Actor strategies and policy instruments within policy change
model: One element of the complex solution
Baketa Nikola1 and Tihmir Žiljak2
Abstract
This paper theorizes the role of the actor strategies which have important role in policy change. The authors
approach is based on the historical institutionalism thoretical perspective and the model which explains policy
change. The main step is to adjust this model to policy and historical institutionalism perspective through
replacement of preferences, perceptions and capabilities with strategic interests, beliefs and capacities. This
paper focuses on the strategies (based on the strategic interests, beliefs and capacites) of actors and how they use
policy instruments in order to foster or prevent the policy change. From our stand point the actors are able to
choose amongst four strategies: 1) to perserve the existing policy instruments in order to prevent policy change,
2) to change the use of existing instruments to foster policy change, 3) to promote policy instruments change, but
with the strategy to obtain status-quo regarding policy change and 4) unintended outcomes. It should be stressed
that actors can be those who make decisions regarding policy instruments, but also those who strive to influence
decions and who do not have the final word in the process.It should not be neglected that actor's strategies are
not the only aspect that influence policy change. The interaction of actors and institutional context are covered
with this model and actor's strategies are only one part of the more complex explanation. Change of the policy
instruments as part of the actor's strategy is not cause of policy change per se. This paper seeks to improve
understanding of the role that actor's strategies may play for policy change and detects the place of policy
instruments in this process.
Key words: policy change, policy instruments, actors, historical institutionalism
1
Nikola Baketa, doctoral student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb,
nikola.baketa@gmail.com
2
Tihomr Žiljak, Phd, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, tziljak@gmail.com
Introduction
Capano and Howlett (2009) presented four general theoretical perspectives on historical
sequencing regarding policy change – cyclical, dialectic, linear and teleological. According to
these authors, cyclical perspective is focused on the structural factors, exogenous variables,
revolutionary change and process. Within this perspective change occurs, but it also returns
to the status quo. Second of all, dialectic perspective stresses agency, endogenous variables,
revolutionary change and process, while change is the product of the process of negation
and synthesis. Next, linear perspective sees change as an evolution, but without clear
endpoint and it is focused on agency, exogenous variables and output. Finally, teleological
perspective is focused on structural factors, exogenous variables, evolution and output.
Here, the change is seen as directed towards identifiable goal.
We find our approach between the cyclical and linear perspective since we stress the
importance of the structural factors, exogenous variables and we are focused on process,
but also in part of our explanation we are focused on the agents and incremental type of
change. This shows the complexity of the topic and provides introduction into this
challenging discussion.
As mentioned, policy change is an complex phenomenon and multilayered process and
it“incorporates all aspects of transformation, redesign, more precisely, (in)stability of certain
policy“ (Petek, 2014: 137). In this paper, the authors will consider the policy change in line
with the Witte's work (2006: 60), who understands „policy change and actual change as
forms and aspects of institutional change since both require the adjustment of formal and
informal features“. The importance and theoretical complexity of the policy change research
are illustrated in the works of Giliberto Capano (2009), Durant and Diehl (1989), Cashore and
Howlett (2007), Rayner (2009), Mahoney and Thelen (2009) etc. These authors discuss
different aspects and dimensions of policy change such as type of change, tempo of change,
context of change, characteristics of types of policy change etc. Approaches in these papers
use dichotomies of two distinctive concepts in order to explain different aspects of policy
change through four possible solutions. For example, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) use
characteristics of the targeted institution (which may have low and high level of discretion in
interpretation) and characteristics of the political context (which may be strong and weak
veto possibilities) in order to present four types of policy change – layering, drift,
displacement and conversion. We find these approaches extremely useful in explaining and
recognition of different individual aspects of policy change. However, the explanation of the
policy change and the role of actors in that process require much complex solution.
Policy change and the models of change
In order to cope with the policy change problem, we decided to use and modify previously
developed models, which cover certain segments of policy change, by North (1990), Scharpf
(1997) and Witte (2006). It is necessary to point out that both, North and Scharpf, are mainly
rational choice institutionalists. However, North with his model presented in Institutions,
institutional change and economic performance (1990) inclines toward more historical view
of institutions and he “is concerned with tracing, historically, the emergence of different
kinds of institutional arrangements that either promote or distort development”(Thelen,
1999: 379). The actor-centred institutionalism, presented by Scharpf (1997) and Mayntz and
Scharpf (1995), covers the side of the actors. Witte (2006) combined these two models in
order to build a model of policy change to explain higher education policy change and
convergence among four systems (Germany, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands) of
higher education in Europe. In order to incorporate these two models and build a new one,
Witte decided to combine theoretical presumptions of three neo-institutionalist theoretical
streams (rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological
institutionalism). Even though we find eclectic approach acceptable and desirable, the
problem is that it sometimes enables to authors to combine theoretical presumptions of
different even when they are in clash in order to explain phenomenon or deviations which
they would not be able to explain within only one theoretical framework. From our stand
point, theoretical assumptions of historical institutionalism provide enough space to adjust
these models and provide strong theoretical foundation for further research within this
theoretical framework.
First of all, we find that the nature of policy change demands historical institutionalism
approach in order to comprehend and understand the whole process which happens from
the beginning till the end since this approach is not bounded in time and space as other
variations of neoinstitutionalism (Peters 1999: 76). According to Hall and Taylor (1996)
historical institutionalists define institutions “as the formal or informal procedures, routines,
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” (1996: 938),
they explain the relationship between institutional framework and actors and “have a view
of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended
consequences” (1996: 938). Institutions, in that form, influence degree of power that actors
have and their strategic interests, but they do not define (only shape) their interests and
they are not the only cause of outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, Immergut, 1998). The
same authors claim that the actors within historical institutionalism are not rational
maximizers (which is one of the assumptions of the rational choice institutionalism), the
historical institutionalism theoretical framework sees them as rule followers who are trying
to satisfy their goals within existing institutional framework.
We find that the institutional part of the model (Figure 1) is clear and that the influence of
the institutional context is discussed numerous times in historical institutionalism’s literature
such as Immergut (1998), Sanders (2006), Steinmo (2008), Thelen (1999) etc. On the other
side of the model, actors’ side, there are several important features. In our model there are
three important dimensions that are used to explain the policy change and role of actors in
this process – capacities, beliefs and strategic interests. We find these three concepts
theoretically more appropriate (within the historical institutionalism theoretical core) and
more in line with the policy research than the concepts presented in other models. North
(1990) uses opportunities, incentives and mental maps, Scharpf (1997) and Witte (2006) use
capabilities, preferences and perceptions. As mentioned earlier, North within his model, in
respect of institutions, inclines towards historical institutionalism. However, his view of the
actors and their characteristics remained within rational choice perspective. On the other
hand, the concepts used by Scharpf and Witte seem as not precise enough and hard to
encompass through research. Witte provides explanation of these concepts. Under
preferences she considers interests, norms identities and interaction orientations. Interest
are self-interests, norms are “preferences derived from organizational goals and missions,
but also from the normative limitations” (2006: 70), identities are interest and norms based
on the corporate identity, interaction orientations are preferences based on relation with
other actors. Furthermore, perceptions are subjective perceptions of reality which
encompass facts and causal relationships. In the end, capabilities are all resources which
allow actors to influence an outcome (position, financial resources etc).
Figure 1. Witte’s model of policy change – combination of North’s and Scharpf’s approach
Source: Witte (2006: 93)
As it can be seen in Figure 1, Witte combines findings of North (1990) and Scharpf (1997) in
order to create a policy change model to explain change in higher education policy. In our
opinion this model can be used to explain policy change in other policy areas too. However,
it requires certain improvement.
Reshaping the model
Within the proposed solution, we find capacities, beliefs and strategic interests as more
suitable concepts. In that respect, the concept of beliefs concerns ideas of actors which they
use for decision making within process of policy formulation. (Sabatier and Weible, 2007;
Žiljak, 2014) Beliefs are more suitable within the policy literature than perceptions and they
guide actors in their strategic behavior and in choosing policy instruments. Furthermore, we
find capacities as more appropriate then capabilities or opportunities, since they indicate the
totality of resources available to actors and their legal possibilities. According to the authors
which cope with the concept of capabilities, such as Sen (2002), Martins (2006) and
Nussbaum (2011), that concept represents certain potentials that could be actualized, or in
other words, capabilities are types of freedom to realize different actions. In that respect,
the concept of capabilities is used in analyses of freedoms and rights. On the other hand,
capacities represent totality of resources available to actors in respect to their position
(legal, institutional). In the end, we find that strategic interests of actors should be taken
into account instead of preferences and incentives since they are actual expression of actors’
internal preferences (which cannot be detected) and incentives (which can be interpreted
uniquely by each of the actors). Even though this concept may indicate that it belongs to
rational choice part of neoinstitutionalism, we find it appropriate. As mentioned earlier,
actors have bounded rationality within the historical institutionalism so they are able to
develop and pursuit their interests but within certain limits. As Goddard (2010) shows
strategic interest are tied with the cultural and social networks and Pierre (2006) separates
substantial interests and strategic interests. Thus, we find that strategic interests are not
based on absolute knowledge, they are not short-term interests and they are not directed
toward maximization. In respect of the North’s concepts, Witte (2006: 68) claims that in her
work she chose to use concepts developed by Scharpf since those definitions are clearer and
they have higher degree of operationalization which enables easier empirical analysis. We
definitely agree with Witte’s opinion that concepts proposed by North are hard to
operationalize and it makes empirical analysis unfeasible. However, we find that her
concepts still lack clarity and they did not show suitable in empirical analysis, too. Thus, we
see a solution in further theoretical improvement of the model.
Table 1. Actors’ features
North (1990)
Scharpf (1997)
Baketa
Witte (2006)
Žiljak
Incentives
Preferences
Strategic interests
Mental maps
Perceptions
Beliefs
Opportunities
Capabilities
Capacities
As we named this paper Actor strategies and policy instruments within policy change model:
One element of the complex solution it is clear that the further focus will be on one specific
element of the previously presented policy change model. These three actor’s feature shape
actors’ strategies toward political change. Theoretical presumptions of historical
institutionalism and the policy change model provide plausible foundation for the discussion
regarding actor strategies and policy instruments. In other words, we find necessary to
explain how actors use policy instruments in order to foster or prevent the policy change.
However, it should be pointed out that actor's strategies are not the only aspect that
influences policy change. The capacities of actors, their beliefs, strategic interests and
interaction within the institutional context are covered with this model so actor's strategies
are only a part of the more complex explanation. Change of the policy instruments as part of
the actor's strategy is not cause of policy change per se. There are four possible strategies: 1)
to preserve the existing policy instruments in order to prevent policy change; 2) to change
the use of existing instruments to foster policy change; 3) to promote policy instruments
change, but with the strategy to obtain status-quo regarding policy change and 4)
unintended outcomes.
As Immergut summarizes, “not only may political institutions, political authorities, and
political culture play a critical role in the definition, mobilization, and organization of
interests, but the structure of political opportunities will shape the strategies of organized
interests and their beliefs regarding the efficacy of different types of political action” (1998:
21). Surely, the definition of institutions within historical institutionalism encompasses
institutions, authorities and culture as formal and informal aspects within organizational
structure of the polity (institutional part of the model). On the other hand, political
opportunities, seen as capacities in our case, provide space for strategic interests and beliefs
of actors in order to shape their strategies.
It should be noted that the change is difficult due to several reasons. Policy or institution are
always embedded within larger system and there is a resistance of those who are in
advantaged position, existing structure provides predictable rules of game and actors have
created expectations that they do not want to replace with the new unpredictable
situations, the change might create costs since the policy or institution is locked-in or actors
can create preferences toward certain institutional arrangement and they refuse the change
(Steinmo, 2008). This is also visible from strategies that we presented, since two of them
pointing towards prevention of change and through one unintended consequences are
possible. On the other hand, only one strategy is focused on the fostering policy change.
The next part of the paper focuses on the actors and their features which explain how they
choose strategies within the institutional framework which shapes their possible actions.
Policy instruments and strategies
In public policies, actors may or may not act, may or may not make decisions (Dye, 2012). In
a situation where actors do not intend to act or when they do not make decisions that would
have an impact on a public issue, there are no instruments as well (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist
and Vedung, 2007: 51). When they plan to act, then there is a need to determine the
intentions, objectives, context of activity, who will act and how. The decision to act and
choice of action always happens in institutions and in institutions work people who act
according to their capacities, specific interests and beliefs.
The intention of actors may be focused on the goal or on the ensuring of their own position,
i.e. the creation of support and ensuring the legitimacy (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung,
2007). In doing so, the intention may be to change the situation, not to change it, or to resist
the change. These three options are not necessarily separated, so the change of one option
may serve to prevent a total change (as in the novel Il Gattopardo and Luchino Visconti's
eponymous movie - "everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same"). In any
case, the focus on the goal and the choice of instruments should be an important part in the
heuristic stages model of public policy. The instruments can therefore be grouped on the
basis of rational choice theory, according to which individuals are rational participants, and
collective is a community of rational individuals. Rationality is measured by calculation of
goals and resources (cost-benefit or pleasure and pain) and the choice will be guided by
maximization of the benefits for the individual. The choice can be controlled with
appropriate sanctions.
Therefore, there should be an analytical basis in order to be able to assess the benefits and
costs and determine the desired outcomes. But rational choice is only one part of instrument
choice explanation so additional explanation of ideas and beliefs, timescape and policy
learning will create more realistic picture of the problem. On this basis we can start to
determine the best instruments to achieve one of these goals.
Choice of instruments does not necessarily follow from the intent to systematically solve the
problem on the basis of the comprehensive analysis, because of actors’ bounded rationality.
As incremental approach proved, most actors make decisions based on incomplete
information and a lack of time, by adjusting to the circumstances and other actors, and by
bargaining with other actors (Lindblom, 1959). Sometimes, instruments are looking for
trouble (not vice versa), for example as in the March and Olsen's garbage can model, as
Jeremy Richardson shows on EU policies (Richardson, 2012: 354). This means that the stages
approach, in which the instruments have a clear position and connect the formulation and
implementation, is not always the closest to the real policy process (Sabatier, 2007: 7), and
that it is more prescriptive than descriptive by nature, but makes it easier to describe the
policy process (Hill, 2005: 20).
Accordingly, the instruments are not simply a tool-kit from which we choose what we want
to implement; the instruments are not so clearly defined (van Nispen, 2011). They have the
technical characteristics (as tools), but contain a representation of the organization and
management philosophy (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007: 7). In this sense, the instruments
are not neutral tools. Pia Cort has shown this very well in her analysis of the qualifications
framework as one element of European education policy (Cort, 2010). She has precisely
shown how this instrument has contained a certain understanding of education, values and
basic ideas of change.
„...EQF is not neutral but will influence national education policies in the direction of a higher degree
of standardisation and commodification of education and an introduction of market principles into
the education sectors“ (Cort, 2010: 307).
Also, the idea of policy work presumes that the instruments serve different purposes and it
is not always possible to prepare them for certain problems in advance, or rule out that the
new instruments will have to be created (such as, for example, qualifications framework in
education policy). Namely, the qualifications framework precisely confirms Giles's thesis that
instruments are at the same time both tools and institutions (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007:
8).
The attempt to create typology of instruments has also shown that they are beneficial for
teaching, but actors rarely use them (Linder and Peters, 1989). Likewise, detailed typologies
are less transparent and it is difficult to implement them within the research because they
are too extensive, too detailed.
Vedung has extensively analysed different types of instruments and came to the conclusion
that the power and coercion analysis are important for their classification. So, when players
decide to act, their choice of instruments is important: regulation, economic resources or
information. Thus, he called these three groups sticks, carrots and sermons. These
classifications are helpful if they are not limited to the stick-carrot dichotomy (Howlett,,
2005: 33), but also include the context and other elements of choice for action. Schneider
and Ingram have similarly pointed out the difference between the authority (related to
power), incentives (which use the economic resources) and capacity building (Schneider and
Ingram, 1990). Hood's typology, which also has authority as a starting point, is well known,
and beside treasure (economic resources) and nodality (which is close to capacity building
and sermons) he has also added organization. Salamon similarly recognizes that coerciveness
is one of the basic characteristics of instruments (beside directedness, automaticity,
visibility) (Salamon, 2002). Therefore, instruments' successfulness should be checked against
the following criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, management, legitimacy (Salamon,
2002). The actors should have the legitimacy (capacity) for the use of instruments (especially
the ones which contain coercion), but instruments can also serve the actors so that they can
maintain the legitimacy of their activity, where carrots can have an important role.
The analysis of the use of instruments has shown that the application of instruments has
been overlapping on the horizontal and vertical dimension and different instruments can be
used for the same goal on different levels of implementation. Vedung i Bemelmans-Videc
have called this the packaging (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung, 2007). For example,
what is specific for vertical stacking of instruments (packaging) is that the same policy can be
implemented through different instruments (different "packages" of instruments), which is
especially interesting within the Europeanization process. But there is also an opportunity to
repackage instruments, and on different levels of policy process instruments and policy
direction could be changed. The EU can start in the direction of one policy, which within the
implementation in one country or on the sub-national level can then be continued by the
use of an another instrument or it can come across an instrument which is preventing
implementation (obstructing implementation).
Crespy and Saurruger gave an example of obstruction in case of Europeanization
„Instruments of resistance must not be considered to be a purely functional rejection of European
norms that are seen as problematic by national actors. The instruments depend, on the contrary, on
the political as well as institutional and social context in which they are generated. How national
actors resist EU norms and how they decide upon instruments of resistance is a consequence of
existing power games and conflicts at the domestic level. These are then largely influenced by the
institutional context or domestic politics. From this perspective, instruments are not ”axiologically
neutral and indifferently available tools.“ (Crespy and Saurugger, 2014: 12).
The instruments do not have to be linked to the same idea or objective throughout the
whole process. Beside vertical packages, this is also clearly evident within policy transfers
and isomorphism. Dollowitz and Marsh have shown that within policy transfer, instruments
that are transferred are not necessarily linked to the same idea, objective or model of policy
that is being implemented (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Meyer and Rowan, within their
analysis of the concept of isomorphism, have shown that the structure can be separated
from basic ideas and activities so that the actors could adapt to the environment and get
legitimizing consent (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Hall has also shows that the instruments and
objectives do not always have to be connected i.e. you can change instruments without
changing objectives (1977).
So the instruments are not necessarily linked to the same idea, objective or policy model.
They can change the objectives or objectives can change the instruments, but that does not
mean that they become value-neutral. Lowi has shown that different policies provoke
resistance of different groups, but the reasons why some turn out to be losers and some
winners show that same instruments have different ideological orientations, they are not
neutral (Lowi, 1972). The instruments are not linked only to objectives, efficiency and
effectiveness, they can also be linked to legitimization of authority (solving or concealing
problems).
Five “I” foundation
Choice of instrument is connected to the group of elements that Peters called five “I”
(Peters, 2011). Beside institutions, ideas and interests that Hugh Heclo had indicated earlier
(Heclo, 1993), he has added the individual dimension and international organizations. He has
interpreted institutions within the new institutionalism approach, with special emphasis on
historical institutionalism. Interests here relate to those interests which actors seek to
achieve through political activity (they could be also called strategic interests) and strongly
connected with policy change. Ideas are important because they include the impact of mass
culture, political ideology and specific ideas in public policies, and they have huge influence
to actors coping with public issues. Accoording to Cobb (1973) the ideas which are used in
decision making process, which help actors to deal with policy problems and which are not
discussed are considered as beliefs. Peters has cautiously introduced the traditional question
about the role of an individual in the political process and change, as well as the role of
leaders and citizens. International environment includes dynamic communication between
countries and the transfer of innovation. Finally, without the international context policy
change can not be explained. The elements that he has emphasized, similarly to what
McDonnell has done in her interpretation of Hugh Heclo, are the mutual intertwining and
mutual influence of all these five elements (Peters, 2011, McDonnell, 2009).
In the choice of instruments, political context in which the choice happens is certainly an
important issue. This is clearly evident in the analysis of McDonnell and Elmore. The choice
of instruments depends on how the policy problem is defined, and the resources and
constraints policy makers face. In any case, the problem is defined by political context and
this determines the choice of instruments and the possibility of using force, as shown in our
model. The context can often reduce the choice of instruments. The institutional context
includes governmental capacity, fiscal resources, political support and opposition,
information (political, strategic, analytical), past policy choices. So there is a large number of
factors that affect the way actors do policy design (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987).
Jordan, Wurzel, Zito and Brückner have analyzed a similar effect of context and they talk
about three ways of choosing the instruments. The first is the one in which ideas and beliefs
determine what would be the instruments. Another approach emphasizes the institutional
dimension (whole range of state and societal institutions) and the third one is called chaotic
(chaos-dominant approach) which they link with Kingdon's three streams and with the
unpredictability of the political process. Namely, only opening the windows of oportunity
allows policy entrepreneurs to start troubleshooting in an unpredictable environment. They
analyzed the three approaches on the example of the EU environmental policy and showed
that the institutional approach is the most influential of the three in the choice of the
instruments (Jordan, Wurzel, Zito and Brückner, 2005: 332)
Structural dimension is certainly important, but there is also a dimension of the actors and
their beliefs, capacities and strategic interests. Therefore, the policy process is understood as
work on policies in which actors select instruments on the basis of their strategic interests,
capacities, beliefs and institutions in which they operate, but also in the interaction with
other actors to which they adapt their activity.
Sabatier also talks about these dimensions in his Advocacy coalition framework, with specific
emphasis on the role of beliefs in the choice of instruments. He categorized them as deep
core beliefs (which involve very general normative and ontological assumptions about
human nature), the policy core beliefs (applications of deep core beliefs that span an entire
policy subsystem) and secondary beliefs (relatively narrow in scope and address,
applications within a specific program).
„Policy core policy preferences are beliefs that “(i) are subsystemwide in scope, (ii) are highly salient,
and (iii) have been a major source of cleavage for some time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999,
134). Policy core policy preferences are normative beliefs that project an image of how the policy
subsystem ought to be, provide the vision that guides coalition strategic behavior, and helps unite
allies and divide opponents. When translated to secondary beliefs, policy core policy preferences
become policy preferences related to specific instruments or proposals dealing with only a territorial
or substantive subcomponent of a policy subsystem“ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195).
Peters and Linder distinguished two types of context. The first one is context as a setting
(systematic and organisational variables ), and the second one is context as a problem
(problem-specific variables). The contexts are part of exogenous factors which cause a
variation in choice of policy instruments. (Linder and Peters, 1989 50). Endogenous factors
are individual variables, which they explain as cognitive dimension of actors' policy activity.
Conluding remarks
It was found in analysis of instruments choice that beliefs, strategic interests and
institutions are key explaining variables. They link structure and agency. Choice of
instrument and use of different types of instruments cannot be explained using only one or
some of presented elements or variables. Interaction of all elements influences the selection
and choice of the instrument.
The context framing of the whole process and changing nature of the context produce
uncertainty and push actors to continuously work on redefinition of the problem, find
solution and choice or invent appropriate instruments. The characters of the leading actors
as well as citizens are also important, and are stimulus for activity which does not come
only from the outside, or from the exogenous factors (Linder and Peters, 1989), but also
from their personalities (Schneider and Ingram, 1990: 519) from endogenous, cognitive and
normative beliefs of actors (Peters, 2011).
In such complex environment and circumstances, work on policy is a continuous process in
which the actors learn from their own experience or the experience of others, they try to
find solutions in changing environment. The selection and choice of the instruments should
be the key tool for realisation of implementation of actors' intention and meaning. They can
use instruments to change policies, to save status quo or to continue with small changes,
and they can use the instruments for resistance to policy change or for retrenchment , like in
Europeanisation policy (Radaelli, 2003). Of course, there are also possible unplanned or
unintended outcomes or policy failures. They can occur because of a weak problem
definition, (linking problems and instruments), the actors’ inconsistency or changing political
environment (new government), poor use of instruments or a wrong selection and choice of
instruments (McDonnell and Grubb, 1995). The instruments have their technical dimension
which can be used for different purposes. But fine-tuning and calibration are important for
the nature of instruments, they are important for making decisions about a level of
constraint (to preserve or to get legitimacy) and orientation (to adjust instruments to goals
and target groups). With such use of instruments, effectiveness, efficiency and political
support should be achieved. Knill, Schulze and Tosun explain two dimensions of policy
calibration: the level and scope of instruments. They explain the process of calibration
within the environmental policy change, and they have found that calibration can occur
through tightening of regulatory standards or through increase of target group e.g. by lower
emission limits. On the other side, calibration could occur through loosening of regulatory
standard or decrease of the target group e.g. by increasing emission limits (Knill, Schulze
and Tosun, 2011: 12).
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