Hell Along the F ront Range: The Ongoing Wildfire Threat in El Paso County, Colorado J.P. Griego Policy Memorandum In partial fulfillment for the Degree of Masters of Public Policy (M.P.P.) Spring 2015 Policy Advisor: Richard Caldwell CBA Advisor: Dr. Andy Sharma I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y S t u d i e s – U n i v e r s i t y o f D e n v e r 2 [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] Acknowledgments I want to express my gratitude to the many experts in the field of firefighting, public safety and policymaking who provided information and expertise that was critical to the development of this policy memorandum. These individuals have spent years in the service of protecting our communities and ensuring that everyone comes home after a wildfire. These experts include: Steve Dubay, Battalion Chief, Colorado Springs Fire Department Kevin Klein, Director, Colorado Dept. of Homeland Security & Emergency Management Jim McGannon, Former City Forester, City of Colorado Springs Joel Miller, Former Colorado Springs City Councilman Melissa Lineberger, Director, Center of Excellence for Advanced Technology Aerial Firefighting Steve Schopper, Audio/Visual Specialist, Colorado Springs Fire Department Justin Whitesell, Section Chief, Colorado Wildland Fire Management Section David Yowell, Wildland Fire Supervisor, El Paso County Sheriff's Office Additionally, this policy memorandum would not be possible without the support of my friends and family, many of whom supported my endeavor of pursuing a Masters Degree in Public Policy. Witnessing first hand the incredible power and destructive capabilities of wildfire during the Waldo Canyon blaze in the summer of 2012 gave me reason each day to continue researching policy solutions. Many friends and neighbors lost their homes during the 2012 and 2013 wildfire season; some sadly perished in the disasters. The research and policy solutions within this document were developed to help alleviate another catastrophic event such as the Waldo Canyon or Black Forest fires from ever happening again in our community. Finally I would like to extend my sincerest acknowledgement of the fourteen men and women who lost their lives valiantly fighting the Storm King Fire near Glenwood Springs in my home state of Colorado. Their sacrifice twenty years ago has changed wildfire suppression policy forever. Every fire season brave men and women don the green dungarees, suit up with the 40-­‐pound plus pack, grip pulaski tools in hand and march towards infernos when everyone else is moving in the opposite direction. Their courage has inspired me to write this policy memorandum. Godspeed. May 1st, 2015 Cover Photo: Residents flee the Mountain Shadows Neighborhood as the Waldo Canyon Fire
approaches. Source: The Denver Post
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 3
Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 1. INTRODUCTION 7 2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 2.1 U.S. WILDFIRE HISTORY 2.2 THE SCIENCE & ECOLOGY OF WILDFIRE 2.3 CONTEMPORARY SUPPRESSION POLICY & GROWING FISCAL CONCERN 2.4 TRAGEDIES 3. METHODS 3.1 EL PASO COUNTY 3.2 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK & STAKEHOLDERS 3.3 DATA 3.4 FACTORS OF SUCCESS 3.5 PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4. ISSUE ANALYSIS 4.1 HISTORICAL & RECENT WILDFIRE COST IN EL PASO COUNTY 4.2 CLIMATE CHANGE & ADDITIONAL WILDFIRE FACTORS 4.3 STAKEHOLDER INPUT 5. SOLUTIONS 5.1 THE STATUS QUO 5.2 ALTERNATIVE 1 – ADDITIONAL SEASONAL WILDLAND FIREFIGHTERS 5.3 ALTERNATIVE 2 –AUTOMATED WILDFIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS 5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 6. COST-­‐BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6.1 THE STATUS QUO 6.2 ALTERNATIVE 1 – ADDITIONAL SEASONAL WILDLAND FIREFIGHTERS 6.3 ALTERNATIVE 2 – AUTOMATED WILDFIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS 6.4 CONCLUSION 7. DISCUSSIONS & STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION 7.1 UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 7.2 WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION FEE 7.3 FUTURE OUTLOOK 8 11 14 17 18 20 23 23 26 27 30 32 34 36 37 38 40 41 43 45 47 49 53 8. WEAKNESSES & LIMITATIONS 54-­‐55 9. REFERENCES 56-­‐65 9.1 APPENDIX 9.2 WORKS CITED 4 [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] Table of Contents (continued) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: CAUSES OF WILDFIRE FIGURE 2: 10-­‐COUNTY LOCAL TAX COST PER CITIZEN FIGURE 3: PALMER DROUGHT INDEX: MORNING OF WALDO CANYON FIRE IGNITION FIGURE 4: BEST-­‐CASE SCENARIO CONDITIONS FOR LOW-­‐INTENSITY WILDFIRE FIGURE 5: WORST-­‐CASE SCENARIO CONDITIONS FOR HIGH INTENSITY WILDFIRE FIGURE 6: TOTAL ACRES BURNED IN COLORADO WILDFIRES PER DECADE LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN EL PASO COUNTY TABLE 2: LIST OF COLORADO’S SIX MOST DEVASTATING WILDFIRES TABLE 3: TOTAL NUMBER OF WILDFIRES NATIONALLY IN 5-­‐YEAR SPAN TABLE 4: WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION COST FY2015-­‐19: STATUS QUO TABLE 5: WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION COST FY2015-­‐19: 3 SEASONAL FTE TABLE 6: WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION BENEFITS: 3 SEASONAL FTE TABLE 7: WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION COST FY2015-­‐19: AUTOMATED WILDFIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS TABLE 8: WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION BENEFITS: AUTOMATED WILDFIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS TABLE 9: FULL COST-­‐BENEFIT ANALYSIS MATRIX TABLE 10: COST-­‐PURPOSE ASSESSMENT OF LOW-­‐COST UAS TABLE 11: TOTAL REVENUE GENERATED FROM WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION FEE FY2015-­‐19 TABLE 12: 2013 NATIONAL REPORT OF WILDFIRES & ACRES BURNED BY LAND OWNERSHIP LIST OF IMAGES IMAGE 1: SMOKEY BEAR IMAGE 2: PILATUS PC-­‐12 SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT IMAGE 3: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY CADET CHAPEL DURING WALDO CANYON FIRE IMAGE 4: BUSY FIRE DAY: THE EIGHT WILDFIRES BURNING IN COLORADO ON JUNE 23, 2012 5 13 24 31 39 39 51 21 30 31 41 42 42 44 44 46 49 52 53 10 16 22 28 [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
BIA
Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM
Bureau of Land Management
CAL FIRE
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CFAC
Colorado Firefighting Air Corps
COA
Certificate of Authorization
COE
Center of Excellence for Advanced Technology Aerial Firefighting
CO-WRAP
Colorado Wildfire Assessment Portal
CRS
Congressional Research Service
CSFD
Colorado Springs Fire Department
CSFS
Colorado State Forest Service
CSPD
Colorado Springs Police Department
CWPP
Community Wildfire Preparation Plan
DFPC
Colorado Department of Fire Prevention and Control
DOA
Department of Agriculture
DOD
Department of Defense
DOI
Department of the Interior
EPSO
El Paso County Sheriff’s Office
EPSOWF
El Paso County Wildland Fire Crew
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA
Federal Emergency Administration
FS
Forest Service
FWS
Fish and Wildlife Service
GIS
Geographic Information System
GPS
Global Positioning System
GFA
Government Firefighting Agencies
HOA
Homeowners Association
ICT
Incident Command Team
MAA
Mutual Aid Agreements
MAFFS
Modular Aircraft Firefighting System
MMA
Multi-Mission Aircraft
NASF
National Association of State Foresters
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NIFC
National Interagency Fire Center
NOAA
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPS
National Parks Service
NWS
National Weather Service
NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command
TABOR
Taxpayers Bill of Rights
UAS
Unmanned Aerial System
6 [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The increased frequency and intensity of wildfires in El Paso County, Colorado, have
resulted in enormous expenditures for suppression efforts, levying serious fiscal costs amongst
an array of stakeholders within the Pikes Peak region. Since the summer of 2012, El Paso
County has experienced two major wildfires that destroyed a combined total of 32,527 acres,
burned 835 homes, claimed four lives and cost $23.8 million to suppress.1 According to a recent
study released by NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center, the summer of 2014 experienced the
highest recorded temperatures since data was collected more than 130 years ago.2 Devastating
floods and higher soil erosion occurred in the aftermath of the Waldo Canyon Fire and the Black
Forest Fire. With higher temperatures, lower rainfall and expanding urban areas, El Paso County
features a favorable location for a continued presence of powerful and destructive wildfires. This
is a problem that threatens the people, property and place of El Paso County, Colorado.
Wildfire has and will continue to be an issue the people of El Paso County face.
Through careful examination of past and present wildfire suppression policy as well as a
complete discussion of the factors contributing to the increased frequency of wildfire, this policy
memorandum will present an understandable format for experts and novices alike. It is critical to
conduct precise research in efforts to accurately forecast the economic and social costs
associated with the potential of future wildfire. Today the growth of El Paso County’s suburban
population into the wildland urban interface (WUI) is quickly changing the environment of the
county along the I-25 corridor, putting more strain upon firefighting resources within the county.
This policy memorandum analyzes the status quo of wildland firefighting policy while
providing two policy alternatives for improved wildfire suppression capabilities. These policy
alternatives would have direct effects in identifying fires early while keeping firefighters safe
and ultimately lessening the physical destruction as much as possible. The two policy
alternatives are:
•
Hiring three seasonal wildland firefighters to the El Paso County Sheriff’s
Office Wildland Fire Crew to assist in improved coordination and response
times when a wildfire is still in its early stages
•
Acquiring Automated Wildfire Detection Systems to be placed within heavily
forested areas, which would monitor forest conditions 24 hours per day
1
Makings, Vickie. “Colorado’s Largest Wildfires (burn area),” The Denver Post.
NOAA National Climatic Data Center, State of the Climate: Global Analysis for August 2014, published
2
NOAA National Climatic Data Center, State of the Climate: Global Analysis for August 2014, published
online September 2014, NOAA.
2
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 7
Finally by conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the research of this policy memorandum
suggests that new suppression policy is needed to develop smart, cost-effective measures to
ensure that El Paso County, Colorado can remain a safe and vibrant community for generations
to come. A sensitivity analysis will also be included within the cost-benefit analysis section that
analyzes best-case and worst-case scenarios for a wildfire that warrants suppressive action to
occur. A brief portion of this memorandum following the cost-benefit analysis of the status quo
and two alternatives will be dedicated to the discussion of two additional options to aid future
wildfire suppression policymaking: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) technologies to assist
with identifying points of ignition, daily surveillance of forest conditions and monitoring
behavior of future wildfires and the implementation of a County Wildfire Suppression Fee for
those who live within the WUI to help finance a growing wildfire mitigation and suppression
budget.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wildfire. This natural phenomenon, which ranges in both size and intensity, is the
subject of legends. Interestingly, wildfire serves in both constructive and destructive ways. Its
power is derived from three ingredients: heat, oxygen and fuel. Many vegetative species depend
on wildfire to blossom, to help support mature tree growth, and to clear out underbrush that
competes for nutrients. However constructive wildfires may be, during the months of April
through October, the United States is faced with an average of 80,000 wildfires per season.3
Damaging and destroying thousands of homes and property and costing the Forest Service (FS)
more than $1billion to suppress each year, wildfire is no small policy issue.4
The locations most prone to the largest and most destructive wildfires are within the
Rocky Mountain and southwest regions as they feature semi-arid and warm temperatures, which
are favorable conditions for the presence of wildfire. El Paso County, Colorado is a prime
example of a fire prone location. It is home to over 20 cities, towns and census-recorded areas
including the county seat and second largest city in the state, Colorado Springs, making it the
most populated county in the State of Colorado.5 Currently, 32 percent of U.S. housing units and
3
“Total Wildland Fires and Acres,” NIFC.
“Federal Firefighting Costs (Suppression Only),” NIFC.
5
Historical Census Population, Department of Local Affairs: State of Colorado.
4
8 [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] one-tenth of all land with housing units is situated in the WUI with sustained growth expected.6
The growing population of El Paso County is putting a greater strain on the delicate balance of
the WUI, creating an environment that will require additional resources to protect homes and
property from wildfires. This is a concern for foresters, wildland firefighters and residents alike.
El Paso County officials and residents are seasoned from two recent, costly wildfires:
the Waldo Canyon Fire in 2012 and the Black Forest Fire in 2013. Still, many areas throughout
the County face the threat of another major wildfire. The economic and ecological impacts of
these wildfires last for several years. Flames from the wildfire damage property and land, make
the soil hydrophobic, and prime it for disastrous floods as experienced in the summer of 2013.
While many lessons have been learned from these past wildfires, there still remains a great deal
of concern over large parts of the County’s wooded southwestern slopes along Cheyenne
Mountain and its sprawling plains east of Colorado Springs.
Through careful examination and direct conversations with stakeholders and
policymakers, this policy memorandum is designed to provide analysis in avenues of financial,
political and social policy in an effort to recommend solutions to identify and suppress the future
spread of wildfire at its earliest stages within El Paso County, Colorado. While it is evident that
wildfire is a natural phenomenon, it must be recognized that no matter the amount of public and
private mitigation of potential flammable vegetation and other fuels, wildfire awareness, public
outreach and education programs, or fire-retardant building materials, wildfire is going to
happen. Therefore policymakers must craft smart, cost-effective solutions to identify wildfire at
the earliest onset, suppressing and extinguishing when and wherever it sparks.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Wildfire, whether natural or manmade, is an ongoing threat to the people,
property and place of El Paso County, Colorado requiring new cost-effective
suppression policies to combat future wildfires.
2.1 U.S. Wildfire History
As the United States expanded westward, more land was needed for American settler
development. For centuries, various Native American tribes used wildfire to clear land for
6
Wildfire, Wildlands, and People: Understanding and Preparing for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban
Interface. U.S. Department of Agriculture.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 9
hunting buffalo and other large game.7 Once the nation began to populate the frontier towns and
mining camps, a network of commerce was formed. Fire was used in ‘slash and burn’ methods
to clear way for fields of crops and ranching. Fueling the expansion westward was the vast
network of railroads, which connected commerce from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The
introduction of the railroad to the western frontier brought an expansive market to
commercialize millions of acres of untouched forests for logging.8 During this period the
logging business was a public and private market with FS serving in the role of chief land
steward, partitioning off parcels for commercial development. With the growth of the agriculture
and logging industries, came the need for the protection of property from any and all threats
including the West’s most formidable foe: wildfire.
Following the American Civil War, the U.S. experienced its most deadly wildfire. On
October 8, 1871, the Great Peshtigo Fire in northwest Wisconsin burned over 3.7 million acres
and killed a record 1,500 people.9 Peshtigo was one of the first incidents where the expansion of
the nation reached a tipping point with deadly consequences. It would not be until 1910 when
the strategy of fighting wildfires would garner the attention of the public and policymakers alike.
During that summer, a wildfire broke out along the Idaho-Montana border. Hundreds of men,
many of whom were volunteers and had no professional training in fighting fires, were
mobilized to combat the blaze. Claiming 85 lives and destroying 3 million acres, the Great Idaho
Fire, more commonly known as the ‘Big Blowup’ or the ‘Big Burn,’ triggered a number of
changes within wildland firefighting.10 Public sentiment reflected near unanimity that fire was a
threatening evil to be fought and suppressed at any cost. Booklets were printed to rally
communities against the threat imposed by wildfires. Printed material of the time, such as a
booklet published at the turn of the Century by FS and the California Division of Forestry
(CDF), captured the wildland firefighting fever that swept the nation:
We have inherited a tremendous responsibility: the priceless treasures of
natural resources of this Nation have been entrusted to our care. As Nature’s
abundance sustained our forefathers, it sustains us; that abundance will and
must be available for our children and their children. To keep these natural
riches abundant, we must zealously guard them from all destructive agents. The
foremost of these is fire – man’s best servant but worst enemy!
(CDF/FS 1900)
7
William, G.W. “Introduction to Aboriginal Fire Use in North America,” Fire Management Today.
Bradshaw, Karen M. Norms of Fire Suppression among Public and Private Landowners. Wildfire Policy.
9
“Historically Significant Wildland Fires,” NIFC.
10
Egan, Timothy. The Big Burn: Teddy Roosevelt and the Fire that Saved America.
8
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 10 COUNTY, COLORADO] The Weeks Act of 1911 and the Clark-McNary Act of 1924 initiated the first steps of
building cooperative assistance between states and the federal government. The 1926 “10-Acre
Policy” mandated the suppression of all wildfires before they reached 10 acres in size. This
policy was the foundation of the first national fire policy, which did not come until 1935 after
nearly fifteen years of combatting powerful wildfires since the Big Burn. FS suppression policy
began to focus more on fire exclusion altogether. During the time, fire exclusion from the forest
was believed to promote ecological stability and health. More importantly, fire exclusion could
also reduce damages to residential and commercial entities, lessening the possibility of total
economic loss. In 1935, FS instituted the “10 AM Rule,” wherein the objective was to prevent
all human-caused fires and contain any fire that started by 10 a.m. the following day.11 Much of
FS policy at the time reflected a fear of wildfire and belief that such a natural disaster could and
must be suppressed immediately. The objective of these policies that called for immediate
suppression by the next morning was to utilize the evenings and mornings when temperatures
were relatively cooler and conditions allowed crews to gain an upper hand on the incident.12
Following the implementation of total suppression policies, fighting wildfire became a
cultural endeavor supported through media productions. Walt Disney’s 1942 classic Bambi,
featured wildfire in the ending scenes as a destructive wildfire consumed a swath of the forest as
the creatures fled for safety. During World War II, several advertising campaigns were launched
including the propagandizing of Axis powers secretly
plotting to start wildfire in the country. It was not until
after the war in 1946 when one of the most famous and
iconic characters had a special message for Americans,
“Only YOU can prevent forest fires.” Based on a real
life black bear cub orphaned by the Capitan Gap Fire
in California, Smokey Bear quickly became a popular
character amongst millions of youth. Created by FS,
Smokey was used to indoctrinate a generation of
Americans to believe that wildfire was an evil that had
to be fought and defeated at all costs. Despite the
highly recognizable presence of Smokey and other
Image 1: Smokey Bear. Source: FS.
public wildfire prevention efforts, FS and other land
management policymakers made a critical
11
12
Review and Update of the 1995 Wildland Fire Management Policy. NIFC.
Gorte, Ross W. Federal funding for wildfire control and management. Congressional Research Service.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 11
miscalculation. What officials failed to take into account was the immense amount of
underbrush that had accumulated over the years due to immediate wildfire suppression policies,
which now spread throughout the West as prime tinder for larger and more powerful wildfires.
Finally the soaring cost of wildfire to various stakeholders can be explained with the
increased focus on institutional factors related to budgets and financing for wildfire suppression.
Currently in place are several perverse incentives that amplify a larger emphasis on wildfire
suppression policies. This critical issue can be largely attributed to local politics and increase
building permits within the WUI. Wildfire suppression is financed through taxpayer dollars
rather than revenue generated from homeowners living in the WUI or general contractors
developing within the WUI. An additional perverse incentive can be found when giving FS and
other government firefighting agencies (GFAs) essentially a Congressional blank check for
emergency firefighting which enables these agencies to borrow funds from other land
management programs including improved mitigation efforts prior to a wildfire ignition to fund
greater wildland firefighting. Additionally, there are unequal cost-share agreements between
federal, state and local governments for suppressing multi-jurisdictional wildfires. With these
historical wildfire policies leftover from over a century of immediate suppression and lack of
reform, a restructuring of institutional practices is critical to correcting the historical
mismanagement of the growing cost of wildfire suppression.
2.2 The Science & Ecology of Wildfire
What is wildfire? When uncontrolled and often destructive, the terms ‘wildfire’ or
‘wildland fire’ are used to identify burning within a less-developed, less-inhabited area. After the
turn of the 21st Century, FS redeveloped terminology that included forest fire under the umbrella
terms of wildfire or wildland fire. According to FS, a wildfire is defined as: “An unwanted,
unplanned, damaging fire burning in forest, shrub, or grass and is one of the most powerful
natural forces known to people.”13 Fire needs three components to sustain itself: heat, oxygen
and fuel. The ‘fire triangle,’ to which it is more commonly referred, displays the chemical
reaction of fire known as combustion. Once sustainable in a larger environment, fire is no longer
a controllable force. The behavior of wildfire varies with respect to the amount of combustible
fuel, the topography of the region and weather conditions such as temperature, relative humidity
and wind patterns. Although fuels vary, all physical items have a point at which it combusts and
13
“What is a Wildfire,” Wildfire Science. SmokeyBear.com.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 12 COUNTY, COLORADO] begins to burn known as the ‘flash point.’ Wood, the most common fuel, has a flash point of 572
degrees Fahrenheit. 14
Changing climate in the western regions of the U.S., particularly areas within the Rocky
Mountains, has contributed greatly to the lengthening of the wildfire season. In years past, the
wildfire season began in May and concluded in late September; however, this is no longer true.
Climate change is significantly worsening the risk of large wildfires in the Rocky Mountain
West. The western wildfire season has now lengthened from five months on average in the
1970s to seven months today.15 A warmer and drier climate has directly altered weather patterns,
contributing to greater intensity and frequency of wildfire. In fact, with favorable conditions,
wildfire has the ability to create its own weather. This volatile weather creates additional wind
that in turn supplies wildfire with more oxygen with the power of producing fire whirls which
feature bursts that can be 66 feet wide and shoot out 328 feet at a speed of 100 miles per hour.
These bursts have the ability to emit embers that can discharge upwards and travel over a mile
away, which is known as ‘spotting.’16 Spotting allows the wildfire to grow in size, often
beginning smaller, separate blazes from the principal burn. The combination of warmer
temperatures, abundance of dry fuel and sufficient oxygen can sustain a wildfire for weeks.
Studying the diverse means by which wildfire can spark, several agencies have
identified various causes for alarm. The most common cause for wildfire is in fact nature itself.
Figure 1 depicts acts of nature, such as lightening and volcanic activity as the largest causes of
wildfire. Specifically in Colorado, the summer months feature warm and dry mornings that are
often cooled by scattered thunderstorms in the evening that are capable of producing large
quantities of lightening strikes. Since 1980, the National Weather Service (NWS) in Pueblo,
Colorado has observed July as the month with the highest number of recorded lightening
strikes.17 Lightening is an extremely unpredictable source of ignition, able to strike at anytime in
remote, forested areas even without accompanied rainfall. This phenomenon, known as ‘Virga,’
is when streaks or wisps of precipitation fall from a cloud but evaporate before reaching the
ground.18 During Virga, lightening occurs when charged particles within clouds emit powerful
bolts of electricity to the ground, capable of igniting a wildfire similar to the South Canyon Fire
near Glenwood Springs, Colorado in 1994.19 While nature is responsible for a significant
14
Bensor, Kevin. “How Wildfires Work,” How Stuff Works.
The Heat is On: U.S. Temperature Trends. Climate Central.
16
The Fire Line: Wildfire in Colorado, The Denver Post.
17
Colorado & National Lightning Statistics, National Weather Service: Pueblo, CO.
18
National Weather Service Glossary. NOAA.
19
Maclean, John N. Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire.
15
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 13
percentage of wildfire ignitions, human activity remains the principal source of starting wildfire.
Mankind, directly or indirectly, presents the greatest danger to the health of the forest.
Although the destructive capability of wildfire is evident, its constructive traits are often
overlooked. Following the reworking of FS wildfire policy in the late 1970s, a growing number
of scientists and foresters began to research the natural benefits of wildfire. This change in
attitude, from classifying wildfire as a malevolent force of destruction to a healthy, cyclical
process with beneficial properties, was revolutionary. Wildfire is an essential natural
phenomenon that allows for the renewal of 94 percent of wildlands across the U.S.20 Many
ecosystems depend on the occurrence of wildfire happening periodically to allow for the
germination of different species of trees including the Ponderosa Pine, Lodgepole Pine and the
Douglas Fir, all of which are native to Colorado and can be found in the various forested areas
within El Paso County.21 Wildfire also serves in a restorative capacity that clears and removes
smaller, younger brush and seedlings from underneath the canopy, allowing for mature trees to
grow and thrive. When wildfire is excluded from the ecosystem of the forest, the overgrowth of
younger floor plants and trees make accessing precious nutrients more competitive.
Unfortunately, as a result of greater wildfire suppression, the forest health has declined. In order
for forests to remain vibrant and sustainable ecosystems, a certain degree of wildfire presence
must be allowed to exist.
Debris/ Juveniles 5% Vegetation 5% Causes of Fire Cigerette Butts 1% Unknown 1% Mechanical 7% Camphires 9% Incendiary/
Arson 13% Acts of Nature 39% Miscellaneous or Unrecorded 20% Figure 1: Causes of Wildfire. Source NIFC.
Note: Acts of Nature (lightening, volcanic activity, sparks from rockfall), Miscellaneous or Unrecorded
(cabin fires, meth lab fires), Incendiary/Arson (fireworks, flares, exploding targets from sport shooters),
Mechanical (Downed power lines, sparks from train brakes, vehicle exhaust), Debris/Vegetation (Trash
fires, prescribed burns), Juveniles (Children playing with fire).
20
21
Fire Wars, NOVA.
Graham, Russell T. & Theresa B. Jain. “Ponderosa Pine Ecosystems,” USDA Forest Service.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 14 COUNTY, COLORADO] 2.3 Contemporary Suppression Policy & Growing Fiscal Concern
FS defines suppression as, “All the work of extinguishing or containing a fire, beginning
with its discovery.” Since the redrafting of FS suppression policy in 1970, the process of
addressing wildfire spread and intensity has evolved. The 1995 Wildland Fire Policy and its
2001 update recognized the growing fire protection problems in the WUI and noted the need for
financial stability within FS wildfire suppression policies. Each year FS employs nearly 8,400
seasonal wildland firefighters to assist in the mitigation, suppression and restoration of national
forests and grasslands. Today FS manages 193 million acres in 44 states and territories
representing 30 percent of all federally owned lands including 155 national forests, 20 national
grasslands and seven national monuments.22
While FS still maintains a principal role within the wildfire policymaking and strategy
developing structure, the coordination to combat wildfire amongst the various jurisdictions of
federal, state and local government agencies now rests with the National Interagency Fire Center
(NIFC). Originally founded in 1965 as the Boise Interagency Fire Center (BIFC) by FS, other
GFAs such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National Weather Service, identified
the need to collaborate in order to maximize resources, reduce duplication of services and
overall cut costs while coordinating a national wildfire response center. In the 1970s, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) joined the efforts. By 1993 the
BIFC was transformed into today’s modern NIFC. Its motto reflects the efforts that
policymakers made to ensure smart, cost effective measures were implemented to suppress
wildfires at the first spark: “To serve as a focal point for coordinating the national mobilization
of resources for wildland fire and other incidents throughout the United States.”23
Although consolidation of decision-making has ultimately reduced costs and improved
response times to wildfires, the growing wildland fire program budgets have been a concern
since at least the 1970s. Two decades later, with the objective of cost containment, the Strategic
Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs reviewed over 300 recommendations regarding the
skyrocketing costs of wildfire suppression. The panel regarded the federal government’s
approach over the previous two decades as, “[having] operated under the current system of
essentially having a blank check. The lack of accountability for costs allows for increasing costs
of wildland fire suppression.”24 This approach gave GFAs a perverse incentive to reallocate
22
Fiscal Year 2015: Budget Overview. United States Department of Agriculture.
Mission and History, NIFC.
24
Large Fire Suppression Costs: Strategies for Cost Management. Strategic Issues Panel on Fire
Suppression.
23
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 15
financial resources to suppressing fires rather than alleviating the total cost of wildfires through
fuel reduction and prescribed burns. In a 2011 report, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
found that federal wildfire management costs, while varying based on fire season severity and
climate conditions, have steadily increased over the past 15 years.25
The Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) Act of 2009
addressed some of these unintended fiscal consequences, reducing the need to borrow funds
from other programs to cover increasing wildland firefighting costs.26 The FLAME Act
established separate fire suppression accounts, dedicated to financing the costs of suppressing
large and potentially life-threatening wildfires, in annual appropriations. CRS reported that while
funds supplied by the FLAME Act have shielded federal programs from the financial impacts of
borrowing from other programs such as mitigation projects to pay for wildland fire suppression,
the critical shortcoming is that the FLAME funds do not provide the necessary incentives vital to
reduce or contain growing wildland firefighting costs.
Today’s wildland firefighters are made up of a patchwork of elite crews comprised from
several federal, state and local GFAs. These crews are trained to engage the most serious and
dangerous incidents. Fires are catalogued by a 1-3 scale with Type-3 incidents featuring a single
tree or bush set ablaze to Type-1 incidents classified as ‘high severity incidents’ requiring the
mobilization of hundreds of firefighting vehicles and personnel.27 Once a wildfire reaches Type1 classification, an incident command team (ICT) assumes command of all suppression efforts.
The ICT is comprised of several crews, including hand crews and engine crews who initially
begin work on fire lines that help contain the wildfire by reducing flammable fuels and
sometimes by providing water or foam to slow the blaze. At the heart of the ICT are hotshot
crews: ground personnel working in pairs of ‘sawyers’ who cut down brush with chainsaws and
‘swampers’ who follow behind and remove the flammable debris. These men and women are
directly deployed into the most dangerous areas of the wildfire and are responsible for building
firebreaks to contain the blaze and identify fire behavior at its deadliest points.28 Armed with
chainsaws and pulaski tools, hotshots are the shock troops to fighting wildfire. Depending on the
topography of the incident, smokejumpers may be mobilized to attack the incident from the air.
Using helitack crews to chopper them in, smokejumpers are said to assume the greatest risk,
25
Gorte, Ross W. Federal Funding for Wildfire Control and Management. Congressional Research
Service.
26
Wildland Fire Leadership Council. 2011. A National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy.
27
Dubay, Steve. "Colorado Springs Fire Department's Role in Recent Wildfires." Telephone interview
with Battalion Chief Steve Dubay of the Colorado Springs Fire Department.
28
Dickman, Kyle. “In the Line of Wildfire,” Outside Magazine.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 16 COUNTY, COLORADO] often landing in areas completely cut off from outside personnel. These highly trained and fit
wildland firefighters parachute in behind fire lines to gain a strategic foothold on the blaze and
serve as the eyes and ears of the ITC, reporting the direction and behavior of the wildfire.
Outside of helitack crews are surveillance aircraft and large air tankers. Surveillance
aircraft are critical to any wildfire suppression campaign, as these aircrafts such as the Pilatus
PC-12 and the Beechcraft Super King Air, have advanced Global Information Systems (GIS),
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and high definition infrared cameras. Image 2 shows the
proposed detailing of a Pilatus PC-12 for the Colorado Firefighting Air Corps (CFAC) a
subsection within the Division of Fire Prevention and Control (DFPC) in the Colorado
Department of Public Safety. These aircraft would assist in the goal of the Department to: “Keep
all wildfires with values at risk smaller than 100 acres and to suppress all fires in the WUI areas
at less than ten acres, 98 percent of the time.”29 Large air tankers, such as the civilian DC-10
aircraft used by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection or ‘CAL FIRE,’ are
capable of dumping more than 12,000 gallons of slurry directly over the fire. In addition to
civilian firefighting capabilities, military resources can be mobilized through the use of mutual
aid agreements (MAA), which provide personnel, vehicle and aircraft support, such as the USAF
C-130 Modular Aircraft Firefighting Systems (MAFFS), to assist in major Type-1 incidents.30
Used in extreme circumstances, military assets maybe mobilized once a state governor or the
president issues a state of emergency declaration.
Image 2: Pilatus PC-12 Surveillance Aircraft. Source: Center of Excellence for Advanced
Technology Aerial Firefighting.
29
Report to the Governor and General Assembly on Report to the Governor and General Assembly on
Strategies to Enhance the State's Aerial Firefighting Strategies to Enhance the State's Aerial Firefighting
Capabilities. Colorado Firefighting Air Corps, Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control
30
Firefighting Aircraft: Recognition Guide. CAL FIRE.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 17
Every summer for the past hundred years, the U.S. has waged a war-like campaign
against wildfire. Thousands of young men and women train to combat the spread of large blazes.
Although technology continues to advance, human lives, whether building fire lines on the
ground or monitoring wildfire behavior from the air, are placed in jeopardy with each new
incident reported. By risking their own lives each year, a political and moral question is raised
about the value of homeowners’ property versus the lives and resources of the firefighters
working to save them. Following the Waldo Canyon Fire, in a press conference Colorado
Springs Fire Department (CSFD) Chief Captain Steve Riker brought this very moral issue to
public attention conveying, “We do take risks, and I’m not going to put my people in a situation
that won’t come out alive. I did not sign on with the city that I would die for you.”31 Sadly, when
wildfires become too dangerous, firefighters who bravely risk their own lives for others
tragically end up making the ultimate sacrifice.
2.4 Tragedies
Wildfire is a force of nature that acts on its own accord, seeking new fuels to consume to
continue its existence. From alpine forests in the Sierra Nevada’s to the high plains of the
Midwest, dry arid desserts in the Southwest and suburban homes along the Californian coast and
Rocky Mountain Front Range, the presence of wildfire is seen and felt across many American
communities. Over the past hundred years, many lives have been lost due to the intense heat and
flames of wildfire. Since the times of Peshtigo and the Big Burn, wildland firefighting strategy
has been enhanced with better communications technology, vehicles, aircraft, and personnel
equipment such as ‘fire shelters,’ which are individual blanket-like sheets that are deployed to
protect a hotshot caught too close to a wildfire. Despite the advancements to wildland
firefighting, tragedies still occur. Twenty years ago, Storm King Mountain near Glenwood
Springs was the site of the South Canyon Fire, which claimed the lives of 14 firefighters.32 A
well-trained and well-experienced crew, the Prineville Hotshots fell victim to a fast moving,
high intensity fire along the steep and rugged terrain within Glenwood Canyon. The deaths in
Colorado prompted many wildland firefighting experts to vow that a similar tragedy would
never happen again. In the summer of 2013, nearly two decades following the deaths on Storm
King Mountain, 19 members of the elite crew Granite Mountain Hotshots, were caught within a
wildfire at Yarnell Hill, Arizona. Despite being able to deploy their fire shelters, the hotshots’
31
Schopper, Steve. "Colorado Springs Firefighter Shares Emmy Win for Fire Doc." Interview by Ryan
Warner. Colorado Matters. Colorado Public Radio.
32
Maclean, John N. Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 18 COUNTY, COLORADO] bodies could not withstand the 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit blaze, as it is six times more than the
human body is able to tolerate.33
Outside of the United States, wildfire is prevalent in the Australian outback. In 2009, in
the State of Victoria, with temperatures above 115 degrees Fahrenheit, relative humidity at 6
percent and winds at high speeds, conditions were prime for wildfire. On this tragic day
commonly known as ‘Black Saturday,’ the worst wildfire in Australian history burned over 1
million acres and claimed 127 lives.34 As demonstrated by this historic and horrific event,
wildfire knows no national boundaries. Enhancing wildfire suppression policy in the United
States can aid other nations fight this global threat. No matter the place or people, wildfire still is
a tremendous power, with the capacity to take lives and change communities forever.
When I am called to duty, Lord ...
To fight the roaring blaze ...
Please keep me safe and strong ...
I may be here for days.
Be with my fellow crewmembers ...
As we hike up to the top.
Help us cut enough line ...
For this blaze to stop.
Let my skills and hands ...
Be firm and quick.
Let me find those safety zones ...
As we hit and lick.
For if this day on the line ...
I should answer death's call ...
Lord, bless my hot shot Crew ...
My family, one and all.
Hotshot’s Prayer35
3. METHODS
3.1 El Paso County
El Paso County lies in east central Colorado and encompasses more than 2,158 square
miles. The County features some of the most diverse terrain in the state: rocky foothills border
the west along the Rampart Range, jagged cliffs and rolling hills makeup the central part of the
County, densely wooded forests are prevalent in the north and sprawling prairie lands makeup
33
Mockenhaupt, Brian. “Fire on the mountain,” The Atlantic.
Kenneally, Christine. “The Inferno: After the deadliest fires it has ever known, a nation reassesses,” The
New Yorker.
35
“Hotshot’s prayer read by lone survivor at memorial for 19 elite Arizona firefighters,” Fox News.
34
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 19
the eastern areas. The landscape is dominated by Colorado’s eastern-most ‘14er,’ Pikes Peak,
which inspired Katharine Lee Bates to write the poem "America the Beautiful.” The mild
climate provides 285 days of sunshine, with average annual precipitation of 15 inches of rain
and 35 inches of snow supporting a dry-type forest comprised of Ponderosa Pine and Gambel
Oak with some Douglas-Fir at higher elevations.36 The area has a mixed-severity fire regime.
Wildfire can vary from ground fires that cause little or no overstory damage to severe crown
fires that burn within the canopies of the forest.
The county seat is Colorado Springs. Founded as one of the 17 founding counties of the
Territory of Colorado, El Paso County was once home to the state capital before it moved back
to Denver. According to the recent 2010 U.S. Census report, El Paso County is the most
populous county in the state with an estimated population of 655,044, a 5.3 percent increase
from 2000. Residents enjoy a relatively high median household income of $57,125. 37 El Paso
County is also home to five military installations, making the community one of the most
military-oriented in the country. In addition to a large military presence, the County also is home
to many technology and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, including Lockheed
Martin and Boeing.
Under Colorado state law, the El Paso County Sheriff is designated as the chief fire
official for unincorporated areas of the County. The El Paso County Sheriffs Office (EPSO) is
responsible for maintaining a Wildland Firefighting Crew under the Emergency Services
Division. The El Paso County Wildland Fire Crew (EPSOWF) is currently comprised of three
FTE: one commander and two supervisors for the coordination of volunteer firefighters. The
Sheriff also has the ability to lend or receive firefighting support under two separate MMAs: 1)
the 2001 Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding for Mutual Aid Between Fire
Departments, and 2) the Annual Wildfire Operating Plan. The first MAA shares personnel and
other resources such as engines and equipment between the County and local municipal
agencies, and the second MAA shares resources between the County, Colorado State Forest
Service (CSFS), FS, and BLM. If an incident expends all available local resources, the Sheriff
may call upon CSFS for additional State support and request additional emergency wildfire
funding. Once at the state level, Federal support can be requested from the State with the
concurrence of the Sheriff. This step in the suppression process indicates that the incident has
become critical, demanding additional personnel and resources to combat the blaze. Providing
that all local resources have been expended and are inadequate for suppressing the incident, a
36
37
About El Paso County & Colorado. El Paso County, Colorado: Visitor’s Page.
State and County QuickFacts: El Paso County, Colorado. United States Census Bureau.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 20 COUNTY, COLORADO] federal ICT is mobilized under the suppression structure of the NIFC. Additional federal funding
can be made available if the Governor makes a formal declaration of disaster. Only then can the
State seek reimbursement of up to 75 percent of qualifying expenditures from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).38
3.2 Analytic Framework & Stakeholders
The focus of this policy memorandum is exclusively on the policy efforts to suppress
wildfires through the immediate location of the point of ignition, perimeter establishment and
containment, and total extinguishment. After the brutal 2012 and 2013 wildfire seasons, the
State of Colorado investigated the acquisition of its own aerial firefighting fleet. SB 14-164 was
passed with bipartisan support by the Colorado General Assembly and signed into law by
Governor John Hickenlooper on May 12, 2014. The bill appropriated $700,000 for FY2015-16
to establish and operate the newly proposed Center of Excellence for Advanced Technology
Aerial Firefighting (COE).39 According to Interim Director of the COE, Melissa Lineberger, the
Center will: “Research, test, and evaluate existing and new technologies that support sustainable,
effective, and efficient aerial firefighting techniques…early projects will likely include research
into direct attack on fires at night from the air, implementing more sustainable contract models,
and identifying better ways to locate ground resources from the air.”40 Prior to the construction
of a permanent home for the COE in the small mountain town of Rifle, lawmakers chose to set
aside funding for the purchasing of two Pilatus PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to be used for the early
detection and routine surveillance of wildfires.
El Paso County is home to five DOD military installations. Each installation is located
within or near residential areas. In cases of wildfire, both residential and military communities
may be directly impacted from ignition sparking in either area. Table 1 details the location,
characteristics and specific military branch each installation is affiliated with. Due to the
presence of such highly classified and strategically important military installations within the
County, it is imperative that a working relationship between military and civilian leadership
exists when wildfire threatens the community.
38
After Action Report: El Paso County Black Forest Fire Administration Support, El Paso County,
Colorado
39
SB14-164, 70th General Assembly.
40
Lineberger, Melissa. “Information Request from Division of Fire Prevention and Control.” Email
Correspondence with Interim Director of the Colorado Center for Advanced Technology Aerial
Firefighting.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 21
U.S. Military Installations in El Paso County
Installation
Cheyenne Mountain
Air Force Station41
Branch
Joint Command: U.S.
Air Force, U.S. Army,
U.S. Navy & Royal
Canadian Air Force
Peterson Air Force Base42
U.S. Air Force
Schriever Air Force Base43
U.S. Air Force
United States Air Force
Academy44
U.S. Air Force
Fort Carson45
U.S. Army
Location
Southwest Foothills.
Borders the Pike
National Forest to the
west and the historic
Broadmoor
community to the
east.
Eastern city limits of
Colorado Springs.
Features short-grass
prairie amongst
suburban
developments.
12.2 miles east of
Peterson in
unincorporated El
Paso County prairie
land.
Northwest of
Colorado Springs.
Situated at the foot of
the Pike National
Forest.
Southeast of Colorado
Springs. Located on
137,000 acres, the
‘Mountain Post’
primarily is within El
Paso County with
parts of live artillery
and small arms
training grounds in
Pueblo and Fremont
Counties.
Characteristics
Site of the
subterranean
Cheyenne Mountain
Complex of the North
American Aerospace
Defense Command
(NORAD).
Shares runways with
the Colorado Springs
Airport and is the only
location outside of
Denver International
Airport with runways
large enough to field
MAFFs.
Home to 50th Space
Wing responsible for
operating over 150
satellites for military
and civilian purposes.
Serves dual role as a
university and Air
Force installation. Sits
on 18,000 acres, home
to the 10th Air Base
Wing, providing a
number of logistical
supports for military
and civilian needs.
Originally Camp
Carson following the
attacks on Pearl
Harbor, the Army
base is home to nearly
19,000 soldiers and
their families of the
4th Infantry Division
and the 10th Special
Forces.
Table 1: U.S. Military Installations in El Paso County. Source BaseGuide.com.
41
About NORAD: Cheyenne Mountain Complex, North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Base Guide, Peterson Air Force.
43
Base Guide, Schriever Air Force Base.
44
Base and Academy Guide, United States Air Force Academy.
45
Base Guide, Fort Carson.
42
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 22 COUNTY, COLORADO] Tourism plays an enormous role as a principal economic driver within the County. In
2010, the Colorado Tourism Office estimated that $1.192 billion was generated by the more than
5 million visitors traveling to the Pikes Peak region each year, making the state the fifth most
traveled destination in the nation. The tourism industry is the third largest employer in the
County, providing nearly 14,000 jobs, which include local retailers, family-owned restaurants,
and historic attractions such as Glen Erie Castle and the old County courthouse now, Pioneer
Museum. 46 Along with Pikes Peak, points of interest include Garden of the Gods, Seven Falls,
Cave of the Winds, the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo, the United States Air Force Academy and the
historic and luxurious Broadmoor Hotel. During the Waldo Canyon Fire, the industry was
greatly impacted. The Manitou Springs Economic Development Council estimated that the City
Of Manitou Springs, a small mountain community at the foot of Pikes Peak lost more than $2
million in potential tourism revenue during the times when the wildfires were active, which is a
heavy price tag for a small mountain town. Even the Broadmoor Hotel released a statement from
president and chief executive Stephen Bartolin Jr. noting that other than "some light smoke
during the early days of the fire, we were otherwise not affected. ... If you have decided to
change your plans, I ask for your reconsideration. I assure you that The Broadmoor is operating
in full glory." 47 Image 3 is a picture taken of the world-renown United States Air Force
Academy Cadet Chapel during the Waldo Canyon Fire as smoke billowed northward, prompting
evacuations of cadets and all nonessential personnel from the area. Not
only was El Paso County affected but
also Colorado as a whole lost out on
tourists spending millions of dollars in
the region for goods and services.
Therefore, the tourism industry has a
significant stake in regards to the
discussion of future wildland fire
policy, which protects their properties,
Image 3: United States Air Force Academy Cadet Chapel
During Waldo Canyon Fire. Source: The Denver Post.
46
the safety of their guests and
employees.
The Economic Impact of Travel on Colorado: 1996-2009, Dean Runyan Associates.
Meyer, Jeremy P. and John Mossman. “Waldo Canyon fire singes Colorado Springs economy,” The
Denver Post.
47
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 23
3.3 Data
Data collected for the development of this policy memorandum was supplied by facts
and figures provided by a number of federal, state, county and local government sources.
Budgets and future economic forecasts were supplied through the access of the databases from
federal agencies including FS under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA), BLM, BIA,
FWS and the National Parks Service (NPS) under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of the
Interior (DOI). Local information was attained through the State of Colorado’s Department of
Local Affairs, the Governor’s Office of State Planning and Budgeting, DFPC, EPSO and the
City of Colorado Springs. Past and present policies were analyzed using the information
assembled by the NIFC and the National Association of State Foresters (NASF).
Academic resources were used from the peer-reviewed journals of Journal of Forestry,
International Journal of Wildland Fire, Journal of the Association of Fire Ecology, Journal of
Forest Economics, International Journal of Remote Sensing Applications and Journal of
Aeronautics & Aerospace Engineering. Other articles were sourced from The Economist, The
Denver Post, The Colorado Springs Gazette, The Atlantic and The New York Times.
Documentary coverage was used from Rocky Mountain PBS and National Public Radio.
3.4 Factors of Success
Successful implementation of the recommended policy alternatives found within this
policy memorandum depends on two main factors of stakeholders’ will: willingness to pay and
willingness to collaborate. While it has been seven years since the impacts of the Great
Recession first affected the financial and housing markets, El Paso County has largely seen tax
revenues stay stagnant. In 2012, El Paso County Sheriff Terry Maketa requested additional tax
revenue to fund expanded Law Enforcement needs, Criminal Justice needs and Emergency
Response needs. The El Paso County Sheriff Sales Tax County Question known as ‘Question
1A’ was approved by voters, which authorized the County to increase sales tax by approximately
.23 percent in order to raise $17 million a year. Despite the additional funding from Question
1A, overall property and sales tax remains amongst the lowest within the state. Compared to
nine other surrounding counties, Figure 2 shows El Paso County ranking last in terms of dollars
taxed per capita.48 The current tax structure and budgeting process has proven unable to support
future wildfire suppression and emergency relief services. Suggesting higher taxes will require a
48
El Paso County 2014 Original Adopted Budget. El Paso County Budget Administration.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 24 COUNTY, COLORADO] 10-­‐County 2013 Local Tax Cost Per Citizen $579 $600 $521 $500 $400 $416 $354 $387 $387 $401 $449 $272 $300 $218 $200 $100 $0 Figure 2: 10-County Local Tax Cost Per Citizen. Source: El Paso County, Colorado Budget Administration.
process of referendum to the voters for approval. In 1992, Colorado voters passed a
constitutional amendment titled the Taxpayers Bill of Rights or more commonly referred to as
‘TABOR.’ This measure curbed the ability of the Colorado State Legislature, as well as city and
local governments, to raise taxes without a vote of the people.49 With a culture of limited
government and low taxes, partial financial support from the State, El Paso County faces a bleak
financial future that will require policy to increase tax revenue or find areas within the budget to
eliminate.
Although state funding is largely restricted to the process of TABOR, financial support
does exist to provide support for local governments. Following the 2012 wildfire season
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper announced that the State would allocate $3.7 million in
statewide grants that will fund 37 projects in different 18 counties. The Wildfire Risk Reduction
Grant Program, created under Senate Bill 14-269, was designed to generate more than $7.5
million worth of work on the ground because of a 100 percent match requirement for applicants.
Due to the incredible complexity of jurisdictions, tight budgets and variances such as a different
radio frequency for communications, a working relationship within the various agencies and
49
Constitutional Provisions. Colorado Department of the Treasury.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 25
levels of government is critical. With the grant program, El Paso County is slated to receive a
total of $413,980 with $175,000 to the Donald Wescott Fire Protection District, $90,000 to
Black Forest Together, and $148,980 to EPSOWF.50 These dollars have since helped finance
further efforts in all three areas of wildland firefighting: mitigation, suppression, and restoration.
Homeowners associations (HOAs) represent an additional factor of success outside of
the willingness to pay. Collaboration with HOAs is a crucial element to the creation of any
future preventative wildfire measures. Removing trees and underbrush often is met with
resistance from HOAs as they argue that any thinning of branches or trees is not aesthetically
pleasing for prospective buyers. In previous years, the City of Colorado Springs has attempted to
require homeowners to take preventative measures around their property. Following the 2012
wildfire season, many insurance companies decided to incentivize homeowners through a
reduction of premiums and even a complete denial of insurance coverage depending on a
homeowner’s level of mitigation. State Farm, an insurance company that serves about 22 percent
of all Colorado homes, introduced this strategy. After the massive Hayman Fire west of
Colorado Springs in 2002, State Farm, along with other insurance companies, put a new
emphasis on wildfire mitigation and implemented a "wildfire loss prevention program" the
following year.
Additionally, State Farm began surveying and assessing properties in Colorado,
Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming to determine their level of mitigation. 51A
former member of the Colorado Springs City Council relayed that the city, as with many of the
surrounding municipalities, had forgone a citywide enforcement policy for homeowners who
choose not to mitigate around their property. Since government policies in place are only at an
education and encouragement level from cities and the County, private insurance company
policies are the only form of mitigation enforcement on homeowner’s property. The City of
Colorado Springs however, does have a roofing ordinance for residential structures. In
accordance with the City’s Fire Code, wood shake roofing is prohibited. For new construction,
the building must use Class A (non-combustible) roofing materials and for existing construction,
the whole roof has to be replaced with a Class A roofing material.
According to a representative of CSFD, the Waldo Canyon Fire, a complex Type-1
incident, was estimated to have cost on average $1 million everyday for the 18 days it burned
through western El Paso County and Colorado Springs. The cost of suppressing large incidents
50
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper. Colorado.gov.
Vogrin, Bill. “Insurance demands for fire mitigation may mean big changes in communities,” The
Colorado Springs Gazette.
51
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 26 COUNTY, COLORADO] similar to Waldo Canyon is fiscally unsustainable. Success of the recommendations of this
policy memorandum depends largely on the ability of county officials to coordinate an effective
and timely response to an identified incident. Locating a reported incident is the first step in
suppression. While smoke trails rising are often the best means of discovering and tracing a
potential wildfire, pinpointing an exact location is difficult due to a number of factors including
weather patterns, terrain and possible manmade structures impacting the ability to reach an
incident. The 30-60 minutes of first detection are the most critical to wildland firefighting.
Getting a crew either by ground transportation or by aerial support within this timeframe is
crucial to developing a strategy that allows either for immediate suppression of the incident or a
cautious approach to letting the incident burn for ecological purposes. The recommendations of
this policy memorandum are not suggesting a redevelopment of current federal, state or local
wildland firefighting policy but rather are focusing on the specifics of the county procedures,
such as increasing the personnel and tools available directly to El Paso County officials and local
municipal partners which will lead to quick and efficient responses to reported incidents.
3.5 Performance Measures
In the analysis of this policy memorandum, a goal-oriented model was used to both
quantify and qualify successful implementation of the recommended policies. Using the
SMART (Specific, Measurable, Accountable, Relevant and Time-Bound) Goal model, the
recommended policies of this policy memorandum were evaluated using these five indicators:52
1. Specific: Rather than articulating a general vision for greater wildland fire
mitigation coupled with adequate suppression strategies, the recommended policies
articulate a clear mission of suppression strategy including the immediate detection
and persistent monitoring of future wildfire incidents in El Paso County.
2. Measurable: In line with the Colorado Department of Public Safety, the
recommended policies are developed to: “Keep all wildfires with values at risk
smaller than 100 acres and to suppress all fires in Wildland Urban Interface areas at
less than ten acres, 98 percent of the time.” There is a clear need for locating and
identifying the behavior of a reported incident with the first 30-60 minutes of
detection.
52
Performance Development: Smart Goals. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 27
3. Accountable: While wildfire has no boundaries when it burns, the recommended
policies were developed for the EPSOWF to implement and regulate under the
jurisdiction of the EPSO. These policies are clear in purpose with all expenditures
accounted for within the cost-benefit analysis portion of the memorandum.
4. Relevant: The recommended policies herein had to be consistent with the problem
definition of developing, “new cost-effective suppression policies to combat future
wildfires.” Due to past large, Type-1 incidents, the recommended policies were
written in response to an urgent issue affecting the future welfare of El Paso County.
5. Time-Bound: The goal for the recommended policies is to present to an EPSOWF
representative regarding the cost-benefits of set policies by the end of FY2015-16.
4. ISSUE ANALYSIS
4.1 Recent Wildfire Cost in El Paso County
“We are a local control state and local authorities must request state assistance when a fire
breaks out. We are working hard with local communities to make sure they are aware of the
assets available to them because our top priority should be getting water on fires within the first
hour they are discovered” - Gov. John Hickenlooper
Around noon on June 22, 2012, heavy smoke was reported within the Pike National
Forest, just north of U.S. Highway 24 and approximately three miles west of Colorado Springs.
What ensued for the next two and a half weeks became known as the Waldo Canyon Fire.53 El
Paso County was already under a Red Flag Warning due to high winds and low relative
humidity. FS was the first GFA to respond, with local agencies declaring a mandatory
evacuation for residents in Manitou Springs, Crystal Park, Green Mountain Falls, Chipeta Park
and the subdivision of Cedar Heights. Mountain Shadows, a neighborhood in western Colorado
Springs, was split into two evacuation zones. Residents living south of Wilson Road were given
the mandatory evacuation order while residents living north of the road were placed on notice
with voluntary evacuation. Within 36 hours of the first report, the Colorado Springs Police
Department (CSPD) had evacuated 2,841 people from their homes. Throughout the duration of
the incident, temperatures reached highs of 101 degrees Fahrenheit. Conditions were near
perfect, with relative humidity low and wind gusts of up to 65 miles per hour, for the wildfire to
53
Note: Local Fire Districts called the incident the ‘Pyramid Mountain Fire’ but once FS assumed
command, the incident was later renamed the ‘Waldo Canyon Fire’.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 28 COUNTY, COLORADO] grow in size and complexity. 54 The behavior of the wildfire was erratic, with two fronts forming
in different directions further perplexing the ICT headquartered at the University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs. Colorado Springs Fire Chief Richard Brown called the wildfire, “A firestorm
of epic proportions." The final FS review of the incident noted that the Waldo Canyon Fire
covered 3 miles in 45 minutes, which many officials now consider the new normal for wildfire
behavior.55
Following a Presidential Disaster Declaration, President Obama accompanied by
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper and members of the Colorado Congressional delegation
toured the ravaged area. Other dignitaries included secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland
Security, Chief of the Forest Service, Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment,
and many high-ranking military officers and staff. Along with the visits of several high-profiled
leaders and representatives, a wildfire that affected a large metropolitan area drew considerable
media attention. Adding to the media spotlight was the loss of the historic ‘Flying W Ranch.’ A
cherished tradition, the Flying W Ranch was a western tourist attraction with live cowboy music
and chuckwagon suppers that sadly was a complete loss in the fire. Live tweets and videos were
broadcasted of the devastation with the Twitter handle ‘#PrayforColorado’ trending on several
social media websites. At the time, Colorado was suppressing seven other wildfires in addition
to Waldo Canyon (Image 4). Constant national and international news coverage was seen up
until ICT Commander Rich Harvey
declared the wildfire fully contained on
July 10, 2012. With over $15 million spent
for suppression efforts, the incident
became Colorado’s most destructive fire,
consuming 18,247 acres, destroying 347
homes and killing two people. Following
the containment of the wildfire, residents
were allowed to return home. At the peak
of its intensity, 776 firefighting personnel
were engaged including members of the
Colorado National Guard and nearly
32,000 people had been evacuated.56
54
Image 4: The Eight Wildfires Burning in Colorado
on June 23, 2012. Source: The Denver Post.
Meyer, Jeremy P. “Colorado wildfires: Several fires explode across Front Range,” The Denver Post.
Waldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San Isabel National Forests, FS.
56
Waldo Canyon Fire: 23 June 2012 – 10 July 2012. Final Action After Report. City of Colorado Springs.
55
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 29
In the summer of 2013, wildfire returned with an even greater impact than the prior
season. Following the most destructive wildfire in El Paso County history, a wildfire began on
June 11, 2013 in the Black Forest subdivision north of Colorado Springs. The EPSO dispatch
received several 911 calls of complaints of large plumes of smoke rising within the area.
Conditions were similar to the Waldo Canyon Fire and again the NWS issued a Red Flag
Warning for El Paso County due to the high winds and temperatures above 90 degrees
Fahrenheit. As the wildfire occurred in unincorporated El Paso County, the EPSO was the
principal GFA tasked with the suppression of the Black Forest Fire. 57 As the fire grew in size,
evacuations were issued for residents in El Paso County and surrounding areas including Elbert
and Douglas Counties. Some reports indicate that the smoke traveled as far north as two Denver
suburbs, Centennial and Parker. Once again ICT Commander Rich Harvey assumed command
of the incident. When fully contained on June 21, 2013, the wildfire had 457 firefighting
personnel, which consumed 14,280 acres, destroyed 489 homes and killed two people, eclipsing
the Waldo Canyon Fire, as the most destructive fire in Colorado’s history.
The Black Forest Fire was different than its predecessor, the Waldo Canyon Fire,
because of the topography and zoning of the affected neighborhood. The suburban neighborhood
of Mountain Shadows featured homes with ‘zero-lot’ lines meaning that many homeowners had
property built close to one another, many without sharing a fence or boundary demarcating
property. As opposed to the densely wooded terrain of the Black Forest Fire, which depends on
periodic wildfire to germinate and mature, crews combatting the Waldo Canyon Fire had to
overcome difficulties associated with the rocky terrain and steep foothills. 58 Black Forest also
featured a much lower elevation, with homes situated on several acres of land used primarily for
ranching. Jurisdiction boundaries and landownership of the regions impacted by the Black Forest
Fire varied greatly from the Waldo Canyon Fire.59 Unlike the Waldo Canyon Fire that burned
large swaths of acreage belonging to the Pike National Forest, which is under the jurisdiction of
FS, the Black Forest Fire burned mostly private property. Although similar in destructive
capability and featuring favorable fire conditions, topography, land ownership, jurisdiction and
residential zoning all were factors that made the Waldo Canyon Fire a WUI fire and the Black
Forest Fire a true wildland fire.
Colorado, as with many western states, has experienced a number of devastatingly
powerful and destructive wildfires. According to the Colorado Department of Local Affairs, the
57
Black Forest Fire: After Action/Improvement Report. El Paso County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office.
Weber, William A. and Ronald C. Wittmann. Catalog of the Colorado Flora: A Biodiversity Baseline,
University Press of Colorado.
59
Waldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San Isabel National Forests, FS.
58
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 30 COUNTY, COLORADO] state features roughly 6.6 million acres with 20 percent of total land area zoned for residential
development within the WUI. This means that approximately 1 in 5 Coloradans reside in the
WUI. Currently 36,000 homes in El Paso County are located directly within the WUI.60 Table 2
illustrates the five most destructive wildfires within Colorado. As the area is a popular
destination for tourists and businesses alike, the state depends heavily on the natural amenities
offered to residents, visitors, and businesses.
Colorado’s Six Most Devastating Wildfires
Fire
Location
Year
Acres Burned
Deaths
South
Canyon
Missionary
Ridge
Hayman
Glenwood
Springs
Durango
1994
2,000
14 firefighters
Cost of
Suppression $*
400,000
2002
1,739
1 firefighter
40,000,000
Deckers
2002
137,760
5 firefighters
39,000,000
High Park
Larimer
County
2012
87,250
0 deaths
39,200,000
Waldo
Canyon
Black Forest
W Colorado
2012
18,247
2 civilians
15,300,000
Springs
NE El Paso
2013
14,280
2 civilians
8,500,000
County
Table 2: Colorado’s Six Most Devastating Wildfires. Source NIFC.
*Not including costs associated with rebuilding (i.e. property appraisals, insurance premiums,
local economic impact, ecological cost)
4.2 Additional Wildfire Factors
In recent years, Colorado has experienced a near perfect storm of external factors that
has cultivated favorable conditions for larger and more powerful wildfires with each new season.
These factors include above normal temperatures, lower precipitation and snowpack, increased
presence of the Mountain Pine Beetle in alpine forests and the Emerald Ash Borer in urban and
suburban parks. Within the two-year time span of Waldo Canyon and Black Forest, El Paso
County experienced an extreme cycle of weather that contributed to the destructive nature of
both fires and the lasting affects of the incidents. Table 3 illustrates the number of wildfires that
burned nationally within the previous 5-year span. Figure 3 shows the drought conditions during
the morning of June 23, 2012, the second day of the Waldo Canyon Fire and it is apparent that
much of Colorado and the American West were either in severe or extreme drought during this
60
As Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Develops, Firefighting Costs Will Soar, Headwaters Economics.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 31
time. With higher temperatures and growing drought concerns, higher rates of beetle infestation
will be expected as the insects feed off of warmer temperatures and more nutrients within tree
sap to produce larvae that eventually kill large swaths of Colorado’s forests.
Total Number of Wildfires Nationally in 5-Year Span
Date
Number of Fires
Acres Burned
Acres Burned Per Fire
2010
4,277
122,728
28.7
2011
2,808
270,518
96.3
2012
3,694
152,697
41.3
2013
2,376
86,092
36.2
2014
8,108
191,688
23.6
Table 3: Total Number of Wildfires Nationally In 5-Year Span. Source NOAA.
Figure 3: Palmer Drought Index: Morning of Waldo Canyon Fire Ignition. Source NOAA.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 32 COUNTY, COLORADO] Adding to favorable conditions for wildfire is the infestation of Mountain Pine Beetle in
the alpine and subalpine forests. 61 Additionally, recent discovery of the Emerald Ash Borer in
Boulder has forced CSFS to reexamine the health of urban and suburban parks and forested
areas. Unlike its beetle cousin, this borer is non-native to Colorado. It has already affected 4
million acres of forest across Colorado and therefore the ash borer is set to impact the WUI at a
level not seen with the beetle (See the Appendix for Map of Insect & Disease Areas). Smaller
than the width of a penny and with no natural predator, the ash borer has become a serious
ecological problem for foresters. The beetle and borer deprive trees of their nutrients and
consequently they become brittle and dry, which is an ideal fuel for wildfire.62 From areas all
across the state including the Denver Metropolitan Area and municipalities along the Front
Range and Western Slope, communities have to address a potential growth of beetle presence.
Interestingly enough, if during the 1990s a natural presence of wildfire been allowed to clear
underbrush, mature trees would now be healthy enough to combat the beetle and ash borer
infestation using their own sap to stop the insects instead of relying on the current method of
using pesticides.63
4.3 Stakeholder Input
In the face of the devastating toll on Colorado residents from the 2012 and 2013 wildfire
seasons, Governor John Hickenlooper created the Wildfire Insurance and Forest Health
Taskforce through Executive Order B 2013-002.64 This taskforce was asked to identify and reach
an agreement on ways to encourage activities, practices and policies that would reduce the risk
of loss of land in WUI areas and provide greater customer choice and knowledge of home
insurance options. Of the many recommendations to the Governor and General Assembly, this
taskforce outlined a clear need for a greater emphasis on digital mapping of those living in the
WUI across the state. The Colorado Wildfire Risk Assessment Portal (CO-WRAP) is a tool that
was first developed by CSFS in 2012. CO-WRAP already operates as a risk assessment tool to
deliver risk information and create awareness about wildfire issues across the state.65 By
utilizing this technology, residents are able to log into the CO-WRAP website and access
61
Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic, BLM.
Aguilar, John. "A Bug's Strife." The Denver Post.
63
Leatherman, D.A., I. Aguayo & T.M. Mehall. “Mountain Pine Beetle,” CSFS.
64
Exec. Order. No. B2013–002. C.R.S. (2013).
65
Van Heuven, Catherine M. “Wildfire Insurance and Forest Health Task Force: Report to the Governor
of Colorado, the Speaker of the House of Representative sand the President of the Senate,” Kaplan Kirsch
& Rockwell, LLP.
62
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 33
information and data to better understand the dangers associated with living near or within the
WUI. The creation of such a taskforce demonstrated a clear message from Colorado’s elected
officials to better assess the growing threat of wildfire presence in Colorado.
In addition to using online tools to assess wildfire risk, creating fire-adapted residential
and commercial structures is vital to the livelihood of individual citizens and businesses located
along the Rampart Range. Colorado Springs is a growing city with a diverse economic portfolio
and being the second largest city in the state demands the attention of policymakers both at the
state and local level to ensure the area is suitable for future sustained growth and development.
Featuring a burgeoning defense contract community, IT computer software and aerospace
industries, the United States Olympic Committee, a principal United Services Automobile
Association financial center and headquarters for several international Christian organizations
including Focus on the Family, Compassion International and The Navigators, the County has
much to consider to protect the future welfare of these organizations and industries. With
breathtaking vistas and favorable weather conditions, El Paso County is an ideal location for
future business growth and additional commercial opportunities. Forbes has listed the Colorado
Springs Metropolitan Area as the 29th best place for business and careers.66 As the population of
the County increases at a rate higher than the state average, continued development and future
zoning of subdivisions within the WUI must be tailored with the understanding that wildfire will
have a continued presence within the area.67 The Waldo Canyon Fire and Black Forest Fire are
examples of such a destructive force threatening the operations of many private and commercial
enterprises. Therefore, robust wildfire suppression policy is of paramount importance to
residents and business owners alike.
For the five major military installations in the County, wildfire has considerable effects
on operations within the region. Similar to civilian government MAAs, each of the five DOD
installations have agreements with local civilian authorities to ensure a working relationship and
the sharing of resources in the event of an emergency. Wildfire is indifferent to whom or what it
threatens, as it has significant impacts on both private and public entities, including civilian and
military property. Much to the ire of many residents within the County during the Waldo
Canyon Fire, the U.S. Air Force was unable to mobilize its C-130 Hercules aircraft to aid in the
suppression of the incident. Due to the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, capabilities of the U.S.
Military are limited when using military personnel and vehicles, which includes aircraft and
navy vessels, to act as domestic law enforcement personnel. Unfortunately wildfire suppression
66
67
Colorado Springs, CO: CO Metropolitan Statistical Area, Forbes.
State and County QuickFacts: El Paso County, Colorado. United States Census Bureau.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 34 COUNTY, COLORADO] is classified under domestic law enforcement and thus must seek specific approval when all
civilian resources have been exhausted.68 The President of the United States holds exclusive
authority to mobilize military assets to assist civilian authorities to suppress wildfire including
the deployment of such C-130 Hercules MAFFs. However, as previously mentioned within the
Issue Analysis section, the Governor of Colorado can declare a disaster emergency and decide to
mobilize the Colorado National Guard to assist in law enforcement, search and rescue efforts
and direct wildfire suppression activities. Governor John Hickenlooper issued disaster
declarations during both the Waldo Canyon Fires and Black Forest Fires with Executive Order D
2012-020 and Executive Order D 2013-010, respectively, when civilian law enforcement and
firefighting personnel were exhausted.
5. SOLUTIONS
5.1 The Status Quo
Currently the cost associated with the suppression of wildfire in El Paso County is
unsustainable. Although being the most populous county in Colorado, El Paso County is largely
undeveloped and unincorporated. Headwaters Economics estimates that along with the State of
Washington, Colorado features 20 percent of its population residing within in the WUI, still
leaving tremendous room to increase residential and commercial construction within
undeveloped areas.69 El Paso County features a favorable climate and room to grow and develop
in parts to the east of the Colorado Springs Metropolitan Area. Areas such as the Flying Horse
neighborhood in the northeast section of Colorado Springs, which features large, luxury homes
as well as an 18-hole golf course, has seen tremendous growth in both real estate value and
permit rates to construct new homes.70 The population growth has impacted wildfire suppression
efforts with the EPSO facing severe challenges in recent years. Since 2000, the Colorado
Department of Local Affairs recorded more than a 20 percent increase to the County’s
population. With a forecasted population featuring a higher growth rate than the state, El Paso
County is expected to grow at a rate above 6 percent until 2020.71 While the 2014 wildfire
season remained calm due to the already large parts of the county burned from the Waldo
68
18 U.S. Code § 1385.
Gorte, Ross. “The Rising Cost of Wildfire Protection,” Headwaters Economics.
70
Flying Horse, Cherry Creek Properties.
71
DeGroen, Cindy. Population Forecasts: State Demography Office Annual Meeting. Colorado
Department of Local Affairs
69
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 35
Canyon Fire and the Black Forest Fire as well as higher levels of precipitation, county officials
should not assume that the 2014 wildfire season be the norm for future seasons.
The EPSO is the principal GFA responsible with the coordination of resources and
personnel during a wildfire incident. The crew directly responsible for wildfire mitigation and
suppression efforts, the EPSOWF, currently staffs 3-FTE wildland firefighters. First created in
1994, the EPSOWF operates under the direction of the sheriff who acts as chief emergency
response officer. While the role of the sheriff is largely dedicated to law enforcement, the
responsibility of the office is found within the office’s mission statement, “To provide public
safety services to our community,” which includes three non-traditional duties outside of
exclusive law enforcement. These non-traditional duties include: hazardous waste disposal,
search and rescue and wildland firefighting.72 The EPSO budget for FY2015-16 is $47,469,612
with 54 percent reserved for public safety. While wildfire suppression falls within the category
of public safety, the EPSOWF operates largely out of specified accounts set aside for postdisaster to help areas in need to recover. A mere $100,000 is set aside for burn and flood
recovery, a total far from the amount needed for both recovery and ongoing efforts to alleviate
the threat of future wildfire. 73 Current efforts taken by the EPSO are largely underfunded and
reactive, increasing the risk of not only the presence of wildfire but also the frequency and
intensity of larger incidents.
During the Waldo Canyon Fire and Black Forest Fire, it is important to note the amount
of time that was spent by local authorities and GFAs in attempting to locate both incidents’
ignition point. According to various experts within the wildfire community, the best form of
wildfire detection still to this day is the individual citizen calling in to the dispatch center and
reporting the sighting or the scent of smoke. Despite the plethora of calls received by various
city and County dispatches, authorities were simply unable to locate a point of ignition for both
incidents. In fact according to call logs and records, the FS crews that were deployed to locate
the Waldo Canyon Fire were unable to determine a location at the time of the initial search. The
Waldo Canyon Fire did experience growth on June 22, 2012, the initial date of the incident. It
would be several hours before any strategic firefighting response was organized.74 These records
demonstrate the difficulty for the EPSO and other GFAs when locating reported incidents. Initial
hours that are crucial to an effective response to wildfire suppression were lost, aiding to the
growth and eventual intensity of both wildfires. The status quo of wildfire suppression policy in
72
Wildland Fire Crew: General Information. El Paso County Sheriff’s Office.
El Paso County 2014 Original Adopted Budget. El Paso County Budget Administration.
74
Handy, Ryan. “New planes could have helped firefighters locate Waldo Canyon before it grew,”
Colorado Springs Gazette.
73
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 36 COUNTY, COLORADO] El Paso County is both insolvent as well as insufficient to protecting the people, property and
place from future threat imposed by wildfire.
5.2 Alternative 1 – Additional Seasonal Wildland Firefighters
The first alternative to the status quo is the hiring of three seasonal FTE for the
EPSOWF. Despite a growing number of wildfires in the state, the Colorado State Fire Chiefs
Association estimates that Colorado is short 3,500 volunteers in meeting National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) standards. To meet the requirement, an increase of more than 40
percent to the present force is necessary. Currently the EPSOWF is comprised of only three
career wildland firefighters and 50 volunteers who are responsible for covering 200,000
residents over, 200 square miles. That equates to roughly 2.4 firefighters per 100 square miles
and a mere 0.3 wildland firefighters per 1,000 residents.75 With only an incident commander and
two wildland fire supervisors, the individuals tasked with the job of monitoring as well as
coordinating volunteers when responding to a reported incident is tremendous when considering
the terrain diversity and number of residents living within the County. During the winter months
or the ‘shoulder season,’ the duties entrusted to three FTE wildland firefighters may be
applicable and certainly when budgets are limited, feasible. However, during the active wildfire
season, this number of FTEs on the EPSOWF is a dangerously low number with the growing
number of residents within El Paso County to which only amplifies this deficiency. An increased
number of wildland firefighting personnel is warranted.
According to the NIFC the wildfire season has dramatically increased each year with
warming temperatures and limited precipitation rates. With both more people choosing to reside
in El Paso County each year and warmer temperatures causing many GFAs to be on alert for
wildfire earlier, additional staff, if only seasonal should be seriously considered. A cost
conscious approach was taken in this analysis, which looked at the hiring of year-round FTEs as
well as the use of private wildland firefighting crews. The difficulty with hiring three FTE year
round is the justification of public funds when paying additional staff when wildfire is not
burning. The wildland fire season now often lasts from late May through early October when
temperatures are at their warmest. During the winter and early spring, duties of combating
wildland fire are dramatically decreased. In fact, one Colorado wildland section chief puts it,
“Wildland firefighting is not like structure firefighting, and guys don’t wait in the firehouse for
the call. If a wildfire is not burning, there is only so much you can do.” A 2005 analysis of crew
75
Kuntz, Katie & Burt Hubbard. “Colorado Short Thousands of Volunteer Firefighters, Say State Fire
Chiefs,” Rocky Mountain PBS: I News.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 37
costs found the cost to finance wildland firefighters consumes 56 percent of total wildfire
suppression budgets. 76 Therefore a special consideration was made to analyze the potential costs
saved by contracting wildfire suppression to private crews. According to the same study, given,
a 14-hour workday and 90 productive days in a fire season, the mean cost of a government
wildland fire crew was $2,252 less than that of a contract fire crew. The study largely attributes
the savings of hiring a government crew versus a contract fire crew to the better coordination
and training from GFAs.
5.3 Alternative 2 – Automated Wildfire Detection Systems
It has become increasingly clear that wildfire is a force of nature that will continue to
occur no matter the level of mitigation to prevent it. With the understanding that wildfire will be
continued presence in El Paso County, all avenues of technology must be considered to give
ICTs every second afforded to them when monitoring conditions susceptible to wildfire.
Therefore, the second policy alternative to the status quo is the acquisition of automated wildfire
detection systems. Governments from Turkey to the State of Idaho have invested into the use of
such technologies to replace direct human observation. In fact the German Aerospace Agency,
Deutsche Luft-und Raumfahrt (DLR), conducted a pilot program using this technology from
1995 through 2003. The program revealed that automated optical detection decreased wildfire
acreage destruction by over 90% compared to that of manned lookouts. DLR also discovered
that early detection minimizes damage and automated detection technologies can greatly assist
in fire detection.77 This finding reinforces the argument that potential for large, catastrophic
wildfire as experienced with the Waldo Canyon Fire and Black Forest Fire can be lessened with
early detection. Even the ability to spot smoke or detect warming trends within the forest maybe
small detail to overall wildfire suppression; however, it is still the policy of the vast majority of
GFAs that initial detection followed by immediate response to a reported incident is still the best
strategy to manage a wildfire from reaching catastrophic status. To achieve this endeavor, the
acquisition of automated wildfire detection systems is a viable technology that can achieve that
mission.
A 2012 study used two types of wildfire detection systems: ground-based fire detection
cameras that utilize infrared technology and ground-based fire detection cameras that use
76
Donovan, Geoffrey. “A Comparison of the Costs of Forest Service and Contract Fire Crews in the
Pacific Northwest,” Western Journal of Applied Forestry.
77
Bernhard E., E. Stein, A. Twele, and M. Gähler, “Synergistic Use of Optical and Radar Data for Rapid
Mapping of Forest Fires in the European Mediterranean,” German Aerospace Center (DLR).
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 38 COUNTY, COLORADO] surveillance technology to detect fire. Using infrared technology is incredibly valuable as it has
the ability to monitor wildfire sparks at night. According to the study this product can operate for
years without maintenance and can be equipped with a low-cost cell phone that can contact a fire
district or department office when a fire is detected. The other type of wildfire detection system
has the ability to detect smoke and flame, which is necessary for the analysis of this alternative
section. 78 Wildfire smoke detection is critical for early warning systems as smoke is often the
predecessor to flames spreading within a forested area such as the expansive Pike National
Forest. Named after the 19th Century American explorer Zebulon Pike, the forest spans across
1,106,604 acres, which encompasses areas in six counties. Comprised primarily of Ponderosa
Pine, Douglas-Fir, and Grable Oak, the Pike National Forest is the key location to future wildfire
presence. Currently, FS staffs 7 ranger districts throughout the forest with the Pikes Peak District
in Colorado Springs serving as the principal FS outpost in El Paso County. There are over 225
miles of trails and approximately 250 developed campsites and fishing areas within the District
making it a very popular destination for campers, anglers and outdoor enthusiasts. In addition to
the most recent wildfire, the Waldo Canyon Fire, the Pike National Forest has also witnessed
large scale burning with the 11,375 acre–Mason Gulch Fire in 2005 and the 137,370–Hayman
Fire in 2002.79 Automated wildfire detection systems with the capabilities of monitoring smoke
and wildfire behavior both during the day as well as night are incredible assets, assets that the
EPSO would stand to benefit greatly if seriously considered for future application.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to weigh costs and benefits within a best-case and
worse-case scenario framework. Four variables were used to determine total net benefits for the
status quo and the two recommended policies. Over the past several decades, due to the
historical miscalculation of immediate wildfire suppression of various federal agencies and
increased development within the WUI and changing climate, the presence of wildfire has
become increasingly unpredictable. Higher temperatures and prolonged periods of drought have
not only contributed to conditions favorable to a wildfire but also aided in the growth of the
Emerald Ash Borer and Mountain Pine Beetle infestation in Colorado, which furthers the chance
of wildfire occurring. For the success of limiting the presence of future large, catastrophic
wildfires, understanding the conditions and using real-time data complied through interagency
78
ByoungChul Ko, Joon-Young Kwak, Jae-Yeal Nam. “Wildfire smoke detection using temporospatial
features and random forest classifiers,” Optical Engineering.
79
About the Forest: Pike and San Isabel National Forest, FS.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 39
databases is critical. The four variables used are: Temperature (T), Precipitation (P), Wind
Speeds (W) and County Population Rate (D). Each climate related variable (Temperature,
Precipitation and Wind Speed) was averaged using monthly means for the months featuring the
most favorable times for a wildfire to spark: May through September. Within this sensitivity
analysis a quantitative model was used to forecast the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario
for wildfire to spark.
Best-case scenario is described as Temperature (Tb) featuring average or below average
daily temperatures of 78 degrees Fahrenheit, Precipitation (Pb) featuring average or above
average monthly precipitation of 2.39 inches, Wind Speeds (Wb) featuring average or below
average daily wind patterns of 10.5 miles per hour, and featuring less than or equal to the current
rate of County Population growth (Db) as forecasted by the Colorado Department of Local
Affairs. The coefficient b is used to connote the best-case scenario function. Low-intensity
wildfire (LIW) presence would be expected with the best-case scenario conditions. Equation 1 is
shown:
Tb + Pb + Wb + Db = LIW
Variable
Temperature
Precipitation
Wind Speed
Measurement
≤ 78°F
≥ 2.39 inches
≤ 10.5 mph
County Pop.
Rate
≤ 6.6 %
Figure 4: Best-case scenario conditions for a low-intensity wildfire. Source: Climate averages
calculated from NOAA, population averages from Colorado Department of Local Affairs.
Worst-case scenario features above average daily temperatures (Tw), below average
monthly precipitation levels (Pw), above average daily wind patterns (Ww) and increased rate of
population growth (Dw). The coefficient w is used to connote the worst-case scenario function.
High-intensity wildfire (HIW) presence would be expected with the worst-case scenario
conditions. Equation 2 is shown:
Tw + Pw + Ww + Dw = HIW
Variable
Temperature
Precipitation
Wind Speed
Measurement
> 78°F
< 2.39 inches
>10.5 mph
County Pop.
Rate
> 6.6 %
Figure 5: Worst-case scenario conditions for a high-intensity wildfire. Source: Climate averages
calculated from NOAA, population averages from Colorado Department of Local Affairs.
Equation 1 and Equation 2 serve as models that forecast the potential severity of future
wildfires. Using the four variables of Temperature, Precipitation, Wind Speed and the
County Population Growth Rate, the conditions conducive to wildfire ignition as well as
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 40 COUNTY, COLORADO] longevity and severity can be better understood. With temperatures rising steadily, precipitation
levels fluctuating with each year due to annual snowpack, and seasonal rainfall and varying wind
speeds, climate variables are largely out of the hands of GFAs. Alternatively, population growth
within the County is a variable that can be controlled and influenced with public policy.
Although population growth to the region brings jobs and economic opportunity, it does raise the
important question of adequate public resources to support the influx of new residents. Not all
future residents will chose to build within the WUI; however, it is vitally important for the EPSO
to monitor both existing residential areas as well as the plans for new developments in fire-prone
areas. While wildfire still has the ability to occur despite the variables of a best-case scenario, it
is the position of this paper that lower temperatures, higher precipitation levels, moderate wind
speeds and sustainable growth with El Paso County will affect future wildfire suppression
efforts, aiding in the prevention of large, catastrophic wildfire.
6. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
6.1 The Status Quo
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a technique for evaluating the positive and negative
changes associated with proposed policy changes. The CBA can serve as an aid for decision
making, by identifying and expressing (in constant dollar terms) the net effect of a proposed
policy or project. Analyzing the cost in 2015 dollars of the average annual wildfire season for
EPSO is calculated using the data found from a 2013 study done by the Northern Arizona
University Ecological Restoration Institute, including data compiled by the EPSO of the total
number of acres burned by wildfire within the County since 2000. The 2013 study modeled the
effects of proposed forest restoration treatments in the Coconino National Forest, which is
southeast of the City of Flagstaff, Arizona, a region similar in both climate and WUI
development to El Paso County. The study calculates the average cost of wildfire suppression
per acre at $695 (2013 dollars).80 This was used as a base figure for calculating total wildfire
suppression cost per acre.
Next, the average cost per acre is multiplied by the average acreage of recent wildfire
within the County since 2000, which is 3,770 acres.81 Assuming all costs hold steady and
accounting for inflation using the Denver-Boulder-Greeley Consumer Price Index of 2.777
80
Fitch, Ryan A., Yeon-Su Kim & Amy E.M. Waltz. “Forest Restoration Treatments: Their Effect on
Wildland Fire Suppression Costs,” Northern Arizona University: Ecological Restoration Institute.
81
Community Wildfire Protection Plan: A Continuing Process, EPSO.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 41
percent, the cost for the status quo of EPSO wildfire suppression policy is shown for FY2015-16
and three successive fiscal years in Table 4.82 According to the ESPO After Action and
Improvement Report, the total cost of the Black Forest Fire as of June 20, 2013 was $9,829,056
and the average cost per acre to suppress the Black Forest Fire was $688.31.83 Although the
Black Forest Fire is the most expensive wildfire in El Paso County’s history, the costs are within
the range found by the study. With that in mind, the EPSO must consider the potential for an
even greater wildfire that matches or even exceeds this cost estimate per acre.
Fiscal Year
FY 2015-16
FY 2016-17
FY 2017-18
FY 2018-19
Cost
$2,691,780
$2,766,530
$2,843,357
$2,922,317
Table 4: Wildfire Suppression Cost FY2015-19: Status Quo
6.2 Alternative 1 – Additional Seasonal Wildland Firefighters
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics cites that the average salary of a wildland firefighter
is $48,270.84 Hiring additional year round FTEs can be costly. With wildfire seasons varying due
to snowpack and water levels, fluctuating temperatures and mitigation efforts from months
leading into the season, the activity of wildland firefighters can range from around the clock
suppression duty to stagnant, often waiting on wildfire to occur. Therefore the recommendation
of this policy memorandum is for the hiring of three seasonal FTE beginning May 1 and ending
September 30. Aligning with FS and BLM wages on the General Schedule Pay Scale or ‘GS’,
these seasonal employees would be paid a $13 per hour for those with a GS-03 and $17 per hour
for those with a GS-05.85 The GS scale is used for civil service employees with wages increasing
with each level of additional education and years of experience in a particular field of
government employment. A GS-03 is an entry-level position for those possessing a High School
Diploma or GED and one year of post-secondary study. The GS-05 classification is an entrylevel position for those possessing a High School Diploma or GED and four years of postsecondary study attaining a Bachelor’s of Arts of Bachelor’s of Science.
With seasonal FTEs, the EPSO would have the flexibility of hiring either a GS-03 or a
GS-05 depending on the need for additional wildland firefighting personnel. A contract with the
82
Inflation: Denver-Boulder-Greeley Consumer Price Index, State of Colorado.
Black Forest Fire: After Action/Improvement Report. El Paso County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office.
84
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Firefighters, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
85
Hours/Pay/Benefits for Hotshots, BLM.
83
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 42 COUNTY, COLORADO] EPSOWF would feature a 100-day wildfire season beginning May 1 and concluding September
30. A potential seasonal FTE would need to pass a physical and background check to qualify for
the position. The FTEs would be working a minimum of a 40-hour workweek and would be
allotted 2 days off per week. Hours would change should a wildfire demand extra time from the
EPSOWF. Benefits would have to be factored within the contract including sickness and injury
on the job compensation. For the purposes of this analysis, a cost spectrum is shown from the
lowest amount the EPSO would have to pay for three seasonal FTEs with all GS-03 candidates to
the highest with the potential hiring of all GS-05 candidates. Working up to 40 hours a week for
five months, the three GS-03 wildland firefighters would secure approximately $31,200 in the
first year of employment. For GS-05 wildland firefighters, $40,800 would be paid. Total cost is
calculated for FY2015-16 to FY2018-19. With the hiring of three additional wildland firefighters
for the EPSOWF, the crew would increase its coordination capabilities by a 100 percent. Inflation
is factored in at a 2.777 percent rate for the calculation of three future fiscal years shown in Table
5.
Fiscal Year
FY 2015-16
FY 2016-17
FY 2017-18
FY 2018-19
Cost for 3 FTE
GS-03
$31,200
$32,066
$32,957
$33,872
Cost for 3 FTE
GS-05
$40,800
$41,933
$43,098
$44,295
Table 5: Wildfire Suppression Cost FY2015-19: 3 Seasonal FTE
Policy
Total Costs
Total Benefits
Net Benefits
Discounted Net
Benefits
3 Seasonal FTE
GS-03
$130,095
$1,066,279
$936,183
$856,740
3 Seasonal FTE
GS-05
$170,124
$1,402,998
$1,232,873
$1,128,254
Table 6: Wildfire Suppression Benefits: 3 Seasonal FTE
Weighing the option of hiring a GS-03 versus a GS-05 not only comes down to pay but
also capabilities and skill levels of each GS level. GS-03 would provide the most affordable
option, as these workers are deployed to work firelines, burn slack piles and operate heavy
equipment. However, a GS-05 would generate a host of additional benefits outside of the
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 43
suggested net benefits within the CBA. GS-05 are workers capable of climbing the leadership
ladder, providing a hybrid of duties both inside and outside of the office. Administrative duties
are often given to GS-05, as college-educated workers tend to showcase good organizational and
communication skills. While the opinion of this policy memorandum is not to fully hire GS-05,
it is however, articulating the option of hiring FTE with a college degree in the field of study.
Total benefits is derived from speaking to a representative of the EPSOWF who stated that
additional FTE, albeit seasonal, would give the crew up to a 50 percent advantage during
heightened wildfire season.86 A 3 percent social discount rate was factored to calculate the
discounted net benefits. 87
6.3 Alternative 2 –Automated Wildfire Detection Systems
The summary of cost associated with the acquisition of three automated wildfire
detection systems is minor when compared to the total cost of suppression and recovery of
wildfire. Many American localities have investigated the purchasing of this technology. The
City of Austin, Texas is an example of one of the first American municipalities to actively
pursue the acquisition of automated wildfire detection systems. In 2011, the city, which is home
to both the Travis County Seat and the Texas State Capital, faced a series of nine wildfires
around the Labor Day Weekend that destroyed more than 1,800 homes and burned nearly 47,000
acres. The ‘Labor Day Fires’ featured many of the same conditions found during a worst-case
scenario: 100 degree Fahrenheit temperatures, 6.5 of the 16 inches of normal precipitation levels
by August and high winds.88 Following the destructive 2011 season, a shift in perspective both
within HOAs and local government occurred, with added focus upon other policies that could
alleviate another scenario similar to the devastating Labor Day Fires.
Since then, Austin has been the site of two automated wildfire detection systems. During
the summer of 2012, the Austin City Council approved the purchase of two systems from the
company ‘FireWatch America’ for a one-year pilot program. Each early detection system
consists of a computer based configuration of high-resolution optical sensors and a remote
central office to provide smoke detection within a range of up to six miles with just one camera.
The image processing software analyzes the behavior of smoke plumes and automatically alerts
86
Yowell, David. “El Paso County Wildland Firefighting Crew.” Phone Interview with Wildland Fire
Supervisor of the El Paso County Sheriff's Office. 12 Mar. 2015.
87
Loomis, John, Dana Griffin, Ellen Wu, and Armando González-Cabán. 2002. Estimating the economic
value of big game habitat production from prescribed fire using a time series approach. Journal of Forest
Economics.
88
Davis, Richard L. “The Feasibility of Utilizing Ground-Based Camera Systems for Wildfire Detection,”
Austin Fire Department.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 44 COUNTY, COLORADO] monitoring personnel within six minutes during daylight and within twelve minutes during
evening hours. The sensor systems are installed on high towers or buildings and are capable of
rotating up to 360 degrees every four to six minutes during daylight and eight to twelve minutes
during nighttime. Currently the City of West Lake Hills, an Austin suburb, has FireWatch
equipment in use. To finance this endeavor, a cost-sharing program was established between the
City of Austin and Travis County, each splitting the cost.
El Paso County is similar to Travis County. The 117,000 acres of forested areas,
including the Pike National Forest to the western foothills and Black Forest, the unincorporated
mixed residential and ranching community located to the northeast.89 Deploying three FireWatch
early detection systems, two in the Pike National Forest and one in Black Forest, would have
significant benefits when giving the EPSOWF extra time to respond to a potential incident.
FireWatch can be deployed for a one-time cost of less than three dollars per acre or for as little
as 20-30 cents an acre, per year, over its life expectancy. A maintenance fee of $4500 is
associated with annual check up on all installed wildfire detection systems. According to
FireWatch America, the automated wildfire detection systems can be designed, manufactured,
calibrated, shipped and installed within 120 to 180 days or less from order. Each system costs
$180,000. Total costs are valued for FY2015-16 and three consecutive fiscal years. The DLR
report is used as a base number to calculate the benefits of the technology. Once again a 3
percent social discount rate was factored to calculate the discounted net benefits. With early
detection saving GFAs up to 90 percent of costs associated with wildfire, the automated wildfire
detection systems are a viable alternative to the status quo.
Fiscal Year
FY 2015-16
FY 2016-17
FY 2017-18
FY 2018-19
Cost
$540,000
$13,500
$13,875
$14,260
Table 7: Wildfire Suppression Cost FY2015-19: Automated Wildfire Detection Systems
Policy
Total Costs
Total Benefits
Net Benefits
Discounted Net
Benefits
Automated
Wildfire Detection
Systems
$581,635
$2,525,397
$2,224,361
$2,291,092
Table 8: Wildfire Suppression Benefits: Automated Wildfire Detection Systems
89
FireWatch: Early Warning Systems, FireWatch America.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 45
6.4 Conclusion
Social costs or costs born by society when faced with a threat such as wildfire, must be
considered when taxpayer dollars are being used. The status quo of wildfire suppression policy
in El Paso County is outdated and overdue for a change in financing. Both current and future
citizens alike deserve to live within a County that values both public safety and taxpayer
resources. New policy alternatives to the status quo must be considered when previous wildfire
seasons have been the most devastating in the County’s history. In conclusion, three societal
costs are analyzed to present a complete cost-benefit analysis of this policy memorandum.
• Tourism Industry: Employing 14,000 employees and generating an estimated $1.192
billion in total revenue, the tourism industry was impacted greatly during the 2012 and
2013 wildfire seasons.90 Due to the location and proximity to many tourist attractions,
the cost associated from the Waldo Canyon Fire to the industry was used as a final cost
number. According to The Denver Post, the industry on average lost out on a 50 percent
in total revenue.
• Property Evaluation/Home Insurance: According to the Rocky Mountain Insurance
Information Association, the amount of insurance claims during the Waldo Canyon Fire
was $453,700,000 and $292,800,000 during the Black Forest Fire.91 Combined, the total
cost of insurance claims was $746,500,000. Even for homes with no damage, the threat
now imposed by flooding as a result of the charred, hydrophobic landscape indirectly
devalued property values all across the Mountain Shadows and Black Forest
neighborhoods.
• Post-Wildfire Disasters: In 2013 1.3 inches of precipitation fell within the County.92
The western hillsides scarred by the Waldo Canyon Fire became the location of yet
again another costly, natural disaster. Due to the intense heat of the wildfire a year
prior, the ground became hyperbolic and with little to no trees or ground vegetation to
absorb the moisture, the flow of rainwater was unimpeded as it rushed towards Manitou
90
The Economic Impact of Travel on Colorado: 1996-2009, Dean Runyan Associates.
Cost of Wildfire, Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association.
92
Rain Sets Off Deadly Mudslide and Floods in Colorado, New York Times.
91
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 46 COUNTY, COLORADO] Springs. When the rain subsided, the City of Manitou estimated that the total cost of
damage to both public and private entities was $5.4 million.93
Costs and benefits of the status quo and the two policy alternatives are found within the
complete CBA matrix. Social costs are also included within the matrix, which features costs and
benefits to the tourism industry, property values including home insurance claims and flooding
damage following the Waldo Canyon and Black Forest Fires. Since the costs associated with
direct wildfire suppression is borne by the EPSO, there is no direct social cost to homeowners or
commercial entities unless the County decides to assess a fee or seek out a raise in taxes to
support a larger suppression budget.
Table 9: Full Cost-Benefit Matrix
93
Meyer, Jeremy P. and John Mossman. “Waldo Canyon fire singes Colorado Springs economy,” The
Denver Post.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 47
7. DISCUSSIONS & STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION
7.1 Unmanned Aerial Systems
The utilization of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technologies is an emerging area of
public policy that would have significant applications for the suppression of wildfire. Currently
FS use of UAS for wildfire suppression is in its infancy. According to the FS website, the
agency states that it is, “highly interested in new technologies,” furthering saying that FS
“believes there is potential to use UAS to support a host of natural resource management
activities, including forest health protection, wildfire suppression, research, recreational impacts,
and law enforcement.”94 Any FS-leased, contracted, or owned UAS will require a Certificate of
Authorization (COA) from the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) before operation. Despite
federal regulation grounding most UAS flights, the technology has a tremendous capacity to
improve wildfire suppression strategy. Fire direction and speed can change rapidly with results
that threaten both structures and human lives alike. A sustained observation of wildfire through
UAS can help direct firefighting resources where they are need most. Communities can be
warned and evacuated should a spreading fire warrant such action. Using high definition lenses,
real-time data can be relayed back to managers at ICTs to prompt hotshot and engine crews to
redeploy or retreat when conditions become too dangerous.
During the 2013 wildfire season, the Rim Fire in southern California burned more than
160,000 acres of the Stanislaus National Forest in Yosemite National Park and destroyed more
than 20 structures. Falling under the jurisdiction of CAL FIRE, the wildfire had nearly 4,000
personnel engaged and was only 20 percent contained with no estimated containment date.95
With few remaining options, CAL FIRE submitted “A Request of Assistance.” The FAA is the
government agency tasked with the regulation of all aerial devices both manned and unmanned.
Currently the agency restricts civilian use at a local government level, requiring that a
government public safety agency can operate UAS weighing 4.4 pounds or less, if operated: 1)
within the line of sight of the operator, 2) less than 400 feet above the ground, 3) during daylight
conditions, 4) within Class G airspace (uncontrolled airspace) and 5) outside of 5 statute miles
from any airport, heliport, seaplane base, spaceport, or other location with aviation activities.96
While current regulations limit the growth of the UAS market for local government, several
states have been selected as test sites for the new technology.
94
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FS.
Jones, Jennifer. “U.S. Forest Service Explores Use of UAS In Fire Management,” FS.
96
H.R. 658–62, 112 Cong. Subtitle B, FAA.
95
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 48 COUNTY, COLORADO] Policymakers and elected officials at all levels of government are beginning to lead on
the issue of UAS. In a letter written to FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta following the
active 2013 wildfire season, U.S. Senator Michael F. Bennet (D) from Colorado urged the FAA
to consider using UAS in future wildfire monitoring and suppression. Bennet wrote that,
“Unmanned aerial vehicles hold out the potential to help first responders map, measure, and
combat fires in ways that will strengthen our firefighting capabilities. This technology can help
first responders see through smoke, utilize infrared technology, and fly through areas too
dangerous for traditional aircraft, allowing them to identify hotspots and predict directional
changes in a fire more effectively.”97 Bennet also pointed out that a major Colorado wildfire this
year showcased the value of UAS technology writing, “This past summer, for example, UAS
technology was used to detect a dangerous remnant from the Black Forest fire in Colorado,
which firefighters extinguished before it could reach a major gas pipeline.”
In addition to elected officials, private industry is influencing the FAA to ease on
restrictive regulations. In Colorado, the lobbying group ‘UAS Colorado’ was formed in 2012
after several Front Range chambers of commerce met to establish an organization to draft a
proposal to the FAA seeking permission for Colorado to be one of the six test sites around the
country. The UAS Colorado proposal was supported by more than 100 businesses, 8
universities/colleges, 14 airports and flight areas, 7 regional economic development agencies,
County Representatives from 8 County Commissions, and many County Sheriffs and
Firefighting Departments. Although Colorado was ultimately not selected, UAS Colorado is just
one of many budding private groups representing public interests in the procurement of UAS
technologies for future use.
However, cost concerns arise when procuring UAS technology. Average costs of larger
UAS from prominent defense contractors range from the ScanEagle UAS from the InSitu Group,
a subsidiary of Boeing at $100,000 per unit98 to Northrup Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk
costing $222.7 million per unit.99 The most well known UAS is the General Atomics MQ-1B
Predator, which has a payload of 450 pounds, a max speed of up to 135 miles per hour, and has a
range of 770 miles and the capability of reaching heights of upwards of 25,000 feet. The unit
cost comes complete with two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and costs the U.S. Air
Force $20 million dollars (2009 dollars).100 While FS and other GFAs do engage wildfire in a
97
“Bennet Urges FAA to Prioritize Wildfire Monitoring, Suppression When Choosing UAS Testing
Sites,” Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado.
98
InSitu Group ScanEagle A-15, Barnard Microsystems.
99
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO.
100
MQ-1B Predator Fact Sheet, U.S. Air Force.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 49
military-minded way, often waging ‘warfare’ against a wildfire, both the capabilities and costs
exceed the needs for wildfire suppression and monitoring purposes. Policymakers and wildfire
managers often have a preconceived notion about UAS, as being used for military purposes
only, therefore there is some apprehension for the exploration of such technology. For the
purposes of this discussion, a 2014 study was released that studied a low-cost way of UAS
application for remote sensing in forested landscapes. The study outlines the costs as shown in
Table 10:
Component
Purpose
Cost
2.4 GHz
Tx/Rx
4500
mAh 11.1
V LiPo
Airspeed
Sensor
ArduPilot
APM 2.5
Canon
S100
Allows for
automatic
programs to
fly GPS
Missions
$160
Controls
UAS from
hand-held
device
Battery
that
powers
UAS
Monitors
Speed
and
Altitude
of UAS
$360
$30
$25
RiteWing
Zephyr II
TTC
Radio
Pocket
Sized
Camera
for
Imaging
Body and
Wings for
UAS
Piece
that
comm.
w/the
ground
$300
$325
$86
uBlox
GPS
Module
Voltage
Regulator
Details
location
of UAS
in flight
Maintains
constant
flow of
power to
UAS
$15
$76
Table 10: Cost-Purpose Assessment of Low-Cost UAS, Source: International Journal of Remote Sensing Applications
The study identified that it is in fact easier and a lot more cost effect to construct a UAS
by hand than to purchase through large contractors. The final cost for the UAS constructed and
used in the study was $1,377.101 A total cost savings of $98,623 as compared to $100,000 of the
least expensive UAS from a private defense contractor. With cost savings in mind, local
policymakers and wildfire managers may be more inclined to explore the possibilities associated
with the acquisition or even the self-construction of a UAS for wildfire suppression and
monitoring purposes. As more research is conducted about the benefits of UAS technology,
regulation will lessen and a market for its services will form. Additionally, an increase in
demand will lower the initial price of many of these higher-end UAS, thus becoming more
affordable for state and local government procurement.
7.2 Wildfire Suppression Fee
The budgeting of a County Wildfire Emergency Response Fund is another possible
avenue that may be explored more as wildfire suppression costs continue to rise and other areas
101
Wing, Michael, J. Burnett, S. Johnson, A.E. Akay, & J. Sessions. ”A Low-­‐‑cost Unmanned Aerial System for Remote Sensing of Forested Landscapes,” International Journal of Remote Sensing Applications. [HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 50 COUNTY, COLORADO] of revenue are intriguing. This fund will focus exclusively on the financing of wildfire
suppression strategies in El Paso County. Financing such a fund will require additional moneys
attained from property owners who reside within the WUI through the assessment of a Wildfire
Suppression Fee. Current rules and regulations enacted by the Taxpayers Bill of Rights
(TABOR) restrict the growth of taxes. Fees for service, however, can be utilized to support this
fund. Since 2000, there were 329 large wildfires in Colorado that were greater than 100 acres.
Altogether, they burned approximately 1.5 million acres and incurred more than $557 million in
suppression costs in 2012 dollars.102 In 2013 alone, 1,368 fires were recorded (Table 12).
Historically, disaster relief has come in the form of a joint assistance fund through federal
agencies matching loans and grants from state and local assets.
While a Disaster Emergency Fund exists at the state level, wildfire, unlike flooding or
blizzard, is not fully budgeted and often requires the combination of funds financed by the
TABOR Emergency Reserve and the transfer of additional funding from other departments
within the General Fund. The Colorado Disaster Emergency Act of 1992 defines a disaster as,
“the occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or
property resulting from any natural cause or cause of human origin, including but not limited to
fire.”103 Senate Bill 13-270 authorizes the establishment of a state managed Wildfire Emergency
Relief Fund and the structure by which it is financed and used. By executive order or
proclamation, the governor may access and designate moneys and transfer it from the Disaster
Emergency Fund to the Wildfire Emergency Relief Fund.
Today, 1.1 million Coloradans live in more than half a million homes near or within the
WUI across the state. This is equivalent to one in every four homes and one in every five people
in the state.104 A 2011 study by the National Academies found that the average area burned
annually in the western United States will rise dramatically with every 1.8°F of warming.105 The
CSFS interactive web-mapping service, CO-WRAP is a useful tool that allows County officials
to fully designate which households fall within the WUI designation. The model factors in
approximately 160 variables, including vegetation, topography, weather patterns, wildfire
102
Cleetus, Rachel and Kranti Mulik. “Playing with Fire: How Climate Change and Development Patterns
Are Contributing to the Soaring Costs of Western Wildfires,” Union of Concerned Scientists
103
C.R.S. §24-32-2103(1.5)
104
Data: Homes in the Red Zone, Rocky Mountain PBS I-News
105
Climate Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over Decades to Millennia.
National Research Council (NRC)
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 51
history, flame intensity and speed, all of which can be used to calculate various aspects of
wildfire risk.106
With a growing WUI population and a sustained presence of wildfire due to drier
temperatures and larger fuel buildup, financing current levels of suppression efforts is
unsustainable. The trend of wildfire has increased significantly in the 2000s (Figure 6).
As GFAs are willing to suppress wildfire on public lands to protect private lands within the WUI,
suppression costs that continue to rise will be more a cost directly to the taxpayer. This cost
structure allows private homebuilders, local and state governments to evade the responsibility or
accountability for approving new housing development in fire-prone lands. That creates a
perverse incentive to allow continued development within the WUI despite a growing risk of
wildfire. Therefore, this memorandum recommends the exploration into the assessment of a
Wildfire Suppression Fee directly to homeowners living within the WUI.
Figure 6: Total Acres Burned in Colorado Wildfires per Decade. CSFS.
Fee-based programs are not new. Recently, California enacted legislation that requires
rural residents to pay an annual $150 firefighting fee.107 To improve the financial structure of
wildland firefighting, a $50 Wildfire Suppression Fee will be levied upon those households
designated as living within the WUI. With an estimated 36,000 households located within the
County’s WUI areas (Headwater Economics), the formula is shown as the $50 fee multiplied by
106
Van Hueven, Catherine M. “Wildfire Insurance and Forest Health Taskforce,” Colorado Department of
Regulatory Agencies.
107
Assembly Bill X1 29, California Fire Prevention Fee
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 52 COUNTY, COLORADO] the number of households. Using forecasted population trends and the Denver-Boulder-Greeley
Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 2014, the amount will be adjusted for inflation and population
growth for the following fiscal years: FY2015-19 as shown in Table 11:
Fiscal Year
FY2015-16
FY2016-17
FY2017-18
Revenue
$1,800,000
$1,803,300
$1,853,377
Generated
Table 11: Total Revenue Generated from Wildfire Suppression Fee FY2015-19
FY2018-19
$1,904,845
The fee will be assessed annually on a fiscal year basis (July 1 – June 30). If a resident
lives within an apartment building then the entire complex will be responsible for the fee rather
than each unit. As part of this process, households may be eligible to qualify for a rebate or
reduction of the fee for efforts made to reduce wildfire risk on their property as well as if they
reside within fire districts or city and town fire departments that receive tax dollars for their own
suppression efforts. It is important to note that this fee is neither a penalty for living within the
WUI nor a policy measure to discourage growth within the County. It is rather an economic tool
to influence the behavior of rapid development within many of these fire-prone areas. Before
implementation, below are three policy points to consider:
1. TABOR: Under TABOR, located in Article 10, Sec. 20 within the Colorado State
Constitution, the state cannot assess a tax increase unless by vote of the people. The
current financing formula of TABOR is based upon inflation multiplied by the growth of
population each year. The El Paso County Commissioners should consider the creation
of a Wildfire Suppression Fee to finance future wildfire mitigation and suppression
efforts. With the assessment of a fee, El Paso County would not be subject to the
restrictions of TABOR as it is a fee for service rather than a direct tax on homeowners.
2. Maximizing Funding: In addition to immediate suppression efforts, revenue generated
from this potential fee would have the flexibility to be used on both mitigation services
prior to a wildfire starting and exploratory efforts to examine the potential acquisition of
future technologies such as automated wildfire detection systems or UAS when the
technology becomes more available to local governments.
3. Public Opposition: While a Wildfire Suppression F would support 0.67 cents of every
dollar spent on suppression costs incurred by future wildfires, it will not be met without
opposition from various stakeholders. Property owners within the WUI will be opposed
to any additional fee on top of insurance premiums to protect against wildfires and other
natural disasters. With the assessment of a fee, revenue to support the fund will be
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 53
directly collected from those living within the most fire-prone areas and requiring the
most immediate attention designated by CO-WRAP.
COLORADO
# FIRES (WILD)
ACRES (WILD)
# FIRES (Rx)
ACRES (Rx)
BIA
111
112
3
36
BLM
401
7,466
23
1,062
COUNTY
323
32,584
30
1,487
DDQ
3
2
8
5,385
FWS
5
0
7
864
NPS
30
1,009
5
151
OTHER
0
0
0
0
STATE
9
824
0
0
USFS
294
153,148
116
7,336
CO TOTALS
1,176
195,145
192
16,321
Table 12: 2013 National Report of Wildfires & Acres Burned by Land Ownership. Source: NIFC.
Note: Fires are categorized into wildland fires ignited both of natural and manmade origins and
prescribed (Rx) burns.
7.3 Future Outlook
In the examination of the status quo of wildfire suppression policy in El Paso County as
well as two policy recommendations, a discussion of the future use of UAS technology and the
implementation of a wildfire suppression fee, the recommendation of this policy memorandum is
the acquisition of automated wildfire detection systems. As modern technology advances, so too
will communication amongst first responders improve. Surveillance and monitoring of current
conditions within the forest will progress and overall response to the detection of a wildfire will
aid in the containment and extinguishment of the incident. By acquiring automated wildfire
detection systems within the hands of EPSOWF, suppression can be started the moment when a
single Lodgepole Pine begins to combust. This technology is both timely and cost-beneficial to
the future wildfire suppression strategies of El Paso County. Initial costs, albeit steep, will be
offset in two to three years by the projected savings of preventing a large, Type-1 Incident.
While the utilization of UAS technology is years from implementation in wildland firefighting
policy, it does open the door for the use of affordable technology that monitors wildfire
conditions. Using such technology will help the EPSOWF to be both proactive and ready should
a wildfire spark and resources and personnel mobilized for suppressive purposes. When battling
such a powerful and destructive force as wildfire, every second is crucial to GFAs to protect the
people, property and place of El Paso County.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 54 COUNTY, COLORADO] El Paso County is on the forefront of wildland firefighting. With military partnerships
and previous experience with complex Type-1 incidents, wildfire suppression policy only stands
to develop, further enhancing wildland firefighting for the future. In time suppression policy will
begin to revert back to allowing the natural cycle of wildfire within America’s forested areas.
Still, wildfire remains the only natural force that mankind believes it can control. However, with
improved data collection systems from Automated Wildfire Detection Systems and possible
UAS usage relaying real-time information to ICTs, the threat of wildfire can be less harmful to
property and less lethal to people and wildland firefighters. The future holds tremendous
opportunity for improved wildfire suppression policy in El Paso County.
8. WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS
Wildfires are not a question of if they will burn but rather when they will burn. The
alternatives discussed within this policy memorandum have weaknesses and limitations that may
alter the desired success of future outcomes. While no measure of public policy is without fault
or lack of complete information, each effort must be done in way that is both respectful of
various stakeholders’ positions and responsible with taxpayer dollars. It must be made clear that
it is not the position of this policy memorandum that these recommendations will prevent
another large, catastrophic wildfire from occurring in the County with immediate suppressive
strategies. This policy memorandum, however, does advocate quick and immediate detection of
wildfire, giving managers of the County time to make the decision of full-suppression or a ‘letburn’ strategy as the best course of action. The recommendations discussed within this policy
memorandum have both their weaknesses and limitations including:
•
Hiring Three Full Time Seasonal Wildland Firefighters: EPSO is currently
facing a $2.5 million deficit due to excessive hiring of law enforcement
personal.108 In 2012, El Paso County voters approved the increase of a .23
percent sales tax in an effort to generate an estimated $17 million in additional
public safety funding. The earmarked funding known as ‘1A’ was spent on
hiring 32 additional staffers to which EPSO is now unable to finance fully. Any
additional FTEs to the EPSO will necessitate either a redistribution of funds or
cutting of services or existing FTE to finance three seasonal wildland FTE.
108
Handy, Ryan M. “1A money a point of contention for El Paso County, new sheriff thanks to legacy of
Maketa,” Colorado Springs Gazette.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 55
•
Acquiring Automated Wildfire Detection Systems: Initial costs are the principal
weakness of this recommendation. Operating at $180,000 per system, the
technology is expensive. Training personnel how to operate the system would
be an additional weakness as well as the risk of the technology malfunctioning
when a wildfire begins.
Following the destruction of the Waldo Canyon and Black Forest Fires, many steps have
been taken to analyze and learn from the wildfires; however, too many residents in El Paso
County still face the threat of future wildfires. It is evident that many variables such as future
development within the WUI, rising temperatures, lower precipitation, higher winds and growth
of beetle infestation will cause many wildfires to burn larger and longer. In the region, the core
issue in the near future for the region will not be cost reduction or even cost containment, but
rather cost management. A balance of the ecological need as well as the protection of both
public and private properties is a delicate but necessary process to ensure future prosperity and
enjoyment for residents and visitors alike. Rather than a militant attitude of waging war or
fighting wildfire, the EPSO and regional GFA partners must learn to live with wildfire and
accept the role it plays in revitalizing and re-nourishing the landscape. Regardless of town or
neighborhood, all residents of the County are impacted by wildfire that occurs within the region.
The tourism industry, the military, small businesses, municipal and county governments, federal
GFAs and residents, each have equal stakes and each possess the ability to influence policy to
alleviate the potential of another large and catastrophic wildfire. Ultimately, through
collaborative action, improved wildfire suppression policy can be achieved for El Paso County,
Colorado.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO 56 COUNTY, COLORADO] 9. REFERENCES
9.1 Appendix
IV
2014 Report on the Health of Colorado’s Forests
2014 Insect and Disease Activity in Colorado Forests
Aerial Survey Data
Due to the nature of aerial surveys, the data on this map only provide rough
estimates of location, intensity and the resulting trend information for
agents detectable from the air. Many of the most destructive diseases are not
represented on the map because these agents are not detectable from aerial
surveys. The data presented on this map should only be used as an indicator
of insect and disease activity, and should be validated on the ground for actual
location and causal agent. Shaded areas show locations where tree mortality or
defoliation were apparent from the air. Intensity of damage is variable, and not
all trees in shaded areas are dead or defoliated.
The insect and disease data represented on this map are available digitally
from the USDA Forest Service, Region 2 Forest Health Management group.
The cooperators reserve the right to correct, update, modify or replace GIS
products. Using this map for purposes other
than those for which it was intended may yield
inaccurate or misleading results.
Map created December 2014
For more information:
www.csfs.colostate.edu
©CSFS
Data Source: United State Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Forest Health Technology Enterprise Team (FHTET)
Appendix: 2014 Insect and Disease Activity in Colorado Forests, Report on the Health of Colorado
Forests. Source: Colorado State Forest Service.
[HELL ALONG THE FRONT RANGE: THE ONGOING WILDFIRE THREAT IN EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO] 57
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