Experimental Philosophy*
UniversityPressScholarshipOnline
OxfordScholarshipOnline
OxfordStudiesinExperimentalPhilosophy:Volume1
JoshuaKnobe,TaniaLombrozo,andShaunNichols
Printpublicationdate:2014
PrintISBN-13:9780198718765
PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:January2015
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001
ExperimentalPhilosophy*
1935–1965
TaylorMurphy
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0013
AbstractandKeywords
Intheheydayoflinguisticphilosophyanexperimentalphilosophymovementwasborn,
andthischaptertellsitsstory,bothinitshistoricalandphilosophicalcontextandasitis
connectedtocontroversiesaboutexperimentalphilosophytoday.Fromitshumble
beginningsattheViennaCircle,themovementmaturedintoavibrantresearchprogram
atOslo,andsoughtadventureatBerkeleythereafter.Theharshanduncharitable
reactionitmetissurprisingbutunderstandableinlightofdisciplinarytensionsandthe
legacyofantipsychologism—sentimentsandargumentswhichhavereemergedtoday,
albeitinmodifiedform.YettheresearchatOsloremainedunperturbedanditflourished
inbothitstheoryanditsapplications,whichspannedthephilosophicaldomain.The
Berkeleyyearswereshortbutintense,asexemplifiedbytheirengagementwith
ordinary-languagephilosophy,J.L.Austin,andthetheoryofcommunicativesignificance.
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Experimental Philosophy*
Keywords:empiricalsemantics,psychologism,intuition,methodology,interpretation,ArneNaess,Herman
Tennessen
Introduction
Intheheydaysoflinguisticphilosophy,agroupofNorwegianphilosopherssawthat
philosophersoftenreliedonintuitionswhenspeakingabouttheconceptualcommitments
andlinguisticusesofordinarypeople,despiteenduringdisagreementonthematter.
Thentherewasthecriticalinsight:“Whenphilosophersofferconflictinganswersto
questionsthathaveempiricalcomponents,empiricalresearchisneeded”(Naess,1953a,
p.vii).Callingthemselvesempiricalsemanticists,thisgroupstoodopposedtothe“antiempiricallyorientedarmchairphilosopher”andpointed“tothepossibilityofan
‘experimentalphilosophy’”(Tennessen,1964,p.290;Naess,1938a,p.161).Theyargued
thatitis“hardlysufficientthatasinglepersonregistershisownreactionstothisorthat
sentence,ormakespronouncementsbasedonintuitions,orundertakesscattered
observationsofothers’usage”(Gullvå g,1955,p.343).Andsoofftheywent,testingthe
claimsmadebyphilosophers(p.326) andinvestigatinghowconceptsareunderstood,
defined,andusedbyordinarypeople.
Empiricalsemanticsisdeeplysimilartotoday’sexperimentalphilosophy;itwaslinguistic
philosophy’sexperimentalphilosophy.Althoughtheempiricalsemanticsmovementisnot
historicallycontinuouswithtoday’sexperimentalphilosophymovement,empirical
semanticistsengagedwithmuchthesamesubjectmatter,hadsimilarmotivationsand
aims,andencounteredcharacteristicproblemsandobjectionsattheinterfacebetween
analyticphilosophyandexperimentalpsychology.Thischapterspellsoutthese
connectionsandsituatesempiricalsemanticswithinthecontextofexperimental
philosophyandanalyticphilosophy.
ArneNaessledtheempiricalsemanticsmovement.ThemostrenownedNorwegian
philosophertoday,Naesswashonouredwithastatefuneralandiswellremembered
bothforpioneeringtheecologicalmovementandforhisactivismintheinternationalpeace
movement(Stadler,2009).Naessisalsocreditedwithbringingsocialsciencemethods
intoNorway,andempiricalsemanticsisconsideredanintellectualforerunnerto
sociolinguisticsandcorpuslinguistics(Chapman,2008,2011;Thue,2009).Alongwith
Naess,thecentralempiricalsemanticistswereHermanTennessen,apsychologistwith
interestsinlogicalanalysis;IngemundGullvå g,alogician;andHaraldOfstad,alegal
scholarturnedmoralphilosopher(Ofstad,1951,pp.42–3;Tennessen,1962).
Thischapterisorganizedintothreesections,roughlycorrespondingtothreeperiodsof
empiricalsemanticsresearch.Ibeginwiththeoriginalinspirationforempiricalsemantics
(around1935–38),andsurveyitsreceptionovertheyears.ItgrewfromNaess’sown
interestsandhisencounterswiththosehemetinVienna.Naesshadanongoinginterest
inbehaviouralpsychologyandtheconceptoftruth,andgainedfurthermotivationto
studythenotionoftruthexperimentallyinconversationwithTarskiandothersatthe
ViennaCircle.Theoverarchingfactorwastheapparentrelianceonintuitionwhen
assessingthewaythattermsaredefined,conceived,andusedbyordinarypeople.
Naess’sworkovertheyearswasmetwithresistance,largelyduetoantipsychologistic
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Experimental Philosophy*
(orantinaturalistic)sentimentsandargumentsthatbecamecentraltoanalyticphilosophy
whenitpartedwayswithexperimentalpsychologyaroundtheturnofthecentury.
Empiricalsemanticistspointedtothe(p.327) broadlyempiricaltraditionalconceptionof
philosophythatexistedpriortotheriseofanalyticphilosophy.Whilethedistinction
betweenanalyticconceptualanalysisandsyntheticsciencessuchaspsychologywas
sensible,itwasoftenusedtodepreciateempiricalresearchontraditionalphilosophical
topics.MyaccountofwhattranspiredinViennaandNaess’sintellectualdevelopmentat
thisstageisdrawnlargelyfromhisrecollections,whichwerepennedafterWorldWarII.
InthenextsectionofthechapterIsurveytheworkdonebyempiricalsemanticistsin
Oslo(around1939–56).Isketchsomebasicideasandmethodsandplacethisworkinits
socialandpoliticalcontext.Despitetheemphasisinsociopoliticaltopics,therewasa
vibrantresearchprogramontopicsinanalyticphilosophy.Theexperimentalstudieshere
focusedonunderstandinghowpeopleconceiveoftruth,democracy,synonymy,
consciousness,and“testability”amongphysicists,tonamejustafew.Iconcentrateon
onestudyoftypologicalconceptsforillustration,andnotesomecontrastswith
experimentalphilosophy.Perhapsmoststrikingisthattherewasnoattempttoaccess
analyticitiesorconceptualtruthsfromtheexperimentaldata—itwasregularscienceand
not,asitwere,priortoit.However,italsoembodiedauniqueanalyticalandphilosophical
approachofitsown.Formysourceshere,IbeganwithTennessen’scoursetextbooks
andaccountsbytheempiricalsemanticistsabouttheirownresearch,aswellassome
archivalmaterialthatincludesoriginalstudiesanddata(ascitedbelow).Forthe
illustrationontypologicalconcepts,IpartiallytranslatedsomeofTennessen’sworkfrom
NorwegianandusedTennessen’sEnglishsummary(nowavailableonline).
Lastly,IturntotheperiodofworkthatfollowedatBerkeley(around1957–61).Whereas
theworkinOsloconsistedineffortstounderstandhowpeoplethinkaboutspecifictopics,
atBerkeleythefocusturnedtowardexplanationofcertainpatternsofintuitivejudgments
aboutlanguagefoundinanalyticphilosophy.Asdestinywouldhaveit,therewasaclashof
sortsbetweenempiricalsemanticistsandordinary-languagephilosophers,thoughthis
clashwasalsoquiteconstructive.Althoughlogicalanalysiscouldbedistinguishedfrom
empiricalsemantics,ordinary-languagephilosophycertainlyappearedtobeaboutthe
samesubjectmatter:ordinarylanguage.Someofthisworkisobscurebecauseit
suddenlystoppedaround1960,andmuchofitwasdoneinconnectionwithJ.L.Austin
(whodiedinFebruary1960).Thissection(p.328) drawsheavilyonarchivalmaterial
fromthisperiod,includingseminarnoteswrittenatBerkeley,anddraftsofwork(someof
whichwerenotpublished).Again,muchofthisworkisnowonlineoravailableonrequest.
ExperimentalPhilosophyattheViennaCircle
Muchhappenedinthisperiod,soabrieftimelineofNaess’sactivitiesisinorder(see
Stadler,2009).NaessspenthisstudentyearsinParisstudyingphilosophy,psychology,
mathematics,andastronomy.In1933hecompletedtwoMaster’stheses,oneontruth
andoneonbehavioralpsychology.Thisworkincludedsomequantitativeanalysisofthe
usageofevidentialexpressionsinscience,suchas“show,”“prove,”and“demonstrate”
(Naess,1933;cf.Overton,2013).WhenNaessarrivedinViennain1934,hewasinvited
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Experimental Philosophy*
toparticipateinMoritzSchlick’sViennaCircleseminars.Herehecontinuedtodevelop
hisinterestsincloseconversationwithRudolfCarnap,CharlesMorris,OttoNeurath,
andAlfredTarski,amongothers.Naesswrotehisdissertationontheempiricalstudyof
scientificbehaviourandpresentedthistotheViennaCircleinMarch1936.Naesswas
alsoinspiredtoconductexperimentsontheconceptoftruth,andpresentedsome
resultsattheThirdInternationalCongressfortheUnityofScience(July1937,Paris).In
parallelhedidresearchwiththeViennesepsychologistEgonBrunswick—alsoa
participantattheViennaCircle.Naesswastocontinuethisresearchinexilein1938–39at
Berkeley,whereheworkedinEdwardC.Tolman’spsychologylaboratory.
AccordingtoNaess,onecentralideaofhiswasinfluencedbyhowtheViennaCircle
seminarswerestructured.Participantsworkedtowardgainingagreementonprecise
formulationsoftheirphilosophicalpositions,revisingtheirformulationswhentherewere
diverginginterpretations.Ashelaterrecalledit,thisprocessledhimtothinkthat“we
werenotquiteclearinourheads—thatweinasensewereonlyvaguelyawareofwhat
wemightbetalkingabout”(Naess,1993,p.263).“Theirquestforclarityandcordial
cooperationinpursuitofknowledgeledmetoappreciatethat‘WhatdoImean?’isan
openquestion”(Naess,2005a,p.lxiiif).Naessobservedconsiderableshallownessof
semanticintentionandthattherewereoftensurprisinglydiverseinterpretationsforeach
other’sformulations.Thisledhimtoargueextensivelyagainstthe(p.329) assumption
thatpropositionswerepreciselygraspedinactualthinkingandunderstandinginhis
dissertation,CognitionandScientificBehaviour(1936).
AccordingtoNaess,ViennaCircleparticipantsoftenappealedtotheordinary,commonsensemeaningsandusesofwords.Herecallsfindingitperplexinghow“thelogical
empiricists[could]boastaboutascientificattitudewhentheyreliedsomuchonintuition
whenspeakingabouttheuseofwords”(2005b,p.199).Hewasconfidentthatempirical
methodscouldbeofusehere,aswellasforstudyinglanguagemoregenerally:
Ibelievedthatonecouldpurgelogicalempiricismofitsantiempiricaltendenciesby
aprogramforpurelyempiricalstudiesoflinguisticusage.Preciselysuchresearch,
withoutfurtherintentions,seemedtomenecessary(1)tocounterbalanceaform
of“logicalanalysis”thatstrictlyspeakingwasnotlogical,and(2)tocreatethe
preconditionsfortheconstructionofasystemofexactconceptsintendedtocover
allempiricalfieldsofimportanceinthephilosophicaldiscussion.
(Naess,2005b,p.203)
IntheViennaCircle,NaessandTarskidiscussedTarski’srecentworkontheconceptof
truthinformalizedlanguages.OneofTarski’sdesideratalinkedhisaccounttothe
ordinaryconceptoftruth—his“materialadequacy”condition.AsLinskyputit:
Therequirementofmaterialadequacyissimplytherequirementthatthedefinition,
onceachieved,shallcorrespondmoreorlesscloselywiththatconceptoftruth
whichallofushaveinmindbeforeweeverundertakethetaskofexplication.
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Experimental Philosophy*
(Linsky,1952,p.1)
Tarskibelievedthathisaccount(roughlyoftheform,“p”istrueiffp)doesindeed“do
justicetoourintuitions”abouttruthandconformswith“common-senseusage,”thereby
fulfillinghismaterialadequacycriterion(Tarski,1944).Naessdoubtedthatthiswasreally
thecommon-sensenotionoftruth,aswouldberevealedbysystematicquestioningof
non-philosophers.However,Naessalsohadalargerconcern,fortheViennaCircle
participantswerenotaloneintheirhabitofreferencingtheviewsofnon-philosophersas
decisiveinrejectinganother’sformulationorposition.
(p.330) Naess’sextensiveinvestigationswerepublishedinhisbook“Truth”as
ConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessionalPhilosophersandinTheoria(Naess,
1938a,1938b).HereNaessreportsontheextenttowhichphilosopherstake“a
standpointtowhatthenon-philosophersmean,statingthatthetheoriesoftruthadhered
tobytheiropponentscontradictthebasicstructureoftruthrevealedamongthenonphilosophers”(Naess,1938a,p.165).Heconcludedthatnoagreementwascomingany
timesoonfromthearmchair:
Undernoconditionscanweattributeanyvaluetostatementsonthesematters
deducedfromgeneralphilosophicalviewsorfrom“intuition.”Ifonewishesto
knowsomethingaboutthematter,thetraditionalmethodsofattackmustbe
radicallyanddefinitelyabandoned.
(Naess,1938a,p.93)
Inhisefforttosettlethings,Naessinterrogatedandsurveyedordinarypeople;heasked
themtoexplicitlystatewhattheythinktruthis,tostatewhatiscommontoallthatistrue,
tomakesynonymityjudgments,toevaluateothers’definitions;andhetriedavarietyof
othertechniques(seeAppiah,2008;Chapman,2008,2011;Stadler,2009).Naessalso
investigatedotherfactorssuchasage,gender,suggestibility,andeducation.1
Naessidentifiedsomethirty-seventruththeories,includingthosecenteringonwhatis
provable,whatisarrivedatfromone’ssenses,whatislearned,whatserveslife,what
cannotbecomeotherwise,whatagreeswithalltheevidence,andwhatisagreeduponby
consensus.Hetookthistoshowthattherewasjustnothingthatdeservedtobecalled
thecommon-sensetheoryorpre-philosophicconceptionoftruth;somuch,then,forthe
materialadequacycondition:2
(p.331) Itisthereforenonsensicaltospeakofthecommonsenseviewofthe
truth-notion.Equallynonsensicalitistospeakoftheviewofthemaninthestreet,
oftheuneducated,oftheprephilosophicmindetc.Nophilosopherspeaksofthe
philosophicviewofthetruth-notion…thiswouldnot,however,beanymore
ridiculousthantospeakofthecommonsenseview.
(Naess,1938a,p.85)
Insteadofresearchontheordinaryconceptionoftruth,Naessproposedsome
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Experimental Philosophy*
alternativeprojects:thedevelopmentandacceptanceofscientifichypotheses,the
functionofmaximsandstatementsinideologicalcurrents,formalizationofevidential
expressionsinscience,andconceptualclarificationwhenitisusefultodoso.AsNaess
latersummarizedhisconclusions:
In“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessionalPhilosophers,Itried
toshowtheinadequacyofintuitivemethodsemployedbyphilosophersforthe
purposeofdetermininghow“true”andrelatedtermsareconceived,definedand
usedbyordinarypeople.Theexclusiveuseofintuitivemethodsforthese
purposestendstoresultinanunderestimationofthediversetrendsofreflection
amongthosewhoarenotlearned…Dialogueswiththosewhoarephilosophically
uneducatedconvincedmethatacceptanceofintuitionsreportedbythe
philosophicallysophisticatedabouttheverbalandconceptualhabitsofothersleads
toconfusionanderror.
(Naess,1953a,p.vii)
Itisworthhighlightingtheuseof“intuition”byNaesshere,asitdiffersfromsome
currentwaysofusingtheterm.Now,itwasnotuncommontotreatconformitywith
ordinaryusageand“ourintuitions”asdecisive.Naesswascertainlynottheonlyoneto
noticethis,norwashealoneinsurveyingsuchappealsandproposingempirical
investigations.RichardRudner(anAmericanphilosopheratWashingtonUniversityinSt.
Louis)didsoaswell.Rudnersurveyedanumberofphilosophers—Carnap,Goodman,
Moore,Hempel—andaskedhowtheintuitionsthattheyappealtocouldbejustified,
weighedagainsteachother,andsystematized(Rudner,1950).
Thereisanimportantdifferenceherebetweenappealingtointuitionsassuchandtreating
themasevidenceofthecorrectnessofone’sanalysis,(p.332) versusamethodof
reflectingfromthearmchaironwhatotherswouldordinarilysayorthink.Rudner(and
Goodman)mayhavebeenconcernedwiththeformer,butNaessonlyhadthelatteruse
inmind.Naessdidnotviewcommon-senseusageorsharedintuitionsashavingany
distinctive,epistemicallysignificantroleinphilosophicalanalysis;insteadheworriedthat
therelianceonintuitionsinmakingtheseclaimswasasourceoffruitlesscontroversy.As
heputit:
Itisnotnecessarytodepartfromphilosophicalpasturesinordertoseetheneed
fortryingoutempiricalprocedurestodiscoverthelinguisticusesandconceptual
commitmentsofthemanonthestreet…[Forexample,seethedisagreementin]
articlesinrecentvolumesoftheperiodicalsMind,AnalysisandPhilosophical
Review.Idonotcontendthatthesephilosophersinallcasesshouldhave
investigatedconventionalusagebyothermeansthanintuition.Imerelysuggest
thatempiricalproceduresshouldbeappliedtoempiricalquestions.When
philosophersofferconflictinganswerstoquestionsthathaveempiricalcomponents,
empiricalresearchisneeded…Ifintuitionsareused,proceduresshouldbe
devisedbywhichintuitiveresultsofdifferent,presumablycompetentpeoplecan
becompared.Iftheintuitiveresultsseemtoconflictoraredifficulttodelimitand
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express,oneshouldlookformethodsbywhichtoavoidatleastsomeofthe
intuitivecomponentsoftheprocedure.
…Thekindofactivitytodayreferredtobynamessuchas“logicalanalysis”and
“conceptualclarification”isonlypartlydeductiveandaxiomaticalincharacter.Much
ofitseemstometorestonintuitionsaboutone’sownandothers’usesofterms
andtocontainrecommendationsorpreferencesinmattersofterminology.The
intuitionalapproachisexcellentsolongastheagreementinresultsisofthe
intersubjective,interculturalkindthatcharacterizessomeoftheresultsinthe
formalorfactualsciences.Suchagreements,however,havenotbeenobtained.
(Naess,1953a,pp.vii–x)
Theroleofagreementwithordinaryusageandourintuitionsdoesnotappeartoamount
toanythingmorethanAristotle’suseofendoxaasreasonablestartingpointsindialectical
arguments(Hintikka,1999).Naessdidnotregardintuitionsandordinaryusageas
anythingmorethanconventionalpointsofdepartureforone’sexplications,construction
ofaxiomaticalsystems,orothertheorizing.3
(p.333) Receptionofempiricalsemanticsinanalyticphilosophy
ReviewsofNaess’sworkwerestrikinglyhostile,particularlyatfirst.Briefly:J.Moore
criticizedNaessfornothaving“formulatedhisconclusionsinanysystematicfashion,”
addingthat“therearefewermisprintsthanareusuallyfoundinworksofthischaracter”
(Moore,1939).Malisoffbeganhisreviewbystatingthat“thismaybedescribedasa
psychologicalstudy”(Malisoff,1939).NagelpredictedthatNaess“willnodoubtremain
anoutcastfromthephilosophiccommunityandwillhavetofindwhatsolacehecanin
beinga‘mere’scientist”(Nagel,1939).Laterreviewsofhisworkbarelydifferinwhat
theyconsiderimportanttomention.StrawsonalsocomplainedaboutNaess’swriting
aptitudeandwasconcernedthathis(notinaccurate)summarywas“parodyingthe
author”(Strawson,1954).Huttenwrotethatitisa“socialandpsychologicalstudyabout
howpeopleusewords;ithardlytouchesuponthelogicalorphilosophicissuesinvolved”
(Hutten,1953).Chisholmstressedthatalthoughitisimportantforlinguisticsitdoesnot
haveanyclearrelevancetophilosophicalquestions(Chisholm,1953).Thesereviewsare
shortanddonotengagemuchwiththework.
Toputthesestatementsincontext,considertheperiodof1880–1920asthetimeofan
academic“powerstruggle”betweenphilosophersandexperimentalpsychologists
(Kusch,1995,2011).Whiletheturnofthecenturyisrememberedasapointof
departurebetweenphilosophyandexperimentalpsychology,itwasalso,asSoberputit,
“atimeofexile:whilethepsychologistswereleaving,philosopherswereslammingthe
doorbehindthem”(Sober,1978,p.165).Theriseandexpansionofexperimental
psychologytookplaceinphilosophydepartmentsandpresentedthevisionofanew
academicrolethatispartphilosopherandpartexperimentalscientist.Thismotivated
manyphilosopherstoargueforastrictseparationbetweenpurephilosophyand
experimentalpsychology,inaprocessof“rolepurification”(Kusch,1995).Carnap’svision
isemblematic:“Nowweshalleliminatethepsychologicalquestionsalso,notfromthe
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regionofknowledge,butfromphilosophy.Then,finally,philosophywillbereducedto
logicalone(inawidesenseofthisword)”(Carnap,1935,p.33).Psychologism,Carnap
said,consistsintheconflationofthetaskoflogicalanalysiswiththeempiricalquestionsof
psychology.
(p.334) Theseearlydebateswerecouchedintermsof“psychologism”or
“psychologicism,”andclimaxedinacontroversialpetitionin1913—onethatwas
expressly“directedagainstthefillingofchairsofphilosophywithrepresentativesof
experimentalpsychology”(quotedinKusch,1995,p.191).Theoutcomeofthesedebates
wasamuch-emphasizedseparationof“pure”philosophyfromexperimentalpsychology
asdistinctfieldsofstudy,withFregeandHusserlreceivingcreditformakingthecritical
distinctions(seeKusch,1995,2011).Fregearguedforasharpdistinctionbetween
logic/mathematicsandpsychology:mathematicsandlogicareneitherpartsofpsychology
noraretheirobjectsdefined,illuminated,justified,orproventruethroughpsychology.
Onemust,afterall,distinguishbetweenideasofnumbersandthenumbersthemselves.
Fregeacknowledgedthatknowledgeofvaguepsychologicalprocessesmaybeofsome
interest,butrejectedpsychologicalinterpretationsoftheanalytic/syntheticandapriori/a
posterioridistinctions;thedifferenceisinhowtheyarejustifiedorproventrue.In
particular,theyarejustifiedwithoutreferencetomattersoffact,psychologicalor
otherwise.Andatanyrate,psychologicallawsdonotevaluatethinkinghabitsfortheir
truthorfalsehood—anindependent,priorcriterionisneededtoevaluatethemandto
distinguishbetweenbeingtrueandmerelybeingtaken-as-true.Allgoodpointstobe
sure,butthisconceptionandthesedistinctionsbecamecentraltophilosophy,properly
conceived.4
Naessrecallsthathisworkwasmetwithhostilityandthathewasoftenaccusedof
psychologism.AttheThirdInternationalCongressfortheUnityofScience,Carnapeven
warnedNaessnottopresentonhisexperimentalstudies(Naess,1981,pp.144–5).The
useofquestionnaireswasscornedby“genuine”philosophers,Naesssays,somuchso
thathisdepartmentchairatOslothreatenedthathewouldnotvoteforNaess’stenureif
hepublishedhisstudyontruth(Naess,1983,p.311).Naesspublisheditanywayandhis
chairdidnotvoteforhistenure.
NaesscreditsMorris’sdistinctionbetween“pragmatics”and“semantics”withproviding
aneasywayofdodgingthepotentialrelevanceofhis(p.335) empiricalwork(Morris,
1935;Naess,1993).Morrisintroducedthetrioofempirical,pragmatic,andformal
dimensionsofmeaning,writingthat“themeaningofatermiscompletelyspecifiedwhenit
isknownwhatobjectsthetermdesignates,whatexpectationsitproducesinthepersons
forwhomithasmeaning,andwhatitsconnectionsarewithothertermsinthelanguageof
whichitispart”(Morris,1935,p.278).Theformalandpragmaticdimensionsofmeaning
dividedalongthesamelinesaspurephilosophyandexperimentalpsychology;whereas
semanticsreferstothelogicalconnectionsamongtermsinalanguageandisthedomain
ofanalyticityandtheapriori,pragmaticsisanempiricalpsychologyoflanguagewhich
mustnotbeconfusedwithphilosophy.Sellars’smannerofdiscussingpragmaticsandhis
concomitantconcernwithwhatcountsasphilosophyprovidesanideaofhowmanywould
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haveapproachedNaess’sworkinwhatmightbecalled“pragmaticsemantics”(Apostel,
1953).
Itishardlynecessarytopointoutthattheadditionaltoolsforwhichwearelooking
arenottobefoundinthedevelopmentwhichhascometobeknownas
“pragmatics,”forthisis,onthewhole,abranchofempiricalscience,afocusingof
psychologyandsociologyonthephenomenasubsumedundertheempirical
conceptoflanguage…Classicalempiricism…confusedthegrammarofphilosophical
predicatesbyattemptingtoidentifythemwithpsychologicalpredicates.Inmany
casesthegrammarwassoseriouslyconfusedthatcertainofthemoreconsequent
empiricistscanhardlybecalledphilosophers.
(Sellars,1947,pp.645–6)
InresponsetothisattitudeNaesswasquicktopointoutthat“thetermsemanticsisa
catchwordthatdoesnotconveyanydefinitemeaning,”andthathisworkwasnottobe
conflatedwithwhatis“legitimatelydoneinpurelogicalanalysis”(Naess,1953a,p.i).
AlthoughNaess’sempiricalsemanticswasgenerallymetwithresistanceandscepticism
aboutitsrelevanceforanalyticphilosophy,itwasviewedquiteamicablyamonghiscloser
ViennaCirclepeers.5Tarski,forinstance,saidofmaterialadequacythatit“canbesettled
scientifically,thoughofcoursenotbyadeductiveprocedure,butwiththehelpofthe
statisticalquestionnairemethod.Asamatteroffact,suchresearchhas(p.336) been
carriedon[byNaess]”(Tarski,1944,p.360).Carnapadvocatedforanempirical
approachtotheapplicationconditionsorintensionofnaturallanguageterms,and
endorsedNaess’sworkasexemplary(Carnap,1955a).6Carnapthoughtthatatheoryof
pragmaticswasneedednotjustforpsychologyandlinguistics,butalsoforanalytic
philosophyduetothelatter’sfocusonnaturallanguage(Carnap,1955b;cf.Lutz,2009).
Carnapviewedknowledgeaboutthese“pragmaticalconcepts”asinstrumentalin
inspiringandinformingone’sexplications.Healsosawitasinstrumentalinfurnishinga
practicaljustificationforanexplication,asonemayattendtothefunctionthatthese
conceptsareserving.EmpiricalsemanticistsagreedwithCarnap’sassessment(e.g.,
Naess,1953a;Tennessen,1960a).
Itisperhapsnosurprisethatordinary-languagephilosophersdiscoveredawayto
reformulatepsychologismintheirownterms.Ryledidthisexplicitlywhenheintroduced
adistinctionbetweenuseandusage(Ryle,1953).Intherevoltagainstpsychologism,he
says,linguistic“vogues”haveevolved:firstfromtalkofconceptstotalkofmeanings,and
nowtotalkofuses.Ryleattributespsychologismtothesemisleadingverbalvogues.7Yet
usehasacriticaladvantageinthatitcontrastswithmisuseandsoisclearly“normative”
(i.e.,evaluative),whereasusageismerelyadescriptivetypeoflinguisticanthropology
andsociologyandisof“nophilosophicalinterest.”Ifusageisnotinaccordancewithuse
thefolkaremistaken.Andanalysisofuseisnotinformedbyanalysisofusageanyway,as
descriptionsofusagespresupposedescriptionsofuses.Tobesure,Naessand
Tennessendidrefertothemselvesasspecificallyanalyzing“usages”(Naess,1949;
Tennessen,1949a).TennessensawRyle’sdistinctionas“fruitful,thought-economical”but
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didnotfindadifferenceintheuse/usageof“use”and“usage”inordinarylanguage
(“Ryle’sDilemma”;Tennessen,1965).ButasTennessen’scolleagueMaxWrightquickly
pointedout,thisinterpretationpresupposedtheanswer.Eitherthereisnodifference
andtheresultsshowit,orthereisa(p.337) differenceandtheresultsshowthatthe
folkaremistaken;“theappealwas,inanycase,philosophicallypointless”(Wright,1967).
Eventually,threereviewsappearedthatcriticallyengagedwithempiricalsemantics,and
thesearefamiliarintheirargumentsandconcernwithwhatcountsasphilosophy.8Since
thesereviewspresentargumentsinsomedetail,itisusefultohighlighthowtheypose
theirconcerns.Apostelwasworriedabouttheordinaryconceptofsynonymy(Apostel,
1953).Thereisjustnoclearwaytoavoidtheapparentcirclewhenmovingfrom
descriptive“occurrencesynonymy”(orsimilartypes)tothemoreambitious“normative
synonymy”(synonymyaccordingtoarule)—especiallyconcerningthemeaningof
“synonymy”itself.Crockettbroughtupasimilarpointaboutthemissingbridgeto
analyticity,whichhesaysNaess“quitenaturallywishes”tocrossby“countingnoses.”
Thequestionremains,however,astowhetherNaesshasmadeanypositive
contributiontoanalyticphilosophy…Whatisthephilosophicalpointofthese
surveys?[It]isnotatallclearthatthedescriptionofastockuseofanexpressionis
assistedbycountingthenosesofthosewhoemployitinthisway.
…Letussupposethatinaquestionnaire,callitQS1A,onehundredpercentofthe
subjectssaythatthefollowingsentences,chosenbythemfromothersimilar
sentences,expressthesameassertion:[P,Q].Thenwemaysaythat[P]and[Q]
areQS1A-synonymous,andthiswillbeashorthandwayofreferringtotheabove
results.Naess,quitenaturally,wishestosaymorethanthis,andwhathewishesto
sayisthatthesetestsresultsarerelevantconfirmatoryevidenceforthe
synonymityoftheseexpressions.Hereweneedaclear-cuthypothesisofthe
meaningof“synonymity”asitisusedintheprecedingsentence,andNaess’s
failuretoprovidesuchahypothesisinthisandothercasesmakesonewonder
whatcanbetheusefulnessofhistechniques.
(Crockett,1959,pp.109–110)
Inanotherreview,ToulmincomplainedthatNaess’sstudieswereonlyabletohandle
“descriptive”statementsandraisedthepossibilityoferror,therebyquestioningthe
project’sphilosophicalrelevance.Whatdothestudiesproveaboutthecorrectnessof
basicmath,orequivalently,theuseoflanguageandthenatureofourconcepts?
(p.338) ExactlywhatMr.Naesstakestobetheirrelevance,istoone’ssorrow,
leftunclear—“Thequestionofrelevancyiscomplicated,”hesays.Whatmakesitso
puzzlingandtantalizingisNaess’svaguenessaboutthepointoftheinvestigation
forphilosophy.
…Onemusthopethat,beforeNaessgetstooimmersedintothepracticalworkof
framingandusingmoreandmoresimilarquestionnaires,hewillsitdownandtell
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uswhatexactlytheyaredesignedtoprove.Untilthatisdone,itwillbeeasyfor
philosopherstoignorehiswork.“Evenif25.8%ofpersonsarefoundtogivethe
sumoftwoandtwoasfive,”theywillargue,“thatwouldleavethecorrectnessof
theformula‘2+2=4’informalarithmeticunaffected;surelyalso,thefactthatquite
anumberofpeoplewerepreparedtogivesomesensetothestatement‘Jones
knowsthetimeassiduously’wouldnotdestroythefamiliar,establisheduseof
terms,whichrulesoutthecollocationofsuchaverbandadverb?”Anditwouldbe
apityifNaess’sworkweretobeentirelyignored,for,readingthroughthepaper,
onecertainlyfeelsthatthereactionsofhisanswerersprovessomethingaboutthe
natureofourconcepts…Atthemoment,allonecandoaboutthelargeraspectsof
hisworkistosuspendjudgment.
(Toulmin,1956,p.118)
Indeed,historyrepeatsitselfforthoseinanalyticphilosophywhoundertakeempirical
investigationintoconcepts,whicharepresupposedinevaluatingorinterpretingpeople’s
performance(Alexanderetal.,2010;Kauppinen,2007;Machery,2008).Theseconcerns
poseproblemsforempiricalsemanticsandexperimentalphilosophytotheextentthatthe
aimistoaccesssomeambitiousformofapriorianalyticityorconceptualtruthbymeans
ofexperimentalpsychologicalinvestigation.Butinthecaseofempiricalsemantics,there
wasjustnoattemptpursuesucha“mentalist”project(Alexanderetal.,2010).Naess,
afterall,rejectedthatgoalinhisworkonthenotionoftruth,andhisstudentsand
collaboratorsagreed.
Empiricalsemanticistswerewellawareoftheabovedifficultiesandhadnothingagainst
the“laudableefforttostampouteverytraceofpsychologism”(Naess,1954,p.55).What
empiricalsemanticistsdeploredwasthepersistentconcernforwhatcountsas
philosophy,andtheyalwaysinsistedthatthephilosopherwhousesthemethodsof
science“neednotstopbeingaphilosopherforthatreason”(Naess,1961a,p.173).In
theiranalysisofsomeofHume’stexts,theyclosewiththeobservationthattheisolation
ofphilosophyfrompsychologicalresearchis“oneoftheparadoxesofcontemporary
philosophy”(NaessandNaess,1960,p.146).Throughoutmuchoftheworkofempirical
(p.339) semanticstheyadvocatedareturntoatraditionalandbroadlyempirical
conceptionofphilosophy.Naesssumsupthisviewwell:
Thereisatendencytolookupondeductiveandaxiomaticalproceduresas
somehowmorephilosophicalthanempiricalones,andthishasunderminedthe
positionofthebroadempiricaltraditions(Aristotle,Ockham,Locke,Berkeley,
Hume,Bentham,JohnStuartMill),whichinmyviewdeserveastrong
representationincontemporaryculture.Thechargeofpsychologismagainst
thinkersofthistraditioniswellfounded,buthasbeenlargelymisapplied.Ithas
discouragedresearchintogenuinelyempiricalcomponentsofquestioncomplexes
ofamixedformalandempiricalcharacter.
…Veryroughly,onemaydistinguishadeductive,anintuitional,andanempirical
componentinthewritingsofanalyticalphilosophers.Eveninthosecasesinwhich
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Experimental Philosophy*
deductionsandintuitionscanhelpusconsiderably,consistentneglectofthe
empiricalcomponentwillbringresearchtowardstagnation.Ifempiricalstudiesare
neglected,weshallseemuchintelligentdebatealongintuitionistlines,butlessof
thatprocessthatmanyofusfindsoinspiringinthehistoryofphilosophyand
science:thedevelopmentofnewbranchesofreliableknowledgeasaresultof
combinedphilosophicalandscientificefforts.…Criticswhowouldassumethatthe
methodsdescribedinthisbookaimatsolvingquestionsthattheintuitivelyand
deductivelyoperatinglogicianhasnotbeenabletosolve,mistaketheintention.
(Naess,1953a,pp.iii–iv)
InTheFunctionofMoralPhilosophy:APleaforIntegrationofPhilosophicalAnalysisand
EmpiricalResearch(1958),Ofstadbeginswiththeclassicalconceptionofphilosophy:
AmongtheancientGreeksthephilosophyofmoralsdidnotexistasaspecific
discipline.Socrateswasnotonlyaphilosopherofmorals,hewasapsychologisttoo,
andalsoasociologistandapoliticalscientist…Theattempttoanswersuchquestions
ledthemintoempiricalaswellasanalyticalproblems.Theyacceptednodefinite
limitsfortheirspeculationsintheseareas.Whyshouldthey?Itiswewhohave
triedtodistinguishcarefullybetweenquestionsofanalysisoflanguageandthoseof
anempiricalnature,andsplitupthestudyofmanintoanumberofdifferent
sciences.[The]viewthatthephilosopher,quascientist,cannotassertpurenorms
orvalue-statements…hasdominatedimportantpartsofAnglo-Americanand
Scandinavianmoralphilosophyfornearlyfiftyyears,andsoitmaybeusefultotake
itupforevaluation…Ithasstimulatedcontactswithsuchotherbranchesof
philosophyaslogicandsemantics,buttheconnectionswithpsychologyandthe
socialscienceshavebeenalmostbroken.Thetrainingofmoralphilosophersmight
bechangedsothattheireducationwouldqualifythemfortakingpartinteam-work
withlogicians,semanticists,psychologistsandsocialscientists.
(Ofstad,1958,pp.35–7)
(p.340) Ofstadthensurveysresearchprogramsinvariousdisciplines:meta-ethics,
communicationandargumentation,moraldeliberationanddecision-makingprocesses,
beliefsandethicalbehaviour,andsoon,stillinsistingonmethodologicalpluralism:
Whetherresearchofthiskindiscalled“moralphilosophy”ornot,seems,however,
ratherunimportant.Theimportantthingisthatthereoughttobeacloseconnection
betweensuchstudiesandinvestigationswhicharemorecentraltomoral
philosophy…Forthephilosophicalsignificanceofsuchwork,itisimportantto
preserveallthesubtletieswhicharecompatiblewiththeexploitationofthe
research-instrumentsdevelopedwithinthesocialscience.
(Ofstad,1958,p.40)
Intoday’sexperimentalphilosophy,onealsofindsanearlyidenticaldialectic,exemplified
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Experimental Philosophy*
byKnobe’sresponsetoKaupinnen—thatistosay,theresponsethatsuchdifficulties,
whileinteresting,arelargelyaredherring;wherethisisaccompaniedbytheadvocation
ofatraditional,broadlyempiricalconceptionofphilosophy(KnobeandNichols,2008;
Knobe,2007;Knobeetal.,2012).Again,theissueforempiricalsemanticistswasnotthat
thequestionsthatwereraisedwerenotinterestingordifficultones(givenrelevant
aims),butthattheseobjectionshavebeenmisappliedandsohavediscouraged
otherwisevaluableempiricalresearch.
EmpiricalSemantics
Despitesomeresistance,NaesswasappointedaschairofphilosophyattheUniversityof
Osloin1939,andherehecontinuedtoworkonempiricalsemanticswithhisstudentsand
collaborators.ThisworkculminatedinhismonographInterpretationandPreciseness
(Naess,1953a),andlater,CommunicationandArgument(Naess,1966).Empirical
semanticswashighlyinfluentialinNorway;fornearlytwenty-fiveyears,anintroductory
versionofInterpretationandPrecisenesshadservedastheobligatorytextforgraduate
studentswhointendtotakeanyothermajorexaminationat“anyNorwegianuniversity,at
mostadvancedgreat-schools,someteachercollegesandatallthemilitarystaffcolleges
Norway”(Tennessen,1962,p.1).Afterintroducingsomerelevantterminologyandan
overviewofthemethods,Isurveytheworkdoneinthisperiod.
(p.341) Empiricalsemanticsviewscommunicationintermsofasender,signal,and
receiver—particularlytheinterpretationofthesignalbythereceiver(orsender),where
interpretationsaremodeledinsettheoreticterms.Interpretationscanbediscovered
experimentallywiththeuseofquestionnaires,suchasthroughjudgmentsoftheform“Q
maybesynonymouswithP”and“whenyoureadP,didyoutakethistomeanQ?”An
interpretationQofPisaprecization(ismoreprecise)whenthesynonymicalternativesto
QareapropersubsetofthesynonymicalternativestoP.Anexpressionisaplausible
interpretationofanotherroughlywhenitwouldbejudgedaspotentiallysynonymousby
manyinterpreters.Importantly,precizationsandinterpretationsmaybedepictedintreelikemaps,whichencodedirectionanddepthofprecizations(Figure12.1).Strictly
speaking,interpretationsarepropertiesofindividuals,plausibleinterpretationsare
propertiesofgroups,andtheprecisenessofexpressionsaregivenbysocialusages
(Gullvå g,1983).
Definitenessordepthofintentionreferstotheprecizationoperativeinan
interpreter/speaker,asevincedbythepointatwhichtheindividual(p.342)
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Experimental Philosophy*
Figure12.1 Tree-likediagramofprecizations,modeledfrom
Ofstad’sprecizationsofthesentencescheme“ThepersonP
decidedfreelyinsituationS”(Ofstad,1961).Numbersbelow
branchesrefertothecountofprecizationsthathavebeenomitted.
Alsoomittedis“freedomasvirtue”inthetopbranch.
becomesindecisiveamongmorepreciseformulationsofwhattheymeanorunderstand.
Isnoonish14or15minutespastnoon?Onemaybeindecisiveaboutthematterand
unabletoanswerthequestion,andthisindecisivenessisthehallmarkofindefiniteness.
TheconceptwasinfluencedbyPierceandhisdefinitionof“vagueness”(Gullvå gand
Naess,1996;Peirce,1902,p.748).Itismorepreciselyatypeof“processvagueness”
foundintheinterpreter’shead(cf.Sorensen,1990).Depthofintentionwaslater
explainedintermsoftheconceptualframeworkunderlyinganindividual’sabilityto
discriminateinperceptionandthoughtandtoaccessfinerdistinctionsbetweentypesof
situations(Gullvå g,1983;TennessenandGullvå g,1959).
Muchusewasmadeoftheconceptsofdefinitenessofintentionandprecisenessin
diagnosingandexplainingfruitlessdisagreement,andtheywerecentraltohowempirical
semanticiststhoughtaboutconceptualchangeandscientificdevelopment.Italso
underpinnedtheirviewsofthevalue,role,andlimitsofphilosophicalanalysis(Gullvå g,
1988;cf.Howe,2010;Naess,1936;Tennessen,1973).Thecentralityofdefinitenessof
intentionandtheirempiricalapproachtolanguageencouragedempiricalsemanticiststo
interpretstatementsaboutconceptualoranalytictruthsasoptativeratherthan,say,
indicative,constative,apodictic,oranamnesticincharacter,thoughtheywerealso
ferventmethodologicalpluralists.
Empiricalsemanticsresearchwouldtypicallybeginwithasurveyofusesalongside
definitionsandcommentaries,dubbed“occurrenceanalysis”and“metaoccurrence
analysis”respectively.Thedistinctionbetweenoccurrenceandmetaoccurrenceanalysis
distinguishestheprojectsofunderstandinghowatermisusedversusunderstanding
howitisdefinedandconceivedofbyitsusers,soastobeabletodiagnose
discrepancies.Thisfirststagewascoupledwithadetaileddiscussionoftheinterpretation
ofcertaintextsofinterest(“elementaryanalysis”).Therewasatendencytomapoutthe
spaceofpossibleinterpretationsbysubstitutingprecizationsofcomponentpartsof
expressionsandthennarrowingthelistdown.Thegoalwasoftennotjusttofindoutwhat
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Experimental Philosophy*
anyindividualactuallythoughtbuttomapoutthespaceofwhatonecouldpossiblythink
ormeanmoreprecisely.9Thewholeprocesscanbedonefromarmchairuptothispoint
intheprocedure.
(p.343) Oncesomehypotheseswereformedaboutusages/underlyingconceptsand
anypsychologicalorsocialfactorsofinterest,theseweretestedwithquestionnaires,with
interviews,orsimplybyrevisitingtheoriginaloccurrences.Usuallyapanelof
interpreterscodedoccurrencesundertheusagerulesorunderlyingconcepts.Quite
oftenagoalwastounderstandhowpeopleinterpretandunderstandeachotherinfairly
generalterms(e.g.,howdoesconsideringsomeoneasout-grouporin-groupaffectone’s
directionofinterpretationofkeywordsinpoliticalargumentation?).
Theresultoftheinvestigationwouldbeamapofprecizationsandunderlyingconcepts,
plustheeffectsofsuchfactorsaspersonalityandphilosophicalpositions.Thisservedasa
basisformakingfurtherrecommendationsandevaluations,suchasforfacilitatinggood
politicalorscientificdiscoursethroughanincreaseinprecision,forestimatingthe
convincingnessofargumentsandappealofpoliticalslogans(“marketanalysis”),orfor
diagnosingunnoticedambiguitiesandconflationsthatarisefromindefinitenessof
intention.
Thescopeanddetailofthisworkisimpressive.Naess’sanalysisofZaslavski’susageof
“democratie”inLadémocratiesoviétiqueconsideredall192occurrences(Naess,
1953a,pp.300–49).Tennessen’sstudyon“thesystemofprivateenterprise”surveyed
twoyearsofannualnewspapersinNorwayforoccurrencesbeforeconstructing“the
longestquestionnaireevergiveninNorway”(Naess,1964,p.7).Underthesix
conceptionsofprivateenterpriseidentified,theycoded7,667occurrencesandanalyzed
themwithrespecttopoliticalpartyandprofession(TennessenandGullvå g,1959,p.23).
SiriandArneNaessclassified661sentencesinHume’sTreatiseofHumanNatureinto
normative,declarative(analytic,synthetic),andotherlinguisticcategories(Naessand
Naess,1960).Tennessen,Ofstad,Gullvå g,andBay(1950)investigatednationalismandits
relationshipwithpsychological,sociological,andeconomicfactors.Theytestedsixty-three
hypothesesintensurveys,mostwithabouteightyquestionsand500questionnairesper
survey.Analyzingthewealthofdataatthetimeprovedquitedifficult,asonecanimagine.
(p.344) EmpiricalsemanticsresearchatOslo
Naess’sappointmentaschairofphilosophyatOslowassoonfollowedbyafive-yearNazi
occupation.This,ofcourse,impactedeveryoneworkingwithNaessduringhiswartime
seminars.Indeed,someofNaess’sstudentsdidnotsurvivethewarandtheirstudies
werepublishedposthumously.10Itisinthiscontextthata“uniqueinterdisciplinarymilieu
developed,combininganemphasisongeneraltheoryandmethodologywithastrong
concernforsocialandpoliticalproblems”(Bay,1958,p.vii).Thisattitudeisreflectedin
thesubjectmatterandthegoalsofmanyoftheirstudies.Forexample,attheendof
Tennessen’sinvestigationoftheattitudesoflawyerstothetrialsofQuislings11 in
Norway,heconcluded:
Theemotionalimpetusbehindthiskindofworkislinkedtothehopethatourefforts
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Experimental Philosophy*
willincorporateresearchwitharelativelydirectstruggleforhumanistideals.
Regardlessofwhetherwecalloursurveysopinionpollsorattitudeanalysisor
scientificstudiesintheareasbetweensociology,socialpsychology,semantics,and
ethics,thehopeisthatiftheseexaminationswereperformedonalargerscale,they
wouldeffectivelycontributetotheeradicationofantagonismthroughoutsociety.
(Tennessen,1950,mytranslation)
NaessandhisstudentshelpedestablishtheInstituteforSocialResearchinNorwayin
1950,andNaessledUNESCO’sPhilosophicalAnalysisofFundamentalConceptsproject
tostudyconceptsofdemocracy,nationalism,andliberty.
Still,throughoutthisperiodtherewasalsoavibrantempiricalsemanticsresearch
programinphilosophy,andthiscanbedividedintosomeroughcategories(Table12.1).
Inphilosophyoflanguage,therewasan(p.345)
Table12.1.Overviewoftopicsandsampleofworksinempirical
semantics.Asteriskssignifyexperimentsthatusequestionnairesand
interviews.Forsomeotherbibliographiesandoverviews,seeOfstad
(1951),Naess(1953a,pp.viii–ix),andthejournalsSynthese,Theoria,
ThePhilosophicalReview,andInquiryforthe1940sthroughthe1960s
Sampleofempiricalsemanticsresearch
Philosophyoflanguage
•Verificationofstatementsonordinarylanguage(Gullvå g,1955;Mates,1958b).
•*“True,”“perfectlycertain,”and“extremelyprobable”(Naess,1953b).
•*“Or”(Naess,1961b).
•*Commonsensetheoriesand“truth”(Naess,1938a,1938b).
•*Theintuitiveconceptofsynonymity(Naess,1956,1957).
•*Ordinary-languagephilosophers’claimsaboutordinarylanguage(Austinand
Naess,1964;Tennessenetal.,1964;Tennessen,1959a,1965).
Ethics,actiontheory,andfreedomofthewill
•AestheticsandethicsinKierkegaard’sEither/Or(OfstadandLöfgren,1965).
•“Whatisvirtue?”inPlato’sMeno(Grimm,1962,1964).
•Freewilland“ThepersonPdecidedfreelyinthesituationS”(Ofstad,1953,1961,
1967).
•Verifiabilityandobjectivityofdescriptiveandnormativeclaims,relationshipto
“reality”(Naess,1959;Ofstad,1951;Wickström-Nielsen,1948).
Philosophyofscience
•Evidentialexpressionsinscience(Naess,1933).
•Normative,analytic,andsyntheticsentencesinHume’sTreatise(Naessand
Naess,1960).
•“Consciousness”inthepsychologyofperception(Fluge,1945,inNorwegian).
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Experimental Philosophy*
•*“Testability”inphysics(Lövestad,1945;seealsoNaess,1953a,pp.374–6).
•*Conceptsoftype/typicality(Tennessen,1949b,inNorwegian).
Social,political,andlegalphilosophy
•Foundationsforthescienceandempiricalsemanticsoflaw(Aubert,1943).
•Conceptsoflegalnorm(Ofstad,1949,1950).
•CriticalexaminationofNietzsche’s“Willtopower”philosophy(Haaland,1947;see
alsoNaess,1953a,p.266).
•Examinationofdialecticalmaterialism,byArneTorvik(Ofstad,1951,p.41).
•*Businesspersons’viewsofwhite-collarcrime’sstatusas“crime”(Aubert,1952).
•*“Thesystemofprivateenterprise”(Tennessen,1949c,1959b).
•*Lawyers’attitudestoprosecutionofQuislingsinNorway(Tennessen,1950).
UNESCOandNorwegianInstituteforSocialResearch
•Gandhi’sethics(Naess,1958).
•Freedomandliberty(Bay,1958).
•*Conceptsofdemocracy(Naessetal.,1956;Naess,1953a,pp.300–49;Rokkan
andMcKeon,1951).
•*Nationalism(Bayetal.,1950).
Philosophyandeducation
•Precizationineducation,andeducationaldevelopmentoftheconceptoftruth
(Grimm,1955).
•*Theeffectofphilosophyeducationonstudents’philosophicalpositions(Fainand
Kaelin,1960).
(p.346) efforttounderstandstatementsaboutordinary-languagerules,de-precization
inethicalstatements,andstudiesonparticulartermssuchas“true,”“or,”and
“synonymity”.Inethicsandactiontheorythereareinterestsinwhetherpeople
“produce”decisions,“ought”and“can,”thefreedomofthewill,andrelationships
betweeninterpretationsofdescriptiveandnormativestatements.Inphilosophyof
science,topicsincludedconsciousnessandperception,the“testability”ofphysicallaws,
andtheconceptof“type”inpsychology.Theyeventestedwhetherscientistsendupat
observationsentencesthroughrepeatedquestioning(theydonot).Insocialandpolitical
philosophytheyinvestigatedconceptsofcrime,dialecticalmaterialism,Nietzsche’s“Wille
zurMacht,”andinterpretationsof“legalnorm”inlaw.Thediversethemesinempirical
semanticsspantraditionalandcontemporaryphilosophicaltopics,notunlikeexperimental
philosophytoday.
Tennessen’s“ConceptsofType”aptlyillustratestheprocessandstyleofempirical
semanticsresearch(Tennessen,1949b).Thisstudybeginsbystatingthatitsmotiveisto
takeacomparativeandevaluativeapproachtotypologicalmethods,hypotheses,and
researchprograms,usingtoolsfromexperimentalpsychology.Tennessensurveys
occurrencesofandcommentarieson“type,”“typical,”andcloselyrelatedtermsusing
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sourcesfromphilosophyandpsychology,encyclopaedias,andnewspapers.Thenhe
surveystherangeofpossibleprecizationsofthetypeconceptusingaschematicformula
andsubstituting(p.347) interpretationsofkeycomponents.Thisiscoupledwithan
analysisofspecifictypologiesinpsychologytounderstandhowtheyfunctioninresearch.
Thereisalsoawiderinterestinnon-cognitiveaspectsofmeaning,suchasthe
relationshipsamongbinariessuchasfemale/male,young/old,plant/animal,passive/active,
andtheirrelationshiptothetypesofintegrationdisordersdistinguishedinpsychology.
Afterformulatinghypothesesaboutsomeunderlyingconceptsorusages,Tennessen
reportsonthe669questionnairesthatwerecompletedbystudents,farmers,and
professionals.
Tennessenidentifiesfourmaintypeconcepts,whichseemtoberoughlyasfollows:(1)a
characteristicallydescriptiveindividualofthetypeorexemplar;(2)typicalityinthesense
ofstatisticalmodeorsetofmostexpectedfeatures;(3)thosedistinguishingproperties
withhighsensitivityandspecificity;(4)a“class”thatisindividuatedaccordingtosome
constitutivequalitiesofthatclass.Tennessensubsequentlyevaluatestheworkof
typologistsandphilosophers.Forinstance,hecriticizesHempelandOppenheimforfailing
todistinguishbetween(2)and(4)intheirlogicalanalysis.Healsorecommendsthat
typologistsinpsychologyuseprecization(3),giventheirexplanatoryanddiagnosticaims,
andshowshowanumberofthemunknowinglyshiftbetweenusages.Although
Tennessenclosesbysayingthismethodologyisavaluableandmuchneededcontribution
tophilosophicalandlogicalanalysis,heplacesspecialemphasisonitslimitedrole.In
particular,thisstrategymakestheprocessofdiscoveryexplicitbyincludingthe
techniquesforsurveyingthepossibledirectionsofprecization.Italsousesexperimental
methodstotestthedescriptiveadequacyofone’sdelimitedusagesorunderlying
concepts.Thisismeant,amongotherthings,tofixthemysteriousabsenceofa
methodologysection(the“methodofrevelation”)inlogicalanalysispublications
(Tennessen,1949a).
Oneprogramintoday’sexperimentalphilosophyfocusesonunderstandinghowpeople
thinkaboutspecificphilosophicaltopicsofinterest,andthisaimiswellrepresentedinthe
researchdoneatOslo.However,thestudiesperformedinempiricalsemanticsareunlike
experimentalphilosophyintheirconcentrationonlanguagesystems,atleastwhen
theorizingabouttheirwork.Butinpracticetheydidnotsharplydistinguishbetween
meaningsandconcepts,nordidtheydistinguishbetweenpredicationofatermand
applicationofaconcept,northeuseofatermanddeploymentofaconcept,etc.Where
thesestudies(p.348) areexperimental,theyareinthetraditionofbehaviourist
psychologyandsocialscience.Themeasurementsarebetweenvariablessuchas
personalityandphilosophicalviewsandtheireffectsonquestionnaireresultsandother
behaviour.Thetheoriescontainnocognitivearchitecture,identificationofcognitive
systems,orinformation-processingmodels,andthisistypicalofthetime.Thisisalsotrue
oftheworkdoneatBerkeley(discussedbelow).
Thereisalsoacompleteabsenceofanyattempttoestablishanalyticitiesorconceptual
truths.Empiricalsemanticistswerehappytokeeptheirresultsdescriptiveand
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Experimental Philosophy*
understandvariouspartsoftheworld,andneveraimeddirectlyatthemoreambitious
kindofphilosophicalupshotthatwasexpectedofthem.Ingeneral,theydidnotfind
projectsofrefiningintuitionsorincreasingdefinitenessofintentioninconceptualanalysis
worthwhile,exceptasameanstogreaterclarityandprecisionforsomespecified
purpose.ThisoverallattitudeisclearlyexpressedbyNaessonthenotionsofsynonymy
andanalyticity:
BensonMatescontends“thatoneisjustifiedinsayingthatthereare‘intuitive’
notionsofanalyticityandsynonymy.”Thisempiricalhypothesisabouttheexistence
ofcertainphenomenaorkindsofphenomenaistenable,sofarasIcansee.Mates
hasanintuitivenotionofsynonymity;Ihavehadseveralinmylife,andthereis
reasontobelievethatallofthemhavemuchincommon.Ontheotherhand,there
isnoreasontobelievethatthevariousintuitedentitiesareidenticalornear
identical…Ifbothofusshouldassertthatourownintuitionsaremoreadequateor
morenearlysimilartotheintuitionsofrespectableauthorities,therewouldbe
disagreementbetweenus.Butbywhatkindofdiscussionsorresearchcana
disagreementaboutthenatureofanintuitedentitybesettled?Fortunately,
collectiveresearchdoesnotseemtopresupposethatallintuitionsaresharedbyall
researchers,orthattheyshouldevenknowofthedifferences,orthattheintuited
entitiesshouldbedefiniteinoutlineandcontent.Thus,theremayintheyearsto
comebemuchfruitfulresearchconcerningsynonymitybyresearcherswith
partiallydifferentintuitivenotionsofsynonymity…Itisourcontentionthatsound
methodologydoesnotrequirestrictconformityofresearchterminologytoprior
intuitions.Onemayevensaythatstrictconformityisnotpossiblebecauseofthe
indefinitenessoftheintuitions.
(Naess,1957)
Indeed,hearguedthatintuitionsaboutuniversalinterchangeabilitysalvaveritatearenot
universallyheldandthattherearelaxandbroadnotionsofsynonymy.Naess
hypothesizedthatthethoughtthatthisintuitionisuniversalowestooverestimationofthe
definitenessofintention(p.349) inunqualifiedstatements,therebymistaking
unqualifiednessforgeneralityorabsoluteness(aswith“lyingiswrong”).Indefiniteness
wasalsoamajorpointofcontentionbetweenempiricalsemanticistsandordinarylanguagephilosophers.Althoughuse/usageisadistinctionbetweencorrectlanguageuse
andactualperformance,whentakenasanempiricalhypothesisaboutordinarylanguage
itturnedouttobebelowthedefinitenessofintentionofitsusers(Tennessen,1965).
WhereasRylesawtheordinaryconceptofvoluntaryassomehowshapedbyitsrolein
blaming(asshownbyillustrationsofpresumablycompetentusage),empirical
semanticistswouldseethisasundulyprecise,i.e.,asmoredefinitethanorevencontrary
tohowordinaryfolkdefine“voluntary”orconceiveofvoluntariness(Mates,1958b).
EmpiricalSemanticsatBerkeley
Theshortperiodfrom1957to1961atBerkeleywasanotherhighlyfruitfulepisodein
empiricalsemantics.MuchworkoriginallydoneinNorwegianatOslowasalsopublished
inEnglishbyTennessenandNaess(thetwomainexperimentalists).12Whereasempirical
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Experimental Philosophy*
semanticistshadpreviouslyfocusedonlogicalanalysisandthesocialandpolitical
applicationsoftheirtechniquestospecificconcepts,atBerkeleythefocusshiftedto
ordinary-languagephilosophyandtoexplainingwhypeoplehavetheintuitionsabout
linguisticexpressionsthattheydo.Onegoalinthissectionistooutlinethisexplanatory
project.TheworkdoneatBerkeleyisalsoalittlepieceoflosthistorythatisinterestingin
itsownright,andithassomeparallelswithdebatesinexperimentalphilosophy.
ThemaincohortofempiricalsemanticistswenttoBerkeleyin1957.13Tennessentooka
professorshipatBerkeleyintheDepartmentofSpeech(nownamedtheDepartmentof
Rhetoric).Naessalsobecameapart-timevisitingprofessorinphilosophy,andGullvå ga
visitingscholar.HeretheyworkedalongsidephilosophersDavidRynin,Isabelle
Hungerland,BensonMates,andJohnSearle.Everyoneherewascriticalofordinary(p.350) languagephilosophy.14JohnAustinwasavisitingprofessorin1958andinspired
muchoftheempiricalstudythattranspiredintheseyears(Tennessen,1959a).
Uponarrival,TennessenandGullvå gparticipatedinMates’s1957seminaronAustin’s“A
PleaforExcuses”(1956).Inthisseminartheyconcentratedonordinary-language
philosophyandtheirownmethodology.Notesfromtheseminarshowthattheyfocused
intensivelyonhowAustinwasarguingforhispositions:
Eachsetofhypotheses,itwillbenoticed,containsstatementsaboutusageand
statementsaboutactions:e.g.,thatitisgenerallynotpermissibletouseadverbsin
descriptionsofnormalactions,andsome(ormost)actionsareneithervoluntary
norinvoluntary.Oneoccasionallyfeelsthat,forAustin,thetwokindsofstatements,
whichhesimplyjuxtaposes,havesomecloselogicalrelation:onekindisevidence
forthetruthoftheotherkind,forinstance.
(Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.106–7)
Theyalsofounditstrikingthat“Austin’sfavouritemethodappearstobetellinglittle
storiesandaskingpeoplewhattheyshouldsayinthedescribedsituation;bymeansof
setsofstories,hefindshimselfabletoelicitgeneralagreementasto‘whatweshouldsay
when’”(Tennessenetal.,1964,p.103).
ThemainworryinMates’sseminarwasthelackofexplicitnessaboutthewayinwhich
thesevignetteswerepairedwithusagehypotheses.Nearlyadecadeearlier,Tennessen
ransomeexperimentstoinvestigateproblemswithassessingusagefromthearmchair,
andfoundatendencytoconflateevidencewithillustration(Tennessen,1949a).15As
Naesssummarizedit:
(p.351) Thismechanismradicallydestroysthefunctionofdefinitions.Insteadof
givinguspreciseandtenablehypothesesforlanguageusagestobetestedby
observingusagesoftheruleinalanguage,adefinitoformsentenceislookedupon
asaformulation,themeaningofwhichistobeunderstoodbymeansofthe
definiendumwithinthelanguage.Asaresult,thereisatendencytoaccept
uncriticallyandwithoutanyqualificationswhateversubsumptionsareexplicitlyor
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Experimental Philosophy*
implicitlyasserted.
(Naess,1953a,pp.278–9)
TheyapparentlyachievedsimilarresultswithAustinianvignettes,andsostressedthat
thisdistinctionneedstoatleastbemadefullyexplicitinphilosophicalwritingandseminars
suchashis(Tennessen,1959c,1959d).
InordertoexploreAustin’smethodmorecarefully,theysurveyedpossible
interpretationsofAustin’sapproach.Theystressedthatwhatisimportantisnotjustwhat
Austinmeantbutanyotherinterpretationsaswell,aswasstandardpractice.Some
examples:
(2)Usually,useofanymodifyingexpressionisnotpermissible.(2a)Itwouldsound
odd.(2b)ItisnotinaccordancewithcommunicationnormsinEnglish.(2c)Itwould
bemeaningless.(2d)Itwouldbefalse…(5a)Mostpeopledonoteveruse
“voluntary”and“involuntary”indescribingmorethanasmallnumberofcases.
(5b)Cannotmeaningfullybeusedoutsideofsuchcases.(5c)Mostpeopledonot
usethetermssothattheyeversayitwasvoluntaryorinvoluntary.
(Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.101–2;resultsinTennessen,1965)
Theirdiagnosisofthebleakprospectsofthemoreambitiousclaimsofordinary-language
philosophy,astheysawit,turnedonanambiguityaboutwhatis“correct.”
Ofcourseitistruethat,ifanactionhasacertaincharacteristic,thensome
statementis“correct”,i.e.,true,namely,onewhichattributesthatcharacteristicto
thataction.Butonanyothermeaningof“correct,”thisdoesnotfollow,nordoes
theconverserelationhold:thatalocutionis“permissible”doesnotallowustoinfer
anythingabouttheworld…Simplyput:wefeelitnecessarytodistinguishbetween
whatonewouldsayandwhatonecouldsay,andtoinsistthatknowingtheformer
doesnotgiveuscompleteinformationaboutthelatter.
(Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.107–8)
WhiletheMatesseminarwenton,StanleyCavellwasexpressinghighpraiseforordinarylanguagephilosophy(OLP)justafewdoorsaway.So(p.352) Ryninarrangedadebate
atthe1957PacificAPA,andtheytoldCavellhewouldhavetodefendOLPagainstMates
(Cavell,1958;Mates,1958b).16
Mates’spaperdrawsfromtheseminarnotes,butthetargetshiftstoRyleandhis
apparentlyirritatinguse/usagedistinction(Ryle,1953).MatesarguesthatRyle’sclaims
aboutusearedescriptiveafterall,andaccusesOLPofconflatingsemanticsand
pragmatics(conversationalimplicatures).17Hethendistinguishesbetweenextensional
andintensionalmethodsofstudyingordinarylanguage,andcomplainsthatOLPfocuses
onlyontheextensionalmethod.Theextensionalmethodisoccurrenceanalysis,andthe
intensionalmethodismetaoccurrenceanalysiswithaSocratictwist.Theintensional
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Experimental Philosophy*
methodinvolvesaskingparticipantswhattheymeanandpresentingcasesthatmight
makethemreviseandprecisifytheiraccounts.Ordinary-languagephilosophydoesnot
accountfortheconflictbetweenmethods,Matescharges.Bothmethodsare
incorporatedintoempiricalsemantics(Hungerland,1960;Tennessen,1959e).The
SocraticdialoguewasfirstproposedbyToulmintotransgressmerely“descriptive”
statementsbyinvestigatingthesemanticsandentailmentrelationsendorsedbythefolk’s
ownlights(cf.Naess,1961b;Toulmin,1956).TheSocraticdialoguemodelisrevivedin
Kauppinen’sdiscussionofexperimentalphilosophyforthesamepurpose(Kauppinen,
2007).
Experimentsonlanguagejudgments
By1959,atleastfifteenprojectsand4,500questionnairesandinterviewshadbeen
administeredatBerkeleyontopicsincludingtheanalytic/syntheticdistinction,definiteness
ofintention,verbalrigidityandargumentationpatternsinreligiousandpoliticaldiscourse,
and“Pcandecidetodox”(seeTennessen,1959a,p.287).Tennessenusedtheseto
argue“againstanytendenciestonarrowdownthefieldofpermissiblecommunicationby
employingrigid,apriorinormsorrulesfor‘whatcanpossiblybesaid(p.353) and
meant’”because“thewholethingismostoftenaquestionofgeneral(including
hermeneutical)imagination”(Stern,1969;Tennessen,1959a,pp.276–7,1961).
Tennessen’stargetisexemplifiedbyhisappraisaloftheRussell–Strawsoncontroversy
overRussell’stheoryofdescriptions.
Ithasalwaysbeenclearthatwhateveradvantagesthisproposalmighthave,they
havenothingtodowithanalysesorhypothesesabout(commonor“ordinary”)
languageusages.Nonetheless,thefollowingpassageisfoundinStrawson’s“On
Referring”(p.330):
Nowsupposesomeonewereinfacttosaytoyouwithperfectlyseriousair:“The
kingofFranceiswise.”Wouldyousay,“That”suntrue”?Ithinkit’squitecertain
thatyouwouldn’t.
Strawsoniswrong:Ofabout1,500informantstestedinsomerecentexperiments
nooneseemedtoactinaccordancewithStrawson’spredictions…Strawson,one
mightsay,hasopenedthedooracracktothevastfieldofempiricalinvestigations
oflanguage,takenapeepin,and,after(almostimmediately)havingshutthedoor,
hereports:“Russelliswrong:TheTheoryofDescriptionsisfatallyincorrect
becauseonewouldnot(couldnot?shouldnot?oughtnotto?)utter,and/ormean:
‘ThepresentKingofFranceiswiseisfalse’!”However,inhisownattemptata
“solutiontothispuzzle”Strawsonseemsabsolutelyuninterestedinwhat“one”
wouldorwouldnotsay.
(Tennessen,1960b,pp.187–8)18
Bydividingupthemechanismsunderlyingintuitionsaboutlanguageandexplainingthe
tendencytorejectstatementsforpurelylanguagereasons,Tennessenandcollaborators
aimedtoshowthatthesejudgmentswerequiteirrelevantastoastatement’stenability.
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Experimental Philosophy*
Aftersurveyingplausibleinterpretationsof“whatshouldwesay”andsimilarlocutions,
theyidentifiedthreegenerallinesofdefense:ineffability,infrequency,and
impermissibility.Asampleofeachfollows.
Undertheineffabilityapproach,atenuousconnectionwasfoundinthe“verbalrigidity”
hypothesesofVygotsky,Piaget,andFrazer,accordingtowhichchildrenand“primitive
societies”cannotseparatewordformsfromwordmeanings.Tennessenfoundthat
childrenjusthaveastrongtendencytoadheretothepermissibilityratherthan
potentialitydirectionofinterpretationof“can”insuchquestionsas“canyoucallacata
dog?”(Tennessen,1959a,pp.266–72).Theorderofquestionswassufficienttomakethe
difference,andonceclarifiedtherewasno(p.354) evidenceofverbalrigidityfor
Englishspeakers.However,therewasananalogousformofrigidityonthesideof
experimenters,astheywereapparentlyunawareoftheselanguageambiguitiesanddid
notimaginesuchalternativeinterpretations.
Theinfrequencyapproachdrawsonwhatis“neversaid”toformulatelanguagerules.
ThisiswhatAustinreportedlysuggestedatOslo(October1959),inadebatewithNaess
oversomeofTennessen’sexperimentson“voluntaryyawning”:
Austin:
Thesubjectsgavewronganswersconcerningtheirownuseofexpressions,e.g.:
whensayingtheywouldneveruse“heyawnedvoluntarily”asadescriptionofa
perfectlyordinaryofeventofyawningbecauseitisperfectlyobviousthatsuch
yawningsarevoluntary.Actuallythesubjectswouldnotsayitbecauseitcannotbe
said.
Naess:
Thesubjectsinterpreted“heyawnedvoluntarily”assynonymouswith“hewasnot
forcedtoyawn”andthusconceiveditasobviousthathewasnotforcedto(and
thereforenotworthwhilesaying).
Austin:
Butthentheydonotknowwellenoughtheexpression“voluntary.”Itistoodifficult
aword,maybe.Betteruse“clumsy.”
Naess:
SuggestiontoHT:Newexperiments…
Austin:
…Rules(grammaticalorothers)donotexistasrules.Wesaythereisarule
againstsayingxwhenxisneversaid.Whatisagainstthelanguagesystemcannot
betrueorfalseorobvious.Thus“Heyawnedvoluntarily”cannotbetrueorfalse
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Experimental Philosophy*
orobvious.
Naess:
Tennesseninvestigatescommunicationratherthanlanguagesystems.What
happensifsomethingactuallyissaid(uttered)which“neverissaid”?…
Austin:
Supposethatsomeoneyawnedinastandardwayandthereisnothingexceptional
(i.e.,thecaseisastandardcase).Ifweaskpeopletodescribecompletelyas
possiblewhathappens,theywillneveradd“clumsily”or“voluntarily.”Ifwesay
“butdidheordidhenotyawnclumsily(orvoluntarily)”theywouldfindtheterms
inapplicable,thesentencesneithertruenorfalse.
(AustinandNaess,1964)19
(p.355) Thesepotentialproblemsandpredictionswerethesubjectoffurther
experiments,ofcourse.Inonecase,theyhostedfakediscussiongroupsonsocial
problemsamongstudents(accompaniedbyahiddentaperecorder),andaimedtohave
thelocution“voluntaryyawning”occurasnaturallyaspossible(Tennessen,1965,pp.
234–6).ContrarytoAustin’spredictions,thestatementswereacceptedasmeaningful.20
Lastly,considertheimpermissibilityapproach.Tennessenandcollaboratorspredicteda
dissociationbetweentwosourcesunderlyingtheevaluationofastatement:(1)a
grammaticalandidiomatic/literaldirectionofinterpretation,and(2)atenabilitydirectionof
interpretation.Sosomeexperimentsbeganwitheither(1)a“logical-maniacal”lectureon
howpeopleoftenassertnonsenseandcontradictions,or(2)a“common-sensical”lecture
onhowthemostimportantthingistounderstandwhatsomeonemeans.Participantsthen
classifiedsentencesastautologies,contradictions,ornonsense,orasconveyingfactual
syntheticstatements.Participantswerealsoaskedtoprovidetheirreasons,andthese
werecodedaslanguageortenabilityreasonsforrejectingthestatement.These
experimentsshowedthatparticipantscouldadoptandswitchbetweenthetwo
interpretiveattitudesandexposedtendenciesforpseudo-disagreementwhenthese
distinctsourcesorattitudesexplainthedisagreement(Figure12.2A;Tennessen,1959a,
pp.280–4,1959f).
SoTennessenidentifiedtwomechanismsorprocesses,onefastandintuitiveandthe
otherrequiringabitofreflectionandimagination,andtheseunderliethedifference
betweenlanguageandtenabilitydirectionsofinterpretation.Tennessentooktheupshot
ofhisstudiestoshowthatsofartherearenoempiricalgroundsforatheoryoflinguistic
necessityorforlinguisticrestrictivism;theyareeitherempiricallyunsupportedorthey
splitbetweentwosourcesofjudgmentsabouttheacceptabilityofastatement.The
reasonsandfeaturesthesesourcestrackdonottellusanythingabouteachother;ifa
statementisungrammatical,counterintuitive,orgoesagainstordinaryusageinoneway
oranother,thistells(p.356)
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Experimental Philosophy*
Figure12.2 ExampleofoneofTennessen’sexperimentsandhis
roughexplanation.(A)Exampleofonequestionevincinga
dissociationbetweenlanguageandtenabilityreasonsforevaluating
astatement.Rows:Typeofreasongivenbytheparticipants.
Columns:Whethertheparticipantacceptsorrejectsthesentence.
(B)Expressionsandargumentsmaybeinterpretedintrivialor
audaciousdirections,tradingonplausibility.(C)Logicalodditiesas
trivialitiesduetotheirwideacceptanceorasaudacitiesduetotheir
widenon-acceptance,wheretherangeofintuitivelyplausible
interpretationsareafunctionofoccurrencefrequency.(D)
Significanceisthemaximizationoftenabilityandaudacityand
providesanormforinterpretationandagaugeofsignificancewhen
proposinganewtheory.(AadaptedfromTennessen,1959a;B–D
adaptedfrom1959f,1959g.)
usnothingaboutitstenability,andviceversa.TennesseninsistedonCarnap’sprincipleof
toleranceformatterslinguisticandconceptual,anddefendedtheviabilityofRussell’s
approachagainstStrawson-styleordinary-languagerefutations(Tennessen,1960a).
MoreinterestingtoTennessenwaswhattheineffability,infrequency,andimpermissibility
approachesdogetright,andtothisendheofferedsometentative“explanationsofthe
factthattherearelinguisticexpressions,locutions,formulationswhichintuitivelyor
discoursivelysoundoddoreven‘logicallyodd’”(Tennessen,1959f,p.369).Tennessen
viewedthisaspartofhis“attackonthemethodofrevelation”(theuseofintuition)in
philosophy.Hesaid:
Aparticularlyinterestingsituationarises,when[historically]philosophically
interestingproblems—linguisticornon-linguistic—havenotyetbeentackledbythe
scientistswithinanyramiculatedbranchofexistingsciencedisciplines.(p.357) The
primandproperphilosopher,then,whoinsistsonanaprioriattitude,hasto
choosebetweenkeepinghishandsclean,atthecostofignoranceonrelevant
matters,ortoengageinempiricalresearchhimself.Itseemsthatconfrontedwith
thischoice-situation,mostanalyticalphilosophers,andinparticularthesocalled
“ordinarylanguage”orientedphilosophers,chooseignoranceasthelesserofthe
twoevils.Thepresentpaperispartlymeantasanattempttoindicatewhatmaybe
gainedforphilosophybychoosingthemoreearthly,aposteriori,attitude,
employingempiricalinvestigationsafterthepatternofthesocial(andother“soft”)
sciences,anddevelopingtheavailablemethodsandtechniquestofitwithina
philosophicalframeofreference.
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Experimental Philosophy*
(Tennessen,1960a,pp.496–7)
Tennessen’stentativeproposalwasthatthequick,unreflectivejudgmentsaboutlinguistic
or“logical”oddnesscanbeexplainedbyaperson’slinguisticandconceptualhabitsplus
thefactorsgoverningtheremarkabilityofanexpression(Tennessen,1959f,1959g,
1963).Forexample,“Piscultivatingweeds”waslabeledas“logicallyodd”byNowellSmith,despitethisbeingaperfectlynaturalwaytodescribeanormalandimportant
activityundertakenbymanyanti-weed-sprayproducingcompanies(Tennessen,1959f).
ItisjustbecauseNowell-Smithisnotaworkeratsuchacompanyandthatthisisnever
remarkablethatatensionisintuitedbyhim,andthisexplanationholdsquitegenerallyas
afirstapproximation.
HereisthegistofTennessen’stheory.The“audacity”or“triviality”ofastatementisa
measureofhowwidelyacceptedthestatementisamongone’saudience.Ingeneral,
interpretationsofstatements,arguments,andtheoriestendtoleaveopenacontinuum
betweenaudaciouslyfalseandtriviallytruedirectionsofinterpretation—ashepreviously
noticedinhispreviousworkonnationalism,“thesystemofprivateenterprise,”and
elsewhere(Figure12.2B).Therangeoffastandintuitiveinterpretationsisafunctionof
thatexpression’sremarkabilityamongsituationsthatapersonregularlyencounters,so
thattheseintuitivesemanticjudgmentsareareflectionofone’slinguisticandconceptual
habits.However,thewholerangeofplausibleinterpretationsisnotimmediatelyobvious
andmayrequiredeliberationandalittleimagination(Figure12.2C).Whatmakesa
“hypothesis”or“proposal”significantisthatitissufficientlyaudaciouswhilestilltenable
(Figure12.2D).
Tennessenusedtheassumedruleofsignificanceasabenchmarkforsuccessful
interpretation;ifsomeonepropoundsacontradictionorobviousabsurdityand
significanceisassumed,theinterpreterisforcedto(p.358) engageinaroundabout
interpretationbyfiguringoutwhatthesenderis“upto”andintendstoconvey.He
appliedthisschematovariouscasesandaccountedforwittysayingsanddouble
entendresasamismatchbetweenintuitiveandreflectiveinterpretations,toexplainthe
valueinaudacityforspecialemphasis,andtogivereasonswhyonewouldeverremarka
truism,obviousfalsehood,orsomethingcompletelyirrelevant(Tennessen,1959a,
1960b,1965).Thedifferencebetweenmeresensationalismandsignificancewas
accountedforintermsofadifferencebetweenprimafacieandactualtenability(Barnes
andRobinson,1972;Tennessen,1959g,1973,1984).Somethingasaudaciousas
“photonsarebothparticlesandwaves”or“neuroscientistsdiscoverfreewillisan
illusion”istrulysignificantonlyifitistenableinspiteofitsaudacity;onlyifitdoesnot
receiveitsaudacitybytradingonuntenableimplicationsorriggingspurious
interpretations.TennessenandNaesswereveryinterestedinhowthisviewcouldapply
totheoryconstructioninsocialscience(seeTennessen,1960a,pp.496–7).
Itseemsthatthiswasthelastmajorperiodofdevelopmentinempiricalsemantics.The
DepartmentofSpeechthatwashometoRynin,Tennessen,Hungerland,andothers
underwentrestructuringinaround1960andtheNorwegianempiricalsemanticistsall
movedtodifferentinstitutions.Manyofthebooksandcollectionsofexperimentsthat
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Experimental Philosophy*
Tennessenrepeatedlycitesthroughouthisstudieswerenolongerpursuedafter1959–
60andwerenevercompleted.21 Thisisperhapsunfortunate,asmanuscriptsshowthat
theywereaimingtodevelopatheoryof“contextualpragmaticimplications,”whichthey
identifiedasanareaforwhichascientifictheoryislacking(Tennessen,1959e,1959h).
Hungerlandmadesomekeyinsightsintoconversationalimplicaturesandthemanuscripts
showenthusiasmforsystematizingthese(Hungerland,1960).22
Tosumup,theempiricalsemanticistsatBerkeleyviewedordinary-languagephilosophers
asappealingtoordinaryusageandtestedtheseclaims,oftenwithnegativeoruncertain
results.Theconstructiveproject(p.359) toexplainsourcesoflanguageintuitions
immediatelyfollowed.Muchearlierwasthediscoverythattheinterpretationmechanism
tendstotreatevidenceandillustrationofusageindiscriminately.AtBerkeleythey
exploredadissociationbetweenlanguageandtenability-basedjudgmentsinevaluatinga
statement,plusthevariousotherstudiesonusagefrequencyandremarkability(see
Tennessen,1959a,1959f).Thesewereusedtoprovidesometentativeexplanationsfor
thepatternsofcounterintuitivityintermsofusageandadistinctionbetweenfastintuitive
languagejudgmentsandreflectiveinterpretations,whichwasthenappliedto
conversationalandscientificcontexts.Bybetterunderstandingthesourcesofthe
intuitionsinthesecases,thehopewastoclarifywhentheyhavealegitimaterolein
argumentationandtheorizing.
SummaryandConclusion
EmpiricalsemanticshadaninterestinghistoryfromitslaunchinVienna,itsdevelopment
andapplicationsatOslo,andthroughitsdisagreementwiththemethodsofordinarylanguagephilosophyatBerkeley.Naesswasmotivatedbyphilosophers’appealtotheway
termsareconceived,defined,andusedbyordinarypeople,asexemplifiedbyTarski’s
materialadequacycondition.ForNaessandtheotherempiricalsemanticists,intuitions
aboutcommonsenseandthepre-theoreticviewsofordinarypeoplewerenotsufficient,
especiallygivenenduringdisagreementonsuchmatters.Theconclusionwas
underwhelming:thereisjustasmuchvariationandindefinitenessinthemindsof
ordinarypeople.
Theempiricaltechniqueswerevaluableforotherreasons,andsoNaesscontinuedhis
workwithcollaboratorsatOslo.Empiricalsemanticistshadsuccessinprojectswith
UNESCOonconceptswithsocialandpoliticalsignificance,inthestudyofscienceandlaw,
andintheirinquiriesintoquestionsoftraditionalphilosophicalinterest.Laterworkat
Berkeleyinvolveddevelopingtheoriestounderstanddisagreementsarisingfromthe
claimsofordinary-languagephilosophers.TheresearchdoneatOsloandBerkeleywas
extensiveandbroadinitsscope.Itwasveryconstructiveaswell;partofthiswasof
necessityduetothelackofpre-existingmethodsandtheoriesfortheirpurposes,partof
thiswasduetoacommitmenttopluralismaboutthemethodsandsubjectmatterof
philosophy,andpartofthisowedtotheviewthatlong-termconstructive(p.360)
cooperationofmanyworkersisjustasimportantinphilosophyasitisinscience(Naess,
1953a).
Ihavehighlightedthelamentabledialecticthatsurroundedempiricalsemantics
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Experimental Philosophy*
throughouttheperiodoflogicalanalysisandlinguisticphilosophy.Empiricalsemanticists
advocatedareturntothetraditionalconceptionofphilosophythatacceptedthe
philosophicallegitimacyofbothempiricalandanalyticalquestions.Theirkindofapproach
wasmarginalized,ofteninadvertentlytobesure,duetotheexpectationthatapriori
analyticalresultsshouldfollowfromorbetheaimofscientificinvestigationinmatters
philosophical—asif,forinstance,indevelopingascientifictheoryorexplanationofhow
peopledefine,conceive,andusecertaintermsandtheircognates,itwouldnotbe
philosophyproperunlessitalsowenttowardprovingsomecontentiouslogical,semantic,
orconceptualtruthwithoutbeggingthequestion.Thatwastheworrywithanalyticityand
synonymy,withderivingusefromusage,thecorrectnessofmathfrommath
performance,orotherformsofpsychologism.Althoughsomeofthedialecticpersists
today(Kauppinen,2007;Knobe,2007),thephilosophicalclimateandattitudehas
definitelyimproved.
Comparedtoexperimentalphilosophy,thereisanabsenceofany“positive”or“negative”
mentalistprogram,wherethesebothinvolvetakingintuitionstohavesomedistinctive
evidentialroleinconceptualanalysisordiscoveringanalyticities,andthenegative
programcastingdoubtonsuchmentalistprograms(Alexanderetal.,2010;Cappelen,
2012;Machery,2008).Whetherornotthisisanaccuratepictureoftoday’sexperimental
philosophymovement,itwasatanyratenotatopicofinterestintheeyesofempirical
semanticists.Andtherearemanyreasonswhy,includingtheirviewofindefinitenessof
intentioninsemantics,theirsurveyofpossibleuniversalnormativeconclusionsthatmight
bedrawnfromdescriptionsoflanguage,andtheirbroadlyCarnapianattitudetotheory
construction—nottomentiontheirattentiontodifferencesindirectionsofinterpretation
andpreciseness(compareChalmers,2011).
Todaytherearetwobroadexplanatorygoalsfoundinexperimentalphilosophythatare
concernedwithunderstandinghowpeoplethinkaboutphilosophicaltopicsandexplaining
whytheythinkthewaytheydoaboutthem.Bothwerewellrepresentedinempirical
semantics,thoughofcourseintheformofabehaviouristpsychologythat(p.361)
emphasizeslanguageusage.MuchoftheresearchatOslowasconcept-drivenresearch
onhowcloselyrelatedtermsaredefined,conceived,andusedbypeople,andwas
motivatedbyaninterestinimprovingpoliticaldiscourseandcontributingtoscienceand
philosophy.TheworkdoneatBerkeleyexemplifiedtheinterestinexplainingwhypeople
havetheintuitionstheydoabouttheacceptabilityofastatement.Althoughmany
experimentsdirectlytestedtheclaimsmadebyphilosophersaboutordinarylanguage
andthought,thistendedtofunctionasarhetoricalpointofdepartureforsubsequent
theorizingandexplanation.
Atthecenterofempiricalsemanticsandexperimentalphilosophyistheuseofthelatest
toolsfrompsychologyandsocialscience,andareturntoatraditionalconceptionof
philosophyasonethatengageswithbothanalyticalandempiricalquestions.Empirical
semanticshadasmallfollowingandfacedsomedifficultieswithexperimentconstruction
andinterpretationoftheevidence,andmostoftheactualexperimentsinphilosophywere
doneinconnectionwithjustafewphilosophers,amongthemNaessandTennessen.In
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Experimental Philosophy*
contrast,today’sexperimentalphilosophyhasmuchwiderappealandhasfarbettertools
atitsdisposal,andtheexperimentsandresearchersalreadyoutnumbertheworkin
empiricalsemanticsbyawidemargin.Despiteempiricalsemantics’successes,Ernest
NagelwascorrectwhenhepredictedthatNaesswould“nodoubtremainanoutcast
fromthephilosophiccommunityandwillhavetofindwhatsolacehecaninbeinga‘mere’
scientist”(Nagel,1939).Needlesstosay,experimentalphilosophyhasmuchbrighter
daystolookforwardto.
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Tennessen,H.(1950).Holdningertilrettsoppgjøret(1945–1948)belystvedintervjuerav
150Oslo-jurister[AttitudestotheTrials(1945–1948)IllustratedbyInterviewsof150
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Tennessen,H.(1959a).WhatShouldWeSay?Inquiry2(1–4):265–90.
Tennessen,H.(1959b).“TheSystemofPrivateEnterprise,”AnEmpirio-Semantical
AnalysisofaSlogan.Synthese11(1):72–83.
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Tennessen,H.(1959d).NoteonConfusionofEvidenceandIllustrationinDescriptive
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Tennessen,H.(1961).WhereofonehasbeenSilent,thereofoneMayHavetoSpeak.The
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Notes:
SpecialthankstoAdamMortonandJeffPelletier’ssummertimeseminaronempirical
semanticsandexperimentalphilosophyattheUniversityofAlbertain2009.HereI
becameawareofthemanuscripts,seminarnotes,andoriginalstudiesthatwereleftby
HermanTennessen,whichservedasvaluablematerialforunderstandingtheresearchat
OsloandatBerkeley.Someofthismaterialhasbeenplacedonlineonmywebsite,andis
otherwiseavailableonrequest.Iwouldalsoliketothanktheanonymousreviewersand
editorsfortheirinsightfulandhelpfulcomments.
(1 )AsErnestNagelelegantlysummarized:“Italsocontainsmanydeliciousmorsels:for
example,Dr.Naessfoundthatschoolchildrenattheageofpubertyarecapableof
discussingtheproblemoftruthwithasmuchaplomb,thoughwithoutthetechnical
language,asphilosopherswithreputation;thatthetheoryoftruthasadaequatioreiet
intellectuswaspropoundedtohim,exceptforthejargon,byaschool-girlofsixteen;that
hiswomentest-personshadagreatertendencythanmentobelievein“absolutetruth”;
andthatthecriticismsbyhistest-personsofstatementsbytheirfellows,whenthese
statementsweretorncompletelyoutoftheircontext,werenotunlikethosemadeby
professionalphilosophersuponthewritingsoftheircolleagues.”(E.Nagel,1939,p.78)
(2)OnTarski,Naesspointedoutthatthegroupinthisvicinityisunifiedbyitsfunctionin
conversationasameansofaffirmingsomethingstatedorasotherwiseavoiding
redundancy.Tarskirespondedthatparticipantslikelymisunderstood,andproposed
anothertest(Tarski,1944,p.360).
(3)Forthisreason,itisincorrecttocountNaessasanearlyproponentof“experimental
philosophy,”characterizedasadvocatingempiricalstudiesofnon-philosophers’
“intuitionsaboutphilosophicalcases,”orassubscribingtotheviewthatphilosophers
appealtointuitionsassuchasevidence(Cappelen,2012,p.219).
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Experimental Philosophy*
(4)EmpiricalsemanticistshadmuchtosayaboutFregeandHusserl.Frege’sviews
aboutvaguelygraspedpropositionsreceivetreatmentinGullvå g’sformalizationofdepth
ofintentionasdiscussedlaterinthechapter,usingBarwiseandPerry’ssituation
semantics(Gullvå g,1983).SeealsoNaessonHusserl’sapodicticevidenceofideallaws
fromtheperspectiveofempiricalsemantics(Naess,1954).
(5)TheviewsofmanyViennaCirclememberssuchasCarnap,Schlick,Nageland
Neurath(whowereinagreementwithNaess’sapproach)didnotgainmuchcredencein
Germanacademicphilosophybecauseofthiscontrastingattitude(Kusch,1995,pp.222–
6).
(6)Naess(1953b)alsothanksCarnapforinputintoexperimentalhypotheses.Probably
thisinputwasgivenatthe1937CongressinParis,whereNaesspresentedsome
preliminaryresults.
(7)Thatistosay,whenphilosophershaveremarkedsuchthingsas“theconceptofP”or
“themeaningof“P,”theyhaveneverbeentalkingaboutsomeconceptortermthat
standsinrelationtoP,butPitself.Ryle’stakeonthisphenomenonissimilartothatof
TimothyWilliamsonandHermanCappelen.
(8)Apostel,Crockett,andToulminallhavepositivethingstosayintherestoftheir
reviews,asdoesMates(Mates,1958a).Ofcourse,Quineinfluentiallynotedthatitisnot
atallclearhowempiricalinvestigationcansolvedisputesaboutmeaning,andhisinfluence
showsupinsomeofthereviews(cf.Naess,1957;Quine,1951).
(9)Indeed,whenNaesstalkedofthe“possibilityofan‘experimentalphilosophy’”inhis
studyoftruthhereferredtoadevelopmentalpsychologyofconceptualsystems—one
whichbeginswiththe“embryonicform”ofphilosophicalpositionsfoundamongnonphilosophers(Naess,1938a,p.161).
(10)Ina1945lettertoOttoNeurath,Naesswroteofhiswartimeexperiences:“Iamstill
somewhatgroggyanddisheartenedbecauseoflostfriendsandcollaborateurs,butI
hopesoontorecover.TheverybrilliantyoungphilosopherLudvigLövestaddiedthis
year.Hewasmyclosefriendinallkindsofwork,alsothe‘illegal.’Hewastorturedto
death,remainingsilentaboutmyhiding-place.Anotherclosefriendandcollaborateurin
philosophy,Wickström-Nielsen,waskilledwhenjumpingfromparachute.Hecamefrom
EnglandandjumpedwithdocumentsandRussell’snewbookonTruthetc.and
Lundberg’snewbookonthemethodsofsociology.Alsootheryoungpeoplewhowished
togoonwithphilosophyandmathematicsaremissing.Thisfieldgotanexceptionallyhard
blow.”(QuotedinStadler,2009,p.20.)
(11 )QuislingsweremembersofVidkunQuisling’scollaborationistpartyduringtheAxis
occupationofNorwayinWorldWarII.
(12)MuchofthiswasfacilitatedbyNaess’seditorshipatSynthese,andNaess’snew
journal,Inquiry.
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Experimental Philosophy*
(13)ThisisasidefromOfstad,whowenttotheUniversityofStockholmin1955.
(14)TheircolleagueStanleyCavelldescribedthisperiodasoneofbeingengagedin“all
butcontinuousargument,sometimesconsistingoffriendlyexchangesometimesof
(temporarily,butyoucouldn’tbesure)estrangingdispute”(Cavell,1999,p.xxiii).“[I
wassurprisedbythe]outrage[OLP]producedinmyoldercolleagues.Outrageiswhat
itwas.ThiswasevidentinmycolleagueBensonMates’scontempt,echoedinhisolder
friendDavidRynin’sexasperation”(Cavell,2010,p.372).
(15)Someoftheexperimentswentasfollows:“Thewordxseemstobeusedindifferent
ways.Occasionallyitisusedinthesenseofy,asforinstanceinthesentence:‘…’.We
insertedasentencewhichmadeitseempreposteroustobelievethatthewordwasused
asindicatedinthetext.Inspiteofthis,therewasatendencyamongtherespondentsto
agreetothesubsumability.Someofthequestionnairescontainedquestionsofthe
followingkind:‘Doyouthinkthisxisagoodorbadexampleofybeingusedinthesense
ofz?’”(TennessenandGullvå g,1959,p.3).
(16)Althoughitlaunchedhiscareer,Cavellremembersitthus:“Ryninissuedthis
invitation—summonsrather—comingupstairsanddownthehallfromhistomyofficein
DwinelleHall,attheendofaconversationthathebeganbynotingthatsinceIarrivedin
townIhadbeensayingalotofextravagantthingsaboutthisnewworkonordinary
language…Theimpressionofangerinsuchexchangesneverleftme.”(Cavell,2010,pp.
372–3.)
(17)Thisappearstobethefirsttimeconversationalimplicatures,thoughnotnamedas
such,areexplicitlyusedasargumentsagainstordinary-languagephilosophy.
(18)The“1,500”numberpresumablycomesfromitsregularinclusioninstudiesat
Berkeley.
(19)Thefulltranscriptandothermaterialsareavailableontheauthor’swebsite.
(20)Austinplannedtostudytheinterviewsapparentlysupportedoccurrenceanalysisin
dictionaries(AustinandNaess,1964).Indeed,Austinsawhisapproachasonethatwould
beabsorbedintoalargerscientificenterprise(seeNaess,1961a,p.197).Unfortunately
Austinpassedawayshortlyafterthesedebates.Atthetimeitwasanopensecretat
OxfordthatAustinwasseriouslyconsideringmovingtoBerkeley,havingreportedly
remarkedthathe“couldbuildanempirethere”(T.Nagel,2009),andhavingexpressed
concernwithalackofanextgenerationoflike-mindedphilosophersatOxford(Chapman,
2009).
(21 )ThisisasidefromObjectivity,whichwaspublishedbyasmallSanFrancisco
publisher.
(22)Hungerlandarguedthatasatisfactoryaccountofcontextualimplicationdepends
cruciallyonwhatonecaninferaboutthespeaker’sbeliefsgiventhatthenormsof
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Experimental Philosophy*
conversation,whatevertheyare,arestillnotviolated(seealsoChapman,2008,2009).
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