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Learning and Individual Differences 18 (2008) 258 – 263
www.elsevier.com/locate/lindif
Little more than personality: Dispositional determinants of test anxiety
(the Big Five, core self-evaluations, and self-assessed intelligence)
Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic a,⁎, Gorkan Ahmetoglu a , Adrian Furnham b
a
Goldsmiths University of London, United Kingdom
b
University College London
Received 8 October 2006; received in revised form 3 August 2007; accepted 1 September 2007
Abstract
This study attempted a hierarchical integration of several dispositional determinants of test anxiety (TA) [Sarason, I.G. (1984). Stress, anxiety
and cognitive interference: Reactions to tests. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 929–938.], namely the Big Five personality traits
[Costa, P.T. Jr., & McCrae, R.R. (1992). Revised NEO personality inventory (NEO-PI-R) and NEO five-factor inventory (NEO-FFI): Professional
manual. Odessa: Psychological Assessment Resources.], core self-evaluations (CSE) [Judge, T.A., Erez, A., Bono, J.E., & Thoreson, C.J. (2003).
The Core Self-Evaluation Scale: Development of a measure. Personnel psychology, 56, 303–331.], and self-assessed intelligence (SAI) [Furnham,
A. (2001). Self-estimates of intelligence: Culture and gender difference in self and other estimates of both general (g) and multiple intelligences.
Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 1381–1405.] in a sample of 388 US and UK university students. Structural equation models showed
that TA was largely a function of Neuroticism, and that CSE and SAI do not contribute to the prediction of TA over established personality traits.
Furthermore, the relationship between CSE and TA was fully accounted for by personality traits, whereas SAI was not a significant predictor of
TA. The results undermine the notion that self-beliefs affect TA and suggest that wider dispositions play a salient role determining individual
differences in TA. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed, particularly in regards to educational settings.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Test anxiety; Core self-evaluations; Self-assessed intelligence; Big Five; Personality
1. Introduction
Every year, millions of students under-perform in school and
university because of heightened test anxiety (TA) (Hill &
Wigfield, 1984; Hopko, Ashcraft, Gute, Ruggiero, & Lewis,
1998; Zohar, 1998), which is defined as the “set of
phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral responses
that accompany concern about possible negative consequences
or failure on an exam or similar evaluative situation” (Zeidner,
1998, p.17). Although TA is known to depend on situational
variables, such as levels of motivation, task complexity, and the
practical consequences of high or low performance (Humphreys
& Revelle, 1984), it varies markedly from one individual to
⁎ Corresponding author. Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College,
University of London, London, New Cross, SE14 6NW, United Kingdom.
Tel.: +44 207 919 7885; fax: +44 207 919 7873.
E-mail address: t.chamorro-premuzic@gold.ac.uk (T. Chamorro-Premuzic).
1041-6080/$ - see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2007.09.002
another. Thus, some individuals will be relatively calm when it
comes to completing a test, whilst others will generally
“perceive examinations as more dangerous or threatening (…)
and experience more intense levels of state anxiety when taking
tests” (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995, p.6).
Studies on the self-defeating consequences of subjective
cognitions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991) suggest
that poorer self-beliefs are a major cause of TA. However,
psychologists use different labels to refer to what are arguably
overlapping constructs, for instance: Self-regulation (Carver &
Scheier, 1984), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, Smith, Arnkoff, &
Wright, 1990; Zohar, 1998), locus of control (Braden, 1995;
Feather & Volkmer, 1988), attribution for failure and success
(Bandalos, Yates, & Thorndike-Christ, 1995), self-worth
(Covington, 1992), emotional self-efficacy (Petrides & Furnham, 2000), self-concept (Bandalos et al., 1995), self-awareness
(Fletcher & Baldry, 2000), meta-cognition (Stankov, 1999),
self-handicap (Rhodewalt, 1990), self-evaluation (Morris &
T. Chamorro-Premuzic et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 18 (2008) 258–263
Liebert, 1969), self-motivation (Zeidner, 1995), self-concept
(Rindermann & Neubauer, 2001), and self-confidence (Koivula,
Hassmen & Fallby, 2002).
To overcome this problem, and account for the overlap
between different measures of self-belief, Judge, Erez, and Bono
(1998) proposed the concept of core self-evaluations (CSE) and
also developed a measure of this construct. The concept of CSE
was defined as a broad personality trait reflecting the most
general and fundamental beliefs individuals hold about
themselves (Judge et al., 1998). Accordingly, individuals’ CSE
comprise four components referring to individual differences in
a) self-esteem or perception of one’s worth, value, and
importance, b) generalized self-efficacy or one’s typical level
of confidence about the likelihood of performing well, c) locus
of control or one’s perceived degree of control over life events
and situations, and d) neuroticism/emotional stability or one’s
tendency to experience negative affect, increased levels of
worry, and pessimistic beliefs. A large meta-analytic study
(Judge, Erez, Thoreson, & Bono, 2002) confirmed that most
variance among these components can be explained by a general
factor, which was more accurate than the four components in
predicting external criteria (Best, Downey, & Stapleton, 2005;
Judge & Bono, 2001; Judge, Kluger, Locke & Durham, 1998),
though research is yet to examine its relation to TA.
Given the dispositional nature of CSE, it is particularly
important to determine whether any links between CSE and TA
could be explained by established personality traits, notably the
Big Five factors of Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C) (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Indeed, Judge et al.(2003)
suggested that CSE may be partly dependent on N, E, and C,
such that emotionally stable, extraverted, and conscientious
individuals are generally more likely to hold positive selfbeliefs. In one of the few attempts to provide a hierarchical
model for integrating dispositional (both personality and selfevaluative) determinants of AP, Chamorro-Premuzic and
Furnham (2006a) proposed that self-expectancy constructs
may largely be influenced by personality traits, not only N
(negatively) but also E (positively) and O (positively). Accordingly, self-expectancy constructs may mediate (account for)
the link between established personality factors and TA.
However, the authors looked at AP measures (i.e., exams,
continuous assessment, and supervised dissertations) rather than
TA, and conceptualized self-evaluations merely in terms of selfassessed intelligence (SAI), that is, people's estimates of their
cognitive abilities in relation to the overall population (see also
Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller & Baumert, 2006 for similar
hierarchical models of core versus surface characteristics in the
prediction of AP). Whilst SAI has shown incremental validity
predicting AP over and above personality and intelligence
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2006b), its relationship to TA
remains to be tested.
Thus the present study set out to explore whether individual
differences in self-beliefs, as operationalized through CSE and
SAI, account for variance in TA independently of established
traits, and whether CSE and SAI may explain the effects of
personality traits on TA.
259
1.1. The hypothesized models
The first model tested whether the relationship between the
Big Five personality traits and TA was mediated by SAI and
CSE. In line with previous research, paths from N, E, O, and
A, were loaded on to SAI (see Chamorro-Premuzic, Moutafi
& Furnham, 2005; Furnham & Buchanan, 2005), and paths
from N, E, and C were loaded onto CSE (see Judge et al.,
2003). Direct paths between the Big Five and TA were also
allowed according to past findings (see Fitch, 2005; McIlroy
& Bunting, 2002). SAI and CSE were both allowed to
influence TA. This model was compared to a competing
model. The main interest was directed at two variables,
namely N and CSE. Because Judge et al. (1998) argued that
CSE is a broad latent personality construct, a model, in which
CSE and the Big Five were simply correlated, with no causal
paths, was tested. The idea was to include both N and CSE in
the same structure, where neither one factor is broader than the
other (Judge et al., 2002).
The directionality of the model is conceptual rather than
causal and can be justified on the basis that the Big Five are less
affected by situational variables than is TA. Furthermore, as
poorer self-beliefs are assumed to be a major cause of TA, CSE
are treated as both exogenous and endogenous, though whether
CSE are as broad as the Big Five or merely a self-conception/
surface characteristic, akin to SAI, is a matter of theoretical
speculation (see Asendorpf & van Aken, 2003).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were 388 undergraduate students from British
(250) and American (138) universities. There were 287 females
and 101 males. Age ranged from 17 to 29 (M = 19.7, SD = 2.8)
years. Most students were psychology undergraduates who
volunteered to take part in this study in exchange of course
credit units.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Reaction to Tests (RTT, Sarason, 1984)
This is a 40-item measure of TA composed of four anxiety
components, namely “worry” (e.g. "I wonder how other
people are doing";), “irrelevant thinking” (e.g. ";My mind
wanders during tests";), “tension” (e.g. ";I feel distressed and
uneasy before tests";), and “bodily reactions” (e.g. ";I get a
headache before a test";). These components form two
cognitive (worry—irrelevant thinking) and two emotional
(tension—bodily reactions) dimensions of TA. Initially, four
components were extracted as specified by Sarason (1984).
However, these were highly inter-correlated and following a
confirmatory factor analysis, it was decided to compute one
higher order TA factor, which was retained for further analysis
and treated as criterion. Studies have provided strong support
for the psychometric adequacy of the RTT scale (Zimmer et al.,
1992; Sarason, 1984).
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Table 1
Correlations between the Big Five personality traits, SAI, CSE, and test anxiety
1
1. N
2. E
3. O
4. A
5. C
6. SAI
7. CSE
8. TA
− .30⁎⁎
.04
− .13⁎
− .13⁎
− .12⁎
− .64⁎⁎
.45⁎⁎
2
3
4
5
6
questionnaires was randomized to control for order effects.
Individual feedback was offered to each participant.
7
3. Analysis and results
.09
.16⁎⁎
.16⁎⁎
.03
.21⁎⁎
.06
.17⁎⁎
− .07
.10
.02
− .12⁎
3.1. Correlations
.20⁎⁎
−.06
.06
−.13⁎
.06
.20⁎⁎
− .13⁎
.21⁎⁎
− .07
.46⁎⁎
n = 388. N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness, A = Agreeableness,
C = Conscientiousness, CSE = core-self-evaluation, SAI = self-assessed intelligence, TA = test anxiety. ⁎p b .05, ⁎⁎p b .01.
2.2.2. The NEO Five Factor Inventory—Revised (NEO-FFI;
Costa & McCrae, 1992)
This 60-item, non-timed questionnaire, assesses the Big Five
personality factors, namely Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.
Items involve questions about characteristic behaviors or
reactions, which are answered on a five-point Likert scale,
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The
manual reports extensive data on the reliability and validity of
this inventory (see Costa & McCrae, 1992).
2.2.3. Self-assessed Intelligence—SAI: (Furnham; 2001)
This is a 10-item self-report measure of participants’ selfestimated intelligence, which contains: verbal, logical spatial,
musical, body-kinetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, existential,
spiritual and naturalistic intelligence. The scale includes a bellcurve graph indicating numbers and labels for all ability scores
(ranging from 55 “mild retardation”, to 145 “gifted”). Following
PCA (Eigenvalues and Scree Test), a single factor was
computed which accounted for 38.3 % of the variance in the
data.
2.2.4. The Core Self-evaluation Scale (CSES; Judge, Erez,
Bono, & Thoreson, 2003)
This is a 12-item inventory that measures a single factor, i.e.
CSE. Items involve statements about typical thoughts/feelings
(“Overall, I am satisfied with myself”) and behaviors (“I complete
tasks successfully”), which are answered on a five-point Likert
scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. PCA
showed that the items loaded onto a single factor, which
accounted for 39.9% of the variance in the data. There has been
good psychometric support for the CSES. The items reflect a onefactor structure, and the CSES correlates significantly with
expected criteria (Judge et al., 2003).
2.3. Procedure
Questionnaires were administrated in a large lecture theatre
and in the presence of five trained graduate students who
ensured appropriate administration procedures. There were four
groups of students, two in the US. and two in the UK. Order of
Bivariate correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) for the central
measures are shown in Table 1. Descriptive statistics (M and
SD) and the reliability of the scales are reported in Table 2.
Structural equation modeling using AMOS (Arbruckle,
1999) was applied to estimate a series of models. Latent
variables were N, E, O, A, C, SAI, CSE, and TA. The observed
variables for the Big Five were obtained by using a split-half
method, where the observed variables are comprised of
randomly determined halves of the items that load on a
particular hypothesized factor (all 60 items were used). All 10
items of SAI and all twelve items of the CSE were used as
indicators for their respective latent variables. For TA the
observed variables were worry, test-irrelevant thinking, bodily
reactions and tension. Several goodness-of-fit indices were used
for the structural models. Bentler's (1990) comparative fit index
can be interpreted as the improvement in fit of the hypothesized
model over a baseline model, relative to the fit of the baseline
model. The incremental index of fit was developed by Bollen
(1989) to address the issues of parsimony and sample size, and
thus taking degrees of freedom into account. The root mean
square error of approximation (Steiger & Lind, 1980) takes into
account the error of approximation in the population and
evaluates how well the model would fit the population
covariance matrix – if it were available – with unknown but
optimally chosen parameter values. Brown and Cudeck's
(1989) expected cross-validation index measures the discrepancy between the fitted covariance matrix in the analyzed
sample, and the expected covariance matrix that would be
Table 2
Means, standard deviations (SD), reliability, and item loadings of the Big Five,
CSE, SAI, and test anxiety
Means SD
Cronbach α Item loadings
Neuroticism (N)
23.9
7.1 .86
Extraversion (E)
29.2
5.9 .80
Openness (O)
27.0
5.9 .70
Agreeableness (A)
28.6.
5.7 .73
Conscientiousness (C)
29.9
6.1 .80
Core self-evaluation (CSE)
29.8
7.3 .86
Self-assessed Intelligence (SAI) 107.5
13.7 .81
Test anxiety
41.7 .95
148.5
min: .79 max: .88
mean: .84
min: .69 max: .86
mean: .78
min: .60 max: .89
mean: .75
min: .56 max: .91
mean: .74
min: .60 max: .85
mean: .73
min: .36 max: .70
mean: .57
min: .32 max: .76
mean: .54
min: .40 max: .80
mean: .68
n = 388. polarity: high scores on CSE refer to positive self-evaluations, whereas
low scores refer to personal negativity. All other scales are also positive. Item
loadings: completely standardized solution.
T. Chamorro-Premuzic et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 18 (2008) 258–263
261
obtained in another sample of equivalent size. Finally, Akaike's
(1987) information criterion, addresses the issue of parsimony
in the assessment of model fit; as such, statistical goodness of fit
and number of estimated parameters are taken into account.
3.2. Testing between structural equation models
The fit statistics for the first hypothesized model (Fig. 1)
were, χ2(545, N = 388) = 1499.8, p b .01; root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) = .067; comparative fit index
(CFI) = .98; incremental fit index (IFI) = .98; Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) = 1739.8; expected cross-validation index
(ECVI) = 4.50. Though the RMSEA was somewhat above the
desired value (b .06 = good fit), this model showed adequate fit
to the data. However, several paths in the model were found to
have non-significant values. In further fitting efforts these paths
were deleted one at a time, and the model was re-estimated each
time.
The first paths freed were between E and SAI (β = .02,
p N .05), and E and CSE (β = .03, p N .05). In contrast to findings
of previous studies these paths were non-significant. Another
link that was freed, and was not in line with previous research,
was that between C and TA (β = .03, p N .05), as also this was
non-significant. Finally, in the hypothesized and modified
models throughout, the link between SAI and TA remained nonsignificant (β = .03, p N .05). In addition, although the weight of
the path between CSE and TA was β = − .19, it was also found to
be non-significant, therefore not supporting the hypothesis of
the study. Non-significant parameters can be considered
unimportant to the model, and in the interest of scientific
parsimony, they should be deleted (Arbruckle, 1999). Dropping
the two links between CSE and TA, and SAI and TA, did not
affect the model fit but did increased parsimony (χ2(550,
N = 388) = 1504.0, p b .01; RMSEA = .067; CFI = .98; IFI = .98;
AIC = 1734.0; ECVI = .4.48), indicating that these links were
Fig. 1. The hypothesized model, linking the Big Five, CSE, SAI, and TA.
N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, CSE = core-self-evaluations, SAI = self-assessed intelligence,
TA = test anxiety.
Fig. 2. The modified model (completely standardized solutions; arrows with
broken lines are non-significant paths).
statistically not necessary in the study. The modified model is
shown in Fig. 2.
What is worth noting here is the weight of the path between
N and CSE (β = − .77, p N .01). This indicates that in this model,
a great deal of the variance in CSE was accounted for by N,
which might explain the non-significant path between CSE and
TA. Thus, the only paths that loaded significantly on TA, were
those of N (β = .72, p b .01) and E (β = .23, p b .01). It was
concluded that the association between the Big Five and TA is
not meditated by SAI and CSE and the hypothesized model of
the study was not supported. The single best predictor of TA was
N, followed by E.
3.3. Alternative model
In addition to the first hypothesized model, an alternative
model was tested that involved competing conceptualizations,
Fig. 3. Model where CSE and Big Five traits are simply correlated with no
causal links (completely standardized solutions; note: paths between N and
CSE, and C and CSE, are correlations).
262
T. Chamorro-Premuzic et al. / Learning and Individual Differences 18 (2008) 258–263
specifically, between the two latent variables, N and CSE. In
this model, CSE was allowed to act as an exogenous broad
personality factor, rather than a mediator in the relationship
between the Big Five and TA. That is, though the direct paths
between CSE, SAI and TA, as well as the Big Five and TA were
retained, the causal paths between the Big Five and CSE were
deleted (and replaced with correlational paths). Fig. 3 displays
the results of the final model. The fit statistics of this model
were, χ 2 (548, N = 388) = 1500.4, p b .01; RMSEA = .067;
CFI = .98; IFI = .98; AIC = 1734.4; ECVI = .4.48. In this
model the fit values were almost the same (albeit with slightly
worse parsimony), and the relationship between CSE and TA
remained non-significant. Dropping this link, again, did not
affect the model fit and increased parsimony slightly. The links
between the Big Five and TA remained similar. The correlation
between N and CSE was r = − .77.
4. Discussion
This study tested the extent to which individual differences
in self-beliefs, as operationalized through CSE and SAI,
account for variance in TA independently of established traits,
and whether CSE and SAI may explain the effects of personality
traits on TA. Although previous research had linked specific
aspects of CSE (i.e., self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy,
and neuroticism) to TA, no study had, to our knowledge,
previously looked at CSE in academic contexts, let alone in
regards to TA. Likewise, the extent to which individuals’ SAI
may predict TA had not been examined in any previous study,
although a recent paper showed that SAI had incremental
validity (over personality and psychometric intelligence) in the
prediction of AP (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2006b).
The present results showed that SAI and CSE did not
mediate the relationship between the Big Five personality traits
and TA. Rather, there was a strong direct path from N to TA, as
well as modest but significant direct effects of E on TA. In fact,
when these personality traits were taken into account, CSE no
longer explained variance in TA. This indicates that established
traits are better predictors of TA than are CSE, and that the
relationship between CSE and TA can be fully explained by
personality traits.
In light of the vast number of past studies highlighting the
self-fulfilling effects of self-expectancy constructs as a major
cause of individual differences in TA (e.g., Bandalos et al.,
1995; Bandura, 1986, Koivula et al, 2002; Smith et al, 1990;
Zohar, 1998), the findings of this study are particularly striking.
The present findings suggest that, when the main personality
traits, particularly N, are taken into account, the effects of selfbeliefs on TA are substantially attenuated. Thus, future studies
assessing the effects of self-beliefs on TA may wish to consider
major dispositional factors, such as the Big Five.
There were of course limitations to the present study, notably
the use of a relatively small and highly selected university
student sample, as well as the absence of AP data. Additionally,
a general TA construct was used in the analysis, though this was
based on statistical grounds (see also Zimmer, Hocevar,
Bachelor, & Meinke, 1992).
On the other hand, assessing state-rather than trait-TA, would
have enabled us to combine experimental procedures with our
correlational design, for instance by manipulating levels of TA
via external variables (e.g., time pressure, reward, caffeine, etc.)
and assess potential interactions between dispositional and
experimental effects. That said, there are important implications
to be drawn from the current results. Methodologically, they
suggest that it is more effective to predict TA from established
personality inventories, such as the Big Five (particularly the N
scale), than from self-belief measures. Theoretically, they
indicate that the unique contribution of self-belief variables to
individual differences in TA is at least lower than one may have
expected from the previous self-expectancy literature. Finally,
from an applied point of view, it seems reasonable to
recommend that any psychological or educational intervention
directed at reducing the self-defeating cognitions of students
with poor self-beliefs pays attention to those high on the N trait,
as these individuals are clearly more vulnerable than others.
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