20151026-5431 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/26/2015 3:01:57 PM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Public Utilities Commission of the State of )
California
)
)
Complainant, )
)
v.
)
)
Sellers of Long-Term Contracts to the
)
California Department of Water Resources )
)
Respondents. )
)
)
Complainant, )
)
v.
)
)
Sellers of Energy and Capacity Under Long- )
Term Contracts with the California
)
Department of Water Resources
)
)
Respondents. )
Docket No. EL02-60-007
California Electricity Oversight Board
Docket No. EL02-62-006
(consolidated)
JOINT STATEMENT OF POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES OF:
THE CALIFORNIA PARTIES; SHELL ENERGY NORTH AMERICA
(US), L.P.; IBERDROLA RENEWABLES, LLC; AND
COMMISSION TRIAL STAFF
To:
The Honorable Steven A. Glazer,
Presiding Administrative Law Judge
Pursuant to the Rules for the Conduct of the Hearing,1 and the Procedural
Schedule adopted in these proceedings,2 the California Parties,3 Shell Energy
1
“Revised Order Adopting Rules for the Conduct of the Hearing,” Public Utilities
Commission of the State of California v. Sellers of Long-Term Contracts to the California
1
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North America (U.S.), L.P. (“Shell”), Iberdrola Renewables, LLC (“Iberdrola”),
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) Trial
Staff (collectively, “Participants”) hereby submit this Joint Statement of Positions.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This Statement of Positions on the Issues is organized in two main parts.
First, there is a joint statement of issues. The Participants were not able to reach
agreement on one of the three issues in this section and have provided alternate
versions of that issue. Second, each Participant separately provides its own
statement of positions on those issues, together with the information that the
Hearing Rules require.4 No Participant should be deemed to agree with any of the
statements contained in the sections that any other Participant prepared.
Department of Water Resources, Docket Nos. EL02-60, et al. (October 22, 2015) at P 20
(“Hearing Rules”).
2
“Order Compelling Discovery Responses and Adopting Amended Procedural
Schedule,” Public Utilities Commission of the State of California v. Sellers of Long-Term
Contracts to the California Department of Water Resources, Docket Nos. EL02-60, et al.
(March 16, 2015) at P 5.
3
The California Parties are the People of the State of California ex rel. Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California
(“CPUC”), Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and Southern California Edison Company.
The California Electric Oversight Board (“EOB”) is the complainant in one of the two
underlying FERC proceedings, Docket No. EL02-62. In 2008, EOB was de-funded.
Pursuant to California Public Utilities Code Section 343, the Attorney General “shall
succeed to, and may exercise, all rights, claims, powers, and entitlements of the
Electricity Oversight Board in any litigation or settlement to obtain ratepayer recovery for
the effects of the 2000-02 energy crisis.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 343 (West 2014).
4
Hearing Rules at P 20.
2
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II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue One: Whether the seller under a particular contract at issue in this
proceeding engaged in unlawful market activity during the relevant period
that had a direct effect on the negotiations of the contract at issue such that
the Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is avoided and
does not apply to the contract.
Issue Two:
California Parties
Shell, Iberdrola, and Trial Staff
Whether the rate charged in a
contract challenged in this
proceeding imposes an excessive
burden on consumers relative to
what they would have paid absent
the contract, such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and
reasonable rates is overcome and
does not apply to the contract.5
Whether it has been demonstrated
for a particular contract at issue: (1)
what consumers’ rates were that
resulted from the contract; (2) what
consumers’ rates would have been
“down the line” in the absence of the
contract; and (3) how the difference
imposes an excessive burden on
consumers, such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and
reasonable rates is overcome and
does not apply to the contract.6
Issue Three: Whether Iberdrola should be a party in this proceeding.
5
Source: Order on Request for Rehearing or Clarification, Public Utilities
Commission of the State of California v. Sellers of Long-Term Contracts to the California
Department of Water Resources, 150 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2015) at P 14.
6
Source: Order on Remand, Public Utilities Commission of the State of California v.
Sellers of Long-Term Contracts to the California Department of Water Resources, 149
FERC ¶ 61,127 (2014) at P 22.
3
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III.
PARTICIPANT SPECIFIC STATEMENTS OF POSITIONS
A.
CALIFORNIA PARTIES
Issue One: Whether the seller under a particular contract at issue in this
proceeding engaged in unlawful market activity during the relevant period that had
a direct effect on the negotiations of the contract at issue such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is avoided and does not apply to
the contract.
California Parties’ Position: Yes, the presumption should be avoided as to both
the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts. The evidence unequivocally shows that Shell
engaged in unlawful market activity that directly affected the negotiation and rates
in the Shell Contract. Iberdrola’s parent, PacifiCorp, similarly engaged in market
activities that directly affected spot markets thus influencing the negotiation and
rates in the Iberdrola Contract. Shell’s and PacifiCorp’s unlawful actions directly
contributed to the dysfunctional and excessively priced spot market that led to
inflated forward market prices, which in turn “altered the playing field” for the
Shell and Iberdrola contract negotiations and caused the excessive prices for
energy and/or capacity reflected in those contracts.
Estimated Dollar Value (principal):
Shell: $1.37 million
Iberdrola: $601 million
Shell: $2.14 billion
Iberdrola: $875 million
Estimated Dollar Value (principal
plus interest):
WITNESS
Mr. Gerald A.
Taylor
EXHIBITS
CAL-285 (Direct Part
1),
CAL-286 through 316,
CAL-319 (Direct Part
2),
CAL-320 through
512B,
CAL-717 (Rebuttal),
CAL-718 through 763
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Mr. Taylor is an expert economist who
has testified in numerous phases of the
litigation at FERC relating to
manipulation in the California electricity
markets. In Part 1 of his direct
testimony, Mr. Taylor provides an
overview of the dysfunction in the
California markets during 2000 and
2001.
In Part 2 of his direct testimony, Mr.
Taylor presents extensive audio and
documentary evidence of the ISO and
MMIP and market-based rate tariff
4
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violations committed by Shell
throughout the Crisis. Mr. Taylor also
explains how Iberdrola parent
PacifiCorp engaged in and abetted
manipulation that was ongoing during
the negotiation of the Iberdrola
Contract.
Mr. Taylor draws on the testimonies of
other California Party witnesses to
show how the market manipulation
detailed by him and Dr. Berry, together
with the exercises of market power
shown by Dr. Fox-Penner, led to high
spot prices, that in turn influenced
forward markets as shown by Drs.
Goldberg and Celebi, which thereby
directly affected the prices in the Shell
and Iberdrola Contracts. Mr. Taylor
also details contemporaneous evidence
from Shell and Iberdrola concerning
their negotiations with CDWR.
~
In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Taylor
demonstrates that neither Dr. Pirrong
nor Shell’s two fact witnesses, Ms.
Bowman and Mr. Brown, explain away
or justify Shell’s manipulative and
deceptive conduct in its spot market
dealings with CDWR and the ISO that
resulted in high spot market prices,
threatened reliability and drove CDWR
to enter the Shell Contract. Dr. Pirrong
ignores the controlling tariffs,
reliability concerns, bases his statistical
analyses on false premises, and fails to
counter the strong evidence that Shell
achieved its goal of locking high spot
market prices into the Shell Contract.
Mr. Taylor also shows in his rebuttal
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Dr. Carolyn A.
Berry
that neither Mr. Cavicchi nor
Iberdrola’s two fact witnesses Messrs.
Harlan and Hudgens explain away or
justify Iberdrola’s parent’s
PacifiCorp’s manipulative conduct in
the spot market, or show that CDWR
had the upper hand in contract
negotiations.
Dr. Berry is an expert economist
familiar with California energy
markets who presents evidence on
unlawful activities engaged in by Shell
in the natural gas spot market that
affected the Shell Contract.
CAL-268 (Direct),
CAL-269-282;
CAL-706 (Rebuttal),
CAL-707-711
~
Dr. Peter FoxPenner
In her rebuttal testimony, Dr. Berry
responds to Shell witness Dr. Heeb’s
analysis and shows that the analysis
not only focused on the wrong period
(monthly instead of daily data), but
was also flawed. Dr. Berry
demonstrates that gas prices directly
impacted electric prices and that
Shell’s intentional misreporting
skewed indexes on which CDWR
relied. Dr. Berry also responds to
testimonies by Drs. Safir and Pirrong,
and Mr. Brown. Dr. Berry explains
that Shell’s unlawful activities in gas
markets during the Crisis were
persistent, contributed to distortions in
gas indices, and would thereby have
affected spot electric prices.
Dr. Fox-Penner is an expert economist
who explains that the market
manipulation identified by Mr. Taylor
resulted in higher spot prices and
altered the playing field on which the
Shell and Iberdrola Contracts were
negotiated. He uses two different
competitive benchmark price series to
CAL-513 (Direct),
CAL-514-599
CAL-764 (Rebuttal),
CAL-765 through 780,
783
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validate his conclusion.
Dr. Fox-Penner also evaluates Shell’s
credit practices and concludes that
Shell used credit strategically in its
spot market dealings with CDWR in a
manner not consistent with competitive
markets.
Dr. Fox-Penner further provides
testimony describing the economic
consequences of blackouts during the
negotiation period.
~
Dr. Richard E.
In his rebuttal testimony, in response to
Shell witness Dr. Pirrong, Dr. FoxPenner demonstrates that in fact there
is a direct effect between Shell’s
manipulation and the spot prices that
CDWR paid, explaining it requires no
more than simple arithmetic to show
that Shell’s salesto CDWR which were
consistently above the average spot
prices in turn raised that average. Dr.
Fox-Penner explains in response to
Shell witnesses Dr. Pirrong and Ms.
Bowman that Shell could and did
exercise market power as a result of its
pivotality in hours where it waited to
sell until CDWR had no other options.
Finally, in response to Dr. Pirrong and
Iberdrola witness Mr. Cavicchi, Dr.
Fox-Penner describes why the market
fundamentals alone did not explain the
high spot market prices that CDWR
was forced to pay during the Crisis, but
rather set the stage for the wide-spread
market manipulation by Shell and
other market participants, including
Iberdrola’s parent PacifiCorp.
Dr. Goldberg is an expert economist
CAL-604 (Direct)
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Goldberg
CAL-605 through 607,
611-622
CAL-784 (Rebuttal),
CAL-785 through 788
who explains why the elevation of spot
prices during the Crisis led to inflated
forward market prices, and how that in
turn meant the prices in the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts were inflated.
~
Mr. Ronald O.
Nichols
Dr. Goldberg responds to the testimony
of Shell witness Dr. Pirrong and
Iberdrola witness Dr. Cavanagh and
explains that it was the persistent
movements in spot prices that
impacted market expectations and led
to elevated forward prices, not the
transient variations examined by those
witnesses. Dr. Goldberg further
explains that there were significant
flaws in the data and analyses used by
these witnesses. Finally, Dr. Goldberg
rebuts Staff’s witness Mr. Poffenberger
that CDWR did not consider forward
prices during the Shell and Iberdrola
Contract negotiations.
Mr. Nichols is a fact witness who
explains that the team negotiating the
long-term contracts was not aware that
Shell and others were manipulating
electricity or natural gas markets when
the contracts were being negotiated
and that but for this manipulation,
CDWR would not have had to enter
into the contracts at the prices that
resulted. He details the course of
negotiation of the Shell Contract.
CAL-200 (Direct)
CAL-201 through 209
CAL-670 (Rebuttal)
CAL-671 through 672
~
Mr. Nichol’s rebuttal testimony
responds to claims by Shell witnesses
Messrs. Brown and Lednicky and Staff
witness Poffenberger’s assertions that
CDWR dictated the terms and prices of
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Mr. Raymond
Hart
the long-term contracts as issue in this
case. He describes the chaotic market
that existed at the time, which included
power shortages and blackouts. He
also refutes assertions by these
witnesses that elevated prices and
widespread manipulation did not affect
the long-term contract prices and
terms.
Mr. Hart, the Deputy Director of
CDWR during the Crisis, is a fact
witness who details how CDWR
became the counter-party in the longterm contracts. He explains how
astronomical prices in spot markets led
CDWR to accept excessive prices in
long-term contracts. He details the
course of negotiation of the Iberdrola
Contract.
CAL-201 (Direct)
CAL-212 through 213
CAL-673 (Rebuttal)
CAL-674 through 679
~
Ms. Susan Lee
In his rebuttal testimony Mr. Hart
rebuts assertions made by Staff, Shell,
and Iberdrola witnesses that CDWR
had comparable bargaining power,
found the now-challenged prices
acceptable, and that those prices were
not influenced by spot markets.
Among other things, Mr. Hart notes
that at the time CDWR was unaware of
the scope of the manipulation affecting
Western markets and entered into the
contracts because even though the
prices were still egregious, they were
not as high as the spot market prices
CDWR had been paying.
Ms. Lee, a trading manager at CDWR
during the Crisis, is a fact witness who
explains that if CDWR did not
purchase required levels of power,
there would be blackouts and the
pressure this put on CDWR to accept
CAL-222 (Direct)
CAL-223 through 233
CAL-691 (Rebuttal)
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power at high prices in the spot
markets and in long-term deals. She
explains that with the reliability of the
electricity grid at stake, CDWR had no
other options to avert additional
emergencies and blackouts.
~
Mr. Jim
McIntosh
CAL-680 (Rebuttal)
CAL-681 through 682
Commissioner
Michel Peter
CAL-241 (Direct)
CAL-242A through
In response to assertions that CDWR
had strong bargaining power, Ms. Lee
explains the three bad choices that
CDWR actually had: first, it could
continue to buy huge volumes of
energy on the spot market; second, it
could refuse to pay outrageous prices
and risk periodic blackouts; or third,
the least worst option was to enter into
enough long-term contracts, event at
terms that would not have been
possible in a workably competitive
market. As a result, Ms. Lee explains,
CDWR was not similarly situated to
the sellers: it had to procure power
even when the terms were
disadvantageous.
Mr. McIntosh is a fact witness who
was directly involved in supervising
ISO grid operations during the Crisis.
He testifies only as a rebuttal witness
and focuses on the importance of
maintaining grid reliability. Mr.
McIntosh explains why the long-term
contracts were necessary for grid
reliability and that CDWR could not
walk away from the bargaining table.
He also explains that Shell’s
manipulative prices affected grid
reliability and distorted prices, and thus
increased the need for long-term
contracts.
CPUC Commissioner Florio, who as a
consumer advocate and member of the
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Florio
267
CAL-699 (Rebuttal)
CAL-700 through 703
ISO Board lived through the energy
Crisis, relates how the Crisis impacted
every aspect of life in California based
on his own first-hand accounts, as well
as video and documentary evidence
from the period.
~
Commissioner Florio rebuts testimony
by Shell witnesses Messrs. Lednicky
and Brown and explains that their
description of the negotiations is
completely out of touch with the reality
that existed in California when the
contracts were being negotiated, when
California was bracing for another
Summer of rolling blackouts and
exorbitant energy prices.
Issue Two: Whether the rate charged in a contract challenged in this proceeding
imposes an excessive burden on consumers relative to what they would have paid
absent the contract, such that the Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable
rates is overcome and does not apply to the contract.
California Parties’ Position: Yes, the presumption has been overcome with
respect to both the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts because each contract’s rates
imposed an excessive “down the line” economic burden on California consumers
relative to the rates those consumers could have obtained for substitute power after
the impacts of the Crisis finally subsided.
Estimated Dollar Value (principal):
Shell: $1.37 billion
Iberdrola: $601 million
Estimated Dollar Value (principal plus Shell: $2.14 billion
interest):
Iberdrola: $875 million
WITNESS
EXHIBITS
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Commissioner CAL-241 (Direct)
Michel Peter
CAL-242A through 267
Florio
CAL-699 (Rebuttal)
11
CPUC Commissioner Florio concludes
that the contract rates California
consumers paid for power delivered under
the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts were
20151026-5431 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/26/2015 3:01:57 PM
excessive. He further explains that under
the rate mechanisms enacted by the State
in response to the Crisis, every penny of
the excess payments has already been
collected, or will be fully paid by
California ratepayers through rate
increases and energy and bond charges.
CAL-700 through 703
~
Commissioner Florio rebuts the
testimonies of Messrs. Monsen,
Fulmer, and Poffenberger who assert
that the above-market prices in the
Shell and/or Iberdrola Contracts did
not impose an extraordinary burden on
consumers. He explains the approach
he used for evaluating consumer harm,
and concludes that the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts were excessively
burdensome and not in the public
interest
Dr. Metin
Celebi
CAL-634 (Direct)
CAL-635 through 653
CAL-789 (Rebuttal)
CAL790 through 800
Dr. Celebi is an expert economist who
analyzes in detail the Shell and Iberdrola
Contracts, and concludes that each
imposed an excessive “down the line”
burden on California consumers relative to
prices consumers could have obtained for
substitute power following the elimination
of the pervasive market failures.
Comparing CDWR’s actual payments
under the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts’
rates against payments that could have at
the prevailing forward market rates after
the Crisis ended, Dr. Celebi estimates
that the Shell Contract caused a burden
on consumers of $2.14 billion ($1.37
billion principal plus FERC interest),
and the Iberdrola Contract caused a
burden of $875 million ($601 principal
plus FERC interest). Dr. Celebi also
demonstrates that the Shell and Iberdrola
Contracts were substantially higher priced
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than other long-term contracts signed after
the Crisis (including those executed by
Shell). Finally, in a separate analysis
comparing payments under the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts’ rates with estimated
prices based on the underlying cost
elements of producing electric power as of
the contract execution dates, Dr. Celebi
determines that the contract rates by far
exceeded any reasonable price based on
market fundamentals.
~
Dr. Celebi responds on rebuttal to
testimony from Shell witnesses Drs.
Niemann and Safir and Mr. Brown,
Iberdrola witness Mr. Cavicchi, and
Staff witness Mr. Poffenberger. Dr.
Celebi explains how these witnesses
misinterpret and/or misapply the
“down the line” analysis set forth in
Morgan Stanley, and offer analyses
that include major mistakes that
significantly understate their estimates
of the down-the-line impacts of the
challenged contracts. He concludes
that his determination that the downthe-line burden caused by the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts exceeds $3 billion
remains valid.
Mr. John
Pacheco
CAL-214 (Direct)
CAL-215 through 218
Mr. Pacheco explains how the CDWR
purchases of spot and long-term energy
were financed, and the rate
mechanisms used by CDWR to recover
the extraordinary costs that were
incurred. He testifies that California
consumers have paid for these
purchases, and will continue to do so
until 2022.
CAL-684 (Rebuttal)
CAL685 through 690
~
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Dr. Peter
Berck
Mr. Pacheco responds to testimony
from Messrs. Fulmer and Monsen,
witnesses for Shell and Iberdrola,
respectively. Mr. Pacheco explains
that these witness underestimate the
impact of the Shell and Iberdrola
Contracts on rates and that, in fact, the
overcharges are neither small nor
irrelevant. Moreover, to the extent
they are included in the bonds used to
finance the overcharges, Mr. Pacheco
explains that ratepayers will be paying
for the overcharges for over 20 years,
until 2022.
Dr. Berck is an expert economist who
uses a sophisticated computer model to
measure the impact of the Shell and
Iberdrola Contract overcharges on the
California economy. He concludes
that the Shell Contract alone decreased
Real State Personal Income by $3.4
billion, and reduced employment by
3,300 jobs. He concludes that the
Iberdrola Contract alone decreased
Real State Personal Income by $1.4
billion and reduced employment by
1,400 jobs.
CAL-667 (Direct)
CAL-668 through 669
CAL-805 (Rebuttal)
CAL-806 through 807
~
On rebuttal, Dr. Berck responds to
Shell witness Dr. Safir and explains
that Dr. Safir, who offered no
alternative model, misconstrued the
nature of the model he used to measure
the impact of the Shell and Iberdrola
Contracts on the California economy.
He points out that Dr. Safir’s only real
criticism of his calculations are not
valid and would not improve the
results of the model. Dr. Berck
concludes that Dr. Safir’s suggestion
that the Shell Contract overcharges
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Ms. Michele
Kito
conveyed benefits is not valid and that
the results of the model based on the
Shell overcharges, which resulted in a
reduction of real state personal income
of $3 billion and employment of 3,300
jobs annually, is extraordinary.
Ms. Kito is a CPUC supervisor who
was asked to review the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts. She concludes
that the terms and conditions of the
contracts were one-sided and that the
prices far exceed any reasonable
estimations of contract prices during
normal market conditions. She
concludes that the contracts are not in
the public interest, and that their
reformation would not negatively
affect current or future investment.
CAL-665 (Direct)
CAL-804 (Rebuttal)
~
Mr. Gerald A.
Taylor
Ms. Kito rebuts testimony from Shell
witnesses Drs. Niemann and Safir and
Mr. Fulmer and Iberdrola witness Mr.
Cavicchi relating to Ms. Kito’s
conclusion that the Shell and Iberdrola
Contracts were not in the public
interest or consistent with the prices
and terms of reasonably comparable
contracts. She concludes the various
contracts sought to be used by Shell
and Iberdrola are themselves not
comparable and that Mr. Niemann’s
cost-of-new-entry, or “CONE” analysis
was also flawed as a comparator to the
Shell Contract. She concludes that her
definition of the public interest was
sound, as was her conclusion that the
Shell and Iberdrola Contracts were not
in the public interest.
Drawing on the testimonies of Dr.
Celebi, Ms. Kito, Commissioner
Florio, Mr. Pacheco and Dr. Beck, as
CAL-285 (Direct Part
1),
CAL-286 through 316,
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CAL-319 (Direct Part
2),
CAL-320 through 512B,
CAL-717 (Rebuttal),
CAL-718 through 763
well as his own analysis of Shell’s and
Iberdrola’s contemporaneous
evaluations of the challenged contracts,
Mr. Taylor concludes that the Mobile
Sierra presumption should be
overcome based on the undue burden
the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts
imposed on consumers. In addition, he
discusses the “exogenous
circumstances” in which the Shell and
Iberdrola Contracts were executed, and
explains that reforming the contracts
would benefit the public interest, and
not undermine the sanctity of contracts.
~
Mr. Taylor’s rebuttal testimony
explains why Drs. Niemann’s and
Safir’s and Messrs. Cavicchi’s and
Poffenberger’s analyses do not
undermine his and Dr. Celebi’s
testimony regarding either the
exogenous circumstances that existed
while the contracts were being
negotiated or the calculations used to
estimate the consumer burden of those
contracts. He further explains that
Messrs. Monsen’s, Fulmer’s and
Poffenberger’s attempts to minimize
the consumer burden are flawed
Dr. Fox-Penner provides testimony
describing the substantial direct and
indirect economic consequences of
blackouts during the periods in which
the Shell and Iberdrola Contracts were
being negotiated. Dr. Fox-Penner
provides evidence of contemporaneous
reports predicting that blackouts could
last into the Summer of 2001, and that
Shell and Iberdrola would have been
aware of the potential for summer
blackouts.
Dr. Peter Fox- CAL-513 (Direct),
Penner
CAL-514-599
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Issue Three: Whether Iberdrola should be a party in this proceeding.
California Parties’ Position: Yes, there is no basis for dismissing Iberdrola from
this proceeding.
Estimated Dollar Value:
N/A
WITNESS
EXHIBITS
Mr. Gerald A. CAL-319 (Direct Part
Taylor
2),
CAL-320 through 512B,
CAL-717 (Rebuttal),
CAL-718 through 763
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Drawing on testimony from Mr. Hart,
Ms. Lee, Commissioner Florio, Mr.
Nichols, and Dr. Fox-Penner, Mr.
Taylor explains how the 2000-2001
Energy Crisis affected the negotiation
and prices in the Iberdrola Contract.
He draws on the testimony of the same
witnesses regarding the lingering
uncertainty in July 2001 as to whether
blackouts and stage emergencies would
continue. He also draws on the
conclusion of Drs. Goldberg and
Celebi that the dysfunction that
pervaded the Western markets kept
forward prices elevated until August
2001, after execution of the Iberdrola
Contract. He explains why the June
19, 2001 FERC order did not
immediately resolve concerns with the
markets in the Summer of 2001. Based
on the above, he concludes there is no
basis for dismissing Iberdrola from this
proceeding.
~
In his rebuttal testimony Mr. Taylor
responds to Staff witness Mr.
Poffenberger’s claim (no Iberdrola
witness directly addressed the
question), that Iberdrola should be
dismissed because the Crisis conditions
when the Iberdrola Contract were
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Dr. Richard
Goldberg
Dr. Metin
Celebi
Ms. Susan
Lee
Mr. Jim
McIntosh
signed were not as dire as they were at
their peak. He also responds to
testimony from Iberdrola witnesses
Cavicchi and Cavanagh that the impact
of spot market manipulation on
forward prices had subsided by the
time the Iberdrola Contract was signed.
Dr. Goldberg explains that forward
prices at the time the Iberdrola
Contract was executed were still
affected by the high spot prices
experienced during the Crisis.
Dr. Celebi explains that forward prices
at the time the Iberdrola Contract was
executed were still affected by the high
spot prices experienced during the
Crisis. Dr. Celebi concludes that it
was not until after August 2001 that
the effects of the Crisis on forward
prices fully abated.
Ms. Lee explains that concerns with
reliability of the ISO system remained
as the Summer of 2001 approached.
Mr. McIntosh is a fact witness who
was directly involved in supervising
ISO grid operations during the Crisis.
He testifies that the situation started to
improve in June and July 2001, but the
dysfunction continued through the
Summer, and that throughout the
Summer 2001 CDWR and the ISO
needed to continue to take steps to
secure the reliability of the grid,
including entering into long-term
contracts. He testifies that in his view
it was not until September 2001 that
the markets had stabilized.
Dr. Fox-Penner provides testimony
describing forecasts of continued
blackouts during the Summer 2001 and
provides evidence that Iberdrola was
aware of these forecasts.
Mr. Hart describes the course of
CAL-604 (Direct)
CAL-605 through 607,
611-622
CAL-784 (Rebuttal),
CAL-785 through 788
CAL-634 (Direct)
CAL-635 through 653
CAL-789 (Rebuttal)
CAL790 through 800
CAL-222 (Direct)
CAL-223 through 233
CAL-691 (Rebuttal)
CAL-680 (Rebuttal)
CAL-681 through 682
Dr. Peter Fox- CAL-513 (Direct),
Penner
CAL-514-599
Mr. Raymond CAL-201 (Direct)
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Hart
CAL-212 through 213
CAL-673 (Rebuttal)
CAL-674 through 679
Mr. Ronald
O. Nichols
CAL-670 (Rebuttal)
CAL-671 through 672
negotiations of the Iberdrola Contract
and that uncertainty about reliability
and CDWR’s vulnerability to high spot
prices continued through the execution
date.
In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Nichols
responds to Iberdrola’s witness Mr.
Cavicchi’s claims that the energy crisis
ended before the Iberdrola Contract
was executed. Mr. Nichols explains
that no reasonable decision maker at
the time could assume that the Crisis
ended in June 2001, given the
extraordinary length and severity of the
Crisis.
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B.
SHELL ENERGY NORTH AMERICA (U.S.), L.P.
Issue One: Whether the seller under a particular contract at issue in this
proceeding engaged in unlawful market activity during the relevant period that had
a direct effect on the negotiations of the contract at issue such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is avoided and does not apply to
the contract.
Shell Energy’s Position: Testimony submitted by Dr. Craig Pirrong and Ms. Beth
Bowman demonstrates that Coral did not engage in unlawful activity affecting prices in
the spot markets. Testimony submitted by Mr. Ed Brown, Mr. Lynn Lednicky, Dr.
Pirrong, Dr. Andrew Safir, and Dr. Randal Heeb demonstrates that alleged unlawful
activity in the spot market did not affect the negotiation of the contract at issue or forward
prices in general. Mr. Brown and Mr. Lednicky further testify that CDWR had a strong
bargaining position in their long-term contract negotiations and used leverage to gain
valuable concessions from sellers including Coral.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
EXHIBITS
Beth Bowman Ex. SNA-200
SUMMARY OF POSITION
through Ex. SNA218.
Dr. Craig
Pirrong
Ex. SNA-230
through Ex. SNA239.
Ms. Bowman, who was responsible for Coral’s
West Region electric power business in 2001,
describes Coral’s business in the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council. She explains
that Coral did not intend to manipulate any
market and did not engage in unlawful market
activity, but rather engaged in transactions with
legitimate business purposes.
Dr. Pirrong, an expert in economics and
commodities markets, explains that prices were
high in the West during the 2000-2001 period
due to a unique confluence of supply and demand
factors. He explains why transactions that the
Complainants allege to be manipulative are
legitimate and common in commodities markets,
and he conducts an economic analysis showing
that the alleged manipulation could not have had
an impact on prices in the California power
markets, and did not have an effect on the longterm contract negotiations between Coral and
CDWR. Dr. Pirrong also demonstrates that Coral
did not have market power in any relevant
market, and his regression analysis demonstrates
that there is no correlation between spot market
prices and forward market prices as claimed by
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Ed Brown
Ex. SNA-219
through Ex. SNA227.
Lynn
Lednicky
Ex. SNA-228
through Ex. SNA229.
Dr. Andrew
Safir
Ex. SNA-240
through Ex. SNA243.
Dr. Randal
Heeb
Ex. SNA-265
through Ex. SNA274.
the California Complainants.
Mr. Brown, who negotiated the Coral Contract
on behalf of Coral, testifies that the parties
negotiating the Coral Contract did not rely on
spot market prices to determine the prices in the
Coral Contract and demonstrates that CDWR had
strong bargaining power in the negotiations.
Mr. Lednicky, who negotiated another long-term
contract with CDWR in early 2001, testifies that
that the parties negotiating long-term contracts
with CDWR did not rely on spot market prices to
determine the prices in the contracts and that
CDWR had strong bargaining power in the
negotiations.
Dr. Safir, an economist, demonstrates that the
high market prices during the relevant period
were caused by external factors, not any alleged
misconduct by Coral.
Dr. Heeb, an economist, demonstrates that the
alleged misreporting of natural gas prices had
negligible impact on and, if anything, on average
tended to depress, prices reported in the relevant
price indices. To the extent CDWR relied on
reported natural gas prices in its negotiation of
the Coral Contract, that reliance could not have
meaningfully increased the pricing in the Coral
Contract.
Issue Two: Whether it has been demonstrated for a particular contract at
issue: (1) what consumers’ rates were that resulted from the contract; (2) what
consumers’ rates would have been “down the line” in the absence of the contract;
and (3) how the difference imposes an excessive burden on consumers, such that
the Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is overcome and does
not apply to the contract.
Shell Energy’s Position: Testimony by Dr. Scott Niemann, Dr. Safir, and Mr. Mark
Fulmer demonstrates that the Coral Contract has no down-the-line impact and that there
is no difference in consumer rates with the contract in effect compared to not having the
contract in effect.
Estimated Dollar Value:
N/A
WITNESS
Dr. Scott
EXHIBITS
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Ex. SNA-244
Dr. Niemann, an economist, demonstrates that
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Niemann
through Ex. SNA255.
Dr. Andrew
Safir
Ex. SNA-240
through Ex. SNA243.
Mark Fulmer
Ex. SNA-256
through Ex. SNA264.
the appropriate benchmark for assessing whether
a down-the-line impact exists is the cost of new
entry (CONE) or long-run marginal cost (LRMC)
analysis, and that since the Coral Contract is
consistent with CONE and LRMC, there is no
down-the-line impact on consumers.
Dr. Safir demonstrates that the existence of the
long-term contracts, including the Coral
Contract, provided an overall benefit down the
line because they helped to stabilize the market
and lower consumer costs compared to the costs
that would have been expected as of May 2001;
thus, the Coral Contract did not impose an
excessive burden on California consumers.
Mr. Fulmer, an expert in energy ratemaking,
demonstrates that, even assuming the
“overcharges” alleged by the California
Complainants, the impact of the Coral Contract
on consumer rates was de minimis and not an
excessive burden, and therefore could not have
seriously harmed the public interest.
Issue Three: Whether Iberdrola should be a party in this proceeding.
Shell Energy’s Position: Shell Energy takes no position with respect to this
issue.
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C.
IBERDROLA RENEWABLES, LLC
Issue One: Whether the seller under a particular contract at issue in this
proceeding engaged in unlawful market activity during the relevant period that had
a direct effect on the negotiations of the contract at issue such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is avoided and does not apply to
the contract.
Iberdrola’s Position: Testimony submitted by Joseph Cavicchi demonstrates that
Iberdrola was a fledgling power marketing organization that represented only a de
minimis share of the spot market, and as such Iberdrola lacked any capability to
directly impact the terms of the Iberdrola Contract through its spot market
activities. Mr. Cavicchi and Jim Harlan testify that the course of negotiation of the
Iberdrola Contract shows that CDWR maintained considerable leverage
throughout negotiations and that Iberdrola Contract is the result of fair, armslength negotiation. Testimony submitted by Terry Hudgens describes the strict
separations that were established and maintained between Iberdrola and its thenparent, PacifiCorp, such that Iberdrola was unable to benefit from any alleged
unlawful activities committed by PacifiCorp. Further, under Morgan Stanley,
alleged misconduct by PacifiCorp is not a basis for imposition of liability.
Testimony submitted by Dr. Christopher Cavanagh demonstrates that the spot
market, including unlawful activity occurring there, had no statistically significant
impact on the terms of the Iberdrola Contract.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
Joseph
Cavicchi
SUMMARY OF POSITION
EXHIBITS
Exhibit Nos. IB222 through IB241
The California Parties’ testimony and exhibits
fail to show, or even allege, that Iberdrola
engaged in a single act of unlawful market
activity, let alone an act of unlawful market
activity that had a causal connection to any
provision of the Iberdrola Contract. Mr.
Cavicchi testifies that Iberdrola was a fledgling
organization that lacked any capability to
influence the terms of the Iberdrola Contract.
Mr. Cavicchi further testifies that the Iberdrola
Contract was unaffected by spot market
dysfunction and that such contract was the
product of fair, arms-length negotiation.
Contrary to the California Parties’ position that
CDWR lacked leverage in negotiating the
Iberdrola Contract, Mr. Cavicchi demonstrates
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Jim Harlan
Exhibit Nos. IB200 through IB210
Terry
Hudgens
Exhibit Nos. IB211 through IB221
Christopher
Cavanagh
Exhibit Nos. IB242 through IB245
that the price and non-price terms of the Iberdrola
Contract consistently changed in favor of
CDWR, including multiple price reductions and
the introduction of valuable hourly dispatch
rights. Mr. Cavicchi also shows that trend of
negotiations between the parties clearly shows
that CDWR maintained substantial leverage
throughout negotiations.
Mr. Harlan, the lead negotiator for Iberdrola,
offers testimony that relies on his actual
experience in marketing the output of the
Klamath Cogeneration Facility and in negotiating
the Iberdrola Contract. Mr. Harlan explains the
evolution of the contract negotiations and the
various concessions that Iberdrola made in order
to satisfy CDWR’s demands. Consequently, Mr.
Harlan demonstrates that the negotiations were
fair and at arms-length, and that no unlawful
activity in the spot market influenced the
negotiations of the Iberdrola Contract.
Mr. Hudgens served as President and CEO of
Iberdrola when the Iberdrola Contract was
executed, and prior to that role Mr. Hudgens was
an executive with PacifiCorp--Iberdrola’s parent
during the Energy Crisis. Mr. Hudgens confirms
that Iberdrola and PacifiCorp established and
maintained a strict separation of commercial and
marketing functions, consistent with the code of
conduct enforced by the Commission. This
separation prevented PacifiCorp and Iberdrola
from colluding to give Iberdrola the upper hand
in negotiations with CDWR, either as the result
of PacifiCorp’s alleged unlawful conduct in the
spot market or through sharing information about
spot market activities that could benefit Iberdrola.
The California Parties fail to demonstrate that
any act of unlawful spot market activity had a
statistically significant impact on the terms of the
Iberdrola Contract. Dr. Cavanagh explains that
daily spot prices have no demonstrable impact on
a parties’ expectations of future prices, and that
the greatest impact, if any, is caused by
contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous spot
prices. Consequently, the California Parties’ fail
in their assertion that spot prices or unlawful
conduct occurring in the distant past causally
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impacted the negotiation of the Iberdrola
Contract.
Issue Two: Whether it has been demonstrated for a particular contract at
issue: (1) what consumers’ rates were that resulted from the contract; (2) what
consumers’ rates would have been “down the line” in the absence of the contract;
and (3) how the difference imposes an excessive burden on consumers, such that
the Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is overcome and does
not apply to the contract.
Iberdrola’s Position: Testimony submitted by Joseph Cavicchi and Bill Monsen
demonstrates that the Iberdrola Contract is not an outlier that demands such
extreme relief as abrogation, and that the Iberdrola Contract did not impose an
excessive burden on consumers “down the line” relative to rates they would have
obtained after cessation of the dysfunctional spot market.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
Joseph
Cavicchi
EXHIBITS
Exhibit Nos. IB222 through IB241
SUMMARY OF POSITION
William
Monsen
Exhibit Nos. IB246 through IB-
The California Parties seek to benefit from
comparing the Iberdrola Contract to a small
sample of contracts executed following the
Energy Crisis. The analysis is flawed because it
compares two periods in which supply and
demand were substantially different. In
particular, prices in the period selected by the
California Parties was necessarily impacted by
the dozens of long-term contracts executed by
CDWR, including the contracts that are the
subject of this proceeding. But even giving the
California Parties the benefit of their flawed
analysis, Mr. Cavicchi demonstrates that the
Iberdrola Contract is not an outlier when
compared to other tolling agreements that were
signed after the Energy Crisis. Furthermore, Mr.
Cavicchi finds that over the term of the Iberdrola
Contract, California utilities have executed
tolling agreements with prices far in excess of
that in the Iberdrola Contract, and that California
consumers have benefitted from the Iberdrola
Contract because its flat pricing has, to some
extent, allowed consumers to avoid paying for
increased power plant construction costs.
The Iberdrola Contract has not imposed an
excessive burden on California’s ratepayers. Mr.
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250
Monsen demonstrates that the Iberdrola Contract
impacted average rates for residential,
commercial, and industrial consumers of PG&E,
SCE, and SDG&E by no than 0.3%, as
compared to prices consumers would have paid
for the alternative resources offered by the
California Parties. Consistent with the
Commission’s determination in other
proceedings, this small impact is not excessively
burdensome.
Issue Three: Whether Iberdrola should be a party in this proceeding.
Iberdrola’s Position: Iberdrola should be dismissed from these
proceedings. Testimony submitted by Joseph Cavicchi and Jim Harlan
demonstrates that the Iberdrola Contract was executed after the Energy Crisis
ended. As a post-Energy Crisis contract, it necessarily follows that the Iberdrola
Contract was not the direct result of manipulation by Iberdrola during the Energy
Crisis, as required by Morgan Stanley. Similarly, as a post-Energy Crisis contract,
it necessarily follows that there is no basis for the determination, required by
Morgan Stanley, that the Iberdrola Contract imposed an excessive burden down
the line “when the open market was no longer dysfunctional.” Additionally, the
California Parties reliance on market activity of PacifiCorp is not a basis for the
imposition of liability under Morgan Stanley.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
Joseph
Cavicchi
SUMMARY OF POSITION
EXHIBITS
Exhibit Nos. IB222 through IB241
Mr. Cavicchi demonstrates that the Iberdrola
Contract was executed after the Energy Crisis.
By early June 2001, spot market dysfunction had
ended due to various factors, including the return
of critical nuclear facilities and qualifying
facilities, and relaxed NOx allowances for power
plants in Southern California. At the time the
Commission issued is June 19, 2001, order
instituting West-wide price caps and most-offer
requirements, spot market prices had already
significantly fallen. When the Iberdrola Contract
was executed on July 6, 2001, the Energy Crisis
was over. Indeed, the testimony of Raymond
Hart and others on behalf of the California
Parties is clear that CDWR executed the
Iberdrola Contract in the belief that after a period
of negotiations it was the “right thing to do” and
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Jim Harlan
Exhibit Nos. IB200 through IB210
not because of a compulsion driven by the
Energy Crisis.
Mr. Harlan testifies that CDWR was not bound to
enter into the Iberdrola Contract until the contract
was signed on July 6, 2001. CDWR and
Iberdrola entered into two Memoranda of
Understanding--the first on February 8, 2001, and
the second on May 5, 2001--although neither
obligated CDWR to enter into the Iberdrola
Contract. In fact, the terms of the MOUs differ
markedly from the Iberdrola Contract and each of
the MOUs expired by their own terms before
contract execution on July 6.
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D.
TRIAL STAFF
Issue One: Whether the seller under a particular contract at issue in this
proceeding engaged in unlawful market activity during the relevant period that had
a direct effect on the negotiations of the contract at issue such that the MobileSierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is avoided and does not apply to
the contract.
Trial Staff’s Position: Testimony submitted by Daniel L. Poffenberger
demonstrates that Shell’s and Iberdrola’s activities in the spot market did not
affect negotiations of the long-term contracts because the California Department
of Water Resources (CDWR) largely dictated the pricing terms and other contract
provisions contained in the Shell and Iberdrola agreements.
Estimated Dollar Value
WITNESS
Daniel L.
Poffenberger
N/A
EXHIBITS7
SUMMARY OF POSITION
S-100, S-104, and Mr. Poffenberger concludes that Shell’s and
S-105
Iberdrola’s activities in the spot market,
whether lawful or unlawful, did not affect
negotiations of the long-term contracts
because CDWR largely dictated the pricing
terms and other contract provisions contained
in the Shell and Iberdrola agreements. Ex. S100 at 4-5, 26-43. With respect to Iberdrola,
Mr. Poffenberger states that there is no
evidence that Iberdrola engaged in market
manipulation in the spot markets and notes
that a 2007 Settlement purportedly resolved
California Parties’ claims relating to PPM’s
transactions in western electricity markets.
Ex. S-100 at 29-30. Notwithstanding Shell’s
and Iberdrola’s activities in the spot markets,
Mr. Poffenberger focuses on the witnesses
who were part of the long-term contract
negotiations and what information they relied
on to develop the proposed prices and nonprice terms and conditions ultimately agreed
7
The Protected Status of Trial Staff Exhibit Nos. S-100 and S-104 was lifted
pursuant to the “California Parties’ Third Notice Contesting Protected Status of Certain
Prefiled Testimony, Exhibits, Workpapers, and Errata,” and the terms of the Amended
Protective Order.
28
20151026-5431 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/26/2015 3:01:57 PM
to under the long-term contracts. Ex. S-100
at 31-43.
Issue Two: Whether it has been demonstrated for a particular contract at
issue: (1) what consumers’ rates were that resulted from the contract; (2) what
consumers’ rates would have been “down the line” in the absence of the contract;
and (3) how the difference imposes an excessive burden on consumers, such that
the Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable rates is overcome and does
not apply to the contract.
Trial Staff’s Position: Testimony submitted by Daniel L. Poffenberger
demonstrates that Shell and Iberdrola long-term contracts did not impose an
excessive burden on consumers “down the line” relative to rates they would have
obtained after cessation of the dysfunctional spot market.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
Daniel L.
Poffenberger
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Mr. Poffenberger concludes that the Shell and
Iberdrola long-term contracts did not impose
an excessive burden on consumers “down the
line” relative to rates they would have
obtained after cessation of the dysfunctional
spot market. Ex. S-100 at 4, 10-26. He
analyzes whether the Shell and Iberdrola
contracts imposed an excessive burden on
consumers “down the line” based on (1) the
rates charged under the contracts, (2) the
difference between the rates charged under
the contracts and the estimated prices
supported by California Parties’ witness Dr.
Celebi and (3) the difference between the
rates charged under the contracts and the
levelized cost of building a combined cycle
generating unit in 2001. Ex. S-100 at 10-26.
Mr. Poffenberger’s analysis (as explained in
Exhibit No. S-100 at 18-26) shows that the
impact on the customers’ average monthly
bill under Shell’s and Iberdrola’s respective
contracts was less than one percent. Mr.
Poffenberger testifies that a less than one
percent impact is not an excessive burden.
Ex. S-100 at 23, 24.
EXHIBITS
S-100, S-101, S102, and S-103
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Issue Three: Whether Iberdrola should be a party in this proceeding.
Trial Staff’s Position: Testimony submitted by Daniel L. Poffenberger shows
that Iberdrola should be dismissed from this proceeding.
Estimated Dollar Value
N/A
WITNESS
Daniel L.
Poffenberger
SUMMARY OF POSITION
Based on the record, Mr. Poffenberger
testifies that Iberdrola should be dismissed
from this proceeding. Ex. S-100 at 5, 44.
EXHIBITS
S-100
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Candace Morey
Arocles Aguilar, General Counsel
Christopher Clay
Candace Morey
Charlyn Hook
Public Utilities Commission
of the State of California
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 703-3050
/s/ David M. Gustafson
Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General of California
Mark Breckler
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Martin Goyette
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
Paul B. Mohler
Law Offices of Paul B. Mohler, PLC
840 First Street, NE, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
(571) 344-5097
David M. Gustafson
Deputy Attorney General
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612-0550
(510) 622-2232
Lucus A. Ritchie
Louise K. Thomas
Mark B. Rosen
Pierce Atwood LLP
254 Commercial Street
Portland, ME 04101
(207) 791-1100
Kevin J. McKeon
Judith D. Cassel
Whitney E. Snyder
Hawke McKeon & Sniscak LLP
Harrisburg Energy Center
100 North Tenth Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
(717) 236-1300
Attorneys for the Public Utilities
Commission of the State of California
Attorneys for the People of the State of
California ex rel. Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General
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/s/ Stan Berman
Stan Berman
Sidley Austin LLP
701 5th Avenue, Suite 4200
Seattle, WA 98104
Emily Watkins
Lauren Freeman
Sidley Austin LLP
1501 K Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-8000
/s/ Richard L. Roberts
Richard L. Roberts
Jane I. Ryan
Catherine M. Giovannoni
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-3000
Attorneys for Southern California
Edison Company
Mark D. Patrizio
Joshua S. Levenberg
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street, B30A
Post Office Box 7442
San Francisco, CA 94120
Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric
Company
/s/ Jeffrey D. Watkiss
Jeffrey D. Watkiss
William M. Friedman
Jessica L. Bayles
McDermott Will & Emery LLP
500 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 756-8000
Attorneys for Shell Energy North
America (US) L.P.
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/s/ Jason Johns
Jason Johns
Joel A. Mullin
Seth Hilton
Stoel Rives LLP
900 SW Fifth Ave., Suite 2600
Portland, OR 97204
Toan-Hao Nguyen
Senior Counsel
Iberdrola Renewables, LLC
1125 NW Couch, Suite 700
Portland, OR 97209
Counsel for Iberdrola Renewables, LLC
/s/ Edith A. Gilmore
Edith A. Gilmore, Trial Attorney
Justin Mirabal, Trial Attorney
Office of Administrative Litigation
888 First Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20426
(202) 502-8632
Attorneys for Commission Trial Staff
Dated: October 26, 2015
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing
document upon each person designated on the ListServ established for service in
Docket Nos. EL02-60 and EL02-62.
Dated at Washington, DC this 26th day of October, 2015.
/s/ Paul B. Mohler
Paul B. Mohler
Law Offices of Paul B. Mohler,
PLC
840 First Street, NE, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
(571) 344-5097
34
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Document Content(s)
EL02-60 Final Joint Statement of Issues.PDF...........................1-34