Site Selection Considerations for Urban Research Parks e x c e ll e nc e for A rk an sa s Page | 0 Site Selection Considerations for Urban Research Parks Christopher Diaz Hunter Bacot Institute of Government July 2012 In Brief—Recommended Considerations Potentially affected stakeholders should be brought in to the site selection process as active participants. A clearly defined set of best practices should guide the site selection process that considers, and tries to mitigate, the impact that the research park will have on the community in which it is sited. Information from the “Facility Siting Credo” should inform the Little Rock Technology Park Authority in engaging the community directly affected by site selection. Scope This whitepaper provides a brief overview of the advantages, disadvantages, and issues surrounding research parks. In particular, what lessons have other communities learned in choosing locations for research parks, and how can the Little Rock Technology Park Authority apply those lessons to its own proposed Research Park? These lessons should answer the following questions: What issues surround the location of a research park in an urban neighborhood? What opportunities do research parks bring to communities in which these are located? Is there a set of “best practices” to follow in research park location decisions and, if so, what are these? How are plans for locating proposed research parks communicated to stakeholders directly affected by site selection? Can these experiences of other communities locating research parks be applied to the Little Rock Technology Park? Questions and Answers What problems have arisen in locating research parks in urban neighborhoods? There is no body of extant literature that speaks directly to the question of problems with siting research parks in urban neighborhoods. However, much literature addresses this question indirectly in terms of siting other types of facilities, such as landfills, power plants, waste incinerators, and prisons in a variety of urban and non-urban locations. The Page | 1 conclusions drawn by this body of literature can, by inference, be applied to research parks in urban neighborhoods as well. Regardless of the nature of the facility, locating it in an urban neighborhood invariably results in relocating residents, many of whom are elderly, low-income, and minority. Relocating residents involves compensating them for their property at fair-market value, providing assistance with identifying potential properties, and assisting residents in their relocation. Should the authority and residents not be able to negotiate a property agreement, condemning property through eminent domain authority may be used. Eminent domain is the power possessed by government to appropriate property for public use, welfare, or interest. Eminent domain actions, for example, are commonly used throughout jurisdictions across the country to acquire land for road and bridge construction as well as for placing power, water, or gas lines. Based on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the owner of any appropriated property is entitled to reasonable compensation, usually defined as the fair market value of the property. Proceedings to acquire property through eminent domain are generally used as a last resort. How the land acquisition process is conducted for locating a public facility often shapes resident reaction to the siting process. Unless potentially-affected residents are included in the facility-siting process as equally relevant stakeholders, the facility-siting process will likely encounter project delays due to sustained community resistance, which often results legal and political battles during and after the site selection decision is made. Much of this NIMBY-ism (Not In My Back Yard) is unavoidable because such change is difficult and frightening for those affected directly by it, even more so for those who already feel alienated and disenfranchised. However, the entity (which in this case is the Little Rock Technology Park Authority) seeking to locate a facility such as a research park in an urban neighborhood can ameliorate residents’ anxiety by integrating them into the site-selection process, rather than presenting it to them as a “done deal.” Every effort must be made to assess and mitigate the effect of the facility’s location on lives of these residents, and ideally, this impact assessment should occur simultaneously with the siteselection process.1 Research on efforts to acquire property and relocate residents as part of the process in siting research parks is minimal; there are, however, a two specific examples that can inform the Little Rock process. An example involving a high-density urban area that affected stakeholders in the facility site-location process is the East Side Biotech Project in Baltimore, Maryland’s Middle East Neighborhood. In fact, Phase I of that project is somewhat similar in size and scope to the effort currently underway in Little Rock – it consists of 30 acres and encompasses 831 properties. The East Baltimore Development Inc. (EBDI), a nonprofit organization created in 2002 to take charge of the project, worked 1 Laws, David and Lawrence Susskind. “Changing Perspectives on the Facility Siting Process.” Maine Policy Review. 1(1991): n.p. Page | 2 with neighborhood residents to assist them in relocation and job-training to take advantage of the 6,000 biotech jobs that the project’s backers predicted upon the project’s completion.2 Homeowners in the affected neighborhood were awarded relocation packages guided by federal, state, and local regulations, laws, and ordinances.3 In addition, EBDI maintained constant communication and outreach with the neighborhood’s affected residents throughout the redevelopment process from “pre-acquisition to postdisplacement”.4 Though not without challenge, Phase I of that project included acquisition of 831 properties affecting 396 households.5 Although there was lingering mistrust and anxiety throughout the relocation process, a survey of former residents of the Middle East neighborhood indicates an overall satisfaction rating of 8.1 out of 10. Additionally, 69 percent of 157 families relocated said they were “much better off” after being relocated.6 Another example is found in Oklahoma City’s Presbyterian Health Foundation Research Park (PHFRP), which played an integral part in developing the city’s urban redevelopment policies. The PHFRP’s current boundaries included the city’s Harrison-Walnut urban renewal area when the area was specified for development in 1981.7 These redevelopment policies included a comprehensive renewal effort marked by: A comprehensive urban renewal plan; the establishment of a Planned Urban Development (PUD) subdivision arrangement; a sizeable federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) ($4 million); and, the creation of a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district. The City of Oklahoma City outlined its relocation plan for residents and businesses located in the Harrison-Walnut area affected by PHFRP’s continued growth and expansion (which was last updated in 2008). The acquisition process used in the PHFRP’s siting and expansion specifies that residents “will be relocated upon discovery of at least one comparable, replacement dwelling and the offer of its availability to each subject household 2 Cohen, Charles. “Moved and Shaken: As the East Side Biotech Park Comes In, Area Residents Come to Terms with Getting Out.” City Paper. (2/22/06) http://www2.citypaper.com/news/story.asp?id=11505 3 For example, using guidelines based on the federal Uniform Relocation Act, the Eastside Biotech Project awarded relocation packages that included compensation in addition to the appraised value of homes; renters were given a number of years’ worth of their current rent to be applied toward their new monthly rent elsewhere. In addition to the federal guidelines associated with the Uniform Relocation Act, this project was further guided by Maryland state laws and Baltimore local ordinances; together these regulations imposed comprehensive guidelines for relocating residents and businesses, as well as for handling compensation for vacant lots. For a thorough discussion of these regulations, see pages 7-20 of Phillip A. Hummel’s “East Side Story – The East Baltimore Development Initiative.” (December 2007); the manuscript is available through the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law Digital Commons. Accessed June 2012: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlh_pubs/11/. 4 Hummel, ibid, p. 29. 5 Hummel, ibid. 6 Cohen, ibid. 7 Warner, Larkin and Robert C. Dauffenbach. “The Presbyterian Health Foundation Research Park: a Major Oklahoma City Asset.” Prepared for the Greater Oklahoma City Chamber, (2008): 18. Page | 3 or individual. Businesses will be relocated or compensated in a uniform manner as set out in the Policies.”8 What opportunities do research parks bring to communities in which they are located? Research parks’ proponents argue that these parks bring the community opportunities that ultimately offset start-up and carrying costs. Among these opportunities is the potential for fostering university-industry partnerships, financing and supporting the commercialization of intellectual property, retaining and attracting talent, and revitalizing urban communities.9 Other than the number of companies started, the number of jobs created, and the increase in property values as a result of research parks, the extant literature cites greater income equality, expanded opportunities within the existing labor force, growth in educational attainment, and growth of employment and payroll outside the park in support and ancillary sectors.10 None of these studies addresses the question of whether these opportunities and benefits produce positive externalities for neighborhoods affected by these projects. In any event, these opportunities do not accrue automatically to communities with research parks. Some research suggests that these parks either have no effect in attracting biotech industry, or may in fact be counter-productive or superfluous to fomenting research and development activities in a community.11 The primary reason that many research parks do not perform to expectations is due to research funding and commercialization revenues being heavily influenced by the “Top 15” universities that dominate technology transfer.12 Thus, what follows is a brief capitulation of a few technology parks across the country that have or have not performed to expectations. Many research parks meet the expectations promised by their promoters. For example, the Piedmont Triad Research Park (PTRP) in North Carolina is a downtown redevelopment project in Winston-Salem built largely upon land and using buildings deeded by the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company in 1992. Set on 145 developable acres in downtown Winston-Salem, PTRP has currently developed 554,011 gross square feet on approximately 12 acres for laboratory, office, and mixed-use space. When the site is fully developed in 25 8 See “Amended Harrison-Walnut Urban Renewal Plan,” Sec. H, p.12. http://www.okc.gov/agendapub/cache/2/2cadqqjorqdw2du2qwymnu55/49467306182012105055789.PDF 9 Characteristics and Trends in North American Research Parks: 21st Century Directions. Battelle Technology Partnership Practice (October 2007): 35-36. 10 Pinkowski, Jack. “Running Head: Research and Science Parks for Economic Development.” Presented at the St. Lucie County Research & Education Park Planning Workshop, Ft. Pierce, FL (4/21/05): 10-11. 11 Appold, Stephen J. “Research Parks and the Location of Industrial Research Laboratories: an Analysis of the Effectiveness of a Policy Intervention.” Research Policy. 33(2004): 225-243. 12 Levine, Marc V. “The False Promise of the Entrepreneurial University: Selling Academic Commericalism as an ‘Engine’ of Economic Development in Milwaukee.” University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Center for Economic Development. Working Paper (September 2009). Page | 4 to 30 years, it is expected to create 28,000 new jobs.13 At present, the PTRP proudly advertises it successes, which include: attracting approximately 40 companies, professional firms, and organizations; employing approximately 1,000 people with a collective annual payroll of more than $50 million; creating more than 100 park jobs related to infrastructure since 2008; catalyzing three jobs in the community to support biotech for each new park position; enjoying a tenant population representing 25 countries and five continents; projecting that at the 30-year build-out point, PTRP is anticipated to produce $80.1 million per year in measurable fiscal impact to North Carolina, $27.8 to Forsyth County, and $15.7 million to Winston-Salem.14 Another example of a successful research park is the University of Delaware’s Delaware Tech Park, which is situated on 40 acres of land in Newark, Delaware, which lies in the middle of the Philadelphia-Baltimore urban corridor. As of May 2006, the Delaware Tech Park proclaimed success based on several measures, which include: having 56 tenants ranging from business consulting, biotech, pharmaceuticals, and chemical engineering; having 72,000 square feet and three buildings; planning for the future development of three additional buildings and 350,000 square feet of office, laboratory, and light manufacturing space; generating $300 million in federal research dollars since the park opened (in 1993); estimating an economic impact between $70 million and $80 million annually; being named the 2005 Outstanding Research/Science Park of the Year by the Association of University Research Parks.15 The Evanston Research Park (in Evanston, Illinois) provides one more example of a successful research park venture. The Evanston Research Park, which is situated on 22 acres and comprises 400,000 square feet of space, is a partnership between Northwestern University and the City of Evanston. Like the other parks discussed, the Evanston effort has succeeded in: creating a new technology sector for the community; establishing new business relationships for the university; and, converting 22 acres of unused land into taxpaying uses and new jobs. 13 See Piedmont Triad Research Park’s Media Kit at http://www.ptrp.com/about/mediakit/PTRP_Media_Kit_02-15-2012.pdf. 14 Ibid., p.5 15 See Appendix B of Harriman Research and Technology Park—Final Report. Prepared for New York’s Empire State Development. Saratoga Associates (May 2006) at http://esd.ny.gov/subsidiaries_projects/hrtdc/Data/AppdxB_Final_Report_05-23-06.pdf . Page | 5 Given its urban location, the Evanston Research Park experience is quite relevant to the plans for the Little Rock Technology Park; the Evanston park plan was centered on the viability of “mixed-use” as a model for an urban research technology park. Yet, despite its success, the Evanston experience may encounter difficulty in meeting its original, longterm vision of the park as a means of building a new economic development sector in the city and region.16 With these successful examples of technology parks, two research parks cited as models for the Little Rock Technology Park – the Virginia Bio-Tech Research Park and the University of South Carolina’s Innovista Technology Park – are performing below expectations in terms of attracting biotech firms and generating expected revenue.17,18 For example, at the Virginia Bio-Tech Research Park, two of the three publicly-held companies have moved out. As recently as last year, the Virginia Bio-Tech Research Park was in negotiations with Virginia Commonwealth University to sell two of its buildings. Furthermore, much of the park’s space is “occupied by entities that have nothing to do with the original purpose of incubating biotech start-ups and spinning them loose. Very little ‘clustering,’ or big-time corporate contract work, has been achieved. At times, it’s difficult to tell what distinguishes the biotech park from any other office park.”19 In South Carolina, the story is similar: few biotech firms and high vacancy rates at the technology park. As of 2009, the technology park had only one tenant—the University of South Carolina’s Arnold School of Public Health. At the same time, only one of the park’s three buildings was completely occupied (by the Arnold School); the second building was occupied at 20 percent (by university employees), while the third building remained incomplete due to lack of funding. Finally, the cost to taxpayers is staggering; according to one assessment, Innovista has cost South Carolina taxpayers over $100 million. 20 Given the current economic climate and efforts to locate such a park in central Little Rock, the Little Rock Technology Park Authority can utilize these experiences of other similar research park developments to inform its efforts as it moves forward with development. Are there “best practices” to follow in deciding where to locate a research park, and if so, what are they? Yes, there are. At the 1989-90 National Workshop on Facility Siting, sponsored by MIT and the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business, 16 Ibid. Galuszka, Peter. “Bio-bust?” Style Weekly. (5/24/11) http://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/biobust/Content?oid=1494982 18 Dietrich, Kevin. “USC Seeks Another $13.3 Million for Innovista.” The Nerve. (5/4/12) http://thenerve.org/news/2012/05/04/usc-seeks-another-13-million-for-innovista/ 19 Galuszka, ibid. 20 “Innovista: a Public-Private Partnership That’s All Public.” South Carolina Policy Council. (2009). http://www.scpolicycouncil.org/research/economic/innovista-a-public-private-partnership-thats-all-public 17 Page | 6 participants devised a “Facility Siting Credo”21 for making siting decisions that reflect and respond to the concerns of potential host communities.22 Many of these items are applicable to the Little Rock project. The “Facility Siting Credo” provides the following 13 elements: 1. Seek consensus—Seek active involvement by all groups who may be affected by a siting decision. Participation by potentially affected stakeholders in the site decision-making process helps to assuage uncertainty, ambiguity, and legitimate differences of opinion. They should be consulted before key decisions are made.23 2. Work to develop trust—Lack of trust is a major barrier to seeking consensus. Laws and Susskind (1991) argue that “a major source of mistrust is the assumption that affected communities must accept siting decisions if the technical justification is sufficient and procedural requirements have been met. Ambiguity over benefits and risks will give rise to doubts regardless of the weight of the technical evidence. A failure to acknowledge these ambiguities leads to mistrust. Locating multiple facilities in poor or otherwise disadvantaged areas (regardless of the compensation required or the openness of the process) is another source of mistrust.”24 Building trust requires honesty about the challenges of decision making and acknowledging that mistakes have been made in the past. Every effort should be made to avoid obfuscation, and ignoring the legitimate concerns of potentially affected stakeholders will further undermine trust.25 3. Set realistic timetables—Building consensus takes time and should not be rushed. Rushing consensus building with potentially affected stakeholders is likely to be unsuccessful in the long-term, and undermines trust in the shortterm. Deadlines should be sufficient for careful deliberation, but also should require that key decisions be made at specific intervals so that the consensusbuilding process itself is not manipulated to stall for time.26 4. Get agreement that the status quo is unacceptable—A siting process must begin with agreement that a facility is needed. This need should be clearly defined and widely understood. Proponents of a facility should be able to specify who will benefit from the project. Laws and Susskind (1991) make the point that “if a problem is not considered important, or the status quo is deemed acceptable by many interest groups, it is unlikely that the need for a facility will be 21 See also Susskind, Lawrence. “A Negotiation Credo for Controversial Siting Disputes.” Negotiation Journal. (October 1990). 22 Laws and Susskind (1991), ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. Page | 7 established. A siting process that proceeds without agreement on need is unlikely to succeed.”27 5. Choose the design that best addresses the problem—Many possible alternative sites should be reviewed and considered, and each alternative should be analyzed carefully for both its long-term and short-term implications. The “best” site should be judged relative to the extent to which the interests of all stakeholders are likely to be met.28 6. Guarantee that stringent safety measures will be met—Potentially affected stakeholders in a facility-siting decision should be assured that the facility will comply with all federal and state health and safety standards, and reflect current knowledge of “best practices.”29 7. Fully compensate all negative impacts of a facility—Compensation should be negotiated with potentially affected stakeholders. Compensation agreements for potentially affected stakeholders may include property value guarantees, relocation assistance, housing vouchers for renters, job training, and ensuring that public transportation is readily accessible to dislocated stakeholders.30 8. Use contingent agreements—Contingent agreements specify what will be done in the case of accidents, interruptions of service, changes in standards, or the emergence of new scientific information about risks or impacts. Such agreements should describe the triggers for action, delineate responsibilities for taking action, and provide means of guaranteeing that contingent promises will be met.31 9. Keep multiple options on the table at all times—This works for the benefit of both a facility’s proponents and the potentially affected stakeholders. For the former, it prevents the project from being held hostage by a particular community over compensation or benefit packages. For the latter, it prevents a community being considered to host a facility from perceiving that theirs is the only site under consideration. Parties on both sides are less likely to be suspicious of each other, and the acceptability of the eventual outcome will be enhanced if multiple options remain open.32 10. Make the host community better off—Proponents of siting a facility in a particular community should respond to the real needs of potentially affected stakeholders in that community. Comprehensive benefits packages offered to residents could include tax abatements, providing amenities to residents (e.g., parks, access to public transportation), or even direct cash payments to residents. The net effect is that the potentially affected stakeholders feel that they are better off than before the facility displaced them. Laws and Susskind 27 Ibid. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 28 Page | 8 (1991) suggest that “incentive payments or promises to take actions of various kinds should be made over and above commitments to mitigate impacts or compensate a community for impacts that cannot be mitigated.”33 11. Seek acceptable sites through a volunteer process—If the benefits of a proposed facility are clear and unmistakable, and the risks and adverse effects are compensated or mitigated by the facility’s proponents, some communities may compete to host that facility.34 12. Consider a competitive siting process—If the benefits of a proposed facility are high enough, communities may even compete to host the facility. A competitive process should ensure that the level of benefits to a host community is reasonable, and the competitive or bidding process should not be used to reduce benefits to a level below that required to compensate for all non-mitigatable impacts.35 13. Work for geographic fairness—No single community or neighborhood should be the only site for facilities that no one else wants.36 Too often, facility proponents and their government partners ignore these recommended siting parameters, particularly for dealing with potentially affected stakeholders. According to Raab and Susskind (2009), “They [the entity] go through the motions, hunkering down to defend decisions rather than engaging stakeholders in a timely and meaningful way. This breeds even greater public cynicism.”37 While it is largely unknown given the sparse research specific to siting technology parks, community or stakeholder engagement in the policy process is a common facet of public policy research, as well as being a requirement in most federal and many states’ policy process.38 How were plans for locating proposed research parks communicated to stakeholders directly affected by the site selections? This is unclear from the extant literature and media coverage of site selection for other research parks. However, the UALR Institute of Government (IOG) is available to research communication practices of other research park authorities and affected stakeholder groups in various parts of the country to answer this question fully. Can the experiences of other communities with research parks be applied to the Little Rock Research Park? Yes, the “credo” and other tech park experiences discussed above can serve as guides for developing a participatory process for siting the Little Rock 33 Ibid. Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Raab, Jonathan and Lawrence Susskind. “New Approaches to Consensus Building and Speeding Up LargeScale Energy Infrastructure Projects.” Presented at Conference: The Expansion of the German Transmission Grid, Gottingen University, Germany (6/23/09): 1-17. 38 See most recently, a special issue on “Deliberative Democracy and Participatory Practice” of Public Administration and Management, vol. 15: 1 (2010). 34 Page | 9 Technology Park. Further research based on cases similar to that of Little Rock and the Little Rock Technology Park is recommended. Issue Summary This whitepaper provides a brief overview of issues and considerations for locating research parks in urban neighborhoods. Most significantly, this research highlights best practices that proponents of such facilities must recognize in communicating with and involving potentially affected stakeholders in the process of site selection. Lessons learned from other communities that have experienced urban renewal projects, regardless of the specific nature of the project, offer information and guidance for stakeholders on both sides of the site selection process. All three of these prospective sites contain high densities of residents who have lived in these neighborhoods for decades. Using the U.S. Postal zip code (72204) for these three prospective sites, 72.5 percent of owner-occupied housing is occupied by individuals who have owned their homes since at least 1994. Of these homeowners, 11.5 percent live below the poverty level, and 28.9 percent rely on income from Social Security. AfricanAmericans comprise 58.6 percent of homeowners in these neighborhoods; those aged 65 and over make up 24.6 percent of homeowners in these neighborhoods. 39 39 These figures are derived from U.S. Census Bureau data from 2000, the most recent available. Page | 10 Background on the Little Rock Technology Park Project In response to Governor Mike Beebe’s call to increase the number of technology-based businesses in Arkansas through existing incubators on university campuses, the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce commissioned a study by the technology consulting firm, Angle Technology Group, to assess the need for a technology-oriented park and recommend strategies for bringing such a facility to fruition should the need exist.40 As part of the effort to formalize the vision for a technology park in Little Rock, in 2010, the City of Little Rock’s Board of Directors established through ordinance the means for creating a Technology Park Authority. Further catalyzing the impetus for creating a technology park, Little Rock voters approved a three-eighths-cent sales tax increase for capital improvements in 2011 that included $22 million in funding earmarked for the development of the Little Rock Technology Park. Three prospective sites for the research park were identified based on their proximity to the UALR and UAMS campuses and their ease of access to major thoroughfares and interstate highways.41 The first site is located in the area east of Fair Park Boulevard to Jonesboro Drive and from I-630 south to 12th Street. The second site is bounded by 12th Street on the north, the Madison Heights housing development on the east, Franklin Elementary School on the south, and Tyler Street on the west. The third site is bounded by Coleman Creek on the west, 19th Street on the north, Filmore Street on the east, and 23rd Street on the south.42 The map in Figure 1 (see next page) provides a visual context of where these prospective sites for the research park are located in the central Little Rock area. 40 See Study and Recommendations for a Research Park in Little Rock, Arkansas. Prepared for the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce. Angle Technology Group. (June 2009). 41 Ibid., p.39 42 Ibid., p.40 Page | 11 Figure 1. Map of Prospective Sites for Little Rock Technology Parks Source: Little Rock Technology Park Authority, www.lrtechpark.com Page | 12 About the Authors Christopher Diaz is a Research Associate with the UALR Institute of Government. Christopher earned his PhD from Texas A&M University. Hunter Bacot is Director of the UALR Institute of Government. Hunter earned his PhD from the University of Tennessee. The authors wish to acknowledge the comments and suggestions on this manuscript provided by Mr. Ron Copeland and Dr. David Sink. © INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT | UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK 2801 South University Avenue | Ross Hall 6th Floor | Little Rock, Arkansas 72204-1099 (O) 501.569.8572 | (F) 501.569.8514 | http://www.ualr.edu/iog/ The use of information contained in this report is encouraged. We require that use of any kind be acknowledged through appropriate citation; for example, we suggest: Author(s) Name. Year. “Title of Report.” (Little Rock: UALR Institute of Government). For print and broadcast media, radio or television broadcasts, and social media or other electronic outlets (e.g., internet, web logs, Twitter, Google+, etc.) using this information, we suggest an acknowledgment to the effect of: The information is based on a report by the UALR Institute of Government. Page | 13