with the
expectations of both the defense and diplomacy.
The Statute of the South American Defense Council of UNASUR33 was
approved in December 2008 by all South American countries. Among some of the
principles adopted by the statute were: the preservation of democratic institutions,
peaceful conflict resolution, dialogue and consensus on defense, promote the reduction
of asymmetries of defense systems in the region and strengthen the defense capability of
the region, and sovereign defense of natural resources34. The CDS has as general
objectives: a) strengthen South America as a Zone of Peace, b) build a South American
identity on defense, c) build consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in defense
matters.
As might be expected, the Statute of CDS has earned much broader dimensions
than the proposal formulated by Brazil. The Brazilian proposal, in fact, was vague and
was not presented as a public formalized document, a written document. This
complicates a strict comparison between the proposal and outcome. Be vague and open
should be Brazilian intention, it means, do not impose any pre-determined format,
leaving it to the debate between the prospective member countries. Though, the most
important, the type of mechanism agreed to contribute to regional planning has been
adopted, according to the Brazilian proposal.
In the First Meeting of Ministers of Defense of Unasur CDS, in 2009, it was
agreed Santiago do Chile Declaration, where the meeting was held. It was launched the
Action Plan 2009-2010 whereby four lines of actions were developed each one with
specific initiatives: 1) Defense Policies; 2) Military Cooperation, Humanitarian
Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations; 3) Defense Industry and Technology; 4)
Education and Training. In the Second Meeting, held in Guyana, in 2010, the step
forward was the creation of a Strategic Studies Defense Center as an entity for the
32
Colombia and Peru, initially, do not accept the CDS, although they have accepted to be parto f Working
Group that should formulated the CDS in statute.
33
“las contribuciones de la delegación brasileña, que presentó, como subsidio, una propuesta de Estatuto
muy semejante, en líneas generales, al texto finalmente acordado por el grupo.” Nelsom Jobim. Artigo de
documento CDS p.19
34
Statute of South American Defensel. Art. 3. Available at: http://www.cdsunasur.org.
generation of knowledge and dissemination of the South American strategy in matters
of defense and security35.
According to the Statute and to the statements, the South American Defense
Council is an agency which has as goal creating a common vision on defense in South
America and ensures transparency in this matter among the countries. Besides
indicating the principles by which the CDS' actions were oriented, the documents of
CDS have also set some concrete goals. As consequence, in accordance with was
proposed in those documents, the CDS would be a mechanism to contribute to the
organization of a regional security system.
As it was launched in 2008, is still not possible to measure the effectiveness of
the CSD in relation to their goals. We will try to make an evaluation of the CDS and
UNASUR from regional demands of order and security. For such, we will base on two
situations that occurred in South America: the military agreement between Colombia
and the United States, in 2009, and the crisis between Venezuela and Colombia,
breaking off diplomatic relations, in 2010.
The Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State of UNASUR, the Summit of
Bariloche of 2009, was convened to deal with the military agreement between Colombia
and the United States. The issues related to national sovereignty and territorial integrity
were the focal point of the debate36. As a statement of the Joint Declaration of the
Summit of Bariloche, it was held a meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and Defense in order to address confidence-building measures, especially regarding
extra-regional agreements. The final resolution, from this last meeting, has established
which would be the mechanism for incentive measures of trust and security and it has
also included concrete measures for implementation and guarantees, formally known as
Confidence Building Measures37. Further, States were also willing to use the CDS, to
some extent, as a subsidiary instance for the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in
order to provide joint evaluation in crisis situation in the region38.
In July 2010, Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Colombia after a
Colombian complaint at the OAS that would be insurgents of the FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) in Venezuelan territory. It was convened an emergency
meeting between foreign ministers of UNASUR to resolve the crisis. Although the
meeting has not left a consensual resolution, it is symbolic the fact that the South
American countries are willing to resolve regional conflicts among themselves39. The
problem of drug trafficking and FARC in Colombia are still extremely sensitive to
security and regional order. Apparently, the UNASUR and the CDS are not yet ripe to
solve this problem in the short term. However, bring Colombian issues to the regional
level is a measure not only of confidence but also of concerning to the ultimate
resolution of the problem.
35
Declaration of Guayaquil. Available at: http://www.cdsunasur.org.
The military agreement was afterwards invalidated by Supreme Court of Colombia
37
Resolution of Reunião Extraordinária de Ministros de Relações Exteriores e Defesa da Unasul , Quito,
Equador, 2009.
38
JOBIM, Nelson. Documento CDS p. 22
39
Colombia and Venezuela have restablished diplomatic relations in August 2010, after the inauguration
of Colombian new President, Juan Manuel Santos.
36
Such summits and meetings illustrate that, although the subject is mainly about
regional security and defense, the instruments for the discussions and agreements are
essentially diplomatic. Thus, knowledge and connections between defense and
diplomacy, also at the regional level, are indispensable. Regarding the formulation and
the actions of CDS, from a Brazilian perspective, we can observe a synergy between the
initiatives of defense and diplomacy. The CDS appears to be a relevant tool both for the
renewal of the defense as for diplomacy. Nelson Jobim highlights
the fruitful relationship in the field of CDS, including the Ministries of
Defense and Foreign Affairs. The creation of the Council, therefore,
gives substance to the course that has been being imposed on
Brazilian foreign policy, which not only transcends the references
confined to the realm of rhetoric, but materialized under the guise of
an enterprise which undoubtedly, will result in achievements that will
match the excellent results already achieved by the successful and
visible ongoing initiatives in the economics of South American
integration40.
Although CDS has been proposed by Brazil and it has great importance to
strategy of maintenance of order in South America, as well as to Brazilian international
policy. As it can be noted by the CDS documents and meetings, Brazil is a relevant
member, but not impositive. Brazilian agenda to South America was coincidental with
the shape that mechanisms of order –UNASUR and CDS – have taken. However, it
must also be considered that the Brazilian position involves the construction of an order
by the means of cooperation and consensus measures.
Conclusion
The importance of South America to Brazil is a notorious fact and it is
disseminated either by the Brazilian diplomacy or its defense. However, the Brazilian
initiatives for the region, regarding the South American ordering, were not linear. As we
noted, there was a change from the attitude of carrying out agreements on a bilateral
level to the position of the country in regional multilateral mechanisms. This change is
instigating and one of the reasons that led to the creation of new mechanisms of political
integration in South America, notably UNASUR and its South American Defense
Council. Thus, there is a direct influence of Brazilian foreign policy in the establishment
of regional mechanisms that contribute to the stability of regional order.
In this sense, it was observed that there is an important link between defense and
diplomacy in the construction of the Brazilian position about order and security in South
America. Even though defense and diplomacy are not always articulated, having even
differences between them, the discourse and practice of both areas came close to each
other. Rhetorically, diplomacy and defense converge on various principles such as
creating a zone of peace in South America, regional stability, development, and regional
cooperation. Nevertheless, regarding practice, only recently were established and
consolidated institutional bureaucracies as well as strategies plans, particularly within
the defense, so there was not a comparable means between diplomacy and defense.
Only with the creation of domestic mechanism of dialogue, there was an agreement
between diplomacy and defense on the prospect of higher returns and possibilities of
40
MOREIRA, Angela. CONSEJO SUDAMERICANO DE DEFENSA_ HACIA UNA INTEGRACION
REGIONAL EN DEFENSA Available at: http://www.resdal.org/jovenes/investigacion-consejo-angelamoreira.pdf
Brazilian projection at the regional level than in the hemispheric level. That fact
explains the large investment of diplomacy, and, similarly, the defense in initiatives of
regional integration, both economic and political. It may be worth to consider of
whether the defense has such a stance by its own initiative, that means, from its own
calculations of cost-benefit, or whether the defense prospect was only an element of the
foreign policy.
The fact is that Brazil has taken initiatives to draw up proposals to build and
maintain order in South America. As mentioned, the Brazilian proposals have been
partially realized, and they have been shaped by Brazilian suggestion of decisionmaking consensus in multilateral arrangements. It was evaluated before that the change
in bilateral for multilateral arrangements was a strategy utilized by Brazil to increase his
political capital in the region. It is reasonably to admit that this assessment has a great
weight in the Brazilian decision However, multilateral arrangements, even if they are
reached by consensus, are more common in schemes of multipolarity which do not
configure South American reality.
In the case of South America, Brazil is currently the state with the highest
material and political capacity in the region, so it would be expected that the country
preserve bilateral initiatives due to maintenance of order. Thus, the country would have
a greater possibility of applying its perspective. Therefore, this assessment suggests that
the change in Brazilian attitude to the region had taken into account two other variables:
the U.S. presence in the region and Brazilian prospect in building a democratic order.
Thus, Brazil has a realist and an idealist variable, respectively, in its decision-making
process. The Brazilian proposal for the creation of regional institutions is a way to
counterbalance the U.S. presence in the region and its influence in political affairs in
South America. It is manifest that Brazil would take up, at least partially, the vacuum
left by the exit of U.S. presence. Partially because Brazil has presented, as official
declaration, its interest, especially in the international multilateral spheres, in
democratization of international relations and in a larger representation of countries in
the different international organizations.
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