Economic Implications of a Fragmented Patent System in Europe Malwina Mejer and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie Economic Implications of A fragmented patent system in Europe Workshop on regulatory reform: Venice July 18-19 Malwina Mejer and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie July 2008 FIRST DRAFT - comments welcome This is a very preliminary version of the paper, please do not quote or diffuse without prior acceptance by the authors Abstract The European patent system is known to be highly fragmented: once a patent is centrally granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) it must be validated and enforced in the desired EPC (European Patent Convention) Member States. The main criticism of this system is that it is prohibitively costly, due to cumulated translation costs, national validation fees and national yearly renewal fees. This paper argues that the consequences of this ‘fragmentation’ are actually much more dramatic than the mere cost of prosecuting a patent before national patent offices would suggest. Cost simulations and case studies provide evidence suggesting that heterogeneous national litigation expenses and practices induce i) a high level of uncertainty; ii) a more intense managerial complexity; and iii) irrational discrepancies within the European market. Outline of the paper: 1. A fragmented system 2. Cost consequences 3. Litigation costs and institutional setting 4. Legal uncertainty: 3 case studies 5. Concluding remarks 1. A fragmented system The European patent system has been put in place in 1978, when height European countries ratified the European Patent Convention (EPC). Under the EPC, the process of granting a patent has been centrally performed by the EPO (European Patent Office). Nowadays the number of Member States is of 34, witnessing the success of the system and a wide recognition of the usefulness of the EPO. However, the EPC does not provide a uniform system to enforce European patents once they are granted. A European patent takes effect as national patents in each state where it is validated and enforced after its grant by the EPO. In other words, once granted a patent is subject to the national rules and practices of the member states. Such a fragmented system has two main implications for applicants. The first one is the high costs of protection. In contrast to other large regional or national patent offices in the world, payment of validation and renewal fees, the frequent translations requirements and the potential enforcement and litigation costs must be multiplied by the number of countries where the applicant aims at an effective protection. The second one is the complexity and uncertainty induced by a highly heterogeneous system: a patent had to be enforced on a country by country basis, with different practices and outcomes. National courts have so far an exclusive jurisdiction over patent litigations, with effect on their own territory. Furthermore, any infringement case should be dealt with using national law. In case of multiply litigations there is a risk of different courts reaching the opposite conclusions. The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the economic implications of the currently highly fragmented patent system in Europe. Two methodological approaches are used. The first one summarizes the results of recent simulations of patenting costs in Europe. It shows that the fees and translations requirement induce relatively high costs for European inventors. Despite the London Agreement, the cost of patenting in Europe is still prohibitive. The second approach investigates the implications of the fragmented system for managing and enforcing patents in Europe. Three case studies clearly underline the “inconsistencies” that are induced by the European patent system in the current form, not to mention the high degree of complexity and uncertainty induced by variegated approaches. 2. Cost consequences All the costs associated with the patent application and maintenance can be divided into four categories (Roland Berger, 2005 and van Pottelsberghe and François, 2008). The first category consists in the procedural expenses that are due at each state of the patent prosecution up to the grant. Those expenses include fees paid at filing, search, publication, examination and grant. Under EPC, for the European patent to take effect as national patent it has to be validated in the designated states. Validation procedure requires an applicant to submit a European patent translated into national language of the designated country to the national patent office for the publication. Fees that are paid during this procedure are counted as procedural expenses whereas cost of translations constitutes a separate cost category. The third category, cost of maintenance, includes annual renewal fees that are paid to national patent offices in order to maintain the national rights associated with the patent. Apart from the administrative expenses a patentee has to rely on legal advice at each state of patent life starting from a very first step of drafting a patent application up to the representation before EPO and national patent offices until the patent falls into public domain. Those external expenses constitute the remaining category. Evaluating the cost of patent protection is not straightforward as several components are difficult to quantity and depend on the filing strategy of the applicant (e.g. patent size, the application route, the quality of external services, the desired speed of granting process, the targeted geographical scope of protection). Table 1 presents the outcome of three recent studies that tackle the question of the cost of patenting in Europe. The numbers provided are calculated for the EPO-direct applications (i.e. application that are filled directly at the EPO, without going through the PCT process) and thus should be considered as a lower bound of the real cost that an applicant would have to bear.1 Simulations show that the cost of patenting increases with the number of countries. This is due to the three types of expenses: validation fees, translation and renewal fees that have to be cumulated over the number of countries where the applicant seeks effective protection. When looking solely on the short term cost (i.e. procedural and translation fees) the translation costs account for 45 up to 60 percent, depending on the number of countries in which protection is sought.2 Table 1: Comparison of the cost of ten years of protection, Euro direct application Methodology Year Roland Berger, 2005 van Pottelsberghe and François, 2008 van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2008 Survey Simulation based on fees as parameters Simulation based on fees as parameters 2005 2003 2008 W or ki ng H yp otheses Countries designated for protection Number of claims 6 3 13 6 13 CH,DE,ES, FR,IT,UK DE,FR,UK AT,BE,CH,DE, DK,ES,FI,FR,IE, IT,NL,SE,UK CH,DE,FR, IT,NL,UK AT,BE,CH,DE, DK,ES,FI,FR,IE, IT,NL,SE,UK 10 18 18 18.2 18.2 Cost of protection Procedural fees 4,400 4,670 6,575 6,385 7,789 Translation1 3,930 3,400 13,600 6,224 12,488 Renewal fees up to 10 years 5,600 2,975 16,597 6,974 13,770 External expenses2 17,780 12,500 19,500 - - TOTAL COST 10Y 34,720 23,545 56,272 19,583 34,047 Source: Roland Berger, 2005; van Pottelsberghe and François, 2008; van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2008 Notes: 1 Discrepancies between costs of translation come from different assumption about the size of the patent and the cost of translation. Roland Berger (2005) assumes the average patent size to include 10 pages of description and 3 pages of claims and the average cost of translation per page EUR 70, whereas van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) assume the average patent size of 16 and 4, respectively and the cost of 1 For further insights into different filing routes and the filing strategies see Chapter 6 in Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007). 2 The language of the EP at grant is the ‘procedural language’ (one of the three EPO official languages i.e. English, French or German). However, the EPO requires a patentee to provide a translation of claims into two other official languages of the EPO before publishing it in the European Patent Bulletin. When seeking effective protection in all 34 contracting states the patentee has to translate granted European patent into 24 languages. translation to be EUR 76 per page of description and EUR 85 per page of claims. van Pottelsberghe and François (2008) assume that the average cost of translation per language is EUR 1400. 2 External expenses are cost of relying on external (or internal) legal advice and expertise provided by patent attorneys. The patentee seeking ten years of effective protection in 13 EPC contracting states has to pay EUR 34,047 and for protection in all EPC contracting states EUR 84,146, without accounting for the cost of external services (van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2008). In order to ease postgranting translation requirements the group of EPC contracting states adopted the London Agreement on the 17th of October 2000.3 This Agreement, which entered into force on the 1st of May 2008, has been so far ratified by 15 contracting states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, France, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. According to the London Agreement, states having an official language in common with one of the official language of the EPO dispense the applicants from the translation of the description in the three official languages (the claims still have to be translated). States having no official language common with one of the official languages of the EPO may require a translation of description into one of the three official languages.4 Countries that have not yet signed the London Agreement still required the translation of the whole patent (including the claims and the description) into their official language.5 van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) evaluate the impact of the London Agreement on the cost of patenting in Europe. Their results are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1: Relative cost saving due to the implementation of the London Agreement, as of May 2008 (in EUR) Procedural fees Translation cost Renew al fees 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 EPO-6 EPO-6 (LA) EPO-13 EPO-13 (LA) Source: Adapted from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008, Appendix Table XX). These costs correspond to the examination process fees, the translation costs and the renewal fees for ten years of protection in 6 and 13 EPC member states, before and after the London Agreement (LA). Relative cost saving on the procedural and translation cost due to the ratification of the London Agreement is 29% when validating the European patent in six countries EPO-6 (i.e. 3 The official name of the document is Agreement dated 17 October 2000 on the application of Article 65 EPC. In case of dispute full translation of the European patent into an official language of the state in which the alleged infringement took place is necessary prior the suit. 5 In practice, for the validation of the European patent in Belgium, Germany, France, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco and in the United Kingdom no translation of the European patent is required, for validation in Latvia and Slovenia only translation of claims is needed as those countries accept description written in any of the EPO official languages. Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands and Sweden require not only translation of claims but also translation of description to be submitted in English. 4 Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and 24% when validating in thirteen countries (i.e. EPO-13 that includes EPO-6 counties and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden). The saving rates are smaller when looking at a ten years period for patent protection and correspond to 21% and 19% for EPO6 and EPO-13 respectively. This is undoubtedly a substantial cost decrease, but one must keep in mind that a European patent still remains the most expensive region in the world. Figure 2 presents the comparative cost structure for ten years of patent protection in Europe (after the entry into force of the London Agreement), Japan and the United States. Figure 2: Comparative cost structure in the US and Europe, as of May 2008 (in Euro) Procedural fees Translation cost Renew al fees 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 EPO-6 (LA) EPO-13 (LA) USPTO JPO Source: Adapted from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008, Appendix Table XX). These costs correspond to the examination process fees, the translation costs and the renewal fees for ten years of protection in 6 and 13 EPC member states, before and after the London Agreement (LA). Even after the ratification of the London Agreement by 15 EPC contracting states a European patent is four to six times more expensive than a US patent when procedural and translation costs are considered. In relative terms the difference remains large. Table 2 shows that the cost per claim is five to nine times more expensive in Europe than in the US. In Japan, where patents include much less claims, the cost per claim is twice as high as in the US. The last column of the Table 3 takes into account the market size (measures as number of inhabitants in each of the regions). It shows that after the London Agreement a the cost per claim per capita is five to seven times more expensive than in the US. Table 2: Procedural and translation cost relative to the US, fees as of May 2008 EPO-13 EPO-13 (LA) EPO-6 EPO-6 (LA) JPO Per patent 9.0 6.9 5.6 4.0 0.8 Cost per claim 11.4 8.7 7.1 5.1 2.0 Cost per claim per capita 9.2 7.0 7.5 5.4 4.7 Source: Adapted from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008, Appendix Table XX). These costs correspond to the examination process fees, the translation costs and the renewal fees for ten years of protection in 6 and 13 EPC member states, before and after the London Agreement (LA). Due to these prohibitive costs, European patents are, on average, effectively validated and enforced in about six countries (cf. van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) and Harhoff et al. (2007)). In a nutshell, the high fragmentation of the European patent system induces a high and prohibitive cost of patenting in Europe, about 5 to 8 times the relative cost of patenting in the US. These prohibitive costs induce applicants to enforce their patents in (only) about six countries on average (out of 34 Member States); which leads to two potential implications (or discrepancies): • The average patent being enforced in ‘only’ six countries on average, it makes it easy for imitators (or infringers, or parallel importers) to enter the European Union through a country where the patent has not been enforced, and then distribute it widely within Europe. This of course does not preclude enforcing the patent in the countries where it has been validated, but makes it much more difficult to identify imitated goods. (documenting on free movement of goods) • The patent system is justified by the dynamic efficiency it induces: the monopolistic power aims at stimulating firms to innovate. It is generally opposed to the static efficiency ensured by the antitrust or competition policies. The latter is controlled centrally in Europe, by Directorate General Competition, for the whole European Union. There is therefore a flagrant inconsistency within the European market, where the competition policy concerns the whole market and its counter effect actually concerns a few countries. When litigation occur, these two discrepancies are further exacerbated, as illustrated in the following two sections. 3. Litigation costs and institutional setting Patent infringement suits are a costly way of enforcing intellectual property rights, especially in Europe, where there is no uniform system to enforce European patents. According to EPC European patent takes effect as national patent and has to be enforced on a country by country basis.6 The EPC gives national courts exclusive jurisdiction over invalidating the European patent with an effect on its territory.7 In other words, national courts have the power over applying and interpreting harmonized substance of the EPC. Patent infringement cases are also subject to national jurisdictions and should therefore be dealt with using national law.8 Such a system is very costly for both the applicant and the defendant, as the cost of potential enforcement and litigation must frequently be cumulated over the number of countries where the applicant has its patent effectively enforced. Litigation cost vary significantly according to the type of proceedings, complexity of the case, technical field of patenting and amounts in dispute. The EPO (WPL/4/03) estimates the cost of patent litigation for four EPC contracting states, Germany, France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, where 90% of current European patent litigations take place. The broad costs of litigation are presented in Table 3. 6 Art 2(2) EPC: The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that State, unless this Convention provides otherwise. 7 Art 138 of the EPC. 8 Art 64(3) of the EPC. Table 3: Cost of patent litigation in selected EPC contracting states, in 1,000 EUR1 Germany 2 France The Netherlands United Kingdom First Instance 50 to 250 50 to 200 60 to 200 150 to 1,500 Second Instance 90 to 200 40 to 150 40 to 150 150 to 1,000 140 to 450 90 to 350 100 to 350 300 to 2,500 Total Source: Adopted form EPO Doc. WPL/11/05 Rev. 1, 16.02.2006 Notes: 1 Includes both court costs and patent attorney’s fees. 2 Cost for both validity and infringement. The United Kingdom is by far the most expensive jurisdiction as the cost is much higher than the sum of the costs among the three other jurisdictions. The cost of litigation in Germany, France and the Netherlands is comparable. However, in case of multiple litigations, costs have to be added across jurisdictions. The cumulated cost of enforcing the patent rights before the four tribunals of the First Instance vary from the EUR 310,000 up to EUR 3,650,000 when accounting for the cost of appeal at the Second Instance. Costs of multiple litigations are extremely prohibitive especially for individuals and small and medium enterprises. Jurisdictions differ not only in terms of cost of proceedings but also with respect to the institutional setting and the quality of adjunctions (qualification and number of the judges deciding on the case) as illustrated in the table 4. Table 4: Characteristics of juridical systems in selected EPC contracting states Judicial system Germany France The Netherlands United Kingdom Dual system Single system Single system Single system The Court of First Instance Federal Patent Court for invalidity; 12 District Courts for infringement (specialized court in Düsseldorf ) 10 Tribunal de Grande Instance; (specialized patent judges in Paris and Lyon) District Court in The Hague has a specialized IP chamber Patents Country Courts and the Patents Court of the High Court No of judges legally qualified … 62 40 6 6 …out of those technically qualified 46 0 0 5 Specialized court Composition of the court (number of judges 3 or 5 3 3 1 dealing with a case) Source: Allgayer (2005), Council of the European Union Document No 11622/07 and EPO WPL/4/03, Germany is an example of a country with dual judicial system where courts hearing infringement cases are separated from the court that decides on the patent validity (or revocation) albeit in France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom the same court hear and judge in both cases. Table 4 shows that the degree of institutional specialization differs substantially across countries. Some countries have specialized IP chambers (France and the Netherlands), while others specialized patent courts (Germany and United Kingdom). With regard to the quality of proceeding, Germany has the highest number of legally and technically qualifies judges. No technically qualified judges are available in France and the Netherlands.9 (…) Determinants of settlement and litigation are purely economic - cost, quality and the speed of the litigation. Parties involved in the patent dispute will adopt its behavior and litigate in countries where the cost of settlement is high relative to the broad patenting cost (Katz, 1987 and Priest and Klein, 1984) (…) European patents that have been at the opposition before the EPO have a higher probability of being litigated in the future (Gambardella et al., 2005). Table 5: Litigation activity in 2004 Germany France The Netherlands United Kingdom Number of EP in force 307 488 252 289 121 333 257 600 Number of litigations that started in 2004 500 (infingement) 500 (nulity) 50 50 120 Appeals form the first instance judgments 350 (infingement) 250 (nulity) 20 25 3 Source: Adopted from CJA Consultants Ltd (2006) Insert Graph with average cost at first instance vs share of litigation To the cost of the litigation proceedings a patentee has to deal with the legal uncertainty induced by the current European and national systems, as illustrated by the three case studies presented in the next section. 9 However, the judge or the parties can designate a consultant (engineer or research) who is actively involved in the proceedings but does not participate in the judges' deliberations (Council of the EU, 11622/07). 4. Legal uncertainty: 3 case studies In order to illustrate the inconsistencies that are induced by the European patent system we will provide and overview of three case studies (Table 5). It should be pointed here that the focus of this study is not on the legal nature per se. Table 6: Case studies - stylized facts EPILADY DDS v ECB SENSEO Patent Information No of EP EP0101656 B1 EP0455750 B1 EP0904717 Epilady Document Security System Inc. since 2005 Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics Date of filing (EPO) 29/07/1983 13/11/1991* 30/09/1998 Date of grand (EPO) 1986 01/01/2002 22/08/2001 Alleged infringer Remington European Central Bank Group of Dutch and Belgian companies2 Year of litigation 1989 2005 2001 Patent holder Decisions of the Courts Validation Infringement Validation Infringement Validation Infringement n.a - n.a. pending n.a. - upheld n.a. - n.a. revoked n.a. AT - NO pending - - - BE - YES pending - upheld YES DE - YES upheld - - - ES - - pending - - - IT - YES pending - - - FR - NO revoked - - - NL - YES upheld - decision postponed NO UK - NO revoked - - - 1 CFI of the EC Opposition at the EPO Source: Council of the European Union, Document No 11622/07, Bird and Bird (2004), CMS (2007) and Boyes Turner (2007). Notes: 1 Court of the First Instance of the European Commission 2 Retail chains: Coöperatieve Inkoopvereniging Intergro BA, Vomar and Drie Mollen in The Netherlands as well as Fort Koffiebranderij, Cafes Liégois and Beyers Koffie in Belgium Epilady In 1980s Epilady invented its famous device: a “hair remover for use on ladies legs”. Once having granted a European Patent for its invention in 1986, Epilady put its product in the markets of 11 EPC contracting states. During the first two years of marketing and selling, Epilady suited about 28 competitors who infringed its patent producing one-to-one products and it won in all those cases. In mid-1988 Remington entered European market with a Smooth and Silky, a device that performed exactly the same function as Epilady but with a slightly different mechanism. The former used a rotating helical spring system whereas Smooth and Silky a rotating rubber bar with slits in it. The Epilady brought a patent infringement action against Reminton in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The outcomes of those hearing were quite unexpected. National courts issued entirely different decisions on the same subject matter, even though the EPC construct juridical systems in the same way, providing a definition of the interpretation of European patent application.10 No infringement of the Epilady patent was found in Austria, France and the United Kingdom, whereas infringement was found in Belgium, German, Italy and the Netherlands. DDS v ECB An American company Document Security System Inc., which specialized in developing, licensing and selling anti-counterfeiting technology and products, holds a European patent for ‘non-replicable document and method of making same’.11 This technology makes bills replicated by copiers and digital scanners show a stripe they are fakes. In August 2005 DDS started an infringement action against the European Central Bank (ECB) claiming that the ECB uses their technology. According to the EC Treaty, a person claiming compensation from one of the European Institutions can bring his action before the Court of the First Instance of the European Commission (CFI). DDS referred to this rule and launched infringement case before CFI. Shortly after the proceedings before the CFI started, the ECB filed claims to invalidate the DDS Patent in: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. With regard to revocation, already few national courts have taken decisions concerning the interpretation of the patent claims. English and French courts invalidated the DSS patent whereas Dutch and German took the opposite decision upholding the validity. The case before the other courts is still pending so is the infringement case before the CFI. Additionally, to the inconsistent interpretation of the patent application, this example shows that the current system allows for a situation in which the validity of the same European patent is judged separately from the infringement at different courts: one central European and one national. Different courts hearing different aspects of the case is not new in countries that have a dual system i.e. Austria and Germany but not for counties with the single system where there is only one court that judges on both infringement and validation. Senseo 10 Art 69(1) of the EPC reads as follows: The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. During the discussions at the diplomatic conference on the final version of the EPC this simple rule was interpreted in completely different way by the British and German courts. Instead of rewording the article protocol on the interpretation of this article was agreed upon and incorporated into the drat of the EPC (Straus, 2000). 11 Before 2001 DSS was called New Sky Communications, Inc. and specialized in developed and produced theatrical motion pictures and home video cassettes. In 2002 it acquired, through a reverse merger, four companies: Lester Levin, Inc. d/b/a Patrick Printing; Document Security Consultants, Inc. and Imperial Encryption, Inc., Thomas M. Wicker Enterprises, Inc., and changed its name to DSS. With those acquisitions the Company came to the possession of various intangible assents including the European Patent EP0455750 B1. The Dutch-American company Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics developed a Senseo coffee machine, which makes an individual cups of coffee supplied in circular pads that are inserted into the machine by the user. For this technology they were granted a European patent “assembly for the use in a coffee machine for preparing a coffee, container and pouch (pad) of said assembly”. The coffee machine proved to be a great success and competitors started entering the Senseo market for pads delivering copycats to the market. In order to secure its monopolistic position in the market for pads Sara Lee initiated number of infringement proceedings against competitors started towards the end of 2001, including those in Belgium and the Netherlands. She argued that as the pads constituted an essential part of the innovation producing those pads constitute an indirect infringement of her patent. Shortly after grant, in September 2001, the firm Alber Heijn B.V filed an opposition before the EPO.12 In mid 2002 the Court of Appeal in The Hague held in its preliminary proceedings that there was no indirect infringement action. Knowing the views of the Court in The Hague on the subject matter Sara Lee issued number of additional proceedings. By the end of 2003 Sara Lee’s competitors seeking the declaration of non-infringement in Belgium filled an action before the Court of First Instance in Antwerp and won. However, Sara Lee appealed this decision and in 2004, without waiting for the outcome of the opposition before the EPO, the Antwerp Court of Appeal held that the competitors infringed Sara Lee’s patent: they had delivered means that allowed third parties to make use of the patent which constituted an indirect infringement of the patent. Sara Lee won in Belgium and kept the monopoly power until August 2006 when the EPO revoked her patent in full for lack of inventive step. Senseo case shows that the current system not only allows for discrepancies in interpreting the patent claims but also the lack of the logical order making two institutions deciding on the patent validity: the EPO for the European patent (as opposition after grant) and national court for exactly the same patent but as national patent (as validated in the designated state). The geographical scope of the decision in both cases is different. The EPO decides on the European patent thus revocation will result in annulations of the patent in all the states where the patent was effectively validated, whereas national court decision will be binding only within the borders of the particular county. 12 The opposition procedure before the EPO allows a European patent to be centrally opposed if it was allegedly wrongly granted. It can be posed by any person from the public. The notice of the opposition should be filed within nine months from the publication of the mention of a grant of the European Patent. On average, it takes 3 years for the Board of Appeal at the EPO to issue the final decision (Graham et al., 2003). Figure 6: Litigation discrepancies within Europe Senseo Senseo National Court ECB Epilady Epilady ? Centralized European Court ( E CJ /E P O) ECB Senseo INFRINGEMENT VALIDITY Table 7: Summary - inconsistencies of the existing system Epilady claim interpretation Document Security Systems, Inc. Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics claim interpretation claim interpretation Courts rule on infringement and revocation (not within the same national jurisdiction) interpretation of indirect infringement Two different institutions ruling on the same subject matter 5. Concluding remarks References Allgayer U., 2005, A comparison of the litigations systems in Germany, France and United Kingdom, Patenta (Patent Attorney) Bessen J., ad Meurer M.J., 2008, Patent Failure, Princeton University Press, p.330 CJA Consultants Ltd, European Policy Advisers, Britain and Brussels, June 2006, Patent Litigation Insurance: A Study for the European Commission on the feasibility of possible insurance schemes against patent litigation risks, Appendix to the Final Report Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enhancing the patent system in Europe, COM/2007/0165 final European Patent Convention 1973, revised versions 13.12.2007 European Patent Organization, Agreement dated 17 October 2000 on the application of Article 65 EPC European Patent Organization, Assessment of the impact of European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) on litigation of European Patents, WPL/11/05, 16.02.2006 European Patent Organization, Workload and Cost of the European Patent Judiciary, WPL/4/03, 31.10.2003 Gambardella A., Giuri P. and Mariani M., 2005, The value of patents for today's economy and society (Technical Report: Study A1.3 The value of the patents from indirect indicators: Efforts of patent enforcement in Germany), European Commission, DG Internal Market Gambardella A., Harhoff D. and Verspagen B., 2008, The value of European patents, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6848 Graham S., Hall B., Harhoff D. and Mowery D., 2003, Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of U.S. Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions, in Patents and the knowledge based economy, 2003, edited by Cohen W. and Merrill S., National Academies Press, Washington D.C. Guellec D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B., 2007, The Economics of the European Patent System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 250p Harhoff D, Hoisl K., Reichl B. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. (2007), Patent Validation at the Country Level - the role of fees and transaction costs, CEPR Discussion Paper No 6565 Katz, A., 1987, Measuring the demand for litigation: Is the English rule really cheaper?, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 3(2)., pp. 143-176 Priest G.L., Klein B., 1984, The selection of disputes for litigation, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.13, p. 1-55. Roland Berger, 2005, Study on the cost of patenting in Europe, prepared on behalf of the EPO by Roland Berger Market Research (available on the EPO website) Straus J., 2000, Patent Litigation in Europe - A Glimmer of Hope? Present Status and Future Perspectives, Journal of Law and Policy, Vol 2 van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and François D., 2008, The cost factor in patent systems, The Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, in Press. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and M. Mejer, 2008, The London Agreement and the relative cost of patenting in Europe, CEPR Discussion Paper, forthcoming van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and N. Van Zeebroeck, 2008, A brief history of space and time: the scope-year index as a patent value indicator based on families and renewals, Scientometrics, 75(2), 319–338. Working Party on Intellectual Property (Patents), Council of the European Union, Document No 11622/07 Other information sources: Bird and Bird, Patent Update Newsletter, Benelux – Coffee Wars, November 2004, pp 7-9 http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/newsletters/upload/19918_1.pdf CMS European Patent Review, January 2007, pp. 18-19 http://en.cmsdsb.com/legal_news/publications/cms_european_patents_review Boyes Turner, The Mystery of the Euro Bank Note: A Strange Case of Patent Infringement, 12 June 2007, http://www.boyesturner.com/news-article.html?id=197