Wesleyan University
The Honors College
The Apolitical Activist: East Germany's New Forum and
the History of German Grassroots Movements
by
Madalene Smith-Huemer
Class of 2014
A thesis submitted to the
faculty of Wesleyan University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
with Departmental Honors in History and German Studies
Middletown, Connecticut
April, 2014
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ii
ABBREVIATIONS
iii
INTRODUCTION
1
CHAPTER 1
11
CHAPTER 2
40
CHAPTER 3
67
CONCLUSION
92
BIBLIOGRAPHY
97
i Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Erik Grimmer-Solem,
Professor Iris Bork-Goldfield, and Professor Leo Lensing, my thesis advisors, for
their continued support and guidance throughout the writing process. In addition, I
would like to thank Professor Jennifer Tucker, my research supervisor for the
Davenport Fellowship and White Grant. Finally, I wish to thank the staff at The
Robert Havemann Archive for allowing me to use their materials, as well as Tom
Sello and Marianne Birthler, who were gracious enough to answer my questions
about their experiences in East Berlin.
ii ABBREVIATIONS
CDU
Christian Democratic Union
FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
GDR
German Democratic Republic
RHA
Robert Havemann Archive
SED
Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SPD
Social Democratic Party of Germany
iii INTRODUCTION
"I believe that New Forum should continue to be what it was originally
founded to be, namely a citizens' initiative, a nonpartisan platform whose
mission is the discussion, debate, and submission of opinions."
"I want to engage in politics, but I do not want to be bound by party
discipline."
"What interests me are the opinions of the citizens of our country."1
These quotes, taken from the correspondences of New Forum members
throughout 1989 and 1990, illustrate some of the prevailing sentiments of the largest
opposition organization during the final months of the German Democratic Republic.
New Forum, which was founded in mid-September of 1989 by East German dissident
Bärbel Bohley and several other activists, was intended to be a platform that would
open up the sphere of civil society, allowing citizens to voice their political and social
concerns.2 Throughout the fall of 1989, a period that some historians have called the
"Peaceful Revolution,"3 New Forum became the leading organization at the Monday
night Leipzig demonstrations, eventually attracting a following of over 200,000
members.4 Yet, despite the popularity of New Forum, the organization never chose to
become a political party.
1
Diskussion: Partei oder nicht Partei [Discussion: Party or Non-party], 1989, Press Releases, New
Forum Papers, Robert Havemann Archive, Berlin. "Ich bin der Auffassung, daß das Neue Forum das
bleiben sollte, als was es gegründet wurde, nämlich eine Bürgerinitiative, eine überparteiliche
Plattform, deren Aufgabe die Diskussion, Meinungsbildung und Unterbreitung von Vorschlägen ist…
Ich möchte mich zwar politisch engagieren, aber nicht an eine Parteidisziplin gebunden sein… Was
mich interessieren würde, ist die Meinung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in unserem Lande."
2
Elizabeth Pond, "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR,"
International Security 15, no. 2 (1990): 35-66, here: 42.
3
Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany, 1918-2000: The Divided Nation (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2002).
4
Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945-1989 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 156.
1 The problem of New Forum's apolitical identity, which was the main cause of
its rapid decline throughout die Wende (the turn), the initial period of German
reunification, has occupied countless scholars of East German history. Considering
the immense popularity and political potential of the group, why did its leadership
remain adamant about abstaining from party politics? As the Socialist Unity Party
(SED) of East Germany continued its steady decline, it became increasingly clear that
a political void was beginning to open. Initially, the general opinion among East
German demonstrators was that a new political system should replace the corrupt
single-party system of the GDR. Hence, a popular chant at the Leipzig demonstrators,
"Wir sind das Volk" (We are the people), demonstrated both the unity of the protest
movement and a divide between the East German public and the SED regime.5
Despite the opportunity afforded to New Forum by the decline of the SED, its leaders
chose to register as an organization, not a party. Several weeks later, the fall of the
Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 created a colossal shift in the direction of the East
German opposition movement. Rather than chanting "Wir sind das Volk," as
demonstrators had done throughout the months of September and October, the people
now rallied behind "Wir sind ein Volk" (We are one people), indicating a movement
towards German reunification. Once this shift in public opinion had taken place, it
became increasingly difficult for New Forum to maintain its political influence, as
West German politicians quickly intervened within a hasty process of German
reunification.
5
David F. Patton, "Annus Mirabilis: 1989 and German Unification," in The Oxford Handbook of
Modern German History, ed. Helmut Walser Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 753.
2 Considering the growing popularity of New Forum, why was the organization
so insistent upon remaining apolitical or even anti-political throughout the final
months of East Germany's existence? After the ousting of SED officials, the GDR
experienced a political interim period, in which a series of public forums, known as
Round Tables, attempted to redirect the country on a more democratic path.
Throughout this phase, New Forum played a leadership role, interacting with parties
on both the left and right, and ultimately succeeding in planning the GDR's first
democratic elections for March of 1990. In addition to organizing and supervising
several Round Table forums, New Forum leaders spent much of late 1989 and early
1990 publishing a wealth of press releases, academic studies, and other documents
related to its idea of the Third Way. Neither unification with West Germany, nor a
continuation of the SED's oppressive status quo, the Third Way was intended as a
middle path towards a reformed democratic socialism. Yet, despite New Forum's
immense concern for the political future of East Germany, the organization never
evolved into a political party and could not participate in the national elections.
Instead, the group gave its support to Bündnis '90 (Alliance '90), a political merger of
several different opposition groups from the fall of 1989, which had minimal success
in the elections, but later merged with the West German Greens to form Alliance
'90/The Greens.
The puzzle of New Forum's apolitical identity raises a number of questions.
Most obviously: why was New Forum committed to remaining apolitical when there
would have been clear advantages to political partisanship? Was this decision purely
a result of the organization's disillusionment with the SED, or was there, perhaps, an
3 additional set of reasons that led New Forum to shy away from party politics? How
was New Forum's decision to remain apolitical connected to its conception of a Third
Way between capitalism and socialism? In many ways, the Third Way itself was
intended to be above the realm of partisan politics, or a product of Überparteilichkeit.
Hence, it is possible that there was some connection between the apolitical dimension
of New Forum and its arguably anti-political belief in a Third Way. Finally, the
question that is most important for how the group is viewed today asks whether New
Forum's political decline within German reunification implies that the organization
somehow failed. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to investigate the
political goals of the organization. While New Forum may have failed in
implementing the Third Way, it was perhaps not a failure on a larger, metapolitical
level. Alternately, did the apolitical nature of New Forum in any way enhance its
social and political goals, and, if yes, how was this achieved?
Historians of East German history have dealt with the problem of New
Forum's apolitical identity in a number of ways. Some authors, including Christian
Joppke in East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989, have attempted to
explain New Forum's apolitical bent by arguing that the organization was not as
revolutionary as advertised. 6 In fact, Joppke argues that New Forum's Third Way was
merely a reoccurrence of earlier attempts to implement a revised version of socialism
in the GDR. "The founding manifesto of New Forum was also a manifestation of the
revisionism that still characterized opposition in East Germany."7 Although the
socialist aspects of New Forum's Third Way did resemble theories of socialist
6
Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist
Regime (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
7
Ibid., 141.
4 revisionism to some degree, Joppke's argument does not account for the democratic
elements with which the group identified. In fact, New Forum may have been too
revolutionary for the context of the communist GDR, leading many East German
citizens to side with the arguably safer route of German reunification. Ultimately,
Joppke's reading of New Forum as non-revolutionary overemphasizes the effect of
the GDR's socialist institutions on the character of the group. Rather, the organization
was just as influenced by apolitical and anti-political activism in the West as it was by
earlier movements of socialist revisionism in the GDR.
Whereas some scholars of the Revolution of 1989 have related this final phase
of opposition to earlier dissident movements in the GDR, others have investigated the
specific cultural and sociopolitical circumstances that allowed New Forum (among
other groups) to overthrow the regime. Gareth Dale, author of The East German
Revolution of 19898 and Popular Protest in East Germany,9 links the apolitical
identity of New Forum to the character of East German street protest. New Forum
"became a 'flag' that signified a general oppositional stance… but flags can relatively
easily be dropped as others become available."10 Thus, Dale argues that East German
demonstrators, and not New Forum's leadership, were the real determinants of the
organization's path. Although pressure from the masses undoubtedly influenced New
Forum to become a platform of East German opposition and likely affected its
decision to remain apolitical, Dale's approach is ultimately too narrow to account for
all of the factors that prevented the organization from registering as a political party.
While ignoring the external influences of West German activism and simultaneous
8
Gareth Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006).
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany.
10
Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989, 112.
9
5 revolutions in the Soviet bloc, Dale also does not account for the historical
antecedents that led New Forum to take this perplexing position on political
partisanship.
In addition to approaches that deal with the apolitical nature of New Forum by
labeling the organization as non-revolutionary or a 'flag' of greater street protest,
countless other explanations have been offered as to why the organization never
became a political party. In "Annus Mirabilis: 1989 and German Unification,"11
historian Robert Patton's only explanation for why New Forum chose to register as an
organization, and not a political party, was that organizations were within the bounds
of legality, whereas parties were not. Other authors attempt to explain the apolitical
path of New Forum as arising out of its mistrust for the SED. Thus, in Exit-Voice
Dynamics,12 Steven Pfaff writes, "Above all New Forum wanted to avoid the rise of a
new political elite."13 Hence, Pfaff implies that New Forum's condemnation of
parliamentary politics was a result of negative experiences under the SED regime.
Even in historian Konrad Jarausch's seminal book The Rush to German Unity,14 New
Forum's apolitical Third Way is depicted primarily as a reaction to the two unwanted
extremes of the SED regime and Western capitalism.
Thus, the existing literature on New Forum has tended to address the problem
of its apolitical nature by suggesting that it was a reaction to some external influence.
The organization is perceived as a canvas upon which social and political trends were
revealed, but one that never served to influence these trends. Whether pressure from
11
Patton, "Annus Mirabilis: 1989 and German Unification."
Steven Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and
the Revolution of 1989 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
13
Ibid., 199.
14
Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
12
6 the masses, legal restrictions, or the fear of repeating the past, historians have
provided any number of reasons for the group's grassroots apolitical identity. Yet, all
of these solutions fail to provide New Forum with any autonomy as a political actor,
and thus fail to understand the organization for what it truly was.
The reason behind this inadequacy within the existing literature on New
Forum is not necessarily poor logic. Rather, the real problem has to do with the
methodology used by historians writing about New Forum and the Revolution of
1989. A commonality between most, if not all, of the literature is that historians have
investigated and analyzed New Forum solely within the context of East Germany.
Although a few scholars, such as Christian Joppke, have attempted to create
connections between New Forum and earlier reform organizations of the GDR, the
organization has yet to be investigated outside the parameters of its communist
setting. Hence, scholars have treated New Forum within a temporal and spatial
vacuum, one that does not consider the influence of international and historical forces
on the apolitical path of the organization and the Third Way. By investigating
similarities between the apolitical activism of New Forum and grassroots movements
throughout other periods of German history, it should become clear that the
organization was not unique in its apolitical or even anti-political beliefs. New
Forum's apolitical identity does not seem so peculiar if the historical lens is widened
to consider grassroots movements in Germany's past more broadly.
This thesis will utilize a methodological approach that has not yet been
explored by historians of New Forum and the Third Way. By treating the organization
as one historical instance of grassroots reform, and not, as has been done, a political
7 anomaly within the GDR, the problem of its apolitical identity will begin to make
sense. Rather than investigating the specific factors within the GDR that influenced
the apolitical path of New Forum, the organization will be investigated through a
comparison to grassroots and extra-parliamentary movements of the Wilhelmine and
Weimar eras. By widening the historical lens, this thesis will attempt to portray New
Forum, not as a reactionary, passive object, but as a political actor. Furthermore, this
approach will involve widening the spatial lens to consider the external influences of
grassroots activism and anti-parties of West Germany. Did non-traditional parties
such as the West German Green Party influence New Forum to identify as apolitical,
and, if yes, how so? Through a comparison between New Forum and grassroots
movements throughout Germany history, a fuller, more complex explanation for its
apolitical nature will begin to take shape.
In addition to creating a more thorough analysis of East Germany's New
Forum, widening the historical perspective will allow for an investigation of the
larger significance of apolitical activism throughout German history. What is the
meaning of grassroots activism to the German political identity and what are its
defining features? Although New Forum has been primarily understood through its
apolitical identity, it possessed many other defining qualities. By investigating some
of these features, such as environmentalism, social reform, and alternative lifestyles,
it becomes possible to relate New Forum to other reform initiatives throughout
German history. Furthermore, through a comparison of the political contexts in which
Third Way movements arose, one can begin to understand the reasons behind their
creation. What factors have pushed German citizens to engage in apolitical reform?
8 Are apolitical Third Way movements in any way a result of oppressive political
environments? Although several historians have suggested that the oppressive SED
regime led New Forum to condemn parliamentary politics, this claim can be better
substantiated through historical comparison.
In order to solve the puzzle that is New Forum's apolitical identity, this thesis
will argue that its character was not solely a product of the communist GDR. Rather,
West German and historical manifestations of grassroots reform influenced the
organization to oppose party politics in the interest of a superior political system. This
thesis will be divided into three chapters, each of which utilizes a different form of
analysis. Chapter one, "New Forum and the Apolitical Third Way," will investigate
the defining features of the organization as they were manifested in the fall of 1989
and into 1990. Included among these features are, the intellectual character of New
Forum's membership, its apolitical strategies, and the utopian content of its Third
Way philosophy, which will be explored in order to provide a basic understanding of
the organization. Chapter two, "The Defining Features of German Apolitical
Reform," will begin to unpack the most essential elements of apolitical reform
movements throughout German history, namely a focus on nature, grassroots
organization, a commitment to social reform, and a counter-cultural identity. Through
an analysis of these features within a broader historical context, a clearer picture of
German apolitical reform should begin to emerge. Finally, chapter three, "Historical
Instances of German Apolitical Organization," will consist of four historical examples
of apolitical movements: the West German Green Party, Weimar-era synthesis
ideology, the political philosophy of Weimar architects, and socialist revisionism.
9 These four test cases, while in some ways unrelated to New Forum, will also reveal
the extent to which apolitical activism is embedded within German political culture.
Thus, New Forum's apolitical identity was not solely a reaction to political
circumstances; it was also the conscious effort to reform East Germany through the
historically tested practice of grassroots apolitical reform.
10 CHAPTER 1
NEW FORUM AND THE APOLITIAL THIRD WAY
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, citizens of the GDR, their neighbors in West
Germany, and people throughout the world rejoiced at the destruction of this symbol
of political oppression. Yet, the period following this event, also known as Die
Wende, was a tumultuous time for East Germans as the fate of their country was
initially very unclear. Some East Germans believed that a new, more progressive path
could be forged under a united Germany. Others looked to West Germany merely in
expectation of increased material goods and job opportunities. Yet, even as German
reunification appeared increasingly likely (it was the desired outcome of West
German chancellor Helmut Kohl), many dissidents championed another cause. New
Forum, still the largest civic organization in the GDR, was, on the whole, less
attracted to the capitalist West, believing that there was still more to be done in an
autonomous GDR. For the majority of New Forum's membership, the Third Way
constituted a theoretically perplexing yet ultimately hopeful political vision for the
future of East Germany. This chapter will explore exactly what the Third Way was,
its apolitical dimensions, and its limitations within a hasty process of reunification.
Historical Context: The Revolution of 1989
The mass demonstrations that occurred in Leipzig (and in cities throughout
the GDR) during the fall of 1989 were in no way spontaneous or the point at which
formerly obedient citizens decided that they had finally had enough. Rather, it was
the culmination of decades of dissident behavior, the moment in which a variety of
11 political and social factors combined to make a movement of opposition possible,
even under the suffocating surveillance of the SED regime. Between the June 17,
1953 workers' uprising in East Berlin and the 1989 Monday night demonstrations in
Leipzig, there were countless instances of nonconformity. Whether a political joke
during a lunch break, a writer's hints at injustice, an attempted escape, or a bike
demonstration through the streets of Berlin, dissent took a variety of forms in the
GDR. As outlined in Detlev Peuker's book Inside Nazi Germany, dissident behavior
can constitute many different actions, depending on the scope of the criticism and the
sphere of the activity, from nonconformity and refusal all the way to protest and
resistance.15
Although the civic movement during the fall of 1989 represented the crux of
opposition in the GDR, the content and character of grassroots activism had been
evolving throughout the 1980s. From petition campaigns to unofficial strikes, East
German dissidents undertook a variety of methods to unsettle the East German status
quo. Yet, reform in the GDR was quite unlike the political activities of alternative
groups in democratic states, such as the Green Party of the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). Former leading member of the environmental organization Umwelt
Bibliothek (Environmental Library), Tom Sello describes alternative methods of
nonconformity: "It wasn't like in a normal society, where people could come together
and form a party or a group. That wasn't possible in the GDR. One had to use the
available options. For example we had bike demonstrations. We couldn't have actual
15
Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 83.
12 demonstrations, so we rode on bikes."16 Marianne Birthler, former member of the
reform group Solidarische Kirche (Solidarity Church), confirms Sello's claim about
East German opposition, stating that no one would have called themselves a
resistance group in the GDR or would even have considered that they were opposing
the government.17 In the GDR, most reform organizations functioned within the
bounds of legality, a strategy that New Forum maintained through its official political
registration and its reconciliatory stance towards the SED regime.
In 1989 a series of both domestic and international events accelerated the path
of opposition and allowed the grassroots movement to transform from a quiet reform
milieu into a nation-wide civic initiative. In the national elections in May of 1989,
routine fraud on behalf of the SED produced an official vote of 98.85 percent, despite
church observers who had been allowed to monitor voting polls reporting a lower
number.18 Although over two hundred fifty civil rights groups filed suit against the
government, all of them were ignored. Similar levels of fraud had undoubtedly been
occurring over the last forty years, but by the spring of 1989, the SED's moderate
toleration of grassroots reform had proven detrimental to its otherwise oppressive
reign.19 Following the May elections, more than one hundred scattered protests
throughout the GDR demanded the "liberalization of domestic policy" and began to
16
Tom Sello, interview by author, Berlin, July 18, 2013. "Aber das war eben nicht so wie in freien
Gesellschaften, da man sagt, ja gut, den finden sich die Leute zusammen, und schliess mal eine
zusammende gruppende Partei oder eine Gruppe oder eine Interessenvertretung. Das war in der DDR
nicht möglich. Man musste sehen, wie man unter den Möglichkeiten, die da waren, irgendetwas
ansprechen könnte. Das war zum Beispiel so ein Versuch... man macht mal eine Art Fahrrad-Demo,
also eine Demonstration gab es eigentlich nicht, war nicht möglich, also ist man mit Fahrrädern
gefahren."
17
Marianne Birthler, interview by author, Berlin, July 23, 2013.
18
Elizabeth Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 40.
19
Fulbrook, History of Germany, 184.
13 awaken the general public to the phoniness of the GDR's "democratic" elections.20
Thus, by operating under the uncontroversial titles of civic groups or reform
initiatives and staying within the Protestant church, opposition organizations were
able to slowly increase their influence without the immediate intervention or
censorship of the SED regime.
In addition to election fraud, several factors pushed the civic movement to
unite in opposition against the SED regime. Among these, General Secretary of the
SED Erich Honecker's refusal to accept Soviet leader Gorbachev's increasingly liberal
policies both infuriated the East German public while discrediting the GDR on an
international stage.21 After a trip to West Germany in the fall of 1987, it was expected
that Honecker would loosen the internal control system of the SED and perhaps even
attempt to create some domestic dialogue among East Germans. Yet, from 1987 to
1989, Honecker suppressed public dissent more thoroughly than ever before.22 A
separate event, Hungary's removal of its border restrictions on August 19, 1989, led
thousands of East Germans to flee the country via Czechoslovakia into Hungary. By
the fall of 1989, it had become clear that the East German government would not
change on its own accord; the opposition movement was perhaps the only possibility
for real political change.
Before delving into New Forum and the revolution of 1989, it is necessary to
consider what factors prompted the discontent of millions of citizens and led them to
risk their occupations and even their lives. Many political analysts and historians have
considered this question and tend to offer a wide array of answers. Several authors
20
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 38.
Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 36.
22
Ibid., 36.
21
14 have addressed this historical problem through a theoretical approach. In
"Criticism/Self-criticism in East Germany: Contradictions between Theory and
Practice," political psychologist Molly Andrews investigated the concepts of Marxist
criticism and self-criticism and argues that these techniques provided the foundation
for the citizens' uprising of 1989.23 In comparison, historian Steven Pfaff argues that
the crucial factors in making the revolution possible were shared grievances and
expectations of social solidarity.24 Just as there was a variety of reasons for the
apolitical character of New Forum, there were also many different motivating factors
within East German opposition. To some degree, both Marxist political philosophy
and personal ties (as well as other social and political incentives) prompted East
German citizens to participate in dissident activities.
In mid-September of 1989, activist and artist Bärbel Bohley joined with
fellow protestors to found New Forum, the first nation-wide dissident club.25 Later
that month, a series of mass demonstrations in Leipzig and in cities throughout the
GDR provided the perfect opportunity for New Forum to assert itself within the
greater grassroots movement. Distributing political pamphlets such as Aufbruch '89
(Awakening '89), the group successfully advertised itself as the new grassroots
platform for open discussion and debate. A popular chant at the Monday night
demonstrations, "Here Speaks the New Forum," indicated that the grassroots
organization had quickly become the voice of opposition.26
23
Molly Andrews, "Criticism/ Self-Criticism in East Germany: Contradictions between Theory and
Practice," Critical Sociology 24, no. 1-2 (1998): 130-153.
24
Steven Pfaff, "Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East
Germany in 1989," Social Forces 75, no. 1 (1996): 91-117.
25
Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 42.
26
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 159.
15 Although the group was initially denied official registration as a political
organization, this ruling was soon overturned when over 70,000 protestors (the
country's largest demonstration since 1953) gathered in Leipzig on October 9 to
demand democratic reform and the legalization of New Forum.27 Finally, on October
26, elected officials of the SED met with representatives of New Forum to discuss the
organization's concerns, thus demonstrating the group's political legitimacy in the
eyes of the government.28 Throughout the fall of 1989, New Forum amassed the
largest following of any opposition organization in the GDR, thus forcing the
government to recognize its political influence. During the spring of 1990, the group
continued its role as the most prominent mediator between the East German public
and its quickly faltering leadership.
Although it is widely believed that November 9, 1989, the day the Berlin Wall
fell, marked the overthrow of communist East Germany, this is perhaps only true to
the outside world. For many East German dissidents, the actual turning point in the
civic opposition movement had come approximately one month earlier, at the
Monday night demonstrations in Leipzig. Marianne Birthler explains: "For me, the
most important day of the revolution was October 9, 1989. That was the day we knew
the revolution could not be reversed. Before then, there was too much police violence
against demonstrators."29 Birthler goes on to describe the acute sense of fear that
gripped her church in Berlin and much of the nation on the night of the protest. It was
believed that all schools would be closed the following day, that blood was being
27
Ibid., 43.
Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 45.
29
Birthler, interview. July 23, 2013. "Für mich ist der wichtigste Tag der Revolution der neunte
Oktober. Das war der Tag an dem wir verstanden, dass diese Revolution jetzt unumkehrbar ist. Vorher
gab es viel Polizeigewalt gegen Demonstranten."
28
16 collected to save the injured demonstrators, and that doctors were preparing to treat
the victims of police brutality. Yet, none of these things occurred. Twenty minutes
before the march was to begin, police pulled back from the main route, allowing
demonstrators to march peacefully through Leipzig. Although the demonstrators were
lucky that police had not intervened, the lack of violence was partially due to the calls
of New Forum, which had urged participants to employ restraint if confronted by the
authorities.30 By the Monday night demonstrations in late October, over 100,000
people had signed New Forum's political platform "Awakening '89,"31 thus indicating
the group's popularity and influence across dissident circles.
Believing that an authentic East German democracy would arise through
grassroots politics, New Forum defined itself not as a party but as a platform for open
political debate. In its first publication, "Awakening '89," the group wrote: "In our
country, the communication between state and society has been destroyed."32 Thus,
the group's initial primary concern involved the government's exclusion of East
German citizens from political life, whereby the SED had lost all credibility in the
GDR. As a platform for debate, New Forum sought to create a path for change,
without dictating the outcome. Marianne Birthler describes this role: "New Forum
had an important function, because it mobilized many people before the revolution.
And many people were politically awakened, and, for the first time, gave signatures.
The other groups narrowly focused on specific issues, but the New Forum created a
30
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 164.
Ibid., 159
32
Aufbruch '89 [Awakening 89], September 9, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
31
17 mass mobilization."33 Unlike other civic groups, which focused on only one area of
social reform, New Forum desired to incorporate all social issues into a
comprehensive list of necessary reform. In order to do so, New Forum encouraged
smaller groups to redefine themselves as New Forum, declaring: "The experiences
and knowledge of members of many parties and organizations are important - that
gives life to New Forum."34 As its following grew, New Forum's political identity as
a platform for political debate began to take on new meanings. No longer just a space
for discussion, New Forum constituted the alternative path in East German society, or
what it called — the Third Way.
New Forum's Third Way
In its simplest terms, the Third Way can be assessed as a middle ground
between communism and capitalism. Disillusioned by the SED regime, but wary of
the materialist West, New Forum sought to combine the better aspects of each state.
Although some East Germans criticized New Forum for opposing reunification, the
group maintained that there was a better alternative to capitalism.35 Despite political
oppression and the extensive surveillance of the Stasi, there were many benefits to
socialism, which New Forum did not want to relinquish. For example, although the
group sought to increase civil liberties for citizens of the GDR, the state did have
33
Birthler, interview, July 23, 2013. "Das Neue Forum hat eine wichtige Funktion, weil es vor der
Revolution sehr viele Menschen mobilisiert hat. Und viele Leute sind bei dieser Gelegenheit politisch
aufgewacht und haben sich zum ersten Mal getraut mit ihren Namen zu unterschreiben, dass sie
Veränderung wollen. Die anderen Gruppen waren relativ klein und begrenzt, und nur das Neue Forum
hat solche Massen mobilisiert."
34
Grundsatzpapier [Founding Statement], January 16, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
35
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 43.
18 relatively low unemployment rates and an impressive number of social services.36
Working outside the limits of partisan politics, yet still attempting to influence the
political course of the GDR, New Forum sponsored a conference on the creation of a
“socio-ecological market economy” with limited privatization, open competition, and
currency convertibility.37 Thus, the organization sought to incorporate the economic
freedoms of a market economy while maintaining a considerable amount of
regulation and income equality.
In a document entitled "On the Reunification Plan of Pluralistic Rights," New
Forum stated: "After achieving freedom from the clutches of Stalinism, we should not
submit to the social injustices of Mr. Kohl."38 Whereas many East Germans rejoiced
at the superior market economy and seemingly infinite consumer products of the
West, these benefits of reunification failed to entice most members of New Forum.
Thus, although New Forum advocated for democratic institutions, its vision of
democracy was not West Germany. Yet, in this short leaflet, probably distributed at
one of the Leipzig demonstrations during the fall of 1989, New Forum is incredibly
vague about just what the social injustices of Mr. Kohl were. A reoccurring problem
within New Forum's political program of the Third Way, the inability to effectively
articulate problems and their desired solutions would plague the organization well
into 1990. Despite this weakness, New Forum continued to champion the Third Way,
36
Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989, 114.
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 100.
38
Zum Wiedervereinigungsplan der pluralistischen Rechte [On the Reunification Plan of Pluralistic
Rights], October 28, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Wir denken nicht daran, nachdem
wir uns aus den Klauen des Stalinismus befreit haben, mit wehenden Fahnen in die soziale
Ungerechtigkeit der 2/3-Gesellschaft eines Herrn Kohl überzulaufen."
37
19 through which the democratic civil liberties of the West would combine with the
equitable social policies of the East.
Although it can be considered an amalgam of communism and capitalism, the
leadership of New Forum often referred to their preferred political ideology as
"democratic socialism." Despite the negative connotations that the term socialism
possessed for many East German citizens, New Forum promoted an understanding of
socialism based on its original intentions. Thus, the group sought to reclaim these
forgotten definitions of socialism, e.g. a communal ethic, a commitment to welfare
and redistributive justice, and collective ownership.39 In addition to an emphasis on
the communal or collective within its ideology, New Forum expounded a
commitment to participatory democracy and disdain for voter alliances between
political parties. This was the "democratic" aspect to its theory of "democratic
socialism."40 In Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany, Pfaff
discusses the general rubric of the Third Way as a platform for human rights within
the larger framework of a democratic renewal of socialism.41 Whereas most
democracies rely on representational modes of participation, New Forum continued to
emphasize grassroots strategies, advocating direct citizen participation rather than the
parliamentary forms supported by the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
and civic organization Democratic Awakening.42
In practical terms, a "democratic socialism," situated somewhere in between
communism and capitalism, implied neither reunification with the Federal Republic
39
Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989, 113.
Ibid., 114.
41
Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany, 194.
42
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 78.
40
20 of Germany, nor a continuation of the status quo in East Germany. Rather, New
Forum and much of the opposition movement sought to create a new, arguably
utopian GDR, without travel restrictions and including many of the civil liberties
guaranteed in the West. In fact, as late as November 4, 1989, protestors still saw the
movement as a landmark event in East German history, and virtually no one
interviewed by reporters said they wanted reunification.43 Although they welcomed
support from the West, leaders of the greater opposition movement were not
interested in relinquishing their political goals in exchange for the security of Western
institutions. Having worked underground for many years, and in a number of different
grassroots organizations, protesters such as Bärbel Bohley believed that the fall of
1989 was their moment for real political change.
Although New Forum itself resembled something like an umbrella of
disparate political opinions and interest groups, it sought to expand its popular base
through a merger with several other opposition organizations. Seeking to become
more legitimate in the eyes of the SED, but not interested in running for office itself,
New Forum, along with the groups Democracy Now and the Initiative for Peace and
Human Rights, gave its support to the progressive party Bündnis '90 (Alliance '90).44
Although the party had a liberal platform including a variety of political reforms,
which it demanded from the SED government, its central statement was a refusal to
be annexed by the West, thus reflecting the interests of New Forum. In fact, one of
the first documents of Alliance '90, "Press Release of Alliance '90/The Greens," was
published at the New Forum headquarters by New Forum leader Bärbel Bohley and
43
44
Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 47.
Patton, "Annus Mirabilis," 765.
21 other members. Denouncing the SPD and CDU as inadequate and outdated parties
within a reformed East Germany,45 New Forum was instead inspired by the political
merger of the two "anti-parties" of the GDR and West Germany.
During the fall of 1989 and even into 1990, New Forum was distributing a
significant amount of literature in an attempt to publicize the discourse of a grassroots
path towards a perfected socialist state. Noting the significance of the GDR's 40th
birthday, the organization sought to distinguish between the sort of socialism
espoused by the SED and a socialist ideology that could lead to a freer, more liberal
state. In New Forum's statement on the 40th Anniversary of the GDR, the group
wrote, "The government hypocritically says that socialism is endangered, but
socialism is not threatened by a peoples' movement. Peoples' movements threaten
nothing; rather, they help to develop a communal way of life."46 Here, New Forum
alluded to the hypocrisy of the SED, suggesting that there are two forms of socialism:
one that the government abides by and one that is its original, intended form.
Furthermore, in a country in which fear and intimidation were common political
tactics, New Forum attempted to create a softer political image, one that was
rehabilitative and not forceful. In the tumultuous political environment of 1989, New
Forum sought to characterize itself as the Third Way solution by appealing to those
who still felt they had a stake in an independent GDR.
45
Presseerklärung Bündnis '90/Die Grüne [Press Release of Alliance '90/The Greens], May 16, 1990,
New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
46
Erklärung des Neuen Forum zum 40. Jahrestag der DDR [Statement of New Forum on the 40th
Anniversary of the GDR], October 10, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Der
Sozialismus, den die Regierung so scheinheilig gefährdet sieht, kann durch eine Basisbewegung nicht
bedroht sein. Bürgerinitiativen bedrohen nicht, sondern entfalten gesellschaftliches Leben."
22 Sensing the very real competition of Western political might, the group also
used messages of warning, which urged East Germans not to falter from their state's
intended course. Hence, in a press release after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the group
wrote: "Do not fail to answer the call of the state's political awakening."47 This line
from a document published just weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall evokes an
almost militant call to duty, which is eerily reminiscent of the sort of request that the
SED would have demanded of East Germans. Yet, in order to awaken citizens to the
intensity of the political climate, New Forum's publications required a decidedly
straightforward and even demanding tone. On the one hand legitimizing the group in
the eyes of the SED, the powerful language of New Forum's publications was
effective in remedying the group's reputation as a somewhat inactive, indecisive
platform for debate. In addition to warning the public about the costs of reunification,
New Forum repeatedly characterized the fall of 1989 as a revolution, despite the
variety of factors that had contributed to the decline of the SED regime. In the same
document, the group exclaims that East German citizens are "heroes of a revolution,"
who should not become sidetracked by the temptations of reunification.48 Again, New
Forum was strategic in its use of an uplifting yet urgent tone, which alerted its
followers to the seriousness of the political situation.
To fully understand the connection between New Forum's Third Way
movement and reformed socialism, it is also necessary to consider the development of
socialist ideology throughout its forty-year course in East Germany. Founded in 1949
47
Die Mauer ist gefallen [The Wall has Fallen], November 12, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers,
RHA. "Laßt euch nicht von der Forderung nach einem politischen Neuaufbau der Gesellschaft
ablenken."
48
Ibid., "Ihr seid die Helden einer politischen Revolution."
23 under Soviet occupation, the GDR's utopian conceptions of community and
socioeconomic equality were quickly degraded by the corrupt policies of the SED
ruling party. Throughout "Stalinization" of the early 1950s, Third Way Marxists were
purged from the higher ranks of the SED, allowing the Soviet Union to tighten its grip
on East Germany's political trajectory.49 Yet, the socialism espoused by intellectuals
at the founding of the GDR never really died out; it continued to circulate in
underground conversations, eventually resurfacing in the opposition movement of the
late 1980s.50 While the specific language of the Third Way is a German invention, the
realm of apolitical reform was vast and extended throughout the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. George Konrad, a Hungarian activist who eventually found refuge in
West Germany, described anti-politics as a "network of conversations uncontrollable
from above."51 Thus, the Third Way, which New Forum and other civic organizations
championed as a model for an independent East Germany in the fall of 1989, was not
a spontaneous invention. Although political manifestations of the Third Way were
diminished under the SED regime, the ideology of Überparteilichkeit and the belief
in a reformed socialism have been integral components of grassroots, apolitical
reform throughout German history.
New Forum after 1989
After the success of the Monday night demonstrations, New Forum
transitioned from its role as the leading opposition organization into a reconciliatory
49
Fulbrook, History of Germany, 226.
Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989, 207.
51
Kevin Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: Anti-Politics and the Search
for Alternatives, 1890-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 15.
50
24 middleman between the East German public and the SED. Yet in spite of its political
goals, New Forum continued to see itself as an extra-parliamentary platform for
discussion and debate — and not a political party. In "Awakening '89," the political
leaflet distributed at the Leipzig demonstrations, New Forum stated: "Together we are
building a political platform for the entire GDR, which makes it possible for people
of all professions, circles of life, and parties to take part in the discussion of the
essential societal problems of this land."52 For New Forum, apolitical activity did not
imply a reversion back to the underground settings of church basements and private
homes. Rather, the group sought a new vessel for social change outside of
parliamentary structures and apart from plans for a united Germany.
An inclusive message, "Awakening '89" was intended to demonstrate the
open-minded and unbiased nature of the organization (although it is clear that the
leading members of New Forum did hold their own political biases). Thus, the group
attempted to extend the bottom-up approach of grassroots organization to the entire
state, creating a nationwide discussion that might ultimately reach the level of actual
political change. In "Statement of the New Forum on the 40th Anniversary of the
GDR," the group self-proclaims that, "New Forum is the site for new thinking."53
While advertising itself as the creator of a new mode of politics, the group's utopian
leanings and apolitical methods were actually part of a long history of German
grassroots reform. Yet, within the oppressive context of East Germany, this concept
52
Aufbruch '89 [Awakening '89], September 9, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Wir
bilden deshalb gemeinsam eine politische Plattform für die ganze DDR, die es Menschen aus allen
Berufen, Lebenskreisen, Parteien und Gruppen möglich macht, sich an der Diskussion und
Bearbeitung lebenswichtiger Gesellschaftsprobleme in diesem Land zu beteiligen."
53
Erklärung des Neuen Forum zum 40. Jahrestag der DDR [Statement of New Forum on the 40th
Anniversary of the GDR], October 10, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Das Neue
Forum ist eine Stätte für Neues Denken."
25 of a platform for discussion and debate was unprecedented and undoubtedly exciting
for many citizens.
The central political vessel of New Forum throughout 1989 and 1990, the
Round Table forums, were intended to bridge the gap between apolitical grassroots
change and actual legislation. Like New Forum itself, the Round Table conferences
were primarily intended as a temporary platform for discussion. In "Statement of New
Forum on the 40th Anniversary of the GDR," the organization writes, "New Forum
would eventually like to become unnecessary."54 Similar to the intention behind the
organization itself, the Round Table conferences were intended as a temporary
institution on the path towards a revitalized political system. Held in several of East
Germany's major cities, the forums were intended to address a variety of economic
and social issues during this period of political transition. Although there existed a
variety of independent Round Tables, including the grassroots-oriented "Round Table
from Below," the most influential and largest forum, the "Central Round Table,"
hosted representatives from the main civic groups, as well as politicians from the
SED. It included sixteen committees that addressed topics ranging from economic
and constitutional issues to gender equality,55 thus attempting to provide a holistic
solution to the problem of political illegitimacy within the GDR. Although the
Central Round Table was New Forum's first overtly political action, the group
remained nonpartisan throughout the proceedings and played a relatively minor role
despite its immense popularity within East German society.
54
55
Ibid., "Das Neue Forum mag eines Tages entbehrlich sein."
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 86.
26 During the spring of 1990, the delegates at the Round Table were able to
agree upon and enact a variety of social measures, which began the process of
democratization even before the first truly democratic elections on March 18th.
Somewhat of an interim government itself, the Round Table cooperated with the
revived Volkskammer (parliament) to create a new election procedure and voting
laws, which were approved on February 20th. Within this reform act, changes
included a mandatory closed voting booth instead of the outdated procedure of
folding ballots in open view, an abolishment of the required minimum number of
votes for holding seats in parliament, and a clause which allowed civic associations
(not technically parties) to run for office.56 Thus, during this short period of time in
which East Germany retained some political autonomy, dominated by neither the
SED nor West Germany, considerable progress was made towards New Forum's
democratic social ideal. In addition to election reforms that mirrored the right to
privacy in the West and loosened the SED's political control, the contributions of the
Central Round Table even extended to include the civic movement, which had played
an important role in the peaceful revolution during the fall of 1989. The clause
permitting civic associations to run for office included organizations like New Forum,
thus suggesting that this interim period in East German history made some progress
towards the non-partisan Third Way. The fact that associations working outside of
party lines would have had some political say suggests that even the East German
Parliament was somewhat attracted to the radical democratic reforms posited by New
Forum.
56
Ibid., 120.
27 As delegates to the Central Round Table conferences, New Forum leaders
continued their grassroots, regional-based strategies even on the national stage. In its
application to the conference, the organization recommended election reform that
would include "local government elections in cities and regions with the aim of
creating the greatest possible autonomy and self-administration of individual
communities."57 Thus, rather than advocating top-down government reforms, New
Forum continued to focus on regional, grassroots strategies that would give East
German citizens a greater say in political and social matters. This commitment to a
regional understanding of East German political identity is reminiscent of the Heimat
movement during the Wilhelmine era, when Germany's authoritarian center was
counteracted by the reformative efforts of individual communities. Yet despite the
greater German tradition of grassroots regionalism, it proved difficult for New Forum
to reconcile its own political agenda with that of the conservative SED.58
Furthermore, organizations like New Forum were hypocritically working to dismantle
outdated, oppressive structures in solidarity with the very party that had been the
source of this oppression. Thus, although effective in enacting short-term democratic
reforms, the Round Table was unable to provide a lasting solution for East Germany,
partly because it represented the synthesis of two political enemies, who, despite their
attempted reconciliation, ultimately desired very different outcomes.
57
Antrag an den Runden Tisch [Application to the Round Table], December 19, 1989, New Forum,
New Forum Papers, RHA. "Erster Schritt: Kommunalwahlen in den Städten und Gemeinden mit dem
Ziel der größtmoglichen Eigenständigkeit und Selbstverwaltung der Kommunen."
58
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 80.
28 Who Were Third Way Intellectuals?
Essential to understanding how the New Forum operated during its brief
political life, the identity and demographics of its membership reveal a great deal
about both the organization's success and its failure. Much like grassroots movements
throughout the developed world, New Forum members were, for the most part, welleducated, successful professionals, thus suggesting an intellectual or even elite
identity within the group as a whole. Whereas blue-collar workers had more basic
pecuniary concerns, the professionals and artists of East German cities had both the
resources and historical knowledge to voice their opinions on political issues. In
"Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization," Steven
Pfaff offers a "Rational Actor Approach" theory of grassroots movements, which
views demonstrators as actors independent of organizational mobilization.59 Within
this identity driven theory, Pfaff shifts the emphasis from the institutional policies of
mass parties towards the interests and expectations of individuals. In terms of New
Forum, the Rational Actor Approach provides strong evidence as to why educated
intellectuals not only felt the need to participate in the Third Way movement, but also
composed an overwhelming majority of its membership. According to Pfaff, studies
suggest that East German citizens with higher levels of education, and thus greater
exposure to the political history of Germany, were more committed to socialist
ideology than others.60 Although one could argue that grassroots movements are
generally more elitist in membership, perhaps a better approach investigates the
motives of individual actors. In East Germany, educated professionals tended to
59
60
Pfaff, "Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization," 93.
Ibid., 210.
29 embrace the theoretical concepts of the Third Way because they were more familiar
with them, and thus more prepared to advocate on their behalf.
Whatever the cause of New Forum's heavily intellectual demographic, it is
clear that the group's arguably homogeneous membership was instrumental in
shaping its political course. Bärbel Bohley, a founding member of the organization,
was also quite perceptive about its imperfections and political mistakes. She wrote
that the interest groups from which the greater civic movement evolved "were
detached and aloof from the problems faced by the people."61 Although not a direct
implication of New Forum itself, this statement suggests a general trend in the
character of the Third Way movement, in which utopian political hopes tended to
shroud the immediacy of the collapsing state. Statistical evidence reveals a similar
picture. A survey of the Berlin New Forum membership found that almost 75% were
educated to the tertiary level, 39% described themselves as intelligentsia, 10%
percent as managers, and 10% percent as students.62 To some degree, the Third Way
movement was a sort of turning inward away from the political reality of oncoming
German reunification. Less concerned with the practical issues of currency exchange
and potential unemployment, dissident intellectuals focused on the greater ideological
question of an ideal socialism. Reminiscent of the Wilhelmine apolitical milieu,
which deflected efforts at reform away from the state and towards personal
development,63 the East German Third Way neglected the more immediate
international political issues of its time. Although the group was adept at formulating
61
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 157.
Ibid.,171
63
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 4.
62
30 well-articulated press releases and theoretical studies, it had less success in leading
the East German people once the Leipzig demonstrations had passed.
Although there were clear limitations to New Forum's popularity, the group
was actually quite skilled at social networking and tended to utilize personal
relationships in order to build political bridges. One feature, which contributed to a
rapid proliferation of the Third Way ideology, was the dominantly urban character of
the movement. Although New Forum was established in all of East Germany's major
cities, East Berlin was undoubtedly its political center.64 From there, social
solidarities arose in the private sphere between friends and associates. Tom Sello,
leader of the civic group Environmental Library, described his affinity for the
opposition movement as arising out of his own personal commitments and
friendships.65 Thus, the mobilization of grassroots groups, and especially New Forum,
appears to have reflected the organization of an already existing reform niche within
East German counter-culture.
Excluding those who had left for the West, New Forum garnered support from
friends and associates, many of whom had lived and worked together in compact,
tightknit communities for their entire lives. This "niche," so to speak, was not merely
limited to established relationships; it also attracted outsiders who wished to join the
Third Way movement. Although the group experienced difficulties in forming lasting
connections with workers and laborers, it was, at times, surprisingly successful at
attaining their support. During the fall of 1989, entire factories were known to sign
64
Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the
Revolution of 1989, 213.
65
Sello, interview, July 18, 2013.
31 the widely circulated "Awakening 89," New Forum's founding platform.66 For the
apolitical Third Way movement, which rejected nationalist propaganda and other
methods of mass appeal, social networking proved an invaluable resource in
maintaining and increasing popular support.
Partisan Politics and Apolitical Beliefs
Establishing its ambivalence about the East German government at the
beginning of its formation, New Forum went on to view political parties through a
mistrustful and sometimes jaded lens. Citing a disrupted communication between
state and society as the central problem in East Germany in the widely distributed
political pamphlet "Awakening '89,"67 New Forum sought to rehabilitate a sense of
national communication and organization. Although sometimes acting in alliance
with the SED, the group alternately had a heavily apolitical ideology. Regarding its
own political course, New Forum chose to register as an organization and not as a
party, like the Social Democrats or Alliance '90, the latter a party that it officially
supported.68 Yet, through the Round Table debates and amendments to the electoral
system, New Forum initiated a transformation of the East German government, one
that was never brought to completion. Thus, rather than reform East Germany through
parliamentary means, New Forum sought to change the political system entirely.
While apolitical in terms of organization, it could also be argued that New Forum was
66
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 178.
Aufbruch '89 [Awakening '89], December 18, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
68
It is important to note that New Forum was not able to register itself as an organization until October
31, 1989. Thus, it would have been much more difficult to enter partisan politics, even if the group had
desired to do so.
67
32 ahead of the times because it sought to create an untested system through the
synthesis of various government institutions and political philosophies.
Although the group struggled to define a clear political plan for East
Germany, it was clear on one issue: partisan politics were dangerous and tended to
promote the interests of greedy, self-interested individuals, and not the state. Thus,
after the dissolution of Krenz's government in December of 1989, New Forum
demanded a "caretaker government" that would work independently of parties.69
Intellectuals such as Dr. Pavel Strohner of Berlin attempted to offer solutions to the
corrupt single-party system of the GDR. In "People's Movements: Interest-politics or
Integral Politics?" Strohner wrote, "What do integral politics look like compared to
party politics? Are they a new element of the political system?" He went on to claim,
"The previous history of humanity showed itself as a rise and fall of cultures and
forms of government that emerged in the struggle of social forces and dissipated…
Only an integral policy that builds on the cultural achievements of Western
democracy can contribute to a meaningful development of democracy."70 This study,
belonging to an archive of New Forum materials, provides a new perspective on the
meaning of the Third Way. Employing the term "integral" to imply a sort of
wholeness to a reformed democratic theory, Strohner mirrors New Forum's calls for
political synthesis. Within New Forum, questions regarding an integral vision of
69
Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 103.
Bürgerbewegung: Interessenpolitik oder integrale Politik [People's Movements: Interest-politics or
Integral Politics], 1989, Bärbel Bohley, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Wie soll nun solche eine integrale
Politik im Gegensatz zu einer Interessen- und Parteienpolitik aussehen? Ist sie ein völlig neues
Element in der Politik?... Die bisherige Geschichte der Menschheit zeigte sich als historisches Auf und
Ab von Kulturen und Herrschaftsformen, die im Kampf sozialer Kräfte entstanden und vergingen...
Nur eine integrale Politik, die auf den kulturellen Leistungen der westlichen Demokratie aufbaut, kann
zu einer sinnvollen Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie beitragen."
70
33 government provoked a variety of answers, yet all responses involved some sort of
revision of democratic institutions.
Although New Forum viewed parliamentary systems as outdated and even
authoritarian, it was less clear about how a grassroots Third Way movement could
feasibly replace typical republican structures. In "Against the Disintegration of New
Forum," several of New Forum's most prominent members provided a sharp rejection
of the trend of partisan formation in the GDR. Including the "Forum Party," an
offshoot of New Forum, in their denunciation, the authors condemned newly formed
parties for disobeying the organization's central apolitical tenet. Hence, "Political
parties are always consumed with third-rate problems in order to improve
appearances and to obscure the more important questions for which they do not have
answers."71 Rather, the Third Way ideology was intended to remedy the problem of
politicians having to fake interest in nonessential issues in order to increase financial
support or popularity. If leaders acted outside of parties, then perhaps they would not
be bound by promises or platforms, but could instead answer to the real interests of
East German citizens. Yet, it can also be argued that New Forum was against parties
because it saw them as threatening to the grassroots movement. As they claimed, "We
are not against parties, but we are against the destruction of our citizens
movement!"72 Within this single document addressing the state of New Forum, the
topic of partisan politics is portrayed as both a negative and acceptable institution.
Although it tried to operate exclusively on the plane of civil society, New Forum
71
Gegen eine Spaltung des Neuen Forum [Against the Disintegration of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel
Bohley, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Politische Parteien erliegen immer der Versuchung, drittrangige
Fragen aufzubauschen, um Profil zu gewinnen und zugleich die Sachfragen zu verschleiern, für die sie
keine Lösungen parat haben."
72
Ibid., "Wir sind nicht gegen Parteien, aber wir sind gegen die Zerstörung unserer Bürgerbewegung."
34 found it difficult to escape politics altogether, even relying upon existing
parliamentary structures to push for legislation at the Round Table forums.
Although its emphasis on individualism influenced New Forum's initial antipartisan stance, it was not necessarily an "anti-political" organization, as much of its
activity was intended to revolutionize politics. In "Founding Statement," New Forum
declared: "After forty years of conservative thinking, it is important that we expect
responsibility from the political system itself, not only from political parties."73 Thus,
although party greed and corruption may have been important problems, they were
merely symptomatic of the greater political failure of East Germany. While
denouncing the failures of political parties like the SED and the GDR's false
presentation as a democracy, New Forum offered no sound alternative to a
representative system of government. Thus, the problem with the Third Way
movement was not necessarily its apolitical stance, but its failure to translate ideology
into actual policy. Whereas events like the fall of the Berlin Wall could have been
groundbreaking for New Forum in terms of asserting itself as the leading opponent of
the SED, its popularity tended to decline after its leadership role during the October
Leipzig demonstrations. As in other apolitical movements throughout German
history, the East German Third Way was more adept at naming problems than
solutions. While its apolitical nature created certain bureaucratic challenges, the
group's non-affiliated identity could have been used to gain political allies in the
democratic elections of 1990. Instead, New Forum was too critical of even the most
73
Grundsatzpapier [Founding Statement], January 16, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
"Nach 40 Jahren vormundschaftlichen Denkens ist es notwendig, daß wir nicht länger mehr unsere
Verantwortung an Parteien delegieren, sondern die Politik selbst gestalten."
35 progressive of parties, thus preventing its Third Way ideology from finding a
receptive political outlet while becoming increasingly obscure.
Utopianism or Nationalism?
In order to better analyze the politically unique and often contradictory nature
of the German Third Way, it is helpful to broaden the historical lens and to consider
its manifestation during earlier periods. A typical analysis of the ideology tends to
characterize it as considerably utopian in that it tended to ignore some real-world
problems while portraying the future in an optimistic light. Yet, not all of New
Forum's members would have agreed with that characterization, since in many ways
the GDR had portrayed itself as a sort of socialist utopia although it was clearly far
from it. Instead, New Forum attempted to retain optimism about the future while
utilizing the organizational methods of earlier grassroots movements in German
history. In Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, Kevin Repp
argues that the Wilhelmine Third Way movement "refused flight into utopias or
resignation," and instead "took a stand on contemporary ground, fully aware of the
potential dangers."74 Similarly, one should not necessarily define the Third Way as a
utopian concept, since in many regards New Forum's use of grassroots strategies and
call for democratic reform suggest a practical approach to real political change. Yet
conversely, the mission of the Third Way implied that there was some elusive end to
this uncharted territory, a final democratic paradise free from the corrupt influences
of money and power. Although this mission involved a synthesis of existing
institutions, its utopian content revealed a recurrent theme throughout Germany
74
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 16.
36 history. The Third Way arguably constituted a symptom of German political
oppression, a means of articulating political opinions within a system that did not
accept dissenting voices.75
Although very much a Soviet satellite state, East Germany differed from other
Eastern European countries in how it responded to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Whereas many Soviet states underwent extreme nationalist revolutions, some
violent and all striving for complete political independence, the GDR's peaceful
revolution did not demand a complete overthrow of the SED regime. Although the
existence of West Germany changed the political dynamic (reunification seemed a
natural solution to the collapse of the SED regime), there were other factors that led
East German citizens to shy away from nationalist appeals. Historian Robert Patton
argues that intellectuals in particular avoided nationalist language because of possible
links to the Third Reich.76 Yet, the Third Way apolitical movement was also
mistrustful of nationalism because it signified reunification through a top-down
approach, rather than organic grassroots change. Thus New Forum functioned in the
"gray area, neither public nor private"77 (which might also be defined as civil society)
in order to reform the state without using coercive tactics. In "On the Creation of a
United German State," New Forum lamented: "In the past the people understood
German nationalism as state-supported aggression," adding "the problems of our
world will not be solved through nationalism."78 Thus, the Third Way movement did
75
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 4.
Patton, "Annus Mirabilis," 759.
77
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 15.
78
Zur Bildung eines gemeinsamen deutschen Staates [On the Creation of a United German State],
December 18, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "In der Vergangenheit haben die Völker
deutschen Nationalismus als staatliche Aggression erfahren… die Hauptprobleme unserer Welt sind
nicht nationalstaatlich zu lösen."
76
37 not wish to resemble processes of nationalism occurring in other European countries
or to harken back to Germany's nationalistic past, but to forge its own uncharted
grassroots path. By denouncing nationalist appeals, New Forum thereby distanced
itself from West Germany and the trend towards German reunification.
The apolitical Third Way of East Germany was too abstract, too idealistic, and
too impractical to be taken seriously. Eventually, it faded into the political
background. Other members of the opposition movement were disenchanted by the
group's lack of direction. Marianne Birthler of Solidarity Church explained that,
"conceptually, I found New Forum very diffused. They wanted everything and
nothing. For me, the group lacked clear contours. They only named problems; they
didn't provide solutions."79 Thus, to some degree, the apolitical identity of New
Forum prevented the organization from articulating a clear political platform, which
could be translated into actual legislation. Sensing the impracticality of its demands,
the New Forum leadership eventually shifted its radical tone to encourage a more
gradual process of reunification.80 But even this solution, which aimed to save at least
some socialist policies, could not halt the rapid economic and social changes
occurring throughout the GDR. Thus, in the end, the political might of West Germany
overpowered the grassroots strategies of East German Third Way advocates.
Although New Forum's decision to remain apolitical was affected by the character of
East German civic opposition, this was not the only factor influencing its political
course. Rather, the apolitical features of New Forum were related to a greater
79
Birthler, interview. July 23, 2013. "Inhaltlich fand ich das Neue Forum immer ziemlich diffus. Sie
wollten alles und nichts, und hatte für mich keine klaren Konturen. Sie hatten nur Problem benannt,
aber hatten nicht Lösungen."
80
Patton, "Annus Mirabilis," 765.
38 tradition of German grassroots organization. The following chapter will investigate
the common features between New Forum and grassroots movements throughout
German history in order to make sense of the German affinity for apolitical reform.
39 CHAPTER 2
THE DEFINING FEATURES OF GERMAN APOLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Although much of the literature on New Forum and the Third Way considers
this period in East German history as an organizational failure in which the West
quickly triumphed over its socialist counterpart,81 this is perhaps only true in a
political sense. Historically, it is almost impossible to pinpoint a beginning or an end
to this alternative, apolitical component of German political culture. Furthermore, it is
difficult to impose precise boundaries on exactly who this group includes or to
determine what qualifies something as a Third Way movement in Germany history.
Because New Forum's Third Way was a movement that aimed to reclaim a variety of
forgotten social, political, and ecological concepts, it can be better understood by
investigating these ideas in their earlier forms. While creating a precise definition of
the apolitical Third Way is an arguably fruitless project, it is possible to highlight
several themes that have characterized similar reform movements in the past. By
illuminating some of these trends, this chapter will demonstrate that New Forum's
apolitical nature did not arise in a vacuum, but was rather a single occurrence of
extra-parliamentary activism, which has always been an important aspect of the
German political culture.
The first aspect of the German Third Way, the cultivation of an environmental
program, dates back to Wilhelmine conservation movements, in which conceptions of
nature and conservation became intrinsically linked to German national identity. In
addition to a grassroots interest in conservation, political parties were quick to utilize
81
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany and The East German Revolution of 1989.
40 public sentiment for nature within platforms that emphasized the "Germanness" of
exercise and the outdoors. Among such parties were the National Socialists, whose
extensive propaganda included notions of a superior German understanding of and
connection to the natural world.82 Although tainted by its association with National
Socialism, conservation continued to be a major concern among activists in both
West Germany and the GDR. One of the most polluted nations on the European
continent, East Germany of course had an additional set of incentives when it came to
nature conservation and restoration. Given noteworthy similarities in the frequently
irrational demands of activists and their use of utopian terminology, however, the
ideological link between apolitical environmentalism in East Germany and earlier
German Green movements cannot be ignored.
A second connecting thread between East German opposition and the
alternative movements of generations past is a commitment to grassroots politics,
which reveals an affinity for the "gray area," neither public nor private, in which real
change might be achieved.83 What might be termed the political aspect of New
Forum's Third Way, this component of an alternative reform movement is also
sharply apolitical, especially in its renunciation of partisan politics and the
parliamentary system. Although New Forum saw itself as a platform for the
discussion of political issues, it did not consider itself a political organization, and, for
the most part, it shied away from affiliations with parties. Considering the oppressive
history of the SED, it makes sense that New Forum was wary of party politics, but
this tendency is not unique to the East German opposition. In Wilhelmine Germany,
82
Frank Uekötter, The Green and the Brown: A History of Conservation in Nazi Germany (Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
83
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 14.
41 localized conceptions of nationalism, or a "Heimat" movement, first began to develop
without the influence of parties. This emphasis on grassroots, bottom-up reform
carried over into the Weimar Republic, where extra-parliamentary organizations
offered ideological solutions to the state's democratic flaws.84 Whether conservative
or liberal, these groups revealed the alleged misconceptions and failures of Weimar
democracy. New Forum's apolitical Third Way is, to some degree, a continuation of
the political criticisms of reform initiatives in these historical eras.
While related to the apolitical aspect of dissident movements in the GDR, the
goal of social reform was perhaps the beginning of what came to be the East German
revolution. Reform movements in the GDR provided a channel for dissatisfied
citizens to participate in political change without the immediate risk of SED suspicion
or retaliation. Whether it concerned the status of women, the rights of workers, or the
rights and special needs of disabled individuals, reform was an essential component
of New Forum's political platform. Wilhelmine Germany was one of the more
socially progressive states within modern Europe, and its educated bourgeoisie
spearheaded many reform movements, which pertained to a variety of social ills.
With the ultimate goal of creating positive, meaningful change for all sectors of
German society, the Wilhelmine reform movement extended from ideas like physical
health to land reform. This enlightened approach to social change constituted an
attempt to sidestep an authoritarian and undemocratic political system.85 Like the East
German Third Way, it was a bourgeois movement, led by educated individuals and
with less appeal for workers. In Weimar Germany, reform initiatives such as the
84
Hans Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy (Durham: University of North Carolina
Press, 1996).
85
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 4.
42 Garden city movement sought to improve the quality of life through architecture and
urban planning, thus reducing social tensions while strengthening a sense of
community.86
A final component of the German Third Way that was sustained throughout
the twentieth century is a self-awareness of its alternative, counter-cultural identity.
During Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, "naturalists," as they were called, resided
in commune-like settlements, such as the Eden commune on the outskirts of Berlin,
where they practiced socialist alternatives to the authoritarian state.87 In the GDR, it
was difficult to avoid the constant censorship of the SED, yet many artists and
dissidents somehow managed to carve out a space for alternative lifestyles, most
famously in the poor yet trendy "Prenzlauer Berg" neighborhood of East Berlin.88 By
no means representing a single alternative to the East German norm, the dissident
counter-culture consisted of intellectuals, artists, vegetarians, and many other
individuals who struggled to maintain a unique identity within an oppressive political
system. Using Berlin as a case study for this counter-cultural aspect of the Third Way,
this chapter will attempt to show the continuity of the apolitical discourse as it was
expressed throughout German history. Although this chapter lists environmentalism,
grassroots politics, reform movements, and counter-cultures as the defining elements
of the German Third Way, this is by no means an exhaustive list of common themes.
Rather, these threads represent several of the defining features of this alternative
86
Iain Boyd Whyte and David Frisby, Metropolis Berlin: 1880-1940 (Berkely: University of
California Press, 2012), 267-268.
87
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 26.
88
Sello, interview, July 18, 2013.
43 ideology, which, through dictatorships and democracy, has continued to resonate
within German politics.
From Nature Conservation to Environmentalism
Today, Germany is regarded as having one of the greenest economies in the
developed world, and the progressive party Alliance '90/The Greens has a strong
presence in parliamentary politics. Although worldwide developments in renewable
energy and resource conservation have influenced Germany to become greener, the
preservation of nature has been a fundamental political issue since the middle of the
nineteenth century. Hence, despite changing environmental concerns, the
contemporary German Green movement continues to draw upon existing institutional
networks, a long tradition of sentimentalizing nature, and an informed public
discourse on environmental issues.89 Although the GDR's communist government
may not have cared much for nature, as it made abundantly clear through toxic levels
of air and water pollution, the concern and even enchantment with nature was
sustained in pockets of East German subculture. While several dissident organizations
such as Environmental Library and Arche Nova committed their efforts entirely to
issues of conservation and environmental safety, even New Forum dedicated a
considerable amount of attention to issues like nature conservation and atomic
energy. While not always entirely rational or pragmatic in their discussion of
environmental issues, this tendency of New Forum thus reflected continuities of
enchantment with nature throughout modern German history.
89
Thomas M. Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity,
1885-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 256.
44 For German thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, man's
relationship to nature was an existential question that provoked a wealth of literature
and philosophical texts. Much of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's poetry consisted of
musings on the immense wholeness and power of nature. In "Aphorisms on Nature,"
he writes,
Nature lives in her children only, and the mother, where is she? She is the sole
artist, - out of the simplest materials the greatest diversity; attaining, with no
trace of effort, the finest perfection, the closest precision, always softly veiled.
Each of her works has an essence of its own; every shape that she takes is an
idea utterly isolated; and yet all forms one.90
Out of this philosophical tradition, early German conservation movements adopted
almost spiritual overtones, in which preservation of the natural landscape (or rather
the imagined natural landscape) became a personal obligation for nature enthusiasts.
Hence, conservation began as a sentiment, not a social movement, although it quickly
spilled over into the Heimatschutz (homeland protection) and Naturschutz (nature
protection) apolitical organizations of Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany.91 While
operating within a vastly different context, New Forum's language mirrors that of its
Romantic foundations. Writing that "Man, as a part of nature, is only viable when he
succeeds in preserving natural resources like air, earth, and water,"92 New Forum
90
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Aphorisms on Nature," in The Maxims and Reflections of Goethe
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906), 208,
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=CMZJAAAAIAAJ&rdid=bookCMZJAAAAIAAJ&rdot=1 (accessed April 8, 2014). "Sie lebt in lauter Kindern; und die Mutter, wo
ist sie? – Sie ist die einzige Künstlerin: Aus dem simpelsten Stoff zu den größten Kontrasten; ohne
Schein der Anstrengung zu der größten Vollendung – zur genausten Bestimmtheit, immer mit etwas
Weichem überzogen. Jedes ihrer Werke hat ein eigenes Wesen, jede ihrer Erscheinungen den
isoliertesten Begriff, und doch macht alles eins aus."
91
Uekötter, The Green and the Brown, 17.
92
Programmerklärung des Neuen Forum [Problem Explanation of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel Bohley,
New Forum Papers, RHA. "Der Mensch ist als Teil der Natur nur dann lebensfähig, wenn es ihm
gelingt, Lebensgrundlagen wie Luft, Boden und Wasser zu erhalten."
45 emphasized the interconnectedness of nature and man, while acknowledging the
normative superiority of natural resources over commercial goods.
As an ideology, Wilhelmine nature conservation was more than just the act of
preserving nature; it was the emotional, visceral connection to the natural world that,
at times, transcended rational environmental practices. When transposed onto
political platforms, the richness of this ideology tended to dwindle as the Romantic
enchantment with nature was difficult to translate into actual political causes.93 Yet,
in literature and throughout intellectual circles, conceptions of nature extended well
beyond practical applications of conservation and into the realm of utopian, premodern societies. In the 1854 book Naturgeschichte des Volkes (Natural History of
the People),94 Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl celebrated rural life, the German forests, and a
"natural right to wilderness,"95 but his ideas on conservation were not limited to
maintaining the natural environment. Rather, Riehl, "put forward a harmonious ideal
of social relations, with nature being a harbinger of peace,"96 that bears a striking
resemblance to New Forum's idealized notions of a Third Way.
In New Forum's "Program Explanation," the group emphasizes the intimate
relationship between a healthy natural environment and the fate of humanity,
claiming, "We want to live in solidarity with our world."97 Yet, despite New Forum's
emphasis on a harmonious relationship with nature and its emotional calls for
environmental reform, the group's ecological platform is remarkably vague. Despite
93
Uekötter, The Green and the Brown, 18.
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, Naturgeschichte des Volkes [Natural History of the People], ed. David J.
Diephouse, (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1990).
95
Uekötter, The Green and the Brown, 17.
96
Ibid.
97
Programmerklärung [Programm Explanation], 1989, Bärbel Bohley, New Forum Papers, RHA.
"Wir wollen in Solidarität mit unserer Umwelt leben."
94
46 their insistence on a balanced relationship between ecology, economy, and social
concerns, the organization's leadership never offers sound policy justified by rational
scientific or economic arguments. Like the early conservationists with their Romantic
ideologies, New Forum had difficultly translating their concern for nature into viable
environmental policy.
Although New Forum may have been less than successful in producing
concrete ecological measures, it was effective in publicizing the need for
environmental reform and in organizing a national movement of ecological
conscientiousness. While partially a result of the momentum of the West German
Greens, New Forum's environmental fervor is related to a long tradition of German
nature conservation.98 In the late 19th century, new associations, which called
themselves Naturschutz or Heimatschutz organizations, began to form in a "back-tothe-land" impulse that eventually led to a widespread conservation movement with
tens of thousands of followers.99 Comparable to modern-day ecological groups, these
organizations conducted research, lobbied government agencies, and raised public
awareness about nature conservation.100 Thus, Naturschutz organizations, such as the
youth Wandervogel movement, viewed their activities as apolitical in that they
protected a national good, which (to them) was above the interests of partisan politics
(nature belonged to the realm of Überparteilichkeit). However, like New Forum,
these organizations ultimately found it impossible to remain neutral to a variety of
constituents, and were quickly swept up by the political tide of parties on the left, as
well as the National Socialists. Even the enchanted issue of nature was ultimately not
98
Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature, 3.
Ibid., 2.
100
Ibid., 3.
99
47 above political debate, and both Wilhelmine Naturschutz organizations and East
Germany's New Forum found it difficult to keep nature within the realm of apolitical
social reform.
For both Wilhelmine conservation groups and East German dissidents,
environmental issues were not just scientific; they were intertwined with the ideology
of a utopian society in which humanity and nature were free from conflict. This
fascination with an environmental ideal is perhaps best illustrated in the organization
known as the Wandervogel movement, founded in 1889, which began as a hiking
club for German youths.101 Although initially just a group for young people enjoying
the outdoors, the Wandervogel quickly developed an ideology of its own, namely that
a return to the land was the ideal path to social and cultural reform."102 Hans
Mommsen characterizes the Wandervogel tradition in ways that echo themes of New
Forum to an uncanny degree: "The great majority of the bündisch youth thus
organized itself outside of the existing political parties, which it denounced in
unequivocal terms and to which it opposed its own vision of an integral and organic
society that was free from internal conflict."103 Although drastically different in
origin, both the Wandervogel movement and New Forum shared idealism for the
possibility of an ecological utopia free from the corrupt influences of partisan politics.
In reference to the Third Way, New Forum leaders often spoke of an
"Ecological Socialism," an amalgam of communism and capitalism that prioritized
environmental reform above other social measures.104 Both Heimatschutz
101
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 70.
103
Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 309.
104
Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany, 194.
102
48 organizations such as the Wandervogel and East Germany's New Forum shared
similarities in the language of an ecological socialism and in their rejection of an
anthropocentric worldview. Yet, an environmental Third Way was not merely
championed by progressive individuals on the political left. The following chapter
will further investigate the history of the German Green party, its contentious
relationship to National Socialism, and its ideological connection to the German
Third Way.
Grassroots Organization: An Apolitical Strategy
A second common theme of German alternative reform movements, a
commitment to apolitical or even anti-political methods reveals a sense of
disenchantment with the political status quo. Although apolitical activists in a sense
"give up" on the ability of their government to provide for its citizens, the reformers
of imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, and East Germany viewed their activities
as productive, not reactive. These movements utilized a language of idealism in order
to provoke new understandings of social change. In fact, one could argue that it was
the profound optimism of this ideological language that enabled apolitical movements
to hold such weight throughout German history, to retain their vitality well into the
20th century, and even to exist today.105 Whereas New Forum's Third Way arose as
an opportunity for a better society amidst the crumbling political system of the GDR,
the Wilhelmine reform movement did not aim to replace the Kaiserreich. Rather,
through apolitical initiatives such as scientific studies, privately run seminars, model
105
Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins; the German Academic Community, 18901933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 96.
49 institutions, alternative lifestyles, and a variety of other strategies, Wilhelmine
reformers aimed to sidestep bureaucracy and create immediate change.106 In the
Weimar Republic, extra-parliamentary organizations were intended to revise flaws
within the parliamentary order, while representing the interests of neglected
constituencies.107
A central component of New Forum's Third Way program, the idea of partyless candidates stems from a philosophical tradition that actually found great
popularity during the Weimar Republic. During this relatively short period of
parliamentary democracy, criticism of the party system was common among antiliberal forces, but it extended to the left as well. These ideas were expressed in the
commentary of the political analyst and journalist Hans Zehrer, who claimed in an
article entitled "The End of the Parties" that "today the Bund belongs to the future, the
party to the past."108 The political Bund or "league" was intended to replace
traditional political parties as a sort of civic association reminiscent of preconstitutional structures.109 Although it is important to note that the Weimar Republic
was, unlike the GDR, technically a democracy, advocates of party-less candidates had
similar arguments in both political contexts. Most important among these was the
argument that political candidates acted in the interests of the wealthy and other
special interests, and did not, in fact, answer to citizen requests. In "Theses for the
New Forum," the organization writes,
How can a political office become an office of honor? How can one ensure,
that the best of a community, a state, or a country compete for public office?
106
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 14.
Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 230.
108
Ibid., 193.
109
Ibid.
107
50 Party members make up only 4% of the public. How did 4% of the public
claim the right to represent the other 96%? The parties can only be reclaimed
through party-less candidates. Then the party members would have to
surrender to the experts. For example, in the elections for a specific office,
every party should nominate two candidates: one member of the party and one
party-less candidate.110
Of course, no such system was ever put in place, but the extreme nature of the
demands illustrates a deep-rooted mistrust for politicians, which was in part due to the
corrupt nature of the SED. However, the idea for party-less candidates speaks to
earlier eras in German history, during which unaccountable and failing political
systems led citizens to look beyond the party-political framework in search of voices
that actually represented their views.
Although critics of the parliamentary system in both Weimar Germany and
East Germany mistrusted the motives of politicians, their work was, to some degree,
also defined by the need to work in collaboration with political officials. For New
Forum specifically, its simultaneous hatred for and collaboration with the SED
became a contentious issue since many of its more radical followers felt disillusioned
with the group's reconciliatory aims. Within the context of the Round Table forums of
1989 and 1990, this contradiction between an exclusively anti-political way and the
need to interact with parties was illustrated through the divided body of its
representatives. Of the thirty-three organizations with voting rights at the Central
Round Table of 1989, seventeen of them identified as new oppositional groups,
110
Thesen für das Neue Forum [Theses for New Forum], 1989, Press Releases, Christian Tietze
Papers, RHA. "Wie kann ein politisches Amt ein Ehrenamt werde? Wie kann man erreichen, daß sich
die besten einer Gemeinde, einer Stadt oder eines Landes um öffentliche Ämter bewerben?
Parteimitglieder machen nur 4% der Bevölkerung aus. Woher nehmen die 4% das Recht, auch die
übrigen 96% zu repräsentieren? Nur durch parteilose Kandidaten können die Parteien auch wieder
aufgewertet werden. Denn dann müssen sich die Parteikarrieristen auch den Fachleuten stellen. Also
z.B.: Bei der Wahl eines Kandidaten für ein bestimmtes Amt, muß jede der berechtigen Parteien zwei
Kandidaten vorschlagen; ein Mitglied der Partei, ein weiterer parteiloser Kandidat."
51 whereas the other sixteen were from parties that had interacted with the East German
government, including the SED.111 Although New Forum had initially protested the
SED regime for its enormous breach of basic human rights, it ultimately needed the
support and approval of officials to pass legislation. However, participating in the
Round Tables was also a way for the SED to appear more liberal in the eyes of the
West and the East German public, so its collaboration with New Forum was probably
less meaningful than the group would have liked to believe. Of the apolitical activists
in the Weimar Republic, even the leading proponents of party-less candidates and
Bünde sought influence within the parties or even campaigned on their behalf.112
Thus, although grassroots in their organizational strategies, the Third Way reform
movements of the twentieth century were not always as apolitical as they claimed to
be.
A critical feature of grassroots politics throughout German history has been
conceptions of regionalism, which allowed dissident leaders to build up nationwide
movements that were simultaneously rooted in the identities of individual
communities. In A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat, Celia
Applegate describes the German Heimat movement of the nineteenth century, which
went "beyond the particularities of regionality and the generalities of nationality to
rest finally on what both region and nation have in common - the effort to maintain
community."113 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a variety of
grassroots movements utilized conceptions of regionalism and a German Heimat
111
Antrag an den Runden Tisch [Application to the Round Table], December 18, 1989, New Forum,
New Forum Papers, RHA.
112
Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 193.
113
Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 4.
52 identity in order to make their organizations far-reaching and effective. In the late
nineteenth century, this trend is illustrated through Heimatschutz and Naturschutz
organizations, which were quite successful despite their pluralistic nature and lack of
a universally binding canon of conservation ideals.114 Instead, the variety of
conservation approaches was reflected in regional environmental organizations, all of
which were intrinsically connected through their greater belief in conservation. Even
a century later, New Forum utilized existing understandings of regional identity in
cities, regions, and states, by founding local branches of their organization. Like the
Heimat movement of the 19th century, this was primarily an organic, bottom-up
process in which the communities themselves initiated New Forum groups or
renamed existing dissident organizations to the title of New Forum. Hence, while
New Forum was surprisingly successful in the breadth of its popularity, this was in
large part due to the strength of local communities, which were willing to incorporate
the grassroots movement into their regional identities.
Perhaps the most striking comparison between the Wilhelmine reform
generation of 1890 and the dissidents of New Forum is their excitement with the
sense of transition and liminal quality of their political surroundings. In Reformers,
Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, Kevin Repp writes, "the generation of
1890 saw itself as living though a turning point in the times, an epochal caesura at
which rapid transformations in the social, economic, and political structures of the
new Empire could lead either to progress or to ruin."115 Indeed, Wilhelmine Germany
has been characterized as a center of modernity, a place and time during which the
114
115
Uekötter, The Green and the Brown, 19.
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 227.
53 pace of material production and cultural change was almost uncomfortable for its
inhabitants. The pace of transformation is illustrated through an unprecedented annual
rate of population growth (it averaged 12.6% in Prussia between the years 1871 and
1910), as well as the exponential growth of cities fueled by a rise in new technologies
and modes of industry.116 For participants of the Wilhelmine reform milieu, extraparliamentary reform provided an opportunity to involve oneself in the cultural,
social, and technological changes of the time.
In comparison, the final year of the SED regime was, for most East Germans,
the most politically tumultuous time they had ever experienced. As political protests
grew in size and frequency, dissident activists could be certain that drastic changes
lay not far ahead. This sense of new beginnings is expressed in the language of New
Forum's first publications. In "Program Explanation of New Forum," the sub-title is
"Our Land at a New Beginning".117 Hence, not only was New Forum acutely aware of
the shifting political climate, it aimed to utilize this sense of transition to attract a
larger membership base and to rally its existing followers behind the Third Way
cause. Amidst immense economic and political change, reformers of the Wilhelmine
era and dissidents in East Germany believed that their historical moment constituted a
critical turning point within German history. Hence, for citizens throughout German
history, grassroots organization provided a means of affecting the course of the
nation, even when authoritarian systems made direct political involvement
impossible.
116
"Overview: Wilhelmine Germany, 1890-1914," German History in Documents and Images,
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/chapter.cfm?subsection_id=65 (accessed April 8, 2014)
117
Programmerklärung des Neuen Forum [Problem Explanation of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel
Bohley, New Forum Papers, RHA.
54 Social Reform
Although New Forum concentrated its efforts on the Third Way philosophy
and constitutional political change, the group was grounded in a history of reform
initiatives that dates back to the beginning of the GDR. In a public document "Believe
in the Distinct Power,"118 New Forum includes a section on social justice, which
details the inalienable rights of East German citizens, as well as the group's major
social concerns. Included among these rights were a right to employment, a right to
housing, a right to health insurance and welfare, and a right to education, while the
issues of women in society, senior citizens, people with disabilities, single parents,
and art and culture are listed as areas of major social concern.119 Although these
issues belong to a canon of basic human rights for most nations in the Western world,
reform initiatives have found a special place within German history. In earlier
historical contexts, such as the reform milieu of Imperial Germany, apolitical reform
was the only means of changing the social sphere. Since East German dissidents and
Wilhelmine reformers lacked the democratic structures to enact parliamentary reform,
they turned to social reform instead.
A prime example of East German social reform is the invention of
Kindertagesstätte (Kita) or preschool child education, which became institutionalized
in the GDR, but was first explored in the context of Wilhelmine Germany through
118
Vertrauen in die Eigene Kraft [Believe in the Distinct Power], January 28, 1990, New Forum, New
Forum Papers, RHA.
119
Ibid., "Recht auf Arbeit, Recht auf Wohnraum, Recht auf umfassende Medizinische und Soziale
Betreuung, Bildung und Erziehung, Die Frau in der Gesellschaft, Alte Menschen in der Gesellschaft,
Behinderte und Geschädigte Menschen in der Gesellschaft, Alleinerziehende und Kinderreiche, Kunst
und Kultur."
55 social services such as nurseries and popular education clubs.120 An influential figure
within German pedagogy, Friederich Fröbel was an advocate of preschool education
and even coined the term Kindergarten in 1840 after a daycare institute he had
founded.121 Just one of many reform sub-groups, which included alternative lifestyles,
clothing, interior design, urban planning, and animal rights, preschool education
illustrates the long history of apolitical reform as it developed throughout 20th
century Germany.122 Although some social services, such as pre-school education,
were promoted by the SED, many social reform issues were taken up by apolitical
grassroots initiatives.
Within the vast world of Wilhelmine reform movements, three distinct areas
can be related to similar categories of civic organization within the GDR. One
component of Wilhelmine reform, Lebensreform or "life reform" movements,
referred to groups that sought alternative modernities through life improvements such
as physical health, temperance, vegetarianism, education, clothing and interior design,
and even nudism.123 The Orchard Colony of Eden, located on the outskirts of Berlin
and still in existence today, consisted of several hundred so-called "naturalists," who
practiced a variety of these life reform techniques, including temperance,
vegetarianism, and abstinence.124 On the more liberal end of the life reform spectrum
were thinkers such as Karl Mann, who in Kraft und Schönheit [Vigor and Beauty]
suggested that nudism had moral and health benefits that would contribute to the
120
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 213.
Britannica Academic Edition, s.v. "Friedrich Froebel,"
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/220593/Friedrich-Froebel (accessed April 8, 2014).
122
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 4.
123
William H. Rollins, A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the
German Heimatschutz Movement, 1904-1918 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 73.
124
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 26.
121
56 overall wellbeing of the modern man.125 In the late 1980s, East German reform
groups organized themselves around specific issues, such as environmental
protection, education reform, or lifestyle preferences, thus evoking the tradition of
Wilhelmine apolitical activism. Certain life reform initiatives, such as nudism,
became immensely important to East Germans for being one of the few popular
movements not domineered by the SED regime.126 Thus, since the late 19th century,
nudism (or naturalism) has been part of a movement to get back to nature.127
Although differing in several of its specific initiatives, the reform climate of the GDR
was comparable to that of Wilhelmine Germany because of its propensity for
alternative modes of living through apolitical initiatives.
In addition to direct continuity between the life-style preferences of
Wilhelmine reformers and East German dissidents, similarities existed in the
organizational strategies of both reform milieus. The foundational element of change
in both contexts, bottom-up, grassroots systems of organization fostered communities
in which individuals came together around common concerns with no apparent
hierarchy of leadership. In the first issue of the alternative newspaper "Die Andere,"
New Forum leader Reinhard Schult responded as follows to a question regarding the
structure of the group: "People who share interest on a specific topic should come
together. For example: popular education, the economy, the environment, or
125
"Overview: Wilhelmine Germany, 1890-1914," German History in Documents and Images,
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/chapter.cfm?subsection_id=65 (accessed April 8, 2014).
126
Roger Boyes, "The Ideology of Nudism in Germany," Goethe Institute,
http://www.goethe.de/ges/mol/typ/en3097399.htm (accessed January 1, 2014).
127
Ibid.
57 something entirely different. However, it should not be an elite group."128 Like life
reform movements in Wilhelmine Germany, the reform milieu in East Germany was
entirely dependent on the interests and concerns of individual citizens. Yet, despite
the breadth of life reform initiatives in both historical contexts, individual groups
sought to create overarching connections by using similar titles. In 1910, many
alternative lifestyle clubs began renaming themselves to include the phrase "life
reform" for publicity and networking purposes.129 This trend of renaming bears a
strong resemblance to the rise of New Forum when regional dissident groups adopted
the organization's name in the fall of 1989. In comparison to typical parliamentary
representation, life reform groups were wary of allocating too much power to one
individual, and remained seemingly egalitarian in organization. More concerned with
lifestyle preferences than legislation, German life reform movements did not
necessarily require political affiliations, or at least not initially.130
A second area of Wilhelmine reform was land reform, which consisted of
efforts to ensure that both the German countryside and its quickly growing cities were
utilized to their maximum potential. Thus, whereas life reform initiatives
concentrated on the betterment of the individual within society, land reform sought to
direct the land use, agricultural production, and architectural development of the
nation as a whole. The need for reform was nowhere more apparent than in
overcrowded cities such as Berlin, where the suffering of millions, and especially of
women and children, suggested the need for a more sustainable system of
128
Interview with Reinhard Schult, Die Andere [The Other], 1989. "Da sollen sich Leute
zusammenfinden, die Interesse an einem speziellen Thema haben. Also: Volksbildung, Wirtschaft oder
Umwelt. Oder was ganz anderes. Das sollen aber keine Elite-Gruppen sein."
129
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 266.
130
Ibid., 266.
58 development.131 East Germany, in comparison, although a developed nation, was
decades behind its Western counterpart. A visit to Berlin made this clear to most
visitors: whereas the West had dozens of green spaces and was economically
booming, the East was considerably drabber and its residents lived in tight quarters.132
New Forum (like most of East Germany's citizens) recognized the poor quality of life,
and attempted to create basic standards for the residents of East German cities. In one
list of demands, the group writes, "The right to decent and adequate housing must be
constitutionally guaranteed… The poor need to be supported through rental subsidies,
and should be protected from eviction by law."133 Although the land reform
movement of Wilhelmine Germany concentrated its efforts on the sustainable
development of the land, while New Forum focused on cities, their end goal was the
same. By improving the general quality of life and ensuring that all citizens had
access to employment, housing, and recreational areas, reformers aimed to create a
positive difference that could be achieved through mostly non-political avenues.
A final area of reform that was maintained throughout the 20th century, the
women's reform movement in both Wilhelmine Germany and East Germany was
more of a social endeavor than a political one. In the GDR, women faced a unique set
of issues that were arguable atypical of problems faced by women in most
undemocratic nations. Although most women worked (and at an even higher
percentage than that of women in the FRG), they struggled to gain recognition for
131
Ibid., 86.
Sello, interview, July 18, 2013.
133
Vertrauen in die Eigene Kraft [Believe in the Distinct Power], January 28, 1990, New Forum, New
Forum Papers, RHA. "Die Recht auf menschenwürdigen und ausreichenden Wohnraum muß
verfassungsmäßig garantiert sein… Soziale Schwächere müssen über Mietsubventionen unterstützt
werden. Der Kündigungsschutz für diese Personengruppen muß gesetzlich gesichert sein."
132
59 their more domestic and maternal roles, a problem that was due to the neglect of
gender differences under communism. In "Program Explanation of New Forum," the
group advocated for Mutterschutz or the protection of motherhood: "New Forum
cannot support a society that exists at women's expense… We need more part-time
employment and the recognition of child rearing as a real social contribution."134
Thus, in the GDR, the women's movement was arguably atypical of other
contemporary feminist movements. Rather than pushing for amendments in education
or the work place, many female activists sought to illustrate the unique contribution
of motherhood, which often went unappreciated or unrecognized in East Germany.
Although many female activists of the late 19th century called for the political
emancipation of women, others considered the women's movement to be a social
issue.135 Among such activists was Helen Lange, a teacher at a girls' school in Berlin,
who believed that while political activism was unnecessarily masculine, social reform
afforded a more moderate path towards gender equality.136 By calling for the
recognition of the "special nature" of women and emphasizing anti-political
initiatives such as improved professional training, Lange paved the way for a
women's movement that supported the special contribution of motherhood.137 In the
context of East Germany, historical voices such as Helen Lange strengthened the
argument for a culture that valued the unique contribution of women in society.
Although dissident groups such as New Forum were often unaware of their
134
Programmerklärung des Neuen Forum [Problem Explanation of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel
Bohley, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Eine Gesellschaft, die auf Kosten der Frauen existiert, lehnt das
Neue Forum ab... Wir brauchen... mehr Teilzeitbeschäftigung und die Anerkennung der Kinderziehung
als gesellschaftliche Arbeitsleistung."
135
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity.
136
Ibid., 113.
137
Ibid., 112-113.
60 ideological predecessors, a tradition of German apolitical reform served as an
invaluable foundation for the theoretical claims and methodological practices of East
German civic initiatives.
A German Counter-Culture
A final component of the apolitical Third Way ideology, a German counterculture embodies the alternative nature of grassroots politics and the reformers' selfawareness of their status as outsiders. A microcosm of nationwide apolitical
movements, Berlin has been a hub of dissident activity and alternative lifestyles since
the 19th century. During the Wilhelmine era, self-declared "naturalists" experimented
with socialistic alternatives on the outskirts of Berlin.138 The most popular naturalist
community, the Orchard Colony of Eden, consisted of 55 hectares to the north of
Berlin, where residents of 189 homes practiced vegetarianism and temperance, while
supporting themselves through the sale of apple butter and other products in health
food shops known as Reformhäuser or "reform stores."139 Throughout the 20th
century, Berlin became a military headquarters, a site of war-torn destruction, and a
politically divided city, but it sustained its alternative aura nonetheless.
In the 1980s, Prenzlauer Berg, one of the poorest neighborhoods in East
Berlin, became the headquarters for much of East Germany's dissident activity. Home
to the Environmental Library's illegal printing press in the basement of the Zion
Church, Prenzlauer Berg was also a site of underground cafés, discos, and a variety of
meeting places where young people conversed and socialized. In "Semantic and
138
139
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 266.
61 Symbolic Strategies in the Founding Call of New Forum," the group describes this
alternative youth culture: "The emergence of alternative groups during the early
1980s consisted of an amalgam of Protestant, social-utopian, and democratic elements
that were substantially influenced by a language of youth."140 A key component of the
underground political developments of the late 1980s, a youth counter-culture
fostered the sort of intellectual discussions and practices that enabled real grassroots
change later on. Although New Forum is most famous for its role at the Monday night
demonstrations in Leipzig, the historically alternative city of Berlin fostered an
underground social environment in which the seeds of the Third Way first took root.
A source of pride in modern-day Germany, Avant-garde artistic movements
have run a tumultuous course throughout German history and its intellectual leaders
have often born the brunt of immense persecution. Bruno Taut, an architect of the
Weimar period, who fled Germany in 1932, illustrates the idealism central to both the
artistic production and theoretical contributions of the Avant-garde. His political
philosophy depicts a utopian social state in which art would become a source of both
individual expression and a means of unpretentious fraternity between citizens.
Within this ideal society, Taut posited architecture as the main tool for creating an
aesthetically superior and more humane community embedded in nature.141 Thus, for
Taut and other architects of the Weimar era, apolitical life improvements constituted
a way to reduce social tensions and class conflict.
140
Semantische und Symbolische Strategien im Gründungsaufruf des Neuen Forums [Semantic and
Symbolic Strategies in the Founding Call of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel Bohley, New Forum Papers,
RHA. "Mit der Entstehung der alternativen Gruppen entwickelte sich Anfang der 80er Jahre ein
sprachliches Amalgam aus protestantischen, sozialutopischen und bürgerlich-demokratischen
Elementen, das vertikal wesentlich durch die Jugendsprache geprägt wurde."
141
Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007), 171.
62 It comes as no surprise that the East German counter-culture also included the
arts among its primary social concerns. As critics of the oppressive SED regime,
dissidents believed that art was an important channel of protest, and many visual
artists, playwrights, and poets used media to express their discontent with the GDR.
In fact, some of the most important figures within East German opposition were
originally artists, including Bärbel Bohley, a renowned painter and co-founder of
New Forum. The centrality of the arts and culture within New Forum's apolitical
program is articulated in much of the group's literature. In "Believe in the Distinct
Power," New Forum states, "In times of transition, culture is generally ignored - but
the neglect of culture represents the descent into barbarism… We request the
independence and autonomy of the cultural and spiritual life."142 Hence, for New
Forum, as for Bruno Taut, culture was not merely an entity of aesthetic enjoyment or
entertainment. Rather, the arts had deeply spiritual and yet also political implications,
and the inclusion of unrestricted culture within a Third Way democratic program
implied a more free and progressive political future.
In addition to youth and artist counter-cultures, the university sphere was an
important arena for German intellectuals to discuss their more radical political ideas
without fear of persecution or censorship. In Decline of the German Mandarins,
Ringer traces the history of German university culture from 1890-1933, describing
German intellectuals or "Mandarins" as "a social and cultural elite, which owed its
status primarily to educational qualifications, rather than to hereditary rights or
142
Vertrauen in die Eigene Kraft [Believe in the Distinct Power], January 28, 1990, New Forum, New
Forum Papers, RHA. "Im Aufbruchzeiten bleibt die Kultur meistens auf der Strecke, aber ein Schritt
weg von der Kultur ist ein Schritt in die Barberei... Wir verlangen die Unabhängigkeit und
Selbstständigkeit des Kultur-und Geisteslebens."
63 wealth."143 Hence, academics of the university counter-culture in Wilhelmine and
Weimar Germany believed they were different from other members of the middle
class, because, unlike landed officials, their social influence was based on their
education and ideas. Whereas politics required courage and zeal, academia was a
realm in which individuals could improve their society through Wissenschaft
(science) and philosophy. Although New Forum might have liked to see itself as
representing the masses of East Germany, it too relied upon a highly educated
membership base in order to produce the grassroots ideology of the Third Way. As
outlined in chapter two, New Forum's membership consisted primarily of highly
educated intellectuals, with 75% educated to the tertiary level.144 Although the group
would sometimes downplay its intellectual nature for strategic purposes, it also prided
itself on its progressive and idealistic vision for a non-partisan future. Hence, like the
academics of Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, many East German oppositionists
sought an enlightened, apolitical path towards a more ideal political state.
Within the Wilhelmine counter-cultural milieu, nothing was more essential
than the bonds of individual relationships, and dissidents in East Germany would
undoubtedly have said the same. Repp writes that, "what held the milieu together was
relationships: relationships to the practices of social and cultural reform, to the
discourse of alternatives modernities, to the space of anti-politics."145 Although the
Wilhelmine reform movement was home to countless different sub-cultures,
organizations, and political beliefs, what held the movement together was the
personal relationships that overlapped between separate spheres. What can be
143
Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 5.
Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 171.
145
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 229.
144
64 described as a "matrix" of counter-cultures,146 the reform initiatives of the late 19th
century were never quite distinct — although seeking different outcomes, each subgenre, whether conservationist, aesthetic, or intellectual, in some way intersected with
the territory of another.
Although the main goal of opposition in East Germany was arguably more
unified, there were still dozens of grassroots dissident organizations, all of which had
different social and political concerns. Yet, despite their differences, East Germans
shared a common identity and had undergone the same suffering, so that, in 1989,
they were able to come together around a single cause. Tom Sello of Environmental
Library describes the communicative and interpersonal dynamic of opposition in this
way: "People met in private places or sometimes in churches, where they spoke about
the issues, swapped stories, and shared information."147 For Tom Sello, as for many
others, personal ties first led him to join the opposition movement, and it was those
ties that ultimately strengthened his commitment to reform. As in Wilhelmine
Germany, apolitical reform was a deeply personal endeavor, which, more than
anything, relied upon the bonds of friendship and fraternity to strengthen its effects
and spread the cause.
Having outlined several of the key features of German grassroots
organization, the following chapter will provide a more thorough investigation of how
these features were manifested in specific reform movements. Hence, the four
elements of environmentalism, grassroots organization, social reform, and counter 146
Ibid., 227.
Sello, interview, July 18, 2013. "Haben sich Leute in privaten Kreisen getroffen oder manchmal in
Kirchengemeinden, und haben sich über bestimmte Probleme unterhalten, haben sich ausgetauscht,
und haben die Information, die sie hatten, ausgetauscht."
147
65 culture will be explored within a variety of political contexts throughout German
history. Although these movements are in some ways remarkably different from New
Forum, similarities in organizational strategies, anti-political theories, and alternative
modes of living demonstrate continuity of the grassroots throughout German history.
Furthermore, by investigating a variety of apolitical reform groups, it becomes
possible to locate the specific contribution that was New Forum's Third Way.
66 CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL INSTANCES OF GERMAN APOLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Within the broad spectrum of dissident groups in East Germany, New Forum
was unique, not only in the size of its membership and its nationwide following, but
in its commitment to remaining apolitical. New Forum's apolitical program is defined
by a belief in the overarching concept of a third or middle way, which represented a
revitalization of what had become a degraded form of socialism. This commitment to
apolitical reform was considerably progressive and even modern in its advocating a
new, more direct form of participatory democratic government. But New Forum was
by no means the first organization in German history to advocate for apolitical
grassroots reform. In fact, movements on both the political left and right have
championed the considerably utopian belief that Germany might forge an uncharted
path towards a democratic ideal outside of parliamentary politics. This chapter will
serve as an investigation of four very diverse reform movements in order to illustrate
the extent to which this tradition of extra-parliamentary reform is embedded within
the German political identity.
A Brief History of Apolitical Reform
The belief in a third or higher non-partisan system of government has
occupied intellectual and dissident circles since as early as Wilhelmine Germany.
Although the authoritarian political climate of imperial Germany was, in many ways,
quite unlike the socialist context of the GDR, dissident counter-cultures of the two
periods share striking similarities, most notably in their affinity for apolitical methods
67 of change. Whether through scientific studies, legal investigations, community
proposals, private seminars, community service, or alternative lifestyles, members of
the Wilhelmine reform milieu aimed to improve their social sphere through grassroots
initiatives.148 Yet, as in the case of New Forum, this reform milieu often sought
greater influence through political avenues, using existing parties as a vessel for
enacting legislation or voicing their social concerns. Even before the first officially
democratic Germany (the Weimar Republic), the Wilhelmine civic sphere provided
an emergent democratic framework within which activists tested the bounds of the
authoritarian state.149 Thus, a comparison between the civic movements of imperial
Germany and communist East Germany reveals that, in both contexts, dissident
circles sought to change their realities through apolitical reform while experimenting
with democratic concepts and procedures.
During the brief existence of the democratic Weimar Republic, an extraparliamentary offensive of organizations on both the political left and right revealed
the government's failure to adequately represent its constituencies. Several political
trends, namely the Überparteilichkeit of elected president Paul von Hindenburg, the
movement to replace parties with regulatory Bünde, and the ideology of "economic
democracy," suggest that the democracy was not functioning as intended. First, the
election of von Hindenburg as a non-party candidate and his portrayal as "someone
who stood above parties," implies a defamation of the party system itself.150 Fritz
148
Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 14.
Brett Fairbairn, "Membership, Organization, and Wilhelmine Modernism," in Wilhelminism and Its
Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meanings of Reform, 1890-1930 : Essays for
Hartmut Pogge Von Strandmann, ed. H. Pogge von Strandmann, Geoff Eley, and James N. Retallack
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 34-50.
150
Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 237.
149
68 Schaeffer, a politician of the Bavarian People's Party, even stated that Hindenburg's
candidacy was born out of the, "misery of Germany's party politics."151 A second
symptom of the Weimar Republic's democratic shortcomings was the conservative
movement to replace parties with Bünde or organizations structured around a
corporatist order that merged "neighborhood with leadership principle."152 This
system was intended to make parties superfluous in the near future, an idealistic goal
that foreshadows the intentions of New Forum, although the Bünde movement
avoided associations with socialism. Finally, the political theory of "economic
democracy" aimed to gradually reform the private enterprise system in the direction
of socialism through increased state ownership, more state involvement in economic
planning, and the creation of institutions for economic self-administration.153
Although conservative intellectuals tended to advocate for Bünde, whereas "economic
democracy" became the project of the left, both initiatives revealed that the Weimar
government was not effectively representing its citizens.
Somewhat of a continuation of the Wilhelmine reform milieu, the existence of
extra-parliamentary organizations in the Weimar Republic suggests that creating a
functional democratic system in Germany was problematic well before the
illegitimate rule of the SED. The fact that the president of the Weimar Republic was
considered to be "above parties" demonstrates that government officials did not give
much credence to the importance of partisanship within a representative democracy.
Yet, the solutions offered by conservative and liberal extra-parliamentary groups also
did not fully address issues of government fraud and misrepresentation, nor did they
151
Ibid., 237.
Ibid., 231.
153
Ibid., 263.
152
69 appear to understand what a functional democracy might look like. For example, the
ideology of Bünde was ultimately too idealistic; it assumed that the neighborly
qualities of German citizens were sufficient to organize systems of government. On
the other hand, proponents of "economic democracy" overestimated the role of the
market as a controlling mechanism while wrongly assuming that state intervention in
economic processes would be wholly welcomed.154 In less than fourteen years, the
Weimar Republic was toppled and the ensuing Nazi dictatorship obliterated all
democratic institutions, as well as most civic initiatives. Thus, the problem of
democracy (and the incentive to reform it) has occupied reform movements and
dissident organizations throughout 20th century German history. New Forum's Third
Way merely represents one movement that was offered as a solution to a failed
parliamentary system. Operating under authoritarian, corrupt, or oppressive political
structures, civic movements throughout German history have viewed grassroots
organization as the most feasible or, at times, the only option for political
involvement.
Anti-Politics and Alliance '90/The Greens
Germany's Green party, Alliance '90/The Greens has a strong presence in
local and federal politics, arguably much more so than ecological parties in other
developed nations. In the 2013 federal elections, the Green party won 8.4% of votes
and 63 out of 630 seats in the Bundestag.155 Today, supporters of more direct citizen
154
Ibid., 264.
"Clear Victory for Merkel and CDU/CSU," German Missions in the United States,
http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/__pr/P__Wash/2013/09/23-Election-Results.html
(accessed April 8, 2014).
155
70 representation and ecological initiatives, the German Greens and their predecessors
have a long and complicated history of political involvement in both progressive and
rightwing movements. Perhaps the most troubling phase in the ecological/
environmental movements of the 1920s and 1930s, affinities to the National
Socialists, reveals the potential for political flexibility of German conservation
ideology. Both the National Socialists and nature conservationists shared a common
dislike for metropolitan expansion and Western materialism, while emphasizing the
virtues of the organic and the value of natural landscapes.156 In addition to passing a
national conservation law in 1935, many top ranking officials of the Nazi Party
expressed interest in environmental issues, including Herman Göring, a passionate
hunter who was responsible for the development of the Schorfheide nature reserve,
among other conservation projects.157 Thus, although the official Green party was not
founded until 1980, nature conservation had become a political issue many years
earlier. By demonstrating its applicability within the political platforms of parties on
the left and right, the German Green movement began as a nonpartisan initiative that
interacted with the government only when it displayed a commitment to conservation
legislation.
The political relationship between nature conservationists and Nazi officials is
undoubtedly the most disturbing period in the history of the German Green
movement. In general, conservationists were not active supporters of National
Socialism, but they did demonstrate a willingness to overlook racist or authoritarian
156
David Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern
Germany (New York: Norton, 2006), 279.
157
Uekötter, The Green and the Brown, 33.
71 policies so long as their own environmental agenda was implemented.158 Within the
groundbreaking national conservation law of 1935, one clause in paragraph 24
stipulated that the government could designate any piece of land a nature reserve or
prohibit alterations of the landscape, and the owners of the land could not protest or
sue for monetary compensation.159 Although entirely undemocratic, conservationists
favored this clause because it prioritized landscape protection. Hence, although
Alliance '90/The Greens of modern-day Germany is a staunch advocate of
participatory democracy, this has not always been the case among nature
conservationists throughout German history. In fact, it was in the FRG during the
1970s that German environmental movements first began to merge with the more
liberal agendas of international peace and democratic reform.
In West Germany, the origins of the Green party resemble those of the East
German opposition movements in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1970s, the Green
movement was something of an environmental milieu, with activists organizing
themselves among dozens of groups, all of which advocated slightly different
programs concerning ecological conservation, alternative living, and international
peace. It was not until 1980 that The Greens were founded to give the ecological
milieu more political solidarity, as well as parliamentary representation. Ten years
later, a similar organizational process occurred in the East, when New Forum,
Democracy Now, and Human Rights Initiative (three of the largest opposition groups
in the GDR) announced their support for the progressive party Alliance '90. In 1993,
158
159
Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 65.
72 Alliance '90 merged with The Greens to combine the two formerly separate
ecological reform movements within unified Germany.
When New Forum chose to engage in the GDR's political system, it trusted
the German Green party (and not the SPD or other left-leaning parties) to support and
reflect its reformative Third Way message. In a document titled "Semantic and
Symbolic Strategies," a leading member of New Forum writes, "The language of the
West German Greens and its citizen movement could be determined as a suitable
source of external influence."160 Thus, New Forum found a source of inspiration in
the environmental and peace activism of the West, but had a special affinity for the
West German Greens.161 Although operating within significantly more oppressive
political circumstances than were activists in West Germany, New Forum's
oppositional platform tended to mirror the ecological initiatives of the German
Greens, both of which were informed by a long history of nature conservation.
Several features of the West German Greens were influential for the
environmental and political program of New Forum. First, several historians have
considered the German Greens to be the original "non-party" or "anti-party," in that
they wanted a complete overhaul of the structure of and purpose behind
representative government. Whereas traditional parties were preoccupied with
economic growth, stable prices, and strong military defense, the Greens wanted to
replace these concerns with a program that instead emphasized ecology and
participatory democracy. Hence, ecological imperatives would guide economic
160
Semantische und Symbolische Strategien im Gründungsaufruf des Neuen Forums [Semantic and
Symbolic Strategies in the Founding Call of New Forum], 1989, Bärbel Bohley, New Forum Papers,
RHA. "Als Außeneinfluß ließ sich die Sprache der westeutschen Grünen bzw. Bürgerbewegungen
feststellen."
161
Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature, 344.
73 decisions, while the rights to political participation and the freedom to realize
alternative lifestyles would be extended to all West German citizens.162 What has also
been termed "New Politics,"163 the prototype of the anti-party began to evolve during
the 1970s and 1980s as the Green movement transitioned into the realm of
parliamentary politics. Involving a fundamental critique of mainstream growth
politics,164 this revolutionary conception of government found a receptive outlet in the
East. Throughout the 1980s, civic organizations of the GDR advocated for a shift in
the ecological and democratic priorities of the government. Finally, in 1989, New
Forum became the foremost anti-party of the civic movement by registering as an
organization (and not a party) that championed participatory democracy and
responsible economic decision-making above all else.
A second component of the West German Green movement, which was
influential for civic groups in the East, grassroots organization was a fundamental
standard for all efforts undertaken by the party. Hence, the movement advocated for
Basisdemokratie (grassroots democracy), a model for society in which small
organizational units constituted the building blocks of political life.165 In 1990, the
theory of Basisdemokratie was taken up by New Forum, which published a document
entitled "The Approach of Grassroots Democracy," listing the basic tenets and goals
of the political philosophy.166 Originally, ecological activism in the FRG stayed
outside the realm of politics, as conservation movements throughout German history
162
Thomas Poguntke, Alternative Politics: The German Green Party (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1993), 10.
163
Ibid., 5.
164
Margit Mayer and John Ely, The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 6.
165
Poguntke, Alternative Politics, 138.
166
Ansätze zur Basisdemokratie [The Approach of Grassroots Democracy], 1989, New Forum, New
Forum Papers, RHA.
74 have tended to do. Because most West German activists disapproved of the central
political ends of economic growth and military security (among others), they initially
did not respect traditional modes of partisanship. Hence, "it was far from evident that
the social movements of the 1970s would produce a political party."167 Yet,
eventually the Green movement hit a wall, realizing that there were political limits to
demonstrations and extra-parliamentary reform. In founding a Green party, the
movement attempted to reform the parliamentary system and its political priorities
from within, while maintaining a tradition of grassroots democratic organization.
In the GDR, grassroots activism was both a product of regional initiatives and
the outside influences of West German ecological and peace movements. Thus, as in
the West, grassroots organization was a defining feature of both social reform and, in
later years, the opposition movement. Marianne Birthler of reform organization
Solidarity Church and politician of Alliance '90/The Greens, lists several titles that
reform organizations used, including Basisgruppe (grassroots group), in order to
avoid SED suspicion and censorship.168 Hence, as in the West, grassroots
organization was a defining feature of extra-parliamentary reform as it allowed
activists to tap into the real issues experienced by East German citizens. During 1989
and 1990, New Forum was also influenced by the West German concept of grassroots
democracy. Throughout the Round Table forums of 1990, the organization utilized
strategies that were similar to those of the West German Green movement, namely
tactical cooperation with the powers that be. Instead of trying to overthrow existing
parliamentary systems, both the Greens and New Forum employed methods of
167
168
Mayer and Ely, The German Greens, 5.
Birthler, interview, July 23, 2013.
75 negotiation in an attempt to create compromise with the established parties. Thus, the
Third Way, as it was understood by the two anti-parties of East and West, involved
communication and reconciliation with established political parties in order to
gradually achieve the desired democratic and ecological reforms.
Despite the ecological focus of the West German Greens, the party has always
championed a variety of social and political issues, many of which are unrelated to its
environmental concerns. Among these, the belief in participatory or direct democracy
has served as a guiding principle within the program of the German Greens (today
Alliance '90/The Greens). In comparison to the usual choice between political
programs (which might then be enacted in any number of ways by politicians),
participatory democracy was intended to provide the lower units of society with more
extensive decision-making powers.169 Thus, for the German Greens, participatory
democracy was intended to be the original, ideal version of democracy, instead of the
more abstract and mediated variety that was the West German Bundestag. New
Forum describes its interpretation of the West German theory of grassroots
democracy in "The Approach of Grassroots Democracy": "In the discussion of
theories that affect the self-image of the group, that have far-reaching consequences,
or that cause varying degrees of fear among the members of the group, it is probably
better to be look for a version that can endorse all members of the group."170 Hence,
the theory of participatory democracy considered the democratic ideal to be political
169
Poguntke, Alternative Politics, 37.
Ansätze zur Basisdemokratie [The Approach of Grassroots Democracy], 1989, New Forum, New
Forum Papers, RHA. "Bei der Diskussion von Thesen, die das Selbstverständnis der Gruppe berühren,
die weitreichende Konsequenzen haben oder die unterschiedliche Graden von Angst bei den
Mitgliedern der Gruppe auslösen, ist es wahrscheinlich besser nach einer Fassung zu suchen, die alle
Mitglieder der Gruppe mittragen können."
170
76 solutions that all members of a group could agree upon. When New Forum advocated
for "democratic socialism" in the fall of 1989, its understanding of "democratic" was
in line with the participatory version espoused by the West German Greens. While the
West German Greens championed a truer, more ideal form of democracy, New
Forum intended to reinstate a more ideal form of socialism that incorporated the
institutions of participatory democracy.
Although New Forum's Third Way is often presented as a short-lived
phenomenon, there is more evidence to suggest that the Third Way is part of a longer
intellectual heritage. Just as earlier apolitical or anti-political grassroots movements
advocated similar reforms to those of New Forum, it can be argued that the modernday party Alliance '90/The Greens still promotes an apolitical Third Way. One of the
very first press releases of the newly formed party, a call for "the incorporation of
grassroots democratic elements,"171 illustrates an overarching affinity for citizen
initiatives. Marianne Birthler, a politician of the original Alliance '90 party, who later
went on to represent Alliance '90/The Greens in the state parliament of Brandenburg,
describes the political ideals of her party in 1990 as "human rights, democracy,
ecology, gender equality, social justice, and freedom from violence."172 Of course,
Alliance '90/The Greens has changed somewhat over the last fifteen years, but its
commitment to grassroots democracy has not waned. Today, the party continues to
advocate for more direct democracy through its recent proposal of an upper house to
the Bundestag, made up of a citizen roundtable, and by fighting to reduce thresholds
171
Presseerklärung Bündnis '90/Die Grüne [Press Release of Alliance '90/The Greens], May 16, 1990,
New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA. "Einarbeitung von basisdemokratischen Elementen."
172
Birthler, interview, July 23, 2013. "Das war Menschenrechte, Demokratie, Ökologie, Gleichstellung
der Geschlechter, soziale Gerechtigkeit, und Freiheit von der Gewalt. Das waren die wichtigsten
politischen Ideen, die wir auch bis heute haben."
77 for citizen signatures.173 Hence, Alliance '90/The Greens illustrates that the grassroots
initiatives of New Forum did not arise in a vacuum; rather, the group was influenced
by the West German Green movement, with which it eventually merged.
Weimar Political Philosophy and the Concept of Wholeness
In Weimar Germany, a conservative university culture began to experiment
with concepts of wholeness and synthesis as they applied to social and political
systems. Dissatisfied with the bureaucratic failings of the parliamentary system,
academics invented new intellectual methods for achieving the ideal form of
government. One theoretical tool, the concept of "synthesis technique" involved the
rejection of two stated alternatives in favor of a third choice, which was intended to
unite the advantages of the two defeated possibilities on a higher plane.174 Applicable
to a variety of subjects, synthesis ideology was often used to theorize about idealistic
political and social systems. For example, in philosopher and psychologist Eduard
Spranger's essay on the principles of education, a supposed conflict between
individualistic liberty and socialistic equality was overcome through the concept of
fraternity.175 Although Weimar intellectuals such as Spranger were operating within a
conservative university culture, their ideology of a middle or third solution to
opposing entities bears a striking resemblance to New Forum's Third Way.
Furthermore, Weimar intellectuals were not the creators of the concept of a higher
third. "The symphonic analogy, like the concept of wholeness, certainly did not
173
Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians: Eastern German State Legislators in the
Decade Following Democratization (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 108-113.
174
Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 395.
175
Ibid.
78 originate in the 1920s. One might say that it was always implied in the German
intellectual tradition."176 Whereas East German dissidents advocated the Third Way
as a means of reforming socialism, conservative intellectuals of the 1920s would have
used the higher third to criticize ineffective democratic institutions of the Weimar
Republic. Thus, although their political goals were entirely separate, Weimar-era
intellectuals and East German dissidents utilized surprisingly similar theoretical tools
in order to achieve these ends.
In addition to synthesis ideology, the Weimar era saw the production of a
variety of other idealistic political and scientific thought. One such theory, Gestalt
psychology, founded by Max Wertheimer before WWI and then further advanced in
collaboration with other intellectuals throughout the interwar years, literally translated
to "form" or "configuration."177 Central to the theory was the relationship between
Gestalt and wholeness; Gestalt was intended to be the ordering principle within
wholeness, creating a plurality of interconnected wholes. Although Gestalt
psychology was, on the one hand, a theory of the mind, it also had direct applications
to political and social issues. Hence, proponents of the theory argued that there was a
possibility of retaining a place for human significance within nature, that community
could fit comfortably within nation, and that (as the popular saying goes) the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts.178 To summarize, Gestalt psychology was intended
to reassure German citizens that community and culture would not be swallowed up
within the tide of cosmopolitanism and modernity; there was a place for everything
176
Ibid., 396.
Anne Harrington, Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm Ii to Hitler
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 103.
178
Ibid., 104.
177
79 within the greater whole of human existence. The idealism of this theory illustrates
the historical notion of the possibility for a better or higher way. Hence, New Forum
was not necessary delusional when it suggested that perhaps there was an alternative
to reunification. Rather, the group wanted to preserve components of East German
society, which it perceived as essential to the whole.
What literary historian Keith Bullivant terms the "Conservative Revolution,"
the theoretical contributions of conservative Weimar intellectuals, in many ways,
parallel the apolitical, reform-oriented platform of New Forum.179 One similarity
between the two movements involves a disdain for traditional party politics and an
emphasis instead on the transformative potential of ideology. Thomas Mann was one
of several intellectuals who, disillusioned by WWI, initially identified as a
"nonpolitical man."180 Yet, as he became acclimated to the democratic institutions of
the Weimar Republic, Mann began to urge other members of the conservative
university milieu to support their new government and to overlook its shortcomings
with the aim of improving the political system from within.181 Thus, for Mann, the
"middle way" involved becoming aware of political inadequacies and working to
reform them without destroying democracy, as the National Socialists aimed to do.
Like New Forum during the Round Table forums of 1990, Thomas Mann supported
internal reform, communication with parliamentary representatives, and
reconciliatory political legislation to massive political upheaval.
179
Keith Bullivant, "The Conservative Revolution," in The Weimar Dilemma: Intellectuals in the
Weimar Republic, ed. Anthony Phelan (Dover, NH: Manchester University Press, 1985), 47-70.
180
Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen [Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man], (New
York: F. Ungar, 1982).
181
Ibid., 69.
80 Although the synthesis ideology of Weimar intellectuals was useful in its
theoretical applications, its inability to translate into real political change indicated
that the ideology (similar to that of New Forum's Third Way) would remain in the
intellectual sphere. In most demonstrations of the synthesis technique, the resolution
of the two opposing entities tended to be much less precisely defined than its
foundational elements.182 This weakness of the "higher third" can be observed in
Spranger's notion that fraternity was the middle road between individualism and
equality. Although the concept makes sense in theory, it is difficult to explain exactly
what a "fraternal" society might look like. Similarly, New Forum received much
criticism from both East German dissidents and Western activists for not being able
to clearly define its Third Way or to translate it into practical terms. Marianne
Birthler described her discontent with New Forum: "Conceptually, I found New
Forum pretty diffuse. They wanted everything and nothing. It had, for me, no clear
contours. They only named problems, but didn't provide solutions."183 Thus, it
appears as if a central problem within both the Third Way and the "higher third" was
that, while it could criticize existing systems, it had more difficulty articulating a
feasible solution. In addition to its vague character, this tradition of idealist thinking
in Weimar Germany was, as Bullivant writes, "no match for the brown battalions."184
As in the case of the East German Third Way, utopian ideologies of a predominantly
intellectual movement were not able to compete with real political organization.
Ultimately, the idealistic aspects of the synthesis ideology were overshadowed by the
182
Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 395.
Birthler, interview, July 23, 2013.
184
Bullivant, "The Conservative Revolution," 69.
183
81 rise of the Nazis, while its more conservative components were incorporated into the
totalitarian message of Hitler's regime.
The Avant-garde and the New German City
The Garden city movement of the Weimar Republic constituted an attempt to
revive the German city while reducing social tensions and minimizing conflict. The
Garden city movement, a method of urban planning that began in the United
Kingdom during the late 19th century, combined a variety of architectural,
agricultural, and industrial techniques with the aim of beautifying and revitalizing
cities within a greener setting. In Germany, Garden city movements quickly caught
hold as avant-garde architects such as Bruno Taut and Martin Wagner began to
incorporate its hygienic and aesthetic lessons within their own theories of urban
development. Although dedicated to the integration of nature within the urban
environment, Taut and Wagner, who applied Garden city techniques to the city of
Berlin throughout the 1920s, utilized a considerably more modern architectural
approach than their British contemporaries. It could even be argued that the Garden
city trend in Berlin became a movement of social and political reform. In addition to
its aesthetic applications, German architects sought to apply the movement's lessons
to political life, demonstrating an effort to reduce social tensions through metapolitical means.
Although much of the Weimar Garden city movement was concerned with
zoning, landscaping, and construction, all of its more practical endeavors rested on a
utopian socialist theory in which life in the garden cities would lead to a more
82 peaceful and harmonious existence. Among its circle of architects, Bruno Taut was
perhaps the most engaged with the idea of the Garden city, and much of his writing is
concerned with the relationship between environment, building, and life.185 In "The
Falkenberg Garden Suburb near Berlin," Taut wrote, "Life in the garden suburb has a
vigorous pattern of both coexistence and mutual sharing, which reduces the social
divisions and creates civilized values."186 Hence, Taut believed that by improving the
social and physical environment, it was possible to foster a more communitarian style
of living and decrease social tensions. Like the leaders of New Forum, Taut abstained
from the use of the word "socialism" in this passage, but the concepts of mutual
sharing and coexistence undoubtedly imply a belief in a more egalitarian way of life.
Taut believed in socialism in an unpolitical sense, meaning "a society free
from every form of domination and characterized by the simple, unpretentious
relationships of people to one another."187 By creating a close-knit, aesthetically
appealing environment in which people were forced to rely upon one another for their
basic commodities, Taut postulated that individuals would actually become more
caring, empathetic, and community-oriented. For Taut, the ideal economic system
would thus involve many communities of small producers, in which no money was
needed and goods were exchanged on a local scale.188 Bearing a strong resemblance
to what one might describe as a commune, Taut's ideas had political implications, yet
were achieved through the nonpolitical route of architecture and urban planning.
185
Weitz, Weimar Germany, 183.
Whyte and Frisby, Metropolis Berlin, 268.
187
Weitz, Weimar Germany, 175.
188
Ibid., 175.
186
83 Although technically the first parliamentary democracy in German history, the
Weimar Republic was far from resolving the majority of social tensions. A significant
cause of social division, economic inequality led millions of workers to strike — over
13 million annually from 1920 to 1924.189 Thus, social upheaval and mass
demonstrations indicated that there was considerable improvement to be made in
standards of living. As a solution to these inadequate standards, Avant-garde artists
and architects such as Taut and Wagner believed in a middle way towards reducing
conflict, which was to be achieved through the improvement of both public and
private living spaces. As sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf wrote in Society and
Democracy in Germany, "the institutions revealed a strangely rigid attitude, shifting
between unreserved retention of the status quo and a grasp for the stars."190 Hence,
the apolitical solutions of Avant-grade artists provided a solution that was both
realistic yet optimistic. Through the creation of a functional and communal social
environment, these thinkers attempted to reduce social tensions and their unwanted
political manifestations. In Germany, the Garden City movement was perhaps less of
an aesthetic movement and more of a push to create feasible, extra-parliamentary
solutions to social divisions.
Of course, there are many obvious differences between the Weimar-era
Garden city movement and New Forum's apolitical Third Way. Whereas one was
concerned more with aesthetics, the other put a premium on political reform and its
potential to change a society. Furthermore Bruno Taut and Martin Wagner were by no
means political actors; they merely aimed to inspire social cohesiveness through
189
190
Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967), 166.
Ibid., 179.
84 visually appealing yet functional public and private spaces. Yet, the German Garden
city movement is no different from later anti-parties in its idealistic pursuit of the
social good through nontraditional means. In a press release of Alliance '90/The
Greens in May of 1990, the original "anti-party" lists sustainable urban development,
public transportation efficiency, improvement of waste disposal, new zoning
initiatives, and energy saving strategies as key priorities of its political agenda.191
Hence, for both the architects of the German Garden city movement and the leaders
of Alliance '90/The Greens, the sustainable development of Germany's cities was a
foremost concern - not just for aesthetic and ecological reasons, but for the socially
positive effects of a clean, healthy, and beautiful environment as well. Although
neither New Forum nor Garden city architects were overt about their political
preferences, both groups valued the communitarian ideals of socialism and espoused
its social and economic benefits, even if in an apolitical sense.
Reforming Socialism: A German Tradition
For almost as long as the theory of socialism has existed, the desire to reform
and revise its basic program has occupied the work of German scholars and
politicians alike. This tendency began with the work of theoretician and politician
Eduard Bernstein, who, in the late 19th century, promoted the reexamination of
Marxist tenets in favor of a less orthodox form of socialism.192 Bernstein's
revisionism differed from traditional Marxist thought in a number of ways, but his
(and other revisionists') most valid criticisms concerned the negativity of Marxism,
191
Presseerklärung Bündnis '90/Die Grüne [Press Release of Alliance '90/The Greens], May 16, 1990,
New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
192
Andrews, "Criticism/ Self-Criticism in East Germany," 34.
85 that is, the necessity of political destruction in the name of its rebirth. In addition, the
revisionists of the Wilhelmine period questioned whether classical Marxists had a
practical strategy to achieve their desired aim of a socialist state.193 Thus, the
sentiment that socialism, as a political system, was somehow incomplete, or might
not be functioning as well as it could, was felt long before the dissident movement of
East Germany. But coupled with this critical perspective was a very real commitment
to the idealistic destination of Marxist ideology, and Bernstein and other revisionists
by no means meant to do away with the theory entirely. Sharing a similar goal to the
dissidents of East Germany, the revisionists hoped to offer a middle way between
bourgeoisie capitalism, on the one hand, and revolutionary Marxism, on the other.194
A major proponent of Marxist revisionism during the 1960s, East German
chemist and activist Robert Havemann would later become a source of inspiration to
East German dissidents and countless others throughout the Eastern Bloc. His critique
of socialism as it existed in the GDR focused on two major problems: the one being
its neglect of legitimate democratic institutions, and the other its obsession with
emulating the capitalist advances of the West. For Havemann, socialism was
inherently democratic, and its neglect under the SED government had caused the
nation to suffer, both economically and with regard to its international reputation.
"The abolition of democratic rights and liberties... is the underlying cause both of the
economic failure of socialism hitherto, and of the progressive erosion of its
international standing."195 Hence, Havemann believed that socialism, as it existed in
193
Roger Fletcher, "British Radicalism and German Revisionism: The Case of Eduard Bernstein," The
International History Review 4, no. 3 (1982): 340.
194
Ibid., 339.
195
Andrews, "Criticism/ Self-Criticism in East Germany," 142.
86 the GDR, was not legitimate, because it merely faked democratic elections, and failed
to give voice to the interests of the people. Yet, as Havemann professed in an
interview with journalist John-Pierre Hammer in 1978, "this does not mean at all that
I am a supporter of the capitalist system."196 Rather, Havemann continued to advocate
for internal reform of the socialist GDR.
The second main component of Havemann's critique, the GDR's obsession
with emulating capitalist systems, constituted, for him, a moral weakness of
contemporary socialism. Hence, "socialism should offer human beings different
perspectives. Not those of greater consumption but of greater liberty and
development."197 Instead of emulating West Germany through the production of
luxury goods such as the automobile (of which East Germany was an objectively
terrible manufacturer), Havemann believed that the socialist country should invest in
more progressive ventures like high-efficiency public transportation.198 Thus, long
before the Third Way of New Forum, dissidents like Robert Havemann had begun to
critique East German socialism for its lack of democratic institutions and to offer
feasible solutions for its economic and political reform.
Following in the footsteps of revisionists like Eduard Bernstein and Robert
Havemann, the activist leaders of New Forum espoused neither the capitalist
institutions of the West, nor the oppressive socialism of the SED, but a reformed,
more democratic renewal of socialism. Compared to activists in other Soviet states,
East German dissidents alone thought that they were fighting a pro-socialist
196
Robert Havemann, Jean-Pierre Hammer, and Jack Zipes, "Interview with Robert Havemann," New
German Critique, no. 15 (1978): 37-46, here: 44.
197
Ibid., 45.
198
Andrews, "Criticism/ Self-Criticism in East Germany," 141.
87 revolution, in which the founding principles of Marxist ideology might be saved from
its corruption under the SED regime.199 This belief that socialism could somehow be
rescued from its present state was, in part, due to the lack of violence accompanying
the downfall of the SED regime. Whereas other countries in the Soviet Bloc had
undergone bloody revolutions, and vowed never to return to socialism, East Germany
had experienced a much milder shift in political power. Thus, many of its dissident
groups were more willing to engage in a dialogue with SED officials, as the New
Forum leadership did at the Round Table forums throughout 1990.
In addition to the relatively nonviolent nature of the East German revolution,
many dissidents remained committed to socialism because it had played a large role
in the history of their country. When asked exactly what a revised socialism might
look like for the GDR, New Forum leader Bärbel Bohley responded: "There would
have to be changes in the direction of more sovereignty for the people, less emphasis
on consumer goods, and a recognition that there are other problems confronting us —
that the Germans are not the center of the universe."200 Thus, for Bohley and others,
there was no need for extreme changes within East Germany. Rather, increasing
democratic liberties, revising economic policies, and reorienting the state on a more
open path, would be enough to straighten out the uneven course of East German
history. The Third Way, as New Forum understood it, required the incorporation of
the socialist ideology within a new democratic system, and not its total eclipse by the
capitalist West.
199
200
Ibid., 130.
Michael Lucas et al., "Germany after the Wall," World Policy Journal 7, no. 1 (1989): 189-214.
88 Despite the trend towards revisionism within East German opposition, many
organizations were very careful about how they articulated their political demands.
As East German activist and politician of Alliance '90 Marianne Birthler explains,
"No one would have called themselves a resistance group in the GDR. We called
ourselves grassroots groups, freedom groups, or research organizations, but we never
had the idea that we were opposing the government."201 For many dissidents, political
protest did not mean that they were attempting to overthrow the government; rather,
they wanted to engage in communication with their leaders and to reform the socialist
structure of the state. By identifying themselves as Basisgruppen [grassroots groups],
organizations such as New Forum and Human Rights Initiative were able to both
sidestep persecution by the SED regime while contributing to the social reform of
East Germany. In comparison to the socialist revisionism of Bernstein and later
Havemann, opposition organizations in 1989 were wary of using Marxist language,
fearing that they might appear too revolutionary to the East German public. In its
founding statement titled "Awakening '89," New Forum never actually used the term
"socialism" to express its political aims.202 Whereas groups such as Democracy Now
openly endorsed a renewal of socialism through statements like: "We want to see the
socialist revolution, which has stagnated under state control, endowed with new
life,"203 New Forum chose to avoid what some might deem revolutionary language,
instead focusing on the disrupted communication between state and society.204
201
Birthler, interview, July 23, 2013. "Niemand hat sich Widerstandsgruppe genannt in der DDR. Wir
nannten uns Basisgruppen, Friedensgruppen, oder Arbeitskreis, aber wir haben niemals den Begriff
Oppositions benützt... Unser Selbstverständnis war das von Basisgruppen."
202
New Forum, Aufbruch '89 [Awakening '89], September 9, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers,
RHA.
203
Andrews, "Criticism/ Self-Criticism in East Germany," 145.
204
Aufbruch '89 [Awakening '89], September 9, 1989, New Forum, New Forum Papers, RHA.
89 Although vague political language frustrated some of New Forum's followers, the
group's emphasis on democratic reform, instead of Marxist ideology, helped it to
maintain credibility within a variety of political circles.
Anti-politics and the Third Way
The apolitical Third Way is a vague idea in itself, and it would be relatively
easy to apply its utopian, idealistic principles to a number of social movements, both
within Germany and throughout the world. Yet, the conception of a middle road
towards change has repeatedly manifested itself throughout German history and to
such an extent that it would be difficult to discount its relevance within German
grassroots politics. The political philosophies of Weimar intellectuals, who advocated
the "higher third," is perhaps the most obvious theoretical connection between New
Forum's unrealized Third Way and apolitical reform initiatives of the past. Yet, the
West German Green party, socialist revisionism, and the German Garden city
movement all possessed a striking resemblance to the idealistic yet apolitical
ambitions of East Germany's New Forum. Although New Forum members might feel
somewhat uneasy about being compared to such disparate reform movements when
their political agenda applied primarily to the GDR, it is important to note that
apolitical ideas must necessarily transcend the boundaries of partisan interest. Thus, it
is less important whether apolitical grassroots groups identified with the right or left,
and more telling that they understood themselves to occupy the realm above party
politics, the realm of Überparteilichkeit. Ultimately, New Forum's apolitical Third
Way movement should not be considered a failed attempt at grassroots change.
90 Although manifested in different ways, grassroots apolitical reform continues to live
on in Alliance '90/The Greens, and, to some extent, has always been a foundational
component of the German political identity.
91 CONCLUSION
In Society and Democracy in Germany, Ralf Dahrendorf investigates the
German political identity, asking: "But who is the political German? Where do we
find him at work?"205 The aim of this thesis was not, as Dahrendorf writes, to
examine the political German, but rather to examine the apolitical German. Why have
citizens throughout German history consistently organized themselves outside of
political life, seeking instead to transform their societies through grassroots reform?
Although this thesis began with the aim of understanding why the opposition
organization New Forum remained dedicated to extra-parliamentary, apolitical
reform, it has led to an historical investigation of the apolitical German.
New Forum's apolitical identity was both a product of the social and political
conditions of East Germany during the late 1980s and part of a greater tradition of
German grassroots reform. Thus, New Forum's disdain for parliamentary politics as
they had existed within the GDR led the group to register as an organization and not a
political party. In the Third Way, the group saw an alternative to the capitalist might
of West Germany and the oppressive rule of the SED. Yet, the political circumstances
surrounding the Revolution of 1989 do not provide a complete explanation of New
Forum's apolitical character or its utopian Third Way. Rather, one must look to
historical apolitical and philosophical movements in order to fully understand the
reasoning behind New Forum's apolitical stance. As was explored through a
discussion of German nature conservation and the West German Green Party,
environmental movements in both West Germany and throughout German history had
205
Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany. 330.
92 a tremendous influence on the character of New Forum. The West German Greens,
the original "anti-party," were a key factor in New Forum's decision to oppose
traditional parliamentary systems. By adopting their strategy of grassroots
organization and belief in participatory democracy, New Forum was able to
strengthen and solidify its role as the leading apolitical organization in the GDR.
Although West German activism influenced the apolitical path of New Forum,
this was not the only source leading the organization to resist participation in party
politics. In addition to the Green Party, there were a variety of historical apolitical
movements that influenced the organization and philosophy of New Forum. Among
these, the ideology of socialist revisionism, which dates back to the nineteenth
century, influenced New Forum to question the socialist institutions of the GDR,
while remaining wary of West German democracy. Dissatisfied with the existing
forms of representative government, New Forum instead advocated a new, more
direct political system. Labeling itself as a platform for open discussion and debate,
New Forum became the apolitical prototype for a reformed socialist state.
This thesis offers a very general investigation of apolitical reform movements
throughout German history as they relate to East Germany's New Forum. Yet, several
important political (or apolitical) topics have not been explored. Although most
reform initiatives in the Third Reich were all but destroyed under National Socialism
(with the exception of nature conservation), a worthwhile topic of further research
would be the apolitical activism of citizens under National Socialism, the most
oppressive political period of German history. This thesis illustrated the continuity
between several apolitical reform movements before the division of Germany and the
93 civic movement of the GDR. Although discussed briefly through a comparison
between the West German Green Party and New Forum, the relationship between
political activism of West Germany and East Germany remains largely unexplored.
Further research might investigate discrepancies between the official political
relationship of the FRG and the GDR and the somewhat underground relationships of
apolitical activists within the two countries.
New Forum did not arise in a vacuum and it was not solely a product of the
communist GDR. Rather, this apolitical organization was part of a greater German
tradition of grassroots organization that dates back to Wilhelmine Germany.
Operating under oppressive political systems, movements such as the Wilhelime
reform milieu and the East German opposition turned instead to strategies of
grassroots organization and extra-parliamentary reform. Hence, to some degree, the
apolitical Third Way is a symptom of authoritarian political systems throughout
German history. The concept of the anti-party and its manifestation in groups such as
New Forum and Alliance '90/The Greens in no way reflects the desire of German
citizens to withdraw from political life. Rather, the apolitical Third Way reflects the
historical incentive to transform, revitalize, and reclaim ineffective systems of
parliamentary government under authoritarian rule.
Today, the utopian idealism of grassroots activity and Third Way thinking
continues to characterize aspects of German democracy. One of the defining features
of German apolitical organization, an ecological platform, no longer belongs solely to
Alliance '90/The Greens. Rather, parties across the political spectrum have embraced
environmental politics, leading Germany to become one of the greenest democracies
94 in the world. Thus, in some areas of grassroots reform, such as environmentalism,
apolitical initiatives were able to transcend political parties and create a superpartisan consensus. By viewing social and economic issues through an apolitical lens,
grassroots movements created a metapolitical milieu that could relate directly to
regional, local, and personal experiences. Throughout the 20th century, grassroots
movements (including New Forum) drew upon long-standing local and regional
sources of identity. Rather than just identifying with the German nation, German
citizens continued to identify with their locality and region, retaining a sense of
permanency despite rapid political change. Tied to these regional understandings of
Germanness, grassroots movements have allowed citizens to implement reform
outside of federal politics. German reunification did not necessarily affect the strength
of these regional sources of identity, nor their efforts at grassroots organization.
Today, these deeply-rooted sources of German identity have made increasingly
possible what the West German Greens and New Forum once called Basisdemokratie
(grassroots democracy) by allowing politicians to tap into the actual interests of
German citizens more directly.
While this thesis set out to resolve the problem of New Forum's apolitical
identity, its secondary goal was to reclaim the organization that has been labeled a
political failure by so many historians. Although participation in partisan politics has
obvious advantages, this should not imply that grassroots movements are inferior to
their parliamentary counterparts. By viewing New Forum in terms of what it could
not do (compete with West Germany in a hasty process of German unification), the
organization appears weak and ineffective. Hence, when one understands apolitical
95 movements as the antithesis of party politics, one tends to notice their limitations,
both financial and organizational. Yet, this perspective does not give enough credit to
the power of grassroots organization. Perhaps a better way of understanding the
grassroots is as a method of organization and a vehicle of reform entirely outside
political systems. While New Forum was never able to implement the Third Way, the
utopian idealism inherent to Third Way movements has created a basis for a more
directly responsive democratic system in modern-day Germany.
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