Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2010, Vol. 98, No. 5, 761–774
© 2010 American Psychological Association
0022-3514/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017879
Now You See It, Now You Don’t:
Interests, Issues, and Psychological Distance in Integrative Negotiation
Mauro Giacomantonio
Carsten K. W. De Dreu
University of Rome “Sapienza”
University of Amsterdam
Lucia Mannetti
University of Rome “Sapienza”
Negotiators are often advised to seek win–win agreements by focusing on interests (primary features)
rather than issues (secondary features), but whether such advice is valid remains to be seen. Consistent
with construal level theory (Y. Trope & N. Liberman, 2003), Experiments 1 and 2 show that negotiators
focus on secondary features (issues) more than on primary features (interests) when psychological
distance is low rather than high, and concomitant construal level is local and specific rather than global
and abstract. Experiment 3 showed that high construal level promoted problem-solving behavior and
therefore facilitated the achievement of win–win agreement, but only when integrative potential resided
in underlying interests; when integrative potential resided in the issues, low construal level negotiators
achieved higher joint outcomes. Thus, both low- and high-construal negotiators may achieve win–win
agreements when such agreements require trade-offs at the level of issues, or at the level of underlying
interests, respectively.
Keywords: construal level, underlying interests, negotiation
uncover this so-called integrative potential and achieve such desirable “win–win” solutions (for reviews, see, e.g., Bazerman,
Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De
Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). Much of this work
relates to an equally impressive volume of practitioner-oriented
writings that offer exceedingly long lists of advice to further
integrative agreement in either the business environment, in sociopolitical conflicts, or in diplomacy and trade negotiations (e.g.,
Fisher & Ury, 1981; Kelman, 2006; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton
& McKersie, 1965). In both these literatures, a recurrent theme is
that to design integrative solutions, negotiators should explore and
consider interests underlying issues (i.e., focus on reputation and
security rather than on a contested portion of the Sinai Peninsula;
Fisher & Ury, 1981; Rubin et al., 1994).
Despite the common advice to explore and consider underlying
interests, however, researchers know quite little about the psychological mechanisms that drive individuals toward or away from a
focus on the issues versus interests—what is it that helps negotiators to orient their focus on underlying interests; why is it that
issues are prominently considered yet interests ignored; when do
negotiators look beyond the immediate and salient intrinsic issues
value (e.g., commercial value) that are exchanged and instead
consider the deeper underlying interests these issues putatively
serve? The present research was designed to answer these questions. We invoke insights from construal level theory (CLT; Trope
& Liberman, 2003) and propose that issues operate as secondary
features in a negotiation situation that attract attention especially
under a local construal level, when parties focus on the trees rather
than the forest. Interests, in contrast, operate as primary features in
a negotiation situation and attract attention especially under a
global construal level. This proposition is the focus of the first two
To strike deals or to solve social conflict, individuals often
resort to negotiation. Successful negotiation yielding mutually
acceptable agreements may promote order and stability, increases
feelings of self-efficacy, reduces the probability of future conflict,
and stimulates economic prosperity (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).
These potentially positive consequences are particularly likely
when agreements are integrative, so that both parties achieve their
aspirations to a greater extent than they would have through a
simple fifty–fifty compromise. Consider, for example, the conflict
in the mid-1970s between Egypt and Israel about the Israeli
occupation of the Sinai Desert. Assisted by President Carter of the
United States, President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin
of Israel were able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement:
Instead of continuing to fight about how to divide the Sinai, parties
addressed their respective underlying needs by returning the desert
to its historical owner, Egypt, while simultaneously demilitarizing
the area to provide Israel with its need for security (Fisher & Ury,
1981).
Partly inspired by this and similar examples, a large volume of
research has considered the conditions under which individuals
Mauro Giacomantonio and Lucia Mannetti, Department of Social and
Developmental Psychology, University “Sapienza” of Rome, Rome, Italy;
Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
We thank Luigi Leone for comments on an earlier version of the
manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mauro
Giacomantonio, Dipartimento di Psicologia dei Processi di Sviluppo
e Socializzazione, Università di Roma “Sapienza”, Via dei Marsi 78,
00185, Rome, Italy. E-mail: mauro.giacomantonio@uniroma1.it
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GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
studies reported herein. In the third study, we examined the implication that when integrative potential resides at the level of
underlying interests, a global construal level with its concomitant
focus on primary features such as interests leads to more integrative agreements; when integrative potential resides at the level of
issues, a local construal level with its concomitant focus on secondary features, including issues, may promote integrative agreements more.
Issues and Interests in Negotiation
Negotiations often involve one or more issues and one or more
needs or concerns. People negotiate a higher salary (the issue) to
satisfy their need for status (the underlying interest), and as buyers
they try to bring down the price of the apartment (the issue) so they
can afford a comfortable life and look good in the eyes of their
friends (underlying interests). As these examples show, one single
issue may serve one particular underlying interest (salary ⫽ status), or it may serve several underlying interests (lower price ⫽
comfortable life ⫹ looking good). Likewise, it is conceivable that
several issues all derive from the same underlying need or that
several issues derive from several different underlying needs. For
example, a divorcing couple may negotiate the allotment of a fancy
bike and an mp3 player. Each party may want both issues but for
different reasons—the wife wants the bike because it reminds her
of those good old days, whereas to the husband the bike is a vital
means of transportation; and whereas the wife wants the mp3
player because the music helps her relax, the husband wants it
because otherwise his former wife gets something she wants.
The distinction between issues and interests yields two important insights. First, issues often have an attached value to which
parties can agree—monetary worth, for example. Both the mp3
player and the fancy bike can be expressed in monetary terms, and
doing so might make it easier to negotiate a deal that satisfies both
parties (e.g., split the difference instead of having to haggle about
who gets the expensive bike and who gets the less expensive mp3
player). This reasoning does not apply to needs and interests—
rarely do parties agree on (or even think about) the monetary value
of needs and interests. Needs and interests are “just there,” and
some are more important than others. Sometimes parties seek to
fulfill the same needs and interests (e.g., security, status); sometimes they are after quite different needs and interests (e.g., transportation and revenge vs. good memories and relaxation).
The second insight is that whereas issues may be used to fulfill
needs and interests, the reverse is not true. Issues can be transformed into monetary value, which can subsequently be used to
satisfy specific needs and interests—the bike and the mp3 player
may be sold at market value, the profit equally split among
divorcees, with the wife using her share to buy an mp3 player, and
the husband using his share to buy a bike. Obviously, the reverse
does not work—the need for transportation cannot be used to
acquire a bike, nor can a need for relaxation be sold at market
value to finance an mp3 player. Put differently, although the
importance of an issue depends also on the interest it serves (the
mp3 player is more important for a person interested in music),
the importance of an interest does not depend on the issues present
in the negotiation. As such, interests drive the prioritization of
issues, but issues do not drive the prioritization of interests; inter-
ests constitute superordinate, primary features of a negotiation,
whereas issues are subordinate, secondary features.
The two insights together imply that negotiators may not only
distribute but also create (or destroy) value. Returning to the
divorcing couple, the bike is worth more than the mp3 player (in
economic terms), but given what they represent to both parties,
value differences emerge. Whereas the husband may have no other
means of transportation than the bike, the wife may satisfy her
memories through other means than by looking at the bike—the
bike is subjectively more valuable to the husband than to the wife.
Likewise, the wife cannot easily get her music and concomitant
relaxation elsewhere, whereas the husband may mellow down a bit
or find other ways to get back at his former wife—to him, the mp3
player represents less subjective value than to her. Now, when
husband and wife focus on their needs and interests, they may
uncover creative agreements, like the one in which he gets the bike
and she the mp3 player. Deals that integrate and reconcile underlying interests are usually of higher quality and more satisfying
than deals in which parties split the (economic value) difference on
both issues.
Because a focus on underlying interests rather than on overt
issues is so helpful in crafting high-quality agreements, negotiation
research and advice often is about ways to bring out underlying
interests, to find ways to reconcile interests rather than divide
issues, and so on. As mentioned, researchers know relatively little
about the psychological mechanisms that drive people to focus on
either issues or interests, and we suspect that construal level is one
such critical mechanism. This we elaborate on in the next section.
CLT
According to CLT (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Trope,
& Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003), the psychological
distance from an object or event influences the way information
about that object or event is construed and, consequently, how that
object or event is judged and evaluated. Psychological distance can
be rooted in temporal distance (far or close in the future or past),
spatial distance (far or close in space), social distance (outgroup
vs. ingroup membership; strangers vs. friends), and hypotheticality
(hypothetical vs. real). In theory, all four forms of distance influence mental functioning.
When an object or event is psychologically distant (e.g., in
another geographical continent), it cannot be experienced directly,
and the lack of available information leads to high construal. The
mental representation of the object is abstract, simple, and decontextualized. The emerging representation is similar to a schema
that extracts the gist and organizes the knowledge integrating
different aspects of the object or event around simple and general
elements— one focuses on the forest rather than on the trees
(Schul, 1983; Smith & Trope, 2006). But when an object or event
is psychologically close (e.g., in the short-term future), it can be
experienced more directly, and contextual and specific information
is available. A more detailed, less schematic, and more contextualized representation is formed— one focuses on the trees rather
than on the forest (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004). Thus,
reading a book can be construed at an abstract level and in terms
of a superordinate goal (e.g., gaining knowledge), or at a more
concrete level and, in terms of subordinate means, implied in the
action (e.g., following printed lines; Liberman & Trope, 1998;
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Or, applied to the present context,
negotiation can be construed at an abstract level and in terms of a
superordinate goal (e.g., meeting fundamental needs), or at a more
concrete level and, in terms of subordinate means, implied in the
action (e.g., exchanging demands and concessions on particular
issues).
The level of construal has important consequences for cognitive,
motivational, and behavioral tendencies. When primed with a
distant future, people categorize a set of items in a small number
of broad categories; when primed with a near future, the same set
of items is categorized in a large number of small categories
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). Förster et al. (2004)
showed that temporal distance boosts creative performance, and
Förster (2009) uncovered that people with high construal focus on
similarities rather than on dissimilarities, whereas individuals with
low construal tend toward the reverse.
One particularly interesting feature of psychological distance
that has received extensive attention is that it influences the relative weight of superordinate goals versus subordinate means
(Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2000).
Put differently, psychological distance determines whether the emphasis is on primary features (the forest; learning new knowledge;
fundamental needs) or on secondary features (the trees; following
print lines; issues in a negotiation). For example, Sagristano et al.
(2002) showed that participants with a high level of construal
preferred a gamble with a high payoff and low probability,
whereas participants with a low construal level preferred gambles
with a low payoff and high probability. These different preferences
were due to the fact that probability is subordinate to payoff in
choosing a gamble. Similarly, because cons are subordinate to pros
in considering an action, participants generated more pro arguments than con arguments toward an activity planned in the distant
future. The reverse was shown for an activity planned in the near
future (Eyal, Liberman, Trope, & Walther, 2004; see also Fujita,
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006).
Psychological Distance in Negotiation
Psychological distance and concomitant construal levels may
influence negotiation because of its influence on whether primary
or secondary features of the negotiation are attended to. As explained, needs and interests represent superordinate, primary features in negotiation, and issues represent subordinate, secondary
features. Following CLT, negotiators with high construal levels
should focus on primary features and are directed toward underlying interests more than negotiators with low construal levels.
Conversely, those with low construal levels should focus on secondary features of the negotiation and are directed toward specific
demands and issues more than those with high construal levels.
When the negotiation task is structured so that underlying interests
can be integrated, high-construal level negotiators should be more
likely to uncover this integrative potential and, all other things
being equal, more likely to achieve mutually beneficial, integrative
agreements.
There is some initial support for this general idea. Henderson,
Trope, and Carnevale (2006) conducted a series of studies showing
that high temporal distance promoted a more global and structured
approach toward the negotiation. High temporal distance led to an
increased preference for simultaneous issue consideration, whereas
763
a piecemeal, fragmented approach to issues was preferred in the
low-temporal distance condition. This “package deal” approach in
the temporally distant condition fostered integrative agreements
more than the “sequential deal” approach in the temporally near
condition (e.g., Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). However, although not inconsistent with the idea that psychological distance
orients toward primary features of the negotiation, a viable alternative explanation for the results obtained by Henderson and
colleagues is that temporal distance in their studies fostered a
cooperative mind-set and concomitant prosocial motivation. Indeed, there is evidence that psychological distance co-varies with
a less competitive and more cooperative motivational orientation
(De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008) and that a cooperative approach fosters
“package deal” negotiation and integrative agreements (De Dreu,
Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Weingart et al., 1993).
Overview of the Present Study
To further understanding of the psychological processes that
orient negotiators to focus on interests versus issues, and to provide a test of CLT that high psychological distance promotes
abstract construal and a focus on primary rather than on secondary
features, we conducted three experiments. In the first two experiments, we tested the proposition that under high (low) psychological distance, negotiators focus on interests (issues) when making judgments and decisions about their negotiation. In Experiment
1, we examined fixed-pie perceptions—the tendency for negotiators to assume own and other’s interests to be diametrically opposed (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). We created a negotiation task
in which a focus on issues would confirm such a fixed-pie perception, but a focus on underlying interests would lead people to
uncover their fixed-pie perception to be erroneous. We measured
fixed-pie perceptions prior to the negotiation and then again after
participants had received information about their counterpart’s
issue chart (or not, in the control condition). We predicted stronger
revisions of fixed-pie perceptions when negotiators had a high
rather than a low level of construal. In Experiment 2, we tested
whether construal level influences the willingness to accept an
interest-based offer as opposed to an issue-based offer. Offers were
created so that they would be especially attractive when evaluated
in terms of underlying interests or, alternatively, in terms of
specific issues. We predicted greater satisfaction with, and willingness to accept, an interest-based offer under high rather than
low construal level, and greater satisfaction with and willingness to
accept an issue-based offer under low rather than high construal
level. In Experiment 3, we engaged participants in actual face-toface negotiation to further our understanding of the behavioral
implications of psychological distance and its concomitant focus
on primary versus secondary features of the negotiation. This
experiment is introduced in detail after we have reported Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1
Method
Design and participants. The design was a 2 ⫻ 2 factorial,
with construal level (high vs. low) and information about other’s
underlying interests (present vs. absent) as between-subjects vari-
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GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
ables. The main dependent variable was the (fixed-pie) perception
of underlying interests before and after the manipulation of information about the counterpart. Eighty-one students of the University of Rome “Sapienza” participated on a voluntary basis and
were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.
Negotiation task. An adapted version of the task developed
by Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) was used. It is explicitly
designed to distinguish between preferences for underlying interests and preferences for negotiation issues. Participants in this task
negotiate in dyads, with one party being in the role of recruiter and
the other in the role of candidate. In the present study, participants
were tested individually, and all participants were in the role of the
candidate.
As can be seen in the top half of Table 1, there were eight issues
to be negotiated: (a) annual salary, (b) location where the candidate
will work, (c) annual raise, (d) moving expenses, (e) percentage of
health insurance coverage, (f) job assignment, (g) weeks of vacation per year, (h) department destination. Three possible agreements were available for each issue (e.g., rate of annual raise: 6%,
9%, 12%), and each agreement option had a value to the participant ranging from 0 to 60 points (annual raise, moving expenses,
vacation and department destination) or from 0 to 120 points
(salary, location, health insurance, job assignment). Furthermore,
participants read that these eight issues were grouped into four
superordinate categories representing their underlying interests.
Vacation and health insurance grouped into the category benefit;
salary and annual raise grouped into the category money; location
and moving expenses grouped into the category moving costs; and
job assignment and department destination grouped into the category job type. Participants were told that “money” was the most
important category to them (4 points), followed by “moving costs”
(3 points), “benefit” (2 points), and “job type” (1 point). Thus, the
overall value of an agreement was calculated by multiplying the
points obtained on a specific issue, with the points associated with
the category to which that issue belonged (e.g., an agreement of
60% of health insurance had the overall value of [60 ⫻ 2] ⫽ 120
points). To explain how to compute the overall outcome of an
agreement, participants were provided with examples of the worst
and the best agreement they could get. For instance, their best
outcome was (120 ⫻ 4) ⫹ (120 ⫻ 3) ⫹ (60 ⫻ 4) ⫹ (60 ⫻ 3) ⫹
(120 ⫻ 2) ⫹ (120 ⫻ 1) ⫹ (60 ⫻ 2) ⫹ (60 ⫻ 1) ⫽ 1,800 points.1
In contrast to previous tasks used to study integrative negotiation (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; for a discussion, see De Dreu &
Carnevale, 2003), which clearly specified preferences across issues, the present task was intentionally designed so that negotiators
could attribute preferences to each issue according to three different interpretations. First, a person could just focus on the interest
values. As can be seen in Table 1, annual raise serves a more
valuable underlying interest than location (4 vs. 3), thus resulting
in an increased priority. Alternatively, however, a person could
focus on the intrinsic value of the issue. In this case, location
appears twice as valuable as annual raise (120 vs. 60). Third, a
person could consider the joint function of the two sources of
value. In this case, the person should prefer the location (360)
versus annual raise (240). Put differently, the attractiveness of an
issue derives independently from the intrinsic value of the issue
itself, and the underlying interest it serves. This feature makes the
task particularly suitable to test whether negotiators place more
emphasis on interests or issues— different emphasis placed on
issues or interests produce different perceptions of the task, which
should lead to different behaviors (we return to this especially in
Experiments 2 and 3).
Procedure and manipulation of independent variables.
The procedure closely followed the one used by De Dreu, Koole,
and Steinel (2000, Experiment 2). Upon arrival in the laboratory,
participants received a booklet containing instructions regarding
the negotiation task, background information, and the task intended to manipulate construal level.
Construal level was manipulated using a procedure similar to
the one used by Liberman et al. (2002; see also Förster et al.,
2004). Participants were asked to write down 10 activities or
events in which they could have been involved in the near future
(Monday next week) or in the distant future (Monday next year).
Initial work in our laboratory has shown that this manipulation
induces a narrow versus a more global construal level and influences negotiation processes and outcomes in a task similar to the
one used here (De Dreu, Giacomantonio, Shalvi, & Sligte, 2009).
Upon completion of the construal level manipulation, participants filled out the Time 1 measure of fixed-pie perception. This
Time 1 measure served as a baseline to verify that in the absence
of any information, construal level does not influence fixed-pie
perceptions.
Following the baseline assessment, information availability was
manipulated by providing half the participants with a chart containing information on their counterpart’s payoff on both issues
and underlying interests. The counterpart’s issue chart (see Table
1, bottom half) was structured so that integrative potential exclusively resided at the underlying interests. As can be seen in Table
1, the candidate (the participant; top chart) and his or her recruiter
(bottom chart) had perfectly opposed preferences on the issues but
differed in the underlying interests—whereas participants valued
“money” most and “job type” least, the recruiter valued “money”
least and “job type” most. In other words, participants would be
confirmed in their fixed-pie assumption when they either did not
receive or process information on their counterpart or focused on
issues only. They would revise their initial fixed-pie perception
only when they would receive information on their counterpart and
process the information on underlying interests rather than issues.
Participants in the information availability condition were allowed to study this chart for 2 min, after which it was taken away
and replaced by a 5-min filler task unrelated to the present experiment. In the no-information condition, participants were not
1
It might be helpful to note that in designing this task, we were inspired
by the logic used in classical tasks adopted to study lay decisions under
uncertainty. Imagine, for example, a person asked to express his or her
preference about one of the following bets: (a) p ⫽ .3 to get an outcome of
€100 with p ⫽ .7 to get €0; (2) p ⫽ .4 to get €50 with p ⫽ .6 to get €0. If
we assume that probability and payoffs do not always combine multiplicatively in the perception of the lay decision maker, and therefore, under
certain conditions, these parameters have asymmetric weight in determining the attractiveness of gambles (Sagristano et al. 2002), then a person
could rely (mainly) on probability in making a choice. In this case, the
second bet will be the most likely to be chosen ( p ⫽ .4 vs. p ⫽ .3 to get
something). In contrast, a person could based the choice on the payoff, thus
assigning greater value to the first bet (€100 vs. €50). Finally, a person
could base the choice on the expected value (EV). In this case, the first bet
is the most opportune (EV ⫽ 30 vs. 20).
80% (10)
60% (60)
40% (120)
100% (00)
80% (30)
60% (60)
12% (00)
9% (30)
6% (60)
Torino (10)
Milano (60)
Genova (120)
30.000 (10)
28.000 (60)
26.000 (120)
Note. Assign. ⫽ Assignment; Dep. ⫽ Department. Numbers in parentheses refer to points earned by the participant on issues. To obtain the overall value earned, these points should be multiplied
by the interests’ values.
(very low)
(low)
(high)
(very high)
Money
Moving
Benefit
Job type
Dep. A (00)
Dep. B (30)
Dep. C (60)
5 weeks (00)
4 weeks (30)
3 weeks (60)
Department
destination
Vacation
Job assignment
Health
insurance
Location
Annual
salary
Annual
raise
Moving
expenses
Assign. A (10)
Assign. B (60)
Assign. C (120)
Issues
Category
Recruiter interests charts
Recruiter issue charts
Salary, Annual Raise
Location, Moving Expenses
Vacation, Health Insurance
Job Assign., Dep. Destination
1
2
3
4
Value
(very high)
(high)
(low)
(very low)
Salary, Annual Raise
Location, Moving Expenses
Vacation, Health Insurance
Job Assign., Dep. Destination
Money
Moving
Benefit
Job type
Dep. A (60)
Dep. B (30)
Dep. C (00)
5 weeks (60)
4 weeks (30)
3 weeks (00)
80% (120)
60% (60)
40% (10)
Torino (120)
Milano (60)
Genova (10)
30.000 (120)
28.000 (60)
26.000 (10)
12% (60)
9% (30)
6% (00)
100% (60)
80% (30)
60% (00)
Assign. A (120)
Assign. B (60)
Assign. C (10)
Issues
Vacation
Job
assignment
Health
insurance
Moving
expenses
Annual
raise
Location
Annual
salary
Candidate issue charts
Table 1
Issue and Interests Charts for the Candidate (Participant’s Role) and Recruiter (Experiment 1)
Department
destination
Category
Candidate interests charts
4
3
2
1
Value
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
765
shown any information about their counterpart’s issue chart, and
after the Time 1 measure of fixed-pie perceptions, he or she
proceeded immediately with the filler task. In both conditions,
after the filler task, participants were asked to complete the Time
2 fixed-pie measure and also answered several questions (see the
Dependent variables section). They were then thanked and fully
debriefed.
Dependent variables. Fixed-pie perceptions were measured
before and after the presentation of the counterpart’s payoff chart,
using the same procedure used earlier by De Dreu et al. (2000; see
also Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Both times participants were
given an empty chart regarding the counterpart’s underlying interests and were asked to fill in the points and weights they thought
their counterpart had been given. Fixed-pie perceptions were calculated by summing the absolute difference between the rank order
attributed to the partner and the participant’s own underlying
interests. If the participant attributed to the counterpart exactly the
same ranking he or she had, then the score would be 0 (i.e.,
[4 ⫺ 4] ⫹ [3 ⫺ 3] ⫹ [2 ⫺ 2] ⫹ [1 ⫺ 1] ⫽ 0), thus reflecting a
perfect fixed-pie perception. In contrast, if participants had a
perfectly accurate perception (i.e., understood the integrative
potential in the task), then their score would be 8 (i.e., [4 ⫺ 1] ⫹
[3 ⫺ 2] ⫹ [2 ⫺ 3] ⫹ [1 ⫺ 4] ⫽ 8). Note that a high score of 8
could also be achieved when perceptions are not perfectly accurate
(e.g., [4 ⫺ 2] ⫹ [3 ⫺ 1] ⫹ [2 ⫺ 4] ⫹ [1 ⫺ 3] ⫽ 8). Therefore,
before summing, absolute differences were squared so that more
weight was assigned to higher absolute differences that are more
indicative of integrative perception. Put differently, a lower score is
indicative of a fixed-pie perception; a higher score is indicative of an
accurate (integrative potential) understanding of the task.
To check the adequacy of the construal level manipulation,
participants were asked to rate the events, actions, or feelings they
experienced during the manipulation task using four semantic
differential items on scales ranging from 1 to 7 (Burrus & Roese,
2006): (a) important–not important, (b) high priority–low priority,
(c) central in life–secondary in life, (d) long-term goal–short-term
goal. Ratings were averaged (␣ ⫽ .68), and lower (higher) scores
indicate a lower (higher) level of construal. Finally, participants
were asked how difficult it was to complete the perception measures with one item: “How difficult was it to fill in the empty
charts?” (ranging from 1 [not at all] to 6 [extremely]).
Results and Discussion
Manipulations checks. A 2 ⫻ 2 analysis of variance
(ANOVA; Construal Level ⫻ Information) showed that the highconstrual condition produced higher ratings on the manipulation
check scale (M ⫽ 4.9) than the low-construal condition (M ⫽ 4.3),
F(1, 77) ⫽ 4.31, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .04. No other effects were
significant. Two 2 ⫻ 2 ANOVAs on the self-reported difficulty in
filling the fixed pie at Time 1 and Time 2 revealed no effects (all
Fs ⬍ 1).
Fixed-pie perceptions. We submitted fixed-pie perceptions
assessed at Time 1 and Time 2 to a 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2 (Construal Level ⫻
Information ⫻ Time of Measurement) ANOVA, with construal
level and information as between-subjects factors and time of
measurement as a within-subjects factor. Results revealed a main
effect for time of measurement, F(1, 77) ⫽ 34.62, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽
.31; an interaction between time and construal level, F(1, 77) ⫽
GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
766
5.91, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .07; and an interaction between time and
information, F(1, 77) ⫽ 30.52, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .28. These effects
were all qualified by the predicted three-way interaction among
time, construal level, and information, F(1, 77) ⫽ 5.86, p ⬍ .05,
␩2 ⫽ .07. Figure 1 shows that in the no-information condition,
construal level had no effects on perceptual accuracy at Time 1 or
at Time 2. In the information available condition, participants were
more accurate at Time 2 than at Time 1, but this effect was
considerably stronger in the high-construal level condition, F(1,
77) ⫽ 72.2, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .48, than in the low-construal level
condition, F(1, 77) ⫽ 9.61, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .11. As a result,
participants in the high-construal level condition were more accurate at Time 2 than those in the low-construal level condition, F(1,
77) ⫽ 3.77, p ⬍ .06 (approached significance).
earlier findings and showed that negotiators provided with information about their counterpart’s preferences revised their fixed-pie
perceptions and became more accurate than those not provided
with such information. More important, however, we found that
participants with a high construal level benefitted more from the
information provided than those with a low construal level. That is,
after information had been given to them, participants became
more accurate especially when they had a high rather than a low
construal level.
Although findings thus far are consistent with our general predictions, they tell only half of the story. Whereas we showed that
low-construal level participants were less concerned about underlying interests than high-construal level participants, this does not
necessarily mean that low-construal level participants are more
concerned about low-level features of the situation such as negotiation issues. To examine this, in Experiment 2, we investigated
the extent to which participants were willing to accept an offer that
met their preferences on underlying interests (henceforth, interestbased offer) or, in the other condition, met preferences on issues
(henceforth, issue-based offer). We ensured that the objective
value of both offers was the same, but among those focusing on
Experiment 2
Providing negotiators with information about their counterpart’s
preferences and priorities has been shown to increase perceptual
accuracy (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2000) and facilitates the development of integrative, mutually beneficial agreements (e.g., Thompson, 1991). The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with these
Information Available
18
Accuracy
16
14
High Construal
Level
12
10
8
Low Construal
Level
6
4
2
0
Time 1
Time 2
Fixed Pie Measure
No Information Available
18
Accuracy
16
14
High Construal
Level
12
10
8
Low Construal
Level
6
4
2
0
Time 1
Time 2
Fixed Pie Measure
Figure 1. Perceived accuracy of the counterpart’s preferences on underlying interests as a function of time of
measurement, information, and construal level in Experiment 1.
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
1 (low)
2 (medium)
3 (high)
Salary, Annual Raise
Location
Vacation, Insurance
The issue-based offer (top half of the table) and the interest-based offer (bottom half of the table) appear in boldface type.
Note.
5.000 (60)
4.000 (45)
3.000 (30)
2.000 (15)
1.000 (00)
3 weeks (60)
2.5 weeks (45)
2 weeks (30)
1.5 weeks (15)
1 week (00)
30.000 (120)
28.000 (90)
26.000 (60)
24.000 (30)
22.000 (00)
15% (60)
12% (45)
9% (30)
6% (15)
3% (00)
100% (120)
80% (90)
60% (60)
40% (30)
20% (00)
Interest-based offer
Roma (80)
Milano (60)
Napoli (40)
Torino (20)
Bolzano (00)
Money
Destination
Benefit
1 (low)
2 (medium)
3 (high)
Salary, Annual Raise
Location
Vacation, Insurance
Money
Destination
Benefit
5.000 (60)
4.000 (45)
3.000 (30)
2.000 (15)
1.000 (00)
Issue-based offer
Roma (80)
Milano (60)
Napoli (40)
Torino (20)
Bolzano (00)
100% (120)
80% (90)
60% (60)
40% (30)
20% (00)
3 weeks (60)
2.5 weeks (45)
2 weeks (30)
1.5 weeks (15)
1 week (00)
30.000 (120)
28.000 (90)
26.000 (60)
24.000 (30)
22.000 (00)
15% (60)
12% (45)
9% (30)
6% (15)
3% (00)
Category
Merit bonus
Location
Insurance
Annual raise
Vacation
Salary
Candidate issue charts
Table 2
Issue and Interest Charts for the Candidate (Participant’s Role) in Experiment 2
Design and participants. The design was a 2 ⫻ 3 factorial,
with offer (interest based vs. issue based) and construal level (high
vs. low vs. control) as between-subjects factors (the no-construal
level control condition was added to explore default construal level
among negotiators). The main dependent variable was the participant’s satisfaction with the offer. Ninety-four students at the
University “Sapienza” of Rome participated in the experiment and
were assigned randomly to experimental conditions.
Task, procedure, and manipulation of independent variables. The procedure, the task structure, and the manipulation of
construal level were identical to that of Experiment 1, except that
there were five rather than three levels of agreement per issue and
six rather than eight issues. This enabled the manipulation of the
offer. Specifically, participants received the opening offer of their
recruiter (who was presumably sitting in one of the other cubicles
in the laboratory), and they were asked to indicate their willingness
to accept or reject it. In the interest-based offer condition, the
proposal maximized the value to the candidate on the issues
belonging to the most important underlying interest (benefit).
More specifically, the offer provided an outcome higher than
compromise on vacation and insurance. At the same time, participants got a low value (below compromise) on the issues belonging
to the low-value interests (money, salary, annual raise, merit
bonus). They received a compromise offer with regard to the
destination issue (see Table 2).
In the issue-based offer condition, the proposal had an opposite
“shape” meant to maximize the value on the issues under money
(the least important underlying interest) and minimized the value
on the issues under benefit (the most important underlying interest). Specifically, the proposal provided an outcome above compromise for salary, annual raise, merit bonus, and below compromise for vacation and insurance. Like in the interest-based offer
condition, destination was characterized by a compromise offer.
Although the interest-based and the issue-based offers differed
in the extent to which they reflected underlying interests or issues,
both had the same overall value of 500 points: For the interestbased offer: ([45 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [90 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [40 ⫻ 2] ⫹ 15 ⫽ 500 points);
for the issue-based offer: (120 ⫹ [30 ⫻ 3] ⫹ 60 ⫹ [30 ⫻ 3] ⫹
[40 ⫻ 2] ⫹ 60 ⫽ 500 points). However, when participants considered only the value provided by the offer on issues without little
or no concern for underlying interests, the two offers looked very
different. In that case, the issue-based offer appears to be much
better (120 ⫹ 30 ⫹ 60 ⫹ 30 ⫹ 40 ⫹ 60 ⫽ 340 points) than the
interest-based offer (45 ⫹ 90 ⫹ 40 ⫹ 15 ⫽ 190 points). Conversely, if participants focus on interests rather than on issues, the
interest-based offer provided greater value (i.e., ([45 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [90 ⫻
3] ⫽ 405 points vs. [30 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [30 ⫻ 3] ⫽ 180 points on the most
valuable issues with reference to underlying interests).
Dependent variables. The main dependent variable was satisfaction with the offer, measured as in Henderson et al. (2006,
Study 2). Sample items include “How unsatisfied/satisfied would
you be with this proposal (ranging from 1 [very unsatisfied] to 6
Candidate interest charts
Method
Issues
Value
interests (presumably in the high-construal level condition), the
interest-based offer should appear more attractive, whereas to
those focusing on issues (presumably in the low-construal level
condition), the issue-based offer should appear more attractive.
767
GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
768
[very satisfied]) and “How unlikely/likely would you be to reject
this proposal?” (ranging from 1 [very unlikely] to 6 [very likely]).
Ratings were averaged (␣ ⫽ .80).
The manipulation check of the construal level manipulation was
the same as in Experiment 1 (␣ ⫽ .73). The control group did not
do any task, and, consequently, participants in this condition did
not fill out the manipulation check. To check the adequacy of the
offer manipulation, participants were asked to rate “how coherent
was your partner’s proposal with your underlying interests
(money, benefit, location)?” (1 ⫽ totally incoherent, 6 ⫽ totally
coherent).
Results and Discussion
Manipulations checks and information-processing motivation. A 2 ⫻ 2 ANOVA (Construal Level ⫻ Type of Offer)
showed that the high-construal condition produced higher ratings
on the manipulation check scale than the low-construal condition
(M ⫽ 5.0 vs. M ⫽ 4.2), F(1, 60) ⫽ 4.54, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .07. No
other effects were significant.
A 3 ⫻ 2 ANOVA further showed that compared with participants in the issue-based offer condition, those in the interest-based
offer condition perceived the offer as more coherent with their
underlying interests (M ⫽ 4.0 vs. M ⫽ 3.3), F(1, 88) ⫽ 6.78, p ⬍
.01, ␩2 ⫽ .072. No effects involving construal level were significant.
Satisfaction with offer. A 3 ⫻ 2 ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction between construal level and type of offer, F(2,
87) ⫽ 7.33, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .14. Figure 2 shows that participants in
the high-construal condition preferred interest-based offers more
than issue-based offers, F(1, 87) ⫽ 7.31, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .078. The
opposite pattern emerged in the low-construal level condition, in
which the issue-based offer was preferred more than the interestbased offer, F(1, 87) ⫽ 6.93, p ⫽ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .074. In the control
condition, ratings of satisfaction did not change as a function of the
offer presented to participants (M ⫽ 3.80 vs. M ⫽ 3.48; F ⬍ 1).
Experiment 3
The first two experiments showed that negotiators focus on
issues when they have a low construal level and on underlying
interests when they have a high construal level. In Experiment 1,
this showed up in more adequate revisions of fixed-pie percep-
tions. In Experiment 2, this showed up in a stronger willingness to
accept an interest-based offer among high-construal level participants, versus a stronger willingness to accept an issue-based offer
among low-construal level participants. This finding is consistent
with our hypothesis that high-construal level negotiators focus on
interests and that low-construal level negotiators focus on issues.
Furthermore, this finding is difficult to explain in terms of higher
cooperative motivation among high-construal level negotiators
because higher cooperative motivation should have produced
greater satisfaction with and willingness to accept the counterpart’s offer regardless whether the offer is congruent with issues or
with interests.
The goal of Experiment 3 was twofold. First, we wanted to test
the implications of our findings in Experiments 1 and 2 for
dyadic-level performance. In Experiment 3, we engaged dyads in
an interpersonal negotiation structured along the lines of the task
used in Experiments 1 and 2. We manipulated construal level at the
dyadic level (i.e., bringing both parties under the same construal
level) and analyzed the quality of agreements dyads reached.
Second, although the findings of the second experiment were
difficult to explain in terms of enhanced cooperative motivation
under high rather than low construal level, we wanted to definitively rule out this alternative explanation and to provide more
direct evidence for our suspicion that negotiation parties focus on
interests (issues) when they have a high (low) construal level. We
achieved these goals by varying the level at which integrative
potential resides. In one condition, it resided at the level of underlying interests and not at the level of issues. In the other condition,
it resided at the level of issues and not at the level of underlying
interests. If effects thus far were due to enhanced cooperative
motivation among high-construal level negotiators, it should not
matter at which level integrative potential resides, and we should
only find a main effect of construal level on integrative agreements. But if our reasoning holds, high-construal level negotiators
focusing on underlying interests should engage in more problem
solving and achieve more integrative agreements when integrative
potential resides at the level of interests rather than issues; lowconstrual level negotiators, in contrast, should engage in more
problem solving and achieve more integrative agreements when
integrative potential resides at the level of issues rather than
interests.
Satisfaction with the Offer
Method
6
5
4
3
Interest-based Offer
2
Issue-based Offer
1
0
High
Low
Control
Construal Level
Figure 2. Satisfaction with the offer as a function of construal level and
type of offer in Experiment 2.
Design and participants. The design was a 2 ⫻ 2 factorial
design with construal level (high vs. low) and location of integrative potential (underlying interests vs. issues) as between-dyads
factors. The main dependent variable was joint outcome. One
hundred sixty four participants from the University of Rome
“Sapienza” were randomly assigned to dyads with the restriction
that they were not acquainted prior to the experiment. Dyads were
also randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions.
Task and procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants received a folder with the instructions for an upcoming
buyer–seller negotiation concerning the purchase of a car. The
following five issues were described to participants: (a) price; (b)
guarantee; (c) financing; (d) included accessories; (e) delivery
time. Similar to the previous experiments, participants were told
that the five issues were grouped into three superordinate under-
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
lying interests: (a) money (including price and financing); b)
timing (including delivery time); (c) facilities (including guarantee
and accessories). As in the previous studies, the overall value of an
agreement was given by a joint function of the agreement value on
a specific issue and the importance of the corresponding underlying interest. To enhance their understanding of the task, participants were provided with several examples of negotiation outcomes.
Independent variables. Construal level was manipulated by
asking participants, prior to the negotiation, to read a brief passage
explaining how to think increasingly abstractly (see Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004, and Fujita et al., 2006, for the full version
of the passage). Participants in the high-construal level condition
were asked to consider why they would maintain and improve their
health. After listing a reason, they were subsequently asked why
they would pursue this goal. In total, participants had to answer
four consecutive questions. A typical example of what participants
wrote was: “Why to improve and maintain health?” (Step 1) “To
look pretty”; (Step 2) “To improve my social life”; (Step 3) “To
get a partner”; (Step 4) “To be happy.”
In the low-construal level condition, participants first read the
brief passage about how to think increasingly concretely (see
Freitas et al., 2004, for the full version of the passage). Then they
were asked to consider how they would maintain and improve their
health. After listing a mean to reach this goal, they were asked to
write down how they would do it. In total, participants had to
answer four consecutive questions. A typical example of what
participants reported was: “How to improve and maintain health?”
(Step 1) “Avoiding junk food”; (Step 2) “Preparing my meal
myself”; (Step 3) “Cooking some pasta”; (Step 4) “Putting pasta in
the boiling water” (we tend to ignore culturally embedded beliefs
about what is and is not healthy food). Participants in the control
condition skipped this task, and they were involved in the negotiation just after the role instructions.
Location of integrative potential was manipulated so that in the
“integrative interests” condition, negotiators were provided with different rankings on underlying interests and diametrically opposed
preferences on issues (money was seller’s most important interest,
whereas facilities was buyer’s most important interest). Therefore, if
negotiators exclusively focused on issues rather than on underlying
interests, the task appeared as a zero-sum game because preferences about the five issues at the bargaining table were diametrically opposed. Consider, for example, the subjective value of an
agreement of €11.000 (about U.S. $16,000) on price (see Table 3).
This is a compromise agreement that, in case negotiators were not
concerned with underlying interests, provided a value of 90 points
for both parties. In case underlying interests were taken into
consideration, the same agreement was more valuable to the seller
(90 ⫻ 3 ⫽ 270 points) than to the buyer (90 ⫻ 1 ⫽ 90 points).
Each negotiator could reach an overall outcome between 190 and
950 ([150 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [50 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [50 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [150 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [75 ⫻ 2]).
A fully integrative agreement could be reached when the seller
gets his or her way on price as well as on interest (money), and
buyer gets his or her way on warrantee and optional (facilities)
while delivery was split: ([150 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [10 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [50 ⫻ 3] ⫹
[30 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [45 ⫻ 2]) ⫹ ([30 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [50 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [10 ⫻ 1] ⫹
[150 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [45 ⫻ 2] ⫽ 1,460).
In the “integrative issues” condition, participants were provided
with identical rankings on underlying interests, but preferences on
769
issues were asymmetrical (price and optional were seller’s most
important issues, whereas warrantee and interests were buyer’s
most important issues). In this case, if negotiators exclusively
focused on interests rather than on issues, the task appeared as a
zero-sum game because preferences about the three issues at the
bargaining table were diametrically opposed. Also in this condition, each negotiator could reach an overall outcome between 190
and 950. In contrast with the other condition, a fully integrative
agreement could be reached when the seller gets his or her way on
price and optional, and buyer gets his or her way on warrantee and
interest while delivery was split: ([150 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [10 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [10 ⫻
3] ⫹ [150 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [45 ⫻ 2]) ⫹ ([10 ⫻ 3] ⫹ [150 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [150 ⫻
3] ⫹ [10 ⫻ 1] ⫹ [45 ⫻ 2] ⫽ 1,460).
To sum up, in the integrative underlying interests condition,
high joint outcomes can be achieved by making concessions
mainly based on underlying interests. Conversely, in the integrative issues condition, high joint outcomes can be achieved by
yielding appropriately on issues with little or no regard for underlying interests.
Individuals did not receive their counterpart’s issue chart and
were told not to exchange these issue charts during the negotiation.
They were unaware of the integrative potential in the task, and
through negotiation and the exchange of information, they had to
uncover possibilities for trade-off and high joint gain (see De Dreu,
Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006, for a similar procedure).
Dependent variables. Joint outcome (the main dependent
variable) was obtained by summing the outcomes reached by the
candidate and the recruiter. As mentioned previously, a postnegotiation questionnaire (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, &
Nauta, 2001) was included to assess cooperative problem solving
with four items such as “I tried to find solutions that satisfy my
own and the other party’s interests” and “I emphasized that we had
to find a mutually optimal solution (1 ⫽ not at all, 6 ⫽ very much;
␣ ⫽ .76).
Results and Discussion
Impasses. Eighteen out of the 82 dyads did not reach an
agreement. The impasses were distributed as follows: two in the
high construal–integrative interests condition; six in the high construal level–integrative issues condition; nine in the low construal
level–integrative interests condition; one in the low construal
level–integrative issues condition. We performed a binomial logistic regression with construal level, location of integrative potential, and their interaction as predictors to test whether experimental conditions affected the distribution of impasses. In line
with our reasoning, the analysis only yielded a significant interaction between the independent variables (OR ⫽ .379, CI ⫽
.188 –.764, p ⬍ .01), indicating that dyads in the high construal–
integrative issues and in the low construal–integrative interests
conditions were more likely to impasse than the other dyads.
Joint outcomes. When computing a joint outcome index, impasses can be treated in several ways (for an elaborate discussion,
see, e.g., Pruitt, 1981). First, no-agreements dyads can be excluded
from the analyses, but this destroys randomization and the ability
to draw causal inferences. Second, a joint outcome equal to 0 could
be assigned to the no-agreements dyads, but this would create
substantial heterogeneity of variance with reduced statistical
power. Third, a value that does not create too much heterogeneity
GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
770
Table 3
Issue and Interest Charts for the Seller and the Buyer in Experiment 3
Seller issue charts
Price
Warrantee
Interest
Seller interest charts
Option included
Delivery
Category
Issues
Value
Money
Time
Facilities
Price, Interests
Delivery
Warrantee, Optional
3 (high)
2 (medium)
1 (low)
Integrative interests
12.000 (150)
11.500 (120)
11.000 (90)
10.500 (60)
10.000 (30)
6 months (50)
12 months (40)
18 months (30)
24 months (20)
30 months (10)
10% (50)
8% (40)
6% (30)
4% (20)
2% (10)
1 (150)
2 (120)
3 (90)
4 (60)
5 (30)
5
4
3
2
1
weeks (75)
weeks (60)
weeks (45)
weeks (30)
week (15)
Buyer issue charts
Buyer interest charts
Price
Warrantee
Interest
Option included
12.000 (30)
11.500 (60)
11.000 (90)
10.500 (120)
10.000 (150)
6 months (10)
12 months (20)
18 months (30)
24 months (40)
30 months (50)
10% (10)
8% (20)
6% (30)
4% (40)
2% (50)
1 (30)
2 (60)
3 (90)
4 (120)
5 (150)
5
4
3
2
1
Delivery
Category
Issues
Value
weeks (15)
weeks (30)
weeks (45)
weeks (60)
week (75)
Money
Time
Facilities
Price, Interests
Delivery
Warrantee, Optional
1 (low)
2 (medium)
3 (high)
Integrative issues
Seller issue charts
Seller interest charts
Price
Warrantee
Interest
Option included
12.000 (150)
11.500 (120)
11.000 (90)
10.500 (60)
10.000 (30)
6 months (50)
12 months (40)
18 months (30)
24 months (20)
30 months (10)
10% (50)
8% (40)
6% (30)
4% (20)
2% (10)
1 (150)
2 (120)
3 (90)
4 (60)
5 (30)
5
4
3
2
1
Delivery
Category
Issues
Value
weeks (75)
weeks (60)
weeks (45)
weeks (30)
week (15)
Money
Time
Facilities
Price, Interests
Delivery
Warrantee, Optional
3 (high)
2 (medium)
1 (low)
Buyer issue charts
Buyer interest charts
Price
Warrantee
Interest
Option included
12.000 (10)
11.500 (20)
11.000 (30)
10.500 (40)
10.000 (50)
6 months (30)
12 months (60)
18 months (90)
24 months (120)
30 months (150)
10% (30)
8% (60)
6% (90)
4% (120)
2% (150)
1 (10)
2 (20)
3 (30)
4 (40)
5 (50)
of variance yet reflects a suboptimal performance could be assigned when an impasse is reached. This third option is commonly
used in the negotiation literature (De Dreu et al., 2006; Pruitt &
Lewis, 1975) and adopted here as well. Accordingly, we assigned
impasse dyads a joint outcome equal to the lowest joint outcome
reached by any dyad (i.e., 920 points).
A 2 ⫻ 2 (Construal Level ⫻ Location of Integrative Potential)
ANOVA on joint outcome only showed the predicted interaction
between construal level and location of integrative potential, F(1,
78) ⫽ 10.27, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .12. Simple effects showed that when
integrative potential resided at the level of underlying interests,
high-construal level dyads obtained a better joint outcome (M ⫽
1221.57) than low-construal level dyads (M ⫽ 1100.53), F(1,
78) ⫽ 6.36, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .08. When integrative potential resided
at the issue level, low-construal level dyads obtained a better joint
outcome (M ⫽ 1211.5) than high-construal level dyads (M ⫽
1122.08), F(1, 78) ⫽ 3.98, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .05 (see also Figure 3).
Negotiation strategies. We analyzed questionnaire data at the
dyadic level to deal with statistical interdependency (e.g., Kenny,
5
4
3
2
1
Delivery
Category
Issues
Value
weeks (15)
weeks (30)
weeks (45)
weeks (60)
week (75)
Money
Time
Facilities
Price, Interests
Delivery
Warrantee, Optional
3 (high)
2 (medium)
1 (low)
Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). A 2 ⫻ 2 (Construal Level ⫻ Location of
Integrative Potential) ANOVA on cooperative problem solving
revealed a significant two-way interaction between construal level
and location of integrative potential, F(1, 78) ⫽ 7.37, p ⬍ .01,
␩2 ⫽ .09. When integrative potential was located in the underlying
interests, high-construal level dyads reported more problem solving than low-construal level dyads (M ⫽ 3.84 vs. M ⫽ 3.47), F(1,
78) ⫽ 4.19, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .05. When integrative potential was
located in the issues, low-construal level dyads tended to engage in
more problem solving than high-construal level dyads (M ⫽ 3.82
vs. M ⫽ 3.53), F(1, 78) ⫽ 3.19, p ⫽ .08 (marginal).
Cooperative problem solving related to joint outcomes (r ⫽ .37,
p ⬍ .01). To test for mediation, we regressed the joint outcomes on
the dummy-coded main effect of construal level and integrative
location and their interaction before and after cooperative problem
solving had been controlled for. Results showed that the originally
significant regression of joint outcome on the interaction of the
independent variables (␤ ⫽ .34), t(78) ⫽ 3.20, p ⬍ .01, decreased
when integrative we entered behavior in the model (␤ ⫽ .25),
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
1240
Joint Outcome
1220
1200
High Construal
Level
Low Construal
Level
1180
1160
1140
1120
1100
1080
Interests
Issues
Location Integrative Potential
Figure 3. Joint outcome as a function of construal level and location of
integrative potential in Experiment 3.
t(78) ⫽ 2.37, p ⬍ .05. The association between cooperative
problem solving and joint outcome held when the predictor was
controlled for (␤ ⫽ .30), t(78) ⫽ 2.80, p ⬍ .01. Because the
product of the unstandardized coefficients is not normally distributed, we used the z-prime method to test whether the change from
simple to multiple regression was significant (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). This was indeed the case:
The effect of Construal Level ⫻ Integrative Location on joint
outcome was significantly reduced when cooperative problem
solving was controlled for (z⬘ ⫽ 1.95; p ⬍ .05).
Conclusions and General Discussion
The present study revealed that high rather than low psychological distance and concomitant global rather than local processing
modes substantially influence negotiator cognitions, behavioral
tendencies, and outcomes. Specifically, negotiators under a global
rather than a local processing mode revise their inadequate fixedpie perceptions more when provided with information about counterpart’s underlying interests (Experiment 1). And they were more
likely to accept offers that appear uninteresting when considered in
terms of issues but quite valuable when underlying interests are
taken into account (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 further clarified
that these effects can be parsimoniously understood in terms of the
focus on secondary features of the negotiation (issues) under low
psychological distance and local processing, yet on primary features of the negotiation (underlying interests) under high psychological distance and global processing. That is, Experiment 3
showed less integrative agreements under low rather than high
construal level and concomitant local processing when integrative
potential was located at the level of underlying interests, but more
integrative agreements under low rather than high construal level
and concomitant global processing when integrative potential was
located at the level of overt issues.
Together, findings contribute to researchers’ understanding of
interpersonal negotiation, and they expand core facets of CLT to
social exchange settings. These issues, along with some limitations
and questions for new research, are addressed in the remainder of
this section.
Theoretical Implications
The implications for negotiation theory are twofold. First, we
used a negotiation task that allowed us to manipulate the level at
771
which integrative potential resides. Past work, building off the
classic study by Pruitt and Lewis (1975), used a multi-issue task
with integrative potential located in the value attached to the
various issues. Whereas this task allows the researcher to vary the
amount of integrative potential, it did not allow researchers to vary
preferences on issues independently from the integrative potential
inherently attached to those preferences. In the present study, we
used an adapted version of the task designed by Trötschel and
Gollwitzer (2007). It does allow the researcher to vary these two
aspects of the negotiation task independently—tougher preferences on some or all issues were, in principle, independent of the
extent to which underlying interests were served. This is an important innovation for two reasons. First, most real-life negotiations involving multiple issues have a rather indirect direct linkage
between the intrinsic value of an issue and the underlying interests
it serves. More than tasks used in past work (e.g., De Dreu et al.,
2006; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), the currently employed negotiation
task accounts for complex features of “real-life” negotiation (e.g.,
underlying interests), and thus enhances the external validity of
negotiation research. Second, this new task allows researchers to
examine factors, both old and new, that contribute to the negotiators’ focus on issues, on interests, or some combination. As such,
the currently employed task opens up a series of questions that
could not be answered with the tasks used in past work. For
example, are negotiators with a prosocial motivation more likely to
focus on interests, whereas those with proself motivation tend
toward a focus on issues? Does power influence the tendency to
focus on underlying interests versus issues as much as it influences
the tendency to engage in global versus local processing (e.g.,
Smith & Trope, 2006)? Do certain emotions focus negotiators on
basic needs and interests, whereas other feeling states orient them
toward overt issues (and what are the effects of the partner’s
emotions on the receiving negotiator’s tendency to consider own
and others interests, or issues instead)? Clearly, these are but a few
possible questions that are of critical importance to further understanding negotiation and that the present task allows to study in a
more sophisticated way than have previously used negotiation
tasks.
Apart from making this methodological contribution, our study
contributes to researchers’ understanding of the psychological
mechanisms underlying integrative negotiation. We already knew
that negotiators are more likely to uncover integrative potential
when they exchange and process information about their own and
other’s preferences and priorities (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;
Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). We also knew a lot about the
cognitive and motivational determinants of information processing
and exchange fostering integrative agreements (for reviews, see,
e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu et
al., 2007). Yet despite a long list of books of advice on the
importance of focusing on underlying interests rather than on overt
issues (e.g., Fisher & Ury, 1981; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton &
McKersie, 1965), we knew exceedingly little about the psychological determinants of a negotiator focus on secondary features
such as issues, and primary features such as underlying interests
and needs. The present finding that increased psychological distance along with its more global processing mode focuses individuals on primary rather than on secondary features of the negotiation, and thereby facilitates interest-based negotiation, thus is an
important step forward.
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GIACOMANTONIO, DE DREU, AND MANNETTI
Our findings are consistent with those reported by Henderson et
al. (2006) and De Dreu and colleagues (2009). In these studies, the
authors found that when negotiations involved issues and its consequences far removed in time, rather than nearby, negotiators
created more package deals, considered interrelations among issues to a greater extent, and created more integrative agreements.
We extend these findings in several important ways. First, our
findings suggest that it is construal level rather than just temporal
distance that triggers aforementioned effects. Whereas past work
manipulated psychological distance exclusively through temporal
construal, we obtained conceptual replications using a variety of
different ways to vary psychological distance and to induce a highversus low construal level. However, two ways to create variations
in psychological distance were not considered here, and it remains
to be seen whether these two would produce effects similar to
those we found here. For example, social distance caused by
negotiating with a member of the outgroup should raise construal
level and thus facilitate the achievement of mutually beneficial
agreements (provided integrative potential resides at the level of
underlying interests). But negotiating with outgroup members also
reduces cooperative motivation and increases competitive tendencies hurting rather than facilitating integrative negotiation (e.g.,
Halevy, 2008; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007). In a similar
vein, feelings of power, and power asymmetry, are sources of
social distance that should increase construal level (Smith &
Trope, 2006). However, work on power in negotiation suggests
power differences generally impede rather than facilitate the development of integrative, win–win agreements (Giebels, De Dreu,
& Van de Vliert, 2000; Mannix & Neale, 1993; Pinkley, 1995).
Thus, there is reason to believe that not all dimensions of psychological distance have similar effects, whereas all may introduce
more abstract construal level and more global information processing, in some cases co-varying processes may overrule the potentially beneficial effects of abstract and global thinking. Future
research is needed to address these and related issues.
Second, our findings render less likely an explanation in terms
of enhanced cooperative motivation under high temporal distance.
As mentioned, past work could not rule out the possibility that high
rather than low psychological distance and global rather than local
processing fostered a cooperative motivation (e.g., De Dreu &
Nijstad, 2008), which in turn promoted simultaneous rather than
sequential processing of issues. Simultaneous issue processing
facilitates integrative agreements yielding high joint outcome (e.g.,
Weingart et al., 1993). However, such an explanation cannot
account for the present findings. It is difficult to see how, in
Experiment 2, enhanced cooperative motivation among highconstrual level negotiators led to greater willingness to accept an
interest-based offer from their counterpart, but to reduced willingness to accept an issue-based offer. Likewise, it is difficult to see
how, in Experiment 3, enhanced cooperative motivation among
high-construal level negotiators led to more integrative negotiation
in the integrative-interest condition but not in the integrative issue
condition.
Third, and finally, our findings suggest that present and previous
findings can be best understood in terms of two distinct processes
that operate in parallel—a focus on primary rather than on secondary features of the negotiation, and a tendency to craft multiissue offers that emphasize interrelations among issues and interests and that facilitate logrolling. Provided integrative potential
resides at the level of underlying interests, negotiators with a high
construal level thus do achieve more integrative agreements. This
“cross-over” interaction is important not only because it provides
a critical test of CLT, and rules out the possibility that findings
were driven by enhanced cooperative motivation, but also because
it provides first-time evidence for the fact that interest-based
negotiation need not necessarily lead to integrative agreements, an
erroneous assumption often made in both academic and
practitioner-oriented writings. To the extent that parties have interests that are diametrically opposed, interest-based negotiation
will be difficult and unlikely to result in mutually beneficial,
win–win agreements.
In our analysis, we referred to primary features of the negotiation as the distant goals negotiators have or adopt, essentially
referring to their underlying interests (i.e., security needs vs.
reputation concerns in the Sinai Peninsula dispute). The subordinate means to achieve these more distant goals were referred to as
secondary features; it entails the tactics, specific demands, and
positional commitments negotiators adopt and communicate (i.e.,
the claimed share of the Sinai Peninsula). However, the means-end
distinction between issues and interests does not reflect all the
possible distinctions between primary and secondary elements of a
negotiation. As goals are typically organized into a hierarchy with
more exterior interests serving more fundamental ones, superficial
interests can be seen as secondary and subordinate to more basic
interests. In Experiment 1, for example, the high concern for
money of the candidate can be a superficial interest serving the
more basic interest of getting married. Results of the present
research strongly suggest that under high, rather than low, construal level, negotiators will place more emphasis on the most
central interests. This could be very helpful in order to devise a
creative solution to a negotiation because, as noted by Rubin et al.
(1994), “If Party moves along the (hierarchical) tree far enough, it
may locate an interest that can be easily bridged with an interest of
Other” (p. 179).
Likewise, negotiators could have multiple goals at the same
time, with some of them being more important than others even
though not organized hierarchically. For example, a negotiator
could be concerned with obtaining as much economic value as
possible (high importance) and with presenting him- or herself as
a fair person (low importance). If the most important goal can be
seen as a primary feature of the negotiation, then, according to
CLT, we should expect the person in the example to be more
competitive and to demand more under a high construal level.
Our conclusions and their implications are constrained by the
fact that we obtained insight into the negotiating process either
without also observing outcomes (i.e., in Experiment 1 and 2) or
by relying on self-reports obtained after outcomes had been
reached (i.e., in Experiment 3). Future research could invest in
online observation of negotiation behavior to provide more solid
evidence for the role of multi-issue offer making and cooperative
problem solving. Future research could also seek to connect within
one study task-related cognitions and perceptual accuracy, offer
making and acceptance, and integrative outcomes. Whereas
present findings strongly point to such interrelations, studies allowing for path analyses would further illuminate researchers’
understanding of the ways psychological distance influences negotiation processes and outcomes.
CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN NEGOTIATION
Another issue for future research is to consider the interplay
between construal level, on the one hand, and negotiator tendency
to engage in more or less deep and systematic information processing. Recent work suggests that when negotiators engage in
such deep processing, for example, because they are under process
accountability or have low need for cognitive closure, they develop
more accurate perceptions and are more likely to achieve integrative agreements (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Nijstad, &
Van Knippenberg, 2008). Deep and systematic processing is, in
principle, independent of construal level— one can take a global
construal level and process information either systematically or
heuristically as much as one can take a local construal level and
process information either systematically or heuristically. In terms
of the present findings, it follows that one may process information
about either primary or secondary features—interests or issues—in
either a systematic and deliberate fashion or in a more heuristic
and shallow way. The intriguing implication is that deep information processing should amplify the effects observed here—
construal level influences integrative agreements especially when
negotiators engage in deep, deliberate, and systematic information
processing.
Concluding Thoughts
In three experiments, we showed that interests underlying parties’ preferences on issues are more relevant in orienting considerations, cognitions, and strategic behavior of negotiators with a
high rather than a low construal level. Conversely, when negotiators have a low construal level, strategic behavior is based on
negotiation issues. We also demonstrated that the impact of construal level on dyads’ joint outcome was moderated by the location
of integrative potential. That is, when integrative potential resided
in the underlying interests, as in most cases, negotiators can benefit
from construing information at high level. When integrative potential resided in the issues, construing information at low level
appeared to be beneficial for high-quality agreements.
One of the most common types of advice to uncover underlying
interests in a negotiation is that negotiators should ask themselves
a series of why questions about the negotiation (Fisher & Ury,
1981): Why is he or she taking this position? Why is the other
party not yielding as much as I demand? Why is the other giving
up that issue so easily? Our study suggests that asking such “why
questions” is useful indeed, but not because of the potential answers one may get. Rather, asking such questions helps one to
switch from a local to a more global construal level and processing
mode, facilitating a focus on underlying interests. Our study also
suggests that the advice offered by Fisher and Ury, and their
followers, is valid and helpful to the extent only that integrative
potential resides at the level of underlying interests—when this is
not the case, asking “why questions” or shifting to a global
processing mode may turn out to be quite counterproductive and
leads negotiators away from, rather than toward, mutually beneficial win–win agreements.
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Received January 8, 2009
Revision received September 4, 2009
Accepted September 8, 2009 䡲