SECURITY CULTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Miroslav Mareš
Abstract: The aim of this paper is a basic analysis of security culture in the Czech Republic
within the general conceptual framework elaborated by James Sperling (worldview of the
external environment, national identity; instrumental preferences; interaction preferences).
The author focuses on important actors and ideological streams within the security debate in
the Czech Republic and their perception of security culture. Four short case studies are
included in this analysis.
Keywords: Security culture, Czech Republic, Kosovo crisis, NATO-summit, radar
base.
1 Introduction
Security culture is a concept used in contemporary security studies for the analysis of
security governance and security development. It refers to the a broader environment of
security debates and decisions. Research on security culture in various countries was
carried out [5], however, up to now not in a comprehensive form in the Czech Republic.
On the other hand, many publications deal with partial issues in this research field
[3,7,9]. This paper aims to a description of the basic concept and categories of security
culture (elaborated by James Sperling because the concept of this author seems to be
influential and suggestive within this scientific discipline) and its use for a basic
analysis of the Czech situation.
2 Concept of the National Security Culture
National security cultures – according to Sperling – „provide the lens through which
national authorities refract structural position of the state in the international system; it
explains the subjective understanding of objective threats to national security, the
instruments relied upon to meet those threats, and the preference for unilateral or
multilateral action” [5]. Sperling´s key elements of national security cultures are
described in the following table.
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Table 1: Key elements of security culture according Sperling [5].
Worldview
of
the Elite consensus on the underling dynamics of the
external environment
international system, the importance and viability of state
sovereignty and the definitions of security threats
National identity
Extent to which national elites have retained „egoist“
definition of national interests or broader, collective “we”
defined against some ”others”
Instrumental
Hard (military, economic power) or soft instruments
Preferences
(international law, economic aid, normative frameworks) of
statecraft and power
Interaction Preferences
Level of cooperation favoured by state when seeking to
ameliorate a security threat (from unilateral action to
multilateralism within highly formalized institutional
structures).
Security culture can be understood as a part of general political culture. This can be
defined as follows: “Political culture is the underlying set of values and beliefs about
politics and the system of meaning for interpreting politics among the given population”
[1]. Security culture is also interconnected with general political debates in each
country. Strategic culture can be identified within security culture, according to
circumstances of strategic development and strategic decisions.
Figure 1: Dimensions of strategic, security and political culture. Source: Author
3 Security Culture and Major Czech Security Debates
Czech security culture was and is determined by many external as well as internal
factors. As a small country in East Central Europe the Czech Republic occupies a
strategic position in the centre of the continent, where strategic interests of great powers
were and are in conflict. It led to tensions between Western and Eastern orientation of
the Czech external security policy as well as to clashes about allies during various
historical periods (Austroslavism vs. Panslavism in the 19th century, French vs. German
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orientation in the 1930s and Western or Soviet orientation after the World War II) [6, 9]
After the fall of communism the Western orientation dominated in the Czech political
debates. However, also representatives of Eastern orientation or supporters of
isolationism were and are relevant participants of these debates. Within the Western
oriented elites and political streams tension between orientation to the USA and to
European integration can be identified.
According to experts from the Institute of International Relations in Prague, four main
categories of foreign-political streams can be defined. The universalists support
symmetric orientation to the European integration and to trans-Atlantic relations with
the USA orientation, while the Europeanists and Atlanticists prefer only one of these
orientations. both rejected Isolations [3]
Table 2: Foreign-political streams in the CR and Euro-Atlantic development according to
Drulák, Kořan and Růžička [3].
Deepening of
European
Integration
Yes
No
More intensive transatlantic relations
Yes
No
Universalists
Europeanists
Atlanticists
Sovereignists
As representatives of the universalists we can mention former Czech and Czechoslovak
President Václav Havel, contemporary Minister of foreign affairs Karel Schwarzenberg
or President Miloš Zeman (he has also the “Russian vector”). The atlanticists are - for
example – Hynek Fajmon (member of the European Parliament from the Civic
Democratic Party) or Petr Mach (chairman of the small The Free Citizens Party and
leading personality of the think-tank Centre for Economy and Politics) and
contemporary Prime Minister Petr Nečas (at least more than ten years ago as defence
expert of the Civic Democratic Party). The Europeanists are – among others – social
democratic politicians Lubomír Zaorálek and Vladimír Špidla or reform communist
member of the European Parliament Miloslav Ransdorf. The isolationists are right-wing
politicians Miroslav Sládek, Tomáš Vandas or populist Tomio Okamura.
However, some politicians and thinkers cannot be clearly subsumed under one of the
above mentioned four categories (former president Václav Klaus seems to be
somewhere between the atlanticists and the isolationists, for example). An Eastern
orientation to Russia is not included in the previous categorisation (see above mentioned
differences between Zeman and Schwarzenberg). A partially different point of view is
included in the next schema, elaborated by the author of this paper (where Russian
orientation plays an important role). The orientation to the European core (mostly
German politics), to the USA, to Russia and to isolationism and ideological families are
important elements of this scheme.
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Figure 2: Strategic vectors of the Czech foreign security policy. Source: Author.
With the affiliation with atlanticism and very often also with universalism preferences
for military actions under US-leadership against “rogue states” and terrorists are
interconnected (Václav Havel profiled himself as “hawk” during the NATO mission in
Yugoslavia in 1999 or invasion in Iraq in 2003).
It is important to mention that representatives of the above mentioned categories are
activists of political and/or ideological streams. They can be representatives of various
governmental institutions (president, government, diplomacy) or they can influence
politics from non-governmental positions (opposition parties, media, NGOs, think tanks
etc.) significantly [4]. In the Czech Republic it is not possible to designate specific
institutions as holders of stabile ideological positions. Standpoints of presidents or
governments depend on concrete representatives in these positions. The army, police or
intelligence services conduct sometimes as interest groups in their own matters,
however, they are not stabile actors of ideological debates. They are loyal parts of the
democratic political process in the Czech Republic and they are able to fulfil various
demands of political representation. This fact can be demonstrated with the help of the
following case studies.
4 First Case Study: NATO Attacks against Yugoslavia in 1999
In March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) attacked Yugoslavia
because of repressive measures of Yugoslavian government against Albanian
population. The Czech Republic had been at that time only two weeks a member of the
alliance. The Serbians are by Czech nationalists (including leftist nationalists) percepted
as traditional Slavic allies of the Czech geopolitical struggle. The opposition against the
NATO action was strong. On the other hand, a support of a large part of Czech elites
for the attack and strategic responsibility of the Czech government caused the final loyal
position of the official Czech policy [9,14].
Domestic political discussion about the NATO-accession was very complicated in the
middle of the 1990s, mostly due to internal political discussion inside the Czech Social
Democratic Party (ČSSD). This party officially supported the entrance of the Czech
Republic in the NATO, however, many members opposed this step. In 1999, the social
democratic government was ruling. The governmental position towards the action
against Yugoslavia was generally loyal to the NATO, however, Czech diplomacy tried
to develop its own plans for the de-escalation of the crisis [13].
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Domestic political debate was characterized by tensions between the government and
the leftist opposition (including the KSCM and left-radical faction within the ČSSD) on
the one hand and by strong demands to a more active role in support of the NATO from
middle-rightist parties and interest groups (they were represented in the initiative We are
in the NATO) on the other hand. Street protests were organized mostly by right-wing
and left-wing radicals, however, only with several hundreds of participants.
The NATO did not demand active participation of the Czech armed forces or security
corps in the operations in Yugoslavian territory. However, it required transport and
flight of NATO forces over the Czech territory. Czech security forces were able to
secure these tasks. In Macedonia a Czech military hospital for Albanian refugees was
stationed [13].The sceptical position of some soldiers and policemen to NATO attacks
was not publicly manifested.
5 Second Case Study: NATO summit in Prague 2002
In 2002 the Czech Republic hosted in Prague the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. It was the first NATO summit after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the
USA. A wave of solidarity with the victims of these attacks was strong at that time and
Czech politicians – with the exception of extremists – supported the American war on
terror (the situation partially changed after the invasion in Iraq in 2003). The
organisation of the NATO summit was understood as a prestigious matter for Czech
policy.
After the elections in 2002 a coalition government of the Czech Social Democratic
Party (Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla), Christian and Democratic Union –
Czechoslovak People´s Party (KDU-ČSL) and liberal Union of Freedom – Democratic
Union (US-DEU) was ruling. The main opposition party – Civic Democratic Party –
was a strong supporter of the NATO. In such political environment the securing summit
was a political priority shared by main elites of the country [8].
From parliamentary parties it was only the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
that rejected the organisation of this summit. In fact, the main reason was opposition
against the NATO and anti-American orientation. However, in summer 2002 floods
damaged the Czech territory. The communist argued that financial sources should be
used for the reconstruction of the damaged territories, not for the organisation of this
summit [15]. During the summit communists protested against the NATO, several
moderate demonstrations were organized also by the anarchists. They were not able to
influence the security of the participants of the summit due to massive security measures
[8].
The security of the summit was an “honour task” also for Czech security forces. A
unique common body of intelligence and law enforcement agencies was established, for
example. The Czech security system was able to cooperate with the allies. A common
air defence was carried out not only by the Czech air force. The US Air Force operated
over the Czech territory (a special act of the Czech law was adopted for this
purpose)[16].
6 Third Case Study: US Radar Base in the Czech Republic (2002-2010)
The United States of America requested between 2002-2010 installation of a radar
constituting a part of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) in the Czech Republic.
It was a part of hardline Bush´s doctrine. A negative attitude towards this step was
declared mostly by Russia, however, also several European and Middle East countries
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and non-state groups were unsatisfied with the engagement of East Central European
countries in the NMD. In 2010 Obama´s administration stopped this part of the NMD.
[10].
Public debate was very intensive after the spring 2006 in the Czech Republic (during
first years of negotiations it was a secret matter). The right-centre government (created
from the ODS, the KDU-ČSL and the Greens) supported the radar. However, a strong
opposition against the U.S. radar base existed within the CR, as well as at transnational
level. A basic overview of public debate is included in the following table.
Table3. Public debate about US radar in the Czech Republic. Source:[10]
Groupings
Arguments
Modes of
action
Opponents
Social democrats (majority),
Initiative Ne základnám! (No
Bases!), coalition of leftist
(including communist), human
rights, environmentalist and
Islamic organizations;
further anarchists, far right
spectrum;
The base is a part of dangerous
expansionism of the current U.S.
administration
The base increases the risk of a
missile and/or terrorist attack on
the Czech territory.
The base harms national
sovereignty (parallels with Nazi
occupation 1939-1945 and with
the Soviet occupation 19681991).
Protection of the USA without
the protection of the CR itself is
unacceptable
BMDS is inefficient.
Opposition in Parliament,
demonstrations, internet
agitation, newspaper agitation,
limited time on TV
Small part - discussions about
violent resistance (including
guerilla). Demand: a
referendum
Supporters
Conservatives, liberals, christian
democrats (contemporary
governmental parties);
Unclear was attitude of the greens.
Government (Premier Minister
Mirek Topolánek) had generally a
problematic support in the
Parliament
The base is a part of defense of
western democratic values.
The base must be protected by the
US military forces and this is a
strategic advantage for Czech
security.
Potential risks should be taken as a
result of US help to the Czechs in
WW I, WW II, Cold War and
during the entrance-process to the
NATO.
Economical Benefits.
The base has indirect influence on
the possibility of the U. S. visa-free
regime for Czech citizens
Executive power, TV agitation,
newspaper agitation, rejection of a
referendum
Czech armed forces cooperated loyally with the US allies. The radar should have been
stationed in the military site in Jince. The Czech army and Military police were able to
secure this area. Czech intelligence services monitored espionage activities in relation to
the radar installation as well as the Russian support to the anti-radar movement. Security
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Information Service (BIS) wrote: “Russian services attempted to establish contacts with
public opinion-makers, political circles and the media and infiltrate organizations
influencing public opinion to win them over for supporting Russian interests in debates
on the issue of locating an American radar in the Czech Republic“[2]. American
withdrawal from the project was respected.
7 Fourth Case Study: EU Operation in Mali 2013
In 2013 the French Army carried out a successful operation against Islamist non-state
militant groups in Mali. The EU decided on the creation of the European Union
Training Mission to Mali. The Czech right-centrist government of the ODS (with Prime
Minister Petr Nečas from this party), Christian-democratic party TOP 09 and liberal
party LIDEM joined this mission. After domestic political negotiations also the major
part of social democratic opposition sustained this mission “[11].
For the Czech government the mission is also an instrument how to keep impact on
Common security and defense policy of the EU [12]. It was the reason why some
Eurosceptic politicians supported the mission. Countering Islamism and US engagement
in Mali were important arguments, too. A large part of social democrats were loyal to
the EU. On the other hand, some social democrats, regional populists and communists
rejected this mission as a part of „militarization of the EU” and because of financial
costs of this mission“[11].
The Czech army was able to create a small contingent of 34 soldiers without problems.
Despite the fact that Africa is not the most important region of Czech interest, several
military observers and small groups in various missions served in this continent in
previous years. Czech intelligence community started sharing information with friendly
services. In preparation of this mission an important role was played by the Ministry of
foreign affairs [11] and this fact confirmed understanding for this mission as a
diplomatic instrument.
8 Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, majority of Czech elites support the pro-western
orientation and the NATO and EU operations. Communists declare hostility against this
orientation, however, they do not have coalition potential currently. Close relations of
major Czech elites with the USA were demonstrated during negations about the US
radar in the CR during the past decade, on the other hand, there existed a strong
opposition against this radar. Threats to state sovereignty are perceived in a broader
context, together with interests of the allies (mostly the USA and several western
European countries). Individual preferences are sometimes not enforced (on behalf of
common NATO-interests), as the Czech policy during Kosovo crisis showed. Czech
elites interconnected with American “hawk” are able to support the use of hard military
power, however, also economic aid and supporting human rights are important elements
of Czech statecraft. Preference for international cooperation in military matters is
significant, including operations in domestic territory (as was demonstrated with the
engagement of the USAF during the NATO-summit in 2002). Different perception of
the NATO and the EU is typical of the debate among Czech elites, however, the
operations of the NATO as well as the EU are supported if it is necessary (as the
operation in Mali in 2013). Opponents of the „out of area” operations frequently use the
argument about high financial costs of such missions. Transatlantic accent, cooperation
with the NATO and the EU and support of military operations against enemies of the
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Western world are the most significant elements of recent major Czech strategic culture.
The army and security corps are loyal parts of the security system, not individual actors
of major political debates with ideological or geopolitical statements.
Acknowledgements:
This contribution was prepared as part of the research project “Methods of Predicting
Long-term Geopolitical Development in Central Europe - VF20102015005“, funded by
the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic
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