Experimental Philosophy* UniversityPressScholarshipOnline OxfordScholarshipOnline OxfordStudiesinExperimentalPhilosophy:Volume1 JoshuaKnobe,TaniaLombrozo,andShaunNichols Printpublicationdate:2014 PrintISBN-13:9780198718765 PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:January2015 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001 ExperimentalPhilosophy* 1935–1965 TaylorMurphy DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0013 AbstractandKeywords Intheheydayoflinguisticphilosophyanexperimentalphilosophymovementwasborn, andthischaptertellsitsstory,bothinitshistoricalandphilosophicalcontextandasitis connectedtocontroversiesaboutexperimentalphilosophytoday.Fromitshumble beginningsattheViennaCircle,themovementmaturedintoavibrantresearchprogram atOslo,andsoughtadventureatBerkeleythereafter.Theharshanduncharitable reactionitmetissurprisingbutunderstandableinlightofdisciplinarytensionsandthe legacyofantipsychologism—sentimentsandargumentswhichhavereemergedtoday, albeitinmodifiedform.YettheresearchatOsloremainedunperturbedanditflourished inbothitstheoryanditsapplications,whichspannedthephilosophicaldomain.The Berkeleyyearswereshortbutintense,asexemplifiedbytheirengagementwith ordinary-languagephilosophy,J.L.Austin,andthetheoryofcommunicativesignificance. Page 1 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Keywords:empiricalsemantics,psychologism,intuition,methodology,interpretation,ArneNaess,Herman Tennessen Introduction Intheheydaysoflinguisticphilosophy,agroupofNorwegianphilosopherssawthat philosophersoftenreliedonintuitionswhenspeakingabouttheconceptualcommitments andlinguisticusesofordinarypeople,despiteenduringdisagreementonthematter. Thentherewasthecriticalinsight:“Whenphilosophersofferconflictinganswersto questionsthathaveempiricalcomponents,empiricalresearchisneeded”(Naess,1953a, p.vii).Callingthemselvesempiricalsemanticists,thisgroupstoodopposedtothe“antiempiricallyorientedarmchairphilosopher”andpointed“tothepossibilityofan ‘experimentalphilosophy’”(Tennessen,1964,p.290;Naess,1938a,p.161).Theyargued thatitis“hardlysufficientthatasinglepersonregistershisownreactionstothisorthat sentence,ormakespronouncementsbasedonintuitions,orundertakesscattered observationsofothers’usage”(Gullvå g,1955,p.343).Andsoofftheywent,testingthe claimsmadebyphilosophers(p.326) andinvestigatinghowconceptsareunderstood, defined,andusedbyordinarypeople. Empiricalsemanticsisdeeplysimilartotoday’sexperimentalphilosophy;itwaslinguistic philosophy’sexperimentalphilosophy.Althoughtheempiricalsemanticsmovementisnot historicallycontinuouswithtoday’sexperimentalphilosophymovement,empirical semanticistsengagedwithmuchthesamesubjectmatter,hadsimilarmotivationsand aims,andencounteredcharacteristicproblemsandobjectionsattheinterfacebetween analyticphilosophyandexperimentalpsychology.Thischapterspellsoutthese connectionsandsituatesempiricalsemanticswithinthecontextofexperimental philosophyandanalyticphilosophy. ArneNaessledtheempiricalsemanticsmovement.ThemostrenownedNorwegian philosophertoday,Naesswashonouredwithastatefuneralandiswellremembered bothforpioneeringtheecologicalmovementandforhisactivismintheinternationalpeace movement(Stadler,2009).Naessisalsocreditedwithbringingsocialsciencemethods intoNorway,andempiricalsemanticsisconsideredanintellectualforerunnerto sociolinguisticsandcorpuslinguistics(Chapman,2008,2011;Thue,2009).Alongwith Naess,thecentralempiricalsemanticistswereHermanTennessen,apsychologistwith interestsinlogicalanalysis;IngemundGullvå g,alogician;andHaraldOfstad,alegal scholarturnedmoralphilosopher(Ofstad,1951,pp.42–3;Tennessen,1962). Thischapterisorganizedintothreesections,roughlycorrespondingtothreeperiodsof empiricalsemanticsresearch.Ibeginwiththeoriginalinspirationforempiricalsemantics (around1935–38),andsurveyitsreceptionovertheyears.ItgrewfromNaess’sown interestsandhisencounterswiththosehemetinVienna.Naesshadanongoinginterest inbehaviouralpsychologyandtheconceptoftruth,andgainedfurthermotivationto studythenotionoftruthexperimentallyinconversationwithTarskiandothersatthe ViennaCircle.Theoverarchingfactorwastheapparentrelianceonintuitionwhen assessingthewaythattermsaredefined,conceived,andusedbyordinarypeople. Naess’sworkovertheyearswasmetwithresistance,largelyduetoantipsychologistic Page 2 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* (orantinaturalistic)sentimentsandargumentsthatbecamecentraltoanalyticphilosophy whenitpartedwayswithexperimentalpsychologyaroundtheturnofthecentury. Empiricalsemanticistspointedtothe(p.327) broadlyempiricaltraditionalconceptionof philosophythatexistedpriortotheriseofanalyticphilosophy.Whilethedistinction betweenanalyticconceptualanalysisandsyntheticsciencessuchaspsychologywas sensible,itwasoftenusedtodepreciateempiricalresearchontraditionalphilosophical topics.MyaccountofwhattranspiredinViennaandNaess’sintellectualdevelopmentat thisstageisdrawnlargelyfromhisrecollections,whichwerepennedafterWorldWarII. InthenextsectionofthechapterIsurveytheworkdonebyempiricalsemanticistsin Oslo(around1939–56).Isketchsomebasicideasandmethodsandplacethisworkinits socialandpoliticalcontext.Despitetheemphasisinsociopoliticaltopics,therewasa vibrantresearchprogramontopicsinanalyticphilosophy.Theexperimentalstudieshere focusedonunderstandinghowpeopleconceiveoftruth,democracy,synonymy, consciousness,and“testability”amongphysicists,tonamejustafew.Iconcentrateon onestudyoftypologicalconceptsforillustration,andnotesomecontrastswith experimentalphilosophy.Perhapsmoststrikingisthattherewasnoattempttoaccess analyticitiesorconceptualtruthsfromtheexperimentaldata—itwasregularscienceand not,asitwere,priortoit.However,italsoembodiedauniqueanalyticalandphilosophical approachofitsown.Formysourceshere,IbeganwithTennessen’scoursetextbooks andaccountsbytheempiricalsemanticistsabouttheirownresearch,aswellassome archivalmaterialthatincludesoriginalstudiesanddata(ascitedbelow).Forthe illustrationontypologicalconcepts,IpartiallytranslatedsomeofTennessen’sworkfrom NorwegianandusedTennessen’sEnglishsummary(nowavailableonline). Lastly,IturntotheperiodofworkthatfollowedatBerkeley(around1957–61).Whereas theworkinOsloconsistedineffortstounderstandhowpeoplethinkaboutspecifictopics, atBerkeleythefocusturnedtowardexplanationofcertainpatternsofintuitivejudgments aboutlanguagefoundinanalyticphilosophy.Asdestinywouldhaveit,therewasaclashof sortsbetweenempiricalsemanticistsandordinary-languagephilosophers,thoughthis clashwasalsoquiteconstructive.Althoughlogicalanalysiscouldbedistinguishedfrom empiricalsemantics,ordinary-languagephilosophycertainlyappearedtobeaboutthe samesubjectmatter:ordinarylanguage.Someofthisworkisobscurebecauseit suddenlystoppedaround1960,andmuchofitwasdoneinconnectionwithJ.L.Austin (whodiedinFebruary1960).Thissection(p.328) drawsheavilyonarchivalmaterial fromthisperiod,includingseminarnoteswrittenatBerkeley,anddraftsofwork(someof whichwerenotpublished).Again,muchofthisworkisnowonlineoravailableonrequest. ExperimentalPhilosophyattheViennaCircle Muchhappenedinthisperiod,soabrieftimelineofNaess’sactivitiesisinorder(see Stadler,2009).NaessspenthisstudentyearsinParisstudyingphilosophy,psychology, mathematics,andastronomy.In1933hecompletedtwoMaster’stheses,oneontruth andoneonbehavioralpsychology.Thisworkincludedsomequantitativeanalysisofthe usageofevidentialexpressionsinscience,suchas“show,”“prove,”and“demonstrate” (Naess,1933;cf.Overton,2013).WhenNaessarrivedinViennain1934,hewasinvited Page 3 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* toparticipateinMoritzSchlick’sViennaCircleseminars.Herehecontinuedtodevelop hisinterestsincloseconversationwithRudolfCarnap,CharlesMorris,OttoNeurath, andAlfredTarski,amongothers.Naesswrotehisdissertationontheempiricalstudyof scientificbehaviourandpresentedthistotheViennaCircleinMarch1936.Naesswas alsoinspiredtoconductexperimentsontheconceptoftruth,andpresentedsome resultsattheThirdInternationalCongressfortheUnityofScience(July1937,Paris).In parallelhedidresearchwiththeViennesepsychologistEgonBrunswick—alsoa participantattheViennaCircle.Naesswastocontinuethisresearchinexilein1938–39at Berkeley,whereheworkedinEdwardC.Tolman’spsychologylaboratory. AccordingtoNaess,onecentralideaofhiswasinfluencedbyhowtheViennaCircle seminarswerestructured.Participantsworkedtowardgainingagreementonprecise formulationsoftheirphilosophicalpositions,revisingtheirformulationswhentherewere diverginginterpretations.Ashelaterrecalledit,thisprocessledhimtothinkthat“we werenotquiteclearinourheads—thatweinasensewereonlyvaguelyawareofwhat wemightbetalkingabout”(Naess,1993,p.263).“Theirquestforclarityandcordial cooperationinpursuitofknowledgeledmetoappreciatethat‘WhatdoImean?’isan openquestion”(Naess,2005a,p.lxiiif).Naessobservedconsiderableshallownessof semanticintentionandthattherewereoftensurprisinglydiverseinterpretationsforeach other’sformulations.Thisledhimtoargueextensivelyagainstthe(p.329) assumption thatpropositionswerepreciselygraspedinactualthinkingandunderstandinginhis dissertation,CognitionandScientificBehaviour(1936). AccordingtoNaess,ViennaCircleparticipantsoftenappealedtotheordinary,commonsensemeaningsandusesofwords.Herecallsfindingitperplexinghow“thelogical empiricists[could]boastaboutascientificattitudewhentheyreliedsomuchonintuition whenspeakingabouttheuseofwords”(2005b,p.199).Hewasconfidentthatempirical methodscouldbeofusehere,aswellasforstudyinglanguagemoregenerally: Ibelievedthatonecouldpurgelogicalempiricismofitsantiempiricaltendenciesby aprogramforpurelyempiricalstudiesoflinguisticusage.Preciselysuchresearch, withoutfurtherintentions,seemedtomenecessary(1)tocounterbalanceaform of“logicalanalysis”thatstrictlyspeakingwasnotlogical,and(2)tocreatethe preconditionsfortheconstructionofasystemofexactconceptsintendedtocover allempiricalfieldsofimportanceinthephilosophicaldiscussion. (Naess,2005b,p.203) IntheViennaCircle,NaessandTarskidiscussedTarski’srecentworkontheconceptof truthinformalizedlanguages.OneofTarski’sdesideratalinkedhisaccounttothe ordinaryconceptoftruth—his“materialadequacy”condition.AsLinskyputit: Therequirementofmaterialadequacyissimplytherequirementthatthedefinition, onceachieved,shallcorrespondmoreorlesscloselywiththatconceptoftruth whichallofushaveinmindbeforeweeverundertakethetaskofexplication. Page 4 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* (Linsky,1952,p.1) Tarskibelievedthathisaccount(roughlyoftheform,“p”istrueiffp)doesindeed“do justicetoourintuitions”abouttruthandconformswith“common-senseusage,”thereby fulfillinghismaterialadequacycriterion(Tarski,1944).Naessdoubtedthatthiswasreally thecommon-sensenotionoftruth,aswouldberevealedbysystematicquestioningof non-philosophers.However,Naessalsohadalargerconcern,fortheViennaCircle participantswerenotaloneintheirhabitofreferencingtheviewsofnon-philosophersas decisiveinrejectinganother’sformulationorposition. (p.330) Naess’sextensiveinvestigationswerepublishedinhisbook“Truth”as ConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessionalPhilosophersandinTheoria(Naess, 1938a,1938b).HereNaessreportsontheextenttowhichphilosopherstake“a standpointtowhatthenon-philosophersmean,statingthatthetheoriesoftruthadhered tobytheiropponentscontradictthebasicstructureoftruthrevealedamongthenonphilosophers”(Naess,1938a,p.165).Heconcludedthatnoagreementwascomingany timesoonfromthearmchair: Undernoconditionscanweattributeanyvaluetostatementsonthesematters deducedfromgeneralphilosophicalviewsorfrom“intuition.”Ifonewishesto knowsomethingaboutthematter,thetraditionalmethodsofattackmustbe radicallyanddefinitelyabandoned. (Naess,1938a,p.93) Inhisefforttosettlethings,Naessinterrogatedandsurveyedordinarypeople;heasked themtoexplicitlystatewhattheythinktruthis,tostatewhatiscommontoallthatistrue, tomakesynonymityjudgments,toevaluateothers’definitions;andhetriedavarietyof othertechniques(seeAppiah,2008;Chapman,2008,2011;Stadler,2009).Naessalso investigatedotherfactorssuchasage,gender,suggestibility,andeducation.1 Naessidentifiedsomethirty-seventruththeories,includingthosecenteringonwhatis provable,whatisarrivedatfromone’ssenses,whatislearned,whatserveslife,what cannotbecomeotherwise,whatagreeswithalltheevidence,andwhatisagreeduponby consensus.Hetookthistoshowthattherewasjustnothingthatdeservedtobecalled thecommon-sensetheoryorpre-philosophicconceptionoftruth;somuch,then,forthe materialadequacycondition:2 (p.331) Itisthereforenonsensicaltospeakofthecommonsenseviewofthe truth-notion.Equallynonsensicalitistospeakoftheviewofthemaninthestreet, oftheuneducated,oftheprephilosophicmindetc.Nophilosopherspeaksofthe philosophicviewofthetruth-notion…thiswouldnot,however,beanymore ridiculousthantospeakofthecommonsenseview. (Naess,1938a,p.85) Insteadofresearchontheordinaryconceptionoftruth,Naessproposedsome Page 5 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* alternativeprojects:thedevelopmentandacceptanceofscientifichypotheses,the functionofmaximsandstatementsinideologicalcurrents,formalizationofevidential expressionsinscience,andconceptualclarificationwhenitisusefultodoso.AsNaess latersummarizedhisconclusions: In“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessionalPhilosophers,Itried toshowtheinadequacyofintuitivemethodsemployedbyphilosophersforthe purposeofdetermininghow“true”andrelatedtermsareconceived,definedand usedbyordinarypeople.Theexclusiveuseofintuitivemethodsforthese purposestendstoresultinanunderestimationofthediversetrendsofreflection amongthosewhoarenotlearned…Dialogueswiththosewhoarephilosophically uneducatedconvincedmethatacceptanceofintuitionsreportedbythe philosophicallysophisticatedabouttheverbalandconceptualhabitsofothersleads toconfusionanderror. (Naess,1953a,p.vii) Itisworthhighlightingtheuseof“intuition”byNaesshere,asitdiffersfromsome currentwaysofusingtheterm.Now,itwasnotuncommontotreatconformitywith ordinaryusageand“ourintuitions”asdecisive.Naesswascertainlynottheonlyoneto noticethis,norwashealoneinsurveyingsuchappealsandproposingempirical investigations.RichardRudner(anAmericanphilosopheratWashingtonUniversityinSt. Louis)didsoaswell.Rudnersurveyedanumberofphilosophers—Carnap,Goodman, Moore,Hempel—andaskedhowtheintuitionsthattheyappealtocouldbejustified, weighedagainsteachother,andsystematized(Rudner,1950). Thereisanimportantdifferenceherebetweenappealingtointuitionsassuchandtreating themasevidenceofthecorrectnessofone’sanalysis,(p.332) versusamethodof reflectingfromthearmchaironwhatotherswouldordinarilysayorthink.Rudner(and Goodman)mayhavebeenconcernedwiththeformer,butNaessonlyhadthelatteruse inmind.Naessdidnotviewcommon-senseusageorsharedintuitionsashavingany distinctive,epistemicallysignificantroleinphilosophicalanalysis;insteadheworriedthat therelianceonintuitionsinmakingtheseclaimswasasourceoffruitlesscontroversy.As heputit: Itisnotnecessarytodepartfromphilosophicalpasturesinordertoseetheneed fortryingoutempiricalprocedurestodiscoverthelinguisticusesandconceptual commitmentsofthemanonthestreet…[Forexample,seethedisagreementin] articlesinrecentvolumesoftheperiodicalsMind,AnalysisandPhilosophical Review.Idonotcontendthatthesephilosophersinallcasesshouldhave investigatedconventionalusagebyothermeansthanintuition.Imerelysuggest thatempiricalproceduresshouldbeappliedtoempiricalquestions.When philosophersofferconflictinganswerstoquestionsthathaveempiricalcomponents, empiricalresearchisneeded…Ifintuitionsareused,proceduresshouldbe devisedbywhichintuitiveresultsofdifferent,presumablycompetentpeoplecan becompared.Iftheintuitiveresultsseemtoconflictoraredifficulttodelimitand Page 6 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* express,oneshouldlookformethodsbywhichtoavoidatleastsomeofthe intuitivecomponentsoftheprocedure. …Thekindofactivitytodayreferredtobynamessuchas“logicalanalysis”and “conceptualclarification”isonlypartlydeductiveandaxiomaticalincharacter.Much ofitseemstometorestonintuitionsaboutone’sownandothers’usesofterms andtocontainrecommendationsorpreferencesinmattersofterminology.The intuitionalapproachisexcellentsolongastheagreementinresultsisofthe intersubjective,interculturalkindthatcharacterizessomeoftheresultsinthe formalorfactualsciences.Suchagreements,however,havenotbeenobtained. (Naess,1953a,pp.vii–x) Theroleofagreementwithordinaryusageandourintuitionsdoesnotappeartoamount toanythingmorethanAristotle’suseofendoxaasreasonablestartingpointsindialectical arguments(Hintikka,1999).Naessdidnotregardintuitionsandordinaryusageas anythingmorethanconventionalpointsofdepartureforone’sexplications,construction ofaxiomaticalsystems,orothertheorizing.3 (p.333) Receptionofempiricalsemanticsinanalyticphilosophy ReviewsofNaess’sworkwerestrikinglyhostile,particularlyatfirst.Briefly:J.Moore criticizedNaessfornothaving“formulatedhisconclusionsinanysystematicfashion,” addingthat“therearefewermisprintsthanareusuallyfoundinworksofthischaracter” (Moore,1939).Malisoffbeganhisreviewbystatingthat“thismaybedescribedasa psychologicalstudy”(Malisoff,1939).NagelpredictedthatNaess“willnodoubtremain anoutcastfromthephilosophiccommunityandwillhavetofindwhatsolacehecanin beinga‘mere’scientist”(Nagel,1939).Laterreviewsofhisworkbarelydifferinwhat theyconsiderimportanttomention.StrawsonalsocomplainedaboutNaess’swriting aptitudeandwasconcernedthathis(notinaccurate)summarywas“parodyingthe author”(Strawson,1954).Huttenwrotethatitisa“socialandpsychologicalstudyabout howpeopleusewords;ithardlytouchesuponthelogicalorphilosophicissuesinvolved” (Hutten,1953).Chisholmstressedthatalthoughitisimportantforlinguisticsitdoesnot haveanyclearrelevancetophilosophicalquestions(Chisholm,1953).Thesereviewsare shortanddonotengagemuchwiththework. Toputthesestatementsincontext,considertheperiodof1880–1920asthetimeofan academic“powerstruggle”betweenphilosophersandexperimentalpsychologists (Kusch,1995,2011).Whiletheturnofthecenturyisrememberedasapointof departurebetweenphilosophyandexperimentalpsychology,itwasalso,asSoberputit, “atimeofexile:whilethepsychologistswereleaving,philosopherswereslammingthe doorbehindthem”(Sober,1978,p.165).Theriseandexpansionofexperimental psychologytookplaceinphilosophydepartmentsandpresentedthevisionofanew academicrolethatispartphilosopherandpartexperimentalscientist.Thismotivated manyphilosopherstoargueforastrictseparationbetweenpurephilosophyand experimentalpsychology,inaprocessof“rolepurification”(Kusch,1995).Carnap’svision isemblematic:“Nowweshalleliminatethepsychologicalquestionsalso,notfromthe Page 7 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* regionofknowledge,butfromphilosophy.Then,finally,philosophywillbereducedto logicalone(inawidesenseofthisword)”(Carnap,1935,p.33).Psychologism,Carnap said,consistsintheconflationofthetaskoflogicalanalysiswiththeempiricalquestionsof psychology. (p.334) Theseearlydebateswerecouchedintermsof“psychologism”or “psychologicism,”andclimaxedinacontroversialpetitionin1913—onethatwas expressly“directedagainstthefillingofchairsofphilosophywithrepresentativesof experimentalpsychology”(quotedinKusch,1995,p.191).Theoutcomeofthesedebates wasamuch-emphasizedseparationof“pure”philosophyfromexperimentalpsychology asdistinctfieldsofstudy,withFregeandHusserlreceivingcreditformakingthecritical distinctions(seeKusch,1995,2011).Fregearguedforasharpdistinctionbetween logic/mathematicsandpsychology:mathematicsandlogicareneitherpartsofpsychology noraretheirobjectsdefined,illuminated,justified,orproventruethroughpsychology. Onemust,afterall,distinguishbetweenideasofnumbersandthenumbersthemselves. Fregeacknowledgedthatknowledgeofvaguepsychologicalprocessesmaybeofsome interest,butrejectedpsychologicalinterpretationsoftheanalytic/syntheticandapriori/a posterioridistinctions;thedifferenceisinhowtheyarejustifiedorproventrue.In particular,theyarejustifiedwithoutreferencetomattersoffact,psychologicalor otherwise.Andatanyrate,psychologicallawsdonotevaluatethinkinghabitsfortheir truthorfalsehood—anindependent,priorcriterionisneededtoevaluatethemandto distinguishbetweenbeingtrueandmerelybeingtaken-as-true.Allgoodpointstobe sure,butthisconceptionandthesedistinctionsbecamecentraltophilosophy,properly conceived.4 Naessrecallsthathisworkwasmetwithhostilityandthathewasoftenaccusedof psychologism.AttheThirdInternationalCongressfortheUnityofScience,Carnapeven warnedNaessnottopresentonhisexperimentalstudies(Naess,1981,pp.144–5).The useofquestionnaireswasscornedby“genuine”philosophers,Naesssays,somuchso thathisdepartmentchairatOslothreatenedthathewouldnotvoteforNaess’stenureif hepublishedhisstudyontruth(Naess,1983,p.311).Naesspublisheditanywayandhis chairdidnotvoteforhistenure. NaesscreditsMorris’sdistinctionbetween“pragmatics”and“semantics”withproviding aneasywayofdodgingthepotentialrelevanceofhis(p.335) empiricalwork(Morris, 1935;Naess,1993).Morrisintroducedthetrioofempirical,pragmatic,andformal dimensionsofmeaning,writingthat“themeaningofatermiscompletelyspecifiedwhenit isknownwhatobjectsthetermdesignates,whatexpectationsitproducesinthepersons forwhomithasmeaning,andwhatitsconnectionsarewithothertermsinthelanguageof whichitispart”(Morris,1935,p.278).Theformalandpragmaticdimensionsofmeaning dividedalongthesamelinesaspurephilosophyandexperimentalpsychology;whereas semanticsreferstothelogicalconnectionsamongtermsinalanguageandisthedomain ofanalyticityandtheapriori,pragmaticsisanempiricalpsychologyoflanguagewhich mustnotbeconfusedwithphilosophy.Sellars’smannerofdiscussingpragmaticsandhis concomitantconcernwithwhatcountsasphilosophyprovidesanideaofhowmanywould Page 8 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* haveapproachedNaess’sworkinwhatmightbecalled“pragmaticsemantics”(Apostel, 1953). Itishardlynecessarytopointoutthattheadditionaltoolsforwhichwearelooking arenottobefoundinthedevelopmentwhichhascometobeknownas “pragmatics,”forthisis,onthewhole,abranchofempiricalscience,afocusingof psychologyandsociologyonthephenomenasubsumedundertheempirical conceptoflanguage…Classicalempiricism…confusedthegrammarofphilosophical predicatesbyattemptingtoidentifythemwithpsychologicalpredicates.Inmany casesthegrammarwassoseriouslyconfusedthatcertainofthemoreconsequent empiricistscanhardlybecalledphilosophers. (Sellars,1947,pp.645–6) InresponsetothisattitudeNaesswasquicktopointoutthat“thetermsemanticsisa catchwordthatdoesnotconveyanydefinitemeaning,”andthathisworkwasnottobe conflatedwithwhatis“legitimatelydoneinpurelogicalanalysis”(Naess,1953a,p.i). AlthoughNaess’sempiricalsemanticswasgenerallymetwithresistanceandscepticism aboutitsrelevanceforanalyticphilosophy,itwasviewedquiteamicablyamonghiscloser ViennaCirclepeers.5Tarski,forinstance,saidofmaterialadequacythatit“canbesettled scientifically,thoughofcoursenotbyadeductiveprocedure,butwiththehelpofthe statisticalquestionnairemethod.Asamatteroffact,suchresearchhas(p.336) been carriedon[byNaess]”(Tarski,1944,p.360).Carnapadvocatedforanempirical approachtotheapplicationconditionsorintensionofnaturallanguageterms,and endorsedNaess’sworkasexemplary(Carnap,1955a).6Carnapthoughtthatatheoryof pragmaticswasneedednotjustforpsychologyandlinguistics,butalsoforanalytic philosophyduetothelatter’sfocusonnaturallanguage(Carnap,1955b;cf.Lutz,2009). Carnapviewedknowledgeaboutthese“pragmaticalconcepts”asinstrumentalin inspiringandinformingone’sexplications.Healsosawitasinstrumentalinfurnishinga practicaljustificationforanexplication,asonemayattendtothefunctionthatthese conceptsareserving.EmpiricalsemanticistsagreedwithCarnap’sassessment(e.g., Naess,1953a;Tennessen,1960a). Itisperhapsnosurprisethatordinary-languagephilosophersdiscoveredawayto reformulatepsychologismintheirownterms.Ryledidthisexplicitlywhenheintroduced adistinctionbetweenuseandusage(Ryle,1953).Intherevoltagainstpsychologism,he says,linguistic“vogues”haveevolved:firstfromtalkofconceptstotalkofmeanings,and nowtotalkofuses.Ryleattributespsychologismtothesemisleadingverbalvogues.7Yet usehasacriticaladvantageinthatitcontrastswithmisuseandsoisclearly“normative” (i.e.,evaluative),whereasusageismerelyadescriptivetypeoflinguisticanthropology andsociologyandisof“nophilosophicalinterest.”Ifusageisnotinaccordancewithuse thefolkaremistaken.Andanalysisofuseisnotinformedbyanalysisofusageanyway,as descriptionsofusagespresupposedescriptionsofuses.Tobesure,Naessand Tennessendidrefertothemselvesasspecificallyanalyzing“usages”(Naess,1949; Tennessen,1949a).TennessensawRyle’sdistinctionas“fruitful,thought-economical”but Page 9 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* didnotfindadifferenceintheuse/usageof“use”and“usage”inordinarylanguage (“Ryle’sDilemma”;Tennessen,1965).ButasTennessen’scolleagueMaxWrightquickly pointedout,thisinterpretationpresupposedtheanswer.Eitherthereisnodifference andtheresultsshowit,orthereisa(p.337) differenceandtheresultsshowthatthe folkaremistaken;“theappealwas,inanycase,philosophicallypointless”(Wright,1967). Eventually,threereviewsappearedthatcriticallyengagedwithempiricalsemantics,and thesearefamiliarintheirargumentsandconcernwithwhatcountsasphilosophy.8Since thesereviewspresentargumentsinsomedetail,itisusefultohighlighthowtheypose theirconcerns.Apostelwasworriedabouttheordinaryconceptofsynonymy(Apostel, 1953).Thereisjustnoclearwaytoavoidtheapparentcirclewhenmovingfrom descriptive“occurrencesynonymy”(orsimilartypes)tothemoreambitious“normative synonymy”(synonymyaccordingtoarule)—especiallyconcerningthemeaningof “synonymy”itself.Crockettbroughtupasimilarpointaboutthemissingbridgeto analyticity,whichhesaysNaess“quitenaturallywishes”tocrossby“countingnoses.” Thequestionremains,however,astowhetherNaesshasmadeanypositive contributiontoanalyticphilosophy…Whatisthephilosophicalpointofthese surveys?[It]isnotatallclearthatthedescriptionofastockuseofanexpressionis assistedbycountingthenosesofthosewhoemployitinthisway. …Letussupposethatinaquestionnaire,callitQS1A,onehundredpercentofthe subjectssaythatthefollowingsentences,chosenbythemfromothersimilar sentences,expressthesameassertion:[P,Q].Thenwemaysaythat[P]and[Q] areQS1A-synonymous,andthiswillbeashorthandwayofreferringtotheabove results.Naess,quitenaturally,wishestosaymorethanthis,andwhathewishesto sayisthatthesetestsresultsarerelevantconfirmatoryevidenceforthe synonymityoftheseexpressions.Hereweneedaclear-cuthypothesisofthe meaningof“synonymity”asitisusedintheprecedingsentence,andNaess’s failuretoprovidesuchahypothesisinthisandothercasesmakesonewonder whatcanbetheusefulnessofhistechniques. (Crockett,1959,pp.109–110) Inanotherreview,ToulmincomplainedthatNaess’sstudieswereonlyabletohandle “descriptive”statementsandraisedthepossibilityoferror,therebyquestioningthe project’sphilosophicalrelevance.Whatdothestudiesproveaboutthecorrectnessof basicmath,orequivalently,theuseoflanguageandthenatureofourconcepts? (p.338) ExactlywhatMr.Naesstakestobetheirrelevance,istoone’ssorrow, leftunclear—“Thequestionofrelevancyiscomplicated,”hesays.Whatmakesitso puzzlingandtantalizingisNaess’svaguenessaboutthepointoftheinvestigation forphilosophy. …Onemusthopethat,beforeNaessgetstooimmersedintothepracticalworkof framingandusingmoreandmoresimilarquestionnaires,hewillsitdownandtell Page 10 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* uswhatexactlytheyaredesignedtoprove.Untilthatisdone,itwillbeeasyfor philosopherstoignorehiswork.“Evenif25.8%ofpersonsarefoundtogivethe sumoftwoandtwoasfive,”theywillargue,“thatwouldleavethecorrectnessof theformula‘2+2=4’informalarithmeticunaffected;surelyalso,thefactthatquite anumberofpeoplewerepreparedtogivesomesensetothestatement‘Jones knowsthetimeassiduously’wouldnotdestroythefamiliar,establisheduseof terms,whichrulesoutthecollocationofsuchaverbandadverb?”Anditwouldbe apityifNaess’sworkweretobeentirelyignored,for,readingthroughthepaper, onecertainlyfeelsthatthereactionsofhisanswerersprovessomethingaboutthe natureofourconcepts…Atthemoment,allonecandoaboutthelargeraspectsof hisworkistosuspendjudgment. (Toulmin,1956,p.118) Indeed,historyrepeatsitselfforthoseinanalyticphilosophywhoundertakeempirical investigationintoconcepts,whicharepresupposedinevaluatingorinterpretingpeople’s performance(Alexanderetal.,2010;Kauppinen,2007;Machery,2008).Theseconcerns poseproblemsforempiricalsemanticsandexperimentalphilosophytotheextentthatthe aimistoaccesssomeambitiousformofapriorianalyticityorconceptualtruthbymeans ofexperimentalpsychologicalinvestigation.Butinthecaseofempiricalsemantics,there wasjustnoattemptpursuesucha“mentalist”project(Alexanderetal.,2010).Naess, afterall,rejectedthatgoalinhisworkonthenotionoftruth,andhisstudentsand collaboratorsagreed. Empiricalsemanticistswerewellawareoftheabovedifficultiesandhadnothingagainst the“laudableefforttostampouteverytraceofpsychologism”(Naess,1954,p.55).What empiricalsemanticistsdeploredwasthepersistentconcernforwhatcountsas philosophy,andtheyalwaysinsistedthatthephilosopherwhousesthemethodsof science“neednotstopbeingaphilosopherforthatreason”(Naess,1961a,p.173).In theiranalysisofsomeofHume’stexts,theyclosewiththeobservationthattheisolation ofphilosophyfrompsychologicalresearchis“oneoftheparadoxesofcontemporary philosophy”(NaessandNaess,1960,p.146).Throughoutmuchoftheworkofempirical (p.339) semanticstheyadvocatedareturntoatraditionalandbroadlyempirical conceptionofphilosophy.Naesssumsupthisviewwell: Thereisatendencytolookupondeductiveandaxiomaticalproceduresas somehowmorephilosophicalthanempiricalones,andthishasunderminedthe positionofthebroadempiricaltraditions(Aristotle,Ockham,Locke,Berkeley, Hume,Bentham,JohnStuartMill),whichinmyviewdeserveastrong representationincontemporaryculture.Thechargeofpsychologismagainst thinkersofthistraditioniswellfounded,buthasbeenlargelymisapplied.Ithas discouragedresearchintogenuinelyempiricalcomponentsofquestioncomplexes ofamixedformalandempiricalcharacter. …Veryroughly,onemaydistinguishadeductive,anintuitional,andanempirical componentinthewritingsofanalyticalphilosophers.Eveninthosecasesinwhich Page 11 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* deductionsandintuitionscanhelpusconsiderably,consistentneglectofthe empiricalcomponentwillbringresearchtowardstagnation.Ifempiricalstudiesare neglected,weshallseemuchintelligentdebatealongintuitionistlines,butlessof thatprocessthatmanyofusfindsoinspiringinthehistoryofphilosophyand science:thedevelopmentofnewbranchesofreliableknowledgeasaresultof combinedphilosophicalandscientificefforts.…Criticswhowouldassumethatthe methodsdescribedinthisbookaimatsolvingquestionsthattheintuitivelyand deductivelyoperatinglogicianhasnotbeenabletosolve,mistaketheintention. (Naess,1953a,pp.iii–iv) InTheFunctionofMoralPhilosophy:APleaforIntegrationofPhilosophicalAnalysisand EmpiricalResearch(1958),Ofstadbeginswiththeclassicalconceptionofphilosophy: AmongtheancientGreeksthephilosophyofmoralsdidnotexistasaspecific discipline.Socrateswasnotonlyaphilosopherofmorals,hewasapsychologisttoo, andalsoasociologistandapoliticalscientist…Theattempttoanswersuchquestions ledthemintoempiricalaswellasanalyticalproblems.Theyacceptednodefinite limitsfortheirspeculationsintheseareas.Whyshouldthey?Itiswewhohave triedtodistinguishcarefullybetweenquestionsofanalysisoflanguageandthoseof anempiricalnature,andsplitupthestudyofmanintoanumberofdifferent sciences.[The]viewthatthephilosopher,quascientist,cannotassertpurenorms orvalue-statements…hasdominatedimportantpartsofAnglo-Americanand Scandinavianmoralphilosophyfornearlyfiftyyears,andsoitmaybeusefultotake itupforevaluation…Ithasstimulatedcontactswithsuchotherbranchesof philosophyaslogicandsemantics,buttheconnectionswithpsychologyandthe socialscienceshavebeenalmostbroken.Thetrainingofmoralphilosophersmight bechangedsothattheireducationwouldqualifythemfortakingpartinteam-work withlogicians,semanticists,psychologistsandsocialscientists. (Ofstad,1958,pp.35–7) (p.340) Ofstadthensurveysresearchprogramsinvariousdisciplines:meta-ethics, communicationandargumentation,moraldeliberationanddecision-makingprocesses, beliefsandethicalbehaviour,andsoon,stillinsistingonmethodologicalpluralism: Whetherresearchofthiskindiscalled“moralphilosophy”ornot,seems,however, ratherunimportant.Theimportantthingisthatthereoughttobeacloseconnection betweensuchstudiesandinvestigationswhicharemorecentraltomoral philosophy…Forthephilosophicalsignificanceofsuchwork,itisimportantto preserveallthesubtletieswhicharecompatiblewiththeexploitationofthe research-instrumentsdevelopedwithinthesocialscience. (Ofstad,1958,p.40) Intoday’sexperimentalphilosophy,onealsofindsanearlyidenticaldialectic,exemplified Page 12 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* byKnobe’sresponsetoKaupinnen—thatistosay,theresponsethatsuchdifficulties, whileinteresting,arelargelyaredherring;wherethisisaccompaniedbytheadvocation ofatraditional,broadlyempiricalconceptionofphilosophy(KnobeandNichols,2008; Knobe,2007;Knobeetal.,2012).Again,theissueforempiricalsemanticistswasnotthat thequestionsthatwereraisedwerenotinterestingordifficultones(givenrelevant aims),butthattheseobjectionshavebeenmisappliedandsohavediscouraged otherwisevaluableempiricalresearch. EmpiricalSemantics Despitesomeresistance,NaesswasappointedaschairofphilosophyattheUniversityof Osloin1939,andherehecontinuedtoworkonempiricalsemanticswithhisstudentsand collaborators.ThisworkculminatedinhismonographInterpretationandPreciseness (Naess,1953a),andlater,CommunicationandArgument(Naess,1966).Empirical semanticswashighlyinfluentialinNorway;fornearlytwenty-fiveyears,anintroductory versionofInterpretationandPrecisenesshadservedastheobligatorytextforgraduate studentswhointendtotakeanyothermajorexaminationat“anyNorwegianuniversity,at mostadvancedgreat-schools,someteachercollegesandatallthemilitarystaffcolleges Norway”(Tennessen,1962,p.1).Afterintroducingsomerelevantterminologyandan overviewofthemethods,Isurveytheworkdoneinthisperiod. (p.341) Empiricalsemanticsviewscommunicationintermsofasender,signal,and receiver—particularlytheinterpretationofthesignalbythereceiver(orsender),where interpretationsaremodeledinsettheoreticterms.Interpretationscanbediscovered experimentallywiththeuseofquestionnaires,suchasthroughjudgmentsoftheform“Q maybesynonymouswithP”and“whenyoureadP,didyoutakethistomeanQ?”An interpretationQofPisaprecization(ismoreprecise)whenthesynonymicalternativesto QareapropersubsetofthesynonymicalternativestoP.Anexpressionisaplausible interpretationofanotherroughlywhenitwouldbejudgedaspotentiallysynonymousby manyinterpreters.Importantly,precizationsandinterpretationsmaybedepictedintreelikemaps,whichencodedirectionanddepthofprecizations(Figure12.1).Strictly speaking,interpretationsarepropertiesofindividuals,plausibleinterpretationsare propertiesofgroups,andtheprecisenessofexpressionsaregivenbysocialusages (Gullvå g,1983). Definitenessordepthofintentionreferstotheprecizationoperativeinan interpreter/speaker,asevincedbythepointatwhichtheindividual(p.342) Page 13 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Figure12.1 Tree-likediagramofprecizations,modeledfrom Ofstad’sprecizationsofthesentencescheme“ThepersonP decidedfreelyinsituationS”(Ofstad,1961).Numbersbelow branchesrefertothecountofprecizationsthathavebeenomitted. Alsoomittedis“freedomasvirtue”inthetopbranch. becomesindecisiveamongmorepreciseformulationsofwhattheymeanorunderstand. Isnoonish14or15minutespastnoon?Onemaybeindecisiveaboutthematterand unabletoanswerthequestion,andthisindecisivenessisthehallmarkofindefiniteness. TheconceptwasinfluencedbyPierceandhisdefinitionof“vagueness”(Gullvå gand Naess,1996;Peirce,1902,p.748).Itismorepreciselyatypeof“processvagueness” foundintheinterpreter’shead(cf.Sorensen,1990).Depthofintentionwaslater explainedintermsoftheconceptualframeworkunderlyinganindividual’sabilityto discriminateinperceptionandthoughtandtoaccessfinerdistinctionsbetweentypesof situations(Gullvå g,1983;TennessenandGullvå g,1959). Muchusewasmadeoftheconceptsofdefinitenessofintentionandprecisenessin diagnosingandexplainingfruitlessdisagreement,andtheywerecentraltohowempirical semanticiststhoughtaboutconceptualchangeandscientificdevelopment.Italso underpinnedtheirviewsofthevalue,role,andlimitsofphilosophicalanalysis(Gullvå g, 1988;cf.Howe,2010;Naess,1936;Tennessen,1973).Thecentralityofdefinitenessof intentionandtheirempiricalapproachtolanguageencouragedempiricalsemanticiststo interpretstatementsaboutconceptualoranalytictruthsasoptativeratherthan,say, indicative,constative,apodictic,oranamnesticincharacter,thoughtheywerealso ferventmethodologicalpluralists. Empiricalsemanticsresearchwouldtypicallybeginwithasurveyofusesalongside definitionsandcommentaries,dubbed“occurrenceanalysis”and“metaoccurrence analysis”respectively.Thedistinctionbetweenoccurrenceandmetaoccurrenceanalysis distinguishestheprojectsofunderstandinghowatermisusedversusunderstanding howitisdefinedandconceivedofbyitsusers,soastobeabletodiagnose discrepancies.Thisfirststagewascoupledwithadetaileddiscussionoftheinterpretation ofcertaintextsofinterest(“elementaryanalysis”).Therewasatendencytomapoutthe spaceofpossibleinterpretationsbysubstitutingprecizationsofcomponentpartsof expressionsandthennarrowingthelistdown.Thegoalwasoftennotjusttofindoutwhat Page 14 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* anyindividualactuallythoughtbuttomapoutthespaceofwhatonecouldpossiblythink ormeanmoreprecisely.9Thewholeprocesscanbedonefromarmchairuptothispoint intheprocedure. (p.343) Oncesomehypotheseswereformedaboutusages/underlyingconceptsand anypsychologicalorsocialfactorsofinterest,theseweretestedwithquestionnaires,with interviews,orsimplybyrevisitingtheoriginaloccurrences.Usuallyapanelof interpreterscodedoccurrencesundertheusagerulesorunderlyingconcepts.Quite oftenagoalwastounderstandhowpeopleinterpretandunderstandeachotherinfairly generalterms(e.g.,howdoesconsideringsomeoneasout-grouporin-groupaffectone’s directionofinterpretationofkeywordsinpoliticalargumentation?). Theresultoftheinvestigationwouldbeamapofprecizationsandunderlyingconcepts, plustheeffectsofsuchfactorsaspersonalityandphilosophicalpositions.Thisservedasa basisformakingfurtherrecommendationsandevaluations,suchasforfacilitatinggood politicalorscientificdiscoursethroughanincreaseinprecision,forestimatingthe convincingnessofargumentsandappealofpoliticalslogans(“marketanalysis”),orfor diagnosingunnoticedambiguitiesandconflationsthatarisefromindefinitenessof intention. Thescopeanddetailofthisworkisimpressive.Naess’sanalysisofZaslavski’susageof “democratie”inLadémocratiesoviétiqueconsideredall192occurrences(Naess, 1953a,pp.300–49).Tennessen’sstudyon“thesystemofprivateenterprise”surveyed twoyearsofannualnewspapersinNorwayforoccurrencesbeforeconstructing“the longestquestionnaireevergiveninNorway”(Naess,1964,p.7).Underthesix conceptionsofprivateenterpriseidentified,theycoded7,667occurrencesandanalyzed themwithrespecttopoliticalpartyandprofession(TennessenandGullvå g,1959,p.23). SiriandArneNaessclassified661sentencesinHume’sTreatiseofHumanNatureinto normative,declarative(analytic,synthetic),andotherlinguisticcategories(Naessand Naess,1960).Tennessen,Ofstad,Gullvå g,andBay(1950)investigatednationalismandits relationshipwithpsychological,sociological,andeconomicfactors.Theytestedsixty-three hypothesesintensurveys,mostwithabouteightyquestionsand500questionnairesper survey.Analyzingthewealthofdataatthetimeprovedquitedifficult,asonecanimagine. (p.344) EmpiricalsemanticsresearchatOslo Naess’sappointmentaschairofphilosophyatOslowassoonfollowedbyafive-yearNazi occupation.This,ofcourse,impactedeveryoneworkingwithNaessduringhiswartime seminars.Indeed,someofNaess’sstudentsdidnotsurvivethewarandtheirstudies werepublishedposthumously.10Itisinthiscontextthata“uniqueinterdisciplinarymilieu developed,combininganemphasisongeneraltheoryandmethodologywithastrong concernforsocialandpoliticalproblems”(Bay,1958,p.vii).Thisattitudeisreflectedin thesubjectmatterandthegoalsofmanyoftheirstudies.Forexample,attheendof Tennessen’sinvestigationoftheattitudesoflawyerstothetrialsofQuislings11 in Norway,heconcluded: Theemotionalimpetusbehindthiskindofworkislinkedtothehopethatourefforts Page 15 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* willincorporateresearchwitharelativelydirectstruggleforhumanistideals. Regardlessofwhetherwecalloursurveysopinionpollsorattitudeanalysisor scientificstudiesintheareasbetweensociology,socialpsychology,semantics,and ethics,thehopeisthatiftheseexaminationswereperformedonalargerscale,they wouldeffectivelycontributetotheeradicationofantagonismthroughoutsociety. (Tennessen,1950,mytranslation) NaessandhisstudentshelpedestablishtheInstituteforSocialResearchinNorwayin 1950,andNaessledUNESCO’sPhilosophicalAnalysisofFundamentalConceptsproject tostudyconceptsofdemocracy,nationalism,andliberty. Still,throughoutthisperiodtherewasalsoavibrantempiricalsemanticsresearch programinphilosophy,andthiscanbedividedintosomeroughcategories(Table12.1). Inphilosophyoflanguage,therewasan(p.345) Table12.1.Overviewoftopicsandsampleofworksinempirical semantics.Asteriskssignifyexperimentsthatusequestionnairesand interviews.Forsomeotherbibliographiesandoverviews,seeOfstad (1951),Naess(1953a,pp.viii–ix),andthejournalsSynthese,Theoria, ThePhilosophicalReview,andInquiryforthe1940sthroughthe1960s Sampleofempiricalsemanticsresearch Philosophyoflanguage •Verificationofstatementsonordinarylanguage(Gullvå g,1955;Mates,1958b). •*“True,”“perfectlycertain,”and“extremelyprobable”(Naess,1953b). •*“Or”(Naess,1961b). •*Commonsensetheoriesand“truth”(Naess,1938a,1938b). •*Theintuitiveconceptofsynonymity(Naess,1956,1957). •*Ordinary-languagephilosophers’claimsaboutordinarylanguage(Austinand Naess,1964;Tennessenetal.,1964;Tennessen,1959a,1965). Ethics,actiontheory,andfreedomofthewill •AestheticsandethicsinKierkegaard’sEither/Or(OfstadandLöfgren,1965). •“Whatisvirtue?”inPlato’sMeno(Grimm,1962,1964). •Freewilland“ThepersonPdecidedfreelyinthesituationS”(Ofstad,1953,1961, 1967). •Verifiabilityandobjectivityofdescriptiveandnormativeclaims,relationshipto “reality”(Naess,1959;Ofstad,1951;Wickström-Nielsen,1948). Philosophyofscience •Evidentialexpressionsinscience(Naess,1933). •Normative,analytic,andsyntheticsentencesinHume’sTreatise(Naessand Naess,1960). •“Consciousness”inthepsychologyofperception(Fluge,1945,inNorwegian). Page 16 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* •*“Testability”inphysics(Lövestad,1945;seealsoNaess,1953a,pp.374–6). •*Conceptsoftype/typicality(Tennessen,1949b,inNorwegian). Social,political,andlegalphilosophy •Foundationsforthescienceandempiricalsemanticsoflaw(Aubert,1943). •Conceptsoflegalnorm(Ofstad,1949,1950). •CriticalexaminationofNietzsche’s“Willtopower”philosophy(Haaland,1947;see alsoNaess,1953a,p.266). •Examinationofdialecticalmaterialism,byArneTorvik(Ofstad,1951,p.41). •*Businesspersons’viewsofwhite-collarcrime’sstatusas“crime”(Aubert,1952). •*“Thesystemofprivateenterprise”(Tennessen,1949c,1959b). •*Lawyers’attitudestoprosecutionofQuislingsinNorway(Tennessen,1950). UNESCOandNorwegianInstituteforSocialResearch •Gandhi’sethics(Naess,1958). •Freedomandliberty(Bay,1958). •*Conceptsofdemocracy(Naessetal.,1956;Naess,1953a,pp.300–49;Rokkan andMcKeon,1951). •*Nationalism(Bayetal.,1950). Philosophyandeducation •Precizationineducation,andeducationaldevelopmentoftheconceptoftruth (Grimm,1955). •*Theeffectofphilosophyeducationonstudents’philosophicalpositions(Fainand Kaelin,1960). (p.346) efforttounderstandstatementsaboutordinary-languagerules,de-precization inethicalstatements,andstudiesonparticulartermssuchas“true,”“or,”and “synonymity”.Inethicsandactiontheorythereareinterestsinwhetherpeople “produce”decisions,“ought”and“can,”thefreedomofthewill,andrelationships betweeninterpretationsofdescriptiveandnormativestatements.Inphilosophyof science,topicsincludedconsciousnessandperception,the“testability”ofphysicallaws, andtheconceptof“type”inpsychology.Theyeventestedwhetherscientistsendupat observationsentencesthroughrepeatedquestioning(theydonot).Insocialandpolitical philosophytheyinvestigatedconceptsofcrime,dialecticalmaterialism,Nietzsche’s“Wille zurMacht,”andinterpretationsof“legalnorm”inlaw.Thediversethemesinempirical semanticsspantraditionalandcontemporaryphilosophicaltopics,notunlikeexperimental philosophytoday. Tennessen’s“ConceptsofType”aptlyillustratestheprocessandstyleofempirical semanticsresearch(Tennessen,1949b).Thisstudybeginsbystatingthatitsmotiveisto takeacomparativeandevaluativeapproachtotypologicalmethods,hypotheses,and researchprograms,usingtoolsfromexperimentalpsychology.Tennessensurveys occurrencesofandcommentarieson“type,”“typical,”andcloselyrelatedtermsusing Page 17 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* sourcesfromphilosophyandpsychology,encyclopaedias,andnewspapers.Thenhe surveystherangeofpossibleprecizationsofthetypeconceptusingaschematicformula andsubstituting(p.347) interpretationsofkeycomponents.Thisiscoupledwithan analysisofspecifictypologiesinpsychologytounderstandhowtheyfunctioninresearch. Thereisalsoawiderinterestinnon-cognitiveaspectsofmeaning,suchasthe relationshipsamongbinariessuchasfemale/male,young/old,plant/animal,passive/active, andtheirrelationshiptothetypesofintegrationdisordersdistinguishedinpsychology. Afterformulatinghypothesesaboutsomeunderlyingconceptsorusages,Tennessen reportsonthe669questionnairesthatwerecompletedbystudents,farmers,and professionals. Tennessenidentifiesfourmaintypeconcepts,whichseemtoberoughlyasfollows:(1)a characteristicallydescriptiveindividualofthetypeorexemplar;(2)typicalityinthesense ofstatisticalmodeorsetofmostexpectedfeatures;(3)thosedistinguishingproperties withhighsensitivityandspecificity;(4)a“class”thatisindividuatedaccordingtosome constitutivequalitiesofthatclass.Tennessensubsequentlyevaluatestheworkof typologistsandphilosophers.Forinstance,hecriticizesHempelandOppenheimforfailing todistinguishbetween(2)and(4)intheirlogicalanalysis.Healsorecommendsthat typologistsinpsychologyuseprecization(3),giventheirexplanatoryanddiagnosticaims, andshowshowanumberofthemunknowinglyshiftbetweenusages.Although Tennessenclosesbysayingthismethodologyisavaluableandmuchneededcontribution tophilosophicalandlogicalanalysis,heplacesspecialemphasisonitslimitedrole.In particular,thisstrategymakestheprocessofdiscoveryexplicitbyincludingthe techniquesforsurveyingthepossibledirectionsofprecization.Italsousesexperimental methodstotestthedescriptiveadequacyofone’sdelimitedusagesorunderlying concepts.Thisismeant,amongotherthings,tofixthemysteriousabsenceofa methodologysection(the“methodofrevelation”)inlogicalanalysispublications (Tennessen,1949a). Oneprogramintoday’sexperimentalphilosophyfocusesonunderstandinghowpeople thinkaboutspecificphilosophicaltopicsofinterest,andthisaimiswellrepresentedinthe researchdoneatOslo.However,thestudiesperformedinempiricalsemanticsareunlike experimentalphilosophyintheirconcentrationonlanguagesystems,atleastwhen theorizingabouttheirwork.Butinpracticetheydidnotsharplydistinguishbetween meaningsandconcepts,nordidtheydistinguishbetweenpredicationofatermand applicationofaconcept,northeuseofatermanddeploymentofaconcept,etc.Where thesestudies(p.348) areexperimental,theyareinthetraditionofbehaviourist psychologyandsocialscience.Themeasurementsarebetweenvariablessuchas personalityandphilosophicalviewsandtheireffectsonquestionnaireresultsandother behaviour.Thetheoriescontainnocognitivearchitecture,identificationofcognitive systems,orinformation-processingmodels,andthisistypicalofthetime.Thisisalsotrue oftheworkdoneatBerkeley(discussedbelow). Thereisalsoacompleteabsenceofanyattempttoestablishanalyticitiesorconceptual truths.Empiricalsemanticistswerehappytokeeptheirresultsdescriptiveand Page 18 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* understandvariouspartsoftheworld,andneveraimeddirectlyatthemoreambitious kindofphilosophicalupshotthatwasexpectedofthem.Ingeneral,theydidnotfind projectsofrefiningintuitionsorincreasingdefinitenessofintentioninconceptualanalysis worthwhile,exceptasameanstogreaterclarityandprecisionforsomespecified purpose.ThisoverallattitudeisclearlyexpressedbyNaessonthenotionsofsynonymy andanalyticity: BensonMatescontends“thatoneisjustifiedinsayingthatthereare‘intuitive’ notionsofanalyticityandsynonymy.”Thisempiricalhypothesisabouttheexistence ofcertainphenomenaorkindsofphenomenaistenable,sofarasIcansee.Mates hasanintuitivenotionofsynonymity;Ihavehadseveralinmylife,andthereis reasontobelievethatallofthemhavemuchincommon.Ontheotherhand,there isnoreasontobelievethatthevariousintuitedentitiesareidenticalornear identical…Ifbothofusshouldassertthatourownintuitionsaremoreadequateor morenearlysimilartotheintuitionsofrespectableauthorities,therewouldbe disagreementbetweenus.Butbywhatkindofdiscussionsorresearchcana disagreementaboutthenatureofanintuitedentitybesettled?Fortunately, collectiveresearchdoesnotseemtopresupposethatallintuitionsaresharedbyall researchers,orthattheyshouldevenknowofthedifferences,orthattheintuited entitiesshouldbedefiniteinoutlineandcontent.Thus,theremayintheyearsto comebemuchfruitfulresearchconcerningsynonymitybyresearcherswith partiallydifferentintuitivenotionsofsynonymity…Itisourcontentionthatsound methodologydoesnotrequirestrictconformityofresearchterminologytoprior intuitions.Onemayevensaythatstrictconformityisnotpossiblebecauseofthe indefinitenessoftheintuitions. (Naess,1957) Indeed,hearguedthatintuitionsaboutuniversalinterchangeabilitysalvaveritatearenot universallyheldandthattherearelaxandbroadnotionsofsynonymy.Naess hypothesizedthatthethoughtthatthisintuitionisuniversalowestooverestimationofthe definitenessofintention(p.349) inunqualifiedstatements,therebymistaking unqualifiednessforgeneralityorabsoluteness(aswith“lyingiswrong”).Indefiniteness wasalsoamajorpointofcontentionbetweenempiricalsemanticistsandordinarylanguagephilosophers.Althoughuse/usageisadistinctionbetweencorrectlanguageuse andactualperformance,whentakenasanempiricalhypothesisaboutordinarylanguage itturnedouttobebelowthedefinitenessofintentionofitsusers(Tennessen,1965). WhereasRylesawtheordinaryconceptofvoluntaryassomehowshapedbyitsrolein blaming(asshownbyillustrationsofpresumablycompetentusage),empirical semanticistswouldseethisasundulyprecise,i.e.,asmoredefinitethanorevencontrary tohowordinaryfolkdefine“voluntary”orconceiveofvoluntariness(Mates,1958b). EmpiricalSemanticsatBerkeley Theshortperiodfrom1957to1961atBerkeleywasanotherhighlyfruitfulepisodein empiricalsemantics.MuchworkoriginallydoneinNorwegianatOslowasalsopublished inEnglishbyTennessenandNaess(thetwomainexperimentalists).12Whereasempirical Page 19 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* semanticistshadpreviouslyfocusedonlogicalanalysisandthesocialandpolitical applicationsoftheirtechniquestospecificconcepts,atBerkeleythefocusshiftedto ordinary-languagephilosophyandtoexplainingwhypeoplehavetheintuitionsabout linguisticexpressionsthattheydo.Onegoalinthissectionistooutlinethisexplanatory project.TheworkdoneatBerkeleyisalsoalittlepieceoflosthistorythatisinterestingin itsownright,andithassomeparallelswithdebatesinexperimentalphilosophy. ThemaincohortofempiricalsemanticistswenttoBerkeleyin1957.13Tennessentooka professorshipatBerkeleyintheDepartmentofSpeech(nownamedtheDepartmentof Rhetoric).Naessalsobecameapart-timevisitingprofessorinphilosophy,andGullvå ga visitingscholar.HeretheyworkedalongsidephilosophersDavidRynin,Isabelle Hungerland,BensonMates,andJohnSearle.Everyoneherewascriticalofordinary(p.350) languagephilosophy.14JohnAustinwasavisitingprofessorin1958andinspired muchoftheempiricalstudythattranspiredintheseyears(Tennessen,1959a). Uponarrival,TennessenandGullvå gparticipatedinMates’s1957seminaronAustin’s“A PleaforExcuses”(1956).Inthisseminartheyconcentratedonordinary-language philosophyandtheirownmethodology.Notesfromtheseminarshowthattheyfocused intensivelyonhowAustinwasarguingforhispositions: Eachsetofhypotheses,itwillbenoticed,containsstatementsaboutusageand statementsaboutactions:e.g.,thatitisgenerallynotpermissibletouseadverbsin descriptionsofnormalactions,andsome(ormost)actionsareneithervoluntary norinvoluntary.Oneoccasionallyfeelsthat,forAustin,thetwokindsofstatements, whichhesimplyjuxtaposes,havesomecloselogicalrelation:onekindisevidence forthetruthoftheotherkind,forinstance. (Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.106–7) Theyalsofounditstrikingthat“Austin’sfavouritemethodappearstobetellinglittle storiesandaskingpeoplewhattheyshouldsayinthedescribedsituation;bymeansof setsofstories,hefindshimselfabletoelicitgeneralagreementasto‘whatweshouldsay when’”(Tennessenetal.,1964,p.103). ThemainworryinMates’sseminarwasthelackofexplicitnessaboutthewayinwhich thesevignetteswerepairedwithusagehypotheses.Nearlyadecadeearlier,Tennessen ransomeexperimentstoinvestigateproblemswithassessingusagefromthearmchair, andfoundatendencytoconflateevidencewithillustration(Tennessen,1949a).15As Naesssummarizedit: (p.351) Thismechanismradicallydestroysthefunctionofdefinitions.Insteadof givinguspreciseandtenablehypothesesforlanguageusagestobetestedby observingusagesoftheruleinalanguage,adefinitoformsentenceislookedupon asaformulation,themeaningofwhichistobeunderstoodbymeansofthe definiendumwithinthelanguage.Asaresult,thereisatendencytoaccept uncriticallyandwithoutanyqualificationswhateversubsumptionsareexplicitlyor Page 20 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* implicitlyasserted. (Naess,1953a,pp.278–9) TheyapparentlyachievedsimilarresultswithAustinianvignettes,andsostressedthat thisdistinctionneedstoatleastbemadefullyexplicitinphilosophicalwritingandseminars suchashis(Tennessen,1959c,1959d). InordertoexploreAustin’smethodmorecarefully,theysurveyedpossible interpretationsofAustin’sapproach.Theystressedthatwhatisimportantisnotjustwhat Austinmeantbutanyotherinterpretationsaswell,aswasstandardpractice.Some examples: (2)Usually,useofanymodifyingexpressionisnotpermissible.(2a)Itwouldsound odd.(2b)ItisnotinaccordancewithcommunicationnormsinEnglish.(2c)Itwould bemeaningless.(2d)Itwouldbefalse…(5a)Mostpeopledonoteveruse “voluntary”and“involuntary”indescribingmorethanasmallnumberofcases. (5b)Cannotmeaningfullybeusedoutsideofsuchcases.(5c)Mostpeopledonot usethetermssothattheyeversayitwasvoluntaryorinvoluntary. (Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.101–2;resultsinTennessen,1965) Theirdiagnosisofthebleakprospectsofthemoreambitiousclaimsofordinary-language philosophy,astheysawit,turnedonanambiguityaboutwhatis“correct.” Ofcourseitistruethat,ifanactionhasacertaincharacteristic,thensome statementis“correct”,i.e.,true,namely,onewhichattributesthatcharacteristicto thataction.Butonanyothermeaningof“correct,”thisdoesnotfollow,nordoes theconverserelationhold:thatalocutionis“permissible”doesnotallowustoinfer anythingabouttheworld…Simplyput:wefeelitnecessarytodistinguishbetween whatonewouldsayandwhatonecouldsay,andtoinsistthatknowingtheformer doesnotgiveuscompleteinformationaboutthelatter. (Tennessenetal.,1964,pp.107–8) WhiletheMatesseminarwenton,StanleyCavellwasexpressinghighpraiseforordinarylanguagephilosophy(OLP)justafewdoorsaway.So(p.352) Ryninarrangedadebate atthe1957PacificAPA,andtheytoldCavellhewouldhavetodefendOLPagainstMates (Cavell,1958;Mates,1958b).16 Mates’spaperdrawsfromtheseminarnotes,butthetargetshiftstoRyleandhis apparentlyirritatinguse/usagedistinction(Ryle,1953).MatesarguesthatRyle’sclaims aboutusearedescriptiveafterall,andaccusesOLPofconflatingsemanticsand pragmatics(conversationalimplicatures).17Hethendistinguishesbetweenextensional andintensionalmethodsofstudyingordinarylanguage,andcomplainsthatOLPfocuses onlyontheextensionalmethod.Theextensionalmethodisoccurrenceanalysis,andthe intensionalmethodismetaoccurrenceanalysiswithaSocratictwist.Theintensional Page 21 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* methodinvolvesaskingparticipantswhattheymeanandpresentingcasesthatmight makethemreviseandprecisifytheiraccounts.Ordinary-languagephilosophydoesnot accountfortheconflictbetweenmethods,Matescharges.Bothmethodsare incorporatedintoempiricalsemantics(Hungerland,1960;Tennessen,1959e).The SocraticdialoguewasfirstproposedbyToulmintotransgressmerely“descriptive” statementsbyinvestigatingthesemanticsandentailmentrelationsendorsedbythefolk’s ownlights(cf.Naess,1961b;Toulmin,1956).TheSocraticdialoguemodelisrevivedin Kauppinen’sdiscussionofexperimentalphilosophyforthesamepurpose(Kauppinen, 2007). Experimentsonlanguagejudgments By1959,atleastfifteenprojectsand4,500questionnairesandinterviewshadbeen administeredatBerkeleyontopicsincludingtheanalytic/syntheticdistinction,definiteness ofintention,verbalrigidityandargumentationpatternsinreligiousandpoliticaldiscourse, and“Pcandecidetodox”(seeTennessen,1959a,p.287).Tennessenusedtheseto argue“againstanytendenciestonarrowdownthefieldofpermissiblecommunicationby employingrigid,apriorinormsorrulesfor‘whatcanpossiblybesaid(p.353) and meant’”because“thewholethingismostoftenaquestionofgeneral(including hermeneutical)imagination”(Stern,1969;Tennessen,1959a,pp.276–7,1961). Tennessen’stargetisexemplifiedbyhisappraisaloftheRussell–Strawsoncontroversy overRussell’stheoryofdescriptions. Ithasalwaysbeenclearthatwhateveradvantagesthisproposalmighthave,they havenothingtodowithanalysesorhypothesesabout(commonor“ordinary”) languageusages.Nonetheless,thefollowingpassageisfoundinStrawson’s“On Referring”(p.330): Nowsupposesomeonewereinfacttosaytoyouwithperfectlyseriousair:“The kingofFranceiswise.”Wouldyousay,“That”suntrue”?Ithinkit’squitecertain thatyouwouldn’t. Strawsoniswrong:Ofabout1,500informantstestedinsomerecentexperiments nooneseemedtoactinaccordancewithStrawson’spredictions…Strawson,one mightsay,hasopenedthedooracracktothevastfieldofempiricalinvestigations oflanguage,takenapeepin,and,after(almostimmediately)havingshutthedoor, hereports:“Russelliswrong:TheTheoryofDescriptionsisfatallyincorrect becauseonewouldnot(couldnot?shouldnot?oughtnotto?)utter,and/ormean: ‘ThepresentKingofFranceiswiseisfalse’!”However,inhisownattemptata “solutiontothispuzzle”Strawsonseemsabsolutelyuninterestedinwhat“one” wouldorwouldnotsay. (Tennessen,1960b,pp.187–8)18 Bydividingupthemechanismsunderlyingintuitionsaboutlanguageandexplainingthe tendencytorejectstatementsforpurelylanguagereasons,Tennessenandcollaborators aimedtoshowthatthesejudgmentswerequiteirrelevantastoastatement’stenability. Page 22 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Aftersurveyingplausibleinterpretationsof“whatshouldwesay”andsimilarlocutions, theyidentifiedthreegenerallinesofdefense:ineffability,infrequency,and impermissibility.Asampleofeachfollows. Undertheineffabilityapproach,atenuousconnectionwasfoundinthe“verbalrigidity” hypothesesofVygotsky,Piaget,andFrazer,accordingtowhichchildrenand“primitive societies”cannotseparatewordformsfromwordmeanings.Tennessenfoundthat childrenjusthaveastrongtendencytoadheretothepermissibilityratherthan potentialitydirectionofinterpretationof“can”insuchquestionsas“canyoucallacata dog?”(Tennessen,1959a,pp.266–72).Theorderofquestionswassufficienttomakethe difference,andonceclarifiedtherewasno(p.354) evidenceofverbalrigidityfor Englishspeakers.However,therewasananalogousformofrigidityonthesideof experimenters,astheywereapparentlyunawareoftheselanguageambiguitiesanddid notimaginesuchalternativeinterpretations. Theinfrequencyapproachdrawsonwhatis“neversaid”toformulatelanguagerules. ThisiswhatAustinreportedlysuggestedatOslo(October1959),inadebatewithNaess oversomeofTennessen’sexperimentson“voluntaryyawning”: Austin: Thesubjectsgavewronganswersconcerningtheirownuseofexpressions,e.g.: whensayingtheywouldneveruse“heyawnedvoluntarily”asadescriptionofa perfectlyordinaryofeventofyawningbecauseitisperfectlyobviousthatsuch yawningsarevoluntary.Actuallythesubjectswouldnotsayitbecauseitcannotbe said. Naess: Thesubjectsinterpreted“heyawnedvoluntarily”assynonymouswith“hewasnot forcedtoyawn”andthusconceiveditasobviousthathewasnotforcedto(and thereforenotworthwhilesaying). Austin: Butthentheydonotknowwellenoughtheexpression“voluntary.”Itistoodifficult aword,maybe.Betteruse“clumsy.” Naess: SuggestiontoHT:Newexperiments… Austin: …Rules(grammaticalorothers)donotexistasrules.Wesaythereisarule againstsayingxwhenxisneversaid.Whatisagainstthelanguagesystemcannot betrueorfalseorobvious.Thus“Heyawnedvoluntarily”cannotbetrueorfalse Page 23 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* orobvious. Naess: Tennesseninvestigatescommunicationratherthanlanguagesystems.What happensifsomethingactuallyissaid(uttered)which“neverissaid”?… Austin: Supposethatsomeoneyawnedinastandardwayandthereisnothingexceptional (i.e.,thecaseisastandardcase).Ifweaskpeopletodescribecompletelyas possiblewhathappens,theywillneveradd“clumsily”or“voluntarily.”Ifwesay “butdidheordidhenotyawnclumsily(orvoluntarily)”theywouldfindtheterms inapplicable,thesentencesneithertruenorfalse. (AustinandNaess,1964)19 (p.355) Thesepotentialproblemsandpredictionswerethesubjectoffurther experiments,ofcourse.Inonecase,theyhostedfakediscussiongroupsonsocial problemsamongstudents(accompaniedbyahiddentaperecorder),andaimedtohave thelocution“voluntaryyawning”occurasnaturallyaspossible(Tennessen,1965,pp. 234–6).ContrarytoAustin’spredictions,thestatementswereacceptedasmeaningful.20 Lastly,considertheimpermissibilityapproach.Tennessenandcollaboratorspredicteda dissociationbetweentwosourcesunderlyingtheevaluationofastatement:(1)a grammaticalandidiomatic/literaldirectionofinterpretation,and(2)atenabilitydirectionof interpretation.Sosomeexperimentsbeganwitheither(1)a“logical-maniacal”lectureon howpeopleoftenassertnonsenseandcontradictions,or(2)a“common-sensical”lecture onhowthemostimportantthingistounderstandwhatsomeonemeans.Participantsthen classifiedsentencesastautologies,contradictions,ornonsense,orasconveyingfactual syntheticstatements.Participantswerealsoaskedtoprovidetheirreasons,andthese werecodedaslanguageortenabilityreasonsforrejectingthestatement.These experimentsshowedthatparticipantscouldadoptandswitchbetweenthetwo interpretiveattitudesandexposedtendenciesforpseudo-disagreementwhenthese distinctsourcesorattitudesexplainthedisagreement(Figure12.2A;Tennessen,1959a, pp.280–4,1959f). SoTennessenidentifiedtwomechanismsorprocesses,onefastandintuitiveandthe otherrequiringabitofreflectionandimagination,andtheseunderliethedifference betweenlanguageandtenabilitydirectionsofinterpretation.Tennessentooktheupshot ofhisstudiestoshowthatsofartherearenoempiricalgroundsforatheoryoflinguistic necessityorforlinguisticrestrictivism;theyareeitherempiricallyunsupportedorthey splitbetweentwosourcesofjudgmentsabouttheacceptabilityofastatement.The reasonsandfeaturesthesesourcestrackdonottellusanythingabouteachother;ifa statementisungrammatical,counterintuitive,orgoesagainstordinaryusageinoneway oranother,thistells(p.356) Page 24 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Figure12.2 ExampleofoneofTennessen’sexperimentsandhis roughexplanation.(A)Exampleofonequestionevincinga dissociationbetweenlanguageandtenabilityreasonsforevaluating astatement.Rows:Typeofreasongivenbytheparticipants. Columns:Whethertheparticipantacceptsorrejectsthesentence. (B)Expressionsandargumentsmaybeinterpretedintrivialor audaciousdirections,tradingonplausibility.(C)Logicalodditiesas trivialitiesduetotheirwideacceptanceorasaudacitiesduetotheir widenon-acceptance,wheretherangeofintuitivelyplausible interpretationsareafunctionofoccurrencefrequency.(D) Significanceisthemaximizationoftenabilityandaudacityand providesanormforinterpretationandagaugeofsignificancewhen proposinganewtheory.(AadaptedfromTennessen,1959a;B–D adaptedfrom1959f,1959g.) usnothingaboutitstenability,andviceversa.TennesseninsistedonCarnap’sprincipleof toleranceformatterslinguisticandconceptual,anddefendedtheviabilityofRussell’s approachagainstStrawson-styleordinary-languagerefutations(Tennessen,1960a). MoreinterestingtoTennessenwaswhattheineffability,infrequency,andimpermissibility approachesdogetright,andtothisendheofferedsometentative“explanationsofthe factthattherearelinguisticexpressions,locutions,formulationswhichintuitivelyor discoursivelysoundoddoreven‘logicallyodd’”(Tennessen,1959f,p.369).Tennessen viewedthisaspartofhis“attackonthemethodofrevelation”(theuseofintuition)in philosophy.Hesaid: Aparticularlyinterestingsituationarises,when[historically]philosophically interestingproblems—linguisticornon-linguistic—havenotyetbeentackledbythe scientistswithinanyramiculatedbranchofexistingsciencedisciplines.(p.357) The primandproperphilosopher,then,whoinsistsonanaprioriattitude,hasto choosebetweenkeepinghishandsclean,atthecostofignoranceonrelevant matters,ortoengageinempiricalresearchhimself.Itseemsthatconfrontedwith thischoice-situation,mostanalyticalphilosophers,andinparticularthesocalled “ordinarylanguage”orientedphilosophers,chooseignoranceasthelesserofthe twoevils.Thepresentpaperispartlymeantasanattempttoindicatewhatmaybe gainedforphilosophybychoosingthemoreearthly,aposteriori,attitude, employingempiricalinvestigationsafterthepatternofthesocial(andother“soft”) sciences,anddevelopingtheavailablemethodsandtechniquestofitwithina philosophicalframeofreference. Page 25 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* (Tennessen,1960a,pp.496–7) Tennessen’stentativeproposalwasthatthequick,unreflectivejudgmentsaboutlinguistic or“logical”oddnesscanbeexplainedbyaperson’slinguisticandconceptualhabitsplus thefactorsgoverningtheremarkabilityofanexpression(Tennessen,1959f,1959g, 1963).Forexample,“Piscultivatingweeds”waslabeledas“logicallyodd”byNowellSmith,despitethisbeingaperfectlynaturalwaytodescribeanormalandimportant activityundertakenbymanyanti-weed-sprayproducingcompanies(Tennessen,1959f). ItisjustbecauseNowell-Smithisnotaworkeratsuchacompanyandthatthisisnever remarkablethatatensionisintuitedbyhim,andthisexplanationholdsquitegenerallyas afirstapproximation. HereisthegistofTennessen’stheory.The“audacity”or“triviality”ofastatementisa measureofhowwidelyacceptedthestatementisamongone’saudience.Ingeneral, interpretationsofstatements,arguments,andtheoriestendtoleaveopenacontinuum betweenaudaciouslyfalseandtriviallytruedirectionsofinterpretation—ashepreviously noticedinhispreviousworkonnationalism,“thesystemofprivateenterprise,”and elsewhere(Figure12.2B).Therangeoffastandintuitiveinterpretationsisafunctionof thatexpression’sremarkabilityamongsituationsthatapersonregularlyencounters,so thattheseintuitivesemanticjudgmentsareareflectionofone’slinguisticandconceptual habits.However,thewholerangeofplausibleinterpretationsisnotimmediatelyobvious andmayrequiredeliberationandalittleimagination(Figure12.2C).Whatmakesa “hypothesis”or“proposal”significantisthatitissufficientlyaudaciouswhilestilltenable (Figure12.2D). Tennessenusedtheassumedruleofsignificanceasabenchmarkforsuccessful interpretation;ifsomeonepropoundsacontradictionorobviousabsurdityand significanceisassumed,theinterpreterisforcedto(p.358) engageinaroundabout interpretationbyfiguringoutwhatthesenderis“upto”andintendstoconvey.He appliedthisschematovariouscasesandaccountedforwittysayingsanddouble entendresasamismatchbetweenintuitiveandreflectiveinterpretations,toexplainthe valueinaudacityforspecialemphasis,andtogivereasonswhyonewouldeverremarka truism,obviousfalsehood,orsomethingcompletelyirrelevant(Tennessen,1959a, 1960b,1965).Thedifferencebetweenmeresensationalismandsignificancewas accountedforintermsofadifferencebetweenprimafacieandactualtenability(Barnes andRobinson,1972;Tennessen,1959g,1973,1984).Somethingasaudaciousas “photonsarebothparticlesandwaves”or“neuroscientistsdiscoverfreewillisan illusion”istrulysignificantonlyifitistenableinspiteofitsaudacity;onlyifitdoesnot receiveitsaudacitybytradingonuntenableimplicationsorriggingspurious interpretations.TennessenandNaesswereveryinterestedinhowthisviewcouldapply totheoryconstructioninsocialscience(seeTennessen,1960a,pp.496–7). Itseemsthatthiswasthelastmajorperiodofdevelopmentinempiricalsemantics.The DepartmentofSpeechthatwashometoRynin,Tennessen,Hungerland,andothers underwentrestructuringinaround1960andtheNorwegianempiricalsemanticistsall movedtodifferentinstitutions.Manyofthebooksandcollectionsofexperimentsthat Page 26 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Tennessenrepeatedlycitesthroughouthisstudieswerenolongerpursuedafter1959– 60andwerenevercompleted.21 Thisisperhapsunfortunate,asmanuscriptsshowthat theywereaimingtodevelopatheoryof“contextualpragmaticimplications,”whichthey identifiedasanareaforwhichascientifictheoryislacking(Tennessen,1959e,1959h). Hungerlandmadesomekeyinsightsintoconversationalimplicaturesandthemanuscripts showenthusiasmforsystematizingthese(Hungerland,1960).22 Tosumup,theempiricalsemanticistsatBerkeleyviewedordinary-languagephilosophers asappealingtoordinaryusageandtestedtheseclaims,oftenwithnegativeoruncertain results.Theconstructiveproject(p.359) toexplainsourcesoflanguageintuitions immediatelyfollowed.Muchearlierwasthediscoverythattheinterpretationmechanism tendstotreatevidenceandillustrationofusageindiscriminately.AtBerkeleythey exploredadissociationbetweenlanguageandtenability-basedjudgmentsinevaluatinga statement,plusthevariousotherstudiesonusagefrequencyandremarkability(see Tennessen,1959a,1959f).Thesewereusedtoprovidesometentativeexplanationsfor thepatternsofcounterintuitivityintermsofusageandadistinctionbetweenfastintuitive languagejudgmentsandreflectiveinterpretations,whichwasthenappliedto conversationalandscientificcontexts.Bybetterunderstandingthesourcesofthe intuitionsinthesecases,thehopewastoclarifywhentheyhavealegitimaterolein argumentationandtheorizing. SummaryandConclusion EmpiricalsemanticshadaninterestinghistoryfromitslaunchinVienna,itsdevelopment andapplicationsatOslo,andthroughitsdisagreementwiththemethodsofordinarylanguagephilosophyatBerkeley.Naesswasmotivatedbyphilosophers’appealtotheway termsareconceived,defined,andusedbyordinarypeople,asexemplifiedbyTarski’s materialadequacycondition.ForNaessandtheotherempiricalsemanticists,intuitions aboutcommonsenseandthepre-theoreticviewsofordinarypeoplewerenotsufficient, especiallygivenenduringdisagreementonsuchmatters.Theconclusionwas underwhelming:thereisjustasmuchvariationandindefinitenessinthemindsof ordinarypeople. Theempiricaltechniqueswerevaluableforotherreasons,andsoNaesscontinuedhis workwithcollaboratorsatOslo.Empiricalsemanticistshadsuccessinprojectswith UNESCOonconceptswithsocialandpoliticalsignificance,inthestudyofscienceandlaw, andintheirinquiriesintoquestionsoftraditionalphilosophicalinterest.Laterworkat Berkeleyinvolveddevelopingtheoriestounderstanddisagreementsarisingfromthe claimsofordinary-languagephilosophers.TheresearchdoneatOsloandBerkeleywas extensiveandbroadinitsscope.Itwasveryconstructiveaswell;partofthiswasof necessityduetothelackofpre-existingmethodsandtheoriesfortheirpurposes,partof thiswasduetoacommitmenttopluralismaboutthemethodsandsubjectmatterof philosophy,andpartofthisowedtotheviewthatlong-termconstructive(p.360) cooperationofmanyworkersisjustasimportantinphilosophyasitisinscience(Naess, 1953a). Ihavehighlightedthelamentabledialecticthatsurroundedempiricalsemantics Page 27 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* throughouttheperiodoflogicalanalysisandlinguisticphilosophy.Empiricalsemanticists advocatedareturntothetraditionalconceptionofphilosophythatacceptedthe philosophicallegitimacyofbothempiricalandanalyticalquestions.Theirkindofapproach wasmarginalized,ofteninadvertentlytobesure,duetotheexpectationthatapriori analyticalresultsshouldfollowfromorbetheaimofscientificinvestigationinmatters philosophical—asif,forinstance,indevelopingascientifictheoryorexplanationofhow peopledefine,conceive,andusecertaintermsandtheircognates,itwouldnotbe philosophyproperunlessitalsowenttowardprovingsomecontentiouslogical,semantic, orconceptualtruthwithoutbeggingthequestion.Thatwastheworrywithanalyticityand synonymy,withderivingusefromusage,thecorrectnessofmathfrommath performance,orotherformsofpsychologism.Althoughsomeofthedialecticpersists today(Kauppinen,2007;Knobe,2007),thephilosophicalclimateandattitudehas definitelyimproved. Comparedtoexperimentalphilosophy,thereisanabsenceofany“positive”or“negative” mentalistprogram,wherethesebothinvolvetakingintuitionstohavesomedistinctive evidentialroleinconceptualanalysisordiscoveringanalyticities,andthenegative programcastingdoubtonsuchmentalistprograms(Alexanderetal.,2010;Cappelen, 2012;Machery,2008).Whetherornotthisisanaccuratepictureoftoday’sexperimental philosophymovement,itwasatanyratenotatopicofinterestintheeyesofempirical semanticists.Andtherearemanyreasonswhy,includingtheirviewofindefinitenessof intentioninsemantics,theirsurveyofpossibleuniversalnormativeconclusionsthatmight bedrawnfromdescriptionsoflanguage,andtheirbroadlyCarnapianattitudetotheory construction—nottomentiontheirattentiontodifferencesindirectionsofinterpretation andpreciseness(compareChalmers,2011). Todaytherearetwobroadexplanatorygoalsfoundinexperimentalphilosophythatare concernedwithunderstandinghowpeoplethinkaboutphilosophicaltopicsandexplaining whytheythinkthewaytheydoaboutthem.Bothwerewellrepresentedinempirical semantics,thoughofcourseintheformofabehaviouristpsychologythat(p.361) emphasizeslanguageusage.MuchoftheresearchatOslowasconcept-drivenresearch onhowcloselyrelatedtermsaredefined,conceived,andusedbypeople,andwas motivatedbyaninterestinimprovingpoliticaldiscourseandcontributingtoscienceand philosophy.TheworkdoneatBerkeleyexemplifiedtheinterestinexplainingwhypeople havetheintuitionstheydoabouttheacceptabilityofastatement.Althoughmany experimentsdirectlytestedtheclaimsmadebyphilosophersaboutordinarylanguage andthought,thistendedtofunctionasarhetoricalpointofdepartureforsubsequent theorizingandexplanation. Atthecenterofempiricalsemanticsandexperimentalphilosophyistheuseofthelatest toolsfrompsychologyandsocialscience,andareturntoatraditionalconceptionof philosophyasonethatengageswithbothanalyticalandempiricalquestions.Empirical semanticshadasmallfollowingandfacedsomedifficultieswithexperimentconstruction andinterpretationoftheevidence,andmostoftheactualexperimentsinphilosophywere doneinconnectionwithjustafewphilosophers,amongthemNaessandTennessen.In Page 28 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* contrast,today’sexperimentalphilosophyhasmuchwiderappealandhasfarbettertools atitsdisposal,andtheexperimentsandresearchersalreadyoutnumbertheworkin empiricalsemanticsbyawidemargin.Despiteempiricalsemantics’successes,Ernest NagelwascorrectwhenhepredictedthatNaesswould“nodoubtremainanoutcast fromthephilosophiccommunityandwillhavetofindwhatsolacehecaninbeinga‘mere’ scientist”(Nagel,1939).Needlesstosay,experimentalphilosophyhasmuchbrighter daystolookforwardto. References Bibliographyreferences: Alexander,J.,Mallon,R.,andWeinberg,J.(2010).AccentuatetheNegative.Reviewof PhilosophyandPsychology1(2):297–314.doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0015-2. Apostel,L.(1953).BookReview:InterpretationandPreciseness.Synthese,9(6):413–16. Appiah,K.A.(2008).ExperimentalPhilosophy.ProceedingsandAddressesoftheAmerican PhilosophicalAssociation82:7–22. 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Carnap,R.(1955a).MeaningandSynonymyinNaturalLanguages.PhilosophicalStudies 6(3):33–47.doi:10.1007/BF02330951. Page 29 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Carnap,R.(1955b).OnsomeConceptsofPragmatics.PhilosophicalStudies:An InternationalJournalforPhilosophyintheAnalyticTradition6(6):89–91. doi:10.2307/4318235. Cavell,S.(1958).MustweMeanwhatweSay?1.Inquiry1(1–4):172–212. doi:10.1080/00201745808601279. Cavell,S.(1999).TheClaimofReason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,andTragedy. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Cavell,S.(2010).LittleDidIKnow:ExcerptsfromMemory.Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press. 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Kauppinen,A.(2007).TheRiseandFallofExperimentalPhilosophy.Philosophical Explorations10(2):95–118.doi:10.1080/13869790701305871. Knobe,J.(2007).ExperimentalPhilosophyandPhilosophicalSignificance.Philosophical Explorations10(2):119–21.doi:10.1080/13869790701305905. Knobe,J.,andNichols,S.(2008).AnExperimentalPhilosophyManifesto.InJ.Knobeand S.Nichols(eds.),ExperimentalPhilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.3–14. Knobe,J.,Buckwalter,W.,Nichols,S.,Robbins,P.,Sarkissian,H.,andSommers,T.(2012). ExperimentalPhilosophy.AnnualReviewofPsychology63(1):81–99. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100350. Kusch,M.(1995).Psychologism:AStudyintheSociologyofPhilosophicalKnowledge. London:Routledge. Kusch,M.(2011).Psychologism.InE.N.Zalta(ed.),TheStanfordEncyclopediaof Philosophy.<>. Linsky,L.(1952).SemanticsandthePhilosophyofLanguage.Urbana,IL:Universityof IllinoisPress. Page 31 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Lövestad,L.(1945).TheStructureofPhysicalLaws.Theoria11(1):40–70. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1945.tb00003.x. Lutz,S.(2009).IdealLanguagePhilosophyandExperimentsonIntuitions.Studia PhilosophicaEstonica2,117–39. Machery,E.(2008).TheFolkConceptofIntentionalAction:Philosophicaland ExperimentalIssues.MindandLanguage23(2):165–89. Malisoff,W.M.(1939).BookReview:“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNot ProfessionalPhilosophers.PhilosophyofScience6(3):379. Mates,B.(1958a).BookReview:InterpretationandPreciseness.ThePhilosophical Review67(4):546–53.doi:10.2307/2182950. Mates,B.(1958b).OntheVerificationofStatementsaboutOrdinaryLanguage.Inquiry 1(1–4):161–71.doi:10.1080/00201745808601278. Moore,J.S.(1939).BookReview:“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNot ProfessionalPhilosophers.TheAmericanJournalofPsychology52(3):489–90. doi:10.2307/1416771. Morris,C.W.(1935).PhilosophyofScienceandScienceofPhilosophy.Philosophyof Science2(3):271–86. Naess,A.(1933).“YouAssertThis?”:AnEmpiricalStudyofWeightExpressions.In Krabbe,E.C.W.,Dalitz,R.J.,andSmit,P.A.(eds.),EmpiricalLogicandPublicDebate: EssaysinHonourofElseM.Barth.AmsterdamandNewYork:Rodopi,pp.121–32. Naess,A.(1936).ErkenntnisundwissenschaftlichesVerhalten[CognitionandScientiic Behavior](Vol.SkrifterUtgittavDetNorskeVidenskaps-AkademiiOslo.II.Hist.-Filos. Klasse.1936).Oslo:KommisjonHosJacobDybwad. Naess,A.(1938a).“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessional Philosophers.OsloAndLondon:KommisjonHosJacobDybwad. Naess,A.(1938b).CommonSenseandTruth.Theoria4:39–58. Naess,A.(1949).TowardaTheoryofInterpretationandPreciseness.Theoria15(1–3): 220–41. Naess,A.(1953a).InterpretationandPreciseness:AContributiontotheTheoryof Communication,vol.1.OsloandLondon:KommisjonHosJacobDybwad. Naess,A.(1953b).AnEmpiricalStudyoftheExpressions“True,”“PerfectlyCertain”and “ExtremelyProbable.”OsloandLondon:KommisjonHosJacobDybwad. Naess,A.(1954).HusserlontheApodicticEvidenceofIdealLaws.Theoria20(1–3):53– Page 32 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* 63.doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1954.tb00387.x. Naess,A.(1956).LogicalEquivalence,IntentionalIsomorphismandSynonymityas StudiedbyQuestionnaires.Synthese10(1):471–9. Naess,A.(1957).SynonymityasRevealedbyIntuition.ThePhilosophicalReview66(1): 87–93. Naess,A.(1958).ASystematizationofGandhianEthicsofConflictResolution.TheJournal ofConflictResolution2(2):140–55. Naess,A.(1959).DoweKnowthatBasicNormsCannotbeTrueorFalse?Theoria25(1): 31–53.doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1959.tb00290.x. Naess,A.(1961a).TheInquiringMind.Inquiry4(1–4):162–89. Naess,A.(1961b).AStudyof“Or”.Synthese13(1):49–60. Naess,A.(1964).Forewordto“TheSystemofPrivateEnterprise”.InH.Tennessen (ed.),EighteenPapersonLanguageAnalysisandEmpiricalSemantics.Edmonton: UniversityofAlberta. Naess,A.(1966).CommunicationandArgument,ElementsofAppliedSemantics(A. Hannay,trans.).OsloandLondon:Universitetsforlaget,AllenandUnwin. Naess,A.(1981).TheEmpiricalSemanticsofKeyTerms,Phrases,andSentences: EmpiricalSemanticsAppliedtoNonprofessionalLanguage.InA.Drengson(ed.),The SelectedWorksofArneNaess.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,pp.1562–82. Naess,A.(1983).HowMyPhilosophySeemedtoDevelop.InA.Drengson(ed.),The SelectedWorksofArneNaess.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,pp.2189–202. Naess,A.(1993).LogicalEmpiricismandtheUniquenessoftheSchlickSeminar:A PersonalExperiencewithConsequence.InA.Drengson(ed.),TheSelectedWorksof ArneNaess.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,pp.1765–83. Naess,A.(2005a).Author’sIntroductiontotheSeries.InA.Drengson(ed.),TheSelected WorksofArneNaess,vol.1.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands. Naess,A.(2005b).HowCantheEmpiricalMovementBePromotedToday?ADiscussion oftheEmpiricismofOttoNeurathandRudolfCarnap.InA.Drengson(ed.),TheSelected WorksofArneNaess.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,pp.1666–719. Naess,A.,Christophersen,J.A.,andKvalø,K.(1956).Democracy,Ideologyand Objectivity:StudiesintheSemanticsandCognitiveAnalysisofIdeologicalControversy. Oslo:OsloUniversityPress. Naess,S.,andNaess,A.(1960).PsychologicalResearchandHumeanProblems. Page 33 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* PhilosophyofScience27(2):134–46. Nagel,E.(1939).BookReview:“Truth”asConceivedbyThosewhoareNotProfessional Philosophers.TheJournalofPhilosophy36(3):78–80.doi:10.2307/2017766. Nagel,T.(2009).Lecture.JonSearle,50YearsatBerkeley.<>. Ofstad,H.(1949).AlfRoss’sbegrepsbestemmelseavbegrepet“rettsregel”:En elementæranalytiskogkritiskundersøkelse[AlfRoss’sconceptofthedeterminationof theterm“legalrule”:Anelementaryanalyticalandcriticalexamination],vol.13.Oslo: Skrivemaskinslua. Ofstad,H.(1950).TheDescriptiveDefinitionoftheConcept“LegalNorm”proposedby HansKelsen:AnElementaryAnalyticalandCriticalInvestigation.Theoria16(3):211–46. 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Quine,W.V.(1951).MainTrendsinRecentPhilosophy:TwoDogmasofEmpiricism.The PhilosophicalReview60(1):20–43.doi:10.2307/2181906. Rokkan,S.,andMcKeon,R.(1951).DemocracyinaWorldofTensions.Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress. Page 34 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Rudner,R.(1950).Counter-IntuitivityandtheMethodofAnalysis.PhilosophicalStudies: AnInternationalJournalforPhilosophyintheAnalyticTradition1(6):83–9. doi:10.2307/4318095. Ryle,G.(1953).OrdinaryLanguage.ThePhilosophicalReview62(2):167–86. Sellars,W.(1947).EpistemologyandtheNewWayofWords.TheJournalofPhilosophy 44(24):645–60.doi:10.2307/2019792. 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Tennessen,H.(1949c).“PrivateEnterprise.”ASemanticalStudy.InThePsychological andSociologicalImplicationsofEconomicPlanninginNorway.Oslo:UniversityPress. Tennessen,H.(1950).Holdningertilrettsoppgjøret(1945–1948)belystvedintervjuerav 150Oslo-jurister[AttitudestotheTrials(1945–1948)IllustratedbyInterviewsof150 LawyersinOslo],vol.15.Oslo:Klubben. Tennessen,H.(1959a).WhatShouldWeSay?Inquiry2(1–4):265–90. Tennessen,H.(1959b).“TheSystemofPrivateEnterprise,”AnEmpirio-Semantical AnalysisofaSlogan.Synthese11(1):72–83. Tennessen,H.(1959c).EvidenceandIllustration.Synthese11(3):274–6. Page 35 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Tennessen,H.(1959d).NoteonConfusionofEvidenceandIllustrationinDescriptive Definitions.TheJournalofPhilosophy56(18):733–5.doi:10.2307/2022186. Tennessen,H.(1959e).Controversies:FactualandFictitiousasRevealedbyEmpirioSemanticalInvestigations,sections28–32(manuscript).Alberta:UniversityofAlberta. Tennessen,H.(1959f).LogicalOdditiesandLocutionalScarcities.Synthese11(4):369–88. Tennessen,H.(1959g).OnWorthwhileHypotheses.Inquiry2(1–4):183–98. Tennessen,H.(1959h).LanguageandReality,manuscripttobeincludedin Controversies.Alberta:UniversityofAlberta. Tennessen,H.(1960a).PermissibleandImpermissibleLocutions:“PrincipleofTolerance” and“OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophy”.Synthese12(4):495–508. Tennessen,H.(1960b).VindicationoftheHumptyDumptyAttitudetowardsLanguage. Inquiry3(1–4):185–98.doi:10.1080/00201746008601317. Tennessen,H.(1961).WhereofonehasbeenSilent,thereofoneMayHavetoSpeak.The JournalofPhilosophy58(10):263–74. Tennessen,H.(1962).IntroductiontoEmpiricalSemantics.Alberta:UniversityofAlberta Press. Tennessen,H.(1963).LanguageandAbsurdity.Alberta:UniversityofAlberta. Tennessen,H.(1964).EighteenPapersonLanguageAnalysisandEmpiricalSemantics. Alberta:UniversityofAlbertaPress. Tennessen,H.(1965).OrdinaryLanguageinMemoriam.Inquiry8(1–4):225–48. Tennessen,H.(1973).OntheConceptualAbsurdityof“ConceptualAbsurdity”. PhilosophicalForum5(74):584–91. Tennessen,H.(1984).WhatisRemarkableinPsychology?InJ.R.RoyceandL.P.Mos (eds.),AnnalsofTheoreticalPsychology.Dordrecht:Springer,pp.273–8. Tennessen,H.,andGullvå g,I.(1959).LogicalAnalysisandDefinitenessofIntention. Oslo:Universitetsforlaget. Tennessen,H.,Ofstad,H.,Gullvå g,I.,andBay,C.(1950).Nationalism:AStudyof IdentificationswithPeopleandPower.I.ProblemsandTheoreticalFrame-work,vol.1. Oslo:InstituteforSocialResearch. Tennessen,H.,Mates,B.,andGullvå g,I.(1964).SomeVagueandPreliminaryReflections onAustin’s“APleaforExcuses.”InH.Tennessen(ed.),EighteenPapersonLanguage AnalysisandEmpiricalSemantics.Edmonton:UniversityofAlbertaPress,pp.99–110. Page 36 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* Thue,F.W.(2009).Empiricism,Pragmatism,Behaviorism:ArneNaessandtheGrowthof American-StyledSocialResearchinNorwayafterWorldWarII.InJ.ManninenandF. Stadler(eds.),TheViennaCircleintheNordicCountries.Dordrecht:Springer,pp.219– 29. Toulmin,S.(1956).BookReview:AnEmpiricalStudyoftheExpressions“True,” “PerfectlyCertain”and“ExtremelyProbable”byArneNaess.ThePhilosophicalReview 65(1):116–18.doi:10.2307/2182195. Wickström-Nielsen,O.(1948).Forholdetmellemdekriptiveognormativeutagns gyldighetogomutsagnsforholdtil“virkeligheten”[TheRelationbetweentheVerifiability ofDescriptiveandNormativeStatementsandtheRelationbetweenStatementsand “Reality”],vol.7.Oslo:Skrivemaskinslua. Wright,M.(1967).LanguageandtheUseofLanguage.Inquiry10(1–4):439–46. doi:10.1080/00201746708601511. Notes: SpecialthankstoAdamMortonandJeffPelletier’ssummertimeseminaronempirical semanticsandexperimentalphilosophyattheUniversityofAlbertain2009.HereI becameawareofthemanuscripts,seminarnotes,andoriginalstudiesthatwereleftby HermanTennessen,whichservedasvaluablematerialforunderstandingtheresearchat OsloandatBerkeley.Someofthismaterialhasbeenplacedonlineonmywebsite,andis otherwiseavailableonrequest.Iwouldalsoliketothanktheanonymousreviewersand editorsfortheirinsightfulandhelpfulcomments. (1 )AsErnestNagelelegantlysummarized:“Italsocontainsmanydeliciousmorsels:for example,Dr.Naessfoundthatschoolchildrenattheageofpubertyarecapableof discussingtheproblemoftruthwithasmuchaplomb,thoughwithoutthetechnical language,asphilosopherswithreputation;thatthetheoryoftruthasadaequatioreiet intellectuswaspropoundedtohim,exceptforthejargon,byaschool-girlofsixteen;that hiswomentest-personshadagreatertendencythanmentobelievein“absolutetruth”; andthatthecriticismsbyhistest-personsofstatementsbytheirfellows,whenthese statementsweretorncompletelyoutoftheircontext,werenotunlikethosemadeby professionalphilosophersuponthewritingsoftheircolleagues.”(E.Nagel,1939,p.78) (2)OnTarski,Naesspointedoutthatthegroupinthisvicinityisunifiedbyitsfunctionin conversationasameansofaffirmingsomethingstatedorasotherwiseavoiding redundancy.Tarskirespondedthatparticipantslikelymisunderstood,andproposed anothertest(Tarski,1944,p.360). (3)Forthisreason,itisincorrecttocountNaessasanearlyproponentof“experimental philosophy,”characterizedasadvocatingempiricalstudiesofnon-philosophers’ “intuitionsaboutphilosophicalcases,”orassubscribingtotheviewthatphilosophers appealtointuitionsassuchasevidence(Cappelen,2012,p.219). Page 37 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* (4)EmpiricalsemanticistshadmuchtosayaboutFregeandHusserl.Frege’sviews aboutvaguelygraspedpropositionsreceivetreatmentinGullvå g’sformalizationofdepth ofintentionasdiscussedlaterinthechapter,usingBarwiseandPerry’ssituation semantics(Gullvå g,1983).SeealsoNaessonHusserl’sapodicticevidenceofideallaws fromtheperspectiveofempiricalsemantics(Naess,1954). (5)TheviewsofmanyViennaCirclememberssuchasCarnap,Schlick,Nageland Neurath(whowereinagreementwithNaess’sapproach)didnotgainmuchcredencein Germanacademicphilosophybecauseofthiscontrastingattitude(Kusch,1995,pp.222– 6). (6)Naess(1953b)alsothanksCarnapforinputintoexperimentalhypotheses.Probably thisinputwasgivenatthe1937CongressinParis,whereNaesspresentedsome preliminaryresults. (7)Thatistosay,whenphilosophershaveremarkedsuchthingsas“theconceptofP”or “themeaningof“P,”theyhaveneverbeentalkingaboutsomeconceptortermthat standsinrelationtoP,butPitself.Ryle’stakeonthisphenomenonissimilartothatof TimothyWilliamsonandHermanCappelen. (8)Apostel,Crockett,andToulminallhavepositivethingstosayintherestoftheir reviews,asdoesMates(Mates,1958a).Ofcourse,Quineinfluentiallynotedthatitisnot atallclearhowempiricalinvestigationcansolvedisputesaboutmeaning,andhisinfluence showsupinsomeofthereviews(cf.Naess,1957;Quine,1951). (9)Indeed,whenNaesstalkedofthe“possibilityofan‘experimentalphilosophy’”inhis studyoftruthhereferredtoadevelopmentalpsychologyofconceptualsystems—one whichbeginswiththe“embryonicform”ofphilosophicalpositionsfoundamongnonphilosophers(Naess,1938a,p.161). (10)Ina1945lettertoOttoNeurath,Naesswroteofhiswartimeexperiences:“Iamstill somewhatgroggyanddisheartenedbecauseoflostfriendsandcollaborateurs,butI hopesoontorecover.TheverybrilliantyoungphilosopherLudvigLövestaddiedthis year.Hewasmyclosefriendinallkindsofwork,alsothe‘illegal.’Hewastorturedto death,remainingsilentaboutmyhiding-place.Anotherclosefriendandcollaborateurin philosophy,Wickström-Nielsen,waskilledwhenjumpingfromparachute.Hecamefrom EnglandandjumpedwithdocumentsandRussell’snewbookonTruthetc.and Lundberg’snewbookonthemethodsofsociology.Alsootheryoungpeoplewhowished togoonwithphilosophyandmathematicsaremissing.Thisfieldgotanexceptionallyhard blow.”(QuotedinStadler,2009,p.20.) (11 )QuislingsweremembersofVidkunQuisling’scollaborationistpartyduringtheAxis occupationofNorwayinWorldWarII. (12)MuchofthiswasfacilitatedbyNaess’seditorshipatSynthese,andNaess’snew journal,Inquiry. Page 38 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* (13)ThisisasidefromOfstad,whowenttotheUniversityofStockholmin1955. (14)TheircolleagueStanleyCavelldescribedthisperiodasoneofbeingengagedin“all butcontinuousargument,sometimesconsistingoffriendlyexchangesometimesof (temporarily,butyoucouldn’tbesure)estrangingdispute”(Cavell,1999,p.xxiii).“[I wassurprisedbythe]outrage[OLP]producedinmyoldercolleagues.Outrageiswhat itwas.ThiswasevidentinmycolleagueBensonMates’scontempt,echoedinhisolder friendDavidRynin’sexasperation”(Cavell,2010,p.372). (15)Someoftheexperimentswentasfollows:“Thewordxseemstobeusedindifferent ways.Occasionallyitisusedinthesenseofy,asforinstanceinthesentence:‘…’.We insertedasentencewhichmadeitseempreposteroustobelievethatthewordwasused asindicatedinthetext.Inspiteofthis,therewasatendencyamongtherespondentsto agreetothesubsumability.Someofthequestionnairescontainedquestionsofthe followingkind:‘Doyouthinkthisxisagoodorbadexampleofybeingusedinthesense ofz?’”(TennessenandGullvå g,1959,p.3). (16)Althoughitlaunchedhiscareer,Cavellremembersitthus:“Ryninissuedthis invitation—summonsrather—comingupstairsanddownthehallfromhistomyofficein DwinelleHall,attheendofaconversationthathebeganbynotingthatsinceIarrivedin townIhadbeensayingalotofextravagantthingsaboutthisnewworkonordinary language…Theimpressionofangerinsuchexchangesneverleftme.”(Cavell,2010,pp. 372–3.) (17)Thisappearstobethefirsttimeconversationalimplicatures,thoughnotnamedas such,areexplicitlyusedasargumentsagainstordinary-languagephilosophy. (18)The“1,500”numberpresumablycomesfromitsregularinclusioninstudiesat Berkeley. (19)Thefulltranscriptandothermaterialsareavailableontheauthor’swebsite. (20)Austinplannedtostudytheinterviewsapparentlysupportedoccurrenceanalysisin dictionaries(AustinandNaess,1964).Indeed,Austinsawhisapproachasonethatwould beabsorbedintoalargerscientificenterprise(seeNaess,1961a,p.197).Unfortunately Austinpassedawayshortlyafterthesedebates.Atthetimeitwasanopensecretat OxfordthatAustinwasseriouslyconsideringmovingtoBerkeley,havingreportedly remarkedthathe“couldbuildanempirethere”(T.Nagel,2009),andhavingexpressed concernwithalackofanextgenerationoflike-mindedphilosophersatOxford(Chapman, 2009). (21 )ThisisasidefromObjectivity,whichwaspublishedbyasmallSanFrancisco publisher. (22)Hungerlandarguedthatasatisfactoryaccountofcontextualimplicationdepends cruciallyonwhatonecaninferaboutthespeaker’sbeliefsgiventhatthenormsof Page 39 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015 Experimental Philosophy* conversation,whatevertheyare,arestillnotviolated(seealsoChapman,2008,2009). Page 40 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Yale University; date: 01 July 2015