SECURITY
ON THE INDUSTRIAL
INTERNET OF THINGS
How companies can defend themselves against cyber attacks.
Security on the Industrial internet of things Contents
CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................3
Industry in Change .................................................................................................................................................4
Automation and Digitization of Industrial Processes ......................................................................................4
The Internet of Things (IoT): local – regional – global .....................................................................................5
The Challenge: Secure Machine Communication ..........................................................................................6
Risks ........................................................................................................................................................................6
Security Strategies ................................................................................................................................................6
Defense in Depth ..................................................................................................................................................8
Security by Design ................................................................................................................................................9
Protection Objectives in Industrial Networks – Confidentiality and Integrity ........................................... 10
Availability ........................................................................................................................................................... 11
Authenticity ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
The Essentials of a Secure Network ............................................................................................................... 13
Interplay of modules, terminal devices and networks: a use case ….......................................................... 13
Safety precautions for SIM Cards .................................................................................................................... 14
Attacks on SIM Security .................................................................................................................................... 16
Radio Scanners .................................................................................................................................................. 16
Data Platforms for Industry 4.0 Applications – The role of Cloud Computing on the IoT .................. 18
Secure Data Storage and Processing ............................................................................................................. 19
Security in the Cloud – Security at Work ........................................................................................................ 19
Further Requirements, Risks and Protective Mechanisms ......................................................................... 19
A Practical Example: Recording and Relaying Machine Data .................................................................... 20
The Basis: Secure Professional Cloud Data Centers ................................................................................... 22
Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 24
Annex ...................................................................................................................................................................... 26
2
Security on the Industrial internet of things INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
More and more objects, sensors and actuators can be connected by means of intelligent software solutions. Including connected industrial plant, machinery and equipment, they can all be
automated further by means of production, manufacturing and logistics processes, leading both to
many opportunities and to new security risks.
According to the German electrical engineering industry association VDE, seven out of ten decision
makers in industry have misgivings about IT security. They see it as the most serious obstacle to
the spread of Industry 4.0 in Germany. Federal Research Minister Johanna Wanka’s view is that
“without secure data interchange, Industry 4.0 or the fusion of production and services with the
­Internet will not be possible”. IT security, she says, is one of the key preconditions for making use
of the opportunities that Industry 4.0 offers. Secure communi­cation is the only way to create confidence in the new networked production processes.
An industrial Internet of Things thus requires comprehensive security management in order to limit
access to interfaces, systems, sensors, (remote) maintenance access points and equipment to an
authorized group of persons or to authorized processes.
Without laying claim to be complete, this white paper illuminates relevant risks, protection targets,
and aspects of security for communication and data traffic in networks. In addition, it points out
possible solutions to ensure that connecting machines, and storing and sharing data are largely
automated and secure.
The degree of security that a company needs must always be considered in the context of its business model. There is no patent remedy or 100 percent guarantee of security, but a security solution
corresponding to the risks in question can certainly be achieved.
SECURITY WILL MAKE INDUSTRY 4.0 POSSIBLE
IT security is one of the central preconditions for making use of
the opportunities of Industry 4.0. On the following pages you will
find solutions for connecting machines, and for making data interchange largely automated and secure.
3
Security on the Industrial internet of things INDUSTRY IN CHANGE
INDUSTRY IN CHANGE
AUTOMATION AND DIGITIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES
Comprehensive and cross-enterprise digitization and automation characterize the fourth industrial
revolution. They include remote maintenance of plant and machinery by means of an Internet of
Things (IoT) solution, and self-controlling, decentralized processes in production facilities, and
connection of management software and production systems. Operating resources such as plant
and machinery are, along with hardware and software, connected devices and employees, cyberphysical systems (CPS) that can fulfill customers’ requirements swiftly and flexibly in “smart factories”.
Studies and experts forecast a perceptible growth impetus as a result of Industry 4.0. According to
a survey by Bitkom and the Fraunhofer IAO Institute of Labor Economics and Organization (IAO),
a value-added potential of EUR 78 billion awaits the machinery and plant engineering, electrical
engineering, automotive, and chemical industries, agriculture, and information and communication
technology by 2025. This corresponds to an average annual growth of 1.7 percent. Experts say
that digitization offers small and midrange enterprises in particular opportunities to improve their
competitiveness, and hold their own against (international) competition.
4
Security on the Industrial internet of things INDUSTRY IN CHANGE
THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT): LOCAL – REGIONAL – GLOBAL
Where process automation is concerned, the digital factory is already a
reality. The constantly growing deployment of automated production
equipment and robots, and their consistent connection in a local area
such as a production facility are supported by network technologies like
Ethernet, WLAN, Bluetooth, RFID or Low Power Wide Area Networks. In
addition, these technologies facilitate to some extent the networking of
regional locations, as long as their respective network infrastructures do
not differ totally from one another.
Telcos such as Deutsche Telekom provide building blocks for secure supra-­
regional or global connections in the form of network technologies for
Wide Area Networks. Their solutions include, in particular, broadband
connections like fiber optic, and cellular or mobile connections. LTE
technology delivers performance on a par with that of a fixed-line network.
LTE also shortens latencies – with the result that LTE mobile networks
provide a sound basis for the Internet of Things and Industry 4.0.
IDC market researchers estimate that by 2020 about 30 billion “things”
such as machines, cars, washing machines and refrigerators will be connected via the Internet around the world. With the adoption of the IPv6
standard the technical preconditions are in place. Instead of around four
billion addresses as in the days of IPv4, about 340 sextillion addresses
can be allocated under IPv6. So 30 billion connected “things” are just
the beginning – and nowhere near the end of the IoT and Industry 4.0.
In these IoT networks individual components will talk with cyber-physical
systems. They will do so on the basis of previously passive devices or
things being equipped with microcontrollers, identifiers, sensors and
­actuators that are known as embedded systems. They serve inter alia to
receive and relay data, to identify objects unequivocally, to determine
­status, and to check and actively control (production) processes. A smart
container, for example, can be identified indirectly via an RFID transponder.
Depending on how frequently data is recorded and transmitted, the trans­
ponder can then relay at any time required information about the container’s
most recent position and contents. Standardized interfaces and defined
protocols ensure that interaction processes between modules or intelligent
systems are executed and can, as required, be adjusted or replaced at
any time.
Remote maintenance of machinery
at Dürkopp Adler AG.
The sewing machine manufacturer Dürkopp Adler demonstrates
opportunities that can be opened up by means of connected
machines. The Bielefeld-based company has connected its industrial sewing machines in collaboration with Deutsche Telekom.
If the customer so wishes, the manufacturer can monitor from its
head office in Germany the status of machinery at a factory in,
say, Bangladesh. If the monitoring system reports problems, the
configuration can be adjusted from Bielefeld.
Dürkopp Adler reduces in this way both machine downtimes
and the cost of sending service technicians out to rectify faults
on site. To check connected sewing machines, Dürkopp Adler
uses the Cloud of Things (see also practical example on page
20), a cloud-based software platform that manages, controls and
evaluates data from connected devices, and also contains certifi­
cated hardware components and SIM cards with a data tariff.
5
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
THE CHALLENGE: SECURE
MACHINE COMMUNICATION
RISKS
The large number of active or passive elements in an industrial IoT solution
poses in its complexity a major security challenge. Companies must, for
one, ensure the security of the software, infrastructures, application and
computer systems used. For another, they must deal with the effects of
possible cyber attacks on the operational safety of devices and plants
that are connected to the Internet. On the IoT, security management goes
beyond one’s own company because companies must to some extent
open up their networks and systems for customers, suppliers and partners.
In addition, the element of human error comes into play. It includes operating errors, unsafe passwords or simple credulity. According to the Federal
Office for Information Security (BSI), in 2014 social engineering and errors/­
sabotage ranked third and fourth in the top ten security risks faced by industrial control systems (ICS). The only greater risks are those of malware
infection via the Internet and intranet, and via removable storage devices
and external hardware. In fifth place come break-ins via remote maintenance access points. Compromising or manipulation of data and systems
in the production environment, and of cloud components is now another
of the top ten risks for systems used to measure, regulate, and control
processes in production and process automation.
Effective counter-measures exist to deal with all these sources of danger,
however. They include partitioning or sealing off systems, restricting
­access authorizations, and hardening the ICT components used, or in
other words enhancing system security by means of dedicated software,
using encryption processes, and – last but not least – creating a security
awareness among employees along with strict observance of security
guidelines in order to counter the threat of “social engineering”.
a­ ttacks or dictionary attacks on inadequate authentication mechanisms.
Hackers mainly use these methods to identify user account passwords.
They test systematically every possible combination of definable alphanumeric and special characters. This has long been known to be the case,
but hackers still use this method because they can make fully automated
attacks using software tools. The success of these methods depends to a
large extent on the complexity and length of the password. To ward off
follow-on attacks of this kind, companies should establish a basic protection, and put in place against primary attacks further measures as part
of a so-called defense-in-depth concept.
Other attacks involve reading or manipulating control commands because
communication between the control components of industrial plant
­frequently uses unencrypted protocols. A further target of hackers are
network components such as routers or firewalls, the security mechanisms of which they lever out in order, say, to redirect network traffic.
The effects of this multi-stage attack technique on which the well-known
Stuxnet worm was based can be serious. They range from theft of intellectual property and trade secrets via production outages, and physical
damage to plant and equipment to falsified sensor data or incorrect
­display data in control systems leading to a reduction in the quality of
end products. How is one to counter Stuxnet & Co.-style ICS attacks
and to protect process control systems? Firstly, by developing security
profiles specially designed for process control systems at the system
and product level, and secondly, by developing technology-specific
minimum standards.
SECURITY STRATEGIES
Another technique used to attack administrative and user systems consists of spreading deeper and deeper into the company. Hackers launch
follow-on attacks to target especially sensitive systems in the production
area, or attack SCADA systems that monitor and control production
systems. These follow-on attacks are aimed at reading out access data,
and gaining unauthorized access by means of, for instance, brute force
6
To ward off threats to the industrial Internet of Things and facilitate secure
IoT solution communication, a comprehensive, holistic concept based
on a defense-in-depth strategy is required. Security aspects should also
be taken into consideration at the initial development stage of plant,
equipment, systems and networks (Security by Design).
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
RISKS AND COUNTER-MEASURES
Material challenges that pose a threat to the security of industrial
IoT solutions:
1. The complexity of a large number of active and passive components
2. Cyber attacks on the operational security of plant and equipment
3. Networks and systems partially opened for customers, suppliers,
and partners
4. T he human element: human error and credulity
5. Manipulation of cloud components
Effective counter-measures:
1. S
ealing off systems
2. Limiting access authorizations
3. H
ardening ICT components by means of dedicated software
4. U
sing encryption processes
5. Strengthening security awareness among employees
ORGANIZATIONAL THREATS TO IT SECURITY:
THE “ENEMY WITHIN”
In addition to human error and the range of attack techniques used by
cyber criminals, inadequate security management from within poses a
threat to companies. The BSI lists typical self-inflicted risks of this kind ­
in its ICS Security Compendium. They include inadequate IT security
regulations, incomplete documentation, insufficient safeguards for remote
maintenance access points, failure to monitor the supporting infrastructure,
dependence of the ICS network on IT networks, and, last but not least,
a lack of security awareness among employees.
Companies should pay special attention to security in the deployment of
standard IT components. These commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products
often have vulnerabilities that have been identified, are already documented,
and are therefore used by cyber criminals who develop customized malware for them. That is why companies should check carefully which of
these COTS products are especially under threat. Timely installation of
software updates is also very important. These updates fix vulnerabilities
that have come to light – vulnerabilities that virus scanners may not be
able to recognize and fend off.
7
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
DEFENSE IN DEPTH
Defense in depth divides a security architecture into different layers or
levels, each of which is covered by adequate security measures. Should
an attacker succeed in surmounting the barriers of one layer, he will then
face the next “door” and need to pick its “lock”. In ICS systems, for example, there is, for one, a need to make so-called field bus communication
between sensors, actuators and automation devices secure, and to prevent unauthorized access via an unprotected maintenance access point.
For another, additional barriers must prevent the hacker from attacking
the ICS’s programmable logic control (PLC). So the technical implementation of a defense-in-depth strategy at this point requires, in addition to
field bus firewalls, secure protocols and automated anomaly recognition.
To safeguard industrial and automated control systems in depth, a mixture of different products, technologies and methods is advisable. They
help to ward off external and internal threats.
They include:
• Guidelines and procedures for employees to handle control systems
and the corporate assets they contain. Training should also be pro­vided
to promote risk awareness among employees. • Documentation and implementation of all rules and controls designed
to ensure physical security, by restricting access to rooms, switch panels,
cables and devices to authorized personnel only. • A framework structure for the security of network infrastructure (hardware and software, firewalls, routers, switches, etc.) that blocks communication routes and services which are not explicitly authorized. • Hardening or increasing the security of computers by means of, inter
alia, a patch management guideline, using antivirus software, and
­deinstalling operating system components that are not used. • Improving application security by implementing change management,
and systems to authorize and authenticate the (changing) in-house
­users, and hardening devices by limiting physical access to authorized
personnel, encryption of device communication and authentication in
the network before commencing data transmission. 8
The basis for any security concept should be a risk-based analysis, and
inventory that assesses the value of key valuables (corporate assets) such
as production processes, patented processes and formulas, and implements appropriate security mechanisms. It must be borne in mind that
not every machine or every object must be connected. What is required
is a multistage security concept geared to the specific risk situation.
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH SECURITY – MULTIPLE LAYERS OF DEFENSE
Policies,
Procedures & Awareness
Physical
network
Computer
Application
Device
To protect ICS systems all levels must be equipped with end-to-end
safeguards.
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
Security by Design
To put communication to successful use in IoT solutions, security aspects
must be taken into consideration at the development stage. In other words,
rather than incorporating security mechanisms retro- and reactively, which
until now has usually been the practice, in the future a proactive integrated
approach to product and process development will be required that provides for the protection of plant and IT infrastructure. This will also apply
to SME engineering and manufacturing companies that frequently use
control software developed in-house. Their developers must take security
concerns into consideration from the first line of code onward. Firmware
for machinery and equipment must also fulfill equally high security require­
ments in order to prevent product piracy more effectively.
At the same time, security is a moving target. Attackers are constantly
­developing their methods further, thereby requiring companies to constantly adjust their security strategy. The consequence is a changing,
­dynamic threat situation that requires one new adaptation after another.
Security profiles must be corresponding mobile and, if required, permit
swift reconfiguration.
On the one hand, security for the industrial Internet of Things must be
­ensured proactively as far as possible by means of security by design,
while on the other, in the event of a security breach, it must be able to
­respond swiftly and flexibly in order to limit the extent of the damage.
This requires graduated and coordinated prevention, detection and
­reaction measures. “There can be no such thing as an effective security
implementation along ‘set up and forget’ lines,” as the authors of the
­Industry 4.0 Implementation Strategy put it.
MULTISTAGE PROTECTION FROM THE OUTSET
Defense in depth, originally a military strategy devised to delay
attacks by means of independent lines of defense, and to gain
time for counterattacks, serves in information security to ward off
follow-on attacks by an intruder who has gained access to the
corporate network.
Applied to Industry 4.0, a multistage defense-in-depth ­concept
to protect automatic and control systems consists of the
following components:
- Guidelines and awareness methods for employees
- Physical security
- Network security
- Computer security
- Application security
- Terminal device security
Security by design also ensures that the security functions of
products and processes are taken into consideration from the
development stage, and complemented by prevention, detection
and reaction measures.
9
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
PROTECTION OBJECTIVES IN INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
Ways to manipulate or read data on the industrial Internet of Things will
increase in number. Increasingly dynamic and cross-enterprise connection
steps up the risk of “external attacks” by affiliated companies. An IoT
­solution is no exception inasmuch as communication is a matter of trust.
Machine A in Company A must be able to rely on Machine B in Company
B not having been hijacked by an attacker who pretends to be Machine B,
and either steals the data sent by Machine A or reads it undetected. In
much the same way as in data interchange between humans or between
humans and a (Web) service, trust in an IoT solution must be underpinned
by security measures such as confidential login data and encryption of
communications.
On the IoT, however, constellations of persons, services, plant and sensors
involved can change dynamically, and a larger number of digital identities
inevitably means a larger number of targets. Machines cannot make flexible
ad-hoc decisions; they execute prescribed program steps and commands.
That can make security incidents harder to recognize. So companies should
consider setting up central surveillance authorities for their industrial networks to check login data, communication behavior and data quantities
shared, and to identify potential identity theft.
Attacks on the integrity of production data can have serious consequences –
up to and including manipulation of safety-relevant properties of a product
TRUSTWORTHY DIGITAL IDENTITIES
In Industry 4.0’s cross-enterprise value chains there is a growing
number of targets with each participating component. Central
surveillance authorities protect industrial networks by monitoring
registration data, communication behavior and data quantities
shared, and by providing notification of identity theft potential.
Trustworthy digital identities are the key to secure communication,
and to the integrity and confidentiality of data that is in need of
protection.
10
that goes on to cause damage to persons or property. “A minimal misalign­
ment of 0.5 mm can be sufficient to have a painful effect on an entire
production plant and its processes. Or an interval is changed, a plant
suddenly overheats and a robot does things it is not supposed to do.
­Attacks of this kind are a serious risk. That is why trustworthy digital identities of components, sensors and services is so important in Industry 4.0,”
says Claudia Eckert, Professor of Computer Science at Munich TU and
Director of the Fraunhofer AISEC. The integrity of data recorded – data
by which production processes are documented for tracking – is no less
important. Depending on the industry or product, data can be liability-­
relevant or must comply with regulatory requirements as, say, in the pharma­
ceuticals industry.
In the IoT’s cross-enterprise value chains participating companies will
need to make additional contractual provisions on responsibility for data
security because data integrity is no longer a matter for a single party. If,
say, a contract manufacturer receives sensitive design data, it must be
ensured that he can no longer use the information received once the
contract is completed. An additional factor with regard to Industry 4.0’s
Lot Size 1 objective is that personal information such as name, gender,
age or address is processed in connection with an order. So there is a
further obligation to treat all customer data in accordance with the strict
provisions of the German Data Protection Act.
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
AVAILABILITY
The number of systems and interfaces required to operate cross-enterprise
networks on the IoT will tend to increase sharply. Nationwide use of IoT
solutions will present fresh challenges on the availability of infrastructures
and networks. Existing communication networks will need to be expanded
in order to improve fail safety, quality of services and globally available
bandwidth, and to keep latencies to a minimum. Compared with classic
IT, ICS must run for longer periods, have shorter maintenance windows
and will usually face real-time control requirements. Any disruption of
production or other services can constitute a critical business risk, such
as when a coordinated plant shutdown becomes unavoidable to prevent
physical damage.
An attack on availability can also be undertaken indirectly when an attacker
targets operational safety components or functions. This can lead to an
emergency shutdown of a plant or machine if, for instance, a component
or the network is overburdened by too many queries. If an attacker manipulates functions of a safety component to change threshold values, functional
safety is no longer ensured.
An attack vector very often used to bring functions, services or networks
to their knees is a distributed denial of service (DDoS). A Web server, for
example, is so overwhelmed with queries that it uses all of the available
network bandwidth, and legitimate queries can no longer be handled.
On the IoT externally accessible interfaces are especially likely to be the
target of DDoS attacks of this kind. The increase in numbers of time-critical
processes and services that is to be expected will open up further points
of attack.
User
STRONG NETWORKS AND
STRONG PROTECTION
Attacker
User
ISP
Target Server
ISP
User
In nationwide use of IoT solutions two
factors play a vital role in ensuring the
availability of infrastructures and networks. They are powerful communication networks with the lowest possible
latencies and protection DDoS attacks,
especially at externally accessible interfaces.
Attacker
User
11
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE CHALLENGE: SECURE MACHINE COMMUNICATION
AUTHENTICITY
Hitherto the focus of protection in production has been mainly on availability and integrity. With the advent of IoT applications the authenticity of
systems and components will require a higher weighting. As the number
of access points and components connected with the Internet increases,
there will be an increasing number of potential targets for attack. The risk
of unauthorized access will increase especially at unmanned stations,
open network access points and points of communication with other
companies, such as for maintenance or contract processing. Authenticity
thus counts as an “essential characteristic in a value network, especially
when cross-enterprise communication is involved,” according to the
Industry 4.0 Platform in its implementation strategy.
That is why, along with encryption on all communication routes, an unequivocal, forgery-proof identity is an essential prerequisite for every
p­ articipant in a value chain on the Internet of Things, be it a plant, a
­machine, a user or a(n end) product. A forgery-proof identity is a digital
certificate that in addition to the authentication keys contains the information
required for encryption and decryption. “To store security-relevant information trustworthy, secure storage is required. Security protocols and
applications with built-in security must be securely supplied with the
­requisite login data. This presupposes an identity infrastructure (with ­
one or more authorities depending on complexity) across the value network that ensures unequivocal and consistent identification and allocation
of a participant’s identity, and supports authentication and the assignment
of permissions on the basis of identities,” as the authors of the Implementation Strategy for Industry 4.0 put it. Identity management of this kind is
ensured by trustworthy certification authorities that manage the digital
certificates of all participants in an Industry 4.0 value creation network.
AVOID UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS
In the complex value networks of Industry 4.0 trustworthy certifi­
cation bodies provide the necessary identity management. They
use digital certificates and secure storage to facilitate authenti­
cation and assignment of permissions via encrypted communi­
cation channels.
12
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE ESSENTIALS OF A SECURE NETWORK
THE ESSENTIALS OF A
SECURE NETWORK
Fundamental network security requirements continue to be required on
the industrial Internet of Things. Encrypted data transmission is required
on all network channels, and in addition, all interconnection points and
terminals along the entire chain up to devices’ actuators and sensors
must be protected separately. On an industrial Internet of Things the
weakest link in the chain determines the level of end-to-end security. ­
The best network protection is no use if a terminal device is inadequately
secured, as was the case in Spain, where two security experts were able
in a test to crack smart meters that are widely used there, and to manipulate them in such a way that they could have both read and falsified billing
data, and shut down the electricity supply in entire districts.
There will never be total security of either devices or data traffic, of course.
The widest range of attacks is constantly waged on network security. They
include software systems that are attached to network nodes to read the
traffic or programs to crack the encryption or, last but not least, attempts
to exploit human weakness and carelessness (“social engineering”). Yet
in every conceivable scenario, a fundamental question must be the cost
and benefit. A full-scale attack on fiber optic and wireless networks, network nodes and encryption, modules, machines and human requires, in
addition to technical know-how, the right equipment. As a rule, only intelli­
gence services can afford this enormous expense. In view of the benefit
to be gained, it is unlikely that they will tap or sabotage SME production
processes on a large scale.
INTERPLAY OF MODULES, TERMINAL DEVICES AND NETWORKS:
A USE CASE
In a project, funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF), Deutsche Telekom, Infineon Technologies, the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology (SIT) and three companies – WibuSystems, Trumpf and Hirschmann – demonstrated how a secure connected production solution can function. Sensitive production data is sent to
and from two sites via a fully secure network link. Security chips from Infineon serve as proof of identity for computers, routers and machines, and
permit network access only to persons and devices with permissions that
have been checked and found to be valid. In this way hardware and production control software can be secured by means of encryption and authentication processes in such a way that only authenticated machines
can issue instructions to other production units over the Net. Data is sent
encrypted via a secure remote wireless connection, and access to mobile terminal devices is via an authentication dongle with a security chip.
Hardware-based authentication of machines and routers is an essential
part of the security of cross-location data communication.
13
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE ESSENTIALS OF A SECURE NETWORK
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR SIM CARDS
The safest way to send machine data over the mobile network is via a
module of which the network access is authorized by a SIM card. With
SIM cards too, of course, hardware-based identification and protection
play a leading role. With both a built-in and a plugged-in card any
modification would lead to the user no longer being authorized to ­
use the network access.
In addition to robust physical protection, SIM cards for communication
in IoT solutions can be equipped with further protective mechanisms.
Instead of a static password for authentication of two terminals on the
IoT, there is a dynamic password that changes constantly and is transmitted using 128-bit encryption. After exchanging and confirming the
keys, the password, changed yet again, is transmitted so as to ensure
that tracing software stands no chance of reading it. IP VPN technology
(see Using Mobile IP VPN M2M to Protect Mobile Connections diagram)
offers especially effective protection of data transmitted in mobile
­machine traffic.
14
Individual authorization concepts can be set up on the basis of known IP
addresses. Using private IP addresses of the customer’s own ensures not
only a higher level of protection but also simplifies the swift and unequivocal identification of M2M modules in the corporate network (LAN) by
­allocating fixed, static IP addresses.
IP connections via GPRS/EDGE, UMTS/HSPA and LTE are routed without
port blocking or address/port implementation between M2M modules
and corporate LAN. By means of these transparent IP connection, further
savings can be achieved in respect of programming work and the costs
that it involves. In addition, all applications can be used without restriction
within the scope of the bandwidths and runtimes provided. Bidirectional
communication between mobile devices is ensured because connections
in the Deutsche Telekom network are permanently established.
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE ESSENTIALS OF A SECURE NETWORK
USING MOBILE IP VPN M2M TO PROTECT MOBILE CONNECTIONS
Users
Mobile network
Internet
Customer’s network
Router
Closed user group
via SIM card
Private APN and
network transmission
IPSec tunnel
To ensure best possible security of M2M communication, Deutsche Telekom has expanded its M2M Service Portal 2.0. In its standard version the
portal provides M2M modules with a public access point (Access Point Name, APN) to the
Internet via the SIM card. For the secure transmission of
Internet
M2M files from the module to the server, however, private access points and additional precautions are required for protection from unauthorized
access and misuse. These consist, as part of the additional Mobile IP VPN M2M offering, of the following:
• The security of a private APN and a closed user group; only ­
authorized SIM cards can establish a connection with the ­
corporate network or intranet
• The security of an IPsec-encrypted (AES 256) VPN tunnel
between
the mobile
Employees
of yournetwork
company and the customer’s network
Telekom
Closed user group
via SIM card
Private APN and
network transmission
IPSec-Tunnel
• The use of private, customer’s own IP addresses
• Optional blocking access to the public APN/Internet
by means of self-administration
• Monitoring data traffic on the M2M Service Portal
• Administration of all connections on the M2M
Service
Portal
At the
company
Secure data transfer
via the Internet
IPSec-enabled routers via data
in your company’s network
15
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE ESSENTIALS OF A SECURE NETWORK
ATTACKS ON SIM SECURITY
RADIO SCANNERS
As the hack at Dutch SIM card manufacturer Gemalto, that came to light
at the beginning of 2015, shows, card integrity cannot be fully guaranteed
if, say, the attacker is an intelligence service like the U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) or the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) and both have the resources and are interested in the hack.
­According to media reports both services had gained access to the keys
used for the encryption of mobile connections. In addition, they had
hacked the so-called OTA keys used to install updates on mobile devices
over the air (OTA). If an attacker with the right OTA key sends a message
to the SIM card, the attached (mal)ware is installed automatically. Attacks
of this kind require comprehensive technical capabilities, and nearly unlimited server and storage resources that next to nobody other than intelligence services is likely to possess.
Another kind of attack is to use radio scanners to read data traffic. To spy
on a logistics company, you can hack into the IoT solution’s communication and quickly read a telephone or address book, but to gain access to
genuine corporate assets an attacker would need to read all of the data
traffic, and evaluate the geodata, status reports and other data that the
mobile terminal sends to the central server. That would require the use of
significant technical and financial resources. Radio scanners with evaluation tools, for example, cost between € 50,000 and € 100,000. As with
all IoT threat scenarios, the question is for which attacker or attackers the
effort and expense would be worthwhile.
16
Security on the Industrial internet of things THE ESSENTIALS OF A SECURE NETWORK
USING REGENERATIVE ENERGIES WITH TELEKOM
M2M SIM CARDS
In the Bavarian village of Wildpoldsried, local utility Allgäuer
Überlandwerk (AÜW) has jointly with partners set up a smart grid
for renewable energies. Regional solar, wind and biomass power
stations were equipped with measurement technology and wireless routers. As measurement data was transmitted via the Internet, the companies involved had only a limited ­influence on how
it was routed from the wind turbine to the server. In the end, the
utility consulted the experts at Telekom IT partner ID.KOM.
As part of the new solution, industrial wireless routers connect
the measurement devices at the power stations with Telekom’s
wireless network. Via a private access point (APN) the measure­
ment data is sent to ID.KOM’s backbone network. As the AÜW
also uses a leased line of the Telekom IT partner, the data traffic
can simply be routed to the utility’s network. Thanks to the private
access point (APN) the SIM cards are allocated a fixed private IP
address. That not only makes data transfer especially secure; it
is also faster because the data traffic is not routed via the Internet.
17
Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY
4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF
CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
%
€
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Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
SECURE DATA STORAGE AND PROCESSING
Connecting devices, objects and (production) processes over the Internet
means that new masses of data will hit systems, servers and storage
­facilities. For storing and processing this data, and executing applications,
cloud computing is a suitable platform. Its high level of scalability makes
possible a flexible use of computing capacities that in theory can be extended indefinitely, and as a rule significantly exceeds the processing
­capacity of in-house solutions (in-house server systems).
Smart things and systems can be connected with a cloud platform via
communication networks and programming interfaces (APIs). In the
cloud, the link between the IT world and physical devices is provided ­
by applications that evaluate and store data, or send it on to systems like
CRM or data mining for further processing and interpretation. There are
also applications that control devices and processes by means of sensors
and actuators. A secure basis for all traffic to and from the cloud platform
is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption protocol, a further develop­
ment of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). In principle, end-to-end (E2E)
­encryption is considered to be the most suitable security precaution for
all devices on the IoT.
SECURITY IN THE CLOUD – SECURITY AT WORK
Each provider is responsible for the security of its own network routes and
cloud platforms. In addition, all cloud service providers are responsible
for providing secure and standardized interaction options between
clouds. The Internet of Things will consist of many different control circuits
and (sub)processes that must remain capable of communicating with
each other in constantly changing constellations.
In cloud computing mode, responsibility for the physical (operating)
­security of machines and devices continues to lie with the companies.
Machines and handover points to the Net can both become attack targets.
Not in every case will it be possible to improve security by positioning
connected devices in factory areas that are hard to access for unauthorized
persons. Attack vectors are multilayered and can include the firmware or
embedded software systems of a machine. At this neuralgic point in IoT
communication a further security line must therefore be drawn that encapsulates actuators, sensors and microcontrollers, etc.
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS, RISKS AND
PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS
With cloud programming interfaces (APIs) usually being open access
points, special attention must be paid to authentication and integrity. At
these points hackers often try to gain access to access and user data by
means of brute force and dictionary attacks. Suitable countermeasures
are those that are used for authentication by Web applications, such as
automatic blocking after a certain number of failed attempts to log in.
A variation on this approach ensures that after a failure to log in time
elapses before the next attempt can be undertaken, and this interval increases with each new failed bid to log in. This solution slows down automated brute force and dictionary attacks most effectively. In setting the
intervals or tolerance thresholds to ward off automated attacks care, must
be undertaken to ensure, however, that legitimate access to the cloud
interface must not be hindered.
Furthermore, cloud operators must absolutely ensure that individual
clients (tenants) are strictly separated on their IoT platforms and their
data is stored in separate virtual databases. If, for example, a customer
has sustained a computer worm infection via an unprotected access
point, any possibility of further infection must be ruled out. In much the
same way as the defense-in-depth concept at individual companies,
cloud platforms must prevent an intruder from finding his way from one
gateway to the next.
Providers that market their cloud-based IoT solutions globally should be
very careful in their choice of roaming partners so as to ensure frictionfree interaction with their networks and backbones. By no means all network operators have the same security standards. In addition, countryspecific compliance and data protection provisions must be observed.
Regardless whether companies connect within or outside a cloud platform, as participant numbers increase in a value creation network, the
question arises as to whether a central surveillance authority is required
to define and monitor a security policy with user authorizations and authentication mechanisms that is binding on all participating companies.
Security management of this kind leads to longer response times that can
clash with the real-time requirements of automated Industry 4.0 applications. As a rule the largest member of a value creation network will need
to assume responsibility for security, and thereby also be the contact for
any liability and recourse claims.
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Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: RECORDING AND RELAYING MACHINE DATA
IN THE CLOUD OF THINGS
The Cloud of Things is a Deutsche Telekom platform for data processing and control of machines,
devices and automated processes such as remote maintenance. It records sensor data, visualizes
it and then compares it with predefined thresholds, and sounds the alarm if the thresholds are exceeded. In addition, the Cloud of Things can be adapted to the user’s needs by configuration or, in
the case of more complex tasks, by programming. It can also send sensor data for more complex
analysis to systems such as a data analytics program or a customer relationship management system,
where the data can be interpreted and processed specifically.
On the M2M Service Portal, users can view all connection information at a glance at any time.
Security features such as a private APN can be booked swiftly and easily as required.
20
Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
It is based on the Telekom network and its M2M Service Portal, which is
coupled to the Cloud of Things. Both mobile wireless and fixed-line connections are available for secure data transport. For the mobile transmission
route, companies receive SIM cards with a data tariff, and use the M2M
Service Portal inter alia to manage (activate/deactivate) their SIM cards
themselves, to choose or switch tariffs and, if required, to order new cards.
Monitoring of data usage and SIM card misuse is also available. In addition,
all customers receive secure access to their billing data via a dedicated
administrator account on the platform.
To enable companies to deploy processes and devices via this cloud solution,
Telekom provides them with TLS-secured programming interfaces (APIs).
In this way, inter alia, functions of the automation tolls used by the companies in question can be executed in the Cloud of Things and on the M2M
Service Portal.
For legacy devices or server systems that don’t “speak” SSL/TLS or transmit their data in clear text, VPN access to the Cloud of Things is in preparation. The device opens up via the mobile wireless connection a VPN
tunnel to the cloud, thereby ensuring secure encrypted communication
along the entire route for which Telekom is responsible. And if the devices
use proprietary protocols there is an option to “translate” their communication by means of protocol adapters (wrappers), so that they can nevertheless transmit data securely to the Cloud of Things.
For TLS-enabled hardware (gateways, routers, etc.) Telekom conducts a
basic compatibility test of a number of technical parameters before connecting it to the Cloud of Things. In a quick test that does not map any
customer use cases, Telekom checks, inter alia, whether measurement
data and events can be sent and written via https to the standard API.
Via the Cloud of Things users can, inter alia, view the location of their connected devices, and
install firmware updates.
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Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
THE BASIS: SECURE PROFESSIONAL CLOUD DATA CENTERS
Without powerful and highly secure data centers, cloud computing is not
feasible on the Internet of Things. To prove the security of information at
data centers, there is a large number of certifications that are recognized
nationally and internationally.
The most important international information safety management system
(ISMS) certificate testifies to the fulfillment of ISO/IEC 27001 requirements.
ISO/IEC 27001 defines, inter alia, the requirements for the manufacture,
implementation, operation, monitoring, review, maintenance and improvement of a documented ISMS. It shows whether a data center operator
­implements the standard’s requirements, and specifies the risks within
the entire organization. The ISMS thus forms the basis for selecting suitable and appropriate security controls. It specifies the instruments and
methods with which the management comprehensibly directs, plans,
­deploys, implements, monitors and improves tasks and activities aimed ­
at ensuring information security.
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has based its “IT-Grundschutz” on this standard since 2005. It offers ISO 27001 certification based
on this basic IT protection. In the German-speaking region it is one of the
most trustworthy certificates in the IT sector. It counts as proof of compliance
with IT-Grundschutz as defined by the BSI. IT-Grundschutz requirements
are much more detailed than those of ISO/IEC 27001 and thus constitute
a good best practice collection for implementing the international standard.
22
In its benchmark paper the BSI recommends at least the international
ISO/IEC 27001 standard as a basic requirement for eve­ry cloud provider.
The standard is important wherever protection of confidential data must
be ensured, and that includes cloud computing. Other certificates include
EuroCloud Deutschland_eco e.V.’s EuroCloud SaaS Star Audit and the
SAS 70 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
or corresponding certificates issued by the Cloud Security Alliance. Even
though companies can prove with these certificates that their data centers
achieve a high level of security, they are not stand­ards explicitly designed
for cloud computing, and do not cover the special risks that result from the
cloud architecture. So it remains to be said that to this day, no de facto
standard exists that fulfills the special data security and data protection
provisions in the cloud that German law requires.
If data center operators want to achieve ISO 27001 certification, they
must have their business processes audited by an auditor who is qualified
to undertake ISO 27001 audits. That applies to both the international
ISO/IEC 27001 certificate and the ISO 27001 certificate that is based on
IT-Grundschutz. The audit is conducted in two phases on the basis of a
specified verification schedule. The auditor checks reference documents,
carr­ies out on-site checks, and compiles a final audit report and corresponding certification recommendation. The certification body checks
the audit report, releases it, and if the result is positive, a certificate is issued.
Security on the Industrial internet of things DATA PLATFORMS FOR INDUSTRY 4.0 APPLICATIONS – THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING ON THE IOT
TELEKOM’S BIERE DATA CENTER
The auditor bases his report on a catalog of criteria that includes security
guideline issues, and deals with security requirements and risks. His findings must exceed a certain threshold. This certification is recognized
worldwide as a standard and a must for all cloud providers. If a data center
operator has an ISO 27001 certificate, customers can be sure that the
company fulfills the security standards required, and that their data is safe
from third-party access.
Telekom cloud data centers and product development processes are all
certificated to the international ISO/IEC 27001 standard, and certifications
are reviewed at regular intervals.
Germany’s largest cloud data center is taking shape in Biere near
Magdeburg. The twin site of Biere and Magdeburg is set to become
a significant hub of the IT and telco provider’s global data center infrastructure. On completion the newbuild in Biere will be the largest cloud
data center in Germany and one of the largest in Europe. The twin site’s
present IT production area of 5,400 square meters can hold around
30,000 servers, and can be expanded to a total of nearly 40,000 square
meters. With this data center Telekom is ready to meet the burgeoning
demand for secure cloud services from Germany. The building complexes
are sealed off and maximum security protects data from unauthorized
access. The combination of high-performance data centers and swift,
secure networks is essential to take forward technological developments
such as Industry 4.0, the Internet of Things or Big Data analytics.
23
Security on the Industrial internet of things RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
Organizing security on the industrial Internet of Things is a complex task. As the contents of this white paper
show, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Total security is just as unrealistic as the desire to implement
security measures once and for all, and then to shelve the issue. Security remains a moving target, and IT
security strategies and measures require constant further development.
Even though no approach exists that solves all internal and external
problems at one fell swoop, a number of effective safeguards involving
encryption and authentication have emerged. The greatest possible
­security, it appears, is achieved by a combination of methods, technologies
and products. At the same time plant and equipment manufacturers, network operators, software and ICT service providers must join forces to take
forward the establishment of common standards for data traffic on the IoT.
In detail, Deutsche Telekom recommends bearing the following
points in mind:
• Most companies have ground to make good in securing IT infrastructures.
At present only around one in four has an IT security strategy of its own
that it regularly reviews and updates. At the beginning of the age of
­Industry 4.0, the introduction of a binding cross-company security strategy
that covers both IT security and operational safety is indispensable.
• The implementation of any security strategy should be based on a risk
analysis of the company’s infrastructure and corporate assets. On the
basis of the actual and target positions as regards acceptable risks,
a realistic assessment can be made of which methods, technologies
and products the individual company should implement.
24
• Security on the IoT should be preventive and proactive in alignment, and
follow an integrated Security by Design approach to product and process development that keeps an eye on the protection of plant and of
IT infrastructure in equal measure. In software development, IT security
starts with the first line of code, and in the procurement of hardware
and software purchasing certificated products is advisable.
• An Industry 4.0 security architecture should take to heart the principles
of the defense-in-depth approach, and be multistage in structure. Generating awareness among employees, guidelines for the physical security
of plant and machinery, a security framework for the corporate network
“hardening” of computers and equipment, and binding regulations on
authentication of people and machines are all among the basics of any
defense-in-depth strategy.
• In industrial networks external interfaces, and handover and access
points are increasingly targeted by hackers who, by attacking IT security,
trigger follow-on attacks on operational safety, and often go unnoticed
for longer period. To prevent this from happening, prevention, detection
and reaction capabilities must be established or extended at companies.
Security on the Industrial internet of things RECOMMENDATIONS
• Encryption of data traffic, combined with unequivocal authentication
of people and machines, ensures a high level of security. That is why
developing trustworthy certification bodies and clear, forgery-proof
identities along the value chain is a fundamental prerequisite for collaboration in industrial networks.
• Industry 4.0 applications bring with them fresh storage challenges for
companies. Smart sensors generating enormous amounts of data to
be processed by data analytics programs (predictive analytics, data
mining) in many cases make the involvement of external special service providers indispensable – providers who need to be connected to
the networks via secure interfaces. To cope with the requisite storage
and security requirements, data platforms like the Cloud of Things are
suitable because they can also take over the control of machines and
automated processes.
• Industry 4.0 eliminates the distinction between office IT and production
IT with its automated processes. To ensure security from sensors to
Office applications it is advisable to merge responsibilities for both in a
central security management department. With the increasing fusion of
corporate networks and entire value creation networks, each with their
different protection requirements, the importance of coordinating security measures not only in one’s own company but also in dealings with
Industry 4.0 partners and service providers is on the increase.
• Industry 4.0 ushers in cross-enterprise connection and integration in
value networks. To shape cooperation of this kind, the development of
uniform common standards is necessary, as is a reference architecture
for describing and implementing them.
25
Security on the Industrial internet of things ANNEX
ANNEX
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard: an encryption process that guarantees
a very high level of security.
API – Application Programming Interface: is provided by a software system
for other programs and serves to connect them to the system.
APN – Access Point Name: the name of the (entry and exit) gateway between
the backbone (the basic network with high transmission rates) of a mobile
network, and an external packet-based data network like the public Internet.
APT – Advanced Persistent Threat: a complex, sophisticated, long-lasting
attack on critical IT infrastructures and confidential data held by government institutions and companies of all sizes and in all industries. The aim
is to penetrate deeply into the target’s IT infrastructure and to remain
­undetected for a long time in order to spy out important information and/or
cause maximum damage such as business downtimes.
Bluetooth – a wireless standard for data transmission between devices in
close range such as PCs and peripherals.
BSI – (Germany’s) Federal Office for Information Security.
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team: IT security experts who
work on the resolution of specific incidents such as new security vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems, or on viruses or targeted attacks,
and issue security warnings or assess security risks.
CPS – Cyber-physical System: software components, sensors and actuators
create with mechanical and electronic parts a system and communicate
(wirelessly and by wire) via a data infrastructure such as the Internet. CPSs
serve to monitor and control production and business processes, value
chains, factories and traffic routes, etc.
DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service: unavailability of a service due to a
targeted attack by a large number of other systems on a server or other
network components.
E2E – End to End: covering an entire data transmission route from one
end to the other; frequently used in connection with encryption and other
security issues.
Ethernet: a network technology that specifies software and hardware
such as cables, network cards and the like for wired data networks, and
enables data transmission rates of between 10 megabits and 100 gigabits
per second.
ICS/IACS – Industrial Control Systems, aka Industrial Automation and
Control Systems: generic term for automated control and surveillance
­systems at industrial plants and so-called critical infrastructures (such ­as
those of power utilities).
ICT – Information and Communication Technology.
IoT – Internet of Things (also known as the Internet of Everything).
IP – Internet Protocol: a standardized procedure for the transmission of
data in packet-switched computer networks. Version IPv6 complements
Version IPv4, which has run out of addresses. IPv6 permits the allocation
of 340 sextillion addresses (a sextillion is a 1 followed by 36 zeros).
LAN – Local Area Network: a local network at a company or a public
authority.
26
LPWA – Low Power Wide Area networks or the Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT)
are new technologies aimed at providing a publicly available wireless communication network for M2M applications or the Internet of Things (IoT).
LTE – Long Term Evolution: the fourth-generation (4G) mobile network standard,
the successor to UMTS. With LTE download rates of up to 300 megabits per
second are possible.
M2M – Machine-to-Machine Communication: automated data and information
exchange between machines, vending machines, vehicles, containers and
other terminal devices, or with a central switchboard that runs on the Internet,
the mobile network or other access networks.
OTA – Over the Air: an OTA update is a wireless system update (or embedded
firmware update) via a wireless interface such as a smartphone or tablet.
PLC – Programmable Logic Control: a device that is used in industry for control
or regulation and is connected to plant or machinery with sensors and actuators.
PLCs are increasingly replacing built-in wired programmed controllers.
RFID – Radio-Frequency Identification: a technology that uses electromagnetic
waves for automatic, contactless recording and identification of physical
objects.
RZ – Abbreviation of the German word for data center: Rechenzentrum.
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition: SCADA systems collect
and analyze real-time data, monitor and control technical processes, and thereby
optimize industrial facilities. They are used, inter alia, at power generation and
distribution plants (smart grids), telecommunications facilities, chemical plants
or in vehicle production.
TLS – Transport Layer Security: an encryption protocol for data transmission
and further development of Secure Socket Layers (SSLs).
VPN – Virtual Private Network: a closed communication network that uses
another communication network as a transport medium, such as in the form
of a VPN tunnel through the public Internet.
WAN – Wide Area Network: a supra-regional network that can extend across
countries and entire continents. WANs serve, inter alia, to connect LANs with
one another.
WLAN – Wireless Local Area Network: a wireless local radio network.
Security on the Industrial internet of things ANNEX
SOURCES AND FURTHER LITERATURE
IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER
acatech Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften:
Deutschlands Zukunft als Produktionsstandort sichern.
Umsetzungsempfehlungen für das Zukunftsprojekt Industrie 4.0.
Abschlussbericht des Arbeitskreises Industrie 4.0
Accenture technology: Driving Unconventional Growth through the
Industrial Internet of Things.
Amine M. Houyou et al.: Agile Manufacturing General Challenges and an
IoT@Work Perspective
Auf dem Weg ins vierte industrielle Zeitalter, Bekanntmachung des
Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung von Richtlinien zur
Förderung im Themenfeld Industrie 4.0:
http://www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/24078.php
Bitkom/Fraunhofer IAO: Industrie 4.0 – Volkswirtschaftliches Potenzial für
Deutschland. Studie Bitkom/VDMA/ZVEI: Plattform Industrie 4.0. Industrie
4.0 – White Paper F&U-Themen Bitkom/VDMA/ZVEI: Umsetzungsstrategie
Industrie 4.0. Ergebnisbericht der Plattform Industrie 4.0
Bitkom: Spionage, Sabotage und Datendiebstahl – Wirtschaftsschutz im
digitalen Zeitalter. Studienbericht.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI): Industrial
Control System Security. Top-10-Bedrohungen und Gegenmaßnahmen
2014
BSI: Abwehr von DDoS-Angriffen v1.0, https://www.allianz-fuercybersicherheit.de/ACS/DE/_downloads/sofortmassnahmen/BSI-CS_002.html
BSI: Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014
BSI: ICS-Security-Kompendium 2013
BSI: ICS-Security-Kompendium. Testempfehlungen und Anforderungen für
Hersteller von Komponenten, Stand 19.11.2014.
BSI: M 4.396 Schutz vor unerlaubter automatisierter Nutzung von
Webanwendungen, https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/ITGrundschutz/
ITGrundschutzKataloge/Inhalt/_content/m/m04/m04396.html
CeBIT 2015: Industrie-4.0-Lösungen für die vernetzte Produktion:
https://www.telekom.com/medien/konzern/271942
Cesar Cerrudo: An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to
Cyber Attacks
Cisco/Rockwell Automation: Design Considerations for Securing
Industrial Automation and Control System Networks. Synopsis.
Deutsche Telekom: Datenschutz und Datensicherheit. Bericht 2014.
Digitale Erneuerung: Harvard Business Manager Dezember 2014, S.63 ff.
EY: Cybersecurity and the Internet of Things
Finding Success in the New IoT Ecosystem: Market to Reach $ 3.04 Trillion
and 30 Billion Connected “Things” in 2020, IDC Says:
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141107005028/en/FindingSuccess-IoT-Ecosystem-Market-Reach-3.04
Fraunhofer-Institut für Arbeitswirtschaft und Organisation (IAO):
Produktionsarbeit der Zukunft – Industrie 4.0 Studie Gehackte Smart Meter
machen Lichter aus. http://www.golem.de/news/intelligente-stromzaehlergehackte-smart-meter-machen-lichter-aus-1410-109923.html
Gemeinsame Plattform Industrie 4.0 startet:
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=701050.html
Handelsblatt Research Institut: Industrie 4.0. und Digitalisierung im
Mittelstand. Einstellung der KMU zum Thema und ihre Hürden bei der
Umsetzung.
HP: Internet of Things Security Study: Home Security Systems Report
IDC: Grundlage für das Internet der Dinge und die Industrie 4.0: Der
M2M-Markt in Deutschland 2012–2017. Marktanalyse Industrie-4.0Paket, https://geschaeftskunden.telekom.de/startseite/loesungen/
sicherheit/185534/industrie-4-0-paket.html
Infrastrukturen und Industrie im Kreuzfeuer:
http://www.security-insider.de/themenbereiche/plattformsicherheit/
schwachstellen-management/articles/487572/
Inhyok Cha et al.: Security and Trust for M2M Communications,
Interview mit Prof. Dr. Claudia Eckert. Internet der Dinge und Industrie
4.0 benötigen mehr IT-Security: „Gezielte Manipulationen durch
Fernzugriffe sind ein großes Risiko“,
https://wegweisend-digital.t-systems-mms.com/interviews/ClaudiaEckert-Internet-der-Dinge?wt_mc=osm_3:15:15
Magnus Sundell et al.: White Paper on Industrial Automation Security
in Fieldbus and Field Device Level
Mit der Cloud ins Internet der Dinge – aber wie?
http://ikt.nrw.de/cyber-physical-nrw-profilieren/news/einzelmeldung/
article/mit-der-cloud-ins-internet-der-dinge-aber-wie/
Mobile IP VPN. Die Daten-U-Bahn. https://geschaeftskunden.telekom.
de/startseite/loesungen/sicherheit/185534/industrie-4-0-paket.html
NCC Group: Security of Things: An Implementers’ Guide to CyberSecurity for Internet of Things Devices and Beyond
Sicheres Netz für das Netz: http://www.telekom.com/innovation/
archiv/280466
Sicherheitstechnik zum Schutz der Industrie 4.0, http://www.securityinsider.de/themenbereiche/applikationssicherheit/kommunikationssicherheit/articles/463959
So trickst der geniale deutsche Datenbunker die USA aus, http://
www.welt.de/wirtschaft/webwelt/article147483300/So-trickst-dergeniale-deutsche-Datenbunker-die-USA-aus.htm
Strategy Analytics Industrie 4.0: “The Driving Force behind Europe’s
Industrial Internet”
TecChannel Compact: IT im Mittelstand. Praxis, Ratgeber, Trends.
techconsult: Industrie 4.0 – Vernetzung braucht IT-Sicherheit
Telekom Deutschland: mittelstand Die Macher Ausgabe 01, März 2015
The Great SIM Heist. How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption
Castle. https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
The Internet of Things will be a $3 trillion industry by 2020, http://
www.techradar.com/news/internet/cloud-services/the-internet-ofthings-will-be-a-3-trillion-industry-by-2020-1272263
Tobias Heer et al.: Security Challenges in the IP-based Internet of Things
27