ISSN 1010-9536
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
277 Strengthening Bangladesh-India Rice Seeds
Cooperation: Bangladesh Perspective
Mahfuz Kabir
299 The New Government in India and India’s
Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity or Change?
Monzima Haque
321 Humanitarian Intervention: Finding out Its Human
Security Implications
Abul Kalam Azad
Md. Fazlul Halim
338 TRIPS-Plus as a Tool for Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights: Implications for Developing Countries
Mohammad Atique Rahman
360 Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries:
Causes and Consequences
Riad Khan
Anas Khan
Mohammad Mohabbat Khan
Mohammad Habibur Rahman
Volume 35
Number 4
2014
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VOLUME 35
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TABLE OF CONTENT
VOLUME 35
NUMBER 4
OCTOBER 2014
Mahfuz Kabir
Strengthening Bangladesh-India Rice Seeds Cooperation:
Bangladesh Perspective
277
Monzima Haque
The New Government in India and India’s Neighbourhood Policy:
Continuity or Change?
Abul Kalam Azad
Md. Fazlul Halim
Humanitarian Intervention: Finding out Its Human Security Implications
299
321
Mohammad Atique Rahman
TRIPS-Plus as a Tool for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights:
Implications for Developing Countries
338
Riad Khan
Anas Khan
Mohammad Mohabbat Khan
Mohammad Habibur Rahman
Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries:
Causes and Consequences
360
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014: 277-298
Mahfuz Kabir
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA RICE SEEDS COOPERATION:
BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to understand the prospect for strengthening rice
seeds cooperation between Bangladesh and India in modern varieties. Both
the countries are trying to achieve food security through improvements in rice
production, marketing, and research and development in rice seeds. Bangladesh
and four states of eastern India belong to similar agro-climatic zone where rice
is overwhelmingly placed as a major staple food. However, due to absence of
policy and regulatory barriers to rice seeds trade in modern varieties, there are
anecdotal evidences of informal flow of rice seeds across the border, which is
risky for both producers and consumers. The paper finds that there is a notable
presence of informal cross-border trade of many varieties of rice seeds in three
bordering districts in Bangladesh. The paper suggests some doable measures to
strengthen rice seeds cooperation between the two countries through, inter alia,
trade formalisation, making use of SAARC seed bank, joint research and release of
new modern varieties, and harmonising standards and certification procedures.
1. Introduction
With declining agricultural land and increasing population, food production
is gaining the utmost importance. Farmers of Bangladesh and India cultivate varieties
which are traded informally between the two countries. There is a need to formalise
seed trade to meet farmers’ demand for quality seed input. Similar agro-climatic
condition and food habits in Bangladesh and four eastern Indian states, viz. West
Bengal, Odisha, Bihar and Jharkhand, allow a wide range of possibilities for bilateral
cooperation. Rice being a staple food in both the countries offers plenty of scope
for cooperation and collaboration. It would open up a window of opportunities in
agricultural cooperation in much broader context in bilateral or multilateral form.
Seeds influence and direct entire agricultural scenario of a country as the most
vital agricultural input. As staple food of Bangladesh, rice exerts considerable influence
in determining socio-political-economic realities of Bangladesh as illustrated in World
Bank report titled “Bangladesh: Rice is Life”.1 Rice contributes about one-third and
Mahfuz Kabir, Ph. D is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS),
Dhaka. His e-mail address is: mahfuzkabir@yahoo.com. The author is grateful to Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
and CUTS International for supporting the paper and Unnayan Shamannay for undertaking field investigation in
Bangladesh. The earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Conference on“Addressing Barriers to
Rice Seeds Trade between India and Bangladesh”, BRAC Centre Inn, Dhaka, 22 December 2013; and seminars in Delhi,
Kolkata and Jaipur in India in 2013 and 2014 organised by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and CUTS International.
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.
1
World Bank Report, available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/cgiar/newsletter/june97/9bang.html,
accessed on 20 October 2014.
277
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
two-thirds of calorie intake in India and Bangladesh, respectively. Rice production has
undergone significant transformation in past few decades, which has been heavily
dependent on and regulated by government. It has almost quadrupled in the last
four decades at much higher rate than population growth, which helped Bangladesh
attain self-dependency in food production in the face of decreasing land availability
and adverse natural and economic shocks.
Graduation from traditional varieties to modern techniques and high yielding
varieties (HYV) made farmers more dependent on inputs. Bangladesh is pursuing
high input and high output agricultural policy, which opens up opportunities for
supplying agricultural input to farmers by private enterprises. Agricultural input
market is gradually becoming market-oriented through involvement of private forprofit sector, donor communities and NGO activities beside government intervention.
Against this backdrop, it is widely perceived that there are significant
potentials for enhancing rice seed trade between Bangladesh and India, especially the
four eastern Indian states mentioned above. This opportunity stems mainly from past
market dominance of Indian seeds, similar agro-climatic condition and cost advantage
over alternative options. It is assumed that Bangladesh can benefit in exporting rice
seeds to India for Boro season and importing from India for Aus and Aman seasons by
utilising their respective comparative advantages. The benefit would be extended to
greater cooperation beyond seeds trade for attaining further mutual gain. The focus
of this paper is, therefore, on understanding of rice seed sector and exploring the
barriers and potential of seed trade between the two countries.
The rest of this paper has been organised as follows. Section 2 undertakes a
comparative analysis of rice production and yield performance in Bangladesh and
India, and Bangladesh’s import of rice seeds along with some discussion of policy and
regulations pertaining to seed trade. Section 3 presents the findings of a primary field
study to understand the nature and extent of cross-border informal flow of rice seeds
between Bangladesh and India which needs to be formalised. Section 4 identifies the
barriers of trade and issues related to trade facilitation for formal movement of rice seeds.
Finally, concluding remarks and some doable policy options have been suggested in
Section 5 to strengthen cooperation in rice seeds trade between the two countries.
2. Rice Cultivation and Seed Sector
2.1 Rice Cultivation in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh the rice-growing environment has been classified into three
major ecosystems based on physiographic characteristics and land types. These
ecosystems are (a) irrigated, (b) rain-fed, and (c) floating or deep water. The rain-fed
ecosystem has been further classified as rain-fed lowland and rain-fed upland. Thus,
278
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
all rice varieties cultivated in the country are grouped into five distinct ecotypes, such
as (a) Boro, (b) Transplanted Aus (T. Aus), (c) Transplanted Aman (T. Aman), (d) Upland
Aus (direct-seeded Aus), and (e) Deep water rice (floating rice). Boro rice is grown
completely under irrigated ecosystem during the dry period (November to July)
while T. Aman (during July to December), T. Aus (during April to August) and Upland
Aus (during March to July) are cultivated under rain-fed ecosystem. Similar to India,
there are three seasons for rice cultivation in Bangladesh, namely Aus, Aman and Boro.
Aman is the highest rice production season.
Table 1: Trend of Rice Production in Bangladesh2
Aus
Year
Aman
Boro
Average MV
%
MV* %
% of production
MV
%
% of production
MV %
% of production
2001-02
36.20
11.65
50.73
52.97
94.64
35.38
64.57
2002-03
37.52
11.55
51.71
52.76
95.37
35.70
65.66
2003-04
37.60
11.11
52.59
52.46
94.72
36.43
66.27
2004-05
44.01
9.88
55.04
50.92
95.38
39.19
69.76
2005-06
49.97
9.82
58.82
51.56
95.72
38.62
72.20
2006-07
53.04
8.57
61.61
51.23
96.80
40.20
75.02
2007-08
61.01
8.69
67.38
47.74
97.27
43.57
79.85
2008-09
64.72
9.45
67.32
48.74
97.41
41.81
79.65
2009-10
65.79
8.67
66.63
49.88
97.72
41.45
79.44
2010-11
71.62
9.65
69.15
48.97
98.95
41.38
81.72
*MV= Modern Varieties
The trend of rice production in Boro season has been increasing over time.
Adoption of modern varieties seed is increasing and 98.95 per cent of the seeds in
Boro season are modern varieties. On average, use of modern varieties (MV) is 81.72
per cent. Aus, Aman and Boro have 6.6, 38 and 54 per cent share of total rice production
respectively.3 Boro is found to be the most productive season having the highest
average yield of country. Therefore, Aus and Aman have the potential for adopting
new varieties. However, newspaper citing statistics from Department of Agricultural
Extension (DAE) reported 41 and 39 per cent decrease in acreage and production of
hybrid rice, respectively, over the last five years despite various promotional activities
by the government.
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2012, Dhaka: Ministry of Planning,
Government of Bangladesh, 2013.
3
Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2014, Dhaka: Ministry of Finance, Government of
Bangladesh, 2014.
2
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
From a farm level survey, it has been found that in 2004 Aman season,
Swarna, an Indian variety was the second-most dominant variety primarily cultivated
in districts bordering West Bengal despite having lower yield (3.79t/ha). The most
dominant variety was BR11 (3.92t/ha) developed in 1981 which possess several
desirable features for farmers like weed competitiveness or milling recovery. In Boro
season, popular varieties are BRRI dhan-28 (5.11t/ha), BRRI dhan-29 (6.13t/ha), IR8
(5.99t/ha), BR8 (5.71t/ha), BINA 6 (5.38t/ha). BRRI dhan-28 gained popularity because
of its shorter life cycle. It is matured in 2-3 weeks lesser time compared to other
varieties. Indian varieties imported through informal exchange across the border
were also grown in the Boro season. The most important of these varieties are Ratna,
Bhajan, Miniket, Parija, Nayanmoni and Jaya. They were cultivated in nearly 9 per cent
of the total Boro season area in 2005. They gained popularity because of their shorter
maturity (Parija), drought tolerance (Nayonmoni), and superior grain quality (Miniket).
The highest yielding variety was Bhajan with a yield of 5.99 t/ha. The highest number
of varieties is cultivated in Aus season. Most of the varieties cultivated in this season
were released for Boro season and have 1.5t/ha lower yield compared to Boro season.4
2.2 Season-wise Production of Rice in India
There are three seasons for growing rice in India, viz. autumn, winter and
summer. These three seasons are named according to the season of harvest of the
crop. Autumn rice is known as pre-kharif rice. The sowing of pre-kharif rice is taken up
during May to August. However, the time of sowing slightly differs from state to state
according to weather condition and rainfall pattern. It is harvested in SeptemberOctober. Autumn rice crop is known as Aus in West Bengal, Beali in Odisha and Bhadai
in Bihar. About 7 per cent crop is grown in this season. The varieties grown during this
season are mostly varieties of short duration ranging from 90 to 110 days.
The main rice growing season in the country is the kharif. It is known as winter
rice as per the harvesting time. The sowing time of winter (kharif) rice is June-July
and it is harvested in November-December. Winter rice is known as Aman in West
Bengal, Sarrad in Odisha, and Agahani in Bihar. About 84 per cent of the country’s rice
is grown in this season and medium to long duration varieties are generally cultivated
in this season.
Summer rice is called as Rabi in India. It is known as Boro in Assam and
West Bengal, Dalua in Odissa, and Garma in Bihar. The sowing time of summer rice
is November to February and harvesting time is March to June. The area under
cultivation of summer rice is only 9 per cent of total area and early maturing varieties
are mostly grown in this season.
M. Hossain, W. M. H. Jaim, M. S. Alam and A. M. Rahman, Rice Biodiversity in Bangladesh, Dhaka: BRAC
Research and Evaluation Division, 2013.
4
280
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
2.3 Comparative Yield of Rice
Yield varies significantly according to seasons from 1.45t/ha to 6t/ha. Yield of
the four eastern Indian states is also low. Being an important factor, quality of seed
that farmers can control can significantly increase production. Also, modern varieties
are developed suitable for irrigation system, focusing less on rain-fed system.
Bangladesh is experiencing higher yield rate of rice than that of India and it
is around the world average for the last 6-7 years. In the Asian continent, Japan is in
remarkable position for efficient rice production. Japan’s yield rate is almost double
compared to both the countries.
Figure 1: Trend of Rice Yield55
7.0
Tons per hectares
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World
Japan
India
Bangladesh
According to International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), seed is a living
product that must be grown, harvested and processed correctly to maximise its
viability and subsequent crop productivity.6 It is always emphasised that good quality
seed must be sown for optimum yield potential of any rice variety. Good/quality seed
can increase yields by 5 to 20 per cent. Using good seed leads to lower seeding rates,
higher crop emergence, reduced replanting, more uniform plant standard and more
vigorous early crop growth. Vigorous growth in early stages reduces weed problems
and increases crop resistance to insect pests and diseases. All of these factors
contribute to higher yields and more productive rice farms.
5
6
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), World Rice Statistics 2013, Manila: IRRI, 2013.
Ibid.
281
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
Figure 2: Trend of Paddy Yields (on Un-Milled Basis)7
4
3.5
3
2010-11
India
2007-08
Bangladesh
2005-06
2004-05
2003-04
2002-03
World
2001-02
2
2006-07
2.5
2000-01
Yield per Hectare (MT)
4.5
Bangladesh’s rice yield is close to the world average. Rice yield per hectare in
Bangladesh is not very low in comparison to the world, whereas rice yield per hectare
in India is much lower than that of the world. The position of eastern Indian states is
similar to India’s position compared to the world average. Low rice yield in the four
eastern Indian states is not a new phenomenon; it was very low even in the 1970s.
Certain portion of the total seed used in the country is replaced every year
by quality seed through organised supply. The percentage of this replaced portion
against total seed use is called Seed Replacement Rate (SRR). The country with higher
seed replacement rate will be experiencing higher yield than that of the others.
Table 2: Seed Replacement Rate in Bangladesh and Eastern Indian States8
Year
Bangladesh
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
24.70
38.6
39
47.39
Odisha
9.59
5.57
6.13
4.73
6.83
6.4
12.04
14.8
-
India
West Bengal
22.00
23.00
25.00
25.30
25.50
26
26.5
28
-
Bihar
6.33
6.87
6.8
10
12
12
15
19
-
Jharkhand
14.25
-
- indicates that data is unavailable.
CUTS International, Dynamics of Rice Seed Trade: Need for Cooperation between India and Bangladesh,
Jaipur, 2013; United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012-13; Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India, 2012-13; and Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh, 201213. Conversion rate for milled to un-milled rice was used as 1kg of un-milled produces 0.6 kg of milled.
8
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India; Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh;
Bangladesh Seed Grower, Dealer and Merchants’ Association (BSGDMA) 2007 for 2005/06 and Bangladesh
Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) 2011 for 2007/08.
7
282
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
2.4 Bangladesh’s Hybrid Rice Seeds Trade with India and China
Bangladesh is a net rice seed importer with an estimated import market size
of US$5.9 million in 2010-11. It imports 90 per cent of its total imports of hybrid rice
seeds from China, though importing it from India would cost the country far less.
However, the country imports fruits, maize and vegetables seeds from India. China
meets more than 90 per cent of rice seed orders from Bangladesh. India’s exports to
Bangladesh remain negligible, accounting for less than 3 per cent of its total exports.
Figure 3: Bangladesh’s Hybrid Rice Seed Imports from India and China9
120
100
80
60
China’s Export to Bangladesh
India’s Export to Bangladesh
40
20
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Bi-directional informal seed flows between Bangladesh and India are evident.
Formal trade can lead to win-win situation for both countries. Bangladesh has around
65 varieties of HYV rice, of these BR11, BRRI Dhan-28 and BRRI Dhan-29 are found to
be quite popular in Indian states. Assam Agricultural University has requested BRRI
to provide seed of BR-29 as this variety is suitable for cultivation in Assam. Recently,
Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) has exported 40 kg of SL8H hybrid seed to India which will be cultivated experimentally.
There is also scope for introducing submergence, salt and stress tolerant
varieties in both the countries. Indian varieties Miniket, Swarna, Sampa and Parija are
found popular in border and other regions of Bangladesh. Although India is a net seed
exporting country, Bihar, Odisha, Jharkhand and West Bengal are seed deficit and are
characterised by lower level of SRR compared to that of Bangladesh. States like Andhra
Pradesh and Maharashtra are major sources of HYV rice seeds to these states.
Trade Map Database, International Trade Centre, 2013, available at www.trademap.org/Index.aspx,
accessed on 19 December 2013.
9
283
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
2.5 Demand and Supply
Shortage is found in rice seed even after private sector involvement.
According to BADC (2011), 39 per cent of demand was met in 2010-11. Of this supply
BADC provided 40 per cent, DAE 44 per cent and private sector accounted for 16 per
cent. Supply of seed, although lower than required amount, is close to demand in
Boro season. The deficit is staggering in Aus and Aman seasons when only 13 and 24
per cent of demand could be met, respectively for 2009-10. The total deficit stood at
180,890 M. Ton in 2009-10.10
Import of hybrid seeds by private sector was far less than governments
permitted amount in 2010-11 (3,945 tons versus permitted 8530 tons) while private
sector production has been growing. Recently, some companies received permission
to export more than 500 MT of hybrid rice seeds to Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan.
BADC has long term strategy regarding rice seed production and supply targeting to
provide 62 per cent of rice seed requirement by 2021. Still there is scope for private
sector involvement.
Aus constitutes of small amount of rice production while Boro makes up
overwhelming majority of rice production. Greater access to foundation/certified seed
can significantly increase yield and production. By no means is the potential increase in
countrywide production small considering the portion of farmers’ preserved seed usage.
On the other hand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal had 425,723
quintals of excess certified paddy seed in 2013 kharif season. Despite surplus
availability of rice seed varieties in the four eastern Indian states, none of the four
states are self-sufficient with regard to local production except Bihar. In Jharkhand,
Odisha and West Bengal, only 17, 73 and 83 per cent demand is met, respectively.
Jharkhand and Odisha have no private sector involvement in rice seed.
HYV and hybrid seeds are the dominant varieties. Hybrid seeds generally
entail higher production cost along with higher yield compared with HYV. However,
the unit value of cost of seeds import from China is around five times of that from
India. It is perceived that bilateral seed trade between Bangladesh and India can
create win-win situation for both countries.
Bangladesh does not allow direct import of HYV seeds. There is mechanism
for importing parent seed and distributing it through replicating in Bangladesh for
enterprises. Bangladesh’s current seed market is of US$261 million. While 64 per cent
of this belongs to HYV, the rest is hybrid.11 There is a paucity of data regarding seed
import of different varieties and seasons.
Hemant Pullabhotla and A. Ganesh Kumar, “Review of Input and Output Policies for Cereal Production in
Bangladesh”, Discussion Paper 01199, Washington, D. C.: IFPRI, July 2012.
11
CUTS International, op. cit.
10
284
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
2.6 Policy, Regulations and Regulatory Bodies
Seed law is the principal legal instrument of seed flow and trade in Bangladesh.
The Seed Act 2013 has been drafted and will be enforced in near future to replace the
Seeds Ordinance 1977 which has recently been cancelled through a Supreme Court
verdict. There is a national seed policy effective from 2003. Seed Certification Agency
(SCA) was established through SCA Establishment Gazette, 1974. Seed import is also
subject to Plant Quarantine Act, 2010 and Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914.
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures are used rarely in Bangladesh.
Importing seeds to Bangladesh requires an import permit which is issued by
the Plant Protection Wing of the DAE under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and
a phyto-sanitary certificate provided by the exporting country is required. Quality
certificate from the seed certification authority of the exporting country is also
needed. In addition, imported varieties of the five notified crops (rice, wheat, potato,
jute and sugarcane) must be listed on the Official National List of Varieties and comply
with the crop-specific standards.
National Seed Board (NSB) is the apex body regulating seed flow of
Bangladesh. It is a multi-disciplinary body with representatives from government
agricultural departments, SCA, seed producers association, seed traders association,
finance ministry, academicians and experts. Registration of NSB is mandatory for
all types of seed used for commercial purpose in Bangladesh. SCA plays the role of
quality assurance, certification and testing. Any seeds, other than those preserved by
farmers, have to go through NSB for approval for commercial purpose.
Indian seed sector is regulated by Seeds Act 1966, Seeds (Control) Order 1983,
New Policy on Seed Development 1988, Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmer’s Right
Act 2001, National Seed Policy 2002 and Seeds Bill 2004 (Waiting for Approval). The
last two include provision of seed export and import including rice though import of
rice seeds remained zero during 2007-2011. It is found that import of seeds will require
permit from Plant Protection Advisor to government. Seeds and planting material
import will be allowed subject to EXIM policy guidelines and Plants, Fruits and Seeds
(Regulation of Import into India) Order 1989. Some of the authorities concerned with
seeds are Central Seed Committee (CSC), Central Seed Certification Board (CSCB), Seed
Certification Authority of India (SCAI), Central Seed Testing Laboratory (CSTL) and State
Seed Testing Laboratories (SSTL). According to proposed Seed Bill 2004, all varieties of
seed for sale need to be registered and seed container should be labelled with specific
information. It also included provision for farmers’ compensation.
3. Informal Rice Seed Trade between Bangladesh and India
The literature on cross-border informal seed trade is meagre. However,
formalising this trade on one hand will take agricultural cooperation to the next level
285
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
and will ensure quality input at farmer level on the other. Anecdotal evidences suggest
that there is informal rice seeds trade occurring at the border points between India
and Bangladesh. The main points of such trade are district centres of Jiban Nagar,
Jessore district, Benapole, Kushtia, Pragpur, Khulna, Darshana, Rajshahi, Godagiri,
Dinajpur, Lalmonirhat, Burimari, Nawabganj, Sonamasjid, and also some other points.
Informal traders in a group of 3-10 on an average participate in such trade. Evidences
also suggest that the items generally traded by these illicit networks range from rice
seed to rice, pulses, etc.12
There is presently no data or estimate on the current status of informal
rice seeds trade between India and Bangladesh. The study tries to comprehend
this scenario in some selected bordering areas of Bangladesh. Such information or
estimate is primarily based on implementation of field work during 2013. Indian
varieties are primarily cultivated in Aman season because of shorter maturity cycle
which allows farmers greater option for next crop and unavailability of substitutable
varieties. But in Boro (irrigated) cost of production is also higher than Aman.
3.1 Field Findings
Field visits have been conducted in three bordering districts of Bangladesh
which are adjacent to the selected eastern Indian states to understand the rice seeds
supply channel in Bangladesh and informal trade with India. Also, stakeholders
including seed traders, government officials and researchers have been interviewed.
The structure of field investigation has been described below.

Field visit was conducted at Sonamasjid area of Chapai Nawabganj
district. A number of meetings were conducted with important officials
and traders, which include the officials of DAE, Upazila Agricultural
Officer, Seed Dealer; Sales Promotion Officer of Syngenta (Seed Trading)
and journalists. An FGD was conducted with farmers at Chadlai, Ward No.
14, Char Jotpratap of Chapai Nawabganj.
For details, see, S. Pohit and N. Taneja, “India’s Informal Trade with Bangladesh: A Qualitative Assessment”,
The World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2003, pp. 1187-1214; and M. Chakraborty, “Indo-Bangladesh Informal
Trade Nexus: India’s Security Predicament”, Asia Pacific Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1934.
12
286
STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
Map: Areas of Field Investigation
= land port area and upazila level meetings
287
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014

Field visit to Hili land port (Hakimpur upazila), Dinajpur. The study team had
discussion with local journalists, seed dealers, farmers, government officials
from DAE, BADC and plant quarantine office at district and upazila level.

The project team visited Benapole land port (Sharsha upazila) area in
Jessore district in order to get better understanding of informal rice
seed trade dynamics from 21-24 September 2013. Meetings were held
with seed dealers, traders, producers, government officials, and plant
quarantine office at district and upazila level. Also, the team conducted
FGD with local farmers.

Several one to one meetings were held in Dhaka with policymakers,
businessmen, civil society leaders to validate the field findings and
gather additional information.

The major field findings have been summarised in Table 3. It reveals that
informal trade is in general not frequently occurring across Bangladesh.
Table 3: Major Findings from the Field13
Jessore
Swarna (Lal Swarna,
Informal rice seeds
Guti, Miniket (Zira
trade varieties
Miniket)
Certified seeds of
Indian HYV
Germination
problem
of Indian HYV
Production per
bigha
Informal trade
frequency
13
Chapai Nawabganj
Swarna (Guti and Sada),
Parija, Somsor
Certified seeds are
Certified seed of 30kg
unavailable but farmers
bag are available
produce locally
Germination problem
Germination problem
for Indian HYV is lower
is not found
than that of local HYV
Certified seeds are not
available but farmers
produce locally
20/22 mounds
18/20 mounds
18/20 mounds
Frequent informal
trade across borders
Occasional trade
between borders and
Informal trade is not
farmers produce locally
regularly occurring
after taking from Indian
neighbour
Hybrid seed is
Trend of hybrid rice
exhibiting decreasing
production
trend
Last five years
production of
Swarna, Miniket
Indian HYV
Functionality of
Quarantine office is
quarantine office
fully functional
Seeds generation
Dinajpur
Swarna, Swampa,
Parija, Mamun
Parija variety has
germination problem
Use of hybrid seeds is
falling
Use of hybrid seeds is
falling
Swarna, Swampa
Swarna, Parija
Quarantine office is
fully functional
Not visited
Generation related
Farmers are concerned Farmers are not
information on seed is not
about seeds
concerned about seeds
available in case of farmers
generation
generation
preserved seed
Based on field survey during July to September 2013.
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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION

From extensive field research, it is observed that at Chapai Nawabganj
in Aman season, out of 48,000 hectare land, Swarna was cultivated in
33,000 hectare land. Farmers meet most of their seed demand from their
preserved seed. BADC sells seed at 10 kg package while private companies
sell seed at 1, 5 and 10 kg packages. It costs Tk. 360 in 10 kg from BADC and
around Tk. 200-250 of 10 kg package from private companies.

Informal trade is not occurring regularly in Chapai Nawabganj and
Lalmonirhat districts. Based on relationship, some farmers received
seeds of Indian varieties through their relatives or other farmers living on
other side of the border. These seeds were further replicated by farmers
of Bangladesh. Rice seeds of Indian variety are produced locally. Same
applies to seed flow from Bangladesh to India.

Miniket and Swarna seeds are coming informally in Bangladesh at Benapole
area of Jessore district with 30 kg package. These are certified seeds from
Indian authority, which is sold in the informal market at Tk. 60 per kg.

Farmers prefer not to buy seeds from any source but use own preserved
seeds. Buying seeds from external sources poses uncertainty regarding
availability and price. Farmers argued that it is preferable to use own
preserved seeds albeit of lower yield than facing uncertainty.

Discussion with seed dealers revealed that 7-8 years back farmers
used their preserved seeds only. After long advocacy farmers are now
gradually buying seeds from dealers, but still in very low amount.

Currently, hybrid seeds are imported, but not HYV seeds. However, hybrid
seeds are showing a declining trend. Generation related information on
seed is not available in case of farmers' preserved seed. This is particularly
true for informally traded Indian varieties. Usage of certified seed can
significantly increase production of rice.

Field visit in Dinajpur revealed the fact that in Aman season, 53 per cent is
Swarna among the cultivated varieties. At Hakimpur upazila of Dinajpur,
total area under rice production is 7,196 hectare in Boro season. Of this
area 5,646 hectare is under HYV of 3 Indian and 4 Bangladeshi varieties.
1,550 hectare is under hybrid which was previously much greater. BRRI28, BRRI-29, Miniket and BR-49 are responsible for 17, 23, 14 and 12 per
cent, respectively.

Nine Indian varieties are farmed in about 5,390 hectare out of 8,170
hectare in Aman season. Guti Swarna, Mamun, BRRI Dhan-34, Swarna-5
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
and Ranjit contributed 20, 17, 16, 15 and 5 per cent respectively to total
Aman production.

Seed dealers are found to have been sold unpackaged seed collected
from farmers and from Joypurhat district because of high demand. There
is scope for selling certified Indian popular varieties due to high demand.

Yields of Indian varieties are decreasing as certified seed is not available
and quality of seeds preserved by farmers deteriorates after 4-5 seasons.

Discussion with farmers revealed that they are eager to buy quality input
and adapt to modern production techniques.
Table 4: Cultivation of Indian and Local HYV14
Season
Local HYV
%
Indian HYV
%
Chapai Nawabganj
Aman
Boro
BRRI Dhan-34
BR-11
BR-28
BR-29
1
1
25.79
14.22
Swarna
87.37
Parija
Somsu
35.97
3.53
Jessore
Aman
Boro
Aus
Bina-7
BR-39
BRRI Dhan-50
BRRI Dhan-28
BR-26
BR-28
11.46
12.84
24
21.23
24.73
14.48
BRRI Dhan-34
BRRI Dhan-50
BRRI Dhan-11
13.8
20
2
BR-28
33
BR-29
27.5
Swarna (Guti, Kolamocha, Bulet)
33.53
Miniket
27.90
Miniket
28.30
Dinajpur
Aman
Boro
Swarna
53
Indian varieties are dominant in the region. After getting expected amount of
production, farmers preserve it for their next cultivation time. In the Jessore border area,
the team found that foundation seeds and certified bags of rice seeds are smuggled
from India and cultivated for production. Farmers informed the study team that they
have no faith on the publicly supplied seeds as adulterations are common phenomena.
14
Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), District Offices, Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh.
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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
There is scope for importing Aman and Aus varieties from India to Bangladesh
and Boro varieties from Bangladesh to India. Strong political commitment is required
in agricultural cooperation between the two countries so that there are long-term,
sustainable solutions to food security challenges faced by both.
4. Barriers of Rice Seed Trade
Analysis of current policies shows that nothing can deter import of rice seed
and its replication in Bangladesh for commercial purposes. The registration process
is standard for all countries and applicable even for public companies. It can be
assumed that generalised trade barriers and trade facilitation recommendations for
Bangladesh-India are applicable for rice seed trade also. Bangladesh imports fruit,
maize and vegetables seed from India, and does not impose any customs or import
duty on seeds.
The regulatory framework partly explains why there exists informal seed
trade between Bangladesh and India. Farmers, through their networks, might be
interested in a particular variety from other side of border. In absence of institutional
framework required for supply of seed and easy availability or widespread smuggling
can make these seeds available. Therefore, informal trade takes place between the two
countries. India also places regulations and policies that regulate rice seed import. It
is neither possible nor efficient for a small, medium or large farmer to complete the
processes required for importing seed legally.
One aspect of the policy framework is that policies treat all kinds of seed
universally in terms of approval. All notified crop seed like rice has to undergo two
seasons of field testing whether it is certified by country of origin, international bodies
or not certified at all. This provision, while safeguards farmers’ interest, also makes the
registration process quite lengthy. Enabling Agricultural Trade (EAT), a project funded
by USAID, found that it takes 860 days to register a proprietary staple grain variety
through five procedures.15
4.1 Opinion of Experts and Stakeholders
Trading barriers are more rigid and greater in number from Indian side.
Bangladesh imports a wide array of products from India through formal and informal
process. From Bangladesh side there are minimal trade barriers. But in case of India, due
to their federal government system, facilitating trade requires much longer time and
many forms of documents, authorisation and certification from a number of bodies.
USAID, Agribusiness Regulation and Institutions (Agri) Index Pilot Report, Enabling Agricultural Trade, Dhaka,
2012.
15
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
An exercise trying to export some quantity of seed from Bangladesh to
India would reveal all the trade barriers pertaining in this sector. They emphasised
repeatedly on this exercise as it would be very effective and helpful for this study.
NSB is aware of the informal rice seed trade between the two countries. There was
also discussion of the issue in a meeting of NSB. However, no consensus was reached
despite some members’ interests to formalise this type of trade. Formal trade is
expected to bridge the demand supply gaps. More seeds will be available to farmers
and quality production of rice will take place because farmers will be able to use the
certified seeds and foundation seeds. Tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and
transportation cost will be issues of concern if trade is formalised.
There are government level initiatives to bring out bilateral and multilateral
cooperation between Bangladesh and India and other SAARC countries in rice seeds
trade. SAARC Seed Bank Agreement for multilateral seed trade facilitation was signed
in 2009 and Bangladesh government is trying to accelerate the speed of seed trade
among the SAARC nations for ensuring the quality production of rice in the South
Asian region. One of the most fundamental barriers is the rice seed standards of the
two countries. They are trying to accelerate the speed of cooperation for harmonising
the standards of the two countries. Formal trade of HYV seeds is very important
because certified HYV rice seeds of India and Bangladesh will be helpful for quality
production of rice for these countries.
To meet the shortage and to cease the informal trade of rice seeds between
Bangladesh and India, the following measures are needed:
4.2 
Enhanced bilateral cooperation

Harmonisation of policy standards

Eliminating the discrepancy of the system and procedure of the
Quarantine Office of the concerned countries

Eliminating Indian non-tariff barriers to seed import
Non-Tariff and Para-Tariff Barriers
Some barriers that are currently affecting the flow of Bangladesh’s exports to
India include

Classification

Laboratory testing and chemical testing

Labelling requirements

Registration
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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION

Quarantine requirements

Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) requirements
For primary agricultural products, India requires bio-security, SPS and
import permits, which Bangladeshi exporters consider complex. While importing all
kinds of food products, India sends the samples of export consignments to testing
laboratories located at places far from the customs points, which causes delay in the
export process and results in undesirable demurrage.
Export to India would not increase much unless the non-tariff and para-tariff
barriers are removed. Both Bangladesh and India would obtain greater and more
secure economic benefits by giving priority to unilateral trade liberalisation on a
multilateral basis, rather than by pursuing free trade arrangements. It does not mean
that other trade-related cooperative endeavours should be neglected. In particular
there would be substantial benefits from coordinated improvements in transport,
storage and administrative infrastructures at and adjoining the Bangladesh-India
land borders, as well as in harmonisation and cooperation in customs administration
and banking relationships. Bilateral trade facilitation and its cost reduction would
help reduce black economy activities in both countries associated with both the
“bootleg” and “technical” smuggling routes, and improve fiscal resources, especially
in Bangladesh.
4.3 Seed and Field Standards of Paddy
Table 5: Standard Requirements for Bangladesh16
Factors
(A) Seed Standard
1 Pure seed (minimum per cent by wt.)
2 Inert matter (max. per cent by wt.)
3 Other seed (maximum per cent by wt.)
a. Other crop seed (maximum no. in total; whole sample will be tested)
b. Total weed seed (max. no. in total;
whole sample will be tested)
4 Germination (minimum per cent )
5 Moisture content (maximum per cent )
(B) Field Standard
1 Isolation distance (in metre)
2 Other crop plants (maximum per cent
by no.)
16
Breeder
Seed Standard
Foundation
Certified/TLS
99.00
1.00
Trace
2/kg
97.00
2.00
1.00
5/kg
96.00
3.00
1.00
10/kg
2/kg
8/kg
10/kg
80.00
12.00
80.0
12.00
80.0
12.00
3.00
0.00
3.00
0.10
3.00
0.20
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh.
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
3
4
5
Other varieties (maximum per cent by 0.00
no.)
Weed plants (obnoxious max. per cent 0.0
by no.)
a. Wild rice/red rice
b. Barnyard glass
Plants infected by seed borne disease 5.00
(max. per cent of infected plants)
0.10
0.50
0.03
0.05
10.00
20.00
General condition of crop: If the field crop is severely damaged or lodged
and irregularly flowered that makes crop assessment difficult to judge the trueness of
variety and varietal purity, it will be rejected.
For India
Application and Amplification of General Seed Certification Standards
The General Seed Certification Standards are basic and, together with the
following specific standards, constitute the standards for certification of paddy seed.

Land to be used for seed production of paddy shall be free of volunteer
plants.

A minimum of two inspections shall be made from the time the crop
approaches flowering until it is ready for harvesting.

Field standards include general requirements and isolation.
Paddy seed fields shall be isolated from the contaminants shown in column 1
of the Table below by the distances specified in columns 2 and 3:
Table 6: Specific Requirements17
Contaminants
Fields of other varieties
Fields of the same variety not conforming to varietal purity requirements for
certification
Minimum distance (metres)
Foundation
Certified
3
3
3
3
Factors
Maximum permitted (per cent)*
Foundation
Certified
Off-types
0.050
0.20
Objectionable weed plants
0.010
0.020
Standards for off-types and objectionable weeds shall be met at the final inspection.
Objectionable weed shall be: Wild rice
17
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.
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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
Seed Standards
There are some significant differences in standard of paddy seeds between
two countries. Harmonisation of the standards will create the opportunities for
importing and exporting of HYV seeds between two countries.
Table 7: Seed Standards18
Factor
Pure seed (minimum)
Inert matter (maximum)
Huskless seeds (maximum)
Other crop seeds (maximum)
Other distinguishable varieties (maximum)
Total weed seeds (maximum)
*
Objectionable weed seeds (maximum)
Seeds infected by paddy bunt (Neovossiahorrida
(Tak.) Padwick & Azmatulla Khan (maximum)
Germination (minimum)
Moisture (maximum)
For vapour-proof containers (maximum)
Standards for each class
Foundation
Certified
98.0 per cent
98.0 per cent
2.0 per cent
2.0 per cent
2.0 per cent
2.0 per cent
10/kg
20/kg
10/kg
20/kg
10/kg
20/kg
2/kg
5/kg
0.10 per cent
0.50 per cent
(by number)
(by number)
80 per cent
80 per cent
13.0 per cent
13.0 per cent
8.0 per cent
8.0 per cent
Objectionable weed is the same as shown in Table 6.
*
Time Schedule for Clearance
A minimum of 8-10 days or more is required in exports for certification of
seed consignments. Conversely, perishable commodities such as nursery plants,
tissue cultures, fresh fruits, cut flowers, etc. are certified within a maximum period
of 24-48 hours and consignments that require fumigation are certified within 3 days.
The period of quarantine clearance for seeds imports is 30-35 days and
perishable plant materials such as cuttings/saplings/bud wood, etc. are cleared within
12-24 hours. However, plant materials for consumption are cleared within a day or two
except those requiring fumigation after 3 days. The tissue cultures and mushroom
spawn cultures as well as cut flowers and fresh fruits are cleared within 4-6 hours.
5. Conclusion and Way Forward
This paper tries to explore farmers’ perspectives, seed marketing feasibilities,
supply chain and rice seed entrepreneurship opportunities to look for loopholes in
trade barriers and seed sectors, e.g., policy initiatives, seed production system, the
role of public and private sectors, variety registration procedure, varietal protection
18
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh.
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
and the likes. It would also allow analysing issues of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers
that hinder Bangladesh-India rice seed trade. This includes delving into spaces where
tariff barriers and standard testing risk being the biggest impediments in the growth
of bilateral trade between the two countries. The paper tried to identify such trade
barriers and attempt to formulate solutions towards a “win-win-situation” on HYV rice
seed trade ties with the neighbouring country. This would subsequently help achieve
food security and economic advancement.
Given this backdrop, there is a clear need for improving availability and
accessibility to modern variety of rice seeds in both Bangladesh and India. As both
the countries experience resource and technical constraints, cooperation is probably
the best way out. Some of the avenues to enhance bilateral cooperation between
Bangladesh and India rice seed trade can be to harmonise standards, certification
process and quarantine laws; develop regional/bilateral seed bank; establish joint
body for research and development in agriculture; allow seed trade in Border Haat
and share genes of existing varieties at government level so that each country can
release the varieties of the other.
i
Trade Formalisation
To formalise this type of trade there is scope for private sector involvement.
Private enterprises by following the present regulation of going through NSB can make
seeds available to domestic market. If prices and packaging are kept at competitive
level then trade could be formalised.
ii
SAARC Seed Bank and Scope for Bilateral Cooperation
To form collective self-reliance in agriculture with respect to attaining seed
security and also contributing to harmonised seed testing, certification and seed
trade, the main objectives of the SAARC Seed Bank are:

Provide regional support to national seed security efforts

Strengthen cooperation in increasing Seed Replacement Rate (SRR)

Act as a regional seed security reserve

Strengthen the role of farmers/farming communities and protection of
their rights

Provide farmers with quality seeds in the SAARC region
In view of the similar agro-climatic conditions and commonalities in terms
of agricultural practices, requirements and associated problems in the region,
there are substantial opportunities to extend cooperation for development and
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STRENGTHENING BANGLADESH-INDIA COOPERATION
maintenance of harmonised seed system of the SAARC countries. This could help in
making available seeds of improved varieties of such crops suitable for every agroclimatic zone/condition, which is released by any country in the region.19 This may
be particularly useful in meeting the seed shortages caused by natural calamities.
Regional cooperation is no doubt a prime need to develop seed sector in terms of
quality seed production, varietal exchange, seed trade and to mitigate different crisis
in agricultural sector.20 There is also scope for exchanging varieties at government
level to formalise the unregistered seed variety cultivation occurring in Bangladesh
and India so that farmers are ensured with quality input.
iii
Research and Release of New Varieties Regionally
The HYV seeds can be introduced/released through international research
institutes in different countries. If IRRI introduces the HYV varieties for Bangladesh and India
with different names as Swarna Sub-1 in India and BRRI Dhan-51 in Bangladesh, the poor
farmers will be benefitted and more quality seeds will be available which are required for
high yield. Although in Bangladesh private sector produces foundation seed of HYV varieties
the varietal development is primarily focused on hybrid, while public sector is generally
responsible for developing HYV varieties. In this case, joint research by Bangladesh and India
can ensure sufficient investment in sustainable development of HYV varieties.
iv
Harmonisation of Standards, Certification and Registration Procedures
The initiatives to harmonise standards, certification and registration process
need to be accelerated to promote greater private sector participation and enhanced
regional cooperation.
v
Increasing Quality Seed Usage at Farmer Level
The gap between demand and supply of seed is met primarily through
farmers-preserved seeds. Usage of foundation and certified seed can significantly
increase production. Due to unavailability of seeds, uncertainty regarding price,
availability and quality of seeds, farmers have relied on preserved seed after harvest.
At present availability, quality and uncertainty aspects are improved and farmers are
gradually buying seeds. Still preserved seed dominates seed usage. Ensuring quality
seed usage at farmer level is therefore another useful point of intervention.21
Seed Wing, SAARC Seed Congress Fair 2011, Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh and Bangladesh Seed
Association, SAARC Agriculture Centre, Dhaka.
20
M. K. Bashar, A. Salahuddin and P. van Mele, “Building a Rice Seed Network”, in P. van Mele, A. Salahuddin and N.
P. Magor (eds.), Innovations in Rural Extension: Case Studies from Bangladesh, Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2005.
21
M. Kabir, S. P. Singh and A. R. Khan, “Rice Seed Production and Use in Bangladesh and India: Need for
Bilateral Cooperation”, Souvenir of AGM of Bangladesh Seed Association Meeting, 27 September 2013, Dhaka.
19
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
vi
Cooperation in Modern Variety (MV) Rice Seed
Having a similar agro-climatic conditions and food habits, technical knowledge
and infrastructure available in the two countries can be mutually used for improving
food security scenario. For greater collaboration and cooperation in MV rice seed, the
following measures should be adopted by the governments of Bangladesh and India:

Given the sensitivity of MV rice seeds, there should be attempts in both
countries to gather, estimate informal flow of rice seeds to understand
demand for Bangladeshi/Indian varieties in each other.

Seed policies of Bangladesh and India do not put any restriction on
import/export of MV rice seeds. It needs to be explored why trade in MV
rice seed does not exist despite seeds of other crops being traded.

There is need for rice research institutions in the two countries to
cooperate and collaborate in development of MV rice seeds and its use.

Considering that demand for MV rice seed is more than supply in both
the countries, governments should encourage and facilitate active
participation of private sector in seed development. Given the low level
of awareness with regard to MV rice seed, both the governments should
launch campaign to encourage greater acceptability of MV rice seeds.
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014: 299-320
Monzima Haque
THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN INDIA AND INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD
POLICY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
Abstract
Maintaining harmony and peace in South Asia has been a crucial intent not
only of India but also of its South Asian neighbours. Nevertheless, sustaining
stable relationships among New Delhi and its South Asian neighbours have
had remained a formidable challenge. Following May 2014 national election, a
new government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed office in India.
The new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist, renowned for his
impressive management of Gujarat’s economy as Chief Minister is now the leader
of the one billion plus population. New developments, especially inviting all South
Asian leaders in Indian Prime Minister’s oath-taking ceremony and choosing
South Asian Himalayan countries for opening foreign visits, have stirred up
euphoria regarding possibilities of re-energising the flagging discourse of South
Asian neighbourhood. Building on these evolving scenarios, this paper looks into
India’s South Asian neighbourhood discourse in the context of new government’s
accession to power in India. Taking up the early days conducts of the new Prime
Minister into consideration, the paper reveals that although the style of the new
government to deal with neighbours may reflect changes, the overall objective
management of India’s regional relations is unlikely to deviate much.
1.Introduction
The euphoria with which accession to power of the 15th Prime Minister of
India, Narendra Modi, was observed by all South Asian countries is remarkable as well
as of critical importance. Both famed and defamed for his contributions in Gujarat,
the new Prime Minister (PM) attracted global attention through the historic victory of
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the May 2014 national election. The margin with which
BJP has achieved the right to lead the Indian nation is colossal; earning the party a
straight majority in parliament in course of thirty years of history.1 Immediately after
being entrusted with the right to be the Indian spearhead, even before assuming the
office formally, the new PM had set a new example in the political history of South
Asia. Invitation to attend the oath-taking ceremony at the Presidential Palace was sent
to all South Asian leaders.
Monzima Haque is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS),
Dhaka. Her e-mail address is: monzima@biiss.org
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.
Dean Nelson, “Narendra Modi wins India election with landslide victory”, The Telegraph, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/10835229/Narendra-Modi-wins-India-election-withlandslide-victory.html, accessed on 21 September 2014.
1
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
Such bold step was seen as a breakthrough in the flagging discourse of South
Asian neighbourhood politics. It presented the new government of India a chance
to know the neighbours and their concerns while taking over the office as well as
to create an atmosphere of reliance aimed to move beyond the histories of mistrust
by offering an early gesture of interaction. The initiative of new Indian government
received positive responses from the South Asian political leaders in neighbouring
countries who responded to the invitation warmly. This shows the eagerness of
countries in this region towards cooperation.
In continuation to the opening surprises, PM Modi selected Bhutan and Nepal
for his maiden foreign visits. Hence, the new Government displayed a fairly notable
approach in its conduct with neighbours in the initial days. Headed by Narendra Modi,
the new government of rising India stirred up excitement by displaying intentions
to create a ‘peaceful neighbourhood’ and let join the neighbours in its agenda to
move forward. It heightened both expectations and trepidations over how the new
government is going to deal with its neighbours. The uneasiness, however, resulted
from the fear of escalation in communal violence and the probability of adoption of a
hawkish policy by the new government.
Building on this context, the questions that emerge are, does this euphoria
created by the early conducts reflect change in the neighbourhood policy of India?
How the new government will treat its immediate neighbours? And, what are the
ramifications of this change of leadership in the South Asian political landscape
in the coming days? This paper tries to analyse the early indications of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi and finds out the new government’s policy priorities in the
neighbourhood. Geographically, India’s neighbourhood comprises of the countries
with which it shares borders: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives,
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. However, analysis in this paper limits its
focus within India’s South Asian neighbours and excludes analysis of India’s policy
towards China and Myanmar. But, in course of the discussion, references to China and
Myanmar have been made for comparative analysis.
The paper is based predominantly on secondary sources and proceeds as
follows. Dynamics of India’s South Asian neighbourhood along with policies under
various regimes are discussed in the second section. Recent developments followed
by the accession of the new government in India are outlined in the third section. The
fourth section presents ramifications for South Asia. Section five is the conclusion of
the paper.
2. Understanding India’s South Asian ‘Neighbourhood’
To fathom the complex political landscape of South Asian neighbourhood
and realise the aims and objectives of the new Indian leadership in South Asia, at first
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INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
it is necessary to understand how the region has been perceived by India. Therefore,
this section looks into the dynamics of India’s South Asian neighbourhood and the
history of conduct and key elements of India’s neighbourhood policy under different
administration.
2.1 What is Neighbourhood Policy?
The concept of promoting well defined relations with neighbours is not
new. The root of any neighbourhood policy is that a country cannot "choose its
neighbours"2; therefore, it has to adjust with the surrounding environment and
adopt a suitable approach. Frontiers with neighbours are where domestic concerns
intersect with external relationships and therefore, the first area of attention of any
foreign policy is the neighbourhood.3 Good neighbour policy has been campaigned
even in the earlier tradition of international relations of sovereign states. Franklin
D. Roosevelt advocated a new direction in foreign affairs by his well known ‘Good
Neighbour Policy’4. Attempt to build up an accommodating neighbourhood has been
observed in the European Union as well. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
is hitherto a pioneer of its kind in the neighbourhood policy discourse which aims to
avoid dividing lines with its neighbours.5
Defining neighbourhood is critical because it not only rests on geographical
or political factors but it also has social and cultural underpinnings. As a term,
‘neighbour’, which is of West Germanic origin, combines two words, ‘near’ and
‘dweller’6, i.e., someone who dwells nearby. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the term
‘neighbour’ is measured as a fellow, an associate or a beneficiary. This gives a positive
connotation of the expression. However, in some other, like post-communist spaces
where Slavic mores dominate, ‘neighbour’ is explained as a stranger or foreigner. The
Russian word for ‘neighbour’ entails a person who enters another’s private space
without legitimate authority. Thereby, it has a negative connotation of the same
expression. There emerges the inherent ambiguity of ‘neighbour’ as put forward by
S. D. Muni, “Problem Areas in India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, South Asian Survey, New Delhi, Vol. 10, No. 2,
2003, p. 185.
3
Pratip Chattopadhay, “The Politics of India’s Neigbhourhood Policy in South Asia”, South Asian Survey, New
Delhi, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, p. 93.
4
While attending the Pan American Conference in 1936 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Franklin D. Roosevelt
showed that the United States was willing to stop dominating weaker nations by its adherence to the
Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, and that the Latin American countries
would be treated as equals. For more see, Henry J. Brajkovic, “The Foreign Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt
to the Entry into World War II”, available at http://yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1978/3/78.03.05.x.html,
accessed on 10 November 2014.
5
The objective of developing ENP in 2004 was to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between
the enlarged European Union and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and
security of all. The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. For more
see, Official Website of the European Union, available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_
en.htm, accessed on 02 November 2014.
6
Gabriel Meloni, “Who’s my neighbor?”, European Political Economy Review, Summer 2007, No. 07, p. 25.
2
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Chattopadhay, “the neighbourhood is a space lodged in between the safe inside of
friends and the threatening outside of enemies”7. Thus, a neighbourhood is not limited
to territory only; it is also about ‘numerous and diverse individuals’ and their ‘social
constructions’ who are neither well-known nor a total stranger.8 This understanding of
neighbourhood is critical to figure out the dynamics of South Asian region.
2.2 Dynamics of India’s South Asian ‘Neighbourhood’
To comprehend South Asian neighbourhood, especially with regard to Indian
strategic perceptions, one may fall back to the Kautilyan Mandala theory (circle of
States) of foreign policy. The political realist argued that immediate neighbours
are considered to be natural enemy and neighbour’s neighbour is the friend.9 This
perception articulates that India’s immediate neighbourhood is perceived by her
more as an enemy than a friend. Nevertheless, like any other aspirant country, India
too hopes to be surrounded by a ‘band of allies’. There emerges the necessity of a
policy to mould the surroundings for its best.
Although the term is used quite often, India does not have officially declared
neighbourhood policy. It is merely a part of India’s broader foreign policy.10 The term
Indian Neighbourhood Policy hence could be used to refer to various policy statements
as well as policy propositions of different Indian leadership time to time regarding
India’s immediate neighbours providing expression of the neighbourhood policy.
Various observers as well as leaders have reiterated the significance of India’s South
Asian neighbourhood. S. D. Muni, a former Indian ambassador, noted that “achieving the
objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India’s
ability to manage its own immediate neighbourhood”.11 C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian
scholar, observed that without enduring primacy in one’s own neighbourhood, no nation
can become a credible power on the global stage.12 Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee also acknowledged that friends can change but not neighbours who have to
live together.13 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2010 noted that “we cannot realise our
growth ambitions unless we ensure peace and stability in South Asia”.14 Such statements
substantiate the prominence of South Asian region in India’s policy planning.
Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit.
Claudia Coulton, “Defining Neighbourhoods for Research and Policy”, Cityscape, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, p. 236.
9
“Manu and Kautilya’s Ideas on Inter-state Relations and Diplomacy”, available at http://shodhganga.
inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/4285/10/11_chapter%204.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2014.
10
Smruti S. Pattanaik, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Perceptions from Bangladesh”, Strategic Analysis, New
Delhi, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2011, p. 72.
11
S. D. Muni, op. cit. ; see also, David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 22.
12
C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of Indian Foreign Policy, India: Penguin Books, 2003, p.
242.
13
David Malone, op. cit.
14
“India needs US for its growth”, The Deccan Herald, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/
content/96305/india-needs-us-its-growth.html, accessed on 21 September 2014.
7
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Even though this region has been so significant, relations between India and
her neighbours never reached the desired stature of affability. Since independence
in 1947, India’s principal challenges have been dealing with its troubled relations
with its neighbours. With regard to her global strategy, India has oscillated between
nonalignment to realism. But in the case of South Asia, it seems India has fallen short
of a coherently developed strategy. Several factors have contributed to the creation of
the complex dynamics in this neighbourhood. The primary factor being the disparity
of power among neighbours; India has the preponderance of power in the region
in all aspects. She occupies 72 per cent of the land surfaces and is responsible for a
large per cent of regional economic output.15 This offers India a natural advantage of
leadership, but at the same time creates the fundamental security problem within the
regional framework.16 As a consequence of power differences, India is characterised as
‘hegemon’ by smaller nations of the region; always afraid to being subjugated in pursuit
of their national interests. Indian policies with regard to the liberation movement in
Bangladesh in 1971, the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the attempted military
coup in Maldives in 1988 are cited as illustrations of India’s hegemonic authority in the
region.17 Image as a rival and competitor in the eyes of Pakistan also makes the region
a complicated gain for India.
On the contrary, due to the power differences, India also worries that the
smaller countries will ‘free ride’ on its resources in the name of cooperative relationship.
Delhi suspects that its neighbours are or have been involved in receiving, sheltering,
overlooking or tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India.18
The issue of extra-regional powers is another factor that adds hurdle to this complex
security landscape. Since smaller countries of South Asia perceive threats from its big
neighbour; they attempt to address their ‘smaller state complex’ by adopting power
balancing approach through building closer relations with extra-regional powers
in order to counterbalance India’s influence.19 This appears to India as attempts of
smaller neighbours to gang up against the larger neighbour.
Other factors include apprehensions about India’s desire to reinstall an
Akhand Bharat (unified India), where South Asian countries will form a single unit and
India would be in charge of their security and development.20 India’s insistence on
bilateralism is also viewed by smaller neighbours as a coercive approach to weaken
their bargaining power since they are more comfortable to tackle India through
multilateral structure which allows them to voice up their arguments without being
Madhabi Bhasin, “India’s Role in South Asia-Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership”, 2008, available
at http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/MadhaviBhasin.pdf, accessed on 10 November 2014.
Bhumitra Chakma, “Liberalism and South Asian Security”,
available at www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/getpaper.php?id=755, accessed on 17 November 2014.
17
Ibid.
18
Address of Kanwal Sibal, the then Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to French Institute of
International Relations (IFRI), Paris on 17 December 2002.
19
Bhumitra Chakma, op. cit.
20
M. B. I. Munshi, The India Doctrine (1947-2007), Dhaka: Bangladesh Defence Journal Publishing, 2008, p. 10.
15
16
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felt insubstantial. Therefore, the interplay of big power and small power psychosis,
unbalanced perspectives and predisposed perceptions of each other loom large on
the relations of the neighbourhood. Consequently, thus far, India has not been able to
win hearts and minds of its neighbours as a ‘natural leader’ in the region.21
Due to this complex dynamics, countries of South Asia networks in their
own neighbourhood with suspicion and caution. For India, the crucial challenge is to
get over the anti-Indian sentiment prevailing in its strategic neighbourhood. For the
neighbouring countries, the challenge is to keep Indian ‘hegemony’ to a minimum.
This dynamics of South Asia lies at the heart of the complexity of the region.
2.3 India’s Neighbourhood Policy: A Historical Perspective
Indian nationalist leaders articulated an Asianist ideology in the early 19th
century based on the historical, political and the geopolitical interests of Greater
India. Since then, Asia remains by and large a part of India’s global strategy because
India has a geo-strategic centrality in Asia. As a consequence of the Cold War, Indian
attempts to build a cooperative Asian neighbourhood came to an abrupt halt since
Asia was starting to divide along ideological lines with some countries getting more
focused in world politics.22 Subsequently, focus of India began to divide along various
sub-regions of Asia like South Asia as the immediate neighbourhood and South East
Asia as the extended neighbourhood.
Being the immediate neighbourhood, South Asia has always been the ‘first
circle’ of India’s foreign policy.23 Jawaharlal Nehru, the chief architect of independent
India’s foreign policy, “stressed on the importance of keeping foreign powers out
of Asia”24 making the subcontinent as an exclusive sphere of influence of India. He
believed, as the relatively secure power in South Asia, India needs to give more to its
neighbours with a vision of ‘strategic altruism’.25
During years of Indira Gandhi, a turn towards realistic Indo-centric orientation
was observed.26 Delhi continued its denial for role of external powers in the region and
maintained preference for bilateral resolution of disputes.27 Notably, Indian insistence
for multilateralism at global level and preference for bilateralism at regional level
contributed to trust deficit among its neighbours. Moreover, the assertive policies of
Madhabi Bhasin, op. cit.
S. D. Muni and Girijesh Pant, India’s Search for Energy Security, New Delhi: Rupa Co. and the Observer
Research Foundation, 2005, pp. 6-7.
23
Arvind Gupta, Ashok K Behuria and Smruti Pattanaik, “Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy?”, Strategic
Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 36, No. 2, March 2012, p. 231; see also, Sandy Gordon, India’s Rise as an Asian Power:
Nation, Neighbourhood and Region, Washington D.C: The Georgetown University Press, 2014, p. 181.
24
C. Raja Mohan, op. cit., p. 239.
25
Sandy Gordon, op. cit., p. 182.
26
Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 96.
27
Arvind Gupta, op. cit.
21
22
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Indira Gandhi provoked more fear than respect among neighbours which was evident
in Indian actions seeking to influence events in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.28
India’s goal was to remain the uncontested ‘regional hegemon’ in South Asia.29
In the face of growing accusations of Indian intervention in domestic affairs of
smaller neighbours during the 1990s and the deepening crisis evoked a new approach
from the new Prime Minister Narashima Rao. Under the tensed circumstances, he
preferred the policy of benign neglect with regard to Pakistan and adopted a ‘handsoff’ approach in relation to other South Asian neighbours that neither escalated any
problem nor resolved any concern.30
The handling of neighbourhood issues by successive governments, especially
by I. K. Gujral, popularly known as Gujral doctrine, generated some trust among
neighbours and significantly impacted on the neighbourhood policy. Gujral’s ‘nonreciprocal solution’ to problems had a marked impression since India’s South Asia
policy started to shift from an exclusive hard power strategy of military and diplomatic
interventions to a soft power approach that emphasised on intergovernmental
cooperation.31 It seemed like an attempt to induce bandwagoning with the strategic
altruistic approach.32 Five principles of the doctrine were: firstly, with neighbours like
Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity
but gives all it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow
its territory to be used against the interest of another country in the region. Thirdly,
none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, South Asian countries
must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will
settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. 33 Interestingly, I.
K. Gujral did not include Pakistan in his list for non-reciprocal approach. Although
criticised by some analysts as too friendly towards neighbours, he attempted to bring
new dimensions to the regional policy. In the recently enunciated Non Alignment
2.0, the propositions enshrined in the Gujral doctrine are reiterated that India must
constantly go the extra mile to reassure its neighbours and be prepared for unilateral
concessions rather than insist on reciprocity.34
The Janata government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee did not deviate much from
the Gujral doctrine and planned to work towards a South Asia ‘bound together in
collective pursuit of peace and prosperity’. However, in contrast to the Gujral doctrine,
this government put a great deal of effort to bring relations with Pakistan on track and
Ibid.; see also Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit.
Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit.
30
C. Raja Mohan, op. cit., p. 241; see also, Ashok K Behuria, op. cit.
31
Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 100.
32
Sandy Gordon. op. cit.
33
C. Raja Mohan, op. cit.; see also, Ashok K Behuria, op. cit., p. 238.
34
Satish Chandra, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, available at http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/
june/27/india-s-neighbourhood-policy, accessed on 21 November 2014.
28
29
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took a number of measures to lower India’s dominant power profile.35 His famous ‘bus
diplomacy’ to improve relations with Pakistan, however, faced an abrupt end with
the Kargil War of 1999 and terrorist attacks on Indian parliament in 2001. Vajpayee
deviated from Nehru’s vision of non-proliferation and adhered to pro-nuclearisation
strategy ordering series of nuclear tests in 1998. Thus, the then BJP government
adopted a strategy based on both power and peace (Shakti and Shanti).36
The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime that took power in 2004 also
sought to deepen relations with neighbours. The Manmohan Doctrine, as termed by
some observers, emphasised on economic development as drivers of India’s and its
neighbours’ foreign policy.37 During its ten years of governance, UPA continued the
policy of inviting neighbours to share the economic prosperity and building mutually
beneficial relations with neighbours. However, the coalition politics did block some
of its attempts to strengthen relations with neighbours and it could not live up to the
promise of neighbours.
It can be noted that India’s relations with its immediate neighbours fluctuated
quite a bit since its independence. In contrast, in the 21st century, India has taken
a more pragmatic approach in its foreign policy. In the post 9/11 phase, relations
appears to be more or less steady with minor tactical shifts. Irrespective of policies and
actions adopted by different administrations to manage relations with South Asian
neighbours, regional relations never reached the desired warmth. Some scholars
accord this as resulting from India’s ad hoc management of relations.38 Against this
historical context, it can be noted that the new Prime Minister Modi is in the critical
juncture to carry forward India’s neighbourhood policy in this new millennium.
3. New Government in Power: Recent Developments
In a landslide victory in the national election of 2014, India’s National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), assumed
office in India. With this unprecedented success in the much-hyped election,
Narendra Modi sworn in as the 15th Prime Minister of India. BJP, as a political party, is
ideologically inspired by cultural nationalism centering on concepts like ‘Hindutva’.39
BJP traces its roots to Bharatiya Jana Sangh, established in 1951. That is why, prior to
the election, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was largely in discussion due to
his Hindu nationalist ideology and role as alleged ‘mastermind’ of 2002 communal
Pratip Chattopadhay, op. cit., p. 97.
Sanjeev Miglani, “If Modi Wins Election, Neighbours Can Expect a More Muscular India”, The Reuters,
(Indian Edition), 30 March 2014.
37
Prakash Nanda, “Indian Foreign Policy Under Modi”, available at www.aii.unimelb.edu.au, accessed on 21
November 2014.
38
Ashok K Behuria, op. cit.
39
Sreeram S. Chaulia, “BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Realist Alternative’ to the Nehruvian Tradition”,
International Politics, 39, June 2002, p. 220.
35
36
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riot in Gujarat. Of course, the contribution to the economic development of Gujarat
added credibility to his identity. As evident from the unexpected and unparalleled
victory, despite his communal ideology, it was Narendra Modi’s strategy of economic
development in Gujarat that appealed the Indians most. However, towards its South
Asian neighbours, his posture has been quite appealing as well.
To understand the policy priorities of the new Prime Minister of India, first,
it is necessary to look into the indications of election manifesto of BJP. The election
manifesto outlined an economy-driven foreign policy with the aim to strengthen India’s
economy, thereby, boosting its bargaining power with other countries. Although the
election manifesto falls short of clearly articulating the foreign policy vision of BJP
government, the admiration of the incumbent government for former Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and other post election developments indicate that Narendra Modi
would preferably follow the path set by the former BJP government obviously with
minor tactical shifts. BJP remarked in its election manifesto, “We will engage proactively
on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond and create a web of allies
to mutually further our interests”. The manifesto of BJP also made pledges to reinforce
regional forum like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and
insisted on regional cooperation and connectivity. This can be considered as a portent
of the new government’s reverence for neighbouring countries’ contemplations.40
The Prime Minister also reiterated his government’s commitment to work closely for
economic development of neighbouring countries in his Independence Day Address
delivered on 15 August 2014. Counting regional neighbours as ‘partners’ and opening
scope for ‘mutual benefit’ are surely indicative of advancement in economic and political
relations. It was also visible in the oath-taking ceremony and visits to Bhutan, Nepal,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan by representatives of the new government of India.
The swearing-in ceremony of Narendra Modi was a crucial indication of the
Indian government’s intentions to bolster relations with countries of South Asian
region. It was a signal that India is willing to look towards its immediate neighbours
through a new lens in order to bring it back on track. By inviting leaders from all South
Asian countries, the Prime Minister has given an ample clue to the global community
of his priorities of neighbourhood. On the other side, acceptance of invitation is
another cogent signal of what the South Asian neighbours expect from India, i.e., a
more responsible role and a break away from its hegemonic attitude. Narendra Modi
had maintained the momentum of ‘swearing-in diplomacy’ by follow up visits that
reconfirmed the determination of commitment. In June 2014, Indian External Affairs
Minister had also chaired a meeting of India’s top envoys from neighbouring countries
to maintain the momentum and strengthen bilateral ties.41
Arun Sahgal, “India’s Security Policies Under Modi”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.
com/2014/05/indias-security-under-modi/, accessed on 21 November 2014.
41
“Narendra Modi government’s neighbourhood priority policy: Sushma Swaraj to visit Nepal”, The Economic
Times, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-29/news/50946793_1_nepalbilateral-ties-export-promotion-centre, accessed on 15 September 2014.
40
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In the first three weeks of assuming office, the new PM made the maiden
visit to Bhutan. Describing Bhutan as a natural choice for his first visit abroad, the
new PM emphasised on ‘special relationship’ between Bhutan and India. During the
tour, there was discussion on hydropower cooperation, expanding bilateral trade and
increasing scholarship for the Bhutanese students. Both countries also reaffirmed
their commitment to extensive development cooperation.42
The second visit of the PM was to Nepal which was first by any Indian Prime
Minister in seventeen years since 1997. The visit was termed as a ‘historic’ one where
cooperation, connectivity, culture and constitution were discussed.43 Narendra Modi
offered the Himalayan neighbour US$ 1 billion in concessional loans to help build
power plants and roads. On the political front, Prime Minister delivered a speech in
the Nepal Parliament and also met groups of opposition members. He also conducted
a special puja (prayer) at the Pashupatinath temple that demonstrated his prudence
to uphold the cultural bonds sharing both countries.44 It must also be noted that the
new PM’s celebration of the religio-cultural affinity between the two nations was a
smart move aimed to win the hearts and minds of Nepali people.
The next South Asian country visited by the incumbent government was
Bangladesh which was attended by Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj as her
first bilateral visit. The External Affairs Minister had meetings with representatives
from government as well as opposition parties. This visit to Dhaka assumes great
importance in the overall dynamics of neighbourhood policy since the Minister
well communicated the Bangladeshi people about the new Indian government’s
vision. Dhaka was conveyed messages of deepening cooperation and increased
connectivity.45
In the midst of mounting worries of the recurrence of the Taliban insurgency,
especially after the attack on Indian Consulate in Herat province and the mid-2014
election crisis, a trip to Kabul was made by Sushma Swaraj in September. With the
trip to Afghanistan during political transition, India reaffirmed its commitment to its
unstable neighbour.46 This visit at the crucial juncture implied that stability in Kabul
“Ten Key Points of PM Narendra Modi’s Bhutan Visit”, Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/10-key-points-of-PM-Narendra-Modis-Bhutan-visit/articleshow/36663977.cms,
accessed on 15 September 2014.
43
“Modi concludes historic visit to Nepal”, Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Modi-concludes-historic-visit-to-Nepal/articleshow/39628843.cms, accessed on 17 September 2014.
44
“Modi concludes historic visit to Nepal”, The Hindu, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/
international/south-asia/modi-concludes-historic-visit-to-nepal/article6280753.ece, accessed on 17
September 2014.
45
“India-Bangladesh Relations: A Framework of Cooperation”, an Address by Shrimati Sushma Swaraj,
the External Affairs Minister of India, at Eminent Persons' Lecture organised by Bangladesh Institute of
International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka on 26 June 2014.
46
Ankit Panda, “What Role Can India Play in Defusing Afghanistan’s Election Crisis?”, The Diplomat, available at
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/what-role-can-india-play-in-defusing-afghanistans-election-crisis/, accessed
on 12 November 2014.
42
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would be in the priority list of Delhi. Although the envoy discussed routine matters
by avoiding not to have chosen any one side in the political dispute, she kept the
door open for both the candidates to deepen relations and also avoided unwarranted
discussion of interference.
The new government was very strategic to select the two Himalayan
neighbours for maiden visits. For long, these two countries were dispossessed of
Heads of States visits even though bilateral relations had been quite close historically.
Thus, beginning the journey to woo neighbours with these two countries could not
be more productive. Choosing any other neighbour could have added to already
held apprehension by other smaller neighbours in the region. The visit to Bangladesh
was essential to propel the sentiment that close rapport of Dhaka with the UPA
government would not come in way of the new government’s priority. Attending
Kabul demonstrated that Delhi would not let standalone its strategic partner Kabul
during this transition period. All these developments are decisive to understand the
willingness of the incumbent government to put flesh to the electoral promises and
to fathom the implications of the new leadership in India for South Asian neighbours.
4.
Ramifications for South Asia: Continuity or Change?
A number of factors have affected India’s relations with its neighbours in the past
years. Problem with Pakistan roots in the difference of opinion with regard to the twonation theory, insurgency issues and Kashmir crisis. Relations with Himalayan neighbours
like Nepal and Bhutan, in spite of the cultural and religious traditions are affected by
the fear of political domination. Interference in domestic affairs had severely affected
relations with Sri Lanka. With regard to Bangladesh, even though India played a crucial
role in Bangladesh’s War of Liberation, the latter could never avoid the psychological fear
of being dominated by the larger neighbour. Dealing with this psychological distance is
necessary as it can fade any real prospect of progress among neighbours.
With regard to the environment in South Asia, compared to UPA government,
the new leadership is fortunate to experience ‘relative’ stability in the region. Nepal
and Bangladesh have stable governments; political transition in Afghanistan is
almost complete; although Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif has the Pakistan Army and raging
insurgencies to contend with, the current government at least came to power through
a democratic process.47 In addition, fractured electoral mandates did stop many
initiatives of UPA government which is unlikely for current administration due to the
unanimous support Narendra Modi, as candidate of Prime Ministerial position, had
from his party.48 Building on the South Asian perceptions and early days of conduct
“Modi works for a neighbourhood that embraces India”, The Hindustan Times, available at http://www.
hindustantimes.com/comment/pm-s-neighbourhood-policy-symbolism-persistence-need-to-gotogether/article1-1247288.aspx, accessed on 12 November 2014.
48
Aprameya Rao, “Modi and India’s Policy Towards its Immediate Neighbours-Trade and Commerce over
Politics”, Science and Technology Security Forum, available at http://stsfor.org/content/modi-and-indias-policytowards-its-immediate-neighbours-trade-and-commerce-over-politics, accessed on 10 October 2014.
47
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of Indian leadership, what can be expected from the new government in its relations
with neighbours has been analysed in the following discussion.
4.1 Relations with Afghanistan: Forwarding Partnership
India has already been deeply invested in preventing Afghanistan from
becoming a failed state and a launching pad for terrorism in the neighbourhood.49
India is the largest regional investor in Afghanistan and has already contributed to
capacity building of its security personnel. The country has to date disbursed US$ 2
billion worth of effective assistance to Afghanistan. Back in 2011, the two governments
inked a Strategic Partnership Agreement first of its kind between any South Asian
neighbours.50 Under the Agreement, both countries agreed to hold regular Strategic
Dialogues “to provide a framework for cooperation in the area of national security”.51
With the US-NATO forces withdrawal from the country, India would have to take up
additional responsibilities as the rising player in the region. An unstable Afghanistan
is not desired since it would further destabilise Pakistan whose Pashtun dominated
areas would become more restive and lawless upsetting India’s Pakistan policy and
neighbourhood objectives in the whole52.
Since this is the first time Kabul has changed power through a democratic
process, and with Ashraf Ghani coming to power, India is likely to get closer with the
country based on the dictum that ‘democracies do not fight each other’. The Prime
Minister of India pledged to stand beside the new government in Afghanistan ‘at
every step’ as ‘friend and partner’. On the other side, the new Afghanistan President
also termed relations with India as “foundation of Afghanistan’s diplomacy and
economic strategy”.53
India is concerned about its stakes in maintaining peaceful environment in
the neighbouring country. On the same line, Pakistan too is displeased about the
possibility of being a ‘buffer state’ between New Delhi and Kabul resulting from
intensified engagement of India in the neighbouring country. Islamabad is worried
of a possible shift in the balance of power in the region towards Indo-Afghan
Adam B. Lerner, “Who’s Afraid of Narendra Modi: Why the Indian Prime Minister could be good news
for Washington”, available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/whos-afraid-of-narendramodi-111364_Page3.html#.VH_4lmfwCSo, accessed on 21 October 2014.
50
M. Ashraf Haidari, “Afghanistan-India: A Renewed Partnership”, The Diplomat, available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/07/afghanistan-india-a-renewed-partnership/, accessed on 25 October 2014.
51
Niharika Betkerur, “India Stepping Up to the Plate in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/05/india-stepping-up-to-the-plate-in-afghanistan/, accessed on 20 November
2014.
52
R. Dahiya and A. Behuria (eds.), India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades, New Delhi:
IDSA and Pentagon Security International, 2012, p. 22.
53
“PM Narendra Modi Pledges Support to new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani”, Times of India, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-Narendra-Modi-pledges-support-to-new-Afghan-PresidentAshraf-Ghani/articleshow/44831468.cms, accessed on 02 November 2014.
49
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collaboration in lieu of Af-Pak alliance. This would further weaken Pakistan’s regional
stand in South Asia. Closer relations of India and Afghanistan would tilt the balance
of power in the region largely opening up chances of further boom in ‘all weather
friendship’ of Pakistan and China. An insecure, left-alone Pakistan would certainly
resort to violent actions; consequence of which would fall upon the whole region.
Nevertheless, Kabul seems to understand its advantages and so is considering both
the opportunities of extending warm hands to Delhi and Islamabad as evident in the
words of the new leadership. It seems to be well aware that strained ties with Pakistan
are likely to increase chances of insurgency outbreak in the country in post US-NATO
withdrawal period.54
To advance the new government’s objective of connectivity, Afghanistan
is crucial since India’s policy of greater connectivity with Central Asia envisions
Afghanistan as a regional trade hub crossed by energy pipelines as well as air,
rail and road links that would promote resource sharing and people-to-people
contacts between the two regions.55 India has frequently expressed a desire to see
the emergence of a strong, stable and independent Afghanistan. Any economic
assistance provided by India to Afghanistan would be stripped of meaning if the
latter is not strong enough to defend the products of the assistance. Moreover, India
needs Afghanistan to be able to defend the former’s business investments there.
This is one of the main reasons that the new leadership is keeping in touch with
Kabul. Cooperation could also be furthered along the lines of intelligence sharing,
recruitment, communication and logistics, which would help Afghan forces in covert
operations. The posture of the new leadership reflects that Delhi would continue to
assist Kabul’s reconstructions needs but would not step in such a way that causes it to
mire in the Kabul’s crisis.
4.2 Relations with Pakistan: Continuing Contest
As regards India’s relations with Pakistan, both countries have been in
‘two minds’ about each other. Consequently, the relationship oscillated between
psychological hostility to armed conflict ever since 1947. It has been the most
intractable neighbour of India.56 Successive governments in both countries have
attempted to negotiate numerous times yet achievements remain minimal. Change
of government in Pakistan and India in 2013 and 2014 respectively, ensconced hopes
of revitalisation in their bilateral relations. Both countries now have new democratic
governments coming to power with majority votes and their business friendly postures
54
Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Analysts Look for Clues in Narendra Modi’s Foreign Policy”, Voice of America, available
at http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-look-for-clues-in-narendra-modis-foreign-policy/1926457.html,
accessed on 02 November 2014.
55
Edward Schwarck, “Can China and India Cooperate in Afghanistan?”, The Diplomat, available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/10/can-china-and-india-cooperate-in-afghanistan/, accessed on 20 November
2014.
56
David Malone, op. cit.
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have added to the anticipation of development in bilateral relations. It appeared that
since both are eyeing the economic fruits of peace are apparently ready to deal with
one another.57 But all hopes were shattered with the escalation of border tensions.
Although the Prime Minister of India invited his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz
Sharif in his oath-taking ceremony and there was much hype over this as a fresh start;
current situation hints at more disquieting future. Nawaz Sharif also confirmed his
readiness by responding genially to India’s call and gestured with discharging 151
Indian fishermen to kick-start conciliation. Nevertheless, immediately after Narendra
Modi’s election, there was demonstration in Pakistan to unsettle Nawaz Sharif. The
protests significantly reduced the power of the civilian government and relations
grew more unstable. When it was time to improve bilateral ties, PM Sharif was mired in
domestic politics. Involvement of multiple actors in the domestic politics of Pakistan
adds to the complexity. As opined by Shashi Tharoor, “In Pakistan, agreements are
concluded with authorities who do not themselves possess the power to implement
what they have undertaken”.58 In addition, Pakistan Army, the quarter of Pakistan’s
political power play that is fervently anti-Indian, allegedly was not happy with Nawaz
Sharif’s attempts to build rapport with the new administration in India. Farahnaz
Ispahani, a former member of Pakistan’s parliament noted, “Sharif’s moves towards
better ties between India and Pakistan angered the military and may have resulted in
the renewed clashes on the Line of Control”.59
Thus, the flashpoint is the Kashmir issue. It would not be an overestimation
to say that if Kashmir issue is resolved, Indo-Pak problem would cease to exist and
therefore, the rest of South Asia would be in peace. Unfortunately, recent fighting
across the disputed Kashmir is the most serious artillery exchanges since 2003
ceasefire and has threatened the newfound hopes. From Delhi’s side, the cancellation
of talks at the foreign secretary level in retaliation for Pakistani meetings with Kashmiri
separatist organisations was an aggressive move. Visiting the Siachen glacier, an area
that is claimed by both India and Pakistan was also a hint of Modi’s assertiveness and
‘non-compromising position’ with regard to Kashmir.60 As expected, the nationalistic
leader is less tolerant and has already blamed Pakistan for its engagement in ‘the
proxy war of terrorism’ and for violating cease-fire agreements in Kashmir. This also
provoked reaction by Pakistan government as ‘urging New Delhi to adopt a more
constructive approach’. By allowing armed forces full operational autonomy to retort
57
“Kashmir Violence Tests Modi’s Promise of ‘Muscular’ Foreign Policy”, The Voice of America, available at
http://www.voanews.com/content/kashmir-line-of-control-violence-tests-modi-foreign-policy/2480050.
html, accessed on 21 November 2014.
58
Shashi Tharoor, “Modi’s Message to Pakistan at SAARC”, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/opinion/
modi-s-message-to-pakistan-at-saarc-626788, accessed on 28 November 2014.
59
Harsh V Pant, “Out With Non-Alignment, In With a Modi Doctrine”, The Diplomat, available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/11/out-with-non-alignment-in-with-a-modi-doctrine/, accessed on 21 November
2014.
60
“Media See Modi’s Visit to Kashmir as Message to Pakistan”, BBC News, available at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-india-29751900, accessed on 07 November 2014.
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to the increase of ceasefire violations by Pakistan forces, Modi has hinted his offensive
approach. He would be less willing to make concessions and would increase India’s
military strength to deter Pakistan.61
However, both the countries have managed to cooperate on non-securitised
softer issues like disaster response and energy issue. While India assisted the
earthquake devastated Pakistan with relief in 2010, Pakistan reciprocated after
recent floods in Indian administered Kashmir. Discussion over information sharing of
common rivers to develop an early warning flood system also took place. To encourage
energy sharing, India and Pakistan also inked a gas sharing agreement through the
proposed TAPI pipeline which would run through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India
and Pakistan.62 Nevertheless, trade relation has to overcome a major hurdle and the
issue of Non-Discriminatory Market Access (NDMA) is yet to be resolved.63
The escalated tensions can put up further pressure on India.64 India seems to
be pursuing a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, in which it is willing to cooperate if Pakistan shows
the willingness, but would respond to aggression with aggression. It would do great
damage to the new leadership’s credibility if his government is forced to talk to Pakistan
in case situation deteriorates.65 Thus, there seems to be a mixed message towards
Islamabad; on one side, PM Modi extended hands of cooperation in softer issues; on
the other, he reacted quite aggressively with regard to harder issues like insurgencies
and terrorism. Nonetheless, while terrorism in Pakistan remains a problem, Delhi
should be careful enough to craft policies for Pakistan since there always remains the
risk of nuclear war. Talks with the Pakistan army are a must if the new government of
India wants to walk miles with all neighbours. Leaving Islamabad behind would only
hinder the prospects of cooperation. Political will should be expressed by Pakistan as
well. Nevertheless, it is already evident that relations between the larger neighbours
would continue to disquiet the region.
4.3
Relations with Bangladesh: Addressing Mutual Concerns
Bangladesh is a strategic country in the policy propositions of India. There are
innumerable issues continuously opening up from the Pandora’s Box of BangladeshIndia relations. Security and development of North-East India is directly linked with
Bangladesh, so is the success of India’s ‘Look East’ and connectivity policies. With
the visit of Sushma Swaraj, it was evident that Bangladesh figures prominently in
the foreign policy agenda of the new government. The new Prime Minister is also
expected to pay a visit to the country in near future.
Prakash Nanda, op. cit.
Ibid.
63
Smruti Pattanaik, op. cit.
64
Ibid.
65
Harsh V Pant, op. cit.
61
62
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The crucial concerns with regard to the bilateral relations in recent times
are the land boundary agreement issue and water sharing agreements. In the initial
days of PM Modi assuming power, there were apprehensions among Bangladeshi
political community that relations with India may be strained due to the close rapport
of the current administration of Dhaka with the immediate past administration in
New Delhi. In addition, in his election speeches, Narendra Modi has been heating
up debate on the issues of Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’ calling for tighter border controls
and denunciating Bangladeshi Muslim migrants.66 Days before the election, the West
Bengal and Assam unit of BJP heatedly opposed the Land Boundary Agreement and
its implementation when it was scheduled for ratification in Lok Shabha. PM Modi
also threatened to expel the illegal settlers from India and further alleged that a large
number of illegal migrants were being accommodated by the state government to
benefit from vote bank politics.
However, the post election posture has been cautious. The easy going approach
of India regarding maritime boundary verdict in Hague and the consultation External
Affairs Minister had with West Bengal Chief Minister on land exchanges related to
boundary agreement can be considered as positive signals. To add to the positivity, the
current government in India has now been screening keenness over the Land Boundary
Agreement (LBA) mentioning its necessity to curb ‘infiltrators’; parliamentary standing
committee has been set up that submitted unanimous report recommending passage
of the long-held bill to implement the Land Boundary issue. The West Bengal unit has also
changed their stance, possibly due to its trapped state followed by Burdwan bombing.
This has re-generated hopes over the prospect of completion of the implementation of
the deal even before the expected visit of the new Prime Minister to Bangladesh. But to
note, the Assam unit is still furious over the present stance of the new Government.67
PM Modi, who previously objected to the bill mentioning the loss of land, has now
made a turn to favour the deal remarking that the LBA is a short term loss for Assam to
gain over the long run, i.e., closing way for infiltrators. The long run gain would simplify
management of cross border issues and would ultimately clear up settling of its longest
border dispute with Bangladesh. If implemented, the serpentine Bangladesh-India
border would be redrawn and made much straighter for better management with each
country transferring area under adverse possession.68
Deepal Jayasekera, “India: Modi reiterates pledge to expel “Bangladeshi” Muslims in wake of communal
massacre”, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/08/asam-m08.html, accessed on 02
October 2014.
67
“Assam group angry over PM Narendra Modi stand on Bangla Land Swap”, The Indian Express, available
at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/assam-groups-angry-over-modi-stand-on-banglaland-swap/, accessed on 01 December 2014.
68
Pallab Bhattacharya, “Mamata Melting”, The Daily Star, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/mamatamelting-53470, accessed on 05 December 2014.; see also, “Bangladesh is hopeful about implementation
of LBA”, BBC Bangla, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/bengali/news/2014/12/141205_qk_bd_president_
visit_india, accessed on 05 December 2014.
66
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The crisis for administration in Dhaka is that it cannot afford to go forward on
the transit issue without showing positive results on the Land Boundary Agreement
and the Teesta River accord. Lack of infrastructure and non-settlement of transit fees
have also held back progress on the transit related issues.69 In such a scenario, the
new Indian government is expected to show some readiness to deal with these issues
so that consensus can be created within Bangladesh. India needs to attach greater
importance to the regional and sub-regional role of Bangladesh. Since Bangladesh has
been very forthcoming to address issues like extremism, terrorism and connectivity
hand in hand with India, it is time that India come up to add to the confidence of this
strategic neighbour. The promised US$ 1 billion credit line from India has also been
caught up in bureaucratic red tape.70 India’s Border Security Force (BSF) is still regularly
shooting Bangladeshi nationals, while Bangladeshi exports to India face a multitude
of non-tariff barriers. Talks over Teesta Accord are still stalled and no discussion
over this took place during the meeting of PM Sheikh Hasina and Narendra Modi in
Kathmandu, though assurance has been provided to sign the water-sharing treaty
soon. However, as evident in the land boundary agreement, bringing all the actors on
board is the posture of the new leadership. But no discussion has taken place over this
with the West Bengal unit. Another crucial actor in the discussion would be Sikkim
who is still not on board in the discussion. Therefore, relations between Bangladesh
and India would maintain its momentum but implementation of mutual concerns
might take a long time.
4.4
Relations with Sri Lanka: Putting Back on Track?
New Delhi’s relations with Colombo in the recent past experienced abrasion
over two issues: debate of intrusion in internal affairs of Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis.
A course changing turn in policies appeared in early 2014 when the then Indian
government decided to abstain from its hitherto voting prototypes in the United
Nations Human Rights Council with resolution related to Sri Lankan government’s
involvement in human right abuses against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
This idea of the central government was not taken well by the domestic force of Tamil
leaders in India who pushed for stronger stance by the government.
Given Tamil Nadu’s influence in Indian foreign policy with the neighbouring
state and Modi government’s insistence on ‘Team India’, it would be too optimistic to
say an independent, stable course would or could be chosen by the new government.
Inviting Sri Lankan President in the oath taking ceremony, in spite of objection from
Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, may lead to excitement about India’s new leadership;
a major shift in India’s stance on the Tamil issue is unlikely. Although the coalition
Shahab Enam Khan and Parvez Karin Abbasi, “Modi-fying Bangladesh-India Relations”, The Dhaka
Tribune, available at http://www.dhakatribune.com/long-form/2014/apr/01/modi-fying-bangladesh-indiarelations, accessed on 02 October 2014.
70
Zahedul Amin, “The India-Bangladesh Power Trap”, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.
com/2014/04/the-india-bangladesh-power-trap/, accessed on 21 November 2014.
69
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compulsion appears to be lesser in this term compared to the Congress government;
one must not forget that Narendra Modi is a Chief Minister turned Prime Minister who
holds reverence for role of state governments and it lends credence to the view that
Tamil Nadu’s political realities is not going to be ignored. In addition, Prime Minister
Modi has a large majority in the Lok Sabha which moderates his dependence on Tamil
Nadu compared to the previous Congress administration; however, the support of
Tamil Nadu in the Rajya Sabha, the Indian parliament’s upper chamber, where BJP
holds only 57 seats, could play a critical role.71
Greater Indian aid flows and trade ties between Sri Lanka and India, especially
in education, can be expected. Within weeks of election, India signed a memorandum
with Sri Lanka to open a cultural centre in Jaffna. This would help to bridge the trust
gap. Boosting up infrastructural development cooperation is crucial since through this
sort of engagements bulk of Chinese aid flows into the region. Sri Lanka’s President first
approached India when seeking to construct a sea port in southern Sri Lanka, which was
not pursued by India and later was accepted by China.72 Therefore, the interests of the
new government would be best served by undertaking a balanced approach aimed to
avoid the overt interventionist tactics. Ultimately, strategic expansion of socioeconomic
cooperation and pressure to implement the Thirteenth Amendment and devolution of
power needs to go hand in hand to put the relationship back on track.73
4.5 Relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives: Fostering Economic
Engagements
The new leadership would pay precise attention to develop relations with
smaller neighbours, like Nepal and Bhutan, by offering economic incentives. Not only
because economic development of these countries are crucial for India’s own growth.
Improved ties with these countries may help to counter Chinese influence in South
Asia. The Prime Minister’s visit to Bhutan, just ahead of China-Bhutan boundary talks, is
indicative that the new government is not willing to lose one of its strongest partners
in the region. India’s promises of economic assistance to Nepal come at a moment
when China has overtaken India as the biggest foreign investor in Nepal in the first
six months of 2014. China’s aid-driven entry in the region must have impacted Delhi’s
priorities. The impression of ‘equal partners’ as offered by PM Modi was certainly
attempted to entice the Himalayan neighbours.74
Daniel Alphonsus, “Modi’s Sweet and Spicy Sri Lanka Strategy”, The Diplomat, available at http://
thediplomat.com/2014/06/modis-sweet-and-spicy-sri-lanka-strategy/, accessed on 20 November 2014.
72
Ved Singh, “India in a South Asian Context: Modi’s Engagement with South Asian Neighbours”, The
National Bureau of Asian Research, available at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=480, accessed
on 21 November 2014.
73
Ibid.
74
Yuba Nath Lamsal, “Beginning of new optimism in Nepal-India relations”, The Weekly Mirror, Nepal, 29
September 2014.
71
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In addition, the river resources that has been a mark of mistrust rather than
means for mutuality, runs through Modi’s agenda. In Bhutan, he laid the foundation
for a 600 megawatt hydroelectric power station and in Nepal discussed a number of
hydropower pacts. Nevertheless, with regard to Nepal, considering the link between
assumption of power by a “rightwing” BJP-led government and support to the Hindu
Right wing forces in Nepal in a post monarch state, explicit religiosity as demonstrated
during the first Nepal visit could send some unwanted signal especially in light of
declaration of secular Nepal and debate of its identity as ‘Hindu Rastra’. To put in words
of C. Raja Mohan, “The potential danger is about India crossing the line between
celebrating the shared religious heritage and blundering into Nepal’s domestic
debate on the role of Hinduism in the construction of the post-monarchical state”.75
Such a debate can destabilise Nepal adding to the volatility of South Asia.
With regard to Maldives, under the Modi Government, there would be
attempts to mend ties with Maldives that happens to have close ties with China. The
Indian Prime Minister expressed his interest to provide higher education opportunities
in India for Maldivian students. Both countries also discussed about increasing
people-to-people connectivity through tourism since, in 2013 Indian tourists visiting
Maldives increased by 20 per cent. India would likely heed the request made by
Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen Gayoom for help in constructing a naval base off
the main island of Male.76
4.6 Regional Mechanism to Expand?
The only regional institution to address the mutual problems of South Asian
countries is SAARC. So far the organisation has achieved far less from what has been
expected. The new leadership in India, however, hinted its willingness to move out
of the shadows of India-Pakistan spat and carry it forward. The election manifesto of
BJP had also unwrapped desire to reinforce regional organisations. In line with its
renewed commitment to the region, the government of India had called for a new
regional bank, a SAARC bank, to support infrastructure financing for trade facilitation
and development. The bank is expected to boost economic development of South
Asia substantially and provide capital for intra-South Asian projects like energy
management, i.e., hydropower. This appears to be an attempt to bring back India as a
central player within South Asia.
With this declaration, there was an expectation of rebalancing in the regional
economic landscape. In addition, the declaration to introduce business visa during
C. Raja Mohan, “The political pilgrim”, The Indian Express, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/
opinion/columns/the-political-pilgrim/99/, accessed on 24 September 2014.
76
Balaji Chandramohan, “India’s Regional Security Strategy under Modi Government”, available at http://
www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1756-india-s-regional-security-strategy-underthe-modi-government.html, accessed on 06 November 2014.
75
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the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu was another step to boost regional trade.77
Desires were also expressed to look into increased coordination of issues like health
and education which is vital to turn the greatest resource of South Asia, i.e., manpower,
into real dividend. Nevertheless, the 18th SAARC summit also lost its way in the IndoPak confrontation. Before the summit, there were three ministerial meetings of energy
ministers, home ministers and cultural ministers which the Pakistani counterparts did
not attend. The summit could not produce intended result since Islamabad did not
endorse two of three agreements for increased road, rail and energy links put forth by
India78, making the expected integration a nightmare. Only the agreement on energy
has been signed. No significant move on fighting terrorism was observed. Narendra
Modi is likely to lead the infrastructural connectivity in SAARC to reduce China’s
influence. Understandably, from Pakistan’s perspective this is a big no-no and that’s
why China’s all-weather friend is opposing seamless travel plans in SAARC.79 All these
echoes that attempts to expand SAARC would remain complicated unless problems
between the two larger neighbours are resolved.
4.7 Continuity or Change?
Scholars of South Asia have often been looking forward to a Europe Union
like engagement in this part of the world. For long there has been desire for common
markets, development of common currency and trade management regimes.
However, considering the strategic thoughts that prevail in the region, the colonial
history, post-colonial state practices and the ever-hostile relations between the two
larger neighbours, people of South Asia has not been fortunate to experience such
a transformation. There seems to be the realisation that an integrated South Asia is
necessary in this interdependent world but there is lack of initiatives to translate the
theory into practice. Irrespective of common stakes there is diverse perception of
threats and security that haunts any efforts to even envision an integrated South Asia.
Undoubtedly, the new government in India made a fresh start no matter
whatever said during the election time. While it seems that there has been a shift
in the posture of India in recent times especially with the euphoric swearing-in
ceremony and follow-up actions, it may not reflect a change in the traditional policies
toward the region. Cooperation with Pakistan is still limited to softer issues and redline being drawn with regard to insurgencies and terrorism. Though it is expected that
soft cooperation will act as catalyst to resolve harder disputes, it is often the case that
harder issues are hampering cooperation on other fronts like connectivity, trade and
tourism. The mango diplomacy, shawl diplomacy as well as cricket diplomacy has not
Rishi Iyengar, “Indian PM Modi Announces New Business Visas for SAARC Nations”, Time, available at
http://time.com/3607012/indian-pm-modi-announces-new-business-visas-for-saarc-nations/, accessed on
26 November 2014.
78
Ibid.
79
“SAARC Diplomacy”, India Today, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/saarc-pm-narendra-modiindia-nepal-pakistan/1/403967.html, accessed on 02 December 2014.
77
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been able to instill the desire for peace between the larger neighbours. In the post
draw-down phase of NATO forces, Afghanistan may get increasingly unstable and
mere help in reconstruction and economic assistance would not do much. Attempts
to develop a forthcoming Bangladesh-India relation has also been slow with only
a limited sign of activism as observed in the land boundary issue. Considering the
potential benefits of improved relationship between Bangladesh and India in terms
of connectivity, economic cooperation and containing insurgent and terrorist forces,
it is time that the new government play proactive role in resolving the long-held
disputes. Sri Lanka, however, is witnessing a bit of alteration in the traditionally overt
interventionist tactics of India that need to be buttressed with extension of socioeconomic cooperation. The realisation of Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives strategic
significance has been reflected in the incumbent government’s priorities.
In addition, continuity rather than change would also result from the fact that
Narendra Modi has carefully chosen his panel of advisers and ministers based on his
personal preferences. Hence, it is difficult to expect that Modi’s pool of advisors and
bureaucrats would be able to break away from conservative instincts. While BJP plans
to include Chief Ministers and other functionaries as equal partners in the decisionmaking structure propagating the concept of ‘Team India’, it should also be noted that
how state actors can sometimes unreasonably complicate relations with neighbours.
For PM Modi and his government, as noted by Harsh V Pant, the biggest challenge
would remain to move away from an overly personalised foreign policy towards
a more institutionalised foreign policy and national security decision-making, a
weakness that previous governments have failed to overcome.
Having noted this, it is also pertinent to bear in mind that every government
has its own flavour, and subtle changes in traditional policy emphasis are inevitable.80
The leadership in India has adopted a new approach to pursue the old objectives.
The newer approach is confirmed by the way attention and precedence is delivered
to the smaller nations; the emphasis is projected through exercise of soft power
emphasising historical ties with countries in areas of religion, culture and prioritising
geo-economics in conduct by offering assistance to improve economic linkages. The
policy of the new government appears to be to woo the neighbouring countries
through revival of civilisational ties, penetrating the countries with economic
diplomatic efforts in line with their developmental needs to strengthen their desire
and adaptability to democratic forms of governments and then form a belt in South
Asia where there will be no fight among the democracies.
At the core of the new government’s strategy of deepening ties with
other South Asian countries is the strategic objective of a stable and peaceful
neighbourhood to further its global aspirations. In fact, a peaceful neighbourhood is a
sine qua non for the realisation of its growth ambitions.81 The creation of ‘web of allies’
80
81
Daniel Alphonsus, op. cit.
Satish Chandra, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, available at http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/
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as propagated in the BJP manifesto, is aimed to limit diplomatic dominance of China
in its backyard. Thus, under the new government, both economic interdependence
and realism would be hallmarks of Indian foreign policy.82 Attempts are designed
to turn India’s image from regional hegemon to regional leader. Consequently, the
present dynamics offers South Asian smaller countries with opportunity to extract
benefits from both India and China following the similar non-alignment posture that
India has played for long.
5.Conclusion
Post-independence India’s foreign policy has been defined more by continuity
than by change. Contemporary Indian foreign policy is focused largely on the
promotion of economic interests, India’s progression to the high table of international
relations and enhancing its security within immediate neighbourhood.83 With regard
to South Asia, India’s immediate strategic backyard, the ‘Modi doctrine’, if one may
say so, seems no different. The Prime Minister has already hinted on undertaking a
vigorous policy centred on greater economic engagement and people-to-people
contacts. The Modi government seems to tie up the loosened connectivity at people’s
level to remind of the cultural bonds of South Asia which is crucial for growing
realisation of shared prosperity.
The sense of shared prosperity is also central to enhance the security
and promote political reconciliation. Through the promotion of geo-economic
advantages, Indian leadership plans to protect geo-strategic objectives. The swearing
in diplomacy was like creating a brand of India; a brand away from hegemonistic
image and to demonstrate acceptance of India within the region. It was to convince
that India has a strong leadership and can take care of its strategic backyard without
external powers’ presence. It was part of New Delhi’s realisation that further flexibility
is required of India to accommodate neighbours.
What the neighbours had been expecting from India is generosity and
magnanimity. Mingling with smaller neighbours is the first step of ‘renounce the path
of violence and take the path of brotherhood’. Nevertheless, the relations are still in its
honeymoon period. It must not be forgotten that Narendra Modi is a nationalist and
pro-business leader. These short term tactical shifts to bring countries of South Asia
in its radar with carrot of economic development and sweetness of ‘equal partnership’
might also unleash as ‘sugar coated hegemony’. Envisioning a better integrated South
Asia may seem lustrous but it is never to forget that the region has always been hard
to characterise and complex to predict.
june/27/india-s-neighbourhood-policy, accessed on 23 November 2014.
82
Ashok Sharma, “What will India’s foreign policy look like under Modi”, available at http://www.sbs.com.
au/news/article/2014/05/17/comment-what-will-indias-foreign-policy-look-under-modi, accessed on 23
November 2014.
83
David M. Malone, op. cit.
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Abul Kalam Azad
Md. Fazlul Halim
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: FINDING OUT ITS HUMAN SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS
Abstract
Humanitarian intervention based on the idea called ‘The Responsibility to
Protect (R2P)’ leaves little room for controversy because such intervention is
meant to save populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In effect, the R2P is a step by step process for dealing
with an internal conflict with significant security implications. It is a composite
whole of three elements and each of which tries to deal with an internal conflict
with due consideration to security at three levels, i.e., human security at the
national level, regional security and international security. In view of the fact that
contemporary world witnesses, till to date, many internal conflicts of various
nature, intervention in such cases, henceforth, should be guided by the spirit
of R2P. This would enable the conflicts to find their respective end in a peaceful
and non-violent manner in consonance with international laws and norms. The
paper attempts to study the various elements of R2P from a comprehensive
security perspective with recommendation for its application in all future
internal conflicts including the current one in Syria.
1.Introduction
Humanitarian intervention as a political phenomenon has been a controversial
issue whether it is implemented or not. Much of the controversy, however, seems
to have faded away when humanitarian intervention has been looked upon as a
mechanism in conjunction with the idea called ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’, initiated
by the Canadian government in September 2000. Efforts towards promulgation
of such an idea were rendered in response to international community’s failure to
save populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. All such heinous acts were perpetrated in several conflict-ridden countries,
in particular during the post-Cold War period. In view of the fact that most of these
conflicts were intra-state in nature, the normal procedure for resolving international
conflict as enshrined in the UN Charter was not applicable in these cases. As a result,
Abul Kalam Azad, PhD, is Professor at the Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University,
Savar, Dhaka. His e-mail address is: azadmmm@yahoo.com
Md. Fazlul Halim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar
University, Savar, Dhaka. His e-mail address is: fhrana_du@yahoo.com. Currently, he is pursuing his Master’s
degree in Mass Media and Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK.
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.
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ways and means were to be devised to respond to various intra-state conflicts or, in
other words, what is called internal conflicts.
A dispassionate analysis of various internal conflicts quite clearly reveals the
fact that it is the total failure in maintaining internal human security conditions of
the people that lies at the base of all internal conflicts. Since deterioration in human
security conditions causes adverse effects on regional and international security,
internal conflicts are, therefore, deemed to be detrimental to security system at three
levels, i.e., national, regional and international. It is with this consideration in view that
humanitarian intervention has been crafted to forestall the degradation of three-tier
security system through certain measures. All such measures are incorporated in the
concept of R2P. It should be mentioned that the R2P is preventive in nature. It takes
cognizance of the fact that if a conflict arises due to the failure in human security
system, it is better to rectify the wrongs committed in the affected countries before
actually taking any punitive step against them. R2P, in effect, creates conditions for a
conflict-ridden country to look forward to the future, not only from its internal human
security, but also from regional and international security perspective.
In view of the above, the paper seeks to study that R2P driven humanitarian
intervention tries to deal with internal conflict through a comprehensive security
approach. As mentioned earlier, security, in this connection is at three levels, i.e.,
human security at national level, regional security and international security. The
paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. The second
section is an attempt to explain as to why humanitarian intervention is needed to
address the problems associated with an internal conflict. The third section seeks
to find out the measures and procedures through which humanitarian intervention
seeks to address the security complexities as generated by an internal conflict. The
fourth section attempts to prognosticate the future of humanitarian intervention for
meeting the challenges as posed by the internal conflicts of various nature. Finally,
the paper ends with a conclusion.
The paper is based on empirical and analytical understanding of various
facets of security and their linkages with R2P based humanitarian intervention.
Research materials such as books, journals, newspapers, electronic media, etc. have
been utilised for undertaking the research.
2.
Internal Conflict and the Raison d’être of Humanitarian Intervention
At the outset, it should be mentioned that it is the internal conflict rather than
international conflict that invites humanitarian intervention due to few peculiarities
that the former type of conflict exhibits. Although the presence of internal conflicts
has been observed since the very inception of the modern state system, nonetheless,
their occurrence in great number with fierce intensity is mostly observed in the post-
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Cold War period. With the end of the Cold War, a great expectation that peace dividend
would be enjoyed by the international community in perpetuity somewhat became
a chimera when various internal conflicts took place with their destabilising effects
on national, regional and international security. In terms of origin and their resulting
effects, internal conflicts perplexed the international community to the extent that
new measures are needed in order to respond to such conflicts. Towards this end, the
naissance of humanitarian intervention was found to be the most logical answer. This
section of the paper attempts to deal with the nature and characteristics of an internal
conflict in order to examine the ground that they create for inviting humanitarian
intervention. A brief description of humanitarian intervention will also find its place
in the paper.
In the post-Cold War period, internal conflict has been baptised as such like
intra-state conflict, new wars, non-international conflict, wars in the post-Cold War
era and ethnic conflicts. For the purpose of the paper, internal conflict or intra-state
conflict would be used interchangeably. The concept of internal conflict has been
defined in various ways. The paper prefers to cite the opinions of two distinguished
authors in the field, one by Michael E. Brown and the other by Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz.
Michael E. Brown defines an internal conflict as, “By “internal conflict”, we mean
violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily
to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or
threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state”.1 In a similar
vein, Muzaffar Ercan Yilmaz defines an internal conflict in the following words, “A
non-international (internal) armed conflict refers to a situation of violence involving
protracted armed confrontations between government forces and one or more
organized armed groups, or between such groups themselves, arising on the territory
of a state”.2 Examples of internal conflict include violent power struggles involving
civilian or military leaders, armed ethnic conflicts and secessionist campaigns,
challenges by criminal organisations to state sovereignty, armed ideological struggles,
and revolutions.3 “The level of violence can range from low-level terrorist campaigns
to sustained guerrilla insurgencies to all-out war or genocide. In most cases, the key
actors are governments and rebel groups, but when state structures are weak or nonexistent, groups of various kinds fight among themselves in a Hobbesian universe of
their own”.4
It is, therefore, evident that an internal conflict differs from an international
conflict not only in spatial and conflict parties terms, it has, rather, other problematic
characteristics unseen in case of an international conflict. These characteristics
Michael E. Brown, “Introduction” in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,
Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, 1996, p. 1.
2
Muzzafar Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-state Conflicts in the Post-Cold War", International Journal on World Peace,
Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2007.
3
Michael E. Brown, op. cit.
4
Harry Eckstein, “Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War” in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal
War: Problems and Approaches, New York: Free Press, 1964.
1
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ultimately drive an intra-state conflict towards a course that defies, in most cases, all
peaceful means of conflict management and conflict resolution. It is, thus, pertinent
to delve into such characteristics in a manner as brief as possible.
First, the occurrence of an internal conflict is very abrupt and erratic. Such
type of conflict normally does not have precise beginning and ending. It does not
start with a declaration of war. The spatial coverage of an internal conflict is not fixed,
and as a result it is devoid of definitive battlefields. An internal conflict lacks decisive
campaigns and formal endings.5
Second, it is difficult to draw a time framework of an intra-state conflict.
Normally, it is protracted in nature and can last for decades. During the period of
conflict, episodes of fierce fighting may alternate with times of relative peace. This
makes the boundary between war and peace quite blurry both in time and across
space.6
Third, there are differences in modes of warfare in case of an internal conflict. It
is fought by loosely knit groups of ‘regulars’ and ‘irregulars’, soldiers, rebels and civilians,
local warlords, cadres and paramilitaries and not by two (or more) conventional clearcut national armies.7
Fourth, an internal conflict is generally supported by outside sources. The
support may come from overseas diaspora, lobby groups or foreign mercenaries.
Such type of conflict is sustained by global networks of trade, outside emergency
assistance and the parallel economy.8
Fifth, an internal conflict has, in all likelihood, the possibility of getting itself
transformed into either a regional conflict or an international one for the following
reasons: (a) the flow of refugees across borders;9 (b) the use of the territory of
neighbouring states for shipment of arms and supplies; (c) posing a threat to the
interests of distant powers and international organisations; (d) excessive dependence on
diaspora for financial and political support; and finally (e) threatening and undermining
international law, international norms of behaviour and international order.
Jole Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2012.
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Refugees, for example, often flee across international borders in larger numbers: at the height of the
genocidal slaughter in Rwanda in 1994, 250,000 Rwandans fled into Tanzania in a single day. Over the
course of just a few months, an estimated 2 million people fled from Rwanda to Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi;
none of these countries was in a position to provide adequately for a sudden influx of needy people. At
a minimum, refugees impose heavy economic burdens on host states, and they can pose political and
security problems as well. Cited in Michael E. Brown, op. cit., p. 6-7.
5
6
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Finally, an inter-state conflict causes tremendous suffering in terms of loss of
life and property. This is because violence with which an internal conflict is associated
is normally intense due to the involvement of various rebel groups, ethnic factions,
guerillas, insurgents and the like. All these groups fight among themselves, as stated
earlier, in a ‘Hobbesian world of their own’.10
The last point that evokes humanitarian question is relevant for the paper.
Needless to mention, the atrocities and crimes committed in case of an internal conflict
have been found to surpass even those of an international conflict of conventional
nature. As Michael E. Brown aptly remarks, “In most internal conflicts, the stakes are
high and fighting is vicious. Internal conflict often involves direct, deliberate attacks on
civilians. Conflicts over control of territory frequently escalate into military campaigns
designed to drive out or kill civilians from rival groups. Intimidation, assassination, rape,
forced expulsion, and systematic slaughter are commonly employed instruments. The
numbers of people displaced or killed in such conflicts are often counted in tens and
hundreds of thousands, and sometimes even in millions. In the most extreme cases –
in Bosnia since 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, for example – genocide is carried out”.11
Perhaps, more ominous is the fact that killing/massacre or other atrocious acts are not
only committed by the non-state actors but as well by the state authority that itself
perpetrates such acts against its own citizens. As David Dykes observes, “… in the 20th
century alone 262 million people were killed by their own governments: six times more
than the number of people killed in battle with foreign governments”.12
A report published by the UN under the title ‘Human Rights and Conflicts: A
UN Priority’ depicts a more agonising picture of humanitarian crisis as observed in case
of intra-state conflicts. It says, “The number of conflict-ridden deaths is only a small
indication of the tremendous amount of suffering, displacement and devastation
caused by conflicts. Assaults on the fundamental right to life are widespread –
massacre, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, execution of prisoners and starvation of
entire populations. Torture is common in internal conflicts, as are measures restricting
people’s freedom of movement – forcible relocations, mass expulsions, denial of the
right to seek asylum or the right to return to one’s home. Women and girls are raped
by soldiers and forced into prostitution, and civilians are abducted to serve as soldiers.
Tens of thousands of people detained in connection with conflicts ‘disappear’ each
year, normally killed or buried in secret, leaving their families with the torment of not
knowing their fate. Thousands of others are arbitrarily imprisoned and never brought
to trial or if they are, are subject to grossly unfair procedures. Homes, schools and
hospitals are deliberately destroyed. Relief convoys, which try to assist civilians by
providing humanitarian aid are attacked”.13
Harry Eckstein, op. cit.
Michael E. Brown, op. cit., p. 3.
12
David Dykes, "In the post 9/11 era is the ‘Responsibility to Protect' irrelevant?", available at http://www.eir.info?p=2109, accessed on 20 October 2013.
13
"Human Rights and Conflicts: A UN Priority", available at www.un.org//rights/HR Today/hr.conflict.htm,
accessed on 12 August 2013.
10
11
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Beginning from the early nineties, the atrocities and war crimes as observed
in various internal conflicts, in particular in the continent of Africa, took the entire
international community by surprise. Soon a concern for human rights and its
promotion heightened at the international level, propelled further by globalisation
and rapid advancement in information and communication technology. Meanwhile,
rapid changes in international relations following the end of the Cold War led many
quarters to think about direct military intervention in the newly erupted intra-state
conflicts with or without the UN Security Council authorisation. Eventually, there
arose a heated debate over the issue of humanitarian intervention with respect to
its legality and practicality. Finally, the debate subsided with the emergence of the
concept of R2P in successive phases. Thus, one notices, following the end of the 1991
Gulf War, French Foreign Minister Ronald Dumas opined about direct intervention in
the following words, “The international community had a right to intervene to alleviate
human suffering caused by repression, civil disorder, inter-state conflict or natural
disasters”.14 The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his address to the 54th session of
the UN General Assembly in 1999, cited the failures of the UN Security Council to act
promptly in Rwanda and Kosovo and invoked the member states of the UN to “find
common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defense
of our common humanity”. He warned that “if the collective conscience of humanity
cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that
it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice”.15 A year later, he in his Millennium
Report to the General Assembly expressed his dilemma in the following words, “if
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
would we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations
of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”.16
A solution to the dilemma faced by the UN authority was given in a report
published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) in 2000 under the initiative of the Canadian government. The report
incorporated a new idea called ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) rather than the
‘right to intervene’.17 The R2P redefines humanitarian intervention as a responsibility
(first, of the state concerned, and failing that, of the international community), and
not a right (of outsiders, however, may they represent the international community
at large).18 The report considers the phrase ‘right to intervene’ unhelpful, because it
stresses ‘the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states’
over ‘the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of action’, and because it fails
Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt Campbell, “Military Humanitarianism”, Survival, Vol. 33, No. 5, SeptemberOctober, 1991, p. 452.
15
"The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty", ICISS Report, Ottawa, International Development Center, December 2001.
16
Ibid.
17
The Responsibility to Protect, available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp, accessed on 06 July 2013.
18
Amitav Acharya, “Refining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention”, Australian Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, p. 374-74, cited in Mohammad Ismail Hossain, “State Sovereignty and
Humanitarian Intervention : Does One Negate the Other?”, BIISS Papers 22, September 2006, p. 89.
14
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to capture the broader tasks of prevention and follow-up peace building that must
accompany intervention”.19
One of the most prominent features of the report is its assertion that
humanitarian intervention is to be ‘an exceptional and extraordinary’ measure. As
stated in the basic principles of the ICISS, “Where a population is suffering serious
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state
in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect”.20 The report considers two kinds
of event for conducting intervention: “where there is a large-scale loss of life – with
or without genocide intent – that results from deliberate state action or the massive
failure of state structures; and where there is a large-scale ethnic cleansing carried out
by means of killing, rape, torture, or mass expulsion.”21
Intense diplomatic efforts were needed to recognise the R2P as a new political
concept. It is after six years that the idea was duly endorsed by the UN Security Council
Resolution 1674 in 2006. Earlier in 2005, the issue was placed in the UN sponsored
World Summit before the representatives of nearly 170 countries who consented
to the idea almost unconditionally. In 2008, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
appointed Assistant Secretary-General Edward Luck as his Special Adviser for R2P.
Finally, in 2009, the UN General Assembly renewed its commitment to R2P through
a resolution titled ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the first resolution on R2P formalising
international commitment to the concept.
3.
Humanitarian Intervention: Facing the Security Challenges
Since the end of World War II, few instruments like the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948) and the Geneva Conventions (1949) sought to bring a halt
to further genocide, war crimes and all sorts of crimes against humanity across the
globe. In most cases, such promises were, however, not fulfilled to the expectation of
the international community. As observed, during the period of the Cold War, the two
superpowers supported, in an almost unbridled manner, various protracted conflicts
in the Third World to preserve their respective geo-strategic, security and economic
interests. The end of the Cold War witnessed even more serious conflicts, for example in
Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Congo etc. As a result, as Ilicole-Ann Hardwick
remarks, “ In the late 1990s, debates about crisis prevention and response increasingly
began to concentrate on the security of the individual and the community, rather
than merely the state – human security. It was in this context that the ICISS first
presented its report on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in 2001. The traditional, narrow
perception of security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of
Ibid.
ICISS Report, op. cit.
21
Ibid.
19
20
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ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives. The ICISS focused on what it
perceived as new security challenges in 21st century, including international terrorism,
international conflicts, weak state structures and increased vulnerability of civilians”.22
It is, therefore, the paradigmatic shift in the concept of security from a
traditional one to a comprehensive one that lies at the epicentre of the R2P doctrine.
In this connection, R2P seeks to address the security deficit that creates and sustains a
conflict with all its perverse effects on human security and consequently on national,
regional and international security. This section of the paper, therefore, purports to
study the three basic elements of R2P and then examine how they are related to
security in general and to human security in particular. The three elements are: (i) the
responsibility to prevent; (II) the responsibility to react and (iii) the responsibility to
rebuild.
3.1 The Responsibility to Prevent
The responsibility to prevent is a human security driven concept. As indicated
earlier, the R2P envisages that a conflict is caused mainly due to human security
deficit in a particular country, in other words, due to malfunctioning of a state in its
political, economic, social and cultural spheres. As a result, the R2P suggests certain
political, economic, social, cultural, legal and military reforms for a conflict-ridden
country to redress the wrongs committed in the past and to forestall the repetition
of the conflict in the future. As one scholar puts it, “Effective prevention must address
the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises
putting populations at risks”.23 Before actually taking the measures, the R2P suggests
an early warning system through which the causes and effects of a conflict need to
be brought to attention. For effective prevention, ‘there has to be knowledge of the
fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it – so called early warning.’ Early
warning demands a continuous rigorous programme of research and analysis on the
conflict to be dealt with. What then are wrongs committed and how do they impinge
on human security? The answer to the question needs an enquiry into the real causes
of an internal conflict with their consequences for human security.
Volumes of literature exist on the theme called ‘human security’. All existing
ideas and viewpoints with respect to human security unequivocally indicate that
the concept has emerged out of the paradigmatic shift from traditional security to
a comprehensive one. While the former relates to an excessive state-centric notion
of territorial security from military-defense angle, the latter includes within its fold a
wide range of issues related to the wellbeing and safety of the people. Towards this
"Can the doctrine of the R2P make the world more secure?", available at www.e.-ir.info/2012/0815/canthe-doctrine-of-the-R2P-make -the-world- more-secure, accessed on 15 July 2013.
23
Ijaz Khan, “Humanitarian and Military Intervention and the Role of the United Nations: The Responsibility
to Protect" in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.), Humanitarian, Preventive, Punitive and Political Intervention and State
Sovereignty: Varying Political, Moral and Legal Standpoints, University of Karachi: B.C.C. & T Press, 2010, p. 16.
22
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end, human security, in comprehensive sense, includes protection of human being
not only from traditional military threats but also from a variety of economic, social,
ethnic, epidemiological and environment threats.24 A plethora of definitions with
respect to human security can be cited to show how the concept is being broadened
day by day to include a variety of issues that many feel should come within the
province of human security. The paper, however, does not intend to deal with them
other than focusing on the definition as given by Mahbub-ul-Huq in the widely known
United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report of 1994 where he
defines human security as: (a) safety from chronic threats to humans such as hunger,
diseases and repression; and (b) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in
people’s lives – whether in jobs, homes or communities.25 In other words, the key
premises of human security are ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. There is
no gainsaying that while attempts at conceptualisation and theorisation of security
continues to remain in vogue, the two above stated premises of human security are
universally accepted by now. The UNDP report identified seven dimensions of human
security and the emerging threats posed to them. They are: (i) Economic Security
(poverty, homelessness); (ii) Food Security (hunger); (iii) Health Security (inadequate
health care, diseases); (iv) Environmental Security (degradation, pollution, natural
disasters); (v) Personal Security (physical violence, crime, traffic accidents); (vi)
Community Security (oppression, disintegration and discrimination); (vii) Political
Security (repression, torture, disappearance, human rights violations).26
The ‘fear factor’ in symbiosis with the ‘want factor’ of a number of conflict-ridden
countries goes to depict negative human security scenarios in most of these countries.
The ‘fear factor’ is created by the inability of a state authority to keep its citizens free
from state repression, discriminatory policies, breakdown of law and order situation,
diseases, natural disasters etc., whereas the ‘want factor’ is created by hunger, poverty,
homelessness, unemployment, inaccessibility to resources etc. In this connection, it
is relevant to touch upon certain causes of an internal conflict that bring about the
above stated distresses in a given polity. By looking through few of post-Cold War
internal conflicts, Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz reaches the conclusion that "such conflicts are
correlated with, but not limited to, the desire to express cultural identity, discrimination,
anti-democratic political system, economic underdevelopment and unjust distribution
of national wealth, unresolved past traumas, as well as external support".27 A very
exhaustive and succinct explanation of the causes of an internal conflict has been
provided by Michael E. Brown. He cited the causes in the following manner:
Human Security, Center for Global Partnership, available at http://w.w.w.cgp.org/cgplink/programs/
security priorities.html, accessed on 04 April 2002.
25
Manzoor Ahmed. “Human Security: The Perspective of Children and Women in South Asia” in Ramesh
Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (eds), South Asia: Problems Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable
Development, and Good Governance, New York: UN University Press, 2004, p. 296.
26
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995, pp. 24-25.
27
Muzaffar Ercan Yilmaz, op. cit.
24
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Underlying Causes of an Internal Conflict
Structural Factors
Political Factors
Weak States
Discriminatory
Political
Institutions
Exclusionary
National Ideologies
Inter-group
Politics
Elite Politics
Intra-state
Security Concerns
Ethnic
Geography
Economic/ Social
Factors
Economic
Problems
Discriminatory
Economic
Systems
Modernisation
Cultural/
Perceptional Factors
Patterns of
Cultural
Discrimination
Problematic
Group Histories
Michael E. Brown, however, opines that weak state structures are the starting
point for many analyses of internal conflict. He remarks, “Some states are born weak.
Many of the states that were carved out of colonial empires in Africa and Southeast
Asia, for example, were artificial constructs. They lacked legitimacy, politically
sensible borders, and political institutions capable of exercising meaningful control
over the territory placed under their nominal supervision. The same can be said of
many states created out of the rubble of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The vast
majority of these new entities came into existence with only the most rudimentary
political institutions in place”.28 In consequence, the leadership in most of these postcolonial states has been marked by failure to develop their political, social, economic,
cultural and environmental systems in an effective and sustainable manner. Certain
conditions like disorganisation, lawlessness, dislocation, insecurity of the minority
religious and ethnic community, decomposition, breakdowns, anarchy, regression
etc. began to prevail in all such realms. In the circumstances, the fragile policies of
the leaders in power were simply found incapable of constructing a stable, enduring
and sustainable state systems in order to deliver few human security goods to the
citizens, i.e., personal security, economic opportunity, education, health services,
environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order, judicial system, fundamental
infra-structural requirements etc. As Robert I. Rothberg remarks, "such states honoured
these obligations in the breach".29 Eventually, in such polities, the pockets of dissension
were caused mainly by the aggrieved sentiment of an overall deprivation in the daily
national life. In many cases, these states turned out to be what many authors term as
collapsed states, weak states, failed states, disruptive states, quasi states etc.
From the security perspective, the states with distresses and deplorable
order have been found to affect regional security, and hence international security. In
almost all cases, it has been found that (i) there has been the disruption of legitimate
commerce and rise of illegal one, best referred to as ‘black market and gray economy’.
28
29
Michael E. Brown, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
Robert I. Rothberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, The Washington Quarterly, Summer, 2002, p. 90.
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This form of economic disengagement has not only undercut the state but has also
very adversely affected the economies of neighbouring countries; (ii) refugees in
neighbouring countries constituted a security threat in the asylum state and served
as recruiting grounds for armed rebels and militias who further escalated threats to
regional security; (iii) coupled with the rise of illegitimate commerce and the refugee
situation is the emergence of warlords politics for determining the distribution of
wealth, control of illegal commerce, the forging of alliance among fellow warlords,
the control of activities either to threaten regional security or to invite external
intervention; (iv) the emergence of warlords and their control over illegitimate
commerce has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which further
escalated armed violence in existing and new forms of conflict; (v) the condition of
vulnerability to internal and external disruption has been openly exposed. This is
best observed in case of Colombia where the state failing has been exploited by the
criminal elements; (vi) there has been outright challenge to human rights regimes
due to its egregious violation in case of women and children.30
3.2 The Responsibility to React
The responsibility to react envisages measures against a target state short
of military intervention. This aspect of R2P may be viewed as a cautionary approach
towards conflict and peace. In a series of episodes beginning from the early 1990s, there
has been a serious circumscription of sovereignty in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq,
the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia and elsewhere on the
pretext of restoring human rights. Some of the episodes involved military action called
‘humanitarian intervention’ endorsed by the UN or another international organisation
but without the consent of the government of the target state. More menacing were
the so-called humanitarian interventions in some sovereign countries without the UN
Security Council’s endorsement. The US bombing of Iraq in 1999, NATO’s intervention
in Kosovo also in 1999 and the unilateral US attack on Iraq (2003) are cases in point. In
particular, the US aggression in Iraq (2003) evoked the fear worldwide that any state
could be targeted by the US, if it was in the latter’s interest to do so.31
Various hard-core measures like preemptive attack, unilateral intervention,
direct intervention without a UN Security Council mandate could do very little
either to arrest a conflict or guarantee peace after the end of the conflict. Instead, R2P
suggests certain soft measures like arms embargo, economic sanctions, severing of
diplomatic relations and travel restriction. This step is somewhat akin to the idea as
enshrined in Article 41 of the UN Charter where it has been stated that the Security
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
Abul Kalam Azad, “Collapsed State in Contemporary International Politics”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1,
January 2003, pp.1-48.
31
Abul Kalam Azad, “The Impact of Post 9/11 International Developments on State Sovereignty: A
Bangladesh Perspective”, in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.), op. cit., p. 140.
30
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“United Nations” to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
This soft approach has its impact on the target state and as well as on the
international community. As far as the target state is concerned, due to various
international pressures, it may be compelled to control the intensity of conflict and
find out possible means for restoring peace. If the state itself is the repressive agent,
then the task often becomes easy, whereas in case of a conflict where several actors
are involved, such international pressure may have a sobering effect on them. In
particular, the warring factions may become uncertain about future flow of arms or
any other assistance to their hand from the sources, both regional and international.
For the international community, the cautionary approach as envisaged by the R2P
has some of its positive implications. That the conflict is not encountered through any
outright show of force creates a scope for peace and stability in the region where the
conflict is in occurrence. Moreover, the step is in conformity with international law
where the conflicting parties are given an opportunity to cease their conflict under
international pressure.
If the punitive measures, short of military intervention do not work, the R2P
then allows prompt use by the Secretary General of his authority under Article 99
of the UN Charter to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which
in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
Such stance by the Secretary General, in all likelihood, transmits a message to the
target state that its failure to resolve the conflict would ultimately lead to external
intervention of military nature.
In effect, the R2P looks upon military intervention with caution as such action
sometimes goes to aggravate a conflict situation with dire consequences for national,
regional and international security. As per the R2P, military intervention for human
protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary measure.
It is only justifiable when undertaken for halting or averting large scale killing or
expulsion of human beings, either through deliberate state action, state neglect or
inability of the state to act. Failed states are particularly prone to such situations.
In order that a military intervention does not engage itself in ‘excesses’, R2P
has certain prescriptions in the greater interest of peace and security. Thus, in case of a
military intervention, the intervening state or organisation must consider the following:
a. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention must be to
halt or avert human suffering. Sincerity of intention is better assured in
collective or multilateral operations, supported by regional opinion, as
well as the victims.
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b. Last resort: All non-military options for the prevention or peaceful
resolution of the crisis must first be explored and exhausted.
c. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be in proportion to the situation.
d. Reasonable prospects: It should be weighed whether the consequences
of the action are likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction, in
which case the idea of taking action should be dropped.
e. Right authority: The authorisation of the Security Council should
be sought prior to any military intervention. The task is not to find
alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make
the Security Council work better.32
3.3 The Responsibility to Rebuild
The R2P has been invested with the element called ‘the responsibility to
rebuild’ mainly for the purpose of peace and security. After having experienced the
traumas of an internal conflict, a target state may, indeed, feel insecure even after the
end of conflict. In other words, there is no guarantee that sudden end of a conflict
would usher in permanent peace and security in the future. This concern evokes the
question of peace building from the sole perspective of security.
The UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee defines peace building as:
“peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing
or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict
management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.
Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the
country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully
prioritized, sequenced and therefore, relatively narrow set of activities aimed at
achieving the above objectives”33
Sustainable peace and development, as envisaged by peace building
essentially emphasise on developing a security system that would prevent societies
from falling back into violent struggle again. Such a security system entails restoring
human security at the forefront which is to be realised through an all round
development and reconstruction. As Johan Galtung remarks, "peace building should
address the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socioeconomic reconstruction and development".34 Development should be such that both
Ijaz Khan, op. cit., pp.18-19.
Peace building and the UN, The UN Peace Building Support Office, UN.
34
Cited in Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1999, p. 187.
32
33
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the want and fear factors of human security disappear in a manner so as not to allow
insecurity prevail among the general masses long affected by conflict. Peace building,
thus, suggests measures like disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in order
to reinstate a feeling of security among the conflict affected people.
In effect, sustainability of peace as advocated through peace building is
conditional upon certain elements like:
3.3.1
Restoration of Human Rights
If security is considered the prerequisite for post-conflict peace building,
then restoration of human rights is the fundamental factor to catapult it. All victims of
conflict must be ensured their respective human rights as per international standard.
This means providing people with food, health, education, housing, protection of
the family, democracy, participation, the rule of law, protection against enslavement,
torture, cruelty, inhumane treatment or punishment. It should be mentioned that
there is an inevitable correlation between restoration of human rights and human
security as human dignity and welfare is a fundamental point in both the cases.
Both human security and human rights establish a link among individual, national
and international security. In case of human security: individual security, national
security and international security are interlinked. In case of human rights, the same
is corroborated by clause 28 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which
states "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights
recognized in the Declaration can be realized".
3.3.2 Justice and Social Cohesion
The people in a post-conflict situation should be guaranteed justice in all
walks of their life. The judicial system should be effective and operational one with
well functioning court and police systems. "There is a direct relationship between
violence and state collapse and injustice. It is vital to rebuild institutions and societies
on a just basis and to reject the argument that justice is a luxury that can be stalled
until the return of full peace and harmony".35 If people are given the opportunity to
live in a just society, then reconciliation would automatically prevail among different
groups, ethnic communities, tribes and clans. This would ultimately bring cohesion
in the society thereby allowing the people to enjoy community and group rights as
demanded by human security.
35
Ijaz Khan, op. cit., p. 19.
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3.3.3 Rule of Law
The rule of law is prescribed by R2P through peace building. It means
undertaking framework of rules and rights that make prosperous and fair societies
possible. It is a system in which no one, including government, is above the law; where
laws protect fundamental rights, and where justice is accessible to all. The rule of law
is, in fact, a composite package containing the elements that securitise an individual in
the society. These elements are: limited governmental powers, absence of corruption,
maintenance of order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory
enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, informal justice etc.
4.
Humanitarian Intervention: What lies Ahead?
Humanitarian intervention, on the basis of R2P, does not lead to an
infringement of sovereignty of a target state as many would understand. Rather, the
R2P entrusts the responsibility of safeguarding the population of a conflict inflicted
country from all sorts of criminal acts on the international community. This is because
the target country fails to protect its people from want and fear.
As mentioned in previous discussion, the R2P is a step by step process for
dealing with a conflict. It does not prescribe outright military intervention in the
first place. Military intervention enters the scene when all possible peaceful means
of resolving a conflict are exhausted. The relevant question now is: what then is
the political future of R2P? This section of the paper is an attempt to delve into this
question.
It should be mentioned that ever since the time, the concept of R2P has
been floated, it has not remained above controversy on few counts, for instance,
(i) the developing countries have looked upon it as a rationalisation for unwanted
interference in their internal affairs. It has evoked the feeling among the developing
countries that they have been relegated to the role of norm-seekers, while the five
permanent members of the Security Council (P5) would continue as norm enforces.
As historical records suggest, most of these powers have interventionist tendencies,
and they look for pretexts, whether strong or lame, for intervening in the affairs of the
poor and underdeveloped countries. As Stephen Krasner argues, “the recent upsurge
in intervention is nothing new – great powers have always acted in concert and taken
an interest … in the internal affairs of weaker states … The international community
lacks resources for doing so effectively”36; (ii) a number of interventions in both pre and
post 9/11 periods do not clearly show the humanitarian intent involved. The majority
of such interventions have been driven by the interests of the intervening state
rather than by a desire to help suffering humanity; (iii) there has been a great deal of
"Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention", available at http//d3.zeso.com/
jsc/d3/ff3/ff2.html?n;C=9/4/1;s=13;w=728;h=90, accessed on 02 February 2013.
36
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disagreement over the degree of responsibility states have to prevent humanitarian
crises in other states, and to what extent would sovereignty be conditional.37
Despite controversy or reservation with respect to R2P, the fact remains that
R2P which has been designed to respond to internal conflicts will continue to have
its validity in the days to come. Some of the factors in support of this assertion are as
follows:
First, many Third World states are still fragile and groaning under political,
economic and social instability and unrest. These states need administrative structure
with infrastructural power to acquire their respective state capacity. In contemporary
world, state weakness cannot continue to remain a permanent phenomenon as it
ultimately leads to conflict with serious implications for peace and stability in the
geographical segment where it takes place. Needless to mention, there are still many
conflict spots around the globe, many of which are half-resolved or are still awaiting
resolution sooner or later. In the continent of Africa, many peacekeeping operations
are currently being undertaken with the sole intent of ending various internal
conflicts. This goes to demonstrate that internal conflicts are still present in the world
and that there is no guarantee about their absence in the future. Taking the example
of Syria, one notices that a country which anticipated itself to be immune from the
‘Tunisia effect’ got entangled in a state of civil war and that any prospect of recovery
seems to be highly unlikely within a short period of time. For the last 30 months, the
world witnessed rising death toll, displacement of millions and the fading prospect of
‘Damascus Spring’ in Syria. The situation got further complex when the international
community observed the use of chemical weapons upon Syrian civilians thereby
further heightening the worldwide apprehension about the future course of conflict
in the country. Many circles believe that if R2P can be applied in case of Syria, the
conflict, perhaps, can go near to a solution.
Second, the current international system marked by unipolarity, structural
conflict between the North and the South, increasing pace of globalisation in favour
of the richer nations, the West’s craving for resources located in the Third World,
marginalisation of the poor and underdeveloped nations in international trade and
commerce etc. do not favour the weaker or those nations that are on the way of
development. More frustrating is the fact that their hope and aspiration for world
peace and stability under the aegis of the UN have been shaken to a great extent
following the US invasion of Iraq without any UN mandate. The credibility that the
world body attained in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis seems to have eroded by now,
and the Third World remains increasingly doubtful and skeptical about the prospects
for conflict management or resolution either through any regional organisation or
the UN.38 In the circumstances, the viability of R2P is well recognised as it provides an
Abul Kalam Azad, "The Impact of Post 9/11 International Developments on State Sovereignty: A
Bangladesh Perspective", in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), op. cit., pp. 141-142.
38
Abul Kalam Azad, "Collapsed State in Contemporary International Relations", op. cit., pp. 47-48.
37
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opportunity for the weak states to act on their own politically, economically, socially,
culturally and morally. The R2P is a security oriented concept and its application in
case of a conflict may not necessarily need military intervention as discussed earlier.
Third, despite the fact that the primary responsibility for responding to
internal conflicts lies within the affected states, nonetheless, there are few factors that
dictate that outsiders are inevitably involved in internal conflicts and that they play a
vital role in such cases. First, the sources of many internal conflicts lie outside as inside
the state. "The international community in its various guises is often responsible for
the conflict in the first place".39 Second, due to increasing interdependence internal
conflicts affect the interests of regional neighbours and beyond. Third, in case of
internal conflicts, the magnitude of human suffering is very large and that media
transparency makes it difficult for outside governments to watch and see such events
without doing nothing. Fourth, nearly all studies agree that many protracted conflicts
can only be resolved when outside resources are brought to bear.40 This externality of
a conflict can best be managed through the mechanism of R2P.
5.Conclusion
In contemporary world, the resurgence of internal conflicts as a possibility can
not be ruled out for a number of reasons taken up for discussion above. As a result, the
R2P retains its relevance in the future. Any human intervention based on a philosophy
of R2P leaves no room for doubt and suspicion as the R2P does not advocate outright
military intervention or any kind of physical interference in the first place. As has been
discussed, the R2P looks at the entire conflict spectrum from the angle of security. Its
three broad elements try to restore the internal security conditions on a solid basis
so as not to allow any internal conflict to take place with its dire consequences for
national, regional and international security. What the R2P wants is to pave the way
for a state to be strong enough to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity on
the one hand, and develop an all round security structure, on the other.
Meanwhile, all states with weak political, economic, social and cultural
structures must develop themselves in a sustainable manner so that human
security conditions of the general masses are satisfactorily guaranteed. Any failure
in maintaining a viable human security at home sows the seeds of conflict and all
types of violent acts. The current crisis in Syria is a reminder of the fact that an internal
crisis when it is factional in nature is difficult to solve internally. So Syria can be a
laboratory where the international community can test the effectiveness of R2P in
order to prevent the civilians from want and fear. Moreover, the very use of chemical
weapons on the civilians by the Syrian authority amounts to some kind of genocide to
which the R2P, as many opine, could have been a practical response.
39
40
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 33.
Ibid.
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Mohammad Atique Rahman
TRIPS-Plus as a Tool for Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights: Implications for Developing Countries
Abstract
An enormous proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has been explicitly
evident in recent years especially due to a reaction to the slow and disruptive
process of trade negotiations in the multilateral forum i.e., the World Trade
Organization (WTO). These FTAs now adopt Trade Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)-Plus provisions that include new areas of Intellectual Property (IP)
rights protection and implementation of more extensive levels of IP standards
beyond WTO TRIPS’s requirements, particularly in terms of elimination of
options and flexibilities available under the WTO TRIPS. TRIPS-Plus provisions
are conceived as stringent IP provisions aiming to harmonise global IP standards
and enforce IP rights. Given the disparities and lack of progress regarding the
implementation of IP protection, developed and industrial countries have
pursued for stronger IP protections through entering into bilateral FTAs with the
developing countries. In exchange of stronger IP protections, developed nations
bilaterally offer greater market access for developing ones while the FTAs
demand extensive adoption, amendment and invocation of intellectual property
rights laws, institutions and enforcement mechanism. In this context, this paper
attempts to analyse factors behind the adoption of TRIPS-Plus agreements
and their impact on developing countries. The central research questions of
this paper are: why does world community need TRIPS-Plus agreement? Does
TRIPS-Plus agreement help to enforce Intellectual Property rights? Obviously
opportunities like greater market access are lucrative from the developing
country perspective; however, implementation of TRIPS-Plus provisions is
squeezing TRIPS flexibilities available for them. Therefore, developing countries
should adopt cautious measures during the negotiation phase with developed
nations in order to continue to enjoy WTO TRIPS flexibilities particularly in the
fields of pharmaceuticals and agriculture.
1.
Introduction
The adoption of Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries in 1994 was an important tool
of ensuring minimum standards of Intellectual Property (IP) protections. However, recent
trend shows that, countries are moving ahead in the pursuit of stronger IP protections.
The notion of stronger IP protections is now mainly promoted by the industrialised and
Mohammad Atique Rahman is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, University
of Dhaka. His e-mail address is: atq.rahman@gmail.com
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.
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developed countries through entering into bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with
the developing ones. While entering into bilateral FTAs, developing countries have to
recognise and include more IP subject matters viz., broader and extensive coverage,
increased harmonisation of IP laws, stronger enforcement mechanisms, and stepping
away from using flexibilities and special and differential treatments which have been
granted by the WTO TRIPS agreement. As these measures under the FTAs are seeking
higher standards of IP protections beyond TRIPS, these are widely known as TRIPS-Plus
provisions.1 Developing countries, which are still lagging behind in the implementation
of their obligations under the TRIPS, are now compelled to implement higher standards
of IP protections under bilateral FTAs with developed countries.
The issue of TRIPS-Plus has surfaced in international trade negotiations since
2000, followed by the slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations under WTO
framework. From developed countries’ perspective achieving extensive coverage of
IP subject matters and their stringent implementation mechanisms are difficult to
achieve in developing countries through multilateral negotiations in WTO. Developed
countries, therefore, have initiated bilateral trade negotiations with developing
nations outside the multilateral forum of WTO. Through FTAs developed nations offer
concessions to developing countries in core trade areas of agriculture, textile and other
market access preferences.2 In return, developing countries are asked to implement
labour standards, environmental protection measures and also IP provisions to the
extent of TRIPS-Plus standards. The costs and benefits of TRIPs-Plus for developing
countries are always an issue of controversy. In general, entering into a TRIPS-Plus
agreement can bring benefits for developing countries as this will increase their
international trade volume and foreign direct investment. This agreement can also
establish IP standards in developing countries beyond measures which have been
adopted in TRIPS and other international intellectual property agreements. TRIPS-Plus
agreement seeks to strengthen laws and procedures to enforce IP rights and provides
credible deterrent measures against IP infringements.
The opposite view is that TRIPS-Plus generates social and economic costs
for developing countries and shrinks their abilities to use TRIPS related flexibilities
in dealing with intellectual properties granted under WTO. TRIPS-Plus for them is
creating policy constraints at national level i.e., protecting interests of local companies
and sectors like public health, agriculture and education.
In this context, this paper attempts to analyse factors behind the adoption of
TRIPS-Plus agreements and its impact on developing countries. The central research
Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.),
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 215-237,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947767, accessed on 21 October 2013.
2
Jakkrit Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-PLUS Rules under Free Trade Agreements: An Asian Perspective”, in C. Heath & A.
Kamperman Sanders (eds.), Intellectual Property & Free Trade Agreements, United Kingdom: Hart Publishing,
2007, p. 28.
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questions of this paper are: why does world community need TRIPS-Plus agreement?
Do TRIPS-Plus provisions help to enforce IP rights? The paper will also look at the
impacts of TRIPS-Plus provisions on the developing countries and what they can do
in minimising the impacts i.e., the way forward. The paper is divided into six sections
including introduction and conclusion. Section two analyses the factors behind the
adoption of TRIPS-Plus agreement. Roles of TRIPS-Plus in enforcing IPs are discussed
in section three. Section four focuses on the impacts of TRIPS-Plus on developing
countries especially in the pharmaceuticals and agricultural sectors and, section five
highlights the way forward for the developing countries. Section six concludes the
paper.
2.
Factors behind the Adoption of TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs
Many factors contributed to the adoption of TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral
FTAs between developed and developing countries. The recent rise of bilateralism
in international trade negotiations is an important factor giving rise to TRIPS-Plus
provisions in FTAs. The changing nature of the multilateral forum in terms of developing
countries gaining prominence as well as creating hurdles for the developed ones to
pursue their IP related agenda at the multilateral level are also significant contributors.
Moreover, ratcheting up of IP protections in developing countries is also highlighted
by the developed ones as a rationale behind adoption of TRIPS-Plus provisions in
bilateral FTAs.
2.1
Bilateralism and TRIPS-Plus Agreement
The history of intellectual property rights protection under international
trade has always been revolving around the cycles of bilateralism, regionalism and
multilateralism. Nations have been swinging between bilateralism and multilateralism
according to their own interests. Before international agreements on trade and
intellectual property rights, nations have granted trade concessions and sought IP
protections at their national levels according to their own needs and performed in
discriminatory manners to protect and promote their local industries and export
volumes.
This system was inefficient as the IP protection was highly dependent on the
discretionary power of the sovereign state some of which incurred trade imbalances.
Realising this inefficiency, nations wanted to develop multilateral framework and
adopted the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) principles.
Countries had agreed upon multilateral treaties in order to develop general
principles for IP protections and appropriate trade concessions. Notably in the 18th
century, several multilateral treaties were adopted by the nation states viz., the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) (covering patents,
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trademarks, and industrial designs) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (1886) (covering the issue of copyright). According to these
multilateral agreements, countries had agreed to provide minimum protection to
intellectual properties and developed general principles and mechanisms applicable
for all member countries. Following the Second World War (WWII), General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted and subsequently, World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) was established. The decolonisation process after
the WWII heralded the inclusion of newly independent developing countries in the
multilateral socio-economic and political organisations which created imbalance
of power between developed and developing countries. Developing countries had
only agreed to implement minimum standards of IP protection through international
agreements and treaties. Moreover, they differed widely in a number of important
areas of IP protections.3
GATT and other United Nations’ (UN) bodies, however, emerged as developing
countries’ platform where developed nations were becoming incapable of pushing
through for stronger IP protections. Therefore, GATT and other trade related forum
became less acceptable to the developed countries. These countries realised that
they had already gained comparative advantages on IP related trade of goods and
services over developing countries. Again there have been massive IP infringements,
counterfeiting and imitations undergoing in developing countries. In such context,
developed nations started to initiate bilateral talks with developing ones in which
they included IP protection measures as one of the components of international
trade negotiations. Therefore, bilateral and unilateral approaches have been adopted
in the beginning of 1980s. For instance, the United States (US) adopted a process of
naming transgressor developing countries and designating them under priority watch
list in the annual Unites States Trade Representative (USTR) National Trade Estimates
Report to put pressure on them. The United States also granted Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) to the developing countries to allow preferential access to US market
on the ground that they should pay respect to IP protections. The most important
initiative was the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994
in which the US successfully linked intellectual property protection measures with the
treaty provisions that were obligatory for all signatory countries to follow.
On the other hand, the existing GATT system lacked significant enforcement
mechanism for all its member countries as far as IP protections were concerned. A
large scale IP counterfeiting had been going on despite GATT. Therefore, developed
countries wanted to develop a uniform system and notion of IP. The uniform system
is aimed at providing more protections along with effective dispute settlement
mechanism to resolve dispute between nation states on IP counterfeiting and
infringements. Developed countries also wanted to extend the coverage of intellectual
property. Therefore, the treaty of TRIPS signed in 1994 included several subject matters
Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World”, Marquette
Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2004, p. 216.
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of IP i.e., copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed
information. TRIPS agreement is also based on MFN and NT principles.
According to NT principle of TRIPS, member states are obliged to accord to
the nationals of other member’s treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. 4 On the other
hand, the MFN of TRIPS stipulated that, “with regard to the protection of intellectual
property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by member of the
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
nationals of all other members”.5 Based on this principle when a developing country
as member state of the WTO agrees to a higher standard of intellectual property
protection under FTA, then it is also obliged to extend those standards ‘immediately
and unconditionally’ to the nationals of other WTO members. TRIPS also established
minimum levels of protection that each member must provide and grant to other
nations. Importantly, members can also seek policies for higher level of IP protection
given that the principles of MFN and NT are respected.
Facing continuous pressure and unilateral action of withdrawing trade
concessions and foreign aid by developed countries, developing countries have
agreed to the inclusion of IPs in the TRIPS agreement. However, they have negotiated
to agree upon such inclusion in exchange for concessions in other areas i.e. agriculture
and textile. Developing countries also succeeded in the inclusion of several flexibilities
into TRIPS. Notable among these are gaining time-bar for implementing TRIPS
obligations. Developing countries also succeeded in Doha round of WTO Ministerial
Conference in 2000 to include more flexibilities under TRIPS i.e. public health and
access to medicine. Article 4 of the Doha declaration confirmed that “the TRIPS
agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive
of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all”. Doha declaration thus confirmed parallel importation
and compulsory licensing for medicines in developing countries for the purpose
of protection of public health. The most concerning issue in this declaration for
developed nations was that it also allowed third parties to exploit a patented medicine
without patentee’s authorisation. Frustrations grew among developed nations as they
failed to ensure strong IP protections because of the constant resistances from the
group of developing countries. Multilateral trade negotiations thus gained very little
for them in the face of large number of varied opinions and interests from the group
of developing countries. Achieving consensus was very difficult in WTO where every
member can use the veto power in the consensus based decision-making process
to derail entire negotiation process. In such a situation, the interests of a developed
nation or lobbyist of industries like pharmaceuticals and computer hardware and
Article No. 3 of TRIPS, WIPO, “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994”,
2012, p. 17.
5
Article No. 4 of TRIPS, ibid., p. 18.
4
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software have been difficult to maximise in WTO. Therefore, the United States and
other developed countries have again shifted its negotiation focus and sought to use
bilateralism to increase IP protections in collaborations with FTA partners through: (a)
inclusion of new areas of IP rights protection; (b) implementation of more extensive
levels or standards of IP protections beyond TRIPS; and (c) elimination of options or
flexibilities available under TRIPS.6
2.2
Changing Forum and Number of Counterparts
An important reason of policy shift to bilateralism is to change the forum
composition and numbers of adversaries which usually exist in multilateral trade
negotiations. Granting trade concessions to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and
developing countries in bilateral agreements can secure allies within the forum of
LDCs and developing countries. In the process, developed countries gain supports
from the group of LDCs and take advantageous position in bargaining with regard
to IP negotiations. Followed by the emergence of Group of 20 this idea has been
floated among the developed countries’ policy makers. G20 emerged particularly
to the opposition of developed countries in the Cancun Ministerial Conference.
G20, dominated by Brazil, China, South Africa and India has been conceived by the
developed world as new power house within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
In response to such development, developed nations started to increase their bilateral
FTAs with developing countries in order to dismantle their alliance. The objective is to
bypass one-country veto power under WTO multilateral trade negotiation framework.
They used combination of unilateral pressure and bilateral trade negotiation
agreements to pressurise developing countries to distance themselves from the G20
agenda. Shortly after Cancun, several Latin American countries including Costa Rica,
Colombia and Peru, announced they were no longer members of this group.7 One
reason was that the United States has refused to include Costa Rica and Guatemala in
the US-CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement) negotiations unless they back
out of their support for the group of G20.
Moreover, there is a difference in the league of developing countries. Bigger
developing countries like Brazil and Argentina do not agree to FTA provisions.
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the US-Andean FTA, and the US-SACU
(Southern African Customs Union) FTA are currently at a standstill because of their
resistance. On the other hand, middle power countries like Australia and ASEAN
leaders like Singapore tactically supported bilateral trade negotiations and FTAs to
project incentives to the weaker developing countries to follow them.
Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, op. cit., p. 219.
Ruth Mayne, “Regionalism, Bilateralism, and ‘TRIPS Plus’ Agreements: The Threat to Developing Countries”,
Human Development Report Office, 2005, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2005/
papers/HDR2005_Mayne_Ruth_18.pdf, accessed on 23 October 2013, p. 5.
6
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From Table 1, it is apparent that the strategy of developed countries
encompasses ‘dividing’ developing country coalitions and negotiating with those
nations willing to compromise to implement stringent IP protections. It needs to be
noted that many developing countries do not hesitate to trade-off IPs in exchange for
market access.8 In fact, some of them believe that bilateral agreement offers real gains
instead of symbolic victories under multilateral trade negotiations.
Table 1: List of Developing Countries' Membership with G20 and US’s FTA
Developing country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
Egypt
El-Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Paraguay
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
South Africa
Tanzania
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
G20
Ex-G20
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Cairns
Group
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
FTA with
USA
Proposed
Y
Proposed
Y( CAFTA)
Y
Y
Proposed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y (CAFTA)
Y (CAFTA)
Y (CAFTA)
Proposed
Y (NAFTA)
Y (CAFTA)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Proposed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y (SACU)
Y
Y
Y
Source: Peter Drahos, Thomas Faunce, Martyn Goddard, and David Henry, The FTA and the PBS, A submission
to the Senate Select Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 2004, available at https://www.
anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/2004ftapbssubmission.pdf, accessed on 25 October 2013.
C. Freund, “Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements”, World Bank, 2003, available at econ.worldbank.org/
files/26994 wps3061.pdf, accessed on 25 October 2013.
8
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2.3
Ratcheting up IP Standards by Using International Standards
TRIPS-Plus under bilateral FTAs is also aimed for scaling up international
standards through bilateralism. Bilateral FTAs are also based on MFN principle like
TRIPS. To illustrate, if a developed and a developing country member negotiate an FTA,
MFN will force the developing nation to make the same IP standards it accepted in the
FTA, available to all nations. This provision clearly serves the objective of developed
nations to ‘ratchet up’ international IP protection mechanisms. Therefore, when any
FTA contains TRIPS-Plus provisions then these provisions will essentially become the
new minimum standards of intellectual property rights. These new standards then
are the start-up point for any future WTO trade negotiation. At this point, therefore, it
is important to discuss how far TRIPS-Plus provisions under FTAs are contributing in
promoting IP rights standards.
3.
Role of TRIPS-Plus in Promoting Intellectual Property Rights Standards
The NAFTA concluded in 1994 is considered as the first free trade agreement
which contains extensive IP provisions for its signatory countries. In the same year,
under the aegis of the US, the European Union (EU) and Switzerland, the GATT
members, for the first time, also agreed upon concluding an agreement called TRIPS
which links IP norm setting to international trade disciplines. However, developed
states have been constantly pursuing greater IP coverage and extensive IP protection
through their bilateral trade agreements. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to
provide an in-depth discussion about the role of TRIPS-Plus for promoting IP rights
protection globally.
3.1
TRIPS-Plus as Tool of Seeking Higher IP Standards
The proponents of TRIPS-Plus wanted to pursue strict policy guidelines to
push for higher standards of IP in their partner countries. The purpose is to make
developing countries comply with extended coverage and higher levels of IP standards
and also to limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The following table clearly reflects the
fact that under bilateral free trade agreement, developing countries are obliged to
implement extended coverage as well as higher standards of IP protections in their
own jurisdiction in comparison to WTO TRIPS requirements.
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Table 2: TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs and their Comparison with WTO TRIPS
In US-Peru FTA
In US, Peru and Colombia WTO TRIPS Provisions
FTAs
Seeking Adherence to International Intellectual Property Treaties and Agreements
Ratification of various WIPO9 Ratification of various WIPO Developing countries under
treaties and UPOV10 signed in treaties
FTA oblige to join a specific
1991
international
agreement/
treaty on IP which is not part
of TRIPS to meet additional
demands of developed nations for IP protections beyond TRIPS.
Geographical Indications (GIs) and Trademarks
No visual perceptibility re- May adopt visual perceptibil- Under TRIPS (Art. 1.1) memquirement for trademark reg- ity requirement for trademark bers including LDCs and
registration
istration
developing countries have
Provisions on GI application Definition of GIs and list of es- flexibilities to adhere and implement provisions of TRIPS
tablished GIs
procedures
GI protection refusal: when Protection Refusal: when like- and other international trealikely to cause confusion with ly to mislead in light of a well- ties related to IP within their
own legal system and pracknown trademark
a trademark
tice.
Seek WCT11 and WPPT12 standards in national IP policies
Seek protection of Encrypted
Satellite Signals
Limitations of liabilities of internet service providers
Copyright
Seek WCT and WPPT standards in national IP policies
Seek protection of Encrypted
Satellite Signals
-
Not less than 70 years of pro- 70 years of protection
tection
Technological
Protection
Measures (TPM)-circumvention is allowed under TRIPS
but developing countries can
enjoy flexibility under TRIPS
to exempt from adopting circumvention measures in their
national copyright law.
Not less than 50 years.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants originally adopted on 02 December
1961, and later raised at Geneva in 1972, 1978 and 1991.
9
10
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Patents and Undisclosed Information
Standards on novelty and
TRIPS (Art. 27.3) provides
grace period, inventiveness
patent exceptions for (a) diand industrial application
agnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods; and (b)
plants and animals other than
Amendment of patent applimicro-organisms.
cation
Article 30, provides for limited
Extend terms of patent, other May provide for patent term
exceptions to the exclusive
than pharmaceutical patent extension for pharmaceutical
rights conferred by a patent.
patents
10 years for agricultural test
data exclusivity
Normally 5 years for pharmaceutical test data
10 years for agricultural test
data exclusivity
Normally 5 years for pharmaceutical test data
Enforcement
Damage, discovery and evi- Damage, discovery (right of
dence
information) and evidence
Ex officio border measures Border measures by both
with respect to goods in tran- right holders and ex officio
sit
authority to include goods in
transit
Article 39(3) of TRIPS provides
protection for test data but no
time limit is specified.
TRIPS (Art. 41.2) stipulates
that procedures of enforcement of IP rights shall be fair
and equitable. They shall not
be unnecessarily complicated
or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.
Source: UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2011.
As is evident from Table 2, developed countries tend to use bilateral FTAs
as leverage for motivating developing countries to adopt stricter IP policies at
their national levels. They also use FTA bindings to ensure effective enforcement
mechanism in the developing countries for IP rights protections. Without the prospect
of implementing and enforcing IP rights at the domestic level, it would be difficult to
bring any positive change in intellectual property rights enforcements. FTA provisions,
therefore, also cover domestic enforcement mechanisms to protect internationally
traded goods and services.
3.2
Opportunity of Adopting Different Implementation Strategy
An important objective of TRIPS-Plus is to secure the implementation of IP
standards and to seek compliance from the developing countries. TRIPS-Plus provisions
under FTA offer more opportunities to develop new implementation strategies for the
11
12
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996. WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty in 1996.
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developing countries which are difficult to achieve through multilateral agreement.
The notion of ‘one-size fits for all’ system in multilateral agreement does not consider
country specific context and realities. Contrary to that, FTA offers prospects for
further negotiations between the developed and developing countries for durable
amendments of rules and regulations for enforcements of Intellectual Property rights
provisions.
3.3
Expanding Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights
TRIPS-Plus provisions in the FTA also provide leverage to extend coverage of
IP rights. Many countries now try to implement their own regulatory preferences in
their partner countries. A clear example is the case of Geographical Indication (GI).
The issue of extending GI has been basically patronised by the EU, as EU conceived
it as a means of promoting sustainability of small farming and rural communities.
GI protections preserve the income-profit of small firms as well as promoting rural
economy. EU had been successful to include inclusion of wines and spirits under
GI protection in TRIPS agreement. Article 23 of the TRIPS agreement stipulates for
recognising wines and spirit as GI product which all member countries had agreed
upon. Moreover, Article 24 and Article 23 reveal exception; the member states can
negotiate to increase the protection of individual geographical indication. In light
of this, EU and many developing countries opted for ongoing negotiation within
the TRIPS council in seeking additional protection of GI. They promoted multilateral
registration systems to other products under the purview of the concept of additional
protection of GI which is one of the essential elements of the TRIPS agreement.
They have been advocating for extending GI protection on agricultural products,
food stuff, and handicrafts which have originated in a specific place and possess
qualities, reputation, traditional know-how or other characteristics that are essentially
attributable to that place of origin. For example, during December 1998 TRIPS council
meeting, both developed and developing countries submitted many of their products
for inclusion under GI, some of which are noted below13:
Table 3: List of Products Submitted in TRIPS Council for GI Protection
Name of Country
Bulgaria
Canada
Czech Republic
GI Products
Bulgarian yoghurt, Traminer from Khan Kroum (wine),
Merlou from Sakar (wine)
Canadian Rye Whisky, Canadian Whisky, Fraser Valley,
Okanagan Valley, Similkameen Valley, Vancouver Island
Pilsen and Budweis (beers), Various Wines, Liqueurs,
Saaz hops, Auscha hops, Jablonec Jewellery, Bohemia
Crystal, Vamberk Lace
WTO News, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news98_e/pu_e.htm#Top, accessed on 25
October 2013.
13
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European Communities
Hungary
Liechtenstein
Slovak Republic
United States
Champagne, Sherry, Porto, Chianti, Samos, Rheinhessen, Moselle Luxembourgeoise, Mittleburgenland (all
wines); Cognac, Brandy de Jerez, Grappa di Barolo, Berliner Kümmel, Genièvre Flandres Artois, Scotch Whisky,
Irish Whiskey, Tsikoudia (from Crete) (all spirits); and a
range of other products, such as Newcastle brown ale,
Scottish beef, Orkney beef, Orkney lamb, Jersey Royal
potatoes, Cornish Clotted Cream, Cabrales, Roquefort,
Gorgonzola, Aziete de Moura, Olive de Kalamata, Opperdoezer Ronde, Wachauer Marille, Danablu, Lübecker
Marzipan, Svecia, Queijo do Pico, Coquille Saint
Jacques des Côtes-d’Amour, Jamón de Huelva, Lamme
jordsgulerod
Eger (wine), Szatrademarkar (plum)
Malbuner (meat products), Balzer (Hi-tech products)
Korytnická minerálna voda (mineral water), Karpatská
perla (wine), Modranská majolica (hand-painted pottery), Piešt’anské bahno (healing mud)
Idaho (potatoes and onions), Real California Cheese,
Napa Valley Reserve (still and sparkling wines), Pride
of New York (agricultural products), Ohio River Valley
(viticulture area)
This proposal was opposed by the members led by the United States.
Interestingly, some developing countries also supported the United States. The
negotiation derailed in TRIPS council and also later in Doha Ministerial Conference
in 2000. Clause 2 of the Doha instrument only recognised the need for all peoples
to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral
trading system generates. This statement in fact justified that the industry-specific
TRIPS protection is untenable for developing countries.
Given this deadlock situation in TRIPS council and no ready solution for
further harmonisation of ‘global notion’ of GI, EU in 2005 submitted a radical TRIPSPlus proposal to amend the TRIPS agreement in favour of mandatory multilateral
system for all products. They advocated that this proposal would also meet the
need of developing countries as they have successfully established their rights on
agricultural products. The following table shows some examples of GI products in
developing countries.14
Daniele Giovannucci, Tim Josling, William Kerr, Bernard O’Connor, and May T. Yeung, Guide to Geographical
Indications: Linking Products and Their Origins, Geneva: International Trade Centre, 2009, available at www.
intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37595, accessed on 26 October 2013, p. 2.
14
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Table 4: Most Prominent GI Products in Developing Countries
Name of Country
Guatemala
India
Mongolia
Jamaica
Hawaii
Mexico
Colombia
Name of GI Products
Antigua Coffee
Darjeeling Tea
Gobi Desert Camel Wool
Blue Mountain Coffee
Kona Coffee
Mezcal and Tequila
Café Naino
EU as the leading proponent of GI has adopted two different TRIPS-Plus
initiatives i.e., specific Stand Alone Agreement on GIs as for example with China and,
secondly, entering into a Free Trade Agreement.15 The EU has concluded a series of
FTAs which contain important levels of protection for GI. For example, EU and Chile
concluded an association agreement in 2000 which included an FTA that entered into
force in 2003. In this agreement both sides mutually agreed to extend protection of
GI of their products.16 In October 2009, EU and South Korea signed FTA agreement,
according to which both countries agreed to offer high levels of protection of GI
products including protection for EU GIs such as Champagne, Feta Cheese, and
Scotch Whiskey.17
Like many developing countries, Bangladesh also supports the initiative to
extend GI protection for food items under TRIPS. The country can benefit from extending
GI protection to food items. GI extends protection which is relatively impersonal that
means the protected subject matter is related to the product itself and is therefore not
dependent on a specific right holder. Therefore, GI offers protections and opportunities
for local communities to control the productions, branding and marketing of their
products. Bangladesh has diverse agricultural products and is also rich in crafts, cultural
heritage, and traditional knowledge and so on. Bangladesh has enacted Geographical
Indication (Registration and Protection) Act in November 2013. So far, Bangladesh
included 73 products under GI in which 52 are food products and remaining 21 are
European Commission (EC), Geographical Indication, Directorate General for Trade, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/, accessed
on 26 October 2013.
16
Raymond J. Ahearn, Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications, Congressional
Research Service, R41143, 2011, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf, accessed on 26 October
2013, p. 11.
17
“USTR Releases Preliminary Analysis of Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement”, Press Release by the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), 21 October 2009, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press office/press-releases/2009/october/ustr-releases-preliminary-analysis-korea-eu-free-t, accessed on
01 November 2013.
15
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non-food products. Food products include three fish items, 12 fruits, 15 processed foods
and sweets, 14 agricultural products and eight types of vegetables.18
3.4
Limiting Free Riding and Extending Bargaining Trade-off
The TRIPS-Plus provisions under bilateral FTAs reduce the possibility of freeriding of countries available under the multilateral agreement. These provisions are
targeted to amend local policies and regulations in exchange of access to the markets of
the developed nations. TRIPS-Plus seems more effective as it shows credible retaliation
measures other than withdrawing trade concessions and imposing trade barriers. For
example, the unilateral action of withdrawing trade concession under the GSP or the
Special Act no. 301 of US is not effective. In many instances it has been proved that
the Special Act no. 301 measures have not deterred countries from counterfeiting of
IP. On the other hand, from the developing country perspectives, TRIPS-Plus under
FTA provides them bargaining opportunities to cover the liberalisation of goods and
service sectors, trading concessions and greater market access. Most importantly,
developing countries can also use TRIPS-Plus as a bargaining chip for gaining technical
assistance from the developed countries.
3.5
TRIPS-Plus as Capacity Development Tool
TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTA also offer non-binding measures for the
developing countries. The purpose of this is to develop mechanism in the developing
countries which can contribute to the implementation and enforcement of IP in
future. In this regard, the central focus is on capacity building of the institutions
and regulatory cooperation between agreeing parties. Such capacity building
activities develop effective and credible mechanism for enforcing IP by exchanging
information, notifying partner members about the progress of new regulations
adoptions, monitoring of enforcement, arranging consultations and provisions for
amendment of regulations and laws regarding IP rights.
3.6
Accelerating Harmonisation of IP Standards
TRIPS-Plus provisions also accelerate the process of harmonising IP standards
in many developing countries. In this regard, adoption or modification of laws and
adherence to international IP conventions are discussed as follows:
FAO, “Rural Development and Agri-food Product Quality Linked to Geographical Origin in Asia”, Proceedings
from the Technical Consultation, 8−10 June 2009, Bangkok, available at http://www.foodqualityorigin.org/
Bangkok/programme.html, accessed on 23 March 2014, p. 43.
18
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3.6.1 Adoption or Modification of Laws
Empirical evidence shows that developing countries which agreed upon TRIPSPlus have modified their laws to harmonise IP standards with the developed world. For
example, under CAFTA, Costa Rica amended several major domestic IP laws i.e., the
laws on patents, designs, industrial designs and utility models, trademarks and other
distinctive signs, copyright and related rights, undisclosed information, and enforcement
laws. In March 2006, Nicaragua approved laws reforming the protection of copyright
and related rights, programme-carrying satellite signals, patents, utility models and
industrial designs, and trademarks and other distinctive signs. Chile and Morocco
introduced a number of important changes to their IP legislative frameworks in order to
comply with their Preferential Trade Agreement with the US, signed in 2003 and 2004
respectively. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus triggered extensive domestic legislative reforms for
the protection of IP in developing countries. The European Union has agreement on the
protection of GIs with Chile, Mexico and South Africa. Under the TRIPS- Plus provision of
bilateral FTAs, these countries have to phase out or de-register trademarks that conflict
with terms describing European GIs, in exchange for tariff free export to the EU market.
3.6.2 Adherence to the International IP Conventions and Treaties
An important aspect of TRIPS-Plus FTA is the promotion of adherence to
second generation multilateral treaties developed at WIPO. Under FTA, the developing
countries are invited to ratify international IP conventions, particularly WIPO treaties and
the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1991 (UPOV
1991). For example, under US-Chile FTA, Chile has to undertake efforts to ratify or accede
to Patent Law Treaty (PLT, 2000), the Hague Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Industrial Designs (Hague Agreement, 1999) and the Protocol Relating
to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (Madrid
Protocol, 1989) in a manner consistent with its domestic law. Chile is also encouraged
to classify goods and services according to the classification of the Nice Agreement
Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of
the Registration of Marks (Nice Agreement, 1979). On the other hand, Nicaragua and
Panama are obliged to accede to UPOV 1991 under their FTA with the United States.
4.
Impacts of TRIPS-Plus on Developing Countries
The proliferation of FTA has been increasing in number since 2000. Developed
nations have been eager to conclude FTA agreement with the developing countries
to achieve gains in trade in goods and services which appeared difficult to gain under
the WTO framework. The purpose of this section is to explore impacts of TRIPS-Plus on
developing countries. To this end, this section focuses on the effects of TRIPS-Plus in
pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors of developing countries.
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4.1
Impacts on Access to Medicine
There has been growing concerns among the world leading medicine
manufacturing companies regarding the absence of patent protection in the developing
countries. TRIPS agreement provides minimum patent protection mechanism which
all member countries of WTO should oblige. Developing countries as member of WTO
adhered to the international principles of intellectual property protection. But given
the exclusivity of patent, developing countries raised the issue of granting patents
to medicines and drugs which may cause high prices of medicines. Bangladesh as a
developing country will face challenges to ensure public access to medicines after
the expiry of TRIPS extension. TRIPS-Plus provisions erode TRIPS extension and under
the new term patent extension on pharmaceuticals for developing and LDCs will
expire by 2016. Therefore, Bangladesh will have to provide protection to the foreign
pharmaceutical companies which may raise the cost of patented drugs. Bangladeshi
companies will not be allowed to produce generic drugs at all in future.
The experience regarding access to patented drugs in South Africa, Brazil,
and Thailand led to the adoption of Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health.19 The Doha declaration affirms the right of WTO member countries to
protect public health especially in those least and underdeveloped countries which are
adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other critical epidemics. In this
context, member countries have been given rights to use TRIPS flexibilities with regard
to granting patents to medicines and drugs. Member countries can use Article 31(f) and
(h) of the TRIPS agreement to grant compulsory licensing for production in return for
adequate remuneration to the patent holder. The Doha deceleration also adopted the
following options for the developing countries to use TRIPS flexibilities. These are:
– Adoption of the principle of the international exhaustion of rights so
as to facilitate parallel importation of cheaper drugs. The issue is left to
the TRIPS member countries to decide upon the level of exhaustion of
patent rights in Article 6 of TRIPS.
– Exclusion of certain biotechnology inventions, as well as medical
methods for the treatment of humans and animals. This option has been
confirmed on the basis of patentable subject matter of patented goods
stipulated in Article 27 of TRIPS.
– Providing limited exceptions to the developing countries to use patented
medicines for limited experimentation, and prior user’s rights etc. The
provision of limited exception has been articulated in Article 30 of TRIPS.
19
WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 20 November 2001.
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– Providing rights to developing countries to use compulsory licenses for
making available patented drugs.
The TRIPS-Plus initiatives by the developed countries can be seen as an
attempt to circumvent the flexibilities and options granted by TRIPS and Doha
declaration. Following discussion reveals how TRIPS-Plus can reduce a developing
country’s options for using TRIPS flexibilities especially in the public health sector.
4.1.1
Patentable Subject Matter
Some TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral FTAs require that effective and
adequate protection must be given to inventions in all technological fields including
plants and animals that are under the TRIPS Article 27.3 can be excluded from
patentability. TRIPS also restricts member countries to grant patent on medical
practices such as diagnostics, therapy and surgery of human or animal body on the
ground of morality and ethics to prevent monopoly privileges in the public health
sector. However, in many FTAs, attempt has been made to seek compliance from
developing countries to avoid these flexibilities. For example, under the FTA with
the United States, Thailand has to grant patents to the plants and animals as well as
diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical procedures for the treatments of humans and
animals. TRIPS-Plus provision in FTA also demands granting patent to the second use
of invention. On the contrary, TRIPS does not require its members granting patent to
second use invention. Second use of invention is very common in pharmaceutical
sector. For example, an agro-chemical substance can be used as a pharmaceutical
product or a well known drug can be used as new therapeutic application. Such
second use may be claimed for patent by the patent holding companies. The second
use of patent invention limits the freedom of developing countries to determine
what should be protected under product and process patents as provided by TRIPS.
Medicines that are no longer patented as products can be patented as a second use,
new dosages of existing drugs, or new combinations of existing drugs. Patents for
subsequent use of a known drug would thereby unnecessarily prolong the monopoly
and deprive consumers of essential drugs.
4.1.2
Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is a TRIPS provided flexibility which allows a country
to override patent right temporarily and issues third party to perform acts covered
by the patent exclusive rights i.e. manufacturing, selling, or importing patented
medicines. Compulsory license also authorise the production of generic version
of patented products.20 The experiences in many countries including US, Canada,
For more on compulsory licensing, see C. Correa, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries”, South Centre Working Paper No. 5, 1999, available at http://
www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2013.
20
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TRIPS-PLUS AS A TOOL
Brazil21 and South Africa have shown that compulsory licensing is an effective
mechanism to limit abusive practices of the patent holder and help to force prices
down. Brazil has the 9th largest market of pharmaceutical in the world in 2007 with the
sale totalling US$ 5.7 billion.22 There are four main actors of Brazilian pharmaceutical
sector. These are foreign based companies (controls 70 per cent of total production),
government funded lab (18 in number), local private companies producing generic
medicines and local pharma-chemical companies producing raw materials. Brazil
was the first country to use TRIPS flexibilities after the enactment of Patent law in
1996. Brazil based on its new patent law started to issue compulsory licensing to drive
down the price of medicines. By allowing other producers to enter the market, the
legal device allows state to remove exclusivity right of patent holder to set monopoly
prices.23 The compulsory license provision in the patent law of Brazil gives local
pharmaceutical companies opportunities to produce generic versions of eight of
twelve drugs that compose the AIDS cocktail at a cost that is 70 per cent lower than
the current market price. The Brazilian government practises this right by asserting to
Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement which allows countries to issue compulsory license
during the time of national emergency. In this regard, the issue of limiting the right
of the country to use compulsory licensing is one of the main TRIPS-Plus objectives of
bilateral FTAs. TRIPS-Plus agreement tries to impose more stringent conditions than
TRIPS to grant compulsory license and override patent rights. In many bilateral FTAs,
compulsory license can only be granted as remedy to anti-competitive practices, in
the case of public non-commercial use and only in the situation of national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency. Therefore, issuing a compulsory license
on the ground of non-working or insufficient working of patent which is included
in Brazilian patent act is thereby usually prohibited under bilateral FTAs. Some FTAs
also adopt provisions of restricting the transferring of undisclosed information or the
disclosure of know-how through issuing compulsory licensing to the third party for
producing generic medicines. The restriction of know-how under the TRIPS-Plus is
pursued because know-how enables the compulsory license to make efficient use of
the patent. Without access to ‘know how’, the commercial value of access to a patent is
less worthy than licensee. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus provision attempts to limit compulsory
licensing to certain situations and make the procedures for issuing licensee intricate
and prolonged. Obviously, such activity imposes constraints on developing countries
to pursue affordable drugs and access to medicines.
Under the Brazilian patent law, patent protection is provided on condition that the patent holder
produces at least part of the patented goods within Brazil. If the patentee fails to satisfy this ‘local working’
requirement, its patent rights may be subject to a compulsory license, which may be an issue to Brazilian
pharmaceutical companies so that they may produce generic copies of the drugs to supply to the local
market. See Naomi A Bass, “Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol.
34, No. 1, 2002, p. 191.
22
IMS Health, 2008, available at www.imshealth.com, accessed on 04 November 2013.
23
Kenneth C. Shadlen, Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzmán, and N. Lalitha (eds.), Intellectual Property,
Pharmaceutical and Public Health: Access to Drugs in Developing Countries, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd., 2011, p. 149.
21
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4.1.3
Limiting Parallel Importation
Parallel Importation is a situation when the patent holder sells a product to a
buyer who exports the product to a second buyer in another country.24 Such situation
arises when the price of imported medicine or good is lower than the price of the same
product or medicine legally made or imported into that country. This is possible under
the TRIPS provision of exhaustion of rights. Intellectual property rights are exhausted
once a product is sold or once placed in a market anywhere in the world. Therefore,
the initial sale ends the IP holders’ rights and control over what can be done with
that product. Article 6 of TRIPS states that member countries are free to choose any
system of exhaustion of IP rights. Currently, three kinds of exhaustion are available i.e.,
national, regional and international. If any country adopts international exhaustion
of patent rights then a right owner cannot use IP rights to prevent this country from
importing patented goods from anywhere in the world, where the patent holder
placed patented product for commercial use. Therefore, there is no such measure to
prevent importing nation that can acquire pharmaceuticals at reduced prices from any
place in the world. In this context, in many FTAs, TRIPS-Plus provision requires to adopt
only the national exhaustion and prohibiting international exhaustion. For example,
the US’ FTAs with Morocco (Article 15(9) (4)25) and Australia (Article 17(9) (4)26) prohibit
parallel importation. From the developing countries perspectives, prohibition of
international exhaustion and parallel importation can block opportunities to import
cheap medicines and other goods from outside the national market.
4.1.4
Extending Patent Term Protection
Patent term protection is always a critical issue as it grants monopoly exclusive
right to the patent holder. In the TRIPS agreement of 1994, the minimum term of
protection has been set at 20 years. But some products such as pharmaceuticals and
agro-chemicals require lengthy period of test and regulatory approval. This requires
lots of time just to get entry into the market of the country. Therefore, TRIPS-Plus
provisions include a proposal to extend the term of protection to these products
to provide compensation for unreasonable delays in issuing the patents. The main
rationale behind the proposal of extending patent protection is that patent holders
can secure their economic benefits which are not possible to obtain during the
period of testing and gaining approval from the regulatory authorities. In the Central
For more information, see "Health Care and Intellectual Property: Parallel Imports”, available at www.
cptech.org/ip/fsd/health-pi.html, accessed on 10 November 2013.
25
Each Party shall provide that the exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented
product, or a product that results from patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall
not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory. Available at http://www.ustr.
gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file797_3849.pdf, accessed on 09
November 2013.
26
Ibid.
24
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TRIPS-PLUS AS A TOOL
American Free Trade Agreement-CAFTA-DR, extension of patent term protection has
been made. Article 15 (9) (6) of the CAFTA-DR states that:27
Each party, at the request of the patent owner, shall adjust the term of
a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in granting
the patent. For the purposes of this paragraph, an unreasonable delay
shall at least include a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than
five years from the date of filing of the application in the Party, or three
years after a request for examination of the application has been made,
whichever is later.
Critics have argued that the TRIPS-Plus provision regarding extension of
patent term would allow multinational pharmaceutical companies to practice
monopoly for a longer period of time. Extension of patent term delays the potential
introduction of affordable generic medicines and therefore, patent holding company
could gain benefits from charging higher price.
4.2
Impacts on Agriculture
Countries still differ about the patentability of biological materials and
methods. Different countries have different rules in this regard. For example, patent
laws of EU still exclude some form of biotechnological inventions i.e., plant and animal
varieties from patent protection. In many bilateral FTAs, there has been increasing
demand for granting patent to all kinds of life forms including plants, animals,
biological processes, the by-product of generic engineering and biotechnological
methods, genes and gene sequences. If patenting of life was granted through FTA,
then there would be considerable effects on the agricultural sector of developing
countries. If developing countries grant patents to genes it will cause a power shift
in agriculture towards large biotechnological companies. It will then disrupt the
access to essential products such as seeds or foodstuffs. The patent on genes would
give monopoly power to the companies to control over production chain of crops
and foods. Some argued that gene patenting would have detrimental effect on the
research environment and prevent innovation process. As pointed out by Heller and
Eisenberg, the patenting of biological products and processes is regarded as ‘anticommons’, in which individual put fences around the people’s private property and
destroys the commons. This could impede discovery and innovation in the fastestgrowing field of technology.28
For protection of plant varieties (genes), article 27.3 of TRIPS gives member
states options to protect plant varieties by patents or by an effective sui-generis
Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends”, op. cit., p. 230.
M Heller and R. Eisenberg, “Can Patent Deter Innovation?: The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research”, 1998,
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698.full, accessed on 12 November 2013, pp. 698-701.
27
28
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
system. The term effective sui-generis system in TRIPS is a bit ambiguous which allows
developing countries to avoid developing full intellectual property law covering
plant varieties. For example, India and Thailand have flexibly implemented the TRIPS
provisions by incorporating the farmer’s right29 and Access and Benefit Sharing System
(ABS) under the convention on Biological Diversity into their national legislation. But
patent protection of plant varieties under TRIPS-Plus provisions can act as barrier to the
access to agricultural product and transfer of technology to the developing countries.
Multinational bio-tech companies will have opportunity to dominate farming sector
as well as exploit abundant biological processes of the developing countries.
5. The Way Forward
Preceding discussion demonstrates that TRIPS-Plus provisions can impose
strict mechanisms for implementing intellectual property rights in developing
countries. Therefore, measures can be taken beyond the strict implementation of the
provisions of bilateral FTAs. Two of such measures are as follows:
5.1
Issuance of Side Letter
In order to ensure freedom of developing countries to take appropriate
measures recognised by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public health, TRIPS-Plus
provisions under FTA should issue side-letter to recognise this safeguard mechanism
for developing countries. This kind of side letter has been issuing in many FTAs. As for
example, in the US-CAFTA-DR FTA,30 the side letter recognises that the obligations set
forth in the FTA do not affect the ability of either party to take necessary measures to
protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all. Measures to protect
public health thus cannot be prevented in FTAs in special cases such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, as well as circumstances of extreme urgency
or national emergency. Therefore, by gaining side letter developing countries can
create compatible environment between TRIPS safeguard and TRIPS-Plus obligations.
5.2
Inclusion of Provision of Capacity Building and Technical Assistance
Developing countries can negotiate for introducing provisions for capacity
building and technical assistance under the TRIPS-Plus FTA. This is highly important
for developing countries to develop administrative, institutional and technical
capacities to administer and enforce IP rights. Some developing countries have already
The concept of Farmer’s Right adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) for the aim of
compensating farmers who have been conserving plant genetic resources for the past centuries thereby
have contributed to the development of plant varieties. Available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/ourwork/current-projects/rtf-global-regional-level/itpgrfa/en/, accessed on 12 November 2013.
30
The United States-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement.
29
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TRIPS-PLUS AS A TOOL
succeeded to include this kind of provision in their FTAs with the developed nations.
For example, in the US-Chile FTA, Article 17.1 (14) defines means by which the parties
will cooperate in order to strengthen the development and protection of IP, including
through education and dissemination projects and training courses31. Under CAFTA
developing countries secure commitments from their developed partners to support
capacity building in trade. The FTA under EU also includes the provision of providing
technical cooperation with respect to IPs. These are providing legislative advice,
capacity building training and supporting building up institutional structures.
6.Conclusion
This paper begins by pointing out the importance of TRIPS agreement to
implement global standards of intellectual property rights. It is considered to be one
of the most successful multilateral agreements which is legally binding for all the
signatory countries. However, the IP implementation landscape is not as smooth as
it was conceived by the drafters of TRIPS. There has been significant gap between a
country’s international commitment and actual domestic implementation with regard
to intellectual property rights. TRIPS flexibilities subject to national interpretations
caused problems for harmonising IP standards at the global level. Countries are also
very much indifferent to accede to the international treaties covering various areas of
IP rights.
The inclusion of TRIPS-Plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements, therefore,
can be seen as a reaction to the prevailing disparities and as an attempt to limit
TRIPS related flexibilities. TRIPS-Plus thus is a process of recalculating the IP standards
bilaterally with the developing countries. The paper also shows that developing
countries have been constrained under TRIPS-Plus provisions to enjoy flexibilities in
certain sectors. The pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors of developing countries
are going to be affected the most by TRIPS-Plus IP provisions. However, developing
countries still have opportunity to bargain with their developed counterparts to
ensure their rights of using flexibilities in certain sectors. It cannot be denied that
despite some criticism, the TRIPS-Plus initiatives are clearly crucial drivers of significant
reforms in developing countries towards harmonising intellectual property standards
all over the world.
Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng and Jean-Christophe Maur, “The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on
the Implementation of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: A First Look”, ICTSD Issue Paper
No. 33, 2011, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc2011d01_en.pdf, accessed on 14 November
2013, p. 24.
31
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014: 360-373
Riad Khan
Anas Khan
Mohammad Mohabbat Khan
Mohammad Habibur Rahman
SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
Abstract
Skilled labour migration from developing countries to the developed world
has increased exponentially in recent years. The pattern of immigration
has changed enormously over the course of time in some particular cases.
Developing countries experienced group migration in the form of indentured
labourers from 19th century to the First World War. Free migration commenced
after this period. The causes of immigration from the developing countries
have been attributed to the push and pull factors which are related to
economic, political, cultural and the environmental issues. Today, migration
has become a social and political phenomenon of major concern to political
leaders and policy makers in these countries. Advancements in technology,
information and transportation have contributed to the enhanced rate
and pace of immigration. This paper examines the impact of skilled labour
migration from the developing countries which often played a vital role in
supplying labour to the developed world and this is expected to continue.
It shows that this phenomenon has social and political impact in sending
countries including loss of leadership and educated people, impacting
the political process of registering candidature for national elections. The
paper, taking up the example of Fiji, argues that the return of migrants with
enhanced human capital and technology, remittances, loss of educated
people, poor quality of candidates standing for elections and increased
indigenous Fijian dominance are some of the social and political impacts of
immigration in this particular case.
1.Introduction
Migration is one of the most talked about subjects these days. Whether
it is the most renowned academic, politician or the community at large, everyone
seems to have a view on its merits. Immigration, a particular variant of migration, is
essentially the act of leaving one place for another for any length of time. The time
Riad Khan is Freelance Consultant in Fiji. His e-mail address is: riadkhan18@hotmail.com; Anas Khan is
Freelance Consultant in New Zealand. His e-mail address is: anaskhan16@hotmail.com; Mohammad
Mohabbat Khan, Ph.D is former Professor of Public Administration, University of Dhaka and Member,
University Grants Commission, Bangladesh. His e-mail address is: khanmm07@gmail.com; Mohammad
Habibur Rahman, Ph.D is Associate Professor at Mohammad Bin Rashid School of Government, Dubai,
UAE. His e-mail address is: mohammadhabibur@mbrsg.ac.ae
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2014.
360
SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
does not have to be specified but the intention is to relocate from one place to
another. Immigration of skilled persons from the developing to developed countries
has increased over time. It is one of the most pressing issues in the modern globalised
world. The United Nations estimates that over 175 million people, or roughly 3 per
cent of the world’s total population, now reside in a country where they were not
born.1 Throughout history, humans have migrated widely. The movement of people
across the international boundaries has continued both as voluntary migration within
one’s region or further and involuntary migration such as slave trade and mass exodus
due to ethnic or racial cleansing. In order to understand the causes and consequences
of such migration, this paper takes up the example of Fiji – a country which has long
been an important player in the supply of almost all categories of qualified and
experienced personnel.
There has been a huge change in the patterns of migration from the
developing countries over the past century. In the early days, migration involved
permanent rupture, because people did not have the technology to be able to keep
in touch with their homeland. It was essentially a permanent migration. However,
there has been a movement away from that kind of a permanent rupture to transmigration, which has enabled people who lived overseas to have business or social
connections back home. Thus, immigration has now become a much more fluid
process. The assimilationist ideology which required one to completely assimilate
oneself in the overseas lifestyle to be considered as a true overseas citizen has gone.
People are much more at home displaying dual loyalties without necessarily being
accused of being disloyal or unfaithful to the country of residence. This has increased
as a result of the explosive growth in information and communications technology
(ICT). Since the world is getting smaller with advanced technologies, finding required
labour around the globe has become much easier than ever before.2 Distance is now
really an imaginary phenomenon rather than a physical one.
The aim of the paper is to study the impact of skilled labour immigration
from the developing countries to the developed ones, taking up the example of
Fiji as a case study. The paper is organised into six sections. After the introduction,
the second section examines the patterns and nature of immigration in Fiji from
historical perspective. The third reviews the causes of immigration and the fourth
section discusses the impacts of skilled labour immigration from Fiji. Future trends
are identified in section five. Section six draws conclusion.
1
United Nations, International Migration, New York: Population Division, Department of Economics and
Social Affairs, 2000.
2
J. R H. Choi, Woods and S. K. Murrmann, “International Labor Markets and the Migration of Labor Forces as
an Alternative Solution for Labor Shortages in the Hospitality Sector”, International Journal of Contemporary
Management, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000, pp. 61-66.
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
2.
Brief History of Immigration in Developing Countries: The Case of Fiji
Fiji is a multi-ethnic nation of 8,27,900 population according to the 2007
population census. Fiji became a British Crown Colony in 1874 and an independent
nation in 1970. Generally, labour migration in Fiji could be classified in three phases:
mass immigration from 1879-1919 and 1920-1936, permanent labour migration from
1970 onwards, and temporary labour migration and modern immigration since early
1990s. The history of migration in Fiji, from the late 19th century to the First World War,
saw the migration of Indian immigrants, called ‘girmitiyas’, who came to Fiji in 1879 to
work on sugarcane plantations. Between 1879 and 1916, 60,000 Indian migrants arrived
in Fiji and their work helped create the foundations of Fiji’s sugar-based economy.3
This was a form of group migration known as the indentured migration. People were
contracted for a period of service, employed by the Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR)
Company or the government or other employers. At the end of their term of service,
the immigrants could go back to India after five years paying their own fare or after
ten years without paying for transportation. Eventually about 24,000 went back to
India. The majority stayed on. As these labourers were illiterate, and left India in sorry
circumstances and did not have enough money due to settlement costs in Fiji with their
families, physical contact with India decreased. They also lost contact with their families
and had no precise knowledge of where their forefathers had come from. They only
kept in touch with India vicariously, through movies, newspapers and periodic visits by
missionaries from India. Thus, in these cases the rupture was fairly complete. The system
of indentured labourer formally came to an end in 1920. Their descendants constitute
the bulk of the present Indo-Fijian population, the rest being descendants of Gujarati
traders and Punjabi agriculturalists who arrived in Fiji in the 1920s.4
The end of the First World War saw the beginning of free migration with
the arrival of Gujarati migrants in 1904. The first Chinese settlement was recorded
in Levuka (the old capital of Fiji) in the 1870s, its occupants being gold miners from
Victoria, Australia who came to Fiji when the mines were depleted.5 However, a ‘largescale’ migration took place in the 1920s throughout the 1960s where free migrants
were coming from Gujarat, principally from Surat and Navsari districts and Punjab,
principally from Jalundar and Hoshyarpur districts. They were mostly farmers, traders
and merchants from India. Their arrival, together with the Asians, saw the growth
of businesses and trade in Fiji. They were mostly individual migrants who kept
in touch with their families and even brought them to Fiji after a certain period or
went back home to get their children married. Thus, the frequency and intensity of
contact was far greater than with the case of indentured migrants. This also caused
controversy locally about the commitments of these free migrants who had come to
Fiji. The Europeans also exploited this. There were also some conflicts between free
B. V. Lal, "Fiji Islands: From Immigration to Emigration", Washington D.C: Migration Policy Institute, 2003.
Ibid.
5
S. J. Yee, The Chinese in the Pacific, Suva, Fiji: The South Pacific Social Sciences in Association with the
United Nations Development Programme, 1974.
3
4
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SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
migrants and the descendants of the “girmitiyas”. But whether people who came to
Fiji as free migrants or indentured migrants, they all saw Fiji as their home, established
themselves there and developed businesses. It did not seem that there was a sense at
that time to immigrate elsewhere using Fiji as a stopover.
This began to change in the 1960s when small numbers of people started
going to the United Kingdom and Australia. However, there were restrictions in the
case of Australia because of the White Australia Policy. There were also attempts by the
then Governor of Fiji, Sir Derek Jakeway, to stop the outward migration of Indians due
to the loss of skills from Fiji. This attempt was futile as it was seen as interfering with
persons’ freewill and infringement of human rights. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the pace of immigration increased and bulk of migrants went to Canada and the US. A
process of permanent emigration started during and after independence in 1970 and
it has been building momentum since then. In the immediate post-independent years,
Indo-Fijians were beginning to feel insecure and excluded from power. In the 1970s,
there was a sense of anxiety, exclusion and uncertainty in their minds about their
future in that country. With the advent of discriminatory legislations in affirmative
action, education and so forth, people were beginning to feel apprehensive. In the
early 1980s, about 60 per cent of the Fiji emigrants went to Canada and the west coast
of the United States, and the bulk of the rest to Australia and New Zealand.6
People, especially Indo-Fijians, began immigrating in smaller numbers but
the trickle turned into torrent after 1987. Table 1 shows a huge increase in emigration
from 1986 onwards. Interestingly, the move was to Canada, Australia and particularly
New Zealand due to the then Prime Minister David Lange’s more positive response
to the plight of Indo-Fijians (see, Figure 1). The total official outflow from Fiji was over
91,000 between 1987 and 2004.7 In the 1990s, about two-thirds of the population who
left Fiji went to Australia which became the preferred destination for the important
reason of physical proximity compared to Canada or the US. Other factors included
demand for skills, family reunion and better opportunities. All four destinations now
remain very popular for immigration. Despite the loss of skilled people, immigration
has been a desirable means by which people can expand opportunities and gain
experience in a wider global setting.
B. V. Lal, op. cit.
Paper presented by M. Mohanty on “Globalisation, New Labour Migration and Development in Fiji Islands”,
in the Conference on Globalisation, Governance and the Pacific Islands, 2005, Canberra.
6
7
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
Table 1: Fiji Citizen Immigration
Year
1986
1987
1988
1999
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total Departure
2799
5118
5496
5510
5650
5432
4621
4107
4155
4931
5030
4493
4829
4837
5275
6316
5480
5771
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics8
Figure 1: The Direction of Movement of Fiji Emigrants – 2003
Continental
Europe
0%
Canada
9%
Pacific Islands
1%
UK
3%
Others
3%
Australia
31%
USA
18%
NZ
35%
3.
The Causes of Immigration
The usual process of migration from the developing to the developed
countries reveals that most people move for economic reasons in general to take
8
Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Fiji Tourism and Migration Statistics (various issues), Suva, Fiji.
364
SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
better-paying jobs or to search for jobs in new areas.9 Whatever the reasons, migrants
move to seek better lives for themselves and their children. For each individual, there
is a net gain wherever the benefits of life in the destination country exceed those in
the country of origin and the difference between the two is not swallowed up by the
costs of moving.10 Industrialisation and globalisation has also influenced migration by
significantly improving transportation techniques.
As for Fiji, Indo-Fijians make up most of the emigrants from Fiji. According
to Mohanty11, the permanent emigration process is dominated by Indo-Fijians (8889 per cent). However, the number of indigenous Fijian emigrants has also increased
recently. Some estimate that as much as 10 per cent of the migrants from Fiji are
indigenous Fijians, members of an improving and increasing middle class seeking
better opportunities for themselves and their children.12 This indicates that Fiji’s push
and international pull factors have an impact on numerous sections of the community.
Therefore, the causes of immigration in Fiji could be attributed to the push and pull
factors. Push and pull factors are those that either forcefully push people to immigrate
or attracts them and are related to economic, political, cultural and environmental
causes. Push factors which relate to Fiji in this case include essentially the political
upheaval and fear, the sense of exclusion from power, the sense of persecution,
the glass ceiling in the public service, corruption, mismanagement and racial
discrimination in the public sector, poor medical and public services, diminishing
employment opportunities, mistreatment, rise in criminal activities, tensions in
society between majorities and minorities followed by local struggles, racism and
racial discrimination. The consequences of Fiji’s military coups since 1987 have been
deep and irreversible causing massive brain drain from the country. Notably, the level
of out-migration doubles from around 2,400 each year to over 5,000.13 Non-renewal
of land leases and the deteriorating state of the sugar industry are also uprooting
people and have created the mindset for them to emigrate. Since 1987, thousands of
Indo-Fijian farmers’ land leases under Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act have not
been renewed mainly due to political ploys by indigenous Fijian leaders. Fiji has also
lost economic growth potential of more than 5 per cent since 1987.14
Pull factors which relate to overseas countries include better and fairer
opportunities, better living standards, education, enjoyment, better medical care and
public services, equal rights, stability, security and family links. Pull factors could also
be looked at a manner in which people have adapted themselves. Migrants from Fiji
have adapted well to foreign lands. They are talented and culturally well equipped to
participate in the foreign workforce. They are hard-working, understand the basics of
World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), Travel and Tourism: Progress and Priorities, 1995.
N. Hall, “Brain Drains and Brain Gains: Causes, Consequences, Policy”, International Journal of Social
Economics, Vol. 32, No. 11, 2005, pp. 939-950.
11
M. Mohanty, op. cit.
12
B. V. Lal, Turnings: Fiji Factions, Lautoka, Fiji: Fiji Institute of Applied Sciences, 2008a.
13
V. Naidu, “Social Consequence of the Coups”, in B Lal, G Chand and V Naidu (eds.), 1987 Fiji Twenty Years On,
Lautoka, Fiji: Fiji Institute of Applied Science, 2008.
14
B. V. Lal, “The Loss of Innocence”, in ibid.
9
10
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
western culture and have the skills and knowledge and do well overall. What sometimes
is not seen is the hardship that people have to endure in the process of adapting
because they carry with them the ethos and values which are appropriate in indigenous
context but not necessarily in a foreign context. Thus, the pain, hardships and suffering
they encounter are beneath the surface. Citizens from Fiji also have communities in
overseas countries, establish networks, have cultural institutions, and they do not feel
like completely new migrants or in an unfamiliar community. Most immigrants also visit
Fiji on regular basis; thus, they are acquainted with their home country as well.
4.
Political and Social Impacts of Immigration
Given the magnitude and importance of immigration, one cannot ignore
its impact on the developing countries. It will be fair to say that the best and the
brightest Fijians have either left, or are leaving or will leave sooner or later. Fiji has
lost over 3,800 professionals, technical and related workers since the coup in 2000.15
This represents over half of Fiji’s stock of middle to high level workers.16 The Fiji
National Provident Fund processed 741 applications for migration purposes which
amounted to US$ 6.28 million in the first quarter of 2008 and for the period January
to December 2007, withdrawal for migration purposes was US$ 19.74 million. What
is left behind are mostly the desperate or the desperately poor that have inadequate
skills to immigrate. Lal commented that there was hardly a single Indo-Fijian family in
Fiji which did not have at least one member abroad.17 This phenomenon is remarkable
and is certainly true in the case of Fiji. The gravity of focus is now shifted to either ‘I
will go one day or I want my children to be there’. Most migrants tend to be young
adults who are often educated and more ambitious and in this sense there is a loss
of educated leadership, skills and young productive people at village level. Families
also tend to be socially and culturally rooted in their country of birth which may be
difficult to overcome.
Immigration also has demographic consequences such as changes in
population distribution and demographic crises such as aging population due to the
loss of the young and productive group. This drain of skill and talent of professionals
such as doctors, nurses, teachers, accountants and others has been deeply felt by
people affecting their well being. Together with their families, these people 1,30,000
to 1,50,000, accounted for 10-12 per cent of the country’s population in 2000.18 Most
of these migrants also represent the reproductive ages; thus, there is a chance of
continued decline in population in the future. This in turn can be followed by economic
problems. It is estimated that Fiji has been losing US$ 19.35 million annually since
1987.19 These people have taken their skills, their earning and taxpaying capacities,
M. Mohanty, op. cit.
Government of Fiji, Annual Reports – 2000 and 2001, Suva, Fiji: Immigration Department, 2002a.
17
B. V. Lal, 2008a, op. cit.
18
V. Naidu, op. cit.
19
Ibid.
15
16
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SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
their life savings and their purchasing power to Australia, New Zealand, Canada
and the United States.20 Many local investors have also moved their savings abroad
to prevent any risks. Several sectors of the economy also lack quality and efficient
services due to the emigration of professional people. There is also a visible decline in
population of Indo-Fijian settlements in Fiji. Many farms are deserted and settlements
abandoned constituting a major socio-cultural rupture. It is said that over the last 20
years the largest town in Vavua Levu has lost is dynamism and is heading to becoming
a ‘ghost town’.
Institutionalised racism has also become widespread in the public sector
due to the continuous migration of Indo-Fijians causing social divide and further
segregation of people in Fiji. With no regard to ethnic balance, merits or proper
credentials, indigenous Fijians were recruited and promoted in virtually all top
government positions. Virtually all top public service positions have been held by
indigenous Fijians and they hold nearly 70 per cent of the remainder.21
On the other hand, people who migrate also have attachments with their
communities. There is transfer of technology, return of migrants who have learned
new technologies and managerial techniques and enhanced human capital to the
home country by boosting productivity and economic development. They also
contribute through remittances; assist in family or community-based projects or cash
and kind during natural disasters which are quite significant. Thus, the flow on effect
is continued. People also see migration as a multinational activity as they may select
someone to emigrate in the expectation that overtime that person would contribute
and help their families in Fiji.
Remittances particularly are amongst the major positive impacts of
migration. There has been a rapid increase in remittances from people living abroad.
When money is received locally, remittances play a crucial role in supplementing the
national savings rate in many developing countries around the world. Remittances
also assist in reducing poverty if they are effectively utilised by the locals. In the early
1990s, the amount of remittances in Fiji was very low. However, this significantly
increased since 2000 as depicted in Table 2. Between 1993-1999, remittances had a
low growth of only 38.4 per cent with an annual average rate of US$ 23.81 million
per year. This increased to 218.3 per cent during 2000-2004 with an annual average
rate of US$ 99.07 million a year. There was a remarkable rise in the flow of personal
remittances which amounted to over a billion Fijian dollars during the period 20002004. According to Mohanty,22 this dramatic rise was mainly due to the remittances
generated through the salaries and allowances by the peacekeeping forces abroad
and forces working in the United Kingdom.
M Reddy, M. Mohanty and V. Naidu, “Economic Cost of Human Capital Loss from Fiji: Implications for
Sustainable Development”, International Migration Review, 2004.
21
V. Naidu, op. cit.
22
M. Mohanty, op. cit.
20
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
Table 2: Trends in Personal Remittances in Fiji, 1993-2004
Period
1993-1999
2000-2004
1993-2004
Total Personal Remittance
(US$ million)
166.64
(F$ 344.32)
495.36
(F$ 1, 023.50)
662.01
(F$ 1, 367.82)
Annual Average Rate (US$
million)
23.81 (F$ 49.2)
99.07 (F$ 204.7)
55.17 (F$ 114.0)
% Change
+38.4
+218.3
+726.2
Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji.23
There is also debate over the extent to which remittances actually improve the
economy since they are mostly used for consumption purposes that do little to boost
domestic production, employment or exports rather than investment. Macmillan
outlines some of the negative consequences if remittances are used in this way.24
These include an increase in the price level and imports, an overvalued exchange rate
and a dependence on remittances which may delay long-term economic policies,
especially if they cannot be guaranteed due to economic fluctuations. There may also
be cases of unknown or unreported remittances; thus, its actual contribution is not
known.
Fiji’s recent political turbulence sets the context for understanding the
complex dynamics of its citizen’s emigration. Since the coups, emigration from Fiji
has exhibited two main characteristics. The first is the dynamic increase in emigration
since the coups of 1987. Between 1978 and 1986, 20,703 Fijian citizens emigrated
at an annual average rate of 2,300. Between 1987 and 1996, the number increased
to 50,050 at an annual average rate of 5,005. Between 1997 and 2000 alone, 16,825
people migrated. And the numbers are increasing daily. The second characteristic is
that the bulk of the emigrants – about 90 per cent – have been Indo-Fijians.25
Political instability is a major cause of migration from Fiji, making this
demographic transition enormously important politically. The Reserve Bank of Fiji
Quarterly Review noted “it is quite clear that the political instability generated by
events of 1987 and 2000 gave greater impetus to the emigration process.”26 In the
1970s and 1980s and even before, there was a powerful emotion in the indigenous
community that unless Fijians were united against Indo-Fijians, Indians would take
their land or future away. These comments seem to be a political tool to keep the
country divided for personal gains. Land laws cannot be changed unless Fijians
themselves want to change them. It is very solidly entrenched in the constitution.
It is essential to keep politics out of land issues, as land is a huge economic resource
which will benefit landowners, farmers and Fiji as a whole. Apparently, no land has
Reserve Bank of Fiji, Statistics on Personal Remittances, Economics Department, Reserve Bank of Fiji, Suva,
Fiji, 2005.
24
M. Macmillen, "The Economic Effects of International Migration", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
20, 1982, pp. 245-267.
25
B.V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.
26
Government of Fiji, "Impact of Brain Drain in Fiji", RBF Quarterly Review, Suva, Fiji, December, 2002b pp. 40-45.
23
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SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ever been taken away by the Indian community over the last 129 years since the two
communities have been living in Fiji. The fact that indigenous Fijians make up little
over 57 per cent of the total population, the fear that Indo-Fijians might dispose them
of their heritage or the fear of Indo-Fijian dominance has diminished. Migration has a
big role to play in this, allaying Fijian fears. With this fear gone, there is now more room
for debate and discussion among indigenous Fijians. Numerous political parties in
the 1990s came up to the fore partly as a result of the absence of this fear. Indigenous
Fijian concerns and issues will acquire a more prominent place in the public discourse
than was the case in the past.
There is also the loss of educated people through migration who perhaps
had a more genuine and vested interest in the long-term future in this country. This
is of immense concern as good quality of people is the key building block for any
country. For instance, the drain of talent and experience is one problem plaguing the
civil service. Another is its collapsing morale.27 Those who are left behind are gullible,
desperate and open to manipulation by political leaders. They have given up and
there seems a sense of resignation.
The cost of emigration in Fiji is also high. According to Lal,28 Fiji is estimated
to lose, on average, US$ 21.53 million annually due to emigration, mainly through loss
of skill, re-training new appointees and delayed appointments. The figure is much
higher – US$ 133 million – if account is taken of the output lost if the emigrant’s work
is not carried out by a replacement. Another study by Reddy, Mohanty and Naidu29
estimates the country lost directly and indirectly about US$ 21.77 million annually
through its human capital loss.
The other manifestation of this lack of educated commitment in Fiji is in the
calibre of candidates who stand for elections. In the past two decades, there has been
a significant change in the quality Indo-Fijian parliamentarians compared to their
Fijian counterparts.30 There was a time when highly educated and respected people
used to contest the general elections and they showed commitment to and passion
for politics. This has essentially vanished. The people who contest for elections now are
retired and low-level civil servants, faded faces, disgruntled and defeated politicians
and some political retreads hoping for a second career to enjoy a last moment of glory
and to make the most of the opportunity while it lasts for personal gains before the
candle blows out. They do not really have anything to contribute or they may not be
particularly well educated for the job. The educated class of the society remain nonparticipative as they have either made up their minds to immigrate, fear travel bans
and other international sanctions and unfavourable policies or simply do not want
to get involved with the messiness of local politics. Also the sense and fear of coup
B. V. Lal, “Aftermath of the 2006 Coup”, Fijian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2007, pp. 89-123.
B.V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.
29
M. Reddy, M. Mohanty and V. Naidu, op. cit.
30
B. V. Lal, 2008b, op. cit.
27
28
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BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 35, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2014
culture recurring and the culture of racial patronage is a very effective deterrent for
people to participate: ‘why sacrifice when there will be another coup?’ Coups do not
solve problems, they compound them.
On the other side, it can now be seen that the calibre of Fijians in politics is
far better or higher because they see a future in politics whereas Indo-Fijians do not.
This demographic transition has huge ethnic and political implications. People have
not sufficiently appreciated the magnitude of the change that has occurred. Many
people who emigrate feel deeply embittered about the coups, upheavals and other
problems. They sometimes exercise ‘soft power’, that is they create an awareness of
their parties or their community’s predicaments in an overseas country. Many write
from overseas in support for particular political parties or sometimes become the
milking cow for political parties as they do fundraising and other activities in support
of them.
It may also be worthy to mention here that race-based politics has hobbled
Fiji’s future. Despite the potential and opportunities, Fiji has been struggling over
the past two decades with adversities that are both complex and deep rooted. In
the wake of consecutive coups since 1987, Fiji has lost enormously as a result of bad
political and economic governance. Deeply divisive race based politics and the loss
of development opportunities have been immense. From 1970, Fiji started its journey
as a nation with a race-based political climate. Fiji’s politics and overall governance
have been conquered and mired in divisive, race-based policies and institutions
for decades. This has caused severe ruptures in Fiji’s developments resulting in the
hampering of developmental progress and prosperity. Fiji has suffered years of lost
development opportunities. This has had a huge impact on Fiji as a whole and has
contributed largely to the significant loss of skilled and talented people. The coups
and their impact have heightened and magnified the dominance of race-based
politics and governance resulting in a huge flight of trained and talented people,
mainly Indo-Fijians, going abroad.
Racial politics will have no future in Fiji particularly in the minority communities.
The 19 reserved seats for the Indo-Fijian community are also not in proportion with
the severe decline in the Indo-Fijian population size. Initially, there was proportionality
when the number of seats was tiered to the population size. It is also irrational to have
racial-based seats for the indigenous Fijian community which makes up little over 57
per cent of the total population. Another implication of this demographic transition is
that minority group leaders will have to integrate themselves politically with Fijians.
Fiji’s future does not lie in ethnic separation, in separate seats but in forging political
alliances with the indigenous community. It is suggested that all the ethnically
reserved seats should eventually be taken away so that Fiji can have a political
culture which is non-racial. Fijian citizens should move away from the obsession
that only their own ethnic candidate can look after their interests to one which they
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SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
can trust whomever they elect to represent their interests. Leaders also have a huge
responsibility towards this by being fair to all communities. Fiji-born immigrants have
no problem in voting for candidates from diverse ethnicities in overseas countries.
The smallest minority in society is an individual and if individual’s rights are protected
then everyone’s rights are also protected. The communal system and the ethnicity
question in Fiji are fundamental issues that have contributed towards agitation, racebased affirmative action policies, racial divide and the coups. Getting rid of this will
be a major step towards moving away from the politics of race to the politics of nonracialism. The biggest challenges would be to deal with the coup culture, function
and place of traditional Fijian institutions in modern 21st century politics, non-renewal
of expiring land leases under Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act and the country’s
obsession with racial politics. Political leaders will have to deal with these problems
now through dedication, commitment and effective visionary leadership and not
pass it on to the next generation.
Fiji has also inherited a political culture of distrust and suspicion because at
every turn people are reminded of their race. For instance, one has to indicate one’s
race when applying for jobs or filling out certain documents. Thus, public memory is
racially archived and people cannot think outside the box. This has also fragmented
Fiji by keeping people divided. People see each other through the prism of prejudice
and racial stereotyping as there was never a non-racial system of politics in Fiji. The
present system provides all the incentives for ethnic chauvinism, not racial or political
moderation. Fiji residents have different cultural heritages but they are all citizens of
one country. Gradually, this has to change and eventually abolished altogether as
racial seats seem a big hindrance to nation building. There should be politics based on
ideology not primordial affections. Politicians will adapt to any incentive in this system.
5.
Future Trends
As it is evident in many developing countries, the international mobility of
skilled workers including from Fiji is likely to increase in the future. Amongst other
factors mentioned, technological advancements have predestined an upward trend.
Most of the immigrants from Fiji have been Indo-Fijians and their magnitude of
migration has been remarkable. At one stage, Indo-Fijians were 51 per cent of the
population. By the end of World War II, Indo-Fijians outnumbered the indigenous
Fijians in the total population.31 In an interview on 03 January 2008, Professor Brij Lal
mentioned that at one stage Indo-Fijians were 51 per cent of the population, in 1987
they were about 49 per cent of the population, in 1996 they were about 45 per cent of
the population, now it is just over 37 per cent of the population. This is a substantial
drop in numbers. Based on this trend, Indo-Fijian numbers will go down even further
with time. Scholars may come to Fiji and have difficulty in believing that there was a
time in Fiji’s history when 50 per cent of the population was Indo-Fijians.
31
B. V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.
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Certainly, Indo-Fijians feel uprooted and unwanted and given the chance,
they would all go. Emotionally, they are now preparing for migration due to the
continuous instability and conflicts over constitution, land and politics. There may be
some who cannot migrate due to the love for the local lifestyle and jobs that they may
be doing but this may be very small in number. Indo-Fijians are a minority community
and they feel that they are being victimised by the majority community. Lal states that
the political culture of racial patronage and coups spawned effectively marginalised
the community.32 They see their future as very unstable given the problems from
the past decades. They also see the lifestyles of their own kinsmen who have gone
overseas and established themselves well. Their children are also pursuing courses
at tertiary institutions that would accumulate points for them to emigrate. Many
believe that people emigrating from Fiji should not be blamed as one should look at
the reasons why people immigrate, mainly due to diminishing opportunities, unequal
rights and political instability.
There is a creation of a Fiji diaspora mainly in Australia, New Zealand, Canada
and the US. People may come back and live in Fiji but not necessarily as citizens.
However, no one seems to really care that so many of Fiji’s best and brightest are
leaving. Some Fijian nationalists actually want the country emptied of Indo-Fijians.33
The response to the Indo-Fijian emigration has been varied. On the one side, it seems
regrettable that there is enormous amount of brain-drain of skilled and talented
people from Fiji. At another, there is a feeling of relief to have everything amongst the
indigenous community. Fijian nationalists applaud their departure as a necessary first
step in the “Fijianisation” of their country, a price the country “must” pay to reclaim its
indigenous soul.34 The ones who have left are regarded as disloyal or unfaithful to Fiji,
yet by staying back they are regarded as second-class citizens by Fijian nationalists.
Whatever the views, Indo-Fijians have contributed significantly since the colonial
economy to bring Fiji to where it is today. It is now really up to the government of
the day to try and see how they can harness the resources of the diaspora for Fiji’s
development. Lot of people who emigrated still consider Fiji as part of them at least
for the first generation. However, large number of Fiji emigrants may never have any
desire to ever come back to Fiji to live.
It is also important to mention that the development of a Fijian middle class which
is well educated and trained will increase over time. Indo-Fijians had the feeling that they
are the educated ones only but this has certainly changed. The gap would be filled by
people with skills and talent from the indigenous community. Indo-Fijians departure will
certainly make an impact in the short run but not necessarily in the long run.
32
33
34
Ibid.
B. V. Lal, 2008a, op. cit.
B. V. Lal, 2003, op. cit.
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6.
Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of skilled labour migration from the
developing countries exploring the case of Fiji. Fiji has played a vital role in supplying
labour to the developed countries and this is expected to continue. Advancements in
technology, information and transportation have contributed to the enhanced rate
and pace of immigration from Fiji. Labour demand and supply has now become more
globally accessible, with individuals and organisations fulfilling their needs more
effectively and efficiently.
The causes of immigration from any developing country could be attributed
to the push and pull factors which are related to economic, political, cultural and
environmental causes. These factors also have huge social and political impacts, some
of which are positive while others remain negative or undesirable. Higher remittances
and return of immigrants with technology and human capital are some of the
positive outcomes, while in some cases, the loss of leadership and educated people
emerge as undesirable results. If the trend continues, some developing countries
including Fiji will be left with a large pool of poorly educated, unskilled workforce
with disastrous consequences on social and economic infrastructure and levels of
investment adversely affecting industries, standard of education and health services,
and efficiency of civil service. It can be suggested that developing countries should
address their governance problems and take initiatives for democratic consolidation
for nation-building process. The divisive forces in the society need to be eradicated
and better opportunities have to be created through economic advancement that
will in turn make immigration to a foreign country less attractive, thereby benefitting
the developing countries in their development efforts.
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