Editor’s introduction
Neil Croally
Welcome to Semantron 15. So various were this year’s contributions that I felt unable to impose any
sort of thematic order (as in earlier editions). Instead, the alphabet rules, and serendipitous pleasure
is possible.
However, as with earlier editions, most of the contributions come from boys in their last year and are
based on their extended essay. In addition there are a number of pieces which were entered for an
essay prize. The two essays on relativism (Cullen, Nugent) were entered for last year’s Erasmus essay
prize, and the 6 pieces by Messrs. Macklin, Shehzore, Sheriff and Tudor were all prize-winners in our
own Gareth Evans Essay Competition for boys in the Middle School. The essays by Kottering and
Viswanathan, and one by Sealey, were entered for prizes organized by Oxbridge colleges.
Semantron was founded by Jan Piggott and Richard Scholar.
Contents
1
Economic inequality in the USA
SIMON BARROW
6
Why was the aulos the instrument of tragedy?
HO TING CHAN
9
Troades’ remarkable agon
NEIL CROALLY
18
Do some kinds of disagreements disprove the idea that one side is right and the other
wrong?
BARNABY CULLEN
20
How well does supersymmetry explain the physics beyond the standard model?
MATTHEW FEUER
25
It’s a man’s man’s man’s world: women in the films of Martin Scorsese
CHARLIE GODSIFF
28
Can antigravity explain dark matter and dark energy?
HARRY GOODHEW
35
Foreign direct investment: to what extent has it driven the slum growth of developing
nations?
BEN HURD
39
The market for art in the Netherlands in the period 1650-1750
MARCUS KOTTERING
45
Immigrant labour: does it benefit or impoverish the United Kingdom?
PRZEMYSLAW MACHOLAK
50
How is Euripides' Alcestis an exceptional figure in Greek tragedy?
ARCHIE MacCORMACK
53
Why does fiction like to create worlds set in the future?
THEO MACKLIN
56
My new punctuation mark
THEO MACKLIN
60
How does Livy explore and subvert Roman morality in his narrative of the rape and suicide
of Lucretia?
RAFFY MARSHALL
64
Why is Africa poor?
ALEX McCAFFREY
68
German art since 1945
MAX NUGENT
72
Do some kinds of disagreements disprove the idea that one side is right and the other
wrong?
MAX NUGENT
74
To what extent was it a foregone conclusion that the Tsarist autocracy would be
overthrown in 1917?
RONAN PATRICK
78
Has the UK ever seen a government committed to socialist ideals?
TAIDGH PLEDGER
81
War and medicine
GEORGE PORTER
84
The death penalty in a democratic society
ALEX RACKOW
87
The classical influence on the framers of the American constitution
TOBY REDINGTON
90
Do the languages we speak influence the way we think and perceive the world?
JAMIE SCOTT
95
How do their differing conceptions of the 'state of nature' influence the philosophy of
government of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau?
CHRIS SEALEY
98
Did John Stuart Mill really believe in universal free speech?
CHRIS SEALEY
101
Has the internet changed the way we think?
ADIL SHEHZORE
104
Contradiction
ADAM SHERIFF
106
My new punctuation mark
ADAM SHERIFF
108
Quantitative easing
CHRISTOPHER STONE
112
Private equity
CHARLIE SPARKES
119
Re-evaluating Fukuyama’s ‘The end of history?’
EDMUND STUTTER
124
Can western human rights ever be universal in such a diverse world?
CHARLIE SWINBURN
128
Three-parent babies
JACK TEH
133
Are human rights universal?
BEN TUDOR
137
How do their differing conceptions of the 'state of nature' influence the philosophy of
government of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau?
ANAMAY VISWANATHAN
Economic inequality in the USA
Simon Barrow
Inequality in the distribution of income from wages and capital is present in any capitalist society; it
is how incentives are structured. The CEO of a company making multiples of what the junior
employees make serves to incentivize those people to aspire to his or her position. The fact that there
is financial reward for employee’s achievements increases their productivity because it gives them a
reason to work hard because they know they will be rewarded for it and turn they contribute to the
growth and development of the economy of their respective country. Everybody wins, so the
traditional argument goes.
The question is this: is there a point where inequality is at such a level that it hinders the economy
and society more than it helps it, and has America reached this point? Although there is no way to
definitively prove that economic inequality is doing more harm than good because anything written
about a less unequal America is all speculation. However, I endeavour to convince you, the reader, that
inequality is a problem in America and that it is sufficiently serious to warrant action from the
government. I will then propose various policies that the government could undertake and evaluate
their respective plausibility and practicality.
Firstly I will look at the evolution of inequality in the United State in the post-war years. The two
world wars had large effects on the distribution of income and wealth in the USA; they changed the
structure of the economy. There was a far greater focus on labour in the post-war years than there is
currently and capital did not feature in the economy to the same extent that it does. This may explain
why the growth experienced after the wars was more equally distributed. I will look at the period
leading up to the wars, immediately after the wars and then the post war-recovery levels.
The bottom line of America’s inequality story is that it enjoyed equal growth post-war. All wages
rose together and the phrase ‘a rising tide lifts all ships’ seemed to have some truth to it. However,
since 1970 wage growth for manufacturing labour has flat-lined while the share of income to the top
1% of earners in the US has increased dramatically. From 1947 to 1972 the share of income going to
the top 1% of earners decreased by 29.2%. However, from 1972 to 2012 the share of income going to
the top 1% of earners increased by a staggering 119.6% to 17.6% of national income.1
The equal growth experienced from the 40s to the 70s was no accident. It was the result of policy
responses to the great depression of the 1920s. There was federal support for collective bargaining,
which led to a large increase in trade union density from 1935 up to a peak in 1945. There was a slight
decline from 1945 to 1972 but after 1972 trade union density showed an unwavering downward trend
as the share of income going to the top 1% increased dramatically. There were other political
innovations in the New Deal such as social security and a minimum wage. Civil rights movements and
second-wave feminism provided much greater security for working families while simultaneously
reducing discrimination in the work place. The tax system at this time also kept high earners’ incomes
from reaching levels previously seen in the 1920s. There was regulation on speculative finance
accompanied by many public investments in providing access to higher education, mortgage subsidies
for veterans, housing projects and an interstate highway system. These policies still rewarded the
creation of capital, but they supported the rest of the population too, giving them the security they
needed to be productive members of society.
In 1972 the New Deal began to be dismantled. The excuse for this at the time was that it was done
out of economic necessity and that the world had become far more competitive so the New Deal and
the costs it imposed on businesses were no longer sustainable. There was a rise in conservative
1
http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index
1
politicians around this time and with them they brought the values and policies that would be the final
nail in the New Deal’s coffin. There was no longer support for collective bargaining and unions and
there were tax cuts accompanied by cuts in social spending. These policies were all undertaken in
order to lower business costs and create a true free market. There was also widespread deregulation
and privatization. From this time onward inequality has reached new heights. Amongst the OECD
countries America is only less unequal than Mexico, Turkey, and Chile after taxes and transfers by the
GINI index2 measure of inequality.3
So that is a condensed history of inequality in America. Inequality is on the rise and America is among
the most unequal developed countries or, as Thomas Piketty put it, ‘(inequality of labour income in
America) is probably higher than in any other society at any time in the past, anywhere in the world,
including societies in which skill disparities were extremely large.’4
Now that it has been established that inequality has increased dramatically over the last 40 years and
is looking unlikely to decrease without government intervention, it is important to understand the
implications of inequality and the problems it causes in order to address these problems directly as
well as inequality itself. Sustained inequality can be very discouraging for those in the bottom
percentiles of income distribution because their work is rewarded unfairly in comparison to workers
in other income percentiles. Production workers’ wages have stagnated for an entire generation while
the top earners are enjoying nearly half of all of the country’s growth5 and paying relatively little
tax. Many of the activities that the top earners engage in such as predatory lending and sub-prime
mortgage lending are detrimental to the poor but highly profitable for the rich and unsurprisingly
inequality got markedly worse in the run up to the 2008 recession.6
Moreover, as inequality increases to a certain point, consumption begins to decrease because those
with the higher incomes tend to save a larger proportion of income while those on lower incomes
consume all of their pay. This can cause a large drag in demand. This occurred in America to a varying
extent from the 80s onwards, however easing of credit standards, leading to cheaper, more plentiful
borrowing, propped up consumption. This created a financial services sector that was trying to
capitalize on the desperate demand for credit from consumers and the desperation for short-term
speculative returns from those looking to move up the income ladder at any cost, which, to nobody’s
surprise, hugely increased debt in the economy. This ‘let them eat credit’ strategy temporarily subdues
the symptoms of sustained high levels of inequality but it also creates an economy reliant on credit
and vulnerable to external shocks. The extent to which banks were lending enormous amounts of
money to private equity companies and then packaging the debt up in complicated financial products
containing various kinds of ‘toxic debt’ simply to allow a continuation of the borrowing binge was at
least in part helped by the deregulation and easing of credit standards of the 80s onwards. This
combination of businesses and consumers borrowing money at unsustainable levels means that when
there are shocks to the economy, as in the credit crunch of 2008, not only do the banks collapse but
so does consumer spending because the credit that was funding their consumption is no longer
available. This may well have been a contributing factor to the depth of the 2008 recession.
Perhaps most importantly, inequality endangers democracy. Economic inequality breeds political
inequality because those with the money will have the means to make a significant impact on public
policy. This leads to a class of America’s wealthiest citizens, scared of a strong government and
distribution of income and wealth, using their money to influence politicians into policies that favour
them, thus exasperating the initial inequality. As a result government policy caters for a small portion
of the population, namely those who can afford preferential treatment. In recent studies, it was found
that policies supported by 20% of affluent Americans have about a 20% chance of being adopted, while
policies favoured by 80% of affluent Americans are adopted around 50% of the time. Contrastingly,
the support or opposition of the poor or middle class has little to no effect on the likelihood of the
2
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality
- Gini_coefficient.2C_after_taxes_and_transfers
http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index
5 http://fabiusmaximus.com/2013/12/16/income-wealth-political-inequality-60246/
6 http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index
4
2
policy being adopted.7 This problem has now increased further due to the citizens united case vs. the
Federal Election Committee. Citizens United, a conservative non-profit organization, successfully
convinced the Supreme Court that regulation on campaign finance was unconstitutional as political
spending was a form of free speech. This means that corporations and other organizations can spend
unlimited amounts of money on independent political expenditures such as radio and TV ads
supporting a candidate. President Obama said that this ‘gives the special interests and their lobbyists
even more power in Washington’ and that this ruling ‘strikes at our democracy itself.’ This is most
definitely a step in the wrong direction for a so-called democracy where votes are losing their spot as
the primary influence of politics.8
Inequality can also lead to a lack of equality of opportunity. Joseph Stiglitz’s book The Price of
Inequality lays the argument out as follows: Many people at the bottom and in the middle are not living
up to their potential due to the people at the top using their financial means to influence public policy
towards cutting taxes and government spending and away from vital things like infrastructure,
education and technology. This is devastating for the lower income brackets because they do not have
the money that is required to have a good quality of education. 71% of students graduated with
student loan debt, and the average debt was $29,4009 and then a lot of employers are looking for a
master’s degree, but only students with rich parents can afford to not work for another few years and
rack up that level of debt. Unpaid internships are also a common pre-requisite for a high-earning
career path, but again mainly students with rich parents can afford to take an unpaid job. This means
that more than ever the income and wealth of one’s parents are influential in bringing about future
success. This seriously hinders social mobility and may be why social mobility is as low as half what
it is in some western European countries.10
So inequality damages social mobility, democracy and the economy. The damage it causes is severe
enough to contribute to recessions and inequality and financial crises have correlated for a century.
Inequality means that the rewards (money) are not going to the most able or those that work the
hardest but to those with the richest parents. This means that the economy’s most valuable asset, its
people, is being underused. There are benefits to reduced inequality as the IMF concluded that ‘lower
net inequality is robustly correlated with faster and more durable growth, for a given level of
redistribution.’ Reducing inequality would increase social mobility whilst also reducing damage
caused to the economy by inequality, in the form of a parasitic financial sector and a lack of
opportunity.
This raises the question as to how inequality could be reduced. The following are various policy
suggestions that may be appropriate for the government to undertake to reduce inequality.
The solution of the inequality issue is all about redistribution of the resources in an economy.
Germany, Italy and Portugal all have higher market levels of inequality but the US is the third most
unequal OECD country after taxes and transfers.11 The main problem is in the transfers, that there is
not enough social spending on the poor. There must be increased spending on the poor in order to
provide them with the opportunities to succeed, should they be capable. Currently in the US there is
a lack of opportunity and not a great deal of worker protection. This has led to President Obama
calling for the law to be updated so that a woman can ‘have a baby without sacrificing her job’ and that
people can ‘care for a sick child or parent without running into hardship.’ This gets to the core of the
inequality issue. Equality of opportunity is about investing in the children of a country, and currently
only the rich can afford these investments, so the middle class children fall behind for no other reason
than their parents lacking money. This is where the government needs to step in and make these
http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-americaninequality/external?link=http%3A%2F%2Fbostonreview.net%2Fforum%2Flead-essay-under-influence-martingilens&prev=http%3A%2F%2Fscalar.usc.edu%2Fworks%2Fgrowing-apart-a-political-history-of-americaninequality%2Findex
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens_United_v._Federal_Election_Commission
9 http://projectonstudentdebt.org/state_by_state-data.php
10 http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21595437-america-no-less-socially-mobile-it-was-generation-agomobility-measured
11http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality#Gini_coefficient.2C_before_taxes_and_transfers
7
3
investments in the youth so that they will be more productive. This has productivity benefits for the
economy as a whole and may serve to reduce later government spending on welfare. Keeping women
in the work force will also increase the amount of money ordinary families have access to and are able
to spend on their children, thus reducing the ill-effects of income inequality.
This can be shown by the fact that amongst high-earners 66.2% have access to paid parental leave,
compared with 10.8% of those who earn the lowest wages. And while 78.5% of the highest-paid
workers have access to earned sick time, only 15.2% of the lowest-paid workers have the right to take
paid days off if they or a family member get sick.12 This is worrying because it means that those
already in the most fragile of economic situations are most prone to sudden loss of income due to a
child or parent getting sick. Greater equality for working parents would mean a more equal
upbringing for the nation’s children, which should serve to reduce the manifestations of wage-gaps
later on in life and restore a sense of meritocracy to the US economy, so people can finally believe in
the American Dream again.
To create the revenue for this the government could tax income and wealth at an equal level and strive
to eliminate estate tax loopholes that currently allow a very substantial amount of wealth to be passed
down to future generations, which is not good for social mobility. Capital gains and wealth should be
taxed closer to the level wages are taxed at. It is unfair to tax a labourer considerably more than
someone who earns their income from capital gains, they should be treated more equally in tax terms
as sources of income. Giving effective tax breaks to those that have capital allows their income to
grow faster than the rate of growth of the economy and when this is the case it could lead to greater
concentration of wealth and in turn income. This would worsen inequality as a whole, and should be
addressed urgently before the problem grows.
The government may also choose to focus on consumption taxes to help tax the cash economy could
create extra income for the government to then spend on services that increase mobility such as
education, healthcare and welfare benefits. Looking at countries with high mobility such as Denmark
and Sweden, there is significant public spending on healthcare and education accompanied by
consumption taxes.13 The precedent set by these Scandinavian countries may be something for the US
to follow. However, most economists agree that value-added taxes are regressive, which would be an
obvious downside to a policy seeking to reduce inequality.
There could also be a greater focus on immigration of foreign-born people with a university education
to the US without changing the overall level of migration. Currently the professions facing the most
competition from immigrants are low-paid manufacturing jobs and hospitality jobs. Well-educated
immigrants do not compete with low-paid manufacturing workers; they complement each other. With
no US taxpayer dollars needed to educate these immigrants, the US is effectively receiving free human
capital. Since demand for college-educated people has increased simultaneously with decreasing
supply, increasing the supply of immigrants with university degrees, doctorates and PHDs could well
be the answer to the income disparity between less educated and more educated Americans.
Moreover, there should be federal support for unions and collective bargaining because between 1935
and 2012 trade union density and inequality have been negatively correlated. 14 Trade Unions allow
workers to come together and demand fair wages that they can live off. Middle-class wages have barely
changed since 1970 while those of the higher income brackets have increased considerably. Trade
Unions would help reduce wage inequality. The strong link between low levels of inequality and high
trade union membership15 should be carefully considered by the government as a feasible way to
combat inequality.
In conclusion, inequality in America is a problem mainly because it harms social mobility. Equality of
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/to-reduce-inequality-start-withfamilies/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxation_in_Denmark#Local_income_taxes_and_other_income_taxes
14 http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index
15 http://www.epi.org/blog/union-decline-rising-inequality-charts/
12
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outcomes is not the answer to America’s inequality problem but rather equality of opportunity. More
must be done by the American government to remove influence family money can have on the
opportunities available to children. A satisfactory minimum level of education and healthcare are a
must for a society that is to function healthily and have an acceptable level of intergenerational
mobility. There must also be steps taken to increase the power ordinary citizens have over the
government and attempt to reduce the influence wealthy individuals and companies can have on
politicians in order to ensure that policies cater for the majority, not the money. In my opinion, the
best thing the government could do to reduce inequality would be to give federal support to trade
unions to increase the bargaining power of workers. This may impose a minor cost to business, but
the benefit to the wider society far outweighs this cost. Finally, more social spending needs to be
directed to the poorer citizens of America. The reason Germany is more equal than America after
taxes and transfers is not because of the taxes but the transfers. The German government provides
vital services and employment conditions that allow the poorer people in their society to earn a wage
that is possible to live off. Although this would be politically divisive in the US, it is important for the
government to emphasize the benefits of this avenue of reducing inequality. The combination of these
two policies would be the most effective way to reduce inequality in America.
5
Why was the aulos the ‘instrument of tragedy’?
Ho Ting Chan
Athenian tragedy was ‘a musical event’.1 It is accepted that the chorus was a fundamental element of
tragedy with regard to the structure of tragedy and the physical presence of the chorus onstage.2
However, the chorus was not the only musical element in tragedy. For choruses had an instrumental
accompaniment, namely the aulos. In this essay I wish to explore the role of the aulos within tragedy.
I shall briefly explain what the aulos is, before examining why the aulos was a most appropriate
instrument for tragedy. In addition, I will argue that the aulos was more than a simple accompanying
instrument, but was employed to create effects and emotions for the audience. Hence I address the
word ‘instrument’ in two different ways: the first is the aulos’ capability as a physical instrument; the
second is the aulos capability as an emotional instrument.
I shall begin with a description of the aulos. The word aulos is translated from Ancient Greek as a
‘pipe’. The instrument is, in essence, a cylinder-shaped pipe with finger-holes and a double-reed
mouthpiece.3 Therefore, the common perception of the aulos as a ‘flute’ is incorrect because the flute
is not played by means of a reed. The aulos should instead be categorised as an ‘oboe’ because they
both use a double-reed. The instrument was usually made of wood, ivory, bone or metal4 and probably
consisted of two sections of pipe fitted together.5 There were usually five finger-holes, including one
for the thumb on the underside of the instrument.6. As for the reed, this was inserted into a holmos (a
smooth, round object), which was a more bulbous section of pipe.7 The aulos-player, called an aulete,
usually played two auloi at once, one in each hand. The aulete wore a phorbeia, a strap designed to
ensure that the auloi remained in the mouth to ensure easier playing.8
The aulos was an ideal instrument for accompanying the chorus. The instrument’s sound was
particularly penetrating and projected well, which meant that the music would have carried easily to
the audience. The aulos would also have had enough sound to balance well with a chorus of up to 50
members without being overpowering.9 As tragedies were performed outdoors, it is likely that the
aulos was the only instrument capable of projecting music throughout the theatre, as instruments such
as the lyre and the panpipe would probably not have had as piercing a tone. Another advantage of the
aulos was that it had potentially a much greater range of pitch than the chorus.10 It was capable of
playing in registers much higher than the capabilities of a male chorus. As a result, the aulos may have
been used to create an effect of female voices singing as well, if desired.
I shall now turn to the aulos as an emotional instrument. The aulos’ sound was connected with the
‘sound of lamentation’,11 making the instrument suitable for a genre in which grief and mourning
were a prominent feature. The aulos could also create sounds of nature or even mechanical objects.12
The aulete could also switch between musical modes13 due to the invention of adjustable metal sleeves
Wilson 2005 p. 183.
Wilson 2005 p. 183.
3 Artistic and literary evidence suggests that a double-reed was used as opposed to a single-reed. A discussion of this is
provided in West 1992 pp. 83-4.
4 West 1992 p. 86.
5 Neuman 1995.
6 West 1992 p.86.
7 Wilson 1999 p. 69.
8 Wilson 1999 p. 70
9 The trumpet existed in Ancient Greece, but its loud volume might have overpowered the chorus.
10 Tragic choruses were usually all-male. There were different types of auloi, categorised by the registers within which
they sounded. See West 1992 pp. 89-91.
11 Wilson 2005 p. 185
12 Wilson 2005 p.185 (Plato Laws 669c-e; Aristotle Poetics 1461b).
13 I will summarize what modes are in the next paragraph.
1
2
6
on the aulos. Although there is no surviving evidence to suggest that these effects were actually created
in a performance, the flexibility of the aulos would have given a tragedian more compositional freedom
and the range of effects that could be created through music would have grown.
In order to suggest potential effects created by the aulos, a brief outline of modes is required. A mode,
in short, is a scale comprising a fixed set of intervals. The starting note of the scale does not matter,
as long as the intervals are the same.14 The modes usually employed in tragedy were the Dorian mode
and the Mixolydian; the Ionian, Lydian and Phrygian modes were also used. The Dorian mode was
associated with lamentation, but was also seen as a dignified mode, linked with nobility and courage.15
The Mixolydian mode was associated with mourning and grief. On the other hand, Plato
disapprovingly described the Ionian and Lydian modes as ‘soft’16 and ‘suitable for drinking-parties’.17
If we are to believe what Plato has claimed, then these modes would be lighter and less solemn. The
Phrygian mode was linked with anything from dutifulness to wild madness and frenzy. It was also the
mode most associated with the aulos itself, and the ‘Bacchic18 activity and all dancing of that sort’.19
So it seems reasonable to say that the Phrygian mode was capable of inducing strong feelings among
an audience.
Very few fragments of ancient music survive; one fragment from tragedy which survives is part of a
choral ode from Euripides’ Orestes, which is accompanied by the aulos.20 I have listened to this
fragment21 and will now suggest effects produced by the aulos’ presence in the music.
At this point of the tragedy, Orestes, son of Agamemnon, has killed his mother Clytemnestra in
revenge for her murder of Agamemnon. As a result, Orestes is driven mad by the Furies over the
killing of his mother. This Orestes fragment seems to have been composed in either the Dorian or
Phrygian mode. Therefore, the general mood of the music would probably be rather serious and
mournful – somewhat appropriate to the text to which the music corresponds.
ματέρος αἷμα σᾶς, ὅ σ᾽ ἀναβακχεύει;
ὁ μέγας ὄλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐν βροτοῖς:
κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι22.
ἀνὰ δὲ λαῖφος ὥς
τις ἀκάτου θοᾶς τινάξας δαίμων
κατέκλυσεν δεινῶν πόνων ὡς πόντου
λα βροις ὀλεθριοισιν ἐν κυ μασιν.23
Euripides Orestes 338-344
‘I grieve, I grieve – your mother’s blood that drives
you wild. Great prosperity among mortals is not
lasting: upsetting it like the sail of a swift sloop some
higher power swamps it in the rough doom-waves of
fearful toils, as of the sea.’24
For most of the fragment, the auloi appear to accompany the chorus by simply playing in unison;
however, there are some instances where the auloi diverge from the chorus melody, thereby creating
harmony. Given that instances of harmony seem to be relatively uncommon amongst the music, it
An example would be the major scale in music. All major scales are part of the modern Ionian mode.
Plato Republic 399a
16 Plato Republic 398e
17 Translation taken from Plato, Republic trans. R. Waterfield 1993.
18 Bacchic is a term used to describe Dionysus, god of wine, who is associated with drunkenness and madness.
19 West 1992 p.180 (Aristotle Poetics 1342a-b).
20 The transcriptions of the fragment can be found in West 1992 pp. 284-286, the original fragment is Vienna papyrus G
2315.
21 The recordings are available on a CD entitled Music of the Ancient Greeks performed by Ensemble De Organographia, 1995.
22 In the fragment, line 340 is placed before line 338.
23 All Greek text in this essay has been taken from the Perseus Digital Library.
24I have used the translation provided by West 1992 p. 284
14
15
7
would appear that Euripides deliberately employed harmony to create certain emotions.
The first place where harmony occurs is at the word ματε ρος, ‘of the mother’, where the auloi seem
to be in unison here, both playing a different note to the chorus. I feel that the music would gain more
meaning and interest at this point, especially given that the unison music beforehand, while suitably
serious in emotion, lacks particular impact. The harmony here draws our attention to the word, and
may therefore emphasise the relationship between Orestes and Clytemnestra. The fact that the word
αἷμα, ‘blood’, comes afterwards would then highlight the violent act of revenge which Orestes has
committed.
My next point of interest is the word τινα ξας ‘having upset’, where the auloi play one held note whilst
the chorus sing a moving melody. The harmony created by the chorus melody here could indicate a
change in the tone of the text from one of pity, to one of danger. The meaning of the word is drawn
out by the harmony as opposed to unison.
The next point of harmony at the word δεινῶν, ‘terrible’, is of particular interest because the auloi
diverge, playing two separate notes to the chorus. I believe this this development in the harmony could
convey a more intense effect to the audience. Given the meaning of the word, I think that this more
unusual harmony could have been intended to give an effect of fear and terror to the audience.
The final place in the fragment where the parts diverge is at the words ὡς πο ντου, ‘as of the sea’. The
chord, which appears to comprise the same notes as δεινῶν, might indicate that Euripides intended to
imply a relationship between the δεινῶν and the πο ντου. On the other hand, the chord could simply
be one which was often used to convey an impression of power and fear to the audience. Nevertheless,
the presence of harmony draws our attention to the destructive nature of the sea.
In this essay, I have attempted to show why the aulos was the ‘instrument of tragedy’.25 I have looked
at the reasons why the aulos was employed as an accompaniment to the chorus; that is, the penetrating
sound of the instrument enabled it to project music effectively in an outdoor setting. I have also
attempted to suggest that the aulos was capable of being more than just mere accompaniment, and
that the instrument could be used to convey emotions to the audience. Its ability to switch between
different modes meant that it could induce a wide range of feelings among an audience. I also believe
that it could enhance the meaning of the text and create the emotions associated with words in the
text. I acknowledge that very little evidence is available concerning ancient music, and that one
isolated fragment cannot provide an accurate representation of a lost world of music. However,
having listened to the fragment reconstructed, I believe that tragedians wrote music for instruments
to be interpreted with emotion and meaning, rather than as simply plain accompaniment.
Bibliography
Croally, N., & Hyde, R. eds. 2011). Classical Literature: An Introduction. Abingdon.
Csapo, E., & Slater, W. (1994). The Context of Ancient Drama. Ann Arbor.
Ensemble De Organographia (1995). On Music of the Ancient Greeks [CD]. Oregon: Pandourion Records.
Neuman, P. (1995). The Aulos and Drama: A Performer's Viewpoint. Retrieved August 30, 2014, from
http://www.didaskalia.net/issues/vol2no2/neuman.html
Plato. (1993). Republic. (R. Waterfield, Trans.) Oxford.
West, M. L. (1992). Ancient Greek Music. Oxford.
Wilson, P. (1999). The aulos in Athens. In S. Goldhill, & R. Osborne, Performance Culture and Athenian
Democracy. Cambridge.
Wilson, P. (2005). Music. In J. Gregory, A Companion to Greek Tragedy. Malden, MA.
25
I have taken this claim from Wilson 1999 p. 73.
8
Troades’ remarkable agon
Neil Croally
Introduction: the agon
I do not mean to analyse the agon scene in and of itself, as a stand-alone set-piece debate (interesting
though that is). Instead, I want to consider the agon in relation to the rest of the play, most particularly
but not only to the preceding Andromache scene. For it is in this relation that we shall see how
extraordinary the debate between Helen and Hecuba is.1
Of course, the agon is a pervasive feature in archaic and classical Greek culture, and can describe
everything from athletic competitions to set-piece debates for display, from genuine debates in the law
courts to war itself. Athens in the democratic fifth century was not only involved in some form of
military activity on most days somewhere in the Greek world; it was also known for being (and knew
itself as) a famously litigious society, as Strepsiades’ remark at Aristophanes Clouds 208 makes clear
(he has just been shown a map and has asked to be shown where Athens is):
ἐπεὶ δικαστὰς οὐχ ὁρῶ καθημε νους
[It cannot be Athens] because I do not see jurors in session
And Cleon, at least the Thucydidean Cleon, is happy to disparage those attending the Assembly as
eager ‘spectators of speeches’ (theatai ton logon; Thuc. 3.38.4). The agon is also a feature of tragedy,
as Simon Goldhill says:
In the democratic polis, the law court and Assembly are analogous institutions to the
theatre, and these three great public spaces for the performance of logoi – speeches,
arguments, language as display – strikingly interrelate.2
More specifically, the agon is a feature of Euripidean tragedy. While we might disagree with Michael
Lloyd that the earliest examples of the tragic agon appear in Sophocles’ early plays Ajax and Antigone
(what of Eumenides?), we can agree with the same critic’s identification of thirteen clearly definable
agones in Euripidean tragedy.3
Lloyd also notes that Euripides very often clearly marks out his agones as separate scenes.4 That
separation has also been a cause for criticism: Bond, for instance, finds the debate in HF quite
ungermane;5 Collard makes this general point about Euripidean agones. They demonstrate
. . . self-indulgent digression for the sake of rhetorical display, at the cost of dramatic
continuity and relevance . . .6
Lloyd, while not quite agreeing with Euripides’ shortcomings as a dramatist, believes that the
This paper was origanally delivered at a conference on The Trojan Women in Ravenna, February 2015. In expnaded form
it will be published in a collection of the conference papers in 2016.
2 Goldhill 1997: 132. On the agon in Epic, Historiography and Tragedy, see now Barker 2009. On the pervasiveness of
the agon in Greek culture, see Croally 1994:120-22.
3 Lloyd 1992: 1 – 3.
4 Lloyd 1992: 2, 4, 14.
5 Bond 1981: 108-9.
6 Collard 1975: 59.
1
9
Euripidean agon rarely achieves anything. But he reaches this judgement first because he believes that
tragic conflicts are not soluble by rational or rhetorical discussion (possibly true but . . .),7 but also
because he is most keen to compare an agon in one play with one in another; and he is not alone in this.
In these terms the debate in Troades conforms in some respects but not in others. It is certainly marked
out as a debate (see lines 903-4), as is common in Euripides. Both Duchemin and Lloyd note that,
normally in Euripidean debates, the defendant speaks second; Duchemin notes in addition that the
defendant is normally the winner. But in Troades Helen, the defendant, speaks first, perhaps because
she has been so much accused in the play already.8 Whether Helen or Hecuba wins or loses the debate
– both in terms of the argument and whether she is executed or not – remains a matter of debate.9
It is more certain, however, that trying to understand the function and meaning of the debate in
Troades by reference to the apparent convention of agones in other plays may be to miss the point.
Better to look at the debate scene in Troades in the context of the play itself. By doing that we may
be able to make more sense of what makes Troades’ debate scene so distinctive: it is not only clearly
marked out and perceived as separable (qua Lloyd); it is also obviously but importantly anomalous in
tone.
The context
Troades is arguably the grimmest play ever written.
The (imagined) background of the play is the completely destroyed city of Troy. Such a scene is
unique in tragedy.10 The destruction is total (see e.g. 8, 60, 145, 586): all Trojan males (except one)
are dead; all the women have been enslaved and are about to be allocated to their new masters (see e.g.
246ff., 659ff.). The scene we see before us – the tents (skenai) that the women are supposed to inhabit
(though we never see or see used the inside in Troades: this is unique) – is temporary, and will be gone
when the play ends. The Trojan Women are to be dispersed under conditions of slavery throughout
the Greek world (note 159-62; 180-1). Troy has become a desolation; its name as well as its walls gone
(1260ff.).
The Trojan women’s experience of the war is to have witnessed ritual practice and even religious
belief collapse; they have also witnessed – or the play makes clear – the inversion, collapse,
complication or unworkability of constitutive polarities, such as Greek/Barbarian; Free/Slave;
Friend/Enemy; Man/Woman. Hecuba, present in all scenes, is in all scenes except the debate scene
an obvious example of the appalling effects of war, often indeed so oppressed that she is on the floor.
The agon: is it anomalous?
The obvious answer is: yes. Here are some of the reasons:
a. It is the first and only appearance of a senior Greek (Menelaus), and is the first and only
appearance of Helen;
b. the (new) character of Hecuba;
c. the arguments themselves.
I shall deal with these three points in reverse order.
i.
The arguments are anachronistic; Helen borrows some of the arguments used by Gorgias
or, at least, argues in a similar way; Hecuba’s arguments are also sophistic.11
Lloyd 1992: 15-16.
Duchemin 1968: 139; Lloyd 1992: 17, 101
9 Some think that Helen wins the argument; most, Hecuba; see Croally 1994: 157-60 for references and discussion.
10 Easterling 1989; 1997: 173. Stieber 2011: 2 n.3 quotes Burian, P. (1999) ‘Melos or Bust: Reading the Trojan Women
Historically’, AJP abstracts p. 90: Troades ‘is the only extant tragedy that actually shows the destruction of a polis’.
11 On the relation between Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and Helen’s speech in Troades, see e.g. Conacher 1998: 51-8;
Spatharas 2002. I think some critics get themselves tied up in knots as to how Gorgianic Helen’s speech is, and how
sophistic the debate as a whole is. In relation to Gorgias, I think I was right – and Spatharas 2002: 166 agrees – that it
7
8
10
ii.
Hecuba is transformed. No longer the pathetic, oppressed victim of war, she becomes an
uber-Gorgias, a hyper-sophist. Gellie puts it this way: ‘The mater dolorosa has to become
an intellectual heavyweight, a fifth-century free thinker; but this should not disturb us too
much.’12 But such a transformation does trouble some, especially those who like to see
characterization and character development. A.M. Dale, in a famous formula, argued that
character in tragedy is formed by the ‘rhetoric of the situation’.13 Some more recent critics
have urged more caution. Donald Mastronarde, for instance, argues that agones can often
reshape character in interesting ways, ‘a legitimate facet of the dramatic character, one
that is revealed or even triggered by the extreme pressure of a hostile agon’. Mastronarde
also wants to argue that one of the points that Euripides may be making is that character
is not simply single, but capable of various and not necessarily consistent actions.14 There
is something in this, but there remains something in Dale’s formulation as well. Clearly,
Hecuba needs to respond rhetorically to Helen (indeed she demands that she should be
allowed to do so (906-10). But her transformation from victim to rhetorician, and her
return to victim after the debate, suggests that neither Dale’s ‘rhetoric of the situation’
nor Mastronarde’s allowance for the plurality of character explain her transformation
sufficiently.
iii.
Troades is not unique in introducing a character only in a debate scene – Pheres is
introduced for the agon in Alcestis (614-733)15 – but it is surely unique in introducing two
characters, Helen and Menelaus, both of whom only appear in the debate scene. This fact
alone might make Troades’ agon seem remarkable. Menelaus is also only the second
(speaking) man to appear on stage, and certainly the only senior Greek. That his character
can be seen as so feeble, feeble-minded and banal is itself of interest, given the context of
the play. Certainly, all his rather negative qualities are sharply highlighted by the various
ways in which two extraordinary women debate before him as their judge.
Hecuba, and her transformation in this scene, we have already mentioned. But Helen – to
use the vernacular – is something else. Goldhill says: ‘Casting and dressing Helen is not
easy.’16 Imagine that you are the Director. How do you cast and dress Helen? The play
itself, or at least Hecuba in the play, says this of Helen’s appearance (1022-7):
κἀπὶ τοῖσδε σὸν δέμας
ἐξῆλθες ἀσκήσασα κἄβλεψας πόσει
τὸν αὐτὸν αἰθέρ᾽, ὦ κατάπτυστον κάρα.
ἣν χρῆν ταπεινὴν ἐν πέπλων ἐρειπίοις,
φρίκῃ τρέμουσαν, κρᾶτ᾽ ἀπεσκυθισμένην
ἐλθεῖν
And in addition to these things you have come out
having adorned your body, and you have looked at the
same air as your husband, you despicable creature.
You should have come humbly, in rags,
shaking with fear, with your head shaved.
So, is Helen all glammed up? Various productions in the UK have her so. See these two
pictures: one from the National Theatre in 1995 – Helen as Marilyn Monroe;17
is a matter not of ‘priority or influence but similarity’.
Gellie 1986: 117.
13 Dale 1954: xxv.
14 Mastronarde 2010: 222-8; 245.
15 Rutherford 2012: 193.
16 Goldhill 2007: 203.
17 For criticism of this production, see Goldhill 2007: 127-8.
12
11
another advertising the play with (a scantily clad Helen) and the quote: ‘I was sold for my
beauty’ (lines 935-6). I have also one famous classical image: Helen seems to be in control
(especially with her little helper).
Worman notes interestingly that the organizing principle of Helen’s speech are the desirable bodies
of Paris, of Aphrodite, and of course herself.18 However Gorgianic she is, it just may be that the most
persuasive thing about Helen is the way she looks; not only persuasive, but destructive as well, as
Hecuba says (892-4):
αἱρεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ὄμματ᾽, ἐξαιρεῖ πόλεις,
πίμπρησιν οἴκους: ὧδ᾽ ἔχει κηλήματα.
ἐγώ νιν οἶδα, καὶ σύ, χοἱ πεπονθότες.
So how are we to explain the presence of this debate scene, which Gellie calls ‘eccentric’ and ‘played
to special rules’19, another critic ‘baffling’20 and which I have referred to as anomalous?
Worman 1997: 180. Seneca Troades 882ff. has Helen talking about the benefits both of dressing up and being a captive.
Gellie 1986: 114, 117.
20 Amerasinghe 1973: 99.
18
19
12
Let us be clear, though: the anomaly of the scene is not thematic. Earlier critics have referred to the
scene as crystallizing some of the intellectual issues of the play, or as bringing together some of the
play’s most important motifs, or as being the culmination of the play’s concern with marriage.21 I do
not disagree with any of those assessments. But, in my own terms, I would say the following: the
agon in Troades is as much concerned with the terrible effects of war as the rest of the play, as well
as being specifically concerned with the causes of the war. Those terrible effects are seen in the
problems with important constitutive polarities (human/divine; man/woman; free/slave;
friend/enemy; Greek/barbarian.22 But the agon is also a crucial part – along with the Cassandra scene
– of the play’s examination of the agon itself. Though agon can describe a wide variety of contests,
in all its forms it is not only a regulated activity; it is also designed to produce a victor (however
provisional that status is). Cassandra explicitly and paradoxically questions whether the war – one
agon – has produced a winner (365-405). The result of the debate between Helen and Hecuba, while
apparently explicit (Helen is guilty and will be taken back to Greece to be executed), stands in tension
with Odyssey 4, where Helen is alive and well, and indeed enjoying herself.23 Some critics are certain
that Helen is the winner, even if they are depressed about that fact (e.g. Gellie 1986; Worman 1997);
others are sure that Hecuba prevails (e.g. Meridor 2000: 25)24. Lloyd argues that only two Euripidean
debates produce a result (Hecuba and Heracleidae): in his view the lack of resolution is typical and
unsurprising – tragic conflicts are by definition not easy to deal with.25 This view, I believe,
underestimates the debate’s contribution to the play’s examination of the agon per se.
So the anomaly of the agon is not thematic; it is tonal. And that tonal difference is necessary not for
the dramatic structure of the play but for – if I can put it this way – the psychological well-being of
the audience. Some critics have remarked on something like this. Stinton described the debate scene
as emotional relief;26 Poole thought that the function of the scene was to ‘alleviate some immediate
desperation’;27 Gellie well argues that there is so much pain in Troades but that ‘The truly tragic
experience seems to need something else, a make-weight which tugs against misery in a balancing
tension’.28 Again, I do not disagree with any of the above but I do think that we can make our
comments and observations about the function and tone of the agon scene a little sharper. To do that,
we first need to look at the Andromache scene.
As Andromache enters on a cart with Astyanax, we are perhaps not as well-prepared for her being on
stage as we were for Cassandra before and as we will be when Helen enters. For both Cassandra and
Helen (especially the latter) are mentioned a number of times before they actually enter the stage.
This is not so for Andromache.29 Straightaway, she and Hecuba jointly lament the destruction
wrought by war and, in particular, how their status has changed (576ff.). Andromache brings with
her news of Polyxena’s death, which unsurprisingly has a crushing effect on Hecuba (622ff.).
Andromache then argues that Polyxena is in a far better position than herself, precisely because she is
already dead and will not have to endure the humiliations and deprivations that Andromache will
experience in Greece (634ff.). In particular, Andromache notes the horrible irony that her reputation
as a model wife has caused her to be allotted to the son of her husbands’ killer (643ff.). Despite that,
she is determined to remain faithful to Hector (667ff.). Hecuba advises against that, most specifically
because, by devoting herself to her new man, she may be able to raise Astyanax. Her lines here are
worth quoting (701-5):
It is at this very moment, this moment of rare hope, that Talthybius brings news that the Greek army,
Stinton 1965: 39; Ebener 1954; Gellie 1986.
The examination of these polarities under the pressure of war is the subject of Croally 1994: chapter 2. Rosenbloom
2006: 256-9 argues that the agon in Troades should be read with/against the Melian dialogue, that famous debate that
precedes victor’s actions uncannily similar to those of the Greeks in Troades. On the possibility of contemporary
allusions in the play see (now) Roisman 1997.
23 On the relationship with Odyssey 4, see Davidson 1999-2000: 126.
24 ‘And win her case, Hecuba does, as is evident from Menelaus’ decision (1036-41).’ Meridor goes on to argue that the
death of Astyanax means that Helen is not be executed; see 2000:27.
25 Lloyd 1992: 15-16. For criticism of my argument about the lack of resolution in Troades, see Barker 2009: 7.
26 Stinton 1965: 39.
27 Poole 1976: 274.
28 Gellie 1986: 114. On pathos and lamentation in the play, see also Due 206: 136-50; Loraux 2002: 8; Suter 2003.
29 Meridor 1989 argues this; cf. Phillippo 2007: 328.
21
22
13
persuaded by Odysseus, has decided that Astyanax must be killed too, thrown off the
very walls designed to protect him and to define Trojan civilization (713ff.). The scene
ends with Astyanax being taken from Andromache and sent away by Talthybius with
Greek soldiers. At a performance of the play at a London girls’ school I was able to
watch the audience. It was clear that most if not all found the suffering unbearable.
Tony Harrison, poet and verse translator of Greek tragedy, has
said: ‘I always talk about the tragic mask in Greece, because the
mask has eyes that are always open, which must see everything,
and a mouth that is open, that must respond to everything.’30 Classical scholars
have said similar things in relation to Troades. One example will suffice: ‘Trojan
Women testifies to the power of logos to help human beings to endure the
unendurable.’31 My contention, however, is that for about an hour in performance
Troades has been building up to the removal of Astyanax for execution – an
unspeakable, impossible-to-look-at and unendurable event. Real horror tends to render people
speechless, as this one picture of viewers of the 9/11 disaster makes clear. At the end of the
Andromache scene we – the audience – need a break.32 And this, I believe is the function first of the
chorus (759-859) the follows immediately after the abduction of Astyanax and then – in a rather more
complicated way – of the agon itself. Gellie says: ‘[The agon] is a remarkable scene. It is placed in
that sickening gap between the removal of Astyanax for killing and the return of his corpse.’33 The
tone of the agon – so different from the rest of the play – does provide necessary emotional relief; it
also allows us to view the funeral of Astyanax with more equanimity than might have been possible
without the agon.34
But it is not only the fact that the agon gives us a holiday from the relentless, oppressive and depressing
events elsewhere in the play; it is the manner in which it does so. I have already remarked on the
incongruous appearance of Helen. But to understand how radical Euripides is being in the agon, we
have to look at the famous joke. At the end of the debate, Menelaus declares that Hecuba has won
and that she will take Helen back to Greece for execution. Euripides then gives us the following
couplet (1049-50):35
Ἑκ. μή νυν νεὼς σοὶ ταὐτὸν ἐσβήτω σκάφος.
Μεν. τί δ᾽ ἔστι; μεῖζον βρῖθος ἢ πάροιθ᾽ ἔχει;
Hec. Don’t let her get on the same boat as you.
Men. What is it? Is she heavier than before?
I am surprised at the number of scholarly attempts to prove that this is not a joke. Gregory argues
that Hecuba’s worry is serious given Helen’s notorious effect on men and their eyes (891-3); she also
says – extraordinarily – that overloading a ship was a real concern.36 David Kovacs, while accepting
that ‘the Helen scene is the only one that could admit a joke without terrible discomfort’37, argues that
classical literature is full of divine and semi-divine beings being too heavy for boats or other vehicles.
I wonder why scholars are so keen to stop an audience – or a reader – from finding something funny.
Funniness is surely a matter for the audience.
That a joke appears in the agon should make us see the function of the scene as described above. But
it also points us to a distinctive feature of Euripidean tragedy, namely, its preparedness to include the
apparently inappropriate, the grotesque, the bizarre and, yes, the comic.38 One could refer for instance
http://oxfordstudent.com/2013/01/24/expletive-de-leeds-ed-an-interview-with-tony-harrison/
Gregory 1991: 178.
32 Seneca Troades 1110ff. gives a typically graphic account of what happens to Astyanax’s body in the fall from the walls.
33 Gellie 1986); 116.
34 For the funeral of Astyanax, see Dyson and Lee 2000.
35 On comedy and the Trojan War generally, see Wright 2007.
36 Gregory 1999-2000: 68-71.
37 Kovacs 1998: 553
38 On these features of Euripidean tragedy, see Mastronarde 1999-2000; Michelini 1987: 71ff.; Seidensticker 1978; 1982.
30
31
14
the comic dressing-up scene in Bacchae (912ff.), or to the goddess of madness, Lyssa, asking whether
it is quite the sensible thing to do to drive a great hero mad in Hercules Furens (857), or to the frequent
references to the untidiness of Orestes’ hair in the Euripides’ play of that name (Orestes 225-6, 387,
483). However, my main example of the inappropriate comes from Alcestis. Admetus admits that the
death of his wife has taken all the joy out of his life but he consoles himself in the following way (Alc.
348-54):
σοφῇ δὲ χειρὶ τεκτόνων δέμας τὸ σὸν
εἰκασθὲν ἐν λέκτροισιν ἐκταθήσεται,
ᾧ προσπεσοῦμαι καὶ περιπτύσσων χέρας
ὄνομα καλῶν σὸν τὴν φίλην ἐν ἀγκάλαις
δόξω γυναῖκα καίπερ οὐκ ἔχων ἔχειν.
ψυχρὰν μέν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως βάρος
ψυχῆς ἀπαντλοίην ἄν.
An image of you shaped by the hand of skilled craftsmen shall be laid out in
my bed. I shall fall into its arms, and as I embrace it and call your name I
shall imagine, though I have her not, that I hold my dear wife in my arms, a
cold pleasure, to be sure, but thus I shall lighten my soul's heaviness.
(Trans. David Kovacs)
Is there something a little queasy about Admetus’ attachment to his ‘cold pleasure’? Is there
something ‘ludicrous in the extreme, or even disgusting’39 about Admetus’ use of – dare we say? – a
sex toy? I think it’s a good example of the inappropriate grotesque, and I wonder whether Euripides
has either developed or invented this as a category.40 I note something similar in a late 80s film called
River’s Edge (1986), directed by Tim Hunter, in which Dennis Hopper lives with a sex-doll called Ellie.
To close, I wish simply to suggest that another great purveyor of the inappropriate and grotesque is
Seneca himself. I give you two small examples.
First, Oedipus blinds himself (Oedipus 965-9, 978-9):
scrutatur auidus manibus uncis lumina,
radice ab ima funditus uulsos simul
euoluit orbes; haeret in uacuo manus
et fixa penitus unguibus lacerat cauos
alte recessus luminum et inanes sinus
rigat ora foedus imber et lacerum caput
largum reuulsis sanguinem uenis uomit.
Second, Atreus cooks Thyestes’ children, and asks Thyestes whether he recognizes his children
(Thyestes 765-7, 770, 1059-65):
haec ueribus haerent uiscera et lentis data
stillant caminis, illa flammatus latex
candente aeno iactat.
stridet in ueribus iecur
et artus, corpora exanima amputans,
in parua carpsi frusta et haec feruentibus
demersi aenis; illa lentis ignibus
39
40
Beye 1959: 114. See Stieber 2007: 163-4, and 116-45 on agalmata more generally.
On Alcestis, see Buxton 2013: 201-18; Gregory 1991: 19-50.
15
stillare iussi. Membra neruosque abscidi
uiuentibus, gracilique traiectas ueru
mugire fibras uidi et aggessi manu
mea ipse flammas.
Such a tone – comic, but blackly so, violent, grand guignol almost – seems reminiscent not only of
Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy but also of a certain Quentin Tarentino, certainly in Reservoir Dogs
(1992) and Pulp Fiction (1995). That we should end up here, having started with Euripides is another
way in which the agon in Troades is remarkable.
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Lloyd, M. (1992) The Agon in Euripides. Oxford
Loraux, N. (2002) The mourning voice in Greek tragedy. Ithaca
Luschnig, C. (1971) ‘Euripides’ Trojan Women: all is vanity’, Classical World 65: 8-12
Mastronarde, D. (1999-2000) ‘Euripidean tragedy and genre: the terminology and its problems’,
ICS 24/25: 23-40
(2010) The Art of Euripides. Cambridge
McClure, L. (1999) Spoken like a woman. Princeton
Meltzer, G. (2006) Euripides and the Poetics of Nostalgia. Cambridge
Meridor, R. (1989) ‘Euripides’ Troades 28-44 and the Andromache Scene’, AJP 110: 17-35
16
(2000) ‘Creative rhetoric in Euripides’ Troades’, CQ 50: 16-29
Michelini, A. (1987) Euripides and the tragic tradition. Madison
Munteanu, D. (2011) ‘The tragic muse and the anti-epic glory of women in Euripides’ Troades’, CJ
106: 129-47
Papadopoulou, T. (2000) ‘Cassandra’s radiant vigour . . . ‘, Mnemosyne 53: 517-27
Phillippo, S. (2007) ‘‘A future for Astyanax’: alternative and imagined futures for Hector’s son in
classical and European drama’, Internatioanl Journal of the Classical Tradition 14: 321-74
Poole, A. (1976) ‘Total Disaster: Euripides’ The Trojan Women’, Arion n.s. 3: 257-87
Revermann, M. (2006) ‘The competence of theatre audiences in fifth- and fourth-century Athens’,
JHS 126: 99-124
Roisman, J. (1997) ‘Contemporary allusions in Euripides’ Trojan Women’, SIFC 15, 38-47
Rosenbloom, D. (2006) ‘Empire and its discontents . . .’, BICS
Sansone, D. (2012) Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric. West Sussex
Seidensticker, B. (1978) ‘Comic elements in Euripides’ Bacchae’, AJP 99: 303-20
(1982) Palintonos Harmonia. Gottingen
Sommerstein, A. (1997) ‘The theatre audience, the demos, and the Suppliants of Aeschylus’, in
Pelling 1997: 63-79
Spatharas, D. (2002) ‘Gorgias’ Ecomium of Helen and Euripides’ Troades’, Eranos 100: 166-74
Stieber, M. (2011) Euripides and the language of craft. Leiden
Stinton, T. (1965) Euripides and the Judgement of Paris. London
Suter, A. (2003) ‘Lament in Euripides' ‘Trojan Women’’, Mnemosyne 56: 1-28
Thompson, R. (2006) ‘ Theatre(s) of peace and protest’, Australasian Drama Studies 48: 177-88
Worman, N. (1997) ‘The body as argument: Helen in four Greek texts’, Classical Antiquity 16: 151203
Wright, M. (2007) ‘Comedy and the Trojan War’, Classical Quarterly 57: 412-31
17
Do some kinds of disagreements disprove the idea that one
side is right and the other wrong?
Barnaby Cullen
The notion that one idea is right and the other wrong subscribes to an absolutist point of view.1 That
is to say, that there are objective universal truths which exist and are valid, independent of mankind.
This concept is prevalent in scientific schools of thought. According to an absolutist, their objective
principle, be it concerning morality or how the world works, is an invisible truth and anything
contrary to it is wrong. The polar opposite of this is relativism, which holds that there are no objective
truths, although this does not have to extend to every aspect of human thought. Instead, the concept
in question, be it knowledge or morality, are context-dependent, being subjective and reliant on an
individual or a society's particular circumstances or point of view. And, while this does mean that
there are disagreements, as many people will argue for different perspectives, neither of these sides
necessarily have to be right or wrong – no judgement needs to be passed. A relativist disagreement is
one which can disprove the idea that one side is right and the other wrong.
Relativism is at its most basic the denial of absolute truths, preferring subjective, contextuallydependent perspectives. It argues, with plenty of empirical evidence, that viewpoints differ depending
on the society from which they come, historical developments and geography having meant that
societies develop differently. This much is not contested. But the crux of relativism is that since there
are no absolute truths or values, that none of the various different viewpoints have any more validity
than the others and thus that no decision can be made regarding which one of the conflicting
viewpoints is right or wrong. The degree to which this viewpoint is applied to different aspects of
human activity differs, but the essential view is the same. Relativists effectively take on one-place
predicates, e.g. John is poor, and turn them into two-place predicates e.g. John is poor, relative to the
rest of his society. It could be that a society exists in which John would be considered reasonably
wealthy.
The most general type of relativism is that all other types are reducible to it, and the most extreme
is relativism about knowledge. The extreme of this alethic relativism advocates that all claims to
knowledge are contextually reliant, differing depending on society, religion etc. Hence, we cannot
claim to know anything to be objectively, absolutely true and thus, having dismissed the notion of
universal truth, no one can be considered to be wrong. This view, taken to extremes, is untenable, as
it means that truth, which is a justified belief, requires no justification and is instead reliant on society,
and can change. Take for example the change from the geo-centric to the helio-centric model of the
universe. Before Galileo and Copernicus, it was widely held by societies that the sun orbited the earth.
This notion was of course disproved. However, although the geo-centric model may have been true
as far as humans were concerned, it was not true in fact. Truth did not change; Galileo was right and
the church wrong. (Indeed, strong relativism about knowledge is self-defeating, for if one were to say
that everything is relative then that statement would be false, for it is an absolute statement.)
Relativism about rationality concerns judgements of rational or irrational behaviour. Its strong
aspects argue that there is no universal way to distinguish between rational and irrational reasoning,
and thus that they are subject to context, which, like relativism about knowledge, renders
indistinguishable good, rational arguments from bad, irrational ones and thus is not convincing. Its
weaker counterpart, however, limits the terms, and whilst it does accept that there are certain factors
individual to each society which therefore affects the way in which they might justify calling someone
rational or not, it does not mean that rational and irrational behaviour are rendered indistinguishable
by social and cultural differences.
1
This essay was entered for the Erasmus essay competition 2014.
18
Epistemic relativism concerns knowledge, but rather than tread the dangerous, self-defeating ground
of alethic relativism, it does not claim that it is impossible to know anything as truth, it deals more
closely with science and to what extent cultural differences account for different uses of logic and
interpretation of evidence. It rejects the notion of science as a process towards complete knowledge,
but rather takes advantage of its falsifiable nature and the effect of social change on science as a
discipline. Hence it can be used both to support the notion that disagreements do not always mean
that one side is right and the other wrong, as it questions the infallibility of science and how subject
it is to social change.
Conceptual relativism deals with our perceptions of the world, which are altered and coloured by our
experience, society, religion and other such factors, and thus is subjective. We perceive the world
differently as a result, and organize our subsequent experiences in a manner unique to us. An analogy
was drawn to a sculpture – the slab of marble that you are given in the world, defined by scientific
concepts and empirical evidence, but the sculpting of the marble into a piece of art is done by our
own reaction to it, which is itself dependent on cultural and social factors in keeping with relativism.
The conceptual relativism disproves the notion that in disagreements one side is right and the other
wrong advocates that perceptions of the world, an example being alethic beauty, subjective and equally
valid, as one person could think a flower to be beautiful and the other not.
The last type of relativism I shall discuss is probably the most popular one, that of moral relativism.
It is based on the premise that there are no absolute truths but rather different viewpoints based on
society and culture, and then applies it to the human morality. (This concept is seen as the idea of
Sigmund Freud who claimed that the conscience evolves differently depending on society.) Cultural
relativism argues that each society possesses its own moral compasses, while subjective relativism
advocates that each individual forms their own sense of morality, and that they are all equally valid.
Moral relativism is very strong, as it is based on a premise that can be empirically proven that morality
is not consistent in every society in every point in history, e.g. slavery was OK in Britain 400 years
ago but not now. Moreover, morality is not something tangible, and an absolute morality cannot be
scientifically proven, although attempts have been made by Kant for instance to prove it through the
use of reason. Any judgements that we make of other moral codes are done from a modern
perspective, which one cannot divorce from an evaluation of something. Therefore, moral relativism
does disprove the idea that one side is right and the other wrong.
19
How well does supersymmetry explain the physics beyond the
Standard Model?
Matthew Feuer
Supersymmetry was created by physicists in the early 1970s as a mathematical relationship between
elementary particles.1 It is a hypothetical extension to the Standard Model of particle physics and a
framework for numerous proposed theories, which attempt to explain the properties of the universe
beyond the Standard Model.2 Although the Standard Model has had great success in predicting the
outcome of experiments, it is an incomplete theory of the universe as it fails to explain all natural
phenomena.3 Theoretical physicists have proposed various different theories, many incorporating and
needing supersymmetry, as candidates for the ‘theory of everything’; a theory of everything is the
ultimate goal of physics, as it would explain the physics beyond the Standard Model and describe
every aspect of nature, from large galaxies to sub-atomic elementary particles.4
The Standard Model divides the elementary particles into two classes, fermions and bosons, based on
the particle’s spin; fermions make up ordinary matter whereas bosons are responsible for carrying the
fundamental forces. Spin is a quantum-mechanical intrinsic type of angular momentum, which is fixed
at integer or half-integer values. Differences in spin between particles determine whether they are
fermions or bosons as fermions all have half-integer spin and bosons all have integer spin. These
differences in spin create very different properties; fermions obey the Pauli exclusion principle so
cannot occupy the same quantum state however bosons don’t obey the exclusion principle so can
behave collectively.5
Supersymmetry proposes a new symmetry of nature, whereby the equations of the supersymmetric
theory will remain the same when fermions are replaced by bosons and bosons replaced by fermions.6
Supersymmetry thus remarkably implies that fermions and bosons are fundamentally identical,
although to us they seem to exhibit different properties.7 Supersymmetry predicts that every particle
would have a supersymmetric partner (super-partner) with spin differing by ½; this means each
fermion would be paired with a boson with the same properties (except spin). 8 Here we run into a
problem, in a true symmetry the super-partner should have the same mass as its partner but different
(Greene, 1999)
(Lykken & Spiropulu, 2014)
3 (CERN, n.d.)
4 (Duff, 2011)
5 ('t Hooft, 1997, pp. 27-28)
6 (Hey & Walters, 2003)
7 ('t Hooft, 1997, p. 136)
8 (Greene, 1999)
1
2
20
spin, and we would have known for a long time if such partners existed.9 However, this was not the
end of supersymmetry; physicists discovered it could be explained by spontaneous symmetry
breaking. During the high-energy early universe, the super-partners were identical massless
particles10 but as the universe
cooled and its energy
decreased,
the
regular
particles gained a small mass
(via the Higgs mechanism)
whereas the super-partners
acquired larger masses than
we are currently able to
detect.11 This means the
symmetry would be broken
and so supersymmetry is
hidden from our low-energy
view.12
Figure 1 - The supersymmetric particles ( (TJ, 2013))
The first reason that physicists have for
supersymmetry being a true property of the
universe is due to aesthetics. There are a number
of symmetries in the universe, including
translation in space and time or rotation; in 1967,
the Coleman-Mandula theorem stated that no
other symmetries in space, time or motion were
possible other than those already known.
However, when physicists closely investigated the Figure 2 - Force unification ( (New Scientist, 2011))
theorem they found it had a loophole allowing
exactly one more symmetry: symmetry in spin
(supersymmetry). It is mathematically possible to have a universe without symmetry in spin; however,
many physicists were sceptical that the universe would have every possible symmetry except one and
believed a universe lacking supersymmetry compromises the beauty of nature.13
Supersymmetry is also believed to explain the physics beyond the Standard Model. The first major
problem with the current Standard Model is the ‘hierarchy problem’,14 closely related to the problems
of ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘naturalness’. The hierarchy problem concerns the mass of the Higgs boson,
which is the boson of the field responsible for giving elementary particles mass. It was discovered in
2012 at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) with a mass of 125 GeV; however, due to quantum
interactions with virtual particles, the theoretical mass enormously increases to 1019 GeV. This mass
is on the Planck scale; at this point gravity becomes as strong as the other forces, causing space-time
to warp and fill with black holes.15 The large mass of this theoretical Higgs does not agree with the
observations at the LHC; physicists could solve this problem within the Standard Model but only by
manually fine-tuning some of the 20 parameters within the Standard Model. This fine-tuning
required the parameters to be altered with tremendous precision; Brian Greene wrote, ‘Such precision
is on par with adjusting the launch angle of a bullet fired from an enormously powerful rifle, so that
(Strassler, Supersymmetry — What Is It?, 2011)
(Ananthaswamy, In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for, 2009)
11 (Greene, 1999)
12 (Strassler, Supersymmetry — What Is It?, 2011)
13 (Greene, 1999)
14 (Ananthaswamy, In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for, 2009)
15 (Chalmers, 2012)
9
10
21
it hits a specified target on the moon with a margin of error no greater than the thickness of an
amoeba.’16 Many physicists find this ‘unnatural and abhorrent’17, as it lacks a physical mechanism for
the alteration of the parameters, and believe a theory of everything should allow calculations that
predict these values itself rather than relying on measurement of values and fine-tuning of
parameters. However, supersymmetry can solve the hierarchy problem without unnatural fine-tuning;
the Higgs boson interacts with virtual super-partners, which provide quantum corrections and
stabilizes the Higgs at a lower mass.18 The observed mass of 125 GeV would in fact be in the range
some supersymmetric theories predict, providing some indirect evidence for those theories.19
A second problem supersymmetry could solve is to unify the three non-gravitational forces. If the
strengths of these forces are extrapolated back to very high energies, as were present in the early
universe, the strengths converge to nearly a single value. In 1974, Steven Weinberg showed that in
fact the forces would not converge to exactly the same point but unify with each other at different
points, never becoming one unified force.20 Many physicists again found it hard to believe that the
universe would create forces that were almost the same strength in the early universe but did not quite
unify by a tiny amount; they had an intuition that the forces would start from the Big Bang as the
same force but would separate as the universe cooled. However, add in supersymmetry and the small
discrepancy in strengths disappears and the three forces become one strength at high energies. The
forces unify with supersymmetry as the new super-partners provide additional quantum fluctuations;
this causes the strengths of the forces to become the same with amazing accuracy.21 Weinberg said,
‘If you have two curves, it's not surprising that they intersect somewhere but if you have three curves
that intersect at the same point, then that's not trivial’22, showing that he considers this unification to
be more than a coincidence; force unification therefore provides another reason for believing in
supersymmetry.
The next physics beyond the Standard Model is dark matter. Physicists can measure how much mass
they can observe in galaxies and calculate how fast the galaxies should rotate. However, they found
that galaxies rotate faster than they predicted so there must be more matter present than we can
observe; the extra matter must therefore not emit, absorb or interact with electromagnetic radiation.
Physicists now know dark matter makes up 85% of matter in the universe and believe it to be mostly
made up of weakly interacting massive particles (WIMPs).23 The Standard Model does not have any
particles that we believe to contribute significantly to dark matter; although neutrinos do not interact
via electromagnetism, they seem to have too small a mass to make them a large part of dark matter.24
However, supersymmetry could resolve dark matter and once again explain physics beyond the
standard model. It predicts the existence of particles called neutralinos, which include photinos, zinos
and higgsinos (Figure 1). Neutralinos are a good candidate for WIMPs as they are predicted not to
interact with the strong or electromagnetic forces, the lightest neutralinos would be stable and they
should be massive enough to account for a significant amount of dark matter.25
Supersymmetry could also potentially incorporate quantum mechanics and general relativity into one
theory of everything. Currently quantum mechanics and general relativity are incompatible, so
gravity cannot be unified with the three fundamental forces in the Standard Model. 11-dimensional
supergravity was the first supersymmetric theory that incorporated gravity; it showed that using
supersymmetry to turn a particle into its super-partner and back was mathematically equivalent to
moving the particle through space-time.26 This connected quantum properties with space-time,
producing a theory connecting gravity to quantum mechanics. We cannot observe these extra
(Greene, 1999, pp. 174-175)
(Ananthaswamy, In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for, 2009)
18 (Baggott, 2012)
19 (Castelvecchi, 2012)
20 (Ananthaswamy, In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for, 2009)
21 (Greene, 1999)
22 (Ananthaswamy, In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for, 2009)
23 (Powell, 2013)
24 (Rees, 1999)
25 (Baggott, 2012)
26 (Duff, 2011)
16
17
22
dimensions in our four-dimensional world as they are curled up to unobservable sizes.27 However,
supergravity turned out not to be a complete theory, as it did not fully describe the weak force.
Physicists next looked at uniting supersymmetry and string theory into superstring theory. This is
where particles are not point-like but are one-dimensional strings moving in 10-dimensional spacetime; superstrings also united quantum mechanics with general relativity and solved the problem with
the weak force from supergravity, but it still had problems.28 Physicists found there were five
superstring theories, which all gave mathematically consistent results, and they could not work out
which was the correct one. In 1995, Edward Witten showed that the five 10-dimensional superstring
theories and 11-dimensional supergravity were in fact all different expressions of the same
supersymmetric theory, M-theory; this gave physicists confidence that M-theory could be the theory
of everything.29 Thus, supersymmetry could be necessary to unite quantum mechanics with general
relativity and produce a theory of everything.
Despite the many attractive properties of supersymmetry, there are also reasons why it may not
explain the physics beyond the Standard Model. There is no reason, beyond physicists’ intuition and
ideas of beauty, why the universe has to satisfy every possible symmetry or have force unification.
Secondly, no direct evidence has ever been found for supersymmetry. The LHC has currently not found
evidence for the existence of any super-partners; squarks with masses below 1.1 TeV and gluinos with
masses below 500 GeV have been excluded with 95% confidence levels.30 Different supersymmetric
theories predict super-partners with different masses, so some theories expect super-partners more
massive than we can observe. However, to explain much of the physics beyond the Standard Model
we need to find super-partners with masses not too much more than the mass of the Higgs boson.31
To be a candidate for dark matter, at least some super-partners cannot be much more than about 300
GeV, which we should have already found.32 Similarly, to solve the hierarchy problem requires low
mass super-partners, with masses around 1 TeV; if the super-partners have greater masses, then we
would need to fine-tune various parameters to stabilize the Higgs’ mass, creating an ‘unnatural’ theory,
which was what supersymmetry was created to prevent.33 In addition, the Higgs boson found at the
LHC has a mass of 125 GeV, which is too heavy for the simplest supersymmetric models and only
predicted by more complicated theories. Finally, supersymmetry does not have to be true to explain
the physics beyond the Standard Model; various non-supersymmetric theories could each solve
separate problems.34
Supersymmetry is a beautiful idea, which could amazingly explain much of the physics beyond the
Standard Model in a single theory. It could prevent unnatural fine-tuning by naturally stabilizing the
Higgs’ mass, unify the forces with high accuracy and explain dark matter. It is also an integral part
of M-theory, which could be a theory of everything and unify general relativity with quantum
mechanics. I think it is unlikely that one idea could simultaneously explain all of this without being a
fundamental property of the universe; however, scientific theories are based on evidence and
ultimately with no evidence supersymmetry is just an idea and mathematical equations with no true
physical relevance to the universe. I am optimistic that supersymmetry can explain the physics beyond
the Standard Model but unless super-partners are found at around 1 TeV then supersymmetric
theories cannot be the explanation without being unnaturally fine-tuned themselves. Therefore, the
next few years, after the LHC’s 2015 upgrade to higher energies, may be the last chance for natural
supersymmetry to prove itself before it must be abandoned.
(Hey & Walters, 2003)
(Duff, 2011)
29 (Hawking, 2001, pp. 56-57)
27
28
30
(CMS Collaboration, 2011)
(Lykken & Spiropulu, 2014)
32 (Castelvecchi, 2012)
33 (Ananthaswamy, The truth hurts: LHC breaks supersymmetry's beauty, 2011)
34 (Gefter, 2011)
31
23
Bibliography
Ananthaswamy, A. (2009, November 14). In SUSY we trust: What the LHC is really looking for. New
Scientist(2734), pp. 36-40.
Ananthaswamy, A. (2011, December 10). The truth hurts: LHC breaks supersymmetry's beauty. New
Scientist(2842), pp. 42-45.
Baggott, J. (2012). A Fantastic Moment. In Higgs: The Invention and Discovery of the 'God Particle' (pp. 180-185).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Castelvecchi, D. (2012, May). Is Supersymmetry Dead? Scientific American, 306(5), pp. 16-18.
CERN. (n.d.). Supersymmetry. Retrieved July 15, 2014, from
http://home.web.cern.ch/about/physics/supersymmetry
Chalmers, M. (2012, November 12). Particle headache: Why the Higgs could spell disaster. New
Scientist(2890), pp. 34-37.
CMS Collaboration. (2011). Search for Supersymmetry at the LHC in Events with Jets and Missing
Transverse Energy. Physical Review Letters, 107(22).
Duff, M. (2011, June 4). Theory of everything. New Scientist(2815), pp. i-viii.
Gefter, A. (2011, March 19). What if supersymmetry is wrong? New Scientist(2804), pp. 10-11.
Greene, B. (1999). The "Super" in Superstrings. In The Elegant Universe (pp. 166-183). London: Vintage.
Gribbin, J. (1984). Supergravity. In In Search of Schrödinger's Cat (pp. 267-270). London: Black Swan.
Hawking, S. (2001). The Universe in a Nutshell. London: Bantam Press.
Hey, T., & Walters, P. (2003). Beyond the Standard Model. In The New Quantum Universe (7th ed., pp. 274285). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lykken, J., & Spiropulu, M. (2014, May). Supersymmetry and the Crisis in Physics. Scientific American, 310(5),
pp. 34-39.
New Scientist. (2011). Three forces unite with supersymmetry. Retrieved July 16, 2014, from New Scientist:
http://www.newscientist.com/data/images/ns/cms/dn20248/dn20248-2_534.jpg
Penrose, R. (2004). Supersymmetry. In The Road to Reality (pp. 873-877). London: Random House.
Powell, C. S. (2013, November). Inside The Hunt For Dark Matter. Popular Science, 283(5), pp. 36-39.
Rees, M. (1999). The fine-tuned expansion: dark matter and Ω. In Just Six Numbers (pp. 78-81). London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Slezak, M. (2012, November 24). Higgs boson is too saintly and supersymmetry too shy. New Scientist(2892),
p. 12.
Strassler, M. (2011). Supersymmetry — What Is It? Retrieved July 15, 2014, from
http://profmattstrassler.com/articles-and-posts/some-speculative-theoretical-ideas-for-thelhc/supersymmetry/supersymmetry-what-is-it/
Strassler, M. (2013). Where Stands Supersymmetry (as of 12/2013). Retrieved July 15, 2014, from
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http://monttj.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/supersymmetry_zoom_new.jpg
24
It’s a man’s man’s man’s world: women in the films of Martin
Scorsese
Charlie Godsiff
Religion. Power-plays. Emasculation. Crime. These are the major recurring themes in the films by
Martin Scorsese, and the themes are all primarily concerned with the male gender. From Harvey
Keitel’s ‘J.R’1 to Ray Liotta’s ‘Henry Hill’2 through to Leonardo DiCaprio’s ‘Jordan Belfort’3, Scorsese’s
films focus on men, with only two films in his oeuvre portraying a female protagonist4. That is not to
say that the female gender is ignored. On the contrary, most are often just as vital as the men and
cannot all be put in one plain category. Instead they all show characteristics that are complex,
‘vengeful, lustful, conniving, strong, pragmatic and even melodramatic’5. With Scorsese’s latest film,
The Wolf Of Wall Street coming under criticism for seeming misogynistic, and with the majority of
his films controlled by men, I will present an in depth examination of the representation and portrayal
of the female characters in a few of these male-dominated films. This essay will examine the portrayal
of individual female characters within specific films, and their relevance to the outcome of the picture.
For the purpose of this essay, I will focus on The Wolf Of Wall Street (2013), and Casino (1995), with
other examples taken from Taxi Driver (1976), and GoodFellas (1990) to show how the different ways
women assert their power.
With most of the societies in Scorsese’s films run by men, the women often have to resort to using
their sexuality as the only means to achieve power. The portrayals of Sharon Stone’s Ginger in Casino
and Margot Robbie’s Naomi in The Wolf Of Wall Street are both highly sexual, and this sexuality is
presented as their major characteristic. When both are introduced to the audience in their films, the
pair have immense power due to their attractiveness stunning the men (in Casino, there is a slow zoom
into Robert de Niro’s Ace Rothstein’s face when he first sees Ginger and he can’t take his eyes off
her), and the fact that they are self-aware and can control this power: in Casino, in order to get more
money from Ace to ‘powder her nose’, all Ginger does is smile at him and bat her eyelids and he gives
her 100 dollars, and her beauty helps bring in the ‘high rollers’ to the casino and ‘helps them spread
around a lot of money’. In order to get Jordan to have sex with her, all Naomi does is get naked and
stand in front of him. There are also examples of Naomi defeating Jordan with her power, literally
bringing him to his knees when she threatens to wear nothing but ‘short short skirts’ and no underwear
around the house.
However, because of their sexualization, both are objectified as objects to be won. In Casino, when Joe
Pesci’s Nicky first sees Ginger, he only sees her sexuality and remarks to Ace in shock: ‘Holy shit,
what have you been doing out here?’; at the very start of The Wolf Of Wall Street, Jordan’s voice
over links his wife to his house and his car, as if she were just another object that he owns; when
Jordan first meets Naomi in The Wolf Of Wall Street, a Quaalude-drugged Donnie (played by Jonah
Hill) sees her and starts masturbating in front of his friends, colleagues, and his wife. Due to their
objectification and figurative shackles placed on them by society, both Ginger’s and Naomi’s lives
spiral out of control by the end of the film. Naomi’s spiral is caused by Jordan’s drug abuse and she
leaves him with money and her children, whereas Ginger’s is caused by her own drug and alcohol
abuse and she leaves de Niro, only to have her life come full circle and end up as a drugged-addicted
prostitute.
Despite it seeming from their narratives as if the characters are weak and can’t live outside of their
male counterparts stories, the two women are exceptionally important for their films. If you took both
J.R., the main protagonist from Scorsese’s first feature film, Who’s That Knocking At My Door (1967)
Henry Hill, the protagonist from GoodFellas (1990)
3 Jordan Belfort, the protagonist from The Wolf Of Wall Street (2013)
4 Boxcar Bertha (1972) and Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore (1974) are the only two films in Scorsese’s 23 feature film oeuvre.
5 Wain, A. A Retrospective on Martin Scorsese’s Complex Female Characters, URL: http://sobadsogood.com/2014/02/18/aretrospective-of-martin-scorseses-complex-female-characters/ [4 June 2014]
1
2
25
of them out of their respective films, the film wouldn’t be the same: Ginger wouldn’t govern the
events of over half of Casino, and Naomi wouldn’t contribute to Jordan’s life to spin out of control
(although he is primarily responsible for this fact owing to his uncontrollable drug addiction).
However, Scorsese himself never objectifies the women as nothing more than sexual objects. He never
brings to the audience’s attention the women’s gender through camera angles on their bodies. In a
review for The Wolf Of Wall Street, student journalist Erin Landau wrote that Naomi was ‘portrayed
as a sex-crazed gold-digger who immediately dumps Belfort after he is arrested and loses his money’6.
She goes further and says that Naomi and the other women ‘perpetuate stereotypes of females as sexy,
helpless, and unable to exist outside of their male counterparts’7. This review is unfair towards the
film as Naomi doesn’t fall into this description. When we first meet her, she knows what she wants
and she knows how to get it, only to find that what she thought she wanted didn’t turn out to be gold,
a common theme in Scorsese films where the supposed ‘American Dream’ collapses around the
characters. She isn’t sex-crazed, more that she knows that her sexuality brings her immense power;
she can’t be judged for leaving Jordan at the end of the film as it isn’t due to the fact that he loses their
money but the fact that he was an abusive husband. In Casino, as Ginger struts through the casino,
Scorsese doesn’t need to objectify her; he and she both know all eyes are on her and holding up a
mirror to our own preconceptions.
The secondary women in The Wolf Of Wall Street are all strippers and prostitutes, causing the film to
come under fire for being misogynistic. However, an argument can be made to say that they are used
to show the barbaric and animalistic nature of these ‘wolves’ of Wall Street, creating a ‘fierce
condemnation of hyper-masculinity and misogyny’8. As the audience watches the bankers fight and
scream at each other over these women, they are left with a feeling of discomfort, finding no way to
feel that the actions of these bankers are cool or admirable. The constant use of these constantly
naked women is to further and always enforce this feeling of discomfort.
In Taxi Driver, a film Scorsese called his ‘feminist film’9 in the 1970s as it takes ‘macho to its logical
conclusion’10 and shows the problem men have ‘bouncing back and forth between the goddesses and
whores’11, de Niro’s Travis Bickle suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and insomnia coming
back from Vietnam, and he can’t function in this supposedly ‘normal’ society. The two main women
are idealized by Bickle as the purity that he wants to reach, as ‘points of escape’12 out of the hell he is
in, but they ‘only drive him further downwards by reminding him of how far upwards he has to
climb’13. As Scorsese said, it was very important that Cybill Shepherd’s Betsy be a ‘blonde, blue-eyed
goddess’14 to show the level of purity that Travis aspires to.
Scorsese also uses his women as a social commentary in his films. As mentioned before, the women in
The Wolf Of Wall Street are important for this, but so is Lorraine Bracco’s Karen in GoodFellas. The
famous scene where Ray Liotta’s Henry leads her through the Copacabana in one long steadicam shot
is very important. It shows Henry and the ‘world he was trying to get into’15 due to the way
‘everything slipped away, it was like heaven...the camera just glided through this world’16. Scorsese’s
revolutionary camera work contributes to Henry being seduced by this lifestyle, and also Henry
seducing Karen. Not only is he showing her the world he now inhabits, boasting his power to her, but
6
Landau, E.(2013) ‘The Wolf of Wall Street’ is the Year’s Most Misogynistic Blockbuster. URL:
http://www.bustle.com/articles/10767-the-wolf-of-wall-street-is-the-years-most-misogynist-blockbuster [4 June 2014]
7 Ibid.
8 O’Hara, H. (2014) The Case For The Wolf Of Wall Street, Surprisingly Feminist Film. URL:
http://www.empireonline.com/empireblogs/empire-states/post/p1442 [4 June 2014]
9 Ebert, R (1976). Interview with Martin Scorsese. URL: http://www.rogerebert.com/interviews/interview-with-martinscorsese [4 June 2014]
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 Carvajal, N & Winter, M. (2014) Women in the Works of Martin Scorsese. URL:
http://blogs.indiewire.com/pressplay/video-essay-women-in-the-works-of-martin-scorsese [4 June 2014]
13 ibid
14 Ebert, R (1976). Interview with Martin Scorsese. URL: http://www.rogerebert.com/interviews/interview-with-martinscorsese [4 June 2014]
15 Scorsese, Martin. “Wise Guy.” Total Film Mar. 2011:44-45
16 ibid.
26
he is also showing the world the beautiful woman on his arm, as if (like in The Wolf Of Wall Street)
she is something he has won to place on his mantelpiece in such an overtop way that it can’t be
‘believable as anything other than a subtle critique of the way men may place women on pedestals in
an effort to cripple them’17. However, in order to get this point across, Scorsese ends up marginalizing
Karen (and other women in his other films), placing her on the ‘pedestal’ himself.
In GoodFellas, Karen is also the most established female character in Scorsese’s films, being the only
one who shares the protagonist role with a man owing to her voyeuristic voice-over scenes. Film
director Michael Powell also loved the women in the film saying that they were ‘very good’18 and well
developed when they arrived, with other women being arguably as crucial as Karen, like Henry’s
babysitter-turned-drug-smuggler Lois Byrd who causes Henry to be caught by the cops.
In conclusion, as a film maker whose main question in a film is ‘what is a man and what is a hero?’19,
Scorsese is highly pre-occupied with the female gender, often showing us a male-dominated world
‘only to reflect women’s views on it.’20. Whilst this comes with occasionally marginalizing the women,
he balances this with characters of great depth who have as much power as the men. As James Brown
sang, ‘It’s a man’s world but it wouldn’t mean nothing without a woman or a girl.’21
Bibliography
Carvajal, N., & Winter, M. (2014, February 7). Women in the Works of Martin Scorsese. Retrieved June 4, 2014
from indiewire: http://blogs.indiewire.com/pressplay/video-essay-women-in-theworks-ofmartin-scorsese
O’Hara, H. (2014, March 7). The Case of The Wolf Of Wall Street, Surprisingly Feminist Film. Retrieved 4 June,
2014, from Empire: http://www.empireonline.com/empireblogs/empire-states/post/p1442
Landau, E. (2013, December 12). ‘The Wolf Of Wall Street’ Is This Year’s Most Misogynistic Blockbuster.
Retrieved 4 June, 2014, from Bustle: http://www.bustle.com/articles/10767- the-wolf-of-wallstreet-is-the-years-most-misogynist-blockbuster
Schickel, R. (2013). Conversations with Scorsese. New York: Knopf
Scorsese, M. (1976, March 7). Interview with Martin Scorsese. (R. Ebert, Interviewer)
Scorsese, M. (2011, March). Wise Guys. Total Film, pp 44-45
Scorsese, M. (Director). (1995). Casino (Motion Picture)
Scorsese, M. (Director). (2013). The Wolf Of Wall Street (Motion Picture)
Scorsese, M., Christie, I., & Thompson, D. (2003). Scorsese on Scorsese. New York; Faber and Faber
Wain, A. A Retrospective of Martin Scorsese’s Complex Female Characters. Retrieved 4 June, 2014, from
SoBadSoGood: http://sobadsogood.com/2014/02/18/a-retrospective-of-martin-scorsesescomplex-female-characters/
Carvajal, N, & Winter, M. (2014) Women in the Works of Martin Scorsese. URL:
http://blogs.indiewire.com/pressplay/video-essay-women-in-the-works-of-martin-scorsese [18 June 2014]
18 A letter from Michael Powell to Martin Scorsese in 1988, contained in Scorsese on Scorsese, 153
17
19
Schickel, R (2013). Conversations With Scorsese. 2nd ed. New York; Knopf. 118
Carvajal, N & Winter, M. (2014) Women in the Works of Martin Scorsese. URL:
http://blogs.indiewire.com/pressplay/video-essay-women-in-the-works-of-martin-scorsese [4 June 2014]
21 Lyrics from the song “It’s a Man’s Man’s Man’s World” by James Brown and Betty Jean Newsome, 1966
20
27
Can antigravity explain dark matter and dark energy?
Harry Goodhew
Everything in the world is made of matter, which is itself made up of atoms. Atoms consist of a
nucleus containing protons and neutrons, held together by a force known as the strong force and
electrons, which are attracted to the nucleus by the electromagnetic force. Each of these particles has
its own antimatter equivalent (or antiparticle), with identical properties in every respect other than
charge, when a particle and its corresponding antiparticle meet they annihilate, releasing energy in
the form of photons, the carriers of the electromagnetic force. This in a nutshell is the standard model
which governs all of modern particle physics. However, it has nothing to say about gravity other than
it is carried by the elusive graviton nor can it account for dark matter or dark energy, thought to make
up 96% of the visible universe.
Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Dark Force: Not Afraid Of The Dark http://physicsforme.com/2011/08/19/darkenergy-dark-matter-dark-force-not-afraid-of-the-dark/
One of the many uncertainties about gravity is the gravitational interaction between matter and
antimatter, some theories suggest that it is attractive, like opposite poles on a magnet, others that it is
repulsive, like two south poles on a magnet. Despite the existence of several experiments attempting
to resolve this uncertainty none have yet resulted in an answer. A conclusive answer to this question
is keenly awaited as a repulsive gravitational interaction, antigravity, could have serious ramifications
for cosmology by helping to explain dark matter and dark energy and further our understanding of
the universe.
The equivalence principle states that the mass causing the gravitational force (gravitational mass) is
indistinguishable from the mass that resists an accelerating force (inertial mass). This is one theory
that rejects the possibility of antigravity as this would represent a difference between these two
masses. However, other theories predict a repulsive gravity, most convincingly an attempt to make
Einstein’s theory of general relativity, our best theory of gravity, unaffected by the simultaneous
replacement of all matter with antimatter, the reflection of space in a mirror and the reversal of time.1
This is a significant result as it is currently thought all process in the universe are unchanged by such
a transformation.
This conflict between theories emphasizes that this proposal must be tested experimentally, however,
this is far from simple. One way in which a conclusive result could be found is by comparing how
cosmic particles are affected by their passage through the universe, if it were found that matter and
1
M. Villata (2011). ‘CPT symmetry and antimatter gravity in general relativity’. Cornell University Library (Online)
28
antimatter from the same location were deflected to different places, then it would indicate a difference
in the forces that they experienced on their journey. This is difficult because gravity has a far weaker
influence on these particles than the other forces they experience so a special type of particle is needed,
one that has no charge and so is not affected by the electromagnetic force. Fortuitously there is such
a particle, the neutrino, which is found in abundance throughout the universe. Unfortunately the same
lack of charge that makes them suitable also makes them very difficult to detect, as they have to be
identified by their interactions with other particles.
Despite the difficulty, this particular experiment has been carried out on neutrinos emitted from an
exploding star, or supernova, as it cooled23 which concluded that neutrinos and antineutrinos are
affected in the same way by gravity. The results of this experiment were far from conclusive, not only
were very few neutrinos and antineutrinos detected (around 20 in total) but due to the indirect nature
of their detection, it is possible that none were actually observed. To complicate matters further
neutrinos may be their own antiparticle. As they have no charge the distinction between the two is
based on an alternate property known as spin (Appendix 1), however it is not clear if all neutrinos do
in fact have the same spin or if those that spin the other way are very rare. If this were the case then
they would both be affected in the same way by gravity, irrelevant of the gravitational interaction
between matter and antimatter.
Another proposed experiment is being prepared at CERN where they plan to fire cold, neutral
antihydrogen (an antiproton orbited by a positron) at a target and investigate how it is deflected by
the earth’s gravity (Appendix 2). This experiment is known as AEgIS, and aims to build on past
research that has only managed to exclude a repulsive gravity ten times stronger than conventional
gravity. The difficulty in this experiment is the production of antihydrogen which annihilates with
the surrounding atoms, even in the near perfect vacuum surrounding the experiment. Furthermore, it
requires incredibly sensitive instruments to detect minute variations in the antihydrogens’ flight path.
Dark energy is the name given to the observation that the universe appears to contain a larger amount
of energy than can be accounted for by the visible matter. The need for this energy is based on two
principle observations, firstly that the speed at which certain supernovae are moving away from the
earth appears to be increasing.4 Secondly the flat shape of the universe requires some additional
energy to account for the discrepancy between the observed energy content of the universe and the
energy required to prevent any form of curvature5.
Dark Energy http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/astro/dareng.html
A.K. Mann (1997) Shadow of a star: The neutrino story of Supernova 1987A W.H Freeman p. 122
S. Pakvasa, W. A. Simmons, and T. J. Weiler (1989), Test of equivalence principle for neutrinos and antineutrinos,
Physical Review Letters
4 A. G. Riess et al. Observational Evidence from Supernovae for an Acceleration Universe and a Cosmological Constant
15/5/1998 Astronomical Journal arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/9805201 27/08/14
5 D. N. Spergel et al. (WMAP collaboration) March 2006 Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) three year
results: implications for cosmology
2
3
29
Conventionally dark energy is explained in one of two ways. The first of these is that the universe
has a certain energy in a given volume of space, known as the cosmological constant. This means that
the amount of energy the universe contains increases as it gets bigger6 this is sufficient to fuel the
universe’s expansion despite the gravitational attraction which would otherwise cause the universe’s
expansion to slow down. The second is known as quintessence7, a force that accelerates the expansion
of the universe. Both of these proposals have problems, not least that the predicted strength of the
cosmological constant is 10120 times stronger than would be required by the theory which would have
prevented the formation of galaxies.8
Therefore, some alternative is required. Antigravity provides one such alternative. This is because the
repulsion between matter and antimatter galaxies in the universe could be greater than the attraction
between matter galaxies, forcing them apart at an accelerating rate. These antimatter galaxies could
either exist in intergalactic voids9 (large volumes of space where there appears to be no matter), or
they could be hidden amongst the matter galaxies. Both of these proposals have problems, the first
because antimatter galaxies should look identical to matter galaxies and so would not be hidden in
galactic voids. The problem with the other is that the neighbouring matter and antimatter galaxies
should annihilate, causing the release of lots of energetic gamma rays that we would detect. However,
antigravity could also solve this problem as it could keep the matter and antimatter apart and prevent
its annihilation.
Galaxy rotation curve http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/galaxy_rotation_curve
Furthermore, the lack of antimatter in cosmic rays is commonly interpreted as indicating that there
is little antimatter in the universe10. However, it is possible that this conclusion is wrong. Any
antimatter traveling from an antimatter galaxy would probably have annihilated with the matter in its
path. Indeed, heavier, slower moving particles would be more likely to annihilate and are
correspondingly rarer. Furthermore, more positrons are detected at higher energies11 which fits with
such an explanation as higher energy particles would be less likely to annihilate.
Dark matter12 describes the observation that the amount of matter we see in the universe is apparently
not enough. This is based on the fact the speed at which galaxies rotate does not fit the predicted curve
(below), indicating the presence of more mass than we can see. Another key tool is gravitational
lensing13 which allows us to observe the gravitational field by looking at other galaxies through the
field and observing how the light from these galaxies is bent by it. The most convincing observation
Cosmological Constant, http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cosmological_constant 26/04/14
S. Tsujikawa (2013), Quintessence: A Review, Cornel University Library Online
8 S. E. Rugh and H. Zinkernagel 2001 The Quantum Vacuum and the Cosmological Constant Problem philsciarchive.pitt.edu/398/ 27/08/14
9 Astronomy & Cosmology – Large Scale Structure of the Universe, http://www.whillyard.com/science-pages/voids.html
27/04/14
10 Cosmic Rays, http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/astro/cosmic.html 27/04/13
11 First Result from the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer on the International Space Station: Precision Measurement of the
Positron Fraction in Primary Cosmic Rays of 0.5–350 GeV, http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81241, 04/2013, American
Physical Society
12 Dark matter, http://home.web.cern.ch/about/physics/dark-matter 27/04/14
13 What is gravitational lensing? http://www.cfhtlens.org/public/what-gravitational-lensing 27/04/14
6
7
30
of this type is the Bullet Cluster14 (below), where the mass of the colliding galaxies has separated into
a gas cloud and two clusters; surprisingly most of the gravity is in the galaxies whereas most of the
visible matter is in the gas cloud, suggesting that something else is there.15
NOVA science NOW, Dark Matter Mystery PBS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mRtGUCLjQ3w
The usual explanation for dark matter is that there are some massive particles that we cannot see16,
either because they only interact weakly with regular matter, Weakly Interacting Massive Particles,
or because they do not glow brightly enough, Massive Compact Halo Objects. The problem with this
approach is twofold, what are these particles and why have we not detected them? One solution to this
problem is known as Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND)17, which proposes that we can explain
dark matter in terms of a modification of Newton’s Laws of motion. This can even help explain the
bullet cluster which, according to Milgrom18 can be explained by MOND as long as there is a small
amount of additional regular but unobserved matter.
Antigravity could provide a mechanism for MOND. We currently believe that the vacuum of space is
not actually empty but full of particles and their corresponding antiparticles that flicker in and out of
existence as they are produced and then annihilated. If antigravity were correct then this would create
a gravitational dipole, rather like a magnet with a north and a south pole. Unlike a magnet, however,
this dipole would be repulsive and therefore would augment the strength of the surrounding
gravitational field19. This could provide a mechanism for the alteration of Newton’s Laws and would
do so in such a way as to be consistent with some MOND theories. This increase in the strength of
the gravitational field could explain why galaxies rotate faster than we observe without employing
dark matter.
In conclusion, antigravity offers a potentially convincing explanation for Dark Energy, through
providing a repulsive force to accelerate the universe’s expansion. Moreover, antigravity could help
explain why gravity behaves differently at larger distances within the framework of MOND in order
to explain Dark Matter. These successes emphasize the importance of determining, either
theoretically or experimentally, whether the gravitational interaction between matter and antimatter
is attractive or repulsive.
Conversation with H. Brow, 27/04/14
NOVA science NOW, Dark Matter Mystery PBS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mRtGUCLjQ3w 27/08/2014
16 K. Griest, The search for the Dark Matter: WIMPs and MACHOs, Cornell University Library Online, 13/03/1993
17 M. Milgrom, (1983). ‘A modification of the Newtonian dynamics as a possible alternative to the hidden mass hypothesis’.
Astrophysical Journal
18 Milgrom's perspective on the Bullet Cluster, http://www.astro.umd.edu/~ssm/mond/moti_bullet.html 13/06/2013
19 D. S. Hajdukovic (2011). ‘Is dark matter an illusion created by the gravitational polarization of the quantum vacuum?’,
Astrophysics and Space Science (Online)
14
15
31
Appendix 1
All fundamental particles have an intrinsic property known as spin which is a form of angular
momentum. It differs from classical angular momentum in that a point particle cannot be described as
spinning (as it has radius 0). Most particles can exist in one of two spin states. However, the neutrino
has only ever been observed in one of these two states. Conversely the antineutrino has only been
detected in the other one of these states. This suggests that they are distinct, despite the fact that they
have no charge, which distinguishes most matter and antimatter particles (below). On the other hand
for a particle moving at less than the speed of light (as all massive particles do) it is possible change
the spin state of the particle by altering your frame of reference. This is because if you travel faster
than the particle it seems to travel in the opposite direction and therefore would appear to be spinning
in the opposite direction. If it were the case that the spin state distinguished neutrinos from
antineutrinos then by changing your reference frame you would have converted the neutrino to an
antineutrino.
Faster - neutrino appears righthanded, antineutrino appears lefthanded
Slower – neutrino appears lefthanded, antineutrino appears righthanded
Left-Handed Neutrinos http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/particles/neutrino3.html
32
Appendix 2
AEgIS plans to use the antiprotons from the antiproton decelerator which is fed by antiproton
produced in a collision between a metal target and protons from proton synchrotron (below). These
protons are then cooled via electron cooling20, in this process very slow moving electrons bombard
the sample, taking energy from it and confining it in a small space. This is useful because it prevents
contact with the walls of the experiment, preventing annihilation. Next they introduce positrons from
a radioactive source to these antiprotons to form antihydrogen. This neutral antihydrogen is then
accelerated by an electric field through a device which only allows particles on certain trajectories to
pass through it to a photographic film which detects the annihilation of the antihydrogen, allowing
the path of the antihydrogen to be calculated.
The LHC https://bigscience.web.cern.ch/bigscience/en/lhc/lhc2.html
Bibliography
M.J.T.F. Cabbolet, Elementary Process Theory: a formal axiomatic system with a potential application as a
foundational framework for physics underlying gravitational repulsion of matter and antimatter,
Annalen der Physik 27/04/14
M. Doser et al. (2012) ‘Exploring the WEP with a pulsed cold beam of antihydrogen’, Institute of Physics,
29/08/14
K. Griest, The search for the Dark Matter: WIMPs and MACHOs, Cornell University Library Online,
13/03/1993
D. S. Hajdukovic (2011). ‘Is dark matter an illusion created by the gravitational polarization of the quantum
vacuum?’ Astrophysics and Space Science (Online)
B. Kayser Are Neutrinos Their Own Antiparticles? arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0903/0903.0899.pdf
27/08/14
A. R. Liddle (1999), ‘An Introduction to cosmological inflation, High Energy Physics and Cosmology’
27/04/14
A.K. Mann (1997) Shadow of a star: The neutrino story of Supernova 1987A W.H Freeman p. 122
M. Milgrom, (1983). ‘A modification of the Newtonian dynamics as a possible alternative to the hidden mass
hypothesis’. Astrophysical Journal
M. Milgrom, (1983). ‘A modification of the Newtonian dynamics - Implications for galaxies’. Astrophysical
Journal 27/04/14
20
G.I. Budker, ‘An Effective Method of Damping Particle Oscillations in Proton and Antiproton Storage Rings’ 29/08/14
33
Milgrom's perspective on the Bullet Cluster, http://www.astro.umd.edu/~ssm/mond/moti_bullet.html
13/06/2013
S. Pakvasa, W. A. Simmons, and T. J. Weiler (1989), Test of equivalence principle for neutrinos and
antineutrinos, Physical Review Letters
A. G. Riess et al. Observational Evidence from Supernovae for an Acceleration Universe and a Cosmological
Constant 15/5/1998 Astronomical Journal arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/9805201 27/08/14
S. E. Rugh and H. Zinkernagel 2001 The Quantum Vacuum and the Cosmological Constant Problem
philsci-archive.pitt.edu/398/ 27/08/14
A. D. Sakharov (1991). ‘Violation of CP invariance, C asymmetry, and baryon asymmetry of the universe’.
Soviet Physics Uspekhi 27/04/14
G. Sciolla (2006), The Mystery of CP Violation, MIT Physics Annual, 27/04/14
D. N. Spergel et al. (WMAP collaboration) March 2006 Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP)
three year results: implications for cosmology
Cosmological Constant, http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cosmological_constant 26/04/14
J. Storey. ‘The LHC and antimatter’. 31/10/13
S. Tsujikawa (2013), Quintessence: A Review, Cornel University Library Online
M. Villata (2011). ‘CPT symmetry and antimatter gravity in general relativity’. Cornell University
Library (Online)
A. Zee (2007), Fearful Symmetry, Princeton University Press A Clash of Clusters Provides New Clue to Dark
Matter (2008), http://newswise.com/articles/view/543808/ 27/04/14
Aegis homepage, http://aegis.web.cern.ch/aegis/ 14/11/13
Astronomy & Cosmology – Large Scale Structure of the Universe, http://www.whillyard.com/sciencepages/voids.html 27/04/14
Cosmic Rays, http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/astro/cosmic.html 27/04/13
Dark Energy http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/astro/dareng.html 28/08/14
Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Dark Force: Not Afraid Of The Dark
http://physicsforme.com/2011/08/19/dark-energy-dark-matter-dark-force-not-afraid-of-the-dark/
28/08/14
Dark matter, http://home.web.cern.ch/about/physics/dark-matter 27/04/14
First Result from the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer on the International Space Station: Precision Galaxy
rotation curve http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/galaxy_rotation_curve 28/08/14
Gravitational interaction of antimatter,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_interaction_of_antimatter 27/04/14
Left-Handed Neutrinos http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/particles/neutrino3.html 29/08/14
The LHC https://bigscience.web.cern.ch/bigscience/en/lhc/lhc2.html 29/08/14
Measurement of the Positron Fraction in Primary Cosmic Rays of 0.5–350 GeV,
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81241, 04/2013, American Physical Society
NOVA science NOW, Dark Matter Mystery PBS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mRtGUCLjQ3w
27/08/2014
What is gravitational lensing? http://www.cfhtlens.org/public/what-gravitational-lensing 27/04/14
Conversation with H. Brow, 27/04/14
34
Foreign direct investment: to what extent has it driven
the slum growth of developing nations?
Ben Hurd
By 2050 the population of this planet will surpass 9 billion people. 6.3 billion of these people will live
in urban areas, with 5.1 billion of them living in cities of the now developing world1. These statistics
are not all that shocking - population growth in the developing world has been well publicized.
However few have emphasized that of these 6.3 billion individuals, 2 billion will live in slum
settlements2. A UN Habitat report published in 2010 stated 'the world slum population will probably
grow by 6 million each year (or another 61 million people) to hit a total of 889 million by 2020'3. This
gives an incorrect impression that slum expansion will occur at a constant rate. Acceleration of growth
is the inconvenient truth, and despite Foreign Direct Investment's benefits, it is largely to blame.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occurs when a firm invests directly in new facilities to produce or
market in a foreign country4 Generally it is businesses in developed nations that are the primary
contributors to FDI, with many expanding their influence in developing nations for a multitude of
reasons. For example to become more competitive in the global marketplace businesses will for
example always seek cheaper labour, looser regulation and less taxation. Nations that wish to attract
foreign firms must therefore offer these incentives in order to benefit from foreign investment. In this
essay I will first explore how slum growth is a direct result of FDI through explosive urbanization,
financialization and government debt. I will then outline to what extent poor governance and the
existence of informal economies within slums contribute to their development.
It is important to first understand why FDI causes mass migration towards cities and away from rural
areas. As I have already mentioned foreign businesses will always seek to take advantage of cheap
labour, and through globalization and Foreign Direct Investment they are given this opportunity.
FDI will nearly always create new jobs, causing individuals and families to relocate to urban areas
with hopes of earning higher wages. Existing unemployment in undeveloped or developing nations
can provide further incentives for FDI through signalling to firms that there is a large available
workforce that will potentially work for very low wages. The creation of new jobs in cities (foreign
firms will often only target FDI towards financial centres such as cities from which they can coordinate with global markets) will cause large scale urbanization, to the extent that within a short
period of time there will not be sufficient housing to accommodate every aspiring labourer. The
fundamental issue associated with urbanization is that as an influx of migrants appear, land prices
increase at the same time as wages begin to decrease due to the worker surplus5. It is extremely likely
that demand for jobs will be greater than the supply created by FDI, meaning many new urban
inhabitants will become or remain unemployed and therefore be unable to afford housing anyway. It
is now possible to link slum development and urbanization. Due to the job creation resulting from
FDI a wave of migrants enter urban areas, urban land becomes scarce and therefore expensive,
housing becomes out of reach for many individuals and therefore slums form and grow at the same
rate as urbanization.
Urbanization alone however cannot cause slum growth, there must be a driving force such as FDI
that ensures migration continues. Consider for example how and why today’s developed nations
http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/01/amazingendurance-slums/8120/ 10/08/2014
http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/01/amazingendurance-slums/8120/ 10/08/2014
3 htttp://realtruth.org/news/100326-002-international.html 11/08/2014
4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=trvLScaE0YE 21/08/2014
5Frederick Van Der Ploeg, Steven Poelhekke - Globalization and the Rise of Mega-cities in the Developing World, 2008
1
2
35
urbanized without slum development. The Industrial Revolution (an era of mass urbanization that
coincided with massive long term economic growth)6 allowed for urbanization without slum
formation. Slums have developed in nations where urbanization has occurred without equally quick
economic growth, and in many cases FDI has not caused long-term economic growth for the host
nation (rather the business owning developed nation). The formation of cities that will never be able
to house their entire population is undeniably a current global issue. Urbanization can only be
successful if wages and the costs of living are balanced. In cases where slums are formed wages are
less than the formal cost of living, and hence informal housing or slums emerge. Housing can be
considered a scarce resource; there is only a given amount at any time and only a given amount can
be produced in any time frame. To combat the increasing scarcity of housing associated with ‘overurbanization’7 slums are constructed.
FDI has acted as a vehicle for global financialization. Financialization is ’an increase in the size and
importance of a country’s financial sector relative to its overall economy’8. This market fundamentalist
approach offered an alternative to trade through which nations could interact and profit from market
collaboration. 'Privatization, deregulation, free markets, free trade and minimal state interference and
regulation'9 became crucial to national development. In the 1980's FDI increased three times faster
than the trade of manufactured goods10, necessitating the formation of financial centres in developed
nations so that they, like developed nations, could profit from the neo-liberalist boom. Mumbai, Cape
Town, Mexico City and Nairobi all would have to accommodate banks, markets, trans-national
corporations and financial services in order straddle the now most profitable form of globalization.
Wealth will always act as a poverty-magnet due to job creation, FDI in infrastructure and improving
health and policing services. The introduction of urban poverty-magnets in poor nations will mean
urban populations far surpass city housing capacity, causing slums of great magnitude to be formed.
However, although the opportunism of developing nation governments played a key role in the turn
towards market fundamentalism, debt burdens of developing countries almost made it a necessity for
governments to enter these markets. FDI, most significantly throughout the 1980’s, created a source
of funds from which a government could decrease it debt burden. FDI in this case would appear to
have a predominantly positive effect. In the debt ridden 1980's developing nations severely reduced
public expenditure on services and infrastructure therefore increasing poverty, inequality and
decreasing the probability of obtaining even a small amount of economic growth. FDI was seen as a
tool which governments could utilize in order to increase expenditure through shrinking their debts.
Unfortunately this has proved not to be the case. The majority of FDI revenue inevitably retuned to
the pockets of creditors, with little actually improving the lives of their domestic population.
In 1982, the oil shocks of 1974 and high interest rates of the 1980’s created a global debt crisis11. The
IMF and World Bank (organizations dedicated to ensuring global financial security) were called upon
by the developing world for assistance. However the IMF and World Bank were aligned with western
capitalist interests, and took this opportunity to demand the lowering of barriers to international cash
flows (the majority of which rooted for the west). Developing nations who refused to adopt these
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) would receive no assistance regarding their debt levels. The
increase in FDI throughout the 1980’s was a result of this lowering of barriers, with western firms
now cheaply and easily able to enter developing markets. Of the nations that obliged to SAPs, 46
became poorer than they were when the programs were initiated12. Investors took advantage of the
debt crisis. The building of urban facilities through FDI ensured there would be a constant supply of
human capital migrating from the increasingly poor countryside. With negligible economic growth
and minimal new housing, there workers would fuel the expansion of slums.
6http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/
12/08/2014
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/ 12/08/2014
8
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialization.asp 12/08/2014
9
David Harvey - A Brief History Of Neoliberalism, 2007
10
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/ 12/08/2014
11
Vincent Ferraro, Melissa Rosser- World Security: Challenges for a New Century, 1994.
12
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/ 28/08/2014
7
36
Poor governance and inappropriate policy decisions do play a key role in development of slum
settlements. As developing nations move from rural-agricultural to urban-manufacture economic
structures governments 'commercialized, deregulated and privatized their economies for the global
market'13. These global markets require commercial hubs within the host nation, causing the
governments of developing nations to adopt a type of urban favouritism. Consequentially this 'urban
bias’ ensures public expenditure is predominantly concentrated within the wealthier city districts.
Infrastructure and services improve disproportionally in these areas relative to slum settlements. In
less developed countries there is often a huge reliance on agriculture. However tariffs, subsidies and
prices set through government policy are often only beneficial to the manufacturing sector. The
‘seasonally employed’ agriculture reliant demographic therefore flock to the cities, where the scarce
capital these governments had was centralized within industrial production. Slums will continue to
grow in size due to the lack of government support throughout rural regions. Governments
throughout the third world should seek to take full advantage of cheap agricultural production, rather
than wasting funds in the highly competitive global manufacturing industries, in which China and
India already dominate. Agricultural subsidies would not only benefit the majority of the population
(with up to 80% of the extremely poor reliant on income from agriculture14), but also may decrease
the incentives associated with urban-migration and therefore slow slum development.
Formal employment is difficult to find where slum settlements are prominent. The demand for
employment will reach levels that surpass the number of official jobs available, causing the formation
of an informal economy that can provide jobs within the slums themselves. These economies grow
incredibly fast, lack bureaucracy, are not taxed, have no labour laws and are not monitored by the
state or federal government. This informal sector can contribute to as much as 60% of national GDP,
making up near to 78% of non-agricultural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa15. FDI nearly always
creates jobs in the formal economy, whereas these statistics show that huge numbers of migrants are
driven by the incentive to work in the informal economies of slums. The primary reason that urban
informal economies expand so rapidly is because slum populations grow equally fast. Slum growth
creates a supply of work while at the same time creating demand for work. It is this vicious cycle that
ensures migrants for rural regions decide to settle in slums. The informal economy offers dwellers the
opportunity to earn reasonable wages. The fact that they will not be taxed or policed adds to the
appeal.
FDI has a major role in ensuring slums continue to grow. The beacons of capitalism it creates offers
a way that rural workers can work their way out of poverty, causing unsustainable mass urbanization
towards cities. In reality the vision of work FDI creates is for many artificial, therefore forcing the
majority of slum populations to seek work in the informal sector. Wealthy trans-national corporations
should be required to play a greater role in providing official housing for their potential workforces,
while governments should act to increase the incentives of remaining in rural regions.
Bibliography
http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/01/amazingendurance-slums/8120/ 10/08/2014
htttp://realtruth.org/news/100326-002-international.html 11/08/2014
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=trvLScaE0YE 21/08/2014
Frederick Van Der Ploeg, Steven Poelhekke - Globalization and the Rise of Mega-cities in the Developing
World, 2008
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/ 12/08/2014
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialization.asp 12/08/2014
David Harvey - A Brief History Of Neoliberalism, 2007
13
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/05/21/neoliberal-policy-and-the-growth-of-slums/ 28/08/2014
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slum 28/08/2014
15
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slum 28/08/2014
14
37
Vincent Ferraro, Melissa Rosser- World Security: Challenges for a New Century,
1994.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slum 28/08/2014
38
The market for art in the Netherlands in the period 1650-1750
Marcus Köttering
There has been a broad historical consensus addressing the art market from 1650 to 1750.1 Many
historians would agree the expansion and contraction of the market is evident across the period, and
its unique attributes were derived from the extraordinary quality and quantity of artistic production.
Furthermore, the integrity of the market was supported by a prosperous economy and favourable
political conditions2. However, historical understanding of the complexity of this narrative has also
developed. For example, the rate of decline and its impact on the art market has been reviewed in
recent years3, and the tension between innovation and conservativism of Dutch taste appears
increasingly less straight-forward than previously thought4. Marten Jan Bok argues that ‘the market
for paintings was vulnerable to cyclical trends in the economy, since art is not one of life’s primary
necessities’, suggesting the commercialisation of the market was more closely connected to economic
fluctuations5. In this essay, I shall argue that the sensitivity of the art market, through its reliance on
external forces such as international commerce and political flexibility, created unforeseen fragility in
this small Dutch society. In turn, this meant that decline was not only highly probable, but that in fact,
cultural exclusivity would be inevitably unsustainable.
On 15 May 1648, the Treaty of Münster was signed, ending the Thirty Years’ War, in which the
Protestant United Provinces had played largely an indirect military role. The repositioning of
overseas commerce and the internal economic structure greatly benefitted Dutch society. The
conditions of peace allowed the Dutch trading system (growing since the 1630s) to thrive. In 1647,
the Spanish embargoes on the Dutch Republic were lifted, calming tensions in the New World and
establishing Caribbean trade which outperformed England, struck by Civil War. The Flemish
privateering campaign against Dutch ships was brought to an end in 1648 and the Republic removed
its blockade of the Flemish coast. Dutch commerce resumed direct trade with Spain, Italy and the
Levant, securing dominance in the Mediterranean and challenging the English, whose trading
subsidies from Spain were remitted and passed onto the Dutch. After 1650, Dutch merchants felt in a
strong enough position to begin trade with Russia6. As these factors allowed Dutch commerce to gain
control over a number of materials such as wool, dyestuffs, mercury and sugar, the cost of production
for high-value goods, including paintings, dropped. The market responded predictably, lowering
prices. This opened out the market to an emerging middle class, derived from a convergence of factors
that I will outline in this essay. Although it is often disputed, a rough estimate would put the total
number of paintings produced in 1650 since the start of the Golden Age at approximately 2.5 million
pieces7, mostly from the provinces of Holland and Utrecht. By 1650, most Dutch industries were
supplied directly by maritime commerce. Whilst this provided them with great prosperity, it also made
them reliant on the maintenance of international commerce and competitive authority.
The zenith of economic and cultural production from 1650 two 1672 also coincided politically with
the ‘Stadholderless Period’ in which only Friesland and Groningen maintained their Stadholder status,
as Prince Frederick Henry failed to influence the regents before his death, leaving an unborn William
This essay was entered for the Vellacott prize (Peterhouse, Cambridge). It was highly commended.
North, ‘Art and Commerce’ pp. 133
3 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: Society, Economy, pp. 1012
4 North, ‘Art and Commerce’ pp. 135
5 Jan Bok, ‘Culture and Collecting’ in ‘Vermeer and the Delft School’ by Walter Liedkte, [2001] pp.210
6 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: The Later Golden Age (1647-1702) , Society, Economy
7 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part II: The Early Golden Age (1588-1647), Art and Architecture, 1509-1648
1
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III. The governing body of wealthy regents, known as the ‘De Witt regime’8, frequently
commissioned artwork for urban renewal schemes or public buildings (such as the Amsterdam Town
Hall and the Admiralty Building). Thus, a new genre of ‘history’ painting began to emerge, soon
recognised as some of the noblest works of the Dutch art market. Renewed political climate also
facilitated the commission of Flemish artists, arriving from the Spanish Netherlands, by the ruling
élite. However, the economic fragility was mirrored in the unstable power structure, in which the art
market had a vested interest. As the lack of central government prevented the ability of the ruling
classes to take hard line military action to protect economic interest, the Dutch art market began to
increasingly subject itself to external political influences, forming an underlying weakness on which
the abundance of production depended.
Although economic expansion was not unknown to the history of the Republic (as a result of the
plethora of artistic creation witnessed in the 1590s), historians9 now understand the level of economic
production after 1650 to have been unprecedented for the Republic. The end of war appears to have
allowed the Dutch economy to steer the allocation of resources to new demand with more efficiency.
Evidence of this can be seen in its labour market as well. Despite an urban population boom,
(Amsterdam increases from 150,000 to 200,000 between 1640 and 1672; a share of 8% to 11% of the
total population10), an estimated third of the working population in 1664 was made up of foreign
migrants from Germany, Norway and Denmark11. This projection of demand for employment was
seen most vividly in the shipping industry which was free to flourish after the Treaty of Münster and
was largely responsible to the movement of ‘rich trades’, from which the art market drew most of its
resources. The revitalisation and diversification of ‘rich trades’ improved the prospects for the
production of finer materials and goods, such as painting and sculpture; accelerating the process of
urbanisation. This economic restructure can also be seen in agriculture. The post-war rise in
agricultural output of surrounding countries such as the Spanish Netherlands, France and a
recovering Germany meant that, after 1647, Dutch rural society showed increasing signs of
deprivation. Many turned to new land of poorer quality to scrape a living. In Drenthe, for example,
8% more of the land was cultivated between 1650 and 1750. On top of this, the farming industry was
often subject to fluctuating tariffs, as set by the States-General, who were more concerned with
profitable urban renewal. This meant that the cities and towns became far more appealing to a growing
population, creating sufficient conditions for a proliferation of demand in the art market from a new
and emerging class of small traders, shopkeepers and artisans, amongst others.
It is in light of these economic, political and continental climates that we can begin to understand in
greater depth, the fabric of the Dutch art market. As Dutch commerce entered this increasingly
dynamic phase, the growing disposable income found new outlets of expenditure in urban renewal of
buildings in towns such as The Hague, Leiden and Haarlem, and likewise into the decorative arts.
Furthermore, the decentralised nature of Dutch society facilitated the formation of distinct styles
associating with different towns, such as the Leiden fijnschilder and the Delft School. As the urban
landscape developed, new genres of painting such as townscapes and urban panoramas started to
evolve. Some of the leading masters in this field included Gerrit Berckheyde (famous for his cityscapes
of Amsterdam and The Hague), Jan van der Heyden and Jacob van Ruisdael (who gained recognition
from his landscapes in and around Haarlem). Each brought a novel realism through internal reflection
between towns and inhabitants. Defined by its lavish, sophisticated works and richer colouring (from
increasing supplies of dyes originating in tropical countries), this movement followed a growing
interest in agricultural painting, pioneered by the likes of Pieter Saenredam and Gerard Houckgeest.
Although the Reformed Church saw little interest in commissioning decorative works, paintings of
churches or gatehouses became a popular subject of interest for masters like Emanuel de Witte, whose
church interior paintings stood in stark contrast to those of Saenredam. The market now had to satisfy
8 Named
after Johan de Witt, grand pensionary 1625-1672. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_de_Witt.
14.03.15.
9 J.L Price, ‘Dutch Culture in the Golden Age’, Painting and Graphic Art
10 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: The Later Golden Age (1647-1702) , Society, Population
11 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: The Later Golden Age (1647-1702) , Society, Work and Migration
40
Accessed
demand from a rising middle class as well as merchants, connoisseurs and regent who looked to refined
art for profit or pleasure. The extent to which these social bodies contributed to demand has been
disputed, with some saying that the élite class were the dominating force12 and others viewing
patronage as inferior to market forces13.
The still life genre of the first half of the seventeenth century (or still-leven in Dutch) became
increasingly sumptuous (proven) over the course of the third quarter of the seventeenth century with
artists such as Jan Davidszoon de Heem, Abraham van Beijeren and Willem Kalf fetching particularly
high prices. Seascapes in marine environments also saw a great expansion and provide a relatively
accurate historical record of the Anglo-Dutch war due to the realism of the naval scenes depicted by
artists such as Ludolf Bakhuysen. These were often hung up in public offices, town halls and admiralty
colleges around the maritime cities on the North Sea coast14. Another genre characteristic of this
period included Italianate landscape and Mediterranean harbour scenes stemming from a revival of
Dutch trade in that area. For the wealthy élite, this genre was a favourite, as Italy was seen as the
home of classic education, exhibiting Renaissance antiquities. The interior of ordinary, middle class
life also became a popular subject for the emerging market, mastered by the likes of Jan Steen. Many
observe a conventional didacticism, using the physical surroundings as the subject15, but that esoteric
knowledge of the artistic language and symbolic significance can still be seen in the grander styles,
like Johannes Vermeer iconography16. Yet the emergence of portrait genre in Dutch painting, which
often featured erotic subjects or scenes of smoking and drinking, gave Dutch painters a renewed
colloquial identity. As Price identifies, Dutch culture began to see a clash of progression between
‘symbolic understanding…the prestige of Renaissance classicism’ and the ‘material study of reality’.
An historical debate often arises around the status and wealth of painters in this period. For many
artists, recognition did not always come with wealth, and many were dependant on demand from
patron regents. Artists were often from middle class backgrounds and affluent homes17. What is clear
is that there was a marked tendency for paintings to be purchased in the same town as they were
produced. This is likely to be as a result of a strong sense of civic identity, especially in major towns,
in light of the stadholderless political situation. Prices depended largely on demand abroad, as this
increased the significance of an artist’s prestige, and therefore how much the wealthiest were willing
to pay. An example of an artist of exceptional recognition was Gerrit Dou, a master of the fine
painting (fijnschilder). He was commissioned by the Dutch States General to paint a gift for Charles II
upon his succession to the throne of England in 1660. However, he refused to leave his home town of
Leiden, but was visited by many prominent figures like Cosimo III de’ Medici in 1669. For local
regents and merchant connoisseurs, it became a mark of political affluence to have a ‘cabinet’ of work
from well-known artists. Demands to stock these cabinets perhaps provided many artists with a false
sense of security. A grand example of this was the Amsterdam Town Hall (‘Burgerzaal’), painted in
1670, locating the virtue of the Dutch Republic in interpretation of Roman history. Many town halls
also featured works depicting the revolt against Spain, again showing the sense of civic identity which
Dutch society used its own art market to express. Price identifies an art market which ‘had a native
independence to draw pride and influence’. By virtue of their middle class background, and the more
practical education that it came with, Dutch artists were far less influenced by classicist views of the
rules of art, further facilitating this unique nature of its market. It was common for artists to find
alternative forms of employment to earn sufficient wages18, including crafts like weaving, carpentry
and owning taverns. The urban bourgeoisie turned to art-dealing as a more profitable enterprise in
which fortune could be made from export to European capitals, but most artists sold their work on
the open street market. Famously, Vermeer took over his father’s tavern in Delft. Painters were by no
Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III, Art and Architecture, 1647-1702
Michael North, Art and Commerce in the Dutch Golden Age, New Haven and London, [1997] pp. 82
14 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III, Art and Architecture, 1647-1702
15 Price, ‘Culture and Society’, Painting-The Artist as Craftsman [1974]
16 Price, ‘Dutch Culture in the Golden Age’, Painting and Graphic Art [2012]
17 Wayne Franits, ‘The Cambridge Companion to Vermeer’ pp.2
18 Michael North, ‘Art and Commerce in the Dutch Golden Age’, New Haven and London, [1997] pp. 71
12
13
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means wealthy, and on an individual level, this reflects the fragility of their market.
Writing at the time, the former English Secretary of State, Dudley Carleton ‘noted as a singularity,
the common inn where we dined, which hath divers rooms hung with tapestry, as sometime furnished
with the best of hands’. The unprecedented variety in quantity and quality of artwork during this
period has led many to distinguish commercialisation of the Dutch art market. The Guild of Saint
Luke, established in 1648, reiterated this perception through its regulation of the market. Much like
a craftsman, the main priority of most artists was to produce work that would turn a profit, rather
than tailoring their style to the tastes of their patrons. In most cases, the artists were the social equals
of their customers and in this sense, the prices of those such as Rembrandt and Dou can lead the
historian astray. For the most part, like other markets, price was determined by a mechanism of cost
for base materials and quantity demanded. The Dutch fin-de-siècle, Abraham Bredius, estimated that
for every Dutch household, between 100 and 200 pieces would be on display, testifying to the extent
to which production flourished. With such unprecedented variety of genres within one cultural
identity many painters began to specialise. However, this was not a novel concept in Dutch culture as
specialisation can is evident during the Truce Years (1609-1621) of the Eighty Years’ War, when
Amsterdam became a hub of art trade, increasing demand for more efficient production. During the
seventeenth century, the workshops of towns such as Antwerp would see a number of artists working
on the same painting. One consequence of this was to increase production and artistic competition,
meaning that the interface between artists and buyers became more important to ensure demand
would be met. Erna Kok argues that ‘interaction amongst artists and art lovers could be regarded as
a ‘symbiosis’…on the basis of social-economic and artistic motivations’19. In the 1650s, there was
approximately one painter for every 2,000 to 3,000 inhabitants in the Dutch Republic20. The use of
tonal painting characterised the innovative elements of the art market, likewise improving the
productive potential of the market. 21Yet the Guild of Saint Luke embodied the fragility,
commercialisation and size of the art market. The endurance of a six year apprenticeship was enough
of a risk to families during periods of high demand, due to the expense (around 100 guilders per year
to study with Rembrandt or Dou). Yet the reward of an annual salary on average between 1,150 and
1,400 in the 1660s highlights the extent of economic expansion22.
Recent scholarship has pointed to the events of 1672 in the Dutch Republic as the inevitable collapse
of a fragile financial and political structure on which Dutch culture had depended23. The art market
saw stead decline up to and beyond 1750. In 1672, which became known as rampjaar, or ‘disaster year’,
the French King Louis XIV invaded the Republic, leading to a run on Dutch banks and the collapse
of the Amsterdam Trade Exchange. As Prince William III and the Organist appealed to Spain and
the Holy Roman Empire to finally drive out the French in 1778, the regents were ousted from power24
and the Stadholderate was reinstated. The refusal of this new political regime to take on the burden
of indirect tax drained a source of demand for non-necessity goods like artwork, despite relatively
higher wages. It would be possible to identify the rampjaar as the point at which the fragile economic
and political structure, on which the art market had been founded, began to disintegrate. Large
numbers of some of the country’s finest art was shipped abroad as prices slumped and art dealers
became bankrupt. England and Italy attracted some of the greatest Dutch artists of the previous half
century. Beyond the 1670s, high rent and heavy taxation meant that real wages, in comparison to
neighbouring countries were relatively low25. In 1679, the average wage in Holland was between 18
and 24 stuviers per day. As manufacturers faced a more stagnant economy, incomes and consumer
Erna Kok, Innovation through Rivalry. History Painting in Amsterdam 1635-1645
http://www.essentialvermeer.com/dutch-painters/dutch_art/ecnmcs_dtchart.html#.VQirso6sWSo
21 Michael North, ‘Art and Commerce’ pp. 134
22 Michael North, ‘Art and Commerce’ pp. 65
23 Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: The Later Golden Age (1647-1702), 1672: The Year of Disaster
24 Herbert H. Rowen, ‘John de Witt, Statesman of the "True Freedom’ - Johan de Witte was lynched in 1672, supposedly on
the order of Prince William III of Orange
25 According to a working paper by Federico Etro and Elena Stepanova in ‘The Market for Painting in the Netherlands during
the Seventeenth century’ (from the Department for Economics at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) the real wages in
the Dutch Republic fell from 425 fl. in 1672 to 305 fl. in 1698. ISSN: 1827-3580 No. 16/WP/2013 pp. 4
19
20
42
spending fell. In Leiden, total industry fell from 139,000 pieces in 1671 to 54,000 pieces in 1750.
Likewise, the shipbuilding industry’s stock fell from 360 in 1707 to only 5 in 1750. After the turn of
the century, self-sustenance became virtually impossible. The tobacco industry made half its profits
of the previous decade. A series of natural disasters littered the years following the turn of the
century. In 1715, flood defences broke in Zeeland from heavy rainfall; in 1717 Friesland suffered
unusually stormy weather; in 1731, timer exports were infected with ‘pile worm’ and an expensive
‘dike tax’ was implemented to support reparations and a series of cattle viruses broke out across the
Netherlands across the early eighteenth century. If spare income had been a regular occurrence before,
it was by no means a continuity of Dutch society in this period. The termination of overseas trading
strangled the art market and in urban areas, the wealthy manufacturers and craftsmen, who had been
the backbone of civic society during the Golden Age and its market for art, were either depleted of
spare capital, or forced to migrate to neighbouring countries. What ensued became a bad case of
structural unemployment as the skills of the labour market no longer matched those of a restructured
economy, increasing the polarisation of wealth in urban areas. The art market suffered particularly
heavily as its innovation had demanded more specific skills. As food prices rose and the highly skilled
workers often migrated to the New World, demand for higher wages caused a tightening of guild
restrictions. It soon became simply too risky for the younger generation to enter long apprenticeships
in the art market. After 1672, the quality of painting and quantity of fijnschilder declined dramatically,
as materials for the kind of refined effects were no longer accessible for Dutch studios. Landscapes,
still life and low-life scenes lost the appeal and popularity they once had.
The delicate sensitivity of Dutch society and economy to international affairs also contributed to
decline. During the Golden Age, Dutch banks held the lowest interest rates in Europe, creating
unstable foreign investment. Thus, when their neighbours became increasingly institutionalised
(exemplified by the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694), the withdrawal of capital also
hindered the Dutch economy. The same vulnerable sensitivity became more acute in 1713, when the
Peace of Utrecht between the major European Powers strengthened the dominance of Britain and
France, especially in areas such as the North Sea. Previously, the Dutch had relied on this to feed their
fisheries industry, a key prop of the Golden Age economy, which also dwindled thereafter. The
termination of overseas trading strangled the art market. As a result of strong mercantilist policy
since 1648, industrial development had suffered at the hands of a booming overseas commerce,
meaning the internalisation of economic potential caused an unprecedented contraction in the
productivity of the Dutch economy26. Ever since 1647, the Dutch system of trade had evolved,
becoming reliant on ‘rich trades’ (a vital source of material for the art market), from places such as
Guinea and the Levant, under European control. Although the two countries had improved relations
since the previous century, Britain’s protectionist policy from 1720 to 1750, and its focus of expansion
in America, meant that supplies of canvas and linen to the Netherlands soon dried up.
There are also those who argue that the decline was in fact not quite so severe27. As workers looked
to more active areas of employment, goods such as tobacco became more rapidly traded within the
United Provinces. Between 1675 and 1710, the production of tobacco trebled. Much of this was due
to Dutch advantage in technology by comparison to Northern European nations, lasting until around
1740. In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, industries involved in the production of sugar,
silk, cotton, canvas, paper and linen continued to grow. Although it had to fight a price war against
the East India Company, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC)
remained a foremost Asian commercial trading organisation through to the 1720s. In fact, most would
now agree that it was only until the second quarter of the eighteenth century, that the ‘rich trades’ of
the Dutch economy began to weaken as a disintegrating urban economy lost the Dutch merchants
their international leverage that they had previously capitalised on. Between 1700 and 1750, the net
trade of the Dutch Republic fell behind 2 to 5 times the level of their European counterparts. Britain
and France had dominated the trade of tropical goods that had previously supplied the eccentric dyes
and materials to supply the extraordinary proliferation of Dutch art. This alternative perspective is
26
27
Price, ‘Culture and Society’, Decline pp. 212
Israel, ‘The Dutch Republic’, Part III: Society, Economy, pp. 1012
43
also reflected in the art market itself. In 1700, the Dutch Republic remained a hub of artistic activity,
albeit greatly altered from the glories of its past. The Dutch artists retained a high reputation,
especially those who had made their names during the Golden Age. The Dutch school remained one
of the foremost in Europe up until the 1740s, predominantly supported the major towns like
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. Although an estimated quarter of artwork production ceased
between in the 1670s compared to the 1650s, this was still greater than any other European country.
Perhaps this is testament to the growth of the previous decades, or perhaps this shows a
misunderstanding in previous historical thought.
Following the political restructuring of the ruling élite in the latter half of the seventeenth century,
the French cultural influence, whose strength had been previously repressed whilst limited to the
courts of the Prince of Orange, took over artist convention. The arrival of the Huguenots,
permeating the higher end of society, reinforced the notion of French classicism as a superior
discipline28. The centre of this was seen in Utrecht, where painting began to align itself to the rules
of the French theorist Claude Lorrain29. One of Rembrandt’s pupils, Samuel van Hoogstraten noted:
‘One comes near to disgracing [the art of painting] if one makes it serve to picture and object that
is not in itself worth contemplating’. A new generation of artists appeared to reject the
characteristics of mass artistic production. Without a body of educated artists, the Dutch lacked
theorists such as Charles Le Brun, who published his famous thesis ‘Méthode pour apprendre à dessiner
les passions’ in 1698, outlining the humanist practice of artistic appreciation.
We therefore see a remarkable correlation between the vitality of the art market and the stability of
Republic’s economy across this period. Furthermore, we can identify the 1672 rampjaar as the turning
point, in which the fragile origins on which the proliferation of art was able to flourish were exposed,
facilitating the realisation of its inevitable decline. Upon review, the narrative of economic decline can
also be deemed as more intricate than earlier historical writing might suggest, perhaps even
contradictory at times. We may also observe that the dynamic between innovation and conservatism
of artistic style can be approached from a wider variety of perspectives, and that the ultimate victory
of European Renaissance influence has lent the art market of the late Golden Age its distinct
impression.
Bibliography
Etro, Federico, and Stepanova, Elena, ‘The Market for Paintings in the Netherlands during the
Seventeenth Century’, Department of Economics Working Paper 16, Ca Foscari University,
Venice (July, 2013)
Franits, Wayne, ‘Introduction’, in Franits, Wayne, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Vermeer
(Cambridge, 2001)
Geyl, Pieter, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Part Two: 1646-1715 (London, 1974)
Haley, Kenneth Harold Dobson, The Dutch in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1972)
Israel, Jonathan , The Dutch Republic: It’s Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford, 1998)
Kok, Erna, Innovation through Rivalry. History Painting in Amsterdam 1635-1645
North, Michael, Art and Commerce in the Dutch Golden Age, trans. Catherine Hill (London,
1997)
Price, John Leslie, Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic During the 17th Century (London,
1974) www2.uncp.edu/home/rwb/Amsterdam_I.html
28
29
Haley, ‘The Dutch in the Seventeenth Century’ pp. 143
Pieter Geyl, ‘The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Part Two: 1646-1715’ pp. 237
44
Immigrant labour: does it benefit or impoverish the United
Kingdom?
Przemyslaw Macholak
In one month we will know the result of the football World Championship in Brazil. Although, as
always, the event has been dominated by inflated hopes, there is nothing in Heaven and Earth which
could have ensured an England victory. A private company, wholly owned by its 20 Member Clubs,
the English Football Association is one of the strongest leagues in the world, generates the highest
revenue, and is the most watched football league globally. Clubs in the English league pay their players
the highest wages and spend the biggest amount of money on transfers. Despite all this, the national
team cannot reach the heights of 1966, familiar to most people only due to television replays. So how
can we explain the difference between the fates of English league clubs and our ill-fated world cup
team? The simple fact that players from abroad have replaced English footballers in first elevens
throughout the whole country.
As we can see from above, the issue of migration is not relevant when any politician wants to hit the
headlines, but it touches every aspect of life in the United Kingdom, as well as the front pages of
newspapers. Subject to hot political debate, and in our age of globalization and when Western
countries have to face aging society problem, deep analysis of immigrants’ influence is needed.
Immigrant labour, analogically to the labour market it influences, is not homogenous. Therefore,
description of immigrants needs many generalization. Various studies group immigrants depending
on aim and factors of migration, level of skills, time of arrival, country of origin, etc. Because of
such diversity and abundance of nuances, they cannot be seen only as one added population. The
average UK immigrant differs from, for example, the stereotypical UK migrant - people from Albion
moving to Spain for retirement. They are usually much younger, brave enough to leave her home
country (legally or illegally) and start life in completely different environment. Also on average more
educated than UK-born citizens, apparently they are the most educated immigrants in the whole EU
(Dustmann, CREaM 2014). Hence it is hardly surprise, that one of the main arguments for the positive
impact of immigrants is diversification of the culture. A more multicultural society tends to facilitate
innovation diffusion (Saxenian, 2006, Florida 2002) and therefore increases productivity of the
economy as a whole. No matter whether it is a meeting of a board of an international company or a
discussion about funding for next month for products for the local grocery, such cognitive diversity
increases chances for creating a solution for a problem, given the communication barrier is not
significant. In the contrary to some other countries (e.g. Spain), the effect of immigration on UK
productivity is, although small, significant and positive (Lee and Nathan 2013).
Immigrants affect productivity both directly as well as indirectly. They increase access to the human
capital skills pool, boosting competition in some industries and creating completely new jobs in others.
Moreover, immigrants play a crucial role in providing the trade links to the global economy. Analysing
the impact of people speaking the same language, knowing the domestic customs of your company
trade partner in the context of P. Ghemawat’s ‘CAGE distance framework’ (Ghemawat, 2011), benefits
of immigration becomes clearly visible and expansion for foreign markets may not be as demanding
as famous metaphor about ‘writing simultaneously by both hands’. It lowers the UK firms’ transaction
costs, enables them experience economies of scale and allows them to find niches in global markets.
The situation seems to be similarly positive while analysing the impact on budget balance. According
to the research Dustmann and Frattini (2013): ‘immigrants are overall less likely than natives to
receive state benefits or tax credits, and similarly likely to live in social housing as natives in the same
45
region (…) and recent immigrants [probably less integrated] made a positive net contribution to the
UK fiscal system’. Similar results were found by prof. I. Gordon (LSE, 06.2014). Also the division of
cost of public goods on higher number of population while marginal cost close to zero allows
‘substantial implicit saving’ by government. This is possible largely due to the structure of
immigration in UK, weighted towards professionals (Stalker, 2001).
According to OECD report: ‘While openness to immigration is therefore generally needed, highly
skilled personnel, such as good scientist and entrepreneurs, are even more in demand’ (p.106 Legrain,
2006). It is no surprise that many countries in fact try to attract this high-skilled migration. They pull
the best individuals in particular areas, equipped with ‘comparative advantages’ (some nationalities are
better in particular skills than other due to the geographical, cultural factors, and development compare with Legrain, 2006, p.96 and next) with their experience, links, boosting innovation, and
potential grateful and loyal to the receiving country for giving them opportunity. Governors might
consider putting them together to facilitate these innovation diffusion and spill over effects within
clusters, like Milan for fashion or London for financial services. All cited research agree, that while
overall impact of the immigration might be neutral or positive, impact of high-skilled migration is
always outperforming. And, what may be equally significant, receiving country pays relatively nothing
for education of newcomers (language courses or credit for higher education comparing to public
education through about 12 or more years).
However, a potential increase in the real national output due to high-skilled may significantly outweigh
the real impact. Utility of immigrants, however perverse it sounds, is often downgraded and therefore
their skills are not used optimally. This is not unexpected, after all, immigrants often need time to
establish themselves in new environment. There are many examples of post graduates who start their
careers from the very bottom of the labour market, undertaking physical work, only in order to
improve their communication skills. This is compounded by the fact that foreign qualifications are
often not recognized. Natural upgrading is connected with life cycle of immigrants, however due to a
welfare loss there is need of harmonization of skills and certificates to such extent, that employers
would be able to compare them.
Frankly there are more concerns about the impact of lower-skilled workers. While we appreciate the
Oscar given for immigrant creating in our country or get enthusiastic when promising young player
born abroad declares willingness to play for our national team, the ‘bloody’ foreigner with his funny
accent in our company who agrees to do overtime for free does not make us optimistically-viewing
towards result of our wage rise ask. The fiscal effect of immigrants, popularly speaking, draining our
welfare was said before, but what is the effect on wages and unemployment? Is the low-skilled
migration a substitute for native workers and crowds out natives? By increasing competition in the
labour market and lowering the average cost of production due to decreases in average wage, some
native workers may consider as more preferable and useful to stay at home at claim unemployment
benefits than work for lower wage. On the demand-side, low-skill workers have also their preferences,
not only being a factor of production but also as consumers they create more demand for other goods.
Thus, both AD and AS are shifted leading to an increase in the real national output.
Moreover, low-skilled workers often meet demand for the so-called 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and
difficult), where there would be simply shortage of hands to work due to different aspirations, and
willingness to work of native workers resulting from difference in standard of living. Thus, the
lowest-skilled immigrants fill the gap in services that cannot be readily mechanised or imported.
Because they can be easily hired and fired, immigration as a shock absorber helps with the sticky wages
issue – brought in to meet sudden demands for labour and then dismissed when surplus to
requirements. On the other hand, because they are the least stable and lowest paid jobs, it influences
immigrants’ level of unemployment.
They also create potential opportunity for domestic workers to take on better-paid jobs. One of the
clearest examples is time spared by parents on looking after children and household. Thanks to all aupairs, cleaners, etc. they are able to maximize effectiveness of time, do overtime, have a longer rest. So
46
if we were to synthesize all the evidence relating to the labour market, we might conclude that overall
there is little or no impact on unemployment and probably some relatively small negative impact on
wages at the bottom of the distribution. (Wadsworth, 2010, 2014; CREAM, 2014 according to: Portes,
LSE, 06.2014), Indeed, this inequality and potential emergence of the ‘underclass’ that was
unsuccessfully competing against immigrants in the 3-D jobs is the issue that concerns economists at
most.
In case of use of public services, immigrants are relatively much cheaper than internal migrants.
(Whitehead, LSE, 06.2014). Therefore many forecasts overestimate immigrants housing needs,
because of treating them and their behaviour as natives’. Moreover, country benefiting from single
market shall respect also other resolutions following from the same international agreements
(European Court of Justice has already started procedure against United Kingdom – compare with
Brady, 2013). As pointed out in the said article, ‘EU migrants cannot simply arrive in Britain, sign on
to the dole and put themselves in the queue for a house (…) they have to be ’habitually resident’ for
at least six months. Before then, their home country is responsible for their social security needs and
any (say, medical) expenses related to their stay in the UK are reclaimable’. Moreover, problems such
as not enough supply of housing (especially social), access to NHS and JSA will not be solved only by
restricting migration numbers.
Another thing is that significant reduction in immigration numbers would have damaging impact on
the demographic structure of the UK. In a period of aging societies, withdrawal of young and able
to work people could lead to a collapse of pension system. Although UK society is not threatened by
population fall in real numbers, the structure of citizens plays crucial role in the realization of social
contract. The issue described as the ‘greying’ of society is not clearly visible due to immigration,
which acts as an injection to the work force and splits the current pensions burden for bigger number
of people preventing fall in real wages, perhaps increasing of retirement age and loss of
competitiveness.
Thus when economic situation due to immigration has overall significant positive impact, where is the
devil? When analysing natives’ attitude towards immigration, sociocultural concerns are more
important than economic concerns. According to T. Philips (LSE, 06.2014) natives ‘tend to use the
narrative from 70’s; have not seen that immigration has now became circular, richer, higher skilled
and coming from wider origin’ which marks a positive trend for everyone. Due to such narrative,
critics raise issues of segregation (and as a result for example white flight) and loss of culture and
national identity. However, these concerns are not measureable, and are rather the object of interest
of different social sciences than economics.
One of the most hot-topics of political debate is so-called white-flight. It involves value judgement to
choose the best from number of explanations (sometimes contrarian) for such a phenomenon.
Whereas some scholars (E. Kaufmann, G. Harris) prove that segregation is unconscious, perhaps the
answer is to certain extent the sum of all of them, but simultaneously with analysing it as a response
on high level of immigration it should be emphasized, that also age profile of ‘fliers’ matters (most of
older people, and according to cited research of Preston people get more hostile when they get older),
and it can be a flight to familiarity and aspiration found outside the capital as well.
Some critics of immigration also point out that London owes its high youth unemployment level (26%)
(Goodhart, LSE, 06.2014)– the highest number in the whole country to external residents. Frankly,
competition in London is higher in different parts of the country, as well as the level of education
(also due to London school’s transformation success, which is ascribed to immigrants), number of
universities and therefore number of high-skilled workers without enough experience. What is less
obvious is fact, that level of anti-immigration attitudes in the capital is significantly lower than in the
rest of the country.
Questions of possible loss of national identity seem to not be very reasonable. Of course, due to high
immigration, particular components are changing. For example, the role of religion is becoming
47
undermined, but from the psychological point of view many people start to look after, foster their
customs and tradition in response to seeing other communities with strong identities. A much more
important issue is question of segregation/integration, especially after 9/11.It is difficult to assess to
what extent are and what is the optimal value of integration of immigrant groups with a society (and
what do we mean by that – can we say that native who does not have community feeling is not part of
the society and thus for example his rights should be limited or he should be expelled from a country),
however every example of disintegration is strongly visible. It is also appropriate to question the
impact of the migration networks: on one side they help immigrants to acclimatize and prevent
feelings of displacement and alienation, on other they can also effectively prevent them for integration
with the rest of a community. However in the example of London, the immigrant succession theory
seems to be proved, after some time they migrate within UK and London and maintain links with their
natives, move out from their districts, preventing emergence of closed ghettos there (Paccoud, LSE,
03.2014). On the other hand, there is still big room for improvement, especially for NGOs to help
newcomers affiliate on the micro scale through personal and direct help with daily grind in the first
months.
I tried to assess balance of costs and benefits of the immigration labour overall, but to truly
comprehend immigrants’ impact, more nuanced approach should be used. It seems to be clear that in
terms of immigration to UK, the pros outweighs the cons and immigration (overall) benefits. Yet what
is even more clear is the fact that immigration is necessary and inevitable mostly due to the
demographic situation. Most common concerns are not proved by empirical data. Vivid immigrant
communities benefit not only productiveness, but also cultural output and makes the society more
engaging. The question is – what is a socially desirable level of immigration? It is difficult to estimate
how many people feel segregated due to immigration on both sides of the fence. However, research
from Rodgers (CREAM, 2014) suggests some very positive results: people in surveys speak negatively
about immigrants, but when they are asked about their closest area, almost every answer regarding
the impact of immigrants is either positive or neutral. This very clearly illustrates that people simply
learn and develop from each other, even when they have to start a next match on the bench.
Bibliography
Brady H. 26.06.2013, Europe: Britain’s migration delusion, Prospect Magazine,
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blog/europe-britains-migration-delusion-hugo-bradycentre-european-reform/#.U6KXbDfpywV
Dustmann C. Frattini T. 2013, ‘The fiscal effects of Immigration to the UK’, the Centre for Research & Analysis
on Migration’ Discussion Paper Series,
Dustmann C. 6.03.2014, lecture at the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change (MISOC) and the Centre
for Research & Analysis on Migration (CReAM) conference ‘Immigration: New research on
experiences, attitudes & the economic impact’,
Florida R. 2002, ‘Rise of the Creative Class. And how it’s transforming work, leisure and
everyday life’,
Basic Books,
Ghemawat P. 2011, ‘World 3.0 Global prosperity and how to achieve it’, Harvard Business Review
Press,
Goodhart D. 27.06 2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘Migration and the Transformation of London: an
international perspective’,
Gordon I. 27.06 2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘Migration and the Transformation of London: an
international perspective’,
Kaufmann E. 24.03.2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘How is London being transformed by migration?’,
Lee N. and Nathan M. 2013, 'Diversity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from London
firms', Economic Geography,
Legrain P. 2006, ‘Immigrants. Your country needs them’, Little, Brown,
Mahmoud T. O. Raport H. Steinmayr A. and Trebesch Ch. September 2013, The Effect of Labour Migration
on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic, CReAM,
Paccoud A. 24.03.2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘How is London being transformed by migration?’,
Philips T. 27.06 2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘Migration and the Transformation of London: an
international perspective’,
Portes J. 27.06 2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘Migration and the Transformation of London: an
48
international perspective’,
Rodgers B. 6.03.2014, lecture at the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change (MISOC) and the Centre
for Research & Analysis on Migration (CReAM) conference ‘Immigration: New research on
experiences, attitudes & the economic impact’,
Saxenian A. 2006, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy, Harvard
University
Press,
Stalker P. 2001, ‘The no-nonsense guide to International Migration’, New internationalist publications
in
association with Verso,
Whitehead C. 27.06 2014, lecture at the LSE conference ‘Migration and the Transformation of London: an
international perspective’,
The ageing population graph comes from http://www.leftfootforward.org/2013/02/how-best-to-support-anageing-population-more-immigration/ on the 29.06.2014
49
How is Euripides' Alcestis an exceptional figure in Greek
tragedy?
Archie MacCormack
Euripides' first extant play, Alcestis, written in 438 BC, recounts the myth of how Alcestis gave her life
to save her husband’s. When reading the play, it is clear that, although Alcestis' speaking role ends
within the first half of the play, her character never ceases being the focal point of the drama. Since
it is her astonishing act which the audience admires most, despite Heracles' heroics in wrestling with
Death and Admetus' confrontation with Pheres, Alcestis remains the object of both the audiences' and
the characters' minds alike. Alcestis seems to hold a unique position in Greek mythology as a perfect
wife who is both loving and honourable, yet also distinguished and acclaimed for her character when
women in Greek tragedy, such as Medea or Phaedra, are often infamous rather than glorious.
Nevertheless, in 5th-century BC Greece, the issue of 'kleos', in opposition to love, means that it is not
so simple to categorize Alcestis as faultless when questioning her deeper motives for dying.
Alcestis is a character with whom the audience can associate the definitively Greek concept of 'kleos'.
In Greek literature, 'kleos', which is often translated as ‘glory’, is an important concept in the Greek
psyche concerning death. Homer's Iliad, the first extant literary Greek work, concerns 'kleos' as one
of its most important themes with formulaic lines such as ʹἀρνύμενος πατρός τε μέγα κλέος ἠδ᾽ ἐμὸν
αὐτοῦʹ (winning great glory for my father and for myself),1 displaying the extent to which 'kleos' was
imbedded within the heroic identity. In Alcestis, the chorus of citizens of Pherae mentions a very
Homeric form of 'kleos' as ʹπολλά σε μουσοπόλοι / μέλψουσι καθ᾽ ἑπτάτονόν τ᾽ ὀρείαν / χέλυν ἔν
τ᾽ ἀλύροις κλέοντες ὕμνοιςʹ (Many a song shall poets make, / Singing your praise to the sevenstringed mountain lyre, / Or in unaccompanied chorus).2 Although many different myths would have
been sung about, the use of the verb 'κλε οντες' (calling / singing), which is clearly related to 'kleos'
recalls how the Homeric oral tradition made the heroes in the Iliad and the Odyssey famous through
the oral composition of the epics. Therefore, Euripides somewhat aligns Alcestis with the heroes at
the core of Greek literature while he moreover affirms the statement about Alcestis' fame as he
becomes one of the poets singing about her through the chorus.
However, perhaps ironically for a Greek audience, it is a woman in the form of Alcestis who should be
admired for her 'kleos' rather than the masculine Iliadic heroes such as Achilles and Hector who die in
warfare. Alcestis' feminine courage is further emphasized by both Admetus' and his father Pheres'
apparent cowardice in avoiding the death which Fate had allotted him, although Philip Vellacott
believes that 'for us to form a clear moral judgement on Admetus would limit the significance of the
play.'3 Whether we choose to judge Admetus or not, it is nevertheless clear that Alcestis' sacrifice
marks her out as the extraordinary character in the play. Even Heracles, who becomes a hero at the
end of the play, is mocked for his drunkenness in a passage of satyr, meaning his role as the saviour
in the final scene is tainted by his previous appearance on stage. Nevertheless, it is for aspects like his
admiring portrayal of Alcestis, in comparison with the male characters of the play, that some scholars
have labelled Euripides a 'proto-feminist' in the male-dominated society of 5th-century BC Athens.
Moreover, Euripides seems to particularly link Alcestis to Hector, one of the most masculine figures
of the Iliad, through an allusion to Book VI. It is certain that Euripides' Athenian audience during the
Dionysia would have been familiar with the Iliad, enabling this following comparison to be recognized
Hom. Il. 6.446 (Anthony Verity)
Eur. Alc. 445-7 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
3 Vellacott, Alcestis/Hippolytus/Iphigenia in Tauris (Penguin, 1974) p.16
1
2
50
by at least some members of the audience. Before Hector leaves his wife Andromache for battle in an
attempt to win ʹμέγα κλέοςʹ (great glory),4 she calls him her ʹπατὴρʹ (father) and ʹπότνια μήτηρ’
(revered mother), as well as her ʹκασίγνητοςʹ (brother) and ʹθαλερὸς παρακοίτηςʹ (tender husband)
since all her other family is dead.5 Similarly, Admetus declares of Alcestis in a speech against his father
that ʹἣν ἐγὼ καὶ μητέρα / καὶ πατέρ᾽ ἂν ἐνδίκως ἂν ἡγοίμην μόνηνʹ (It is she, and no one else, that I
should rightly call / Both mother and father)6 due to his parents' refusal to die on his behalf. Since
both Hector and Alcestis take on multiple familial roles as not only a spouse but also as a 'mother' and
'father', Euripides' echo of the famous Iliadic scene reinforces the courage and substance of Alcestis'
character in the comparison to one of the great heroes, Hector, despite being a woman. While Hector
wins 'kleos' fighting and ultimately dying for his city and family, Alcestis also gains 'kleos' for dying
for her family. Although Alcestis dies for her husband Admetus, giving up her life but receiving glory
for her decision, she is brought back to Admetus alive thanks to Heracles' wrestling with Death. So it
seems that where in the Iliad Achilles, and even Hector, had to surrender their youthful lives for
everlasting glory, Alcestis is rewarded for her loyalty by keeping her life and gaining glory,.
Furthermore, the importance of 'kleos' in both of these episodes highlights the connection of the two
separate myths. While Hector is obsessed with gaining 'kleos', arguably to an objectionable extent,
when he predicts that some man may one day say of Andromache that 'Ἕκτορος ἥδε γυνὴ ὃς
ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι/ Τρώων ἱπποδάμων ὅτε Ἴλιον ἀμφεμάχοντοʹ (This is the wife of Hector,
who was always the greatest/ of the horse-breaking Trojans, when they fought around Ilium),7
putting his own reputation before his wife's well-fare without him. Both Alcestis and Admetus ponder
'kleos', though only the potential fame of Admetus' parents, as Alcestis says ʹκαίτοι σ᾽ ὁ φύσας χἠ
τεκοῦσα προύδοσαν, / καλῶς μὲν αὐτοῖς κατθανεῖν ἧκον βίου, / καλῶς δὲ σῶσαι παῖδα κεὐκλεῶς
θανεῖνʹ (your father and your mother, who / Were of an age to die honoured by everyone, / And could
have saved their son and gained a glorious death').8 Admetus raises a similar issue with Pheres,
criticizing him for prioritizing his enjoyment of old age over his heir and glory. Moreover, since 'kleos'
is a hereditary concept, passed from one generation to another through a family, Pheres would have
disregarded his honour and family's lineage by allowing his only son to die. Admetus also notes that
Alcestis is 'γυναῖκ᾽ ὀθνειαν' (a foreign woman)9 to highlight that while Pheres is unwilling to die for
his son heir to Thessaly over which he rules, Alcestis has a further ethnic reason not to substitute her
life for Admetus' but does so anyway.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Alcestis chooses to die for future fame or to honour and do her
duty to her husband. The servant reports that while addressing her marriage-bed Alcestis cries out
that 'προδοῦναι γα ρ σ᾽ ὀκνοῦσα καὶ πο σιν θνῄσκω' (for I alone would not be false to you / And to
my husband; and for this I die).10 Euripides' omission of 'kleos' regarding her decision to die possibly
makes her even more admirable as her justification for her sacrifice seems far less egotistical than the
want of eternal fame, unlike Achilles or Hector in the Iliad who die for their names and little other
cause. However, ancient authors considered Alcestis' motive for dying and not all share this view. Plato
questions this through a speech of cynicism by Diotima in his Symposium in which she says: ʹἐπεὶ οἴει
σύ... Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν... μὴ οἰομένους ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι ἑαυτῶν
ἔσεσθαι, ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ... ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης
δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν: τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν.ʹ (Do you suppose... that Alcestis
would have died for Admetus if [she] had not expected to win ‘a deathless memory for valor,’ which
now we keep? Of course not. I hold it is for immortal distinction and for such illustrious renown as
this that they all do all they can. They are in love with what is immortal.)11 Another word related to
Hom. Il. 6.446 (trans. Anthony Verity)
Hom. Il. 6.429-31 (trans. Anthony Verity)
6 Eur. Alc. 646-7 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
7 Hom. Il. 6.460-1 (trans. Anthony Verity)
8 Eur. Alc. 290-3 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
9 Eur. Alc. 646 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
10 Eur. Alc. 180 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
11 Plat. Sym. 208d-e (trans. Harold N. Fowler)
4
5
51
'kleos' in ʹεὐκλεοῦςʹ (illustrious) appears here again and the view that no-one would die simply out of
love conveys the Greek obsession with glory. However, the irony for a modern audience might be how
ʹἀποθανεῖνʹ (to die) is equivalent to ʹἀθάνατονʹ (immortality): a word which Plato repeats three times
in this short passage to emphasize the reward which Alcestis was supposedly pursuing. The brevity
of the final clause is a sharp attack against Alcestis; she was in love with immortality, not Admetus.
Nevertheless, it is controversy like this regarding motives for dying in the ancient world which enables
Euripides to make Alcestis such a complex character through the ambiguity of her motives. L. H. G.
Greenwood believes that Euripides 'refrains so completely from pronouncing judgement . . . that we
really cannot tell what he thinks.' Whether Alcestis died out of love for Admetus or love for fame is
another one of these characteristic Euripidean obscurities. Alcestis' inability to speak in the final scene
of the play further extends this ambiguity to the end.
Despite the questions surrounding the integrity of Alcestis' motives, Euripides still links her in some
ways to a goddess as Admetus declares that ʹσοφῇ δὲ χειρὶ τεκτόνων δέμας τὸ σὸν / εἰκασθὲν ἐν
λέκτροισιν ἐκταθήσεται, / ᾧ προσπεσοῦμαιʹ (I shall bid a cunning sculptor carve your image in stone,
/ And it shall lie stretched on our bed, and I shall kneel / Beside it.)12 Admetus seems to have no
doubts that his wife is selflessly motivated, although it is impossible to know whether Alcestis' longing
for 'kleos' being known would have produced a different reaction from him. Alcestis' image as a goddess
is later restated by the chorus when they sing 'τυ μβος σᾶς ἀλο χου, θεοῖσι δ᾽ ὁμοιως / τιμα σθω' (Let
her tomb be honoured like a god's).13 Although hero cults were common place in the ancient Greek
world, being worshipped in a similar way to the gods would have represented a higher status,
particularly for women who tended not be classified as heroes. This demonstrates how greatly Alcestis
is admired for the glory of her action.
In a lecture delivered by James Morwood about Sophocles Trachiniae,14 he said that ‘In Greek tragedy,
love is rarely life-enhancing’. To a great extent this assertion is true, with Euripidean examples
including Hippolytus and Medea. However, Alcestis appears as an exception, as Alcestis' love for
Admetus, in conjunction with the heroic deed of Heracles, acts not as a death-bringer but as a lifesaver for Admetus and for herself, if we choose to ignore the opinion of Diotima from Plato's
Symposium and embrace Alcestis' decision to die as an act of love.
Alcestis is furthermore apparent in the play as a loving mother; a trait not as often found in Greek
tragic women as a modern audience would expect with mothers such as Medea and Clytemnestra. By
ensuring that Admetus does not take another wife and bestow a stepmother on her children, Alcestis
attempts to secure their futures. Stepmothers, as Euripides reveals in Hippolytus, are dangerous figures
in tragedy. When Alcestis foresees that ʹοὐ γάρ σε μήτηρ οὔτε νυμφεύσει ποτὲ / οὔτ᾽ ἐν τόκοισι σοῖσι
θαρσυνεῖ, τέκνον, / παροῦσ᾽, ἵν᾽ οὐδὲν μητρὸς εὐμενέστερον,ʹ (Your own mother never will /
Arrange your bridal veil, be there to hold your hand / In childbirth, when her comfort is your deepest
need),15 Euripides conveys a profound sense of the female bound between mother and daughter which
is about to be shattered.
Although only present on stage for a short time, Euripides' Alcestis both questions and accepts the
male-dominated Greek society by valuing her husband's life more than her own in a way which must
have been unsettling for the male audience at the Dionysia. The ambiguity inherent in Alcestis'
character continues as the audience examines whether only love could have motivated her decision to
die, or whether Alcestis is not as altruistic as she might appear. Although only present on stage for a
short time, Alcestis deserves her place in the pantheon of extraordinary Greek characters through
the multiple ambiguities of purpose she forces audiences to confront.
Eur. Alc. 348-50 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
Eur. Alc. 996-7 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
14 At Bryanston school on 07/07/2014
15 Eur. Alc. 317-9 (trans. Philip Vellacott)
12
13
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Why Does Fiction Like to Create Worlds Set in the Future?
Theo Macklin
It is commonly held that all books published can be permanently and certainly defined into one of
man’s favourite systems of classification: true or false; non-fiction or fiction. After entering the latter
of these two amorphous definitions the boundaries cloud and the two self-declaring factions of Sci-fi
and Fantasy emerge. One of the ways this is achieved is by the partitioning by timeframes: Fantasy
inhabiting a never land- never been and never will be and Sci-fi: the might have been or the, scarier
yet, might be.
The reason for the creation of stories in the future yet still varies by the subject or style of story. So
we, therefore, should tackle them as reasons just as independent as the tales themselves. The type of
universe such stories are set in can be broken down into three separate regions with their own
justifications for existence: Hard science-fiction, Soft science-fiction and Dystopias.
Hard Science-Fiction
Hard Sci-fi is defined as the type of story where the laws of physics are strictly obeyed and real world
considerations taken fully into account. The simplest justification for setting a story in this accurate
future is that the reader can be fully immersed in the, although unknown, understood scene that the
author is painting. The difficulty with this argument is that often filling a book with science and the
perfect explanation for all occurrences is that, other than being a drag to read, there is no space left
for the reader to use imagination and experience the story for themselves. For this reason this category
becomes a scarce commodity as striking the balance between truth and wonder is a skill reserved to
the likes of Clarke, Asimov and Robinson.
The true purpose or hard Sci-fi is far more than perfectionism though; another explanation for this
appealing tendency to create a realistic future is to act as a forum to express ideas is a huge range of
fields. For example; Arthur C. Clarke introduced such a potent concept for orbital construction that,
in his honour, he now has a field of astro-engineering named after him. This form of discussion thus
has proven its worth due to the freedoms that the future holds over the limitations and cynicisms
introduced by a novel set either in a fantasy or alternative history.
A feature appealing to this genre, also, is that the author has the power to justify him/herself and
receive more patience than that of any less accurate kind of fiction. The power to create an invention
in hard Sci-fi that defies current perceptions of physics, chemistry or biology is treated with less
contempt thanks to the integration with hard evidential material of the rest of the story. This
outrageous contraption benefits from the perplexity induced around it by the juxtaposition,
suggesting that there are things beyond current human understanding and that, perhaps, some such
things should be sought out. As said by Clarke again in his famous second law: ‘The only way of
discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible.’
My final point on this topic, however, is that hard science-fiction is another rung in the ladder of
learning that we all constantly climb. True science can inspire. To a huge extent its influence is
designed to enrapture the next generation of scientists-cum- Sci-fi writers. In a similar way, in
1984(unrelated to the book) a revolutionary video game, Elite, was released- a technical revolutionand its creator David Braben was, in 2014, awarded an OBE for his work which had acted to kick start
for the British computer science industry. Thus in this way hard science-fiction acts as an inspiration
for a generation of new scientists; a feat that would not be accomplished had authors’ work been set
in the past with the limitations of the science of history.
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Soft Science-Fiction
Soft science-fiction is the genre of story in which the events occur in a future time yet little precedent
is put on real science. This type of Sci-fi is most often argued to find purpose in freeing the creator
from the tedium of real events. While this specification is also fulfilled by Fantasy and Alt[ernative]history these styles are limited by the stereotypes of the genre and, in the case of Alt-history, the
point of divergence from true events. Soft Sci-fi allows the writer to begin, if they wish, with a blank
slate- a new planet or social construct (or both).
Soft science-fiction must be considered also as ‘deep-escapism’; meaning that one of the reasons it
exists is to suspend the readers’ disbelief. This futuristic placement serves to extenuate the belief of
the reader, listener or watcher far more than Alt-history or Fantasy as both of those linger in the
predicament of not having happened. Whereas the future is a metaphorically open book- with the
potential to form just as described in the story the audience is engaged in: the audience cannot discard
the story as nonsense just yet.
Other than these arguments there can be made the point that a future setting is practical for the plot.
The vastness of the future means that no matter how many corners the creator imagines their
character into there is sure to be a laser gun, spacecraft or species that can get them out of it. The
future justifies otherwise impossible or ridiculous solutions; rather than Deus ex machina more Solutio
ex postero. These simplified plots make this type of story more accessible to all removing the complex
fixes necessary in a hard Sci-fi story.
The purpose of a soft Sci-fi story is to thrill rather than inspire and the means by which it does this
are equally the plot and the setting. The audience’s reaction to the setting will be instinctively stronger
than their response to the story. The setting in a soft Sci-fi story must be stronger than the plot since
the audience is without the hard science to justify their credulity. The futuristic setting for this genre
thoroughly engages the participant by making the point that this still, might just happen.
Dystopia
Dystopian stories are those set in a normally nonspecific time in the future in which the focus of the
narrative is based upon the socio-political structure. Although some dystopias are projected as a
branch of Alt-history the ratio of these to those set in the future leans so much further towards the
latter thus, in my opinion, justifying it as a major category in sci-fi.
The chief message in dystopian stories is that of a social warning. The timeframe of these novels acts
with specific function to alert the audience that they are responsible for either the creation or
prevention of such a societal construct. Many dystopias are set in very close temporal proximity to
the release of the story for example; Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World. In Four Parts. By
Lemuel Gulliver, First a Surgeon, and then a Captain of Several Ships or Gulliver’s Travels by Jonathan
Swift ends its story in 1715 yet was released in 1726, only 11 years between them. Although the
timeframe was already in the past upon release, the faraway setting still marks the story out as a Scifi dystopia rather than an Alt-history. The most famous example however of the importance of
proximity in these stories is Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell set in the titular year of 1984 yet
was released in 1949, only 35 years between release and events. This extreme proximity to future
events or, in the case of Gulliver’s Travels, the past of faraway marks out to the reader that they must
not become or become like the people they are reading about.
Another reason for the necessity of the future or faraway setting is that it is easier to incur the
audience’s thought upon the matters raised over those that occurred in the past. The events in the
future, as before said, can be stopped by the audience or at least pondered on how it might become
such or not-such. Yet events in the past are treated as though nothing can be done about them. This
reaction means that the audience does not engage with the world of the creator- they are incredulous.
Any creator benefits from passionate positive reaction to his work either by acclaim or by increased
54
sales.
The most practical reason for a future or faraway setting, however, is authorial protection. If an event
is set in the future the inspirational material is disassociated with its negative portrayal. The author
has the capacity if questioned to remove all importance from a particular body’s relation to an
antagonistic force in the story. For example Gulliver’s Travels makes a critique of the British
government at the time, yet only the most observant and those in a similar mind-set as Swift would
draw the comparison. Again in Orwell’s two most famous novels, Nineteen Eighty-Four and Animal
Farm, he makes several veiled points against Communism.
Conclusion
We can see that for a wide variety of reasons it is often favourable for creators to set their plot in a
futuristic setting. For hard Sci-fi writers these include: A credible base for the story, to allow their
story to act as a respectable scientific discussion starting point, to indirectly question current scientific
views and to springboard would be scientists into writing. For soft Sci-fi writers: To suspend their
audience’s disbelief more than other genres, to remove the necessity for complex plot workarounds
and to thrill with the potentiality of truth. For dystopias: To act as a social warning, to cause activism
against such possibilities and to protect the author from either censorship or disapproval from an
external body. Yet all these different explanations for why fiction likes to create worlds set in the future
all agree on one point and that is, to quote Kim Stanley Robinson, the fear of ‘Falling into history’.
55
My New Punctuation Mark
Theo Macklin
Casm: ¡
The English language is limited in its literary form by its two meagre expressions of nuance: the
exclamation and question marks. The lack of description, nuance and intonation conveyed by
punctuation has led to the rise of emoticons in common usage. This is a perversion of the English
language. The casm seeks to increase the range of meaning in direct speech or an address. This mark
implies meaning in a sentence in the form of humour, insincerity or sarcasm. The casm is intended
for use in direct speech and narrative wherein the narrator addresses the audience directly. These are
the chief parts of literature where humour, insincerity and sarcasm are used.
The physical mark of the casm takes the form of an upside down exclamation mark (¡), which I have
chosen thanks to a punctuation mark, used in some Ethiopic languages, of a vaguely similar purpose.
The casm is put at the end of a sentence, in the same way as most English punctuation. The casm
will replace a full stop or exclamation mark at the end of a sentence that is designed to convey humour,
insincerity or sarcasm. The function of the casm varies according to its context and the content of
the sentence or clause. The range of the casm in the sentence stretches back to the last: full stop,
semicolon, hyphen, question mark or exclamation mark. The casm when placed at the end of a
bracketed sentence encompasses the entire content of the brackets. On some occasions sarcasm and
insincerity arise in the form of a question and so the quasm (¿) is used.
The Casm to show Comedic Intent
Often in literature an author will write a sentence in dialogue which is intended to be humorous or
light-hearted. For reasons that vary, person to person, culture to culture, such a remark may not be
interpreted in the author’s intended light. This may spoil a story or confuse the reader as to the
character who made the remark’s intention. The casm can help rectify this issue by announcing the
dialogue to have had a comedic purpose even if this was not realized by the reader at the time. This
would show that the remark was not just a blatant quip or insult towards a person or group.
As an example of the casm as an aid to comedic value:
‘Depression is a side effect of dying. (Cancer is also a side effect of dying. Almost everything is, really.)’
With casm:
‘Depression is a side effect of dying. (Cancer is also a side effect of dying. Almost everything is, really¡)’
John Green, The Fault In Our Stars
The Casm to Show Sarcasm or Insincerity
Sarcasm in literature will sometimes cause confusion to the reader for it may appear solely as
contradiction. When spoken an intonation is put on the voice that helps to distinguish it. But sarcasm
and insincerity are very specific forms of humour that is sometimes too subtle to be picked out of
literature. The casm notifies the reader that a remark was sarcastic or insincere which can give
characterization to the speaker and help distinguish their honest opinion from the contradiction.
56
An example of the casm to illustrate sarcasm:
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
With casm:
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man¡
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, spoken by Marc Anthony
This quote is from the ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears;’ speech in which Marc
Anthony announces Julius Caesar’s death. Since Brutus murdered Caesar, the sarcasm in this is that
the people believe Brutus is honourable yet he is not and so Marc Anthony is playing on their beliefs.
As an example of the casm as an aid to insincerity:
‘How pleasant it is to spend an evening in this way! I declare after all there is no enjoyment like reading! How
much sooner one tires of anything than of a book!’
With casm:
‘How pleasant it is to spend an evening in this way¡ I declare after all there is no enjoyment like reading¡ How
much sooner one tires of anything than of a book¡’
Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice
Spoken by Miss Bingley to Elizabeth Bennett, the former is actually contemptuous of the latter’s
scholarly pursuits.
The Quasm
Occasionally in conversation sarcasm or insincerity arises in the form of a question. In literature at
the moment there is no way for an author to distinguish between a normal question and a sarcastic
question. If one merely used a casm, then it would not fit the English language’s requirement to end
a question with the appropriate mark. Yet if it was ended with a question mark we fall back to the
beginning of the dilemma. It is obvious therefore that a variant of the casm is necessary; the quasm.
The quasm (¿) follows the same rules as a casm yet shows that a question is sarcastic and so expects a
specific answer in reply. The quasm would also be used to punctuate a question which has been asked
insincerely for no purpose other than asking a question.
As an example of the quasm in a sarcastic question:
‘Do you really want to do that?’
With quasm:
‘Do you really want to do that¿’
The first version of this question could be a sincere enquiry yet in the second we can tell that the
speaker is mocking a suggestion that has been made.
As an example of the quasm in an insincere question:
‘Can I help you?’
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With quasm:
‘Can I help you¿’
In these versions it is unclear whether the first is an earnest question yet the second is clearly a
question to no end.
Defence of the Casm
To defend this punctuation mark, I have drawn up what I believe to be the chief arguments against
the casm to which I will rebut.
English has been fine without this for so long, why is it necessary?
In several Ethiopic languages in common usage, the temherte slaqî fulfils a role similar in some respects
to the casm which is in common usage today. Surely this mark must make a difference to their literature
for the better or it would have been discarded long ago.
As the world has further and further globalized, there has been a need for other cultures to learn
English. English has many nuances which do not occur in other languages; therefore it will ease
language learning by simplification of themes and implied concepts. The reduction of potential
confusion in language will also help children learn to analyse books and learn about the rich literary
principles of insincerity, sarcasm and humour.
As with all languages, English has evolved and the casm helps to do so. Some comedy has become
more subtle than in previous periods. This change has also increased the prominence of such humour
as sarcasm to the point where it warrants its own punctuation. The casm fulfils this role.
With the advent of the digital age many activities have become faster. The average child is reading
less and less. The casm speeds up literature by removing some of the extraneous description around
dialogue and by so doing should improve accessibility to reading.
The casm will make authors lazy
The casm will allow authors to be more descriptive in characterization and be able to convey more of
their story through dialogue. The casm will not make authors lazy but open up a new type of literature
and literary conversation which is more focused around parallels to actual speech. Removing the heavy
description currently necessary will allow authors to balance the pace of their books. This means they
would be able to put more effort into the parts of the story where description is better directed. This
would enhance the overall quality of books.
Authors would not be forced to use the casm. This means that if they wished to pursue a theme or
genre that required obscurity or inscrutability in dialogue or prose, for example; a murder mystery,
the style would stay the same as current writing. However, the casm will result in authors formulating
new genres and literature evolving from where it is today.
Would a person accustomed to reading with the casm be shut out of classic literature?
No, a person used to using the casm would still be able to appreciate pre-casm literature as exposure
to post-casm literature would encourage them to try out a new genre of literature that they may have
been wary of before. The casm would help them see patterns in literary humour which they could
apply to classics.
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Conclusion
It is hopefully clear now that the casm and quasm are punctuation which would be useful and
advancing to English literature. They have the ability to engage other countries in English literature
and the ability to progress English humour. Surely, that makes sense¿
59
How does Livy explore and subvert Roman morality in his
narrative of the rape and suicide of Lucretia?
Raffy Marshall
Shakespeare called her ‘Chaste Lucretia… this earthly Saint’, early feminist Thomas Day, seeking to
mould a 12 year French orphan into his ideal Rousseauian wife named the child after her while
Benjamin Britten’s Opera The Rape of Lucretia (1946) appropriates Lucretia’s purity to explore
Christian sacrifice.1 Livy’s Lucretia is seared into the public imagination as a passive and submissive
ideal of Roman womanhood. The moral ambiguity and complexity of Livy’s Lucretian tragedy can
become lost amongst assumption and simplification. Lucretia is defined by her tragic dilemma she
faces and the internal contradictions she comes to embody; perceptive readers must reconstruct and
reconsider Lucretia’s dilemmas while grappling with the spectre of female irrationality which threatens
her responses. By exploring the tragedy through three encounters with men, recording Lucretia’s
thought as perceived by these male viewers, Livy mystifies Lucretia’s motives and emotions forcing
readers to perceive her as an inexplicable and potentially irrational ‘other’. Livy’s voyeuristic tragedy
constructs, examines and subverts Roman moral structures with extraordinary subtlety and incision
plunging readers into contemporary debate about the roman state and the role of the female in its
moral structures.
Foundational and civic myth constituted ‘a vector for the culture of the state and an embodiment of
its values and sense of identity’ and a medium for the exploration and subversion of morality2.
Perceiving a decline in Roman morality and identity Livy reconstructed the distant past as a didactic
weapon. This appropriation occurred within a murderous struggle to control and define the Roman
state: Livy’s contemporary Augustus celebrated his Principate as a restoration of traditional Roman
morality and government, while for opponents it devalued and mocked Rome’s ancient political
institutions. Roman male morality focused upon the application and control of violence; unregulated
violence and warfare threatened the state and peace was considered an enervating threat to the public
morality. In 157 BC the Senate declared war on Dalmatia to avoid the moral corruption of peace while
Livy’s Manilius Torquatus executed his victorious son for illegally giving battle.3 To adapt JeanPierre Vernant (talking of the ancient Greeks) marriage was to a Roman woman as war was to a man4.
The exchange of sexual access to women among fathers and husbands ‘defused hostility among men’,
while enabling the birth of new citizens.5 The Sabine Women embody this complex role; objects in
an (involuntary) exchange of sexual access, they prevent conflict by interposing their bodies between
their warring fathers and husbands while evoking the combatants’ shared love for their potential
children (Livy 1.13). To the Roman mind unbridled female sexuality was a destructive as uncontrolled
warfare; promiscuity threatened the exchange of sexual access and the birth of legitimate children.
While the institutions of state warfare contained male violence, female sexuality was co-opted within
patriarchal marriage institutions. Marriage institutions emphasized female submission and women’s
exclusion from the political, military and literary spheres but women could gain agency through
compliance6. A trusted wife exercised authority within the domestic sphere and might influence the
Shakespeare, The Rape of Lucretia A History of Britain - Volume 3, the Fate of Empire, Simon Schama Renewal in
Britten’s Rape of Lucretia, Michael Fuller
2 Dora C. Pozzi and John M. Wickersham, Introduction, Myth and the Polis (New York; Cornell University Press) 1991.
HMS Drew Conceiving the role of Women in Livy’s narratives of the Early Roman State
3 P10, William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC ( Oxford, Oxford University Press) 1979
and Joshel, S. R. The Body Female and the Body Politic: Livy's Lucretia and Verginia, in Sexuality and Gender in the
Classical World (ed L. K. McClure), Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford (2002)
4 Vernant 1980b:23 quoted in Helene P. Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton and Woodstock; Princeton
University Press) 2001.
5 Helene P. Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton and Woodstock; Princeton University Press) 2001
6 Conceiving the role of women in Livy’s narratives of the early roman state, HMS Drew
1
60
political sphere through her sons and husbands.
Livy presents Lucretia as an embodiment of this empowering submission. A party of young
aristocrats ‘Lucretiam… nocte sera deditam lanae inter lucubrantes ancillas in medio aedium sedentem
inveniunt’7. The authoritative position of ‘Lucretiam’ contrasts with its accusative form and subjection
to (male subject) of the verb ‘inveniunt’8. Lucretia’s position ‘in medio aedium’ (the exact centre of
the house) and ‘inter… ancillas’ emphasizes her devoted emersion in the female domestic sphere. The
aedes was the locus of submissive womanhood, sacred to the goddess Vesta and associated with
cooking and warmth. But ‘Aedium’ also translates as tomb foreshadowing Lucretia’s fate9. The soft,
white ‘lanae’ symbolizes Lucretia’s own purity, while her weaving alludes to the Homeric paragon
Penelope. Initially, Lucretia is therefore a moral exemplum.
The young aristocrats deem Lucretia the most virtuous wife in Rome but Livy questions the conduct
of these self-appointed judges. After the failure of the Ardean military campaign they have indulged
in luxury and drinking; ‘interdum otium conviviis comisationibusque inter se terbant’.10 The
aristocrats have betrayed the morality they claim to represent; ‘otium’ is antithetical to the negotium
(military duties) which should concern the officers while ‘conviviis comisationibusque’ suggest
dissolution and degeneracy. The officers’ assessment of their wives morality during this bout of
drunken negligence is a deliciously ironic attack on hypocritical moralizers.
Inspired by her virtue, Sextus Tarquinius subsequently attempts to rape Lucretia declaring ‘tace,
Lucretia. Sextus Tarquinius sum.’ Livy juxtaposes Tarquinius’ symbolically disempowering demand
for silence with his assertion of identity; Sextus’ identity is derived from the suppression of Lucretia’s.
‘Manu’ evokes roman marriage ‘cum manu’ implying Sextus perceives his position entitles him to
Lucretia.11 Employing the language of warfare Livy suggests Sextus associates the act with legitimate
sexual violence directed against captured foreign women in war. Livy therefore uses Lucretia to expose
the despotic nature of the Roman monarchy. Ignoring conceptual divisions, Sextus exercises the same
dominion over Roman citizens as over foreigner slaves.12 Livy’s framing of the incident within the
context of warfare asks troubling questions about Roman warfare: does the crime arise because the
brutality of Roman warfare inherently fails to obey the status distinctions of Roman society or
because the failure of the Ardean campaign leaves Tarquinius no opportunity for legitimate violence?
Lucretia remains ‘obstinatam’ until Sextus declares ‘cum mortua iugulatum servum nudum positurum
ait ut in sordid adulterio necata’, offering a choice between rape and the destruction of her life and
identity.13 Livy’s readers enter the chamber with Sextus and are privy to his lust but Lucretia’s
thoughts remain concealed. When Lucretia submits even the rape itself is merely perceived as
conquest for Sextus (‘vicisset’) from which Lucretia is peculiarly absent. Readers therefore view
Lucretia’s decision to submit through the eyes of her rapist, a mystification which forces us to
reconstruct her reasoning, transforming Lucretia into a space for engagement with Roman moral
structures.
Lucretia’s decision to sacrifice the reality of her virtue to illicit penetration rather than merely her
reputation for virtue suggests she may perceive morality to be an appearance rather an internalized
code. Chaste Lucretia may be virtuous due to love of reputation rather than love of virtue itself.
Certainly, the reader consistently views her from a superficial external viewpoint. Livy may imply
Lucretia’s choice arises from female superficiality and irrationality, reflecting widespread classical
assumptions; Solon’s much admired legal code considered women as inimical to male reasoning as
drugs or mental illness (Plutarch, Solon 21.3) whilst Aristotle considered women deformed men who,
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.57
Conceiving the role of women in Livy’s narratives of the early roman state, HMS Drew
9 http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/aedis
10 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.57
11 http://www.roman-empire.net/society/soc-marriage.html
12 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC (Oxford, Oxford University Press) 1979.
13 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.58
7
8
61
utterly incapable of rational thought, were suited to silence and submission14.
However, even within the Roman moral frameworks Lucretia’s choice can be conceived as both rational
and honourable. Sextus Tarquinius’ murder of Lucretia would significantly weaken the despotic
Roman monarchy, and her execution as an adulteress would further weaken traditional morality. The
absence of emotional description appears to suggest a rational and self-possessed choice. This
interpretation suggests a Lucretia who remains politically and morally conscious within the structures
of patriarchal state morality: Lucretia retains rationality and morality even during the uniquely female
experience of penetration.
Sextus’ actions force Lucretia to emerge from the purely domestic sphere into the male realm of
politics. Bravely summoning her father and husband, Lucretia chooses to interact with the political
sphere exclusively through her male relations, however to force them into revolutionary action against
the despotic monarchy Lucretia must abandon the submission of her female role. Lucretia’s feminine
tears (‘Lacrimae’) contrast with her aggressive appropriation of male oratory: ‘minime … quid enim
salvi est mulieri amissa pudicia? Vestigial viri alieni, collatine, in lecto sunt tuo; ceterum corpus est
tantum violatum, animus insons; mors testis erit. Sed date dexteras fidemque haud inpune adultero
fore. Sex. est Tarquinius, qui hostis pro hospite priore nocte vi armatus mihi sibique. Si vos viri estis,
pestiferum hinc abstulit gaudium.’
Transcending and problematizing gender boundaries Lucretia’s speech is an extraordinary
combination of confrontation and submission. Her rape becomes merely a threatening penetration of
Tarquin’s space (‘lecto sunt tuo’), defining womanhood as akin to property. But Lucretia challenges
her relative’s masculinity with her conditional phrase ‘si vos viri estis’. By implication her husband’s
effeminate neglect of male martial values has created a crisis of gender definition. Lucretia therefore
attempts to reconstruct the Roman social roles immorality has destroyed. Lucretia forces the male
political and moral leadership on her husband and redefines herself as property.
Lucretia’s suicide appears to assert a right to an independent consideration of morality but
paradoxically she employs her stolen agency to champion patriarchal institutions. Rejecting her
husband’s absolution for her perceive pollution, Lucretia sacrifices her life to protect narratives which
specifically deprive women of agency. Her final words are a patriarchal moral manifesto, ‘nec ulla
deinde inpudica Lucretiae exemplo’, appearing to accuse her husband of overly forgiving sentiments,
while reaffirming patriarchal conceptions of sexual pollution.
Despite her self-sacrificing devotion to patriarchy, Lucretia’s political leadership is a problematic
dislocation resolved only by her death. Lucretia’s effort to protect virtue from despotism paradoxically
forces her to sacrifice the female submission and domesticity endangering Rome’s gender roles.
Moreover, Lucretia’s frenzied rejection of male morality echoes perverted female moralities of
classical literature (such as Medea’s infanticidal distorted morality). Lucretia’s prominent role in a
Roman historical narrative constitutes by definition an intrusion.
Livy’s Lucretia is not merely a passive and chaste wife but a moral actor whose dilemmas create a
space for Livy’s male readership to explore the boundaries of morality. The presentation of Lucretia’s
actions exclusively through male voyeurs force readers to form personal interpretations and engage
with Rome’s legacy. Lucretia constitutes a female other whose moral decisions serve to explore and
promote male identity and morality. Though initially an exemplum of chaste morality, Lucretia
becomes increasingly problematic and morally ambiguous. Lucretia’s submission to Tarquinius’ rape
suggests female moral superficiality and problematically intrudes into the male sphere of politics
while her seemingly irrational rejection of her husband’s affectionate forgiveness in favour of morally
justified self-destruction seems to cast doubt on women’s ability to exercise moral agency. Indeed,
Lucretia becomes defined by her confrontational patriarchalism’s paradoxical conflict with the social
14
P110 Helene P. Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton and Woodstock; Princeton University Press) 2001
62
institutions she seeks to champion and protect. Livy’s Lucretia therefore constitutes a fascinating
microcosm of Roman morality and womanhood.
Bibliography
P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (New York, W.W Norton and Company) 1971
HMS Drew, Conceiving the role of women in Livy’s narratives of the early Roman state
Helene P. Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton and Woodstock; Princeton University Press) 2001
William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
1979
Joshel, S. R. The Female Body and the Body Politic: Livy's Lucretia and Verginia, in Sexuality and Gender in
the Classical World (ed L. K. McClure), Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford (2002)
Dora C. Pozzi and John M. Wickersham, Introduction, Myth and the Polis (New York; Cornell University
Press) 1991
Euripides, Medea
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita
Sallust, Catiline’s War
63
Why is Africa poor?
Alex McCaffrey
The World Bank defines poverty as living on less than $1.25 a day. Ten years ago 58% of people in
sub-Saharan Africa qualified as poor. Today that figure has dropped to 48%, things are improving1.
But Africa still has too many people living in poverty and even those above the threshold are living
on a hand to mouth basis. Whilst Africa is a diverse set of nations, with different histories and cultures
there are several recurring themes that I wish to consider – namely the role of aid, the legacy of
colonization and the resource curse. These themes underlie the corruption and conflict that hinder
Africa so badly. I focus on the Sub-Saharan countries excluding South Africa. That country’s unique
history – early colonization, the Boer Wars, Apartheid, democracy – follows a path that puts it beyond
the scope of this essay.
Aid
African countries have been massive recipients of Aid in the last 50 years. Over $300 billion has been
pumped in with the intent of transforming the continent. Unfortunately however the effect has been
underwhelming, at best this money has been the difference between stagnation and severe cumulative
decline. In some cases however, aid can have decidedly negative effects.
In order to explain where the money has gone and why it hasn’t achieved what we hoped we need to
look at how it’s delivered.
The World Bank and the IMF (the two Bretton Woods agencies) are two institutions adopting similar
approaches to aid and Africa. Both invest heavily in aid programmes without any obvious success. An
IMF paper from 2007 said: ‘IMF-supported programs have done little to address poverty reduction
and income distributional issues despite institutional rhetoric to the contrary.’2
The dominance of Keynesian ideas at the birth of the IMF and the World Bank was soon overturned
after the apparent success of the ‘Chicago boys’ and their policies in Chile. This culminated in the
IMF and World Bank insider John Williamson declaring the Washington consensus as ‘the common
core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists’.3 The aid industry fell into the pitfall of simple
ideology, all questions answered by the beautiful free market. Naomi Klein claims the consensus was
‘nothing less than Friedman’s neoliberal triumvirate of privatization, deregulation/free trade and
drastic cuts to government spending’4
The rise of western free markets would not have been possible without state intervention. Infant
industry protection was necessary to nurture industries in western economies to produce the dynamic,
innovative free markets we see today. This kind of protection is not allowed in many African countries,
who accept aid agreements banning the effective use of tariffs. This chokes off opportunities in low–
end manufacturing which have proved so successful in Asian developing economies.
Another distinct type of aid is direct transfers from government to government. This type of aid took
off during the Cold War era. African countries were effectively proxies for the west and the eastern
bloc. There was little interest in encouraging good governance and growth; donors were focused on
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty
‘The IMF and Aid to Sub‑Saharan Africa’ by Joanne Salop et al (2007)
3 ‘Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’’ by John Williamson (1989)
4 ‘The Shock Doctrine’ by Naomi Klein (2007) p163
1
2
64
finding African leaders up for sale. The end of the Cold War also saw the end of this type of aid.
These Aid agreements often revolve around something called conditionalities, where by the donor
country can decide when and on what the money is spent on. This has led to the phrase ‘boomerang
aid’; ironically this can be used to offer a type of industry protection to firms in the donor country
that is at complete odds with the Washington Consensus. Donor dollars are repatriated by insisting
on the purchase of goods or technical services from certain firms. Western firms in the construction
and defence sectors have been notable beneficiaries, with this aid helping boost their profits,
employment numbers and tax contribution. Aid given with the considerations of the donor in mind
simply isn’t effective; it isn’t targeted at the needs of the recipient country. It leaves a legacy of white
elephant project (pointless dams, empty airports, weapons which are later used to fuel internal conflict)
rather than tackling central economic issues. A Chatham House report summarizes the situation ‘British commercial interests, including arms sales, had been promoted in Africa with little regard for
human rights and governance. If many African states were corrupt it was in part because western
business, including British businesses, allowed them and in some cases encouraged them to be corrupt.’
5
China is investing more and more in Africa. However as the majority of the companies it deals with
are owned or partly owned by the Chinese state there is suspicion that this investment may be aid in
disguise. Both China and the U.S have focused heavily on Africa as competition for resources increases.
It reflects a growing desperation to strengthen their foothold in resource rich countries all the while
beating the drum for ending poverty. If Chinese and U.S. efforts don’t have Africa’s interests at heart
it is unlikely to encourage good governance or growth. Lamido Sanusi, governor of the central bank
of Nigeria, said ‘China is no longer a fellow under-developed economy - it is the world's secondbiggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the west. It is a significant contributor to Africa's
deindustrialization and underdevelopment.’6
But what does aid do once it’s got there? A large injection of cash is always going to distort an
economy, no matter how robust. But because African nations receiving aid are usually stagnant
economically and unstable politically, they are particularly susceptible.
The first threat aid poses is to the export sector. As domestic currency appreciates exportable goods
become less competitive in the global market, whilst imports that threaten domestic industry become
cheaper. Given that exports are an established path for poor countries to establish growth this effect
is especially damaging.
Governments dependent on their citizens’ taxes are more likely to be held accountable by those
citizens and thus more likely to make sound economic decisions. It seems that it is easier to steal
foreign aid than it is domestic taxes. Essentially aid weakens the power of democracy by supplying
governments with an alternate source of funds which means they are less accountable to their citizens.
Aid money distorts the economy in less obvious ways too. Entrepreneurial talent that could innovate
and take the risks that are required to see growth is instead focussed on capturing a slice of the cake.
Natural resources
The vast mineral wealth of Africa would seemingly be a blessing for the continent. Indeed resources
produce a lot of money for Africa – however the effect of this money is complex and surprisingly
destructive.
Resource sales, like any cause of influx of money, drive up the price of local currency. This in turn
makes it difficult for exporters and makes imports relatively cheap. The Zambian copper boom
5
6
‘British government policy in sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour’ by Tom Porteous (2007)
‘Africa must get real about Chinese ties’ Financial Times (2013)
65
managed to push up the prices in the local tourist industry and the agricultural exports business,
rendering them uncompetitive. Meanwhile the vast profits from copper were largely enjoyed outside
Zambia by shareholders in Anglo-American and Chinese firms (the Chinese even brought in their own
workers instead of hiring and transferring skill to local Zambians). As with aid, the large pot of
money that comes with resources diverts the attention of entrepreneurs.
The allure of that money can also be fuel for rebellion and civil war. Collier quotes the Zairean rebel
leader, Laurent Kabila – ‘All I need to start an uprising is $10,000 and a satellite phone’7. The money
is sufficient to raise a small army and the phone is required to negotiate business deals for the country’s
natural resources. Kabila reportedly made $500 million worth of deals with foreign businesses,
promising them resource concessions in the case of a rebel victory in exchange for funds.
The increased chance of conflict these resources bring can be very damaging to a countries economy.
Civil wars are both expensive and likely to recur. Civil wars evoke a strong response from the
international community, one that often heralds a sharp decline in foreign investment and aid. Capital
stock and infrastructure are lost during a civil war, through being destroyed or just not maintained,
making this drop in investment particularly damaging. Rape and mass migration make people
particularly vulnerable to disease. Collier claims more people die from disease in civil wars than in
actual fighting. Resources act as both an incentive and fuel for this.
Colonization
Any understanding of present-day Sub-Saharan Africa requires serious consideration of its colonial
past. The major European powers turned their eyes to Africa in the second half of the 19th century,
with a view to exploiting the ‘Dark Continent’, but ostensibly saving it with the introduction of
Commerce and Christianity. Colonization required that some infrastructure was built, and some
education introduced, as local administrators with elementary literacy and numeracy were required
to work under Colonial representatives. There was little benefit to Africans beyond this. There was
little transfer of technical skills while indigenous industry and institutions weren’t nurtured. These
deficiencies became apparent during the 1960s when Africa was largely decolonized. Without the
insulation of imperial powers African countries found themselves in trouble. There were virtually no
indigenous university graduates. Legal codes, property rights and local administrative policies had
been grafted directly from colonizing countries, only modified to facilitate efficient colonization rather
than to accommodate local customs and needs. Given the role of indigenous people in colonized
countries there was a lack of a political class when European powers withdrew. Supply of experienced
leaders was low and post-colonial governments were poor.
Another legacy of colonization is the arbitrary nature of borders. There is a special band of countries
in Africa that experience the worst growth rates of the entire continent. These are countries that are
both landlocked and don’t have natural resource wealth, examples include Rwanda, Burundi and South
Sudan. These countries do so badly because they rely on their neighbours transport infrastructure to
export. Landlocked countries with resources can afford to incur higher transport costs as what they
are selling is so valuable, those without resources tend to have inward facing economies. Outside Africa
1% of the population live in countries like these. Collier observes that ‘Around 30% of Africa’s
population lie in landlocked, resource-scarce countries. A reasonable case can be made that such places
never should have become countries’8. The disparity between the two figures, and thus the exporting
difficulties many African countries experience, is because of the European partitioning of Africa.
European powers paid no consideration as to how the states they drew up could ever be independent
countries; instead they drew borders according to how they would impact their own gains. African
countries suffer because of this today.
Research by William Easterly identifies two effects of imposed artificial borders. The first explains
7
8
‘The Bottom Billion’ by Paul Collier (2007) p21
‘The Bottom Billion’ by Paul Collier (2007) p57
66
the effect on the heterogeneity of populations, ‘Former colonies with a high share of partitioned
peoples do worse today on democracy, government service delivery, rule of law and corruption9. The
second effect is the relationship between straight line borders, decreased democracy and increased
social ills. Straight line borders perfectly illustrate an imposed rule rather than organic, free growth
geographically, economically and politically. Easterly observes ‘The straight hand of the colonial
mapmaker is discernible in outcomes decades later’.10
Conclusion
Where to go from here? For too long Africa’s development has been blocked by predatory politics,
whether it be colonial powers, rebel leaders or politicians that choose to forgo economic growth in
exchange for private gain. African governments must work to stop this. One way in which they can
do this is weaning themselves off aid and limiting foreign influence over their policies. Internal change
is also necessary, African governments are husks of what they need to be. Internal reform targeting
corruption and strengthening democracy will improve this. The IMF and World Bank also have a
responsibility – infant industries must be offered some protection from globalization initially.
Sustainable resource management and an end to conflict are both more likely given these changes.
Western firms and governments need to accept responsibility for quashing corruption and conflict
and hopefully begin to consider Africa’s needs as well as their own.
Bibliography
‘Dead Aid’ by Dambisa Moyo (2009)
‘The White Man’s Burden’ by William Easterly (2006)
‘The Bottom Billion’ by Paul Collier (2007)
‘False Economy’ by Alan Beattie (2009)
‘The State of Africa’ by Martin Meredith (2005)
‘Economics: The User’s Guide’ by Ha-Joon Chang (2014)
‘The Shock Doctrine’ by Naomi Klein (2007)
‘Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’ by John Williamson (1989)
http://www.visionaryvalues.com/wiki/images/Williamson_DemocracyandWashingtonConsensus.pdf
‘Civil War, Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth’ by Seunjou Kang and James
Meerkik (2007) - http://www.jstor.org/stable/3449706
‘Artificial States’ by Alberto Alesina, William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski (February 2006)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12328
‘Africa must get real about Chinese ties’ Financial Times (2013)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3BgWhj3LC
‘British government policy in sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour’ by Tom Porteous (2007)
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/
Blanket%20File%20Import/inta_450.pdf
‘Africa must get real about Chinese ties’ Financial Times (2013)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3BgWhj3LC
‘The IMF and Aid to Sub‑Saharan Africa’ by Joanne Salop et al (2007)
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2007/ssa/eng/pdf/report.pdf.
‘AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa’ by Emira Woods and Ezekiel Pajibo (2007)
http://fpif.org/africom_wrong_for_liberia_disastrous_for_africa/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_population
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Genocide
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botswana
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty
9
‘The White Man’s Burden’ by William Easterly (2006) p257
‘The White Man’s Burden’ by William Easterly (2006) p257
10
67
German art since 1945
Max Nugent
That the experiences of its past since 1945 have left an indelible impact on the German psyche is
without doubt. The physical scars have largely disappeared; Berlin, a wasteland that in 1945 stood as
little more than rubble, is once again a thriving European metropolis; the discordant styles of West
German and Soviet architecture that divided Germany are now largely integrated. But the guilt, that
so many could have collaborated with the Nazi regime or the GDR, remains strong. In this essay I
will explore the extent of this strength on modern artistic output in Germany. For, in order to see
the most fundamental issues of the day in any society, one must look no further than the serious
contemporary literature; together with the modern media of film and television it indeed acts as ‘the
seismograph of a people’s moral positions’ (Schlant, 1999, p.2). But the more difficult question is
perhaps that of ‘how?’ In this essay I will endeavour to demonstrate the ways in which German artistic
output has been shaped and influenced by Germany’s history, as German writers and authors attempt
to come to terms with their country’s past.
It seems fair to say that German artistic output has been remarkably influenced by the experiences of
World War Two and life under the GDR. To gauge the extent of this influence I have simply consulted
the most up-to-date bestseller lists for paperback and hardback fiction books, as well as a list of
winners of the prestigious German Book Prize. There is a noticeable trend – the more ‘highbrow’ the
books are, the more they are influenced by Germany’s past. Of the 20 paperback bestsellers, not one
addressed the National Socialist or East German past. For the 20 hardback bestsellers, the figure rises
to two. However, since its initiation in 2005, the German Book Prize has awarded five of its nine prizes
to books which deal with Germany’s Nazi and GDR past1. The significant disparity in these numbers
suggests that Germany’s past is not a topic at the forefront of the public’s mind, but nonetheless a
deep-rooted issue that needs addressing.
I shall first deal with the influence of World War Two on German literature.
German artistic output on the topic of World War Two has often been criticized for portraying those
who worked for or collaborated with the Nazis as wholly human and sympathetic characters. However,
this tendency in German artistic output seems to arise not from a desire to provide excuses2 but from
the need to understand the involvement of apparently ordinary people in extraordinary atrocities.
The simplest explanation for this is that the Germans, of all the nations of Europe, are the most
determined to prevent such events ever occurring again3. But for the Germans, the comforting ability
to portray the Nazis and their supporters as evil madmen, a belief held by almost every other country,
is not present. They generally accept the reality that the Nazis garnered widespread support, and then
persuaded a generation of normal Germans to commit or overlook atrocities. So to understand why
entails understanding the motivations of normal people who were persuaded to do terrible things.
Furthermore, there is a personal connection to the perpetrators felt by the German populace4. There
existed a bewildering contradiction for the generation after the war between their friends and family,
One must note that award of the German Book Prize is decided by a panel of judges, not readership or sales figures; thus
it is more likely to be awarded to books which are well-written and explore interesting issues, rather than books which
are simply enjoyable to read.
2 Many critics have levelled this accusation at German artistic output. A review by the Guardian, for example, criticizes
Generation War for ‘suggesting [that] most Germans, symbolized by this quintet, were basically good guys misled by the
real Nazis, who are a kind of symbolic Other on to which war guilt can be projected’ (The Guardian, 2014).
3 It is perhaps telling that it is not in the countries that fought Nazi Germany, but rather in Germany itself, that such actions
as holocaust denial or the Nazi salute are illegal.
4 Indeed, Generation War was entitled Unsere Mütter, Unsere Väter (Our Mothers, Our Fathers) in Germany.
1
68
and the people who committed or overlooked atrocities in the war5. In addition to the fact that it was
patently obvious that these people were not all monsters6, there was a need to understand how loved
ones could have done such things. This is the tension that exists in German artistic output – to prevent
such events happening again requires understanding why people committed them, but this
understanding can be seen to provide excuses for their actions.
However, the influence of Germany’s past in WWII is not simply confined to the artistic output that
deals directly with the war. Difficult themes raised by Germany’s past are also often confronted in
other literature and films that do not directly confront this topic.
The Visit is a well-known example. Dürenmatt paints a compelling picture of a town of ordinary
Germans who are led to consent to the killing of a man who had never done anything wrong to them.
However, these people are normal, civilized human beings7 – indeed, it is vital to note that of the many
townspeople who voted unanimously for Alfred Ill’s death, only one townsman actually commits the
murder. The others are not prepared to do so themselves, and even the doors are locked and lights
dimmed when he is killed, seemingly because even seeing the murder would be too distressing for
most of the townspeople8. With a few ringleaders prepared to commit the murder, all the townspeople
have to do is simply vote and then receive the tangible rewards for themselves. The play carries strong
parallels to the tacit consent of the German population to atrocities by their army and the deportation
of the Jews to labour camps, both of which the population was aware of, but for which there was a
definite distance from the acts themselves as well as tangible rewards for consenting to them.9
Perhaps the most important theme in German post-war art that attempts to address issues raised by
that period is the question of guilt – where other art tends to condemn all those who worked for the
Nazis, German art often explores the difficulty of apportioning guilt to different people.
The Counterfeiters (a film released in 2006) poses an interesting question as to the guilt of the Jews at
Sachsenhausen who collaborated with the Nazis to forge banknotes. Criticizing them for this would
seem unfair – they were in a concentration camp, and refusing to cooperate would have almost
certainly spelled their death. And while we are probably most sympathetic to the situation of these
men, this question can be applied to more ambiguous moral circumstances, such as that of Herzog,
the head of the operation. As a concentration camp officer, fully aware of the horrors occurring in the
wider camp10, many would see him as fully guilty. Yet, he makes sure to provide relative comfort and
security for his charges. Furthermore, he is almost certainly in a closed situation. Refusing his
superiors’ demand to head up the operation would only result in his demotion or punishment, and the
appointment of a more brutal commander for the forgers. Does this lessen his guilt?
The difficulty of assigning guilt is also a main theme of the controversial Generation War TV series.
The case of Friedhelm is particularly difficult. As a pacifist, he was strongly against war. However, he
was called up to the Russian front, and had no choice but to obey. There, he protested against
questionable acts (like his brother’s execution of a captured commissar) and even managed to save the
life of an 11-year old Jew about to be executed. However, by episode two (after witnessing a number
of atrocities,) he realized the pointlessness of protest11. When ordered to shoot civilians, he did so in
In his Guilt about the Past, for example, Schlink talks about a friendly English teacher who had been in the Gestapo, or a
kindly law professor who had previously written essays on the necessary exclusion of the Jews. (Schlink, 2009, Loc. 1014
– Loc.1035)
6 Schlink writes of the over simplicity of ‘the desire for a world where those who commit monstrous crimes are always
monsters’ (Schlink, 2009, Loc. 1003).
7 One must remember the initial vehement protestations of the townspeople at the announcement of Claire’s offer.
8 Some might argue that the lights are turned out to preserve the charade of a ‘heart attack’, but this seems unlikely and
pointless given the patent obviousness of the imminent murder – indeed they have all only just voted to kill Alfred Ill.
9 In this case, not speaking out carried the significant reward of not being arrested and possibly executed by the Nazi
authorities.
10 Not only is he fully aware of the horrors, but quite unaffected by them - Indeed, at one point in the film we hear him
reprimanding a camp guard, not for callously shooting dead a prisoner, but for firing the shots too close to his forgers’
compound, thus risking his workers’ lives.
11 This is perhaps due to the terrible things he has witnessed, including the shooting of the 11-year old girl he had just saved
5
69
cold blood, in the knowledge that if he refused, he would be punished and another soldier would do
the job anyway. As Friedhelm said ‘the war will bring out the worst in us’ (Generation War, 2014) –
but are we to blame them or the war for that?
The White Ribbon (a film released in 2010) also touches on the difficulty of assigning guilt. Of all the
inhabitants, we are left asking ourselves who is actually guilty. The children (allegedly) committed the
crimes, but that is only a result of their very difficult upbringing. Should we blame the parents then;
the Pastor for his extreme harshness and the doctor for his abuse? The adults, however, are only
behaving in a manner they see as normal. The Pastor is adhering to his view of Christian principles,
and the doctor’s behaviour is sadly not unusual in such a patriarchal society. So who are we to blame?
This carries parallels to the end of World War Two; everyone tried to pass the blame on, with the
guilt travelling up the command structure to Hitler himself, who was, conveniently, dead. But Er ist
wieder da, while comical in its presentation of Hitler as a person in today’s society, conveys an
important message: Hitler was just one person, like any of us, and without mass popular support and
cooperation he could not have created the Third Reich.
The Reader is perhaps the most well-known German novel that attempts to deal with the problem of
guilt. Hanna raises the issue of all those who worked for the Third Reich – she feels that she did
nothing wrong12 and claims that all she ever did was follow orders. She genuinely felt that she had no
other choice – indeed, in the trial she asks the Judge in all honesty ‘what would you have done?’
(Schlink, 1997, p.110). In such a situation where she doesn’t understand what she has done wrong,
how is it fair to condemn her? Furthermore, as a concentration camp guard, she carries much guilt.
Yet she took to picking children, who she knew were soon to be killed, to read for her. Perhaps this
was purely a selfish need, as an illiterate, to be read to, but maybe it was deliberately done to remove
them from work and make their last few weeks more bearable. But the incontrovertible fact remains
that she committed an unforgiveable crime. Michael also feels a sense of guilt, and in a way represents
the generation of people that came after the war. Just like those who felt guilt for loving their parents
and relatives, Michael ‘Loves Hanna…and the feeling of guilt is from Michael knowing someone who
committed crimes like that’ (Shea, 2014).
German artistic output on the topic of the GDR has not had as much time to establish itself, and I
shall not spend as much time examining it. While German art about World War Two is mainly
interested in guilt, a stronger theme in art regarding the GDR is that of trust. One theme which often
arises in this artistic output is that of trust, and the almost total inability of anyone in the GDR to
trust each other. In The Lives of Others Donnersmarck portrays a picture of a state surveillance
apparatus that leaves no privacy for its victims whatsoever. In Barbara the titular main character is
subjected to an endless series of searches and checks by the Stasi.
German artistic output on the GDR, much like that on WWII, tends to portray the Stasi officials and
reporters as altogether more human. With some figures estimating that one third of the East German
population were Stasi informers, it is obvious for Germans that they were not all evil human beings.
What is interesting to note, however, is the reverse of the usual chain of events for such a portrayal.
We would expect to see the confluence of motivations and decisions through time that eventually lead
to the character making their decision to work for the Stasi. However, such a portrayal, in its attempt
to understand the motivations, would inevitably fall prey to the same criticism that it is seeking
excuses. Instead, in The Lives of Others we see Wiesler first as a cold Stasi agent, and then the slow
realization that he is human, like anyone else. Similarly in Barbara we are initially shown Stasi officer
Schütz as a heartless human, who conducts house- and strip-searches at will. It is only later, when we
learn that his wife is dying of cancer, that we feel sympathy for his position.
In conclusion, it is clear that, while perhaps not so much in popular, easy-to-read books, Germany’s
12
from execution.
One must remember that all Hanna needs do to refute the claim that she wrote the order is admit to her illiteracy – but
she sees it as worse to be illiterate than to have committed the crime.
70
past has certainly had a large influence on critically acclaimed artistic output. Furthermore, while art
dealing with World War Two and that dealing with the GDR are both concerned with the moral
turpitude of those respective societies, they both focus on different aspects. Art dealing with World
War Two examines guilt and, rather than foreign art, it does not unthinkingly condemn but instead
looks much more deeply at the motivations and level of guilt of those Germans who took part. Art
dealing with the GDR instead looks trust, and how among its citizens the edifice of mutual trust
largely collapsed.
Bibliography
Barbara (2012) Directed by Christian Petzold [DVD]. London: Soda Pictures
Buchreport (2014) Buchreport Hardback bestseller list. Available at:
http://www.buchreport.de/bestseller/hardcover.htm [Accessed: 24/08/2014]
Buchreport (2014) Buchreport Paperback bestseller list. Available at:
http://www.buchreport.de/bestseller/paperback.htm [Accessed: 24/08/2014]
Crawshaw, S. (2004) Easier Fatherland. Trowbridge: Cromwell Press Ltd
Gault, M. (2014) Everyone loses in Germany’s devastating World War Two epic. Available at:
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/everyone-loses-in-germanys-devastating-world-war-ii-epic5930012726d1 [Accessed: 12/08/2014]
Generation War (2014) Directed by Philipp Kadelbach [DVD]. London: Arrow Films
Jeffries, S. (2014) Generation War – Box Set Review. Available at:
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30/07/2014]
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12/08/2014]
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Schlant, E. (1999) The Language of Silence. London: Routledge
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http://www.amazon.co.uk/ (Accessed: 25/06/2014)
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71
Do some kinds of disagreements disprove the idea that one
side is right and the other wrong?
Max Nugent
At first, the assertion that there are some types of disagreements that can disprove that one side is
right and the other wrong – which would seem to abolish the very notions of truth and falsity – seem
absurd.1 However, a number of arguments do exist that seem to support the claim. Supporters cite
clear-cut examples where both sides have claimed to be solely correct, but in the end no victor can be
ascertained. Perhaps we are much the same – vigorously supporting those things which we believe to
be true, whereas in truth (or as close to the truth as can be achieved in a strictly relative world) neither
side is correct, or indeed incorrect. Nonetheless, opponents deride this claim as obviously untrue. They
claim that supporters of the titular claim have conflated matters of opinion and those of fact. Perhaps
disagreements over opinion are relative, they concede, but facts are facts. If you disagree, then you are
incorrect.
Relativists sometimes make use of the following example in defence of their claims: Peter (P) believes
that Mozart was the best composer of all time, while Harry (H) believes that this accolade belongs to
Bach. Both are convinced that they are right. Almost everyone would agree that neither are safely
right, or perhaps that both are jointly right. Thus, relativists say, all arguments follow this same basic
pattern. But how can both P and H, with opposing arguments, be correct? Relativists claim that both
claims, in essence, exist in different domains (much like two non-overlapping Venn diagram circles).
The claim ‘Mozart is the best composer of all time’ in effect should be ‘Mozart is the best composer
of all time [in my domain]’ with H's claim similarly stating that ‘Bach is the best composer of all
time [in my domain]’. Thus, the two do not contradict each other. In this case 'domain' is equivalent
to 'opinion'. In many cases, where disagreements are more widely argued, the domain can be the
opinion of a group of people, or even the outlook of a particular society.
Another example oft cited by relativists is that of history. While historians tend to take a more
nuanced look at their work, and do not claim to be espousing solely the truth and nothing but the
truth, many in the past have believed wholeheartedly in histories that are now largely discredited.
Thus, what people have studied and believed about the past often is not the case at all, and the history
we study today will almost certainly have been transformed into something entirely different within
a century or two. Histories are just the opinions of the societies that create them, it is claimed, and, in
the same vein, any sorts of views that can be argued over are the same.
However, these arguments have been refuted by opponents. There is, it is claimed, a fundamental
difference between fact and opinion. History is difficult, because no one can fully know what actually
happened in the past. Thus, opinions, which are certainly shaped by societies, change. But this does
not alter the actual facts of what happened. Whether your beliefs correspond to the facts or not,
whether you persuade a generation of people to believe what you say or not, doesn't matter. There
were a series of events which happened in the past. To deny those events is wrong, regardless of
whether anyone acknowledges it or not.
Furthermore, the first example with P and H is perhaps even easier to refute. Both are clearly
espousing opinions not facts. The greatness of a composer is entirely based on opinion, and thus
changes from person to person. However, with actual facts it is impossible to be neither wrong nor
right. Many people used to believe that the sun revolved around the earth. Today, we believe the
1
This essay was entered for the Erasmus essay prize 2014.
72
opposite. These are mere opinions, however much we hold them to be facts. There is a very small
chance that today we are wrong and that the earth doesn't revolve around the sun. Nonetheless, our
opinions are irrelevant – there is a fact as to what happens, independent of our opinions and beliefs.
We either believe the fact, and are correct, or we believe otherwise, and are wrong.
Another example is that of so-called 'universal laws' like those of mathematics. Absolutists claim that
‘2+2=4’ is always and everywhere correct: it is hard to disagree.
Some relativists have, however, attempted to counter this. They say that if one was, for example, to
travel to a remote jungle tribe that does not speak English and indeed has never seen mathematical
symbols before, ‘2+2= 4’ would be meaningless. One must first define what 2, = and 4 are. And herein
lies the problem. These (2, 4, =) are just constructs of our society. 2 and 4 do not exist universally. We
have created them and we have defined them. Our very definition of 4 could be seen as 1+1+1+1, and
our definition of 2 as 1+1, with 1 just as some arbitrarily designated constant, but by no means
universal and independent of human thought. Thus the whole exercise becomes rather pointless. It is
like saying does P = P? By the accepted standard, 4 by its very definition must be equal to 2+2. The
operative words here are ‘accepted standard’. In the domain that is mathematics, as created by humans,
2+2=4. But if I were to claim 2+2≠4, I would not be wrong. My statement would in essence read 2+2
≠ 4 [in my domain]; and as 2 and 4 are just abstract constructs, defined by the domain they reside
within, in my domain (i.e. in my opinion) they can be whatever I wish. If I define a 2 in my domain to
have the same value as a 3 in the domain of societally accepted mathematics, then 2+2 ≠ 4 [in my
domain].
The question of the sun revolving around the earth is a little trickier to deal with. In this case, the
sun and the earth are not abstract constructs, they are objects, and it would seem that the earth
revolves around the sun, regardless of whether we believe it or not. However, this can perhaps be
addressed, surprisingly, by science, a discipline that widely deals in facts and absolutes. In the
Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment, a cat in a box with poison has a 50% chance of filling it, remains
dead and alive until one opens the box and checks. It is seemingly here the very possibility of either
result, and the uncertainty of those observing, that keeps the cat in a superposition between both
outcomes. But what if the box is opened and the cat is dead? However, one of the observers believes
it to be still alive (barely). Surely a superposition still exists until the pulse is checked and the cat
pronounced dead or alive for good? But what if there is no pulse, but the man is still not convinced?
Logically there must still be a superposition until an examination is made that convinces the observer,
for the cat could still be one or another. And if the observer is never convinced, does the cat remain
dead and alive forever?
In the same vein, if some people believe the sun orbits the earth, and others vice-versa, does the sun
continue to do both until one person is convinced? Thus, no one is ever wrong. Simply believing a
position makes it true.
To conclude, this question of relativism is very difficult, and has been debated since the days of
Protagoras and still is today. In the end, it is perhaps impossible to prove, and will continue to be
debated. Both sides will continue to believe themselves correct and the other side wrong. Who knows,
perhaps neither side is right or wrong.
73
To what extent was it a foregone conclusion that the Tsarist
autocracy would be overthrown in 1917?
Ronan Patrick
On the 15th March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated from the throne. The Romanov dynasty, which
had ruled for 304 years, was at an end. The backdrop for Nicholas’ resignation was a social and
economic crisis, escalating demonstrations and finally a military mutiny in Petrograd. However, there
is an on-going debate about the inevitability of the Romanov fall from power. For example, Soviet
historians often characterized the Russian Revolution as an ‘inevitable climax of a process of historical
development’1. Alternatively, having developed a ‘virtual mirror-image interpretation’2, some Western
historians such as Richard Pipes have argued the Romanov fall was in no way inevitable.
I would argue that a state is doomed when it neither generates consent, nor successfully coerces its
opponents. In order to assess the question of inevitability, I will explore three areas: the nature of
political opposition; economic and social backwardness, and finally Tsarist militarism.
Radical opposition was an issue that haunted the Tsarist autocracy throughout the 19th and 20th
century. In 1825, the Decembrist revolution demanded a constitution to limit the power of the Tsar.
Whilst Russia never succumbed to the violent Nationalist revolutions that shook Europe in the 19th
century, but the ideas of representation certainly spread to an increasingly radical intelligentsia. This
was exacerbated by Alexander II’s liberalizing of the universities from 1860 onwards (for example,
increasing freedom of speech and access), which had the unexpected consequence of producing a large
cadre of radicalized students to lead revolutionary activities. Furthermore the Tsarist autocracy
largely failed to engender consent within liberal sections of the intelligentsia. Party politics remained
illegal until 1905, forcing liberal groups willing to work through the Zemstva to be categorized
alongside radical movements such as Populists and Nihilists.
The Tsarist autocracy thus never rewarded moderation. Indeed, the imperial government often overreacted to peaceful challenges, as epitomized by the massacre of 200 innocent petitioners during
Bloody Sunday in 1905. The massacres of an oppressive regime provided a rallying point for
revolutionary Opposition. Thus, the Tsarist autocracy arguably doomed itself by perpetuating the
radical opposition who would welcome 1917.
Whilst it was true radical groups such as the Bolsheviks emerged, overall opposition was usually
largely spontaneous, as opposed to being directed. This was epitomized by the escalation of workingclass protest between 1911 and 1914. Protest was fuelled by incidents such as the Lena Goldfields
Massacre in 1912, but also ranks of dissatisfied and idealistic students. It began with a May Day Strike
in 1912 involving 500,000 workers, and culminating in a general strike in St. Petersburg in July 1914.
The Russian gentry’s support was another crucial pillar for Tsarist rule. However, by 1917, the
infamous Rasputin had alienated large sections of it. After the Spala miracle, where Rasputin had
supposedly stopped the bleeding of the haemophilic Tsarivich, Rasputin possessed huge influence over
Alexandra Feodorovna, the Tsarina. Aristocrats were offended that a peasant had so much influence;
his willingness to accept bribes, gifts and sexual favours poisoned the Monarchy’s relation with the
gentry.
The sheer scale and diversity of Russia made the Tsar’s tasks of generating consent more difficult.
Alexander III had been hugely inspired by the British Empire, whose forging of the ‘British’ identity
1
2
A. Wood, The origins of the Russian Revolution 1861-1917( London and New York, Routledge, 1993)p. 50
E. Acton, p.4.
74
ensured a buy-in for Britain’s four nations. The Tsar’s attempts policy of ‘Russification’ aimed to
forging a national identity. Russian culture was forced upon non-Russian communities. Russian was
the only language to be taught in schools. However, for nations such as Poland who revolted against
Russian impositions 1863, ‘Russification’ only exacerbated pre-existing national tensions.
The Tsarist autocracy also frequently relied on coercion. However, the reality was that, in the words
of Prince Sergei Trubetskoi (1900), ‘a unitary Tsarist autocracy, in the proper sense of the word, does
not and cannot exist.’ Labelled by Figes as an ‘unstable pillar’3, the Imperial bureaucracy was an
ineffective tool for coercion. Local government often didn’t have the resources to control society; it
was incredibly difficult to collect taxes from poor peasants. The Tsarist policy of keeping
administration un-coordinated ensured loyalty from a weaker nobility. However, it also led to ‘knots
of competing jurisdiction and legislation’4. Finally, the police struggled to enforce the wishes of this
chaotic bureaucracy; the ratio of police constables to civilians was incredibly small, estimated at 1 to
40,000.
The Tsarist regime was simply not cruel or efficient enough to rely on coercion alone. This was a
lesson the Revolutionaries would take on board - comparable revolutionary leaders who sought to
overthrow the state authorities - such as Stalin, Lenin and Trotsky - would have been shot in
Communist times (Trotsky in fact did have a gruesome end). However, Tsarist Russia, which was
bound to a degree by moral and legal constraint, only exiled such revolutionaries. Icons of popular
protest such as Leo Tolstoy would have quite simply disappeared under the Communist system, but
in Tsarist Russia he remained relatively untouched.
By 1917 Russia’s economy was in ruin. The government’s answer to the mounting costs was to borrow
and print paper roubles, leading to mass inflation. A grain crisis led to the starvation of the army and
the huge peasant body. The following spontaneous protest which contributed to the overthrowing of
Tsar Nicholas II was symptomatic of a wider phenomenon; the intrinsic backwardness of Russia’s
agrarian economy. The emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 was intended to modernize Russia’s
economy following the catastrophe of the Crimean War (1853-1856). However, it had (arguably)
failed. The ancient peasant commune, the Mir, was strengthened. The Mir reinforced primitive
agricultural techniques, such as allocation of land proportional to family members. There was little
incentive for a peasant to invest in his land, decreasing productivity. Whilst it was true Stolypin
attempted to reform the Agrarian economy in 1906 and 1907, Figes argues it was too little, too late.
Finally, by 1917 Russia’s demography made it ripe for revolution. Under the minister of Finance
Sergei Witte (1892-1903), Russia underwent a policy of rapid and forced industrialization from 18901900. Industrialization led to the emergence of a large urban and downtrodden proletariat. In the
midst of Russia’s social urban inequality, Marxist ideas were seductively convincing. Ultimately,
however, historians such as Figes have argued the unresolved Peasant Problem doomed the Tsar. 80%
of the Russian population were peasants, most of who lived in increasing poverty and desperation.
Nations such as Britain ensured a social buy-in for the working class by both representation and
introducing reforms under the banner of New Liberalism. However, in Russia the liberal agenda was
reversed after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The public floggings re-introduced during
Alexander III’s reign, combined with the imposition of martial law following the 1905 revolution
(Stolypin’s Necktie) augmented resentment towards the Tsarist regime. Moreover, Stolypin’s attempt
to establish a Volost Zemstvo dominated by the Peasantry was defeated. This ensured the local
peasantry were not integrated into local politics, and thus alienated from the Tsarist regime. This
increasingly meant ‘only a spark was needed to set the countryside on fire.’5 Indeed, it was the peasants
who arguably scuppered the Russian war effort in 1916/17 by deserting (en masse) and seizing land.
On the other hand, many historians have argued against the notion of inevitability. The Russian
O. Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London, Jonathan Cape 1996), pp. 35-83.
O. Figes, p. 38
5 R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, p. 274
3
4
75
regime was arguably less vulnerable during the Great War than it was in 1905, because of the drastic
reforms undertaken by Witte and Stolypin. In the midst of the 1905 revolution, Witte, who recognized
‘the restoration of order…required fundamental changes’6 , proposed the October Manifesto. This
conceded freedoms such as speech, assembly and the press, and also a constitution. Liberal leaders
such as Miliukov accepted Nicholas’ offer; they were willing to work through the new Duma (a
popularly but indirectly elected lower house). Witte had split Russian opposition, isolating the more
radical elements. The membership of the SD Party (the Bolshevik and Menshevik party) declined
from 150,000 to 100,000 following the 1905 revolution. Moreover, Nicholas II and Stolypin were able
to influence the Duma; in the 1907 3rd June reforms, it was ensured that the wealthiest 1% of the
electorate controlled 66% of the seats in the new Duma. Peasant and worker representation was cut
by roughly 50%. As we have already seen, Figes posits that alienation of the large peasant body
doomed the regime. However, this reform ensured loyalty to the Tsar among the wealthy electorate,
whilst excluding the more revolutionary candidates (who were previously elected by poorer peasants
and workers). With radicals such as Lenin exiled and deported to Siberia, the regime was arguably in
a stronger position by 1914.
Stolypin’s agrarian reforms are another key point of contention between Figes and Pipes. Pipes argues
that if Stolypin’s policies were given more time it may have preserved the regime. In 1906-1907,
Stolypin brought about the annulment of redemption dues (fees that peasants were required to pay
through the Mir for their emancipation). This enabled peasants to leave the commune, thus decreasing
the power of the Mir. By 1914, 25% of peasants had left the communes, and 10% had consolidated
their holdings. Given that Russia’s peasant population numbered about 100 million, this was a
profound change. The purpose of the so-called ‘Stolypin peasants’7 was twofold; firstly, the creation
of a new entrepreneurial landowning class would hopefully modernize Russia’s backwards
agricultural practice. Secondly, this new class would owe their fortunes to the Tsar, and thus hopefully
a loyal pillar of the autocracy. This ‘would provide the foundations of national stability’8. Indeed in
1914, Lenin was concerned that the revolutionary potential of the peasantry was being eroded.
Ultimately, Stolypin’s reforms are a historical ‘what if ’. Stolypin himself accepted the creation of this
class would require at least a generation, but the war threw the Russian society and economy rapidly
off course.
Additionally, by 1914 Russia’s economy was modernizing at an astonishing rate. Witte, securing
multiple French loans, undertook a policy of rapid and forced industrialization. From 1890-1900,
Witte pumped loans into capital infrastructure projects, most notably railways. This provided vital
infrastructure for the Russian economy. In 1914, Russian industrial production was more than four
times what it was in 1881. Russia was modernizing at such a rapid rate that the German Chief of
Staff, Herman Moltke, pushed for war, ‘the sooner the better’9. Economic progress also generated
consent among the businessmen who profited.
Russian Nationalism, and thus loyalty to the regime, was inevitably bolstered by the threat of foreign
powers. Indeed, the Tsarist regime frequently justified its existence through military means. In 1833,
Minister of Education, Surgey Uvarov defined Russia’s ideological doctrine as orthodoxy, autocracy
and nationality. Following the outbreak of war in 1914, the Tsarist regime was bolstered by largescale popular support. Vast swathes of the population and the Orthodox Church seemingly stood
behind Tsar Nicholas II’s defence of the Slav peoples. The declaration of war thus ‘temporarily
diffused the [domestic] situation as a wave of primitive patriotism swept across the country impelling
tsar, government, society and the people to unite.’10
However, the intrinsic militarism of the Tsarist regime often led to over optimism about its military
prospects, and thus poor decision-making. Both the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Japanese War
R.Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919( London, Fontana Press edition, 1992) p.43
J. Bromley, Russia 1848-1917 (Oxford, Heinemann, 2002) p. 112
8 R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution, p. 173
9 J. Bromley, p. 116
10 A. Wood, p. 38
6
7
76
(1904-1905) had emphasized Russia’s military and economic backwardness. The failures during the
Japanese War, especially the battle of Tsu-Shima (1904), had fuelled the 1905 revolution. In 1914
Russia was faced with far stronger adversaries: Germany and Austria-Hungary. Russian per capita
income was one-third that of the Western average in 1914. It was probable that any heavy defeats,
which were likely, risked further rebellion.
It was true that a ‘medieval monarchy which had stumbled into the twentieth century’ 11 was losing
support from its ‘unstable pillars’12. The regime was also fighting a major battle to quell growing
opposition. Nonetheless, on the eve of war the situation was slowly improving, and the risk of
Revolution was slowly receding.
However, I would argue instead that whilst revolution may not have been inevitable by 1914, it was
highly likely if Russia was heavily defeated in war. The dislocated Tsarist regime was unable to
mobilize the patriotism of the Russian people in the Great War behind the ‘Defence of Mother Russia'
as happened against Napoleon and Hitler. Russia was socially, economically and militarily unprepared
for the massive requirements of a major war. The Tsarist regime, having ‘learned nothing and
forgotten nothing’13 of the lessons of its own recent history, went to war for the last time.
Bibliography
E. Acton and others, Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921, London, Arnold, 1997.
J. Bromley, Russia 1848-1917, Oxford, Heinemann, 2002
O. Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, London, Jonathan Cape 1996
R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974.
R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919, London, Fontana Press edition, 1992.
A. Wood, The origins of the Russian Revolution 1861-1917, London and New York, Routledge, 1993.
Comment from History teacher Dr Pyke
Figes, p. 35-83.
13 Quote attributed to Charles Talleyrand with regards to the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchs.
11
12
77
Has the UK ever seen a government committed to socialist ideals?
Taidgh Pledger
This seems a very demanding title to consider, as not only has the United Kingdom undergone over
150 years of modern government, but the idea of socialist ideals itself can be very controversial.
Therefore I shall start by trying to form a definitive guide as to what we mean exactly by the concept
of ‘socialist ideals’. The first thing that must be said is that what we are looking at here may not
necessarily be socialism, which is normally most recognisable by its ends of equality of wealth, and
the control of the proletariat, but instead the means by which socialism can be achieved. Most
obviously there must be some critique of capitalism, as socialism was seen by Marx as an alternative
economic system. However the most crucial criterion by which we should judge governments is their
attempts to initiate public ownership of industry and property, I believe this because this theme seems
to be central to four of the ten generally applicable measures of Marx’1. Abolition of property in land
and application of all rents of land to public purposes… 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4.
Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels…7. Extension of factories and instruments
of production owned by the state;’( Marx, 1848,p.19) and Marx himself claimed that ‘nationalization
of the means of production, distribution, and exchange’( Crosland, 1956, p.74) was what socialism
should be defined as. Whilst socialism comes in many different forms with many different authors, I
think that this definition, coming from its most prominent and famous spokesperson is very apt for
the situation.
This definition also shortens my next task of choosing potentially suitable governments, as it is only
the Labour party that has both held government on its own and had a commitment to public ownership
(or at least they did have until 1995).Thus although the ‘New Liberalism’ government between 19061914 deserves an honourable mention for establishing the first form of a welfare state in the country
it is not suitable in this context. I am also disregarding the brief periods the party held office under
Ramsay Macdonald in 1924 and 1929-31, as not only were these periods simply too short to make a
real impact. Therefore I am left with three governments to assess in more detail; firstly the first
majority Labour government under Clement-Attlee from 1945-51, the Labour governments of 197479 with particular focus on the new programme of 1973 and finally New Labour of 1997-2010 in
order to discover whether the UK has now officially accepted capitalism.
The Attlee government of 1945 was the first time the Labour party had an opportunity to put in
motion the socialist principles that they had preached since their inception, changing attitudes towards
state planning during the war allowed them to nationalize the Bank of England in 1946 with little
visible opposition, and this was followed by the coal industry a year later and the railways in 1948.
However their job soon became more difficult and Crosland describes ‘later proposals (e.g. for
nationalizing steel and chemicals) of course aroused more opposition.’(Crosland, 1956, p.304) Plus
there were actually some successful public campaigns against the nationalization of some major
companies, such as in the case of Tate and Lyle. However this does not make the government any less
socialist, it merely shows a change in public opinion. From what we can see here this government was
completely committed to the nationalization of the means of production, they were just forced to
make the process more gradual due to the democratic system they were operating in. Plus they still
continued developing state planning, even in industries they had not yet nationalized, ‘planning can
be made effective even in the private sector.’(Crosland, 1956, p.359). Furthermore the government
pressed ahead with their social reformation programme, forming the most comprehensive welfare
state the UK had ever seen, including the revolutionary National Health Service. So surely there is no
argument here, this is clearly a government committed to socialist principles, only prevented from
implementing them by the public? I beg to differ.
Although the early work of the government is undoubtedly evidence of socialism, with attempts made
78
to nationalize the means of production, I do not think that the government was committed to them. As
although Attlee and his ministers started off with a clear left wing agenda to implement, I think this
desire was soon lost (a problem with many forward thinking governments). It cannot have been purely
due to restraints imposed on them by other agents that this government stopped at 25% (Crosland,
1956, p.89) of public ownership. Nationalization did not produce the immediate change that was hoped
for in 1945, particularly in the redistribution of wealth, as unlike communist countries the UK
government compensated businesses (by 1951 £2.1 billion in compensation had been paid out). Plus
measures had not been adopted to effectively combat some of the problems that existed in these
nationalized industries, the government continued to push for lower prices of coal, ignoring the
dwindling supplies due to lack of modernization in the industry. This cruel fate was recognized by
Crosland as he stated ‘public-monopoly nationalization… no longer seems the panacea that it used
to.’(Crosland, 1956, p.363) This glum realization changed government policy as they no longer wholeheartedly pursued nationalization, and their commitment to the interpretation of socialism I am
deploring for this essay soon disappeared. Thus I do not think it would be correct to claim that this
government was committed to socialism.
The next period that I will consider is the Labour governments of the 1970s under Wilson and
Callaghan, however I feel that it is important to first consider Wilson’s previous period in power from
1964. I have not decided to examine this period separately for two reasons; firstly as I believe they are
clearly connected (as Wilson was Prime Minister for both) and because I feel that achievements during
this period were limited (in large part due to the devaluation of the pound). Nonetheless it does require
mention and I shall start with Wilson's statement of the ‘white heat of technology’, showing that
there still remained a certain focus on the means of production that carried on into the 1970s.
Moreover, and crucially for the following period there was the event of ‘In Place of Strife’. The
decision for the proposals to be shelved proved particularly damaging for the next Labour government,
with their time marred by clashes with the trade unions, which in many ways prevented them from
being as left wing as they might otherwise have been.
So could the corporatism and increase in political action that occurred in the Labour party in the 1970s
be considered a socialist government? Although the party were still technically committed to
nationalization and public ownership, the solid proposals that existed had been put back by the work
of Ted Heath. Plans to nationalize the docks had been scrapped, plus public shares in companies such
as Short Brothers, BEA, steel companies and Thomas Cook had been sold off. The response of the of
the 1973 programme was very promising in this respect due to calls for greater public ownership and
increases in state planning, but once again when these proposals actually reached the commons they
were very diluted, with only parts of certain markets such as British Leyland ending up being brought
into public ownership. They also seemed to be departing from their commitment to Keynesian
economics (whilst not completely relevant a previous must of any British socialist) with
unemployment growing and reaching a million by April 1975 (Expressandstar.com, ‘Those were the
days’, retrieved 27 December 2011).
After Wilson's retirement things appeared to get worse, as conditions for the IMF loan meant severe
cuts to public spending, halting the social programme. However some industries were still brought
into government control such as British Aerospace, British National Oil Corporation and what
remained of the shipbuilding industry (Thorpe, 2001). Although the government weakened in power
with industrial disputes becoming more common, eventually things became too much with their
demise all but confirmed by the winter of discontent, and it is for this reason that despite attempts I
do not believe this government was committed to socialist ideals. While they came into power
promising a ‘fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of
working people and their families’ (February 1974 Labour Party Manifesto), this did not really occur
as power instead seemed to be transferred to the unions and businesses. Although I do not believe this
was entirely their fault, as they were victims of bad timing, suffering from worldwide financial
problems, but it still did lead them to abandon their socialist principles.
Next we come onto New Labour under Blair, a so-called hero after the 18 disastrous years in
79
opposition that the party had just suffered. It is instantly clear that this government was not
committed to socialist principles, as they were the first Labour government to openly accept
capitalism. However I felt the need to mention this period, as a blunt conclusion that there has never
been a socialist government did not seem an acceptable one, and look briefly as to what we can expect
in the near future. The abandonment of clause IV saw the end of the search for a socialist Britain
from the Labour party; instead they had their hearts set on establishing a ‘new mixed economy’
(Giddens, 1998, p.99) with greater focus placed on greater social mobility and making the markets
more accessible to the lower classes rather than completely reforming them, new buzzwords came into
fashion such as the ‘redistribution of possibilities’ (Giddens, 1998,p.101). Was this the end of socialism
in Britain then?
I do not think so, although I cannot see a radical return to policies of public ownership and greater
state planning in the immediate future. Although Blair and co. delivered the electoral success that
Labour supporters had long craved, it would be wrong to say that the new brand was universally
popular, many saw the ‘New Labour project as an empty one’(Giddens, 1998,p.`155). Thus there is still
a place for socialist ideals in the current political spectrum, especially in this time of soul searching
within the Labour party. It was possibly hoped that this change in policies would be brought about by
‘red Ed’, as he has become known in the press, and there is certainly a gap present for further policies
along the lines of his promise to freeze energy prices. Since 1997 new social movements have taken
the place of the old left of the party, but with the growth of opposition to coalition cuts their views
have been brought to the forefront of British politics. Whilst it was not so long ago claimed that ‘the
economic axis that used to separate voters into ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’ positions has much lower
salience,’(Giddens,1998,p.23) this may no longer be true, with the success of less central parties such
as UKIP increasing (whilst this does not directly correlate to socialism it does show a desire amongst
the electorate for more unique thinking amongst politicians). Therefore I believe that at the time of
writing this essay this should be exactly what major politicians within the Labour party should be
doing, looking back at their socialist roots and examining whether they could transform their policies
to create the first ever government in the UK to be committed to socialist ideals.
Bibliography
Bernstein, E. and Harvey, E.C. (1911) Evolutionary Socialism: a Criticism and Affirmation. New York:
B.W.Huebsch.
Crosland, A. (1956) The Future of Socialism. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd.
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) The Communist Manifesto. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Thorpe, Andrew (2001) A History of the British Labour Party. London: Palgrave.
‘Those were the days’, Expressandstar.com, retrieved 27 December 2011.
Wolff, J. (2002) Why Read Marx Today? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
80
War and medicine
George Porter
Hippocrates once said that ‘War is the only proper school for a Surgeon’ (C.460-370BC). Like many
quotes from the classical era, this simple sentiment has stood the test of time up to the 20th Century.
As we move into the 21st century, however, we can ask if the military still has a role to play in the
development of modern medicine. Do advances developed on the battlefield even have a place at home
and if they do can we expect to see more medical developments from the military with effective nonmilitary applications?
It was a privilege, recently, to meet and discuss these issues with an Anaesthetist, a Captain in the
Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps and a Sergeant Combat Medical Technician. This
essay was born out of ideas gleaned from these discussions and shall look at the advances in Trauma
Medicine specifically, as these were solely made by the military and then transferred to civilian
medicine. Prosthetics and Rehabilitative Psychiatry, while significant were more joint projects
between civilian and military staff. I will examine these advances in detail to demonstrate ways in
which developments on the battlefield have recently improved medicine at home.
One such example of a military medicinal advance that has transferred into the civilian sector and
proved beneficial is the introduction of Trauma Centres. Major Trauma is defined by NHS England
as ‘multiple injuries which could result in death or serious disability,’ for example excessive blood loss
or amputation. Before the introduction Trauma Centres a patient who had received trauma would be
taken to the Accident and Emergency Department of the nearest hospital via ground or helicopter
based ambulance. The problem with this is that while the patient may have a short travel time to the
hospital so care is received quickly many, A&E Departments do not have the specialist equipment nor
experienced staff to provide comprehensive care to the patients both during and after treatment(1).
This is mainly due to a lack of resources as the equipment for dealing with it is scarce and expensive
to maintain(1). Staff in an average an A&E Department might see Major Trauma once a week or less
(1). Furthermore the specialist staff required for dealing with Major Trauma are quite rare and so
cannot be deployed to all hospitals.
NATO forces in the Second and Third Gulf Wars (the Iraq and Afghanistan Intervention,
respectively) had the same problems in dealing with Major Trauma, especially a lack of the proper
equipment. Rather early into the war in Afghanistan (2004) injured troops were, instead of being
evacuated to field hospitals, evacuated to the Major Trauma Ward at Camp Bastion for treatment by
the specialist staff there. After this in 2010 Trauma Wards such as St Mary's were first introduced in
Britain along with Trauma Networks. Trauma Networks, were introduced in 2012, enable casualties
to be identified and transferred to the nearest Trauma Centre via improved systems of communication
between Clinicians at A&E and Ambulance Personnel(2). The Trauma Audit and Research Network's
(TARN) National Audit in 2013 showed an increase in survival rates for patients with Major Trauma
since the introduction of the system, with 1 in 5 patients who would have died under the A&E system
now surviving (2).
One issue that seems to be key to the success of Trauma Centres is resources. Individual A&E
Departments may be less well equipped to deal with trauma as many of the specialist surgeons are
now working in Trauma Centres. This was highlighted when a panel of Surgeons and Ambulance
Personnel in Scotland rejected the government's plan to build four Trauma centres, recommending
two at most as the personnel needed to staff them would be required in front line A&E care(3). There
has to therefore be a balance at a local level however, I would support the introduction of Trauma
Centres as an advance for the much higher quality of after-care given there and increased survival
rates. The true advantage of the system lies in the Trauma centres being staffed by after-care
81
specialists such as Physiotherapists and Speech Therapists who can quickly and efficiently draw up a
personalized rehabilitation plan (1). This is a clear example of a military advance in the field translating
into civilian circumstances and improving healthcare.
Furthermore the introduction of Trauma Centres also allowed for the introduction of the Rapid
Resuscitation Pathway (RRP). This Technique, developed in 2005 at Camp Bastion and introduced in
2013 at St Mary's Trauma Centre involves patients bypassing the resuscitation room and going
straight to theatre, thereby reducing what is called the ‘knife to skin’ time(4). This is the term given
for the time taken from a patient's arrival at a centre to the surgery which could potentially save them.
This treatment is only possible with Trauma Centres, as they can run full 24 hour operating theatres.
They have the specialists required (e.g. Senior Surgeons) and the Theatre Team can be briefed up with
specific action cards while the casualty is on route, due to the information given by staff on the Trauma
Network. This yields much higher survival rates, contributing to the new figure that UK patients are
now 20% more likely to survive Major Trauma since the introduction of Trauma Centres (figures
taken from 2013) (4).
Another advance in conjunction with Trauma Centres and Networks (and certainly a contributor to
their success) is the Intraosseous needle, a way of drilling into the bone marrow and injecting a drug
as opposed to the normal Intravenous needles. This idea was first put into practice in the 1920's but
quickly fell out of practice mainly due to technological difficulties and the large advances in
intravenous technology at the time. Recently, however, the technique has been redeveloped by the
Royal Army Medical Corps for use during the emergency evacuation of injured personnel where
cannulation can be difficult(5). Cannulation is the input of a needle into a person's veins to administer
blood or resuscitory fluids. Due to the unsteady nature of high speed evacuation vehicles such as
Chinook helicopters and Armoured Personnel Carriers along with the low blood pressure of certain
casualties cannulation can be understandably difficult in this situation. Despite being developed for an
entirely military purpose the Intraosseous Drill has also seen use in civilian hospitals(5,6). Due to the
bone marrow's large Blood supply any drug or substance given intravenously can be given
intraosseously as well(6). In situations where cannulation is difficult and/or time consuming, due to a
lack of blood pressure (making the veins both harder to see and less likely to be pierced by the needle
itself), a drug or resuscitation fluid can be administered Intraosseously with the same effect. The
technology has seen much success in Great Ormond Street Hospital for treating children whose blood
vessels tend to constrict and make venous access difficult when they go into shock(6).
Another major advance developed on the front lines of modern combat now making its way into the
NHS is the usage of whole blood transfusions in Damage Control Resuscitation (DCR)** for coping
with Massive Trauma. This technique was developed by US and British forces in Iraq to treat soldiers
who had received Massive Trauma (7). In civilian life, as said before, Massive Trauma is exceptionally
rare and patients who receive massive transfusions (i.e. those who, in a military setting, would receive
DCR) account for just 2-3% of all civilian trauma admissions however in the United States, where
DCR was first trialled in the civilian setting and where these statistics were taken from, leading
Trauma centres yield mortality rates of 40-70% for these patients(7). This makes trauma requiring
massive transfusion the injury with the highest proportion of preventable deaths in American civilian
medicine (7).
To address this, DCR has recently been adopted by the majority of civilian hospitals in America and
the UK. The technique involves a 1:1:1 ratio of Fresh Frozen Plasma (FFP), Red Blood Cells (RBC)
and Platelets. Normally these ratios are different and the make-up of the mixture given is tailored to
what the doctor believes the patient needs. This is called Component-based transfusion and usually
results in FFP and RBC being given in lower ratios. The DCR technique was first presented in a paper
by American Dr Borgman and his team after they observed the cases of 252 military survivors of
massive trauma in 2007(7). The US Army then made it standard doctrine to use DCR with a high ratio
*
.DCR actually refers to a system of dealing with Haemorrhagic shock first developed by the US army in the Iraq War
but for the purpose of this essay we will be look at the whole blood transfusion aspect as this is the main component
82
of platelets and plasma (i.e. the whole blood 1:1:1 system) on casualties with massive trauma as a result
of this study and others like it(7). This method is advantageous as it replaces all lost components of
the blood leading to higher survival rates. The extra viscosity of the whole blood mixture as opposed
to component-based transfusion helps to counter the extreme loss of blood pressure that can cause
circulatory failure in patients with Massive Trauma. Subsequent studies confirm that for Massive
Trauma patients whole blood transfusion is beneficial in both a civilian and military setting and
contributes to higher survival rates(2,8).
The use of a 1:1:1 ratio in a transfusion does, however, have some disadvantages when performed in a
civilian setting. Soldiers, by their very nature, are generally in good physical condition and as they
tend to be injured during combat will have a high level adrenaline, which might provide a higher pain
tolerance at the point of injury. This makes them, in a sense, ideal casualties. The main disadvantage
of the whole blood ratio is that due to the increased viscosity of the mix it can put undue stress on
the circulatory system, specifically the heart itself as it is effectively pumping extra blood. There have
not yet been definitive links drawn between this and harm to civilian patients, apart from casualties
sustained in the early 1920s where whole blood was used, but this could be due to the lack of proper
equipment at that time. There is still a lot of debate as to whether the whole blood ratio is suitable for
a civilian setting and while it has been adopted by many Trauma Centres across Britain and the US,
some major hospitals, such as Great Ormond Street, still use component-based transfusions(7,9). This
illustrates the way in which some military advances are not applicable in a civilian context.
In the recent war in Afghanistan American and British military casualties who survived long enough
to receive treatment (i.e. on the evacuation vehicle) have a survival rate of 90-95%, the highest rate in
any war(5,10). The fraction of those who do not survive often have injuries such as massive head trauma
or were in situations so dangerous that evacuation was delayed. It could be said that Trauma medicine
might be reaching a point where there is little room for further improvement. The Army is not, of
course, perfect at dealing with casualties and Trauma medicine will advance in the future along with
all medical science. The leading cause of death in Britain, however, is Heart Disease and Respiratory
Disease and the leading causes in America are Heart Disease and Cancer(11,12). All three of these
diseases are, by their very nature, things that the Royal Army Medical Corps neither treat nor research
as all soldiers with them are referred to a civilian hospital. These diseases are diseases of age and
lifestyle, not trauma (which is only really a major killer in the younger sections of the population) and
will become increasingly prevalent as the proportion of those living longer increases(11).
So one can see that despite military advances from the War on Terror definitely helping more civilians
survive trauma, the broader battlefields of modern medicine lie in the fight against degenerative
diseases. Now of course from third world countries to the highest echelons of the economic scale the
advances in trauma medicine that the military have developed will always be useful. I would hope that
through a lack of conflict and the endless march of medical progress, we will reach the stage where
we can safely contradict Hippocrates and war will not be the only proper school for a Surgeon.
83
The death penalty in a democratic society
Alex Rackow
The USA proudly considers itself to be ‘the land of the free’, an exemplar of modern democracy, and
a country which places great value on individual liberty and freedom. This raises the question as to
how a democracy such as the USA can justify executing criminals, often in ways which disregard all
dignity (such as the death of Clayton Locket) and victimize those in society who are utterly helpless
(such as Howard Neal).
One argument commonly put forward by proponents of capital punishment is an economic one that
is based upon the relatively cheap cost to the taxpayer of killing criminals found guilty of capital
crimes compared to the costs of imprisonment. According to the Texas Department for Criminal
Justice1 the concoction of drugs used in a lethal injection costs only $83. They reason that this makes
the death penalty a far more appropriate punishment for the most serious crimes in times of economic
hardship around the world.
The cost of incarceration in the UK is estimated to be in excess of £40,000 a year per prisoner and
each new prison place is thought to cost the taxpayer £119,000. With over 83,000 people in prison in
the UK and rising2 it is not surprising that a recent ‘YouGov’ poll found Britons to be in favour of a
reintroduction of the death penalty by 45-39%3. So it appears to make economic sense for countries
which don’t already employ the death penalty to introduce it and for countries and states that do
already have it in place to keep it. However the economic argument is flawed as the cost of the lethal
injection is not the only cost incurred. In fact extra costs are encountered due to the extensive
appellate process that continues for an average of almost 16 years4. In addition, capital cases are
generally far more expensive than other cases due to the far higher stakes resulting in a drawn out
trial period. So $83 per death seems to be a gross under-estimation and the actual cost of executing
someone on death row is estimated to be nearer $3m. It is also quite possible that after trying someone
in a capital case, housing them on death row under intense security and exhausting the appeals process,
a convict is then moved off death row to life imprisonment without parole. Ergo, on a purely economic
basis the death penalty can be argued to be an extremely inefficient way of dealing with the most
serious of criminals and any perceived lower costs are illusory.
Since the death penalty was first introduced in the USA in 1608 there have been numerous different
methods of execution ranging from death by firing squad, hanging, gassing, electric chair and more
recently the administration of a lethal injection. This is intended to be the most humane way of
executing criminals, offering the possibility of a pain free and comparatively dignified death. However
in practice the injections have not functioned properly. The execution of Clayton Locket, who was
found guilty of murder, rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, assault and battery5, earlier this year caused
uproar across America and the world. Locket was left writhing in pain after the administration of the
trio of drugs that make up the lethal injection, the execution was halted after twenty minutes as they
had run out of drugs and then Locket finally died 43 minutes later of a cardiac arrest. This farce was
a result of companies refusing to manufacture the anaesthetic usually used in the execution process
for ethical reasons and the state of Oklahoma then taking it upon itself to use an untested formula to
kill Locket. Proponents of the death penalty may put this down as a one off error, but in fact 7.1% of
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/05/01/considering-the-death-penalty-your-tax-dollars-at-work/
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/jul/28/justice.prisonandprobation
3 http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/08/13/capital-punishment-50-years-favoured/
4 http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-27215508
1
2
84
all executions by lethal injection in the USA encounter complications in some way6. The problems
illustrated above show the method of execution used to be flawed and unreliable.
The fallibility of justice systems all around the world mean that there will always be an element of
human error and miscarriages of justice are bound to occur. There is a compelling argument that
focuses on the fact that the death penalty is irreversible. Clive Stafford Smith sums this up thus: if we
take ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ to mean roughly 75% (as a US federal judge estimated it to be) then
out of the three thousand odd death row inmates in the USA, seven hundred and fifty (25%) are likely
to be innocent if the American justice system gets it right on average 75% of the time7. Looking at
inmates on Indiana State death row further endorses this as there is not a single one who doesn’t have
some kind of mitigating circumstance. The majority are either mentally ill, substance abusers or were
subject to abuse when growing up or, in a number of cases, all three. For example Howard Neal has
been on death row for twenty years and has an IQ of fifty four and, as Stafford Smith writes, can be
persuaded into confessing to the murders of Lincoln and Kennedy8. This raises the question of
whether those on death row with a lack of mental capacity or who are insane can be criminally liable
due to the lack of the necessary mens rea. I am not suggesting that their crimes are excusable but I
believe that as a democracy we have a duty of care towards these people and that instead of
demonizing them and committing them to death (the easy way out) we should take responsibility for
them perhaps through a sentence of life imprisonment in a psychiatric hospital.
Stafford Smith also talks of the racism and prejudices that cloud the American justice system and in
particular issues concerning death row. He argues that there is an inherent racism and highlights this
with a story from Alabama where the prosecutor got rid of all seventeen black jurymen who came up
on jury duty. This story, comic were it not true, illustrates that, in the words of Stafford Smith: ‘the
death penalty is a privilege of the poor and a disproportionate privilege of [ethnic] minorities’9.
It is generally accepted that there are four aims of punishment in a democratic society. These are
rehabilitation, retribution, protection and deterrence. By considering the death penalty in relation to
these four aims of punishment it should give a clear indication of whether any justification for the
death penalty can be found in a democratic society.
Punishment has the aim of acting as a deterrent to future crimes. The death penalty can be seen to be
the ultimate deterrent to ‘future murderers’. This belief is backed up by various statistics such as those
from Emory University showing that each execution across America deters an average of 18
murderers10. Thus it seems logical to assume that with the stakes so high, anyone thinking of
committing a murder in states that use capital punishment will be dissuaded. However the majority
of murders in the USA are not pre-meditated killings but are impulse murders and those who commit
these crimes tend not to have planned their actions and weighed up the possible consequences.
Moreover, those who commit impulse murders tend not to be thinking logically. A survey by the
journal Criminal Justice and Behaviour found premeditated murderers to be twice as likely to have a
history of mood or psychotic disorders and 93% of impulsive murders and 76% of premeditated
murders either have long term issues with drug and alcohol abuse or were intoxicated at the time of
their crimes. In fact I would argue that the death penalty has a negative effect on society. It
unsurprisingly creates a lot of anger amongst communities, which may translate into more crime.
This is highlighted by statistics showing that the murder rate in states that use the death penalty is
consistently higher than in those that don’t use it. In 2011 states that used the death penalty had a
murder rate 18% higher than those which didn’t11. There is also an argument put forward by George
Kateb in his book ‘The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture’ that claims that the death
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-27215508
Clive Stafford Smith. The Death Penalty in the US: Poverty, Prejudice and Politics.
8 Clive Stafford Smith. The Death Penalty in the US: Poverty, Prejudice and Politics.
9 Clive Stafford Smith. The Death Penalty in the US: Poverty, Prejudice and Politics.
10 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/11/AR2007061100406.html
11 http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/deterrence-states-without-death-penalty-have-had-consistently-lower-murder-rates
6
7
85
penalty brutalizes not only individuals as described above, but also the state. He argues that ‘the state’s
power deliberately to destroy innocuous life is a manifestation of the hidden wish that the state be
allowed to do anything it pleases with life’12. Here Kateb is critical of the use of capital punishment
as just another way for the state to overreach its power and interfere in the lives of citizens for no
external benefit. I believe this view to be overly critical of the capitalist state and I would side with a
more utilitarian approach such as that proposed by J.S. Mill that it is sometimes necessary for the state
to intervene in society in order to maintain an ordered society. However I would argue that
punishment such as life imprisonment without parole is a more effective way of intervening in society
than through the use of capital punishment.
Rehabilitation is a part of punishment that is held in particularly high regard by liberal religious
believers who place a great emphasis on repentance and forgiveness. In a democracy the role of the
state is to look after the welfare of its citizens. Liberals argue that punishment should have an element
of forgiveness and even the most monstrous of criminals should be given a chance to redeem
themselves –albeit within the confines of a life sentence. In ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book 3, Chapter
146 Aquinas writes ‘how many people are we to allow to be murdered while waiting for the repentance
of a wrongdoer?’13. Implicit here is the possibility for rehabilitation on death row as if one is not
willing to repent in the face of death then it is unlikely that one will repent at all. Therefore there may
be a place for the death penalty in a democratic society after all.
The fourth aim of punishment, retribution is also the most controversial with many arguing that it is
wrong to exact revenge on others. Nevertheless it is a tenet of democratic societies that those who
break the law must pay some sort of punishment for their crimes. Take for example Frederick Baer
who in 2005 was convicted in Indiana of two counts of murder, robbery, attempted rape and theft
that included slitting the throat of a four year old girl that he had never met14. It is easy to see why
many believe that the only way in which ‘true justice’ can be reached and the balance of justice be
restored in society is for Baer to be punished with the same fate that befell his two victims. The death
penalty can also be said to offer a sense of closure to the families of the victims, who, in a number of
states, are able to watch those who murdered their loved ones being executed. However I believe that
there are a number of fundamental problems with the idea of retribution: retribution requires people
to be punished in proportion for the crimes that they have committed. Yet this is undermined due to
the fallibility of human justice resulting in innocent civilians being killed in error. In his novel ‘The
Idiot’, Dostoevsky agreed that the death penalty did not re-balance the scales of justice15 due to the
long wait on death row under the Damoclean sword of American justice resulting in what is effectively
a double punishment. Moreover there is a further issue with retribution that revolves around
vengeance. In a recent article in the Spectator Charles Moore writes: ‘it is one of the strangest things
about human nature that if something really disgusts us, we lose our sense of justice’16. This reflects
the old adage that ‘hard cases make bad law’ and this is especially true with death penalty cases. As
humans we become so repulsed by the crimes that we become obsessed by trying to point the finger
of blame at someone and we make it our duty to hold someone accountable for that which has so
horrified us. As a result we end up demonizing these criminals (rightly or wrongly) which leads to us
losing our sense of perspective and integrity when trying such criminals and thus such crimes can
lead to punishments out of vengeance rather than retribution – for which there is no place in a
democratic society.
In conclusion I believe that the death penalty cannot be justified in a democratic society. We not only
have a duty of care towards all; we also have an obligation to protect what is just and righteous. In
the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu ‘To take a life when a life has been lost is revenge; it is not
justice.’
Kateb, G. (1992) The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture. Cornell University Press.
Aquinas.T. (1264) Summa Contra Gentiles.
14 McDonald.T. Inside Death Row with Trevor McDonald. ITV1. (2013)
15 Dostoevsky.F. (1868) The Idiot.
16 Charles Moore. The Spectators Notes. The Spectator (19/7/14).
12
13
86
The classical influence on the framers of the American
constitution
Toby Redington
It is frequently thought that the American Constitution primarily drew its principles from the English
constitution and English philosophers such as John Locke. In fact the fundamental principles and ideas
formulated by the framers of the American constitution, who were the men who put forward their
ideas in numbers debates on how best to write an American constitution, can be traced back to classical
systems of government and authors such as Cicero and Polybius. Many of the framers would have
received a classical education and have established themselves through published work as skilled
classicists. We can constantly see in debate and discussion how they drew from their knowledge of
classics when constructing the constitution. Moreover we are able to tell that they acknowledged the
ideas of Montesquieu, also a talented classicist whose ideas of government owe to the likes of
Polybius and Cicero.
The American colonial grammar schools, in particular those associated with the handful of
universities, provided students with a strict classical education. The Greek concept of a well-rounded
education, ‘paideia’, was virtually non-existent in early America. This style of education stretched
throughout the whole of the colonies, since only the very poorest areas could not maintain a grammar
school. For nearly the entirety of a grammar school education, which began at the age of 8 and
continued up for 7 years, students were absorbed by Latin and Ancient Greek. Noah Webster observed,
‘The minds of the youth are perpetually led to the history of Greek and Rome or to Great Britain;
boys are constantly repeating the declamations of Demosthenes and Cicero or debates upon some
political question in the British Parliament.’ Teaching Classics was often severely enforced: a faulty
translation of a passage, a single mistake in the declension of a Latin word or failure to respond
properly to a locution in class would result in a beating by the teacher. Writers such as Richard Steele,
Samuel Johnson and Henry Fielding would recall the pain suffered in school at the hands of their
teachers. Yet it is important to note that many schoolmasters were not well taught in the subjects
themselves. The approach to teaching in the period was primarily reciting and recalling works by
ancient writers. Little was done to enable students to analyse and interpret for themselves what they
had memorized. For this reason, many students took their teachings at face value. This resulted in the
entire framing generation having classics deeply engrained into the way they thought.
The framers themselves were by no means exempt from this strict classical education. Out of the fiftysix members of the 1775 Second Continental Congress which deliberated the Declaration of
Independence, twenty-seven had college backgrounds including eight Harvard degrees. At the 1787
Constitutional Convention, twenty-three of the thirty-nine signers had baccalaureates. Any sort of
college education would have required students to be extremely capable in both Latin and Attic Greek.
For example, Yale’s requirements from 1745 and Columbia’s ordinances from 1755 demanded
unprepared reading ability of works from Cicero, Virgil’s Aeneid and the Greek Testament. In fact,
classicism permeated many layers of colonial and early republic society. Even Americans not educated
in school or college cultivated classical learning. Thomas Jefferson once humorously noted, ‘American
farmers are the only farmers who can read Homer.’
We are able to observe the influence of classicism on specific founding fathers. Benjamin Franklin
(1706 – 1790), for example, was self-taught in Latin and famously grumbled throughout the whole
Constitutional Convention about the misuse of ancient references, yet he would himself be partial to
classical allusion himself. He had published a variant of a Socratic dialogue in his younger days as a
writer.
87
John Adams (1735-1826) was also a leading classicist of his time. He criticized school teachers for
having read some masterpieces of Latin literature. To amend this gap in his knowledge, he imposed
upon himself a new course of classical study in his mid-20s. At the age of twenty-nine he formed the
Sodalitas Club of like-minded readers in Boston. Adams turned to classical history when drafting a
significant piece of research on the nature of constitutional government in his ‘Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America’.
James Madison (1751-1836) was another pioneer in the independence of America with an exceptional
grounding in Classics. Madison’s primary education was so strong that upon arriving at the College
of New Jersey in 1769, he managed to pass exams in Greek, Latin, New Testament, English and
Mathematics with little more than two weeks of preparation. He was one of the most talented
students at Princeton of his time and was undoubtedly influenced by John Witherspoon’s lectures on
rhetoric and moral philosophy. Madison is unlike many others in that he relied heavily on his classical
knowledge for reaching his opinions about forms of American government. Just before the meeting
at Annapolis and Philadelphia in late 1785 and mid-1786, Madison retired to his home in Montpelier
and immersed himself in researching ancient and modern histories of confederacies. The knowledge
that Madison acquired from his extensive research compiled the main raw material for the
interventions he made at Philadelphia. These were later reprinted, in a somewhat altered form, in
selected numbers of ‘The Federalist’.
It is apparent that the framers of the constitution were all deeply invested in classics, many spending
time publishing extensive work on various classical topics. In discussions about the formation of the
constitution. Members of the Convention constantly referenced classical authors and texts. Therefore
we can see how heavily the framers, and thereby the constitution itself, were influenced by classics.
The ideas presented in the constitution were very much ideological, the colonists wanted to turn away
from the English government and create their own better republic. To look for guidance and affirm
their ideas, the framers of the constitution naturally looked towards philosophy for how to formulate
their constitution. One of the main sources of inspiration was the French philosopher Montesquieu.
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et da Montesquieu (1689-1755) was a French political
philosopher during the Age of Enlightenment. The framers considered his ideas on the foundations
of government for guidance. One idea, which Montesquieu is most famous for and the framers
employed in the American constitution (as well as many other constitutions around the world), was
the theory of Separation of Powers. This theory suggested that government ought to have a tripartite
system, meaning it be equally divided into three areas of power: a legislature, an executive and a
judiciary. We see this system still in place today in the United State of America, with the President,
Congress and the Supreme Court. Another important element of the theory was to keep the power
of each of these branches equal. Montesquieu thought that if a single area of government had
significantly more power than another, the government would fail to thrive due to lack of cooperation.
To try avoid this potential problem, Montesquieu devised a system of ‘checks and balances’. This
would mean that each branch of power could keep a check on each other to ensure than power was
balances evenly and to limit one another if there was any inequality.
This system of power balance as theorized by Montesquieu was very appealing to the Americans as
they felt the English Government had been imbalanced and unfair when they were under colonial rule.
England’s legislature was dominant over the other two areas of government. For example, the House
of Commons practically had the power to control the Prime Minister and his cabinet by ousting them
immediately if it were to lose confidence in them. This is just one area where the Americans learned
from the perceived flaws in the English style of government, as they provided the President with a
veto and set the length of his term of office to make him more independent. This redistribution of
power illustrates the direct influence of Montesquieu and his philosophy on the American
Constitution.
In 1748, Montesquieu published ‘The Spirit of Laws’. At the time, this was the most complete
handbook on the science and history of government available to the framing generation. They would
88
have looked towards this book for help in constructing the constitution since it was acclaimed and
recent. Therefore it might appear that modern Enlightenment philosophy had a more direct influence
on the framers of the constitution than classical philosophers. This may be true to some degree but it
is important to note that the main principles of Montesquieu which the framers drew influence from
can be traced back to the classical era. The theory of the Separation of Powers is based on classical
philosophy. Although this concept is not sourced from one particular author, Polybius does a good job
of enveloping ideas put forward by classical philosophy as a whole. In a fragment of Polybius’ sixth
book of the ‘Roman Antiquities of Dionysius Halicarnassus’ he says, ‘It is customary with those who
professedly treat this subject, to establish three sorts of government, kingly government, aristocracy and
democracy’. Here we clearly see how Polybius’ summed up the thoughts of many ancient experts on
the subject of government. This paved the way for Montesquieu to re-establish the theories of the
Separation of Government centuries later, which gave the framers of the American constitution the
foundations upon which they would build the United States of America. Even though the framers
were fully aware of the works of Montesquieu, a study of the ‘Records’ and the ‘Federalist’ - records
of the debates regarding the constitution - shows they would more frequently go back to the ancient
sources from which Montesquieu had derived his influence. This would suggest that the framers did
have an appreciation for modern philosophers like Montesquieu, but in some regards valued the
original ancient sources more highly.
Yet Polybius is not the only classical author to exert influence over the thought of the framers, Cicero’s
‘De Re Publica’ was useful to America’s constitution-makers as it set out in detail the specific
requirements of a republican government. John Adams quoted fragments of ‘De Re Publica’ in his
‘Defence of the American Constitutions’, saying that ‘as all the ages of the world have not produced a
greater statesman and philosopher united in the same character [than Cicero], his authority should have great
weight’. Cicero was an interesting source of information to the framers as he differed from Tacitus,
Livy and Sallust, in that he died at the hands of Octavian’s soldiers in 43BC before Rome’s last hope
for republican government had disappeared. Rome’s other republican authors were writing under a
well-established despotism which imposed constraints on what they wrote. Cicero could write about
and condemn tyrants, and he died denouncing Mark Antony as a public enemy. Cicero’s republicanism
was practical and would have thrived in a Mediterranean empire. Sallust and Tacitus, on the other
hand, emphasized the extreme difficulty of republican government, even its unfeasability, given the
moral state of the Roman people. The stark contrast between Cicero’s republicanism and that of
Sallust and Tacitus foreshadows the rival republicanisms of Federalists and Antifederalists after the
American Revolution. Cicero’s republicanism was not just an attitude, it was a political programme
which made him appealing to the framers in the eighteenth century.
The framers of the American constitution were no means solely reliant on their knowledge of Classics
and modern philosophy. They were all extremely intelligent individuals with their own ideas and
values. However, one cannot fail to realize how these men drew influence from Classics to give
inspiration and, in some cases, justification. Carl Richard notes, ‘The presence of classical exemplars of
resistance to tyranny provided the moral justification and sense of righteous purpose’. The framers could use
their knowledge of the ancient world to learn from the mistakes of the past in order to give their own
United States of America stronger foundations.
Bibliography
Ames R A and Montgomery H C, The Classical Journal, 1934; 30 19-27
Bederman D J, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, Cambridge University Press
2008
Sellers M N S, American Republicanism: Roman Ideology in the United States Constitution, Macmillan
Press 1994
89
Do the languages we speak influence the way we think and
perceive the world?
Jamie Scott
It is fascinating to consider the possibility that our mother tongue frames our thinking, opening up
tantalizing questions such as ‘does a Chinese person perceive time differently given they have no future
tense?’. This subject, known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is of the utmost importance both
scientifically and spiritually, as such an insight would aid the fields of psychiatric medicine and
artificial intelligence amongst others. In this essay, I shall attempt to provide an answer to this
question by calling upon a variety of sources and empirical tests. To gain more insight into the subject,
I shall unusually1 try to place both neurological and bilingual elements in my argument.
Many have argued that languages actually limit our thoughts, whether through lack of terms for a
concept or grammatical complexity with which to express it. It is true that some languages are less
complex than others. English appears far superior to Akkadian2 through its ability to create relative
clauses (the tree, which was tall…), however, at most a lack of grammatical complexity merely makes
for clunky expression as opposed to a barrier to thought. Vocabulary is no hindrance to languages
either, as words3 can be borrowed from others. We can therefore safely agree that language does not
constrain our ability to think about the world and understand concepts.
That said, it may restrict the expression of some concepts as in the case of noun gender,4 a common
trait among languages.5 consider heinrich heine’s poem ‘a palm tree’, in which a snowy (masculine)
pine tree yearns for a hot (female) palm tree. In English the male-female love dynamic is removed,
severely atrophying the depth and content of the poem.
Though language may not limit our thoughts, it may influence them. This would manifest itself most
significantly in cognitive structuring, how our brain categorizes concepts. To return to the
aforementioned vocabulary as an example, the English ‘mind’ is subtly different from the French
‘esprit’. Clearly similar words are placed in subtly different linguistic categories, and I would argue
that it places a subtle twist on our perception of these concepts. As a more extreme example, in the
Nootka language if a rock falls no distinction is made between the rock and the act of falling. This
may seem bizarre, but it is more or less equivalent to the English expression ‘it rains’.
Scientific testing also proves this influence, as John Lucy showed that depending on how much their
second language was used, Japanese-English bilinguals showed more preference to the way of
classifying objects in that language (English by shape, Japanese by material).6 An even more extreme
example of this is that in Hebrew one writes from right to left, causing a perception of time in the
This ‘priming’ is in fact a significant phenomenon in our daily lives; for example, people will genuinely feel happier when
asked to tell a happy story.
2 A translated extract from an Akkadian legal document: ‘Ubarum told Iribum to take Kuli’s field. He on his own initiative
took the field of Bazi. Ubarum didn’t know. He proved (this against) him in front of the inspectors.’ while in English:
‘Ubarum told Iribum to take Kuli’s field, and proved to the inspectors that he didn’t know that Iribum took the field from
Bazi.’ This shows higher complexity in English in that we regularly employ relative clauses (e.g. he said that…), while
Akkadian must use not one sentence, but several back to back to express this idea.
3 In fact a sizeable chunk of English is stolen from Latin and Greek, and come to it French, Morse, Indian and others. The
lack of a word for a single storey house did not stop us understanding the concept, or indeed pinching yet more from
India, here the word ‘bungalow’ (this originally meant Bengal house).
4 Mark Twain famously ranted about ‘the awful German language’ and wrote the comical ‘tale of the fishwife and its sad
fate’, which ridiculed the genders assigned to words in German (for example a fishwife is neuter). Conversely, we have the
side-splitting German joke ‘what colour is the table? It is green’ (he’s actually masculine).
5 The vast majority of European languages have genders, meaning it is in fact English which is strange through its lack
thereof. Given that the Australian language Ngan’ Gityemerri has no less than fifteen genders, we must paraphrase Guy
Deutscher and Aunt Augusta and say to English: ‘to lose a gender once is unfortunate, twice is careless’.
6 This change in perception and categorization is known as cognitive shift.
1
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same direction. More interestingly still, Hebrew children change their perception of time to left to
right after just a few months of learning English. These examples demonstrate the slant imposed by
language on how we view the world in terms of concept organization.
For another example of the way language influences our thoughts we return to gender. Toshi Konishi
tested the associations of German and Spanish speakers with objects whose genders differed in each
language.7 Generally speakers from both languages assigned masculine traits to masculine objects8
and vice versa. This suggests that there is a pernicious effect of gender in the way we perceive objects.
Another reason language places a twist on our thoughts is the natural vocabularies and connections
within a language, which causes us all to experience certain stigmas and associations.
Natural links between words also warp our thinking. For example, let us consider the concept of
‘killing time’: in English this is quite a violent and negative image, while surprisingly the mafioso
Italians abandon this brutality and opt for the more playful ‘ingannare tempo’, ‘to hoodwink time’.
Fundamentally, these are the same concepts, but I would argue that we English speakers harbour a
slightly more negative attitude towards this activity. This would tally with Ray Kurzweil’s ‘pattern
recognition theory of mind’, whereby every thought we have and thing we perceive triggers a cascade
of associations as pattern recognizers are activated across the neocortex. This means that while
superficially some words, phrases or grammars would appear to have little significant effect on the
speaker, they nonetheless alter what we experience in our heads.
Languages could influence our thoughts by directing our attention to different aspects of a sentence,
a phenomenon known as selective attention. A test by Dan Slobin asked children from different
countries to tell a story. The results showed markedly different focuses on the story depending on the
language spoken.
A strong influence exerted by languages is described by a very important paradigm propounded by
Franz Boas, specifically that the grammars of languages differ not in what they allow us to express,
but in what they force us to express. This has far reaching consequences and is really at the heart of
the argument in favour of the hypothesis.
For example, even when describing a dinner you ate with your colleague, in English the gender is
omitted while in German you are forced to make this distinction. Forced disclosure could have serious
effects in society, with far more extreme examples rife, including the Matses tribe where individuals
are required to give painstaking information concerning events.9 Emphasis through word order10
could also influence our thoughts in this way. German word order requires a sentence to be planned
before being executed, and as a result we could say that Germans must think more before they speak.
We shall now examine how what we must express interferes with our cognitive processes, starting
with colour perception.11 The colours in some languages are not the same as our own, for example the
For example, bridge is female in German (die Brücke) but masculine in Spanish (el puente).
The Germans generally described bridges as beautiful, peaceful and elegant, while the Spanish used words such as
‘sturdy’, ‘big’ and ‘strong’.
9 The Matses have a level of accuracy and subtlety when making a statement which would make the eyes of even the
worst lawyer water. a speaker must say if an event happened within the recent past, distant past or remote past. They must
specify if they experienced something, inferred something, are basing their statement on past occurrences or were told
something by somebody else. It is absolutely essential for speakers to get this right, or the statement is considered a lie, to
the extent that when asked how many children he has, a man must state that the last time he checked he had say two. This
culminates to a difference where in English we would say ‘someone walked here’, they would have to say ‘a person walked
here between one month to fifty years ago because our father said he had seen people walk here all the time’.
10 This even extends to encompass the amount of information contained within a word. In modern Greek a sentence is
started with a verb which contains a lot of information, and Athanasia Chalari took this to explain why Greeks interrupt
each other all the time; they know from the beginning of the sentence what’s coming.
11 Empirical testing has been carried out to test the impact of language on colour since the nineteenth century. This was
kicked off by an astute observation by an English politician, William Gladstone, who noticed that throughout Homer’s
Iliad and Odyssey there is a very peculiar use of colour, for example the use of the word ‘oinops’, ‘wine-looking’, to describe
the sea, and later it is described as ‘ioeis’, ‘violet’, with the same word describing the wool of sheep, while honey is
described as ‘chloros’, ‘green’. Further myriad examples exist of this odd colouring, and as a result of this, the limited
7
8
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Bellonese have words only for black, white and red.12 A test devised by Holmgren asked tribespeople
to pick a piece of coloured wool from many to match a shown one. Even though they did not have the
word for the colour, they could still recognize it and understand the concept. Panos Athanasopoulos
devised a test with Japanese-English bilinguals distinguishing shades of the colour blue (Japanese has
separate words for light and dark blue). Those individuals who used English more frequently
distinguished light blue and dark blue less well than those who used Japanese more frequently,
suggesting cognitive changes in perception due to language. A similar test was attempted on
monolinguals by a team from Atanford, MIT and UCLA,13 with the upshot that Russian speakers
(who also have two words for blue) were able to differentiate shades of blue far more quickly than
English speakers. This shows that cognitive processes are literally affected by the language we speak,
and is therefore strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis.
My explanation is that the very act of having to define these two categories for blue in everyday
conversation would tread neural pathways and set pattern recognizers in accordance with
contemporary neurological theory such as Kurzweil’s ‘pattern recognition theory of mind’. This
demonstrates that pattern recognizers are primed in the brain and ways of thinking about objects and
the world become engrained in the mind depending on the language we speak. In accordance with
boas’ paradigm, this happens because language forces speakers to make the distinction.
The distinctions language forces us to make have other similar neurological consequences. The Pirahã
people only have words for one, two and many, and therefore must only make such distinctions.
Cognitive tests showed inferior accuracy and difficulty using fingers to represent individual numbers.
In the extreme, aboriginal Guugu Yimithirr speakers are required to use compass directions rather
than egocentric ones.14 This has led to a group of people with a perfect sense of compass direction,
even in new environments or blindfolded. This method of orientation also has profound effects on
their memory, as can be seen from experiments conducted by Stephen Levinson. in the case of hotel
rooms mirrored across a corridor for example, we English speakers would see two identical rooms,
while speakers of Guugu Yimithirr would see two rooms flipped around as a result of the different
compass positions of objects in the room.
Other examples of how language affects our memory include a test devised by Lera Boroditsky and
Lauren Schmidt, in which Spanish and German speakers had to remember a name for each of a list of
objects given to them.15 What is fascinating, is that the speakers of both languages had a far higher
success rate at recalling the name if its gender was the same as that of the object in their mother
tongue. Another interesting observation by Boroditsky is that Spanish speakers have a poorer memory
of the cause of an accident than English speakers, possibly because Spanish usually employs passive
phrases to describe such events, omitting the agent. These show that the language we speak affects
our memory.16
In support of the hypothesis we have already seen that language affects cognitive processes including
perception of colour and memory. A larger influence of language still is in how we use our brains. As
discovered by Sophie Scott, the tonal nature of Mandarin,17 causes speakers to use an area of the brain
vocabulary for colour used by Homer and the repetition of such strange colouring across many works of Greek literature,
Gladstone concluded that the ancient Greeks saw the world in something closer to black and white than technicolour.
12 Even children in the western world, dominated by colour, who have relentless colour teaching from parents take a
considerable amount of time to confidently and repeatedly describe the sky as blue.
Russian speakers (who have two words for blue) and English speakers had to select the odd one out of three shades of
blue. The Russians chose significantly faster if the odd colour was on the other side of their colour border between light
and dark blue even if it was the same objective distance away as other selections. The English speakers showed no such
skew.
14 E.g. ‘the ant is south west of your foot.’
15 Cunningly, the test was conducted solely in English to avoid bias.
16 It is interesting to note that contemporary theory of memory suggests that language is intimately linked with our
memories, which could explain the lack of memories from our early childhood.
17 It has no tenses, no cases, no genders (often not even between people) and no subjunctive. Comprehension is almost
entirely dependent on word order, while one word can have up to four different meanings depending on the tone assigned
to it. This is without even considering characters, one of the many factors which makes it such a hard language to learn
for Europeans.
13
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associated with music as well as the conventional areas of the brain. The incredible insight that
language causes us to use our brains differently is irrefutable evidence in support of the hypothesis.
We shall now examine more evidence concerning bilinguals18 to gain further insight into how
languages affect us, as they are gifted with a perspective through two languages. There are many
empirically tested cognitive advantages associated with all forms of bilingualism,19 however, much
like the archetypal mad genius these gifts seem to come with the twist of endowing dual personalities.
This surprising revelation is attested by both a plethora bilinguals20 such as Catherine de Lange and
a wealth of empirical evidence. David Luna asked English-Spanish bilinguals to watch identical
adverts six months apart, one in English and one in Spanish, and rate the personalities of the
characters in the advert. In Spanish a woman in the advert was seen as extroverted, while in English
she was described as hopeless. A personality test showed different individuals depending on the
language in which it was conducted. From these tests, the results showed radically different
individuals depending on the language spoken. Given the apparent sole variable of language, this
would appear strong evidence in support of the hypothesis.
My own hypothesis for this phenomenon works on the fact that the brain consists of two hemispheres,
each specialized but nonetheless equipped with its own consciousness, will21 and personality.22 This
can be seen from studies of split-brain patients.23 While language is primarily controlled in the left
hemisphere of a normal monolingual, there is significantly more activity in the right hemisphere of
bilinguals. This activity only arises after acquisition of the second language, suggesting a closer
association between that hemisphere and the second language than with the mother tongue.
Therefore, while speaking the second language more of the right hemisphere’s personality would be
entangled in cognition due to its increased involvement in language production. However, more
research would need to be conducted to prove this.
Conventional explanations state that many bilinguals are migrant workers, and therefore speaking
their native tongue would bring to mind emotions of family and home, while speaking in say English
would bring out memories and a mindset associated with work and education. one other important
explanation is that even those brought up on two languages (crib bilinguals) have an asymmetric
ability in them, and of course superior ability in one language may lead us to feel say more confident
or disposed to cracking jokes in that language, again leading to an apparently different personality.
We must also consider the issue of biculturalism, whereby a person is not only proficient in the
language but the customs and culture of its origin also. The culture associated with this language
would ‘prime’ the speaker to behave in certain manners in accordance with custom. For example, in
18 Surprisingly little research has been conducted with bilinguals, despite the significant advantages of doing so. this has
led some academics to call for more research in this area.
19 Bilinguals performed better in cognitive tasks and tests, both verbal and non verbal, in social skills, better executive
function in the brain including decision-making, and even reducing the likelihood of dementia. This can be explained
through the cognitive work-out the brain must undertake to speak two or more languages. A test carried out by Viorica
Marian conducted a test where Russian-English bilinguals were asked to select an object from a collection in one language,
while the name of the object sounded similar to the name of another present object in the other language. eye tracking
showed that the bilinguals looked at both objects before selecting the correct one, showing that a bilingual must constantly
select the correct word and suppress the other language. this extends to attention and the ability to block out preexisting
knowledge, removing prejudices in social circumstances and thus improving social skills.
It is interesting to note it is thought that every baby is born ‘a citizen of the world’, capable of learning any language.
this demonstrates not only that crib bilinguals are capable of fluency in any language combination, but also demonstrating
that any changes seen in accordance with the hypothesis are not as a result of genetic traits associated with the culture,
but of the languages and cultures themselves.
21 This goes to the extent that the halves and limbs controlled by them actually compete for attention and literally attack
each other.
22 This has led Marvin Minsky to describe the brain as a ‘society of mind’.
23 This occurs when the corpus callosum is severed, halting communication between the two hemispheres. this leads to
each of the hemispheres acting independently without knowledge of each other. each arm, ear and eye half is controlled
by the opposite side of the brain, leading to two ‘minds’ with partial control of a body each. Under normal circumstances
the halves communicate with and update each other, leading to an illusion of one mind.
20
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the aforementioned personality self-assessment people described themselves as more modest in
Spanish since modesty is valued more highly in Mexico than in the USA. However, huge numbers of
bilinguals are not biculturals. Therefore, on account of both the wealth of scientific evidence and the
unsatisfactory nature of explanations, we can agree that the language we speak alters our personality.
In summary, the languages we speak not only modify sensations as rudimentary as colour, but go so
far as to permanently alter cognitive functions including memory and the very parts of our brain we
use. This is attested by a fleet of rigorous empirical tests. It is clear that our mother tongue directs
our attention, and most significantly that languages control us in what they force us to express. It is
essential to note that languages do not restrain our understanding, only influence it to a great extent.
This can go as far as to affect our personality. On a final note, I would agree with Guy Deutscher in
saying that these ascertained effects of language are significant even if they do not constrain our
thought, as it is the fundamental processes of memory, personality and perception which make us
human and are central to our every moment as a conscious being.
Bibliography
Chinese ‘takes more brainpower’ (30/6/2003), bbc news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3025796.stm
Rachel Collier, Language, Culture & Communication (January 2012), unpublished, written at Birkbeck, London
Guy Deutscher, Through the Language Glass (2010), William Heinemann
Do different languages confer different personalities? (5/11/2013), The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2013/11/multilingualism
Gender neutrality in genderless languages (25/6/2014),
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index/php?title=gender_neutrality_in_genderless_languages
Francois Grosjean, The Bilingual Mind (31/10/2013), Psychology Today,
http://m.psychologytoday.com/blog/life-bilingual/201310/the-bilingual-mind
Ray Kurzweil, How to create a mind (2014 edition), Duckworth
Catherine de Lange, Bilingual Brain Boost: two tongues, two minds (8/5/2012), New Scientist
Language and thought (4/2/2014), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/language_and_thought
Linguistic Relativity (16/6/2014), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/linguistic_relativity rlg,
Michael Mosley, Alien Hand Syndrome sees woman attacked by her own hand (20/1/2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12225163
Mursal Saiq, dari: does language affect personality? (23/6/2014), discourse afghanistan,
http://discourse.apn.af/dari-language-affect-personality/
Edward Sapir (19/8/2014), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=edward_sapir
Society for Neuroscience, The Bilingual Brain (1/9/2008)
http://www.brainfacts.org/sensing-thinking-behaving/language/articles/2008/the-bilingual-brain/
94
How do their differing conceptions of the 'state of nature'
influence the philosophy of government of Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau?
Chris Sealey
Imagine living in a world in which life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’,1 where everyone
was constantly at war, where each person was both selfish and power hungry. In this world everyone
had a right to everything, was strong enough to attack everyone else and lived in a state of constant
fear. Everyone constantly attacked each other for gain, for glory and for safety. This is how Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) saw the state of nature.
He defined humans in a state of nature as a constantly desiring ‘felicity’ which he defined as continual
success in achieving the objects of desire. This stemmed from his belief, influenced by Galileo’s
conservation of motion, that humans are never at rest. Hobbes believed that the ‘something’ they were
searching for was ‘a restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in death’.2 This is because
power is one’s present means to obtain some future apparent good.3 Hobbes suggested that this
continual attempt to increase power which is inherently individualistic, coupled with limited resources,
would lead to war. He claimed that humans are equal, meaning ‘the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others.4 This means they are
in constant fear, ironically meaning everyone is attacked, even those who pose no threat, as a way of
maintaining a reputation of strength and ensuring future safety. This combination of equal strength,
a desire for power and scarce resources lead Hobbes to believe that the state of nature would be a state
of war.
Hobbes’ theory of government is based upon the assumption that in society individual rationality and
self-interest must be sacrificed for the collective responsibility and rationality. He surmised that if
man were to exist in this state of conflict over power and resources it would lead to disaster. Therefore,
a state must be reached when people co-operate for the ‘greater good’. Hobbes had nineteen laws of
nature, which can be ‘contracted into one easy sum… do not that to another, which thou wouldest not
have done to thy self ’.5 However, due to man’s tendency to defect to individual rationality for personal
gain, it would be impossible to enforce this rule. If one person were to act in an individualistic way
disobeying the laws of nature it would be irrational and ignorant for anyone else to follow them as he
would ‘make himself prey to others, and procure his certain ruine’.6 The laws of nature would never
be obeyed and would become useless. Hobbes therefore saw that a government able to uphold the laws
of nature would have unlimited power to punish those who disobey. In this way collective rationality
would be maintained.
Hobbes envisaged that the head of this government, or commonwealth, would be a monarch who
would enforce a resolute and consistent experience of political authority. Man would be driven to join
this commonwealth through fear of the consequences if they do not. He stated: ‘fear of oppression,
disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can
secure his life and liberty’.7 This stems from Hobbes’ view that humans are only interested in selfpreservation and are prepared to give up all of their freedoms in order to have a right to life. Therefore,
we can see how Hobbes’ pessimistic view on the state of nature influences his philosophy of
1
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Touchstone Publications, 1997.
Ibid., 161.
3 Ibid, chapter 10
4 Ibid, chapter 13
5 Ibid, 214
6 Ibid, 215
7 Ibid, part 1
95
2
government.
John Locke imagined the state of nature in a different way to Hobbes. Locke believed that the state of
nature would not be a state of war but a state of perfect freedom, with all bound by the laws of nature.
Unlike Hobbes, he believed that the principle of equality was nothing to do with physical or mental
strength but that it was a moral claim about rights; that no person has a natural right to rule over any
other person. This belief stems from the theological aspect of Locke’s philosophy (which is lacking
from Hobbes’ view of the state of nature) as he believed that man was created by God to be his
servants on earth. Consequently he felt that the natural inclination of man was to ‘preserve the rest
of mankind’8 and that ‘no one ought to harm another in his life health, liberty or possessions’9 His
belief in the superiority of God lead him to believe that everyone was ‘bound to preserve himself ’10
and ‘to preserve the rest of mankind’.11 Locke felt that everyone had equal power to enforce the laws
of nature. He concluded it was a natural right, held by each person, to punish those who disobey the
laws of nature. Therefore Locke believed it was possible to live a generally acceptable life without a
government.
A fundamental difference in the state of nature, and therefore the philosophy of government, between
Hobbes and Locke lies in their differing views on the availability of resources. Unlike Hobbes, Locke
believed that during the state of nature there was an abundance of goods for all. Competition for
resources would not exist and there would be not reason to start war. However, Locke did not believe
that this idyllic state of nature with an abundance of goods would persist. Instead he believed that
resources would inevitably become scarce, not through population growth but through greed and the
‘invention’ of money. Money allows people to own more goods and currency than they need so that
there becomes an incentive to collect more than immediately needed for future use. This leads to profit
making, stealing and invasion, whereas in the idyllic state of nature nobody would have taken more
than was necessary as it would have gone to waste. So as time progresses, goods become scarce and
this leads to conflict. Unfortunately this process becomes repeated and intensified until Locke’s state
of nature becomes unbearable. It becomes clear that government is required to maintain order and
this is why Locke believes in a civic government.
Locke argued that natural rights such as life, liberty and most importantly property existed in the
state of nature and that nobody had a right to take them away; even if people wanted to voluntarily
give up their rights, they could not. However, increasingly limited resources mean that a government
is required to protect these natural rights which might otherwise be compromised. This is the key
function of Locke’s government. Because he felt that all people were created equally, he insisted the
sovereignty must lie with the people in the form of an assembly of elected representatives. Thus he
advocates a limited government where the people have a right to a revolution if they believe that their
rights have been compromised. Furthermore, he believed in a separation of powers in order to prevent
one individual becoming too powerful within this government. As a result we can see how Locke’s
view on the state of nature has shaped his philosophy of government,
When Rousseau defined the state of nature he begun with a different premise; humans were not just
motivated by self-preservation but also by pity and compassion. He believed that humans had ‘an
innate repugnance at seeing fellow-creatures suffer’12 and he believed that this feeling was enough to
stop people attacking others. He believed that the savage man had few desires; only food, sexual
satisfaction and sleep. His only fears were hunger and pain. Each savage was portrayed by Rousseau
solitary and almost as if he were some kind of wild animal. He described as this as the happiest and
most stable of epochs ‘the real youth of the world’.13
John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, chapter 2. Hackett
Ibid, chapter 2
10 Ibid, chapter 2
11 Ibid, chapter 2
12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Dover Publications, 2004.
13 Ibid, 91
8
9
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However, Rousseau did not believe that it would not last and we would move on to a more civilized
era because unlike brutes (other animals), he believed humans have two different characteristics: free
will and the capacity for self-improvement. As societies develop language for the first time injury can
be felt as an affront or a sign of contempt rather than simply physical injury. This leads to the injured
seeking revenge. Further to this, an increase in population will lead to scarcity, which as Hobbes’ and
Locke’s agree, will lead to competition and therefore cause a state of war. However, Rousseau argues
that innovation is the primary response to scarcity such using tools. Due to this innovation, the
creation of luxury goods will be created which man becomes attached to and dependent on. This leads
to the rise of pride, shame, jealousy, inequality and slavery of the poor. Rousseau described the
inequality that resulted from the creation of private property: ‘the destruction of equality was
attended by the most terrible disorders’.14 From the idyllic state of nature developed ‘a horrible state
of war’15 i and therefore he deemed that the development of government was necessary.
Rousseau envisaged a government that would take into account this need to protect against war and
disorder caused by language and private property. He believed that the role of government was to
protect everyone’s lives, liberty and property while they all remained free. However, he maintained his
opinion that ‘man is born free and that everywhere he is in chains’16ii believing that the current system
of government was created by the greedy rich to enhance their own financial ends. He described the
solution as creating a social contract in which man would give up his rights, not to a king but to the
‘whole community’, even describing the people as the sovereign as opposed to Hobbes’ king. This
meant that the people could exercise what he called the ‘general will’ – the will of society as manifested
through its political institutions, as opposed to the ‘will of all’, which is the preference of members
on this or than occasion.17 He believed in a direct democracy on a small scale and felt that all people
should to express the general will rather than relying on elected representatives. People should not
vote for personal gain but for common good. He believed that anyone who disobeyed the general will
would ‘forced to be free’.18
In conclusion, we can see that each philosopher’s opinions about their state of nature directly influence
their views on government. Hobbes and Locke both offer a pessimistic view on human nature, with
the state of nature consisting of conflict and war. Consequently, government is needed to assure peace.
Whereas, Rousseau has a more optimistic view of human nature and believed that the role of
government was to return man to some aspects of the idyllic aspects of the state of nature, before
language and money corrupted him. He felt that man’s innate compassion would enable him to act as
part of a direct democracy and make decisions on behalf of the greater good. A problem with this
form of government, as acknowledged by Rousseau is that it only functions when all people within
the state opt into it. His essentially optimistic view on the nature of man leads him to believe that man
will opt into this social contract.
In contrast to this is Hobbes’ view that man is selfish and power hungry. He therefore viewed that an
absolute monarch is required to enforce peace, punishing anyone who breaks these rules. Locke’s view
is essentially the same. The key difference, however, is the theological aspect that is lacking in Hobbes’
philosophy. As Locke believed that man was created as a servant of God, he does not argue for an
absolute ruler. God himself is the supreme sovereign in Locke’s theory with man being created equal
on earth. This is why he promoted a limited government with a separation of powers. It is therefore
clear that the state of nature each philosopher described fundamentally shapes the government that
they envisaged. The engagement of the common man, where power lies and how laws are maintained
are all based on their views on the state of nature
Ibid, 97.
Ibid, 97.
16 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract. Cambridge University press, 1997.
17 Nigel Warburton, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University press, 2008.
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract. Cambridge University press, 1997.
14
15
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Did John Stuart Mill really believe in universal free speech?
Chris Sealey
Utilitarianism is the principle that utility should be maximized within a society with utility defined as
happiness, pleasure or the satisfaction of desires (known as the Utility Principle). Perhaps the most
famous utilitarian was John Stuart Mill. Living from 1803-1873, he published a number of works,
most famously On Liberty. He believed that freedom of expression would also lead to utility being
maximized in the long run because, ‘If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would
be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind’ (Mill, 2007). Further to this Mills believed that utility would be maximized in the
long run if his Harm Principle was obeyed; ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’
(Mill, 2007). However, these two beliefs seem to come into conflict and this is the problem which my
essay will be centred upon. While free speech is important to Mill, he does set out circumstances in
which this right maybe restricted but in practice the application of these theories are complicated and
subjective.
It is important to understand Mill’s justification for free speech. In On Liberty Mill devoted a whole
chapter to arguments regarding safeguarding freedom of speech in pursuit of his utilitarian aims.
Underlying each of these is the assumption that the truth is always desirable. He believed that the
truth would become apparent if free speech was allowed through what he called the free marketplace
of ideas (Mill, 2007). Further to this is that no matter how sure someone is of an idea, concept or
opinion their judgment is always fallible. This means that when people believe they speak an objective
truth it is actually subjective. It is therefore only through universal free speech that these ideas are
explored and scrutinized leading to the truth emerging and ‘non-truths’ being buried. Mill suggests
that limitations on free speech would undermine this process and undesirable non-truths may surface
(Warburton, 2009).
Mill was particularly anxious that free speech would enable even the minority voices to be heard. As
he stated that everyone’s views are fallible, even the idea held by a majority may be no more truthful
than the minority. Mill sets out three scenarios to demonstrate the casualties of silencing the minority.
Firstly, he imagined that if a majority held view were false and minority held view were true, without
freedom of speech the majority would silence the minority. This would mean that the majority held
falsehood would never be challenged. Secondly, he imagined a situation where the majority is correct
and the minority is wrong. Through free speech the majority’s ideas will be scrutinized by the minority
thereby helping them be recognized, developed and not forgotten.
Mill’s third scenario involved both the majority and the minority being partly correct but not
completely truthful. He viewed this as the most common of the three scenarios and his argument is
simple; the majority should enable the minority to express their partial truth and in this dialogue the
truth will emerge (Cartwright, 2003). These examples combine to demonstrate that any restriction
on free discussion impedes the truth and damages the qualities of mind of those people whose access
to discussion is limited.
Mill also introduced the Harm Principle which appears to contradict his concept of free speech. He
states that the only time civilized societies can exercise power over any individual, including free
speech, is to prevent harm to others. However the very act of curbing free speech interferes with his
free market place of ideas and inevitably causes some harm. So, for example, if an opposition politician
gives his opinion on the government in power, this will inevitably harm the current ruler. However,
to intervene in this instance based on the harm principle would lead to the suppression of free speech,
the free market of ideas being compromised and truth buried.
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The difficulty in Mill’s theory is how harm is defined. Without clear definition, using harm as a
justification for interference by the government could be a slippery slope to a totalitarian state. In this
instance, truth would be suppressed. Therefore, it becomes essential to define harm. Unfortunately,
Mill did not do so clearly. He did argue that the only justification for moral judgment and punishment
is when there is ‘injury to others’ or their interests, ‘definite damage’, or ‘offences against the rights
of others’ (Mill, 2007). These statements can be interpreted extremely broadly.
If harm is defined in these terms, the extent of the harm caused must be considered before
intervention takes place. As a utilitarian, Mill believed that whatever brings the greatest happiness
should be the path that is followed. If harm is interpreted in one of the aforementioned ways, speech
could inflict harm upon a person. Mill argued that the harm done to the victim must be greater than
the damage done to society and the individual by oppressing free speech. He considered that the harm
must have already happened or the likelihood of it happening must be high before intervention takes
place.
Consider the example of Fabrice Muamba. On 17th March 2012 Muamba, a professional football
player for Bolton Wanderers, had a cardiac arrest on the pitch during a match against Tottenham
Hotspurs FC. In the hours that followed Liam Stacy, a student at Swansea University, proceeded to
direct racial hatred towards Muamba via twitter. Following this he was arrested and sentenced to 56
days in prison for inciting racial hatred under the Public Order Act 1986 (BBC news, 2012).
Let us consider this case in Mill’s terms. Firstly we must consult the harm principle. While it is clear
that harm was done to Muamba through the racial slurs, was the harm caused enough to justify
intervention and therefore compromise Stacy’s freedom of speech?
However, Mill has distinguished between harm and ‘offence’. According to Mill the suppression of
free speech cannot be justified by mere offence, instead actual harm must be caused or there must be
a high possibility of actual harm. He used the example of a corn dealer to illustrate this idea:
‘An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled in the form of a placard.’ (Mill, 2007). In this case Mill
argues that if the corn dealer is injured or his property is damaged by the crowd harm has clearly
occurred therefore, freedom of speech should be impeded. However, if no actual harm is committed
but only offence caused by the speech, suppression is not justified.
When we consider the case of Liam Stacy it seems that Mill might have argued that only offence was
caused to Muamba and no actual harm. Therefore, Mill would reject Liam Stacy’s imprisonment on
the grounds that it damages the free market of ideas and could lead to ‘truths’ being buried. Even
though Mill might agree that Liam Stacy was incorrect in his opinions, he would not silence him
because Mill argued that Stacy’s view would be opposed by the majority and the truth would prevail
accordingly. The public outcry against Stacy’s comments perhaps suggests that this was the case.
Furthermore, as a utilitarian Mill would also argue that locking Liam Stacy up for 56 days and
silencing his opinion would cause more harm than the initial racial comments caused Muamba.
Further complicating this issue is what Mill termed the concept of customary mortality. Mill thought
that customary morality was a set of moral principles which most of us are brought up to accept and
which forbid, for example, murder and theft. The best way to think about customary morality is to
think of them as rather crude ‘rules of thumb’ (Crisp, 1997). Mill argued that if these rules are
generally followed then utility will be maximized in the long run. This solves the problem that would
otherwise occur of having to weigh up every decision against the utility principle, a time consuming
process which would paradoxically reduce utility.
Considering the Muamba case in this light brings about further considerations. If Stacy’s racist
opinions are contrary to customary morality Mill argued that this could justify interference: ‘Offence
alone cannot justify suppression, unless it is in line with that part of customary morality which is
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justified by the principle of utility’ (Crisp, 1997). This argument provides grounds for silencing
speakers who go against customary morality, such as racist speakers. However, while what Crisp
argues is true, Mill holds universal free speech in such high regard in pursuit of the truth that it would
seem that Mill would have believed that Stacy should not have been silenced.
A further example can be examined in the case of David Irving. It is illegal in Germany and Austria
to deny the occurrence of the Holocaust because of the offence it can cause. In 1989 David Irving, a
British author, gave two speeches in Austria in which he denied the Holocaust. An arrest warrant was
promptly ordered and he was subsequently barred from entering Austria, Germany, Italy and many
other countries (Warburton, 2009). At first glance it may seem obvious that it that Mill would object
to the silencing of Irving’s opinions; he has a right to free speech, no actual harm caused but only
offence and the judge’s ruling could represent a fallible view. However, after closer inspection we once
again see how complicated and at times contradictory Mill’s theories were. David Irving was speaking
a twentieth Century European context in which denying the holocaust has become contrary to
customary morality. Therefore, silencing and punishing Irving can be justified on the grounds of
customary morality. This seems a somewhat confusing contradiction on Mill’s part if he indeed would
have silenced this ‘offence against decency’ (Mill, 2007). Mill is walking a tightrope as he appears to
be torn between the danger of allowing society to oppress individuals and that how certain actions
can be seen as just plain wrong. Mill does not find a solution to this confusing paradox.
Mill’s position on the limits of free speech is both simple and complicated. It is simple in the fact that
the avoidance of harm is the only limit which he allows, but complex in so far as the application of
this limit requires controversial judgments on a range of issues, which can be interpreted in multiple
ways. Ultimately, Mill’s arguments for freedom of speech rest on the principle of utility as Mill states
‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions’ (Mill, 2007). Both his justification for
customary morality and the harm principle rests on this utility principle. If the curbing of free speech
reduces harm or prevents harm, then intervention is legitimate. The difficulty in interpreting Mill’s
theories, as these examples demonstrate, lies in the subjective and at times controversial process of
defining and quantifying harm.
Bibliography
Brink, David, 2014. Interview via Email. Interviewed by Chris Sealey, 3 August 2014.
Cartwright, Will, 2003. John Stuart Mill on Freedom of Discussion. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 5.
Crisp, Roger Mill on Utilitarianism (1997) Routledge, Abingdon.
Crisp, Roger, 2014. Interview via Email. Interviewed by Chris Sealey, 2 August 2014.
Daniel Overgaauw, The paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom of Speech (RE-) Considered (2009). [online]
available at: http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/104/186> [Accessed 21st August 2014]
Fabrice Muamba: Racist Twitter user jailed for 56 days. BBC NEWS [online] available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17515992 [Accessed 14th August 2014].
Mill, John Stuart On Liberty (2005) Cosimo, New York.
Skorupski, John Why Read Mill today? (2007) Routledge, London and New York.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford [online] available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-speech/#HarPriFreSpe [Accessed 26th July 2014].
The Three (Four) Criteria of Legitimate Coercion in Mill’s Moral Theory, 2005. New York University
available at: <https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_037143.pdf>
[Accessed 1st August 2014].
Warburton, Nigel Free Speech A Very Short Introduction (2009) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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Has the internet changed the way we think?
Adil Shehzore
In the 1970s the creation of a way for all of the computers on all of the world's mini-networks to
communicate with one another changed the way in which we saw and interacted with the world. Email
enabled us to send messages in seconds to any part of the world. Furthermore the development of
search engines allowed us to access volumes of information that would take thousands of libraries to
fill. While the advent of online shopping has enabled us to do our groceries, buy houses and book
holidays without leaving our homes. Now the immediate result of the internet is evident, however
many now question if the internet hasn’t only changed our lives, but the way we think too. One would
argue that thanks to its widespread use, that this is indeed the case. Yet this essay aims not to simply
comment on this very basic notion, but to explore the ways in which the internet has caused us to
think in such a way that our society is directly affected. The internet has challenged our perceptions
of past protocols, made information available to all and has physically and mentally changed us as a
species.
The most bona fide effect that the internet has had is evident in the ease and accessibility of the vast
information it contains. Dates, answers and images are all found in one place. As information is no
longer hidden in the crevices of archaic shelves and private collections, the effects of the internet have
not only lead to vanishing encyclopedias and the closure of libraries, but its most palpable effect has
been on the Human species. The internet has changed the way we think in the sense that we no longer
feel the need to memorize every single fact about a time period and no more do we need to be able to
quote definitions verbatim. The knowledge we would once gain from teachers and parents is now
found inside our pockets, in this way Google has become our ‘external hard drive’ – an extension of
our memory, which begs the question: if so much information is and will always be so readily available,
what is the need for spending hours memorizing details when such facts are a fingertip away? However
it is not the effects but the consequences of this question, which present the most significant
consequences of the internet on the way we think. Having so much information readily available
questions many aspects of our very society, in particular its basis: Education. For years students have
been tested on their ability to learn information in a certain period of time and the reproduce it on
paper in an exam. However, surely the presence of this information in our pockets renders this process
and thus a significant part of our education system obsolete. This reveals a pressing matter for
politicians and educators alike. While before someone who may have been applauded with a brilliant
ability to memorize entire passages of prose and recall all the capitals of the world, now the usefulness
of this ability may be called into question. Perhaps we should now have spontaneous practical tasks
rather than dreaded exams or possibly the time has come to abandon the practice of handing a student
a textbook and inviting him back a few months later to regurgitate the information he has managed
to cram in that time. These are all conventions and common practises the internet has caused us to
challenge thus resulting in the destruction of one archaic school of thought and thanks to the internet
the creation of its successor.
The internet has put on the forefront resourcefulness and critical-thinking and relegated
memorization of rote facts to mental exercise or enjoyment. Because of the abundance of information
and this new emphasis on resourcefulness, the internet creates a sense that anything is knowable or
findable — as long as you can construct the right search, find the right tool, or connect to the right
people. The internet empowers better decision-making and a more efficient use of time.
Simultaneously, it also leads to a sense of frustration when the information doesn't exist online. What
do you mean that the store hours aren't anywhere? Why can't I see a particular page of this book?
What do you mean that page isn't available? Page not found?
The internet can facilitate an incredible persistence and availability of information, but given the
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internet's adolescence, all of the information simply isn't there yet. In some ways our minds has
evolved to this new way of the thinking, relying on the information's existence and availability, so
much so that it's almost impossible to conclude that the information isn't findable because it just isn't
online.
The web has also enabled amazing dynamic visualizations, where an ideal presentation of information
is constructed — a table of comparisons or a data-enhanced map, for example. Therefore the
availability of information has made freed us from thinking only in the parameters that textbooks and
teachers provides, instead making us more open to learning and opportunity, however, it has also
reduced our patience and in a way, our understanding. This reinforces the fact that it has undoubtedly
changed the way we think yet whether this change is completely positive remains to be seen.
On a scientific level, it is widely believed that the internet has been responsible for a noticeable change
in not only our way of thinking but caused a great change in or minds on an organic level. Thanks to
the internet’s instant rapid-fire ability to provide masses of information in seconds our brains are now
changing and activated, particularly with regards to memory and decision-making. Given that there
were only 3.5 million web searches in total in 1998, as opposed to the modern day where there are 4.7
trillion search queries daily, a whole generation has grown up and developed as beings with the
availability of this innovation.
Therefore having the sum of all knowledge is in our pockets has had a direct effect on our brains. 1
Neuroimaging of frequent internet users shows twice as much activity in the prefrontal cortex as
sporadic users. This part of the brain is reserved for short-term memory and quick decision-making.
Essentially, our brains recognize that most of the flood of online information is trivial, and doesn’t
deserve our full attention. The problem is, the brain does what we train it to do. And every time we
open a browser, we prepare for skimming instead of learning. So even if we really want to remember
something from Google, our brains are predisposed to forget. Perhaps we are becoming ‘Pancake
People’ — spread wide and thin as we connect with that vast network of information accessed by the
mere touch of a button, making us faster decision makers, yet this very action has made us less able
to absorb and understand the information we are processing. As a result our way of thinking has
changed so that everything we ever wanted to know is available to us, and yet we have conditioned
ourselves to ignore it-opting for a general look rather than a detailed understanding or study as we
believe it is always accessible
Another effect the internet has had on our way of thought is not widely discussed, yet is an incredibly
important one. Thanks to the accessibility and openness of the internet, it has provided platforms like
social media and online forums, we now live in an age where we are able to express opinions and
emotions in a way that was not previously possible. You can now send a message to your favorite
director, informing them of your opinion about their new movie. Thus the internet has perhaps
liberated us as a free-thinking society, on the other hand with this platform, we now have a mask to
veil our identity from others, enabling one to hurt others online simply because there is an inherent
lack of consequence. Thus this liberation of speech has come at a cost. Has the independence of ideas
and opinions resulted in an altercation with our moral compass. This reveals a darker side to the
internet; many people have become accustomed to being able to say whatever they wish simply because
there will be in essence no dire consequence to themselves in doing so. Thus we have resolved to a
way of thinking which surpasses the initial objective of the Freedom Act, 2000 which dictated we
have a ‘Right to Know’, perhaps we now believe that we in fact have a ‘right to say, regardless’.
It is evident to see the vast change the internet advent of t has had on our society as a whole; Our
ability to use and access information has surpasses that of virtually any civilization, while we have
become attuned, as beings to new ways of thinking which include: the freedom to express ourselves
G.W, T.D Moody, P Siddarth, and S.Y Bookheimer. ‘Your Brain on Google: Patterns of Cerebral Activation During
Internet Searching.‘ The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry : Official Journal of the American Association for Geriatric
Psychiatry. 17.2 (2009): 116-126. Print.
1
102
regardless of consequence, shed the load of a fact-laden brain for a curious, inquisitive one.
Nonetheless it is important to consider the fact that a great innovation often results in a complete
change in people’s perception of life and society. In the case of the Industrial revolution, the invention
of the steam engine by James Watt’s transformed industry in the 1760’s, enabling the creation of
machines which would never tire, nor sleep and were efficient it became unnecessary to have hundreds
of workers toiling away and demanding pay when a few loyal machines would do as is the case with
the internet. Therefore the internet has changed our way of thinking; We are now able to find and
collect information in a way that is almost infinite in its opportunities, our thoughts and emotions are
synergizing into a greater conscious with more immense and far-reaching effects on our morality as
well as our society, than we could ever anticipate. However I believe this change should not be
considered an individual result due to the contrivance of a singular development, instead the internet
is simply one in a line of many advancements and innovations which have and will continue to
revolutionize our society thanks to their capability and change our idea of the world and ourselves
due to their potential, opening windows for ideas to flourish and expand through an interface of
opportunity.
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Contradiction
Adam Sheriff
‘War Is Peace. Freedom Is Slavery. Ignorance Is Strength.’
-The Party.
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949)
Introduction
The art of contradiction, literally from the Latin ‘to speak against’, has been abused for centuries, by
those in power, to steer the masses towards supporting their own interests. George Orwell’s post-war
dystopian novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, provides an emphatic illustration of this. The three slogans
quoted above, are examples of directly contradictory statements that were used to justify the actions
of the mysterious government depicted by Orwell, ‘The Party’, which ruled the dystopic super-state,
Oceania. Whilst this example is evidently fictitious, recent real-world events have shown that
contradiction is playing an important role in influencing the public psyche. In this essay, we shall
explore the impact of contradiction on real-life society in the context of The Party’s slogans.
War Is Peace
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Ministry of Peace of Oceania ensures that the nation is constantly
embroiled in a state of war and spreads fear amongst her citizens in order to gain their support against
perpetual enemies. Their contradictory slogan- ‘War Is Peace’ epitomizes their method of
brainwashing people into believing that their wars are eventually going to restore peace. Similar
justifications, however, can be seen today, a prime example being the claims of NATO countries of
entering a purely ‘pre-emptive war’ in order to appease their citizens. The notion of a ‘pre-emptive
war’, i.e. starting a war in order to prevent wars, is a contradiction in itself and yet is a concept still
widely used by NATO and other organizations. They use this excuse as thinly veiled licences to initiate
any conflict on the pretext of bringing peace. The disastrous consequences of NATO ‘interventions’
in Libya, Syria and Iraq against seemingly faceless and ever-shifting foe and the way in which they
have spawned, like a Hydra’s head, ever more abundant and dangerous terrorist groups parallel the
methods of perpetual war and the constant threat of terror which the Ministry of Peace imposed on
its citizens. It seems that the titles given to the Ministry of ‘Peace’ and the modern-day Ministry of
‘Defence’ are equally contradictory.
Freedom Is Slavery
It seems increasingly common in today’s society that in our eagerness to protect perceived freedoms
we are actually enslaving ourselves. A recent example is during the aftermath of the tragic ‘Charlie
Hebdo’ shootings in Paris. A few days after these events, a number of world leaders announced they
will no longer tolerate attacks on our freedom of speech, some whilst simultaneously advocating an
amendment to the so-called ‘snooper’s charter’ which will allow governments to escalate their
monitoring of mobile telecommunications and the internet. Often, governments are too hasty to enact
laws that may protect one aspect of civil liberties but curtail a number of existing ones. It appears
that this situation has led to a certain degree of public unease; a 2013 poll by the Washington Post
discovered that 70% of respondents were concerned about the US Government’s routine collection
of large amounts of private metadata. This atmosphere of fear is mirrored by the long shadow of
The Party which gives the impression that its citizens are always being monitored through
‘telescreens’, supressing open opposition. The infamous whistle-blower Edward Snowden has
mentioned the danger of worldwide mass surveillance marking the emergence into reality of Orwell’s
warning of an ever-watching ‘Big Brother’; he claims that the only difference is that the modern
methods employed by governments are more sophisticated and intrusive than Orwellian telescreens.
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Chillingly, it appears that some governments have taken such great strides in monitoring its own
people that it has far surpassed anything The Party could have dreamed of.
Ignorance Is Strength
The third and final of the Party’s contradictory slogans- ‘Ignorance Is Strength’ describes an attempt
by The Party to encourage its citizens to accept what they are told and to never question their policies.
Thus, by encouraging people to be satisfied with ignorance and unawareness, governments can rely
on support for their actions with little opposition. The manipulation of media to broadcast a one-sided
view is a technique which has been employed throughout modern history. However, technological
advances such as the arrival of the internet and social media, together with 24 hour news channels
have brought current affairs to the general public like never before. A notable example of this is Tony
Blair’s strong working relationship with the Australian media mogul Rupert Murdoch; it is thought
that Blair’s landslide election victories in 1997 and 2001 can be attributed in some part to the strongly
supportive stance Murdoch’s papers (in particular The Sun) broadcasted to its millions of daily
readers nationwide. In essence, by presenting a narrow and biased viewpoint to the public,
governments are able to use mass media outlets to encourage people to follow the status quo and to
not question the information they are spoon-fed.
Conclusion
It is now fifteen years since the millennium, and yet it seems like we are drawing nearer and nearer to
Nineteen-Eighty Four. The Party’s slogans seem so contradictory and caricatured that it can be hardly
believed that they are being played out in real-life. However, this type of contradiction can be subtle.
‘War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, Ignorance Is Strength.’ Perhaps one way to escape is to exercise
the judicious use of some ‘contradiction’ of our own; by ‘speaking against’ the spoon-fed information
portrayed by the media and some of the actions of modern governments across the world. 65 years
since the publication of Nineteen-Eighty Four, we must ensure that this fictitious novel does not become
our reality.
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My new punctuation mark
Adam Sheriff
‘Cut out all these exclamation points. An exclamation point is like laughing at your own joke’
F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940)
The English language is a rich tapestry which has evolved over millennia; from the archaic Old
English of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms to the lingua-franca that is now used by millions across the
globe. At the heart of this evolution is the development of punctuation, which both complements and
enhances the meaning of the language itself. However, there remains a significant flaw in the timeless
beauty of the dots, commas and hyphens; the lack of proper, expressive punctuation. It is
extraordinary that in a language that has four separate glyphs to demonstrate varying strengths of
pauses, the exclamation mark alone is responsible for punctuating every emotion in the human
repertoire as well as volume in text.
The exclamation mark is thought to originate in the Roman era, when scribes would add the word ‘io’
(literally, hurrah) to the end of sentences to indicate joy. Over time, the ‘I’ migrated above a
diminishing ‘O’ to form the modern exclamation mark. However since then, no new expressive
punctuation has been developed. The lack of variety explains the sheer laziness of modern writers in
applying this insipid mark to every instance to attempt to create excitement. In verbal face-to-face
communication, there exist a number of indications which make clear the emotion being expressed.
For example, a red complexion, gritted teeth and aggressive stare is associated with a flash of anger.
Similarly, the emotions of joy, tearfulness or surprise are all easy to differentiate using diverse visual
clues. In written text however, the exclamation mark is used, remarkably drably, as a general
expression of emotion. This has led to a lack of clarity which makes emotions ambiguous.
The general use of exclamation marks also narrows the meaning of the text it punctuates. It can in
certain settings evoke a sense of enforced jollity or drama. It is telling that the authors of great
fictional thrillers and mysteries, such as Alistair Maclean and Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle, used few
exclamation marks in their stories and yet both are renowned for the incredible suspense and tension
they evoke. When used, exclamation marks can detract and diminish the quality of writing as they
encourage authors to be less imaginative with the language they produce.
The corporate industry has also discovered the failings of the exclamation mark. Advertising used to
employ exclamation marks in their messages to generate excitement and command their customers.
Lately, it has been realized that they evoke a sense of desperation and willingness to manipulate their
customers into a purchase. An advertisement encouraging people to ‘Act quickly while stocks last!’ a
classically hackneyed method of conveying urgency to a potential customer, is a prime example. The
most memorable and successful slogans such as Adidas’s (somewhat improbable) ‘Impossible Is
Nothing’ tagline do not use exclamation marks and are more powerful because of it. Apple, the world’s
most valuable brand, goes a step further by even banning its distributors from using exclamation
marks to promote their products. An exclamation mark used in advertising merely cheapens the image
of the product, not to mention the company which uses them.
It is therefore evident that the exclamation mark has largely been made redundant by writers and
advertisers alike. Users deserve more characteristic and elegant forms of punctuation to replace them
and this is what is being proposed. The exclamation mark’s weakness and ambiguity arise from the
fact that it has too many uses therefore it would be counterproductive to simply devise another single
mark to replace the exclamation mark.
However inspiration can be taken from the world of digital communications. Electronic conversations
via the media of text messaging and emails are rapidly increasing in volume and therefore the
language used is evolving at a faster rate than any other form of English. In online conversations
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users have already moved on from the exclamation mark; it has been superseded by the advent of
emoticons. Emoticons have a major advantage over the exclamation mark; they provide a fresh
alternative with an exclusive icon for each emotion that the writer wants expressed, thus removing
uncertainty. The colourful red and yellow icons used online clearly cannot be incorporated into formal
writing and novels, however, I believe a system based on emoticons but with a more muted and refined
repertoire is the answer. This new system will completely replace every role of the exclamation mark
thus far.
:
Surprise
Happiness
Volume
Anger
Therefore, these are the series of the four new punctuation marks that are being proposed and the
essence of what they would convey. The design is similar to current emoticons however they will
easily be able to integrate themselves into writing at a variety of registers. As a further advantage
over the obsolete exclamation mark the new set do not require a full stop to follow them, thus allowing
sentences to flow more smoothly without being broken up; creating a more enjoyable experience for
the reader. Below are four example sentences, complemented by the new punctuation marks. As can
be seen the new set of punctuation marks has achieved a much richer sense of tone, with clearer
emotions in the same sentences than with the exclamation mark.
I passed! I passed
Hello! He boomed Hello he boomed
Oh my Gosh! Oh my Gosh:
Get off my land! Get off my land
This new series of four punctuation marks will not only serve the needs of language that the
exclamation mark has until now. They will also allow writers in the fields of novel writing to
advertising to go much further than before in creating emotion, tone and expression in written
English to match that in the oral form.
I anticipate that the new punctuation will be adopted quickly after its introduction as users will enjoy
the novelty of using them in their writing. However after the allure has rubbed off, I believe this set
of four small punctuation marks will prove to be a cornerstone in modern punctuation and become an
endearing image of the new age of English and the wonderful, flexible nature of our ancient language.
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Quantitative Easing
Christopher Stone
Quantitative Easing, QE, is one of the newest and most untested concepts in modern day economics,
yet it has played an important part in stimulating growth in the recovering economies of the UK,
USA and Japan. In 2009 the UK undertook quantitative easing and since then it has grown the Bank
of England’s balance sheet to £375billion1 worth of assets, so by no means is this as simple as raising
and lowering interest rates and its impacts are near on impossible to judge. Despite this the question
still remains and all eyes are on the Monetary Policy Committee, MPC, as to when and how do they
begin to sell the asset purchases before to increased money supply effects inflation without damaging
the fragile UK recovery.
Before I begin the trying to decipher whether there has been a positive outcome from QE I should
give a brief overview of how it works. The Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England
monthly will agree on a figure, to create electronically to spend on asset purchases. The money once
created is used to buy up UK Government Bonds and other qualifying assets causing the price of
these assets to rise and therefore the yield of such investments will begin to fall alongside interest
rates. As the yields fall private investors begin to look elsewhere to invest e.g. equities, corporate bonds
or loans, which promise a higher potential yield. The idea behind this is that investment increases and
the suppressed interest rates, encourage borrowing leading to a further increase in borrowing by
businesses and households alike. Once the economy is either back on track or inflationary pressures
are forcing CPI inflation above the 2% target the bank will begin to sell of its purchased assets, N.B.
this will be after the base rate of interest has been raised but we will look at this in more depth later,
until either its targets are met or until it no longer holds any of the assets that it purchased. This will
increase the yields of bonds again and cause the cost of borrowing to rise causing inflation to fall and
growth to slow back to a sustainable level.
For now, however, let’s go back to the start of the process in 2009 when the UK economy was in
recession with growth as low as -2%. As the Bank of England cut interest rates to a record low of
0.5%, a level which it hasn’t moved from for over 5 years, the Monetary Policy committee decided to
take further action. This came in the form of QE and it began with a first round of £200bn to buy
government bonds to reduce yields and force down interest rates. From 2009 to the end of 2011 bond
yields fell from 4% to 1.9% on 10-year gilts2. Although bond yields were already falling it does suggest
that the decision to start QE did have an effect as the speed at which yields were falling increased.
This increased money supply that forced long term interest rates, some economists believe, had a vital
impact on the economy as it potentially has helped the UK economy to avoid the deflationary pressures
that would have caused the cost of debt to rise causing major damage to economy.3 This scenario isn’t
too far off what is being experienced in the Eurozone, with inflation below 1% the possibility of
deflation could be disastrous given the high levels of debt. The IMF has claimed that QE will have
huge benefits including increased supply and demand for credit producing a direct stimulus to the
Eurozone economy in the form of consumer spending and investment, which provides an
‘overwhelming case’ for QE in Europe.4 However, has it had the same effect on the UK economy?
Although many economists have claimed QE to be necessary there are split views as to its success in
2012, the Bank of England claimed that QE had increased GDP by 1.5-2% with the first £200bn of
quantitative easing. However, after this claim was made the UK slipped into a double dip recession
suggesting one of two things, either QE wasn’t working or it was taking longer to stimulate the
1
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/default.aspx
The journey towards becoming Japan.
3 The case for truly bold monetary policy
4 Eurozone needs quantitative easing
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2
economy than expected. The other suggestion was that QE had been too small and the risk of a double
dip recession was enough for the MPC in late 2011 to launch the second round of QE to give the
economy a further boost.
One of those leading the case for QE not working is, the inventor of QE, Professor Werner from
Germany who has said, ‘UK QE has failed’. He claimed in a recent interview that the main idea is that
as QE takes hold banks start lending more to economic agents boosting investment and that will in
turn have its knock on affects throughout the economy. However, Professor Werner claimed, ‘bank
credit is still shrinking’5 in which case there is a lack of confidence that is QE is designed to build. In
a counter to this the Bank of England claimed that the QE they are carrying out is designed not to
use the banks to increase lending but to increase it through them buying assets providing an
alternative money supply until such time as QE has stimulated enough growth that confidence is
growing and banks have repaired their balance sheets and can once again become the main supply of
money within the economy6. However, Prof Werner’s argument does have one strong point that the
benefits of QE aren’t filtering through the economy sufficiently and this is highlighted by the
difference in credit availability to firms. The Bank of England credit reports for the last three quarters
has shown that despite continuous increases in demand for credit from both small and medium sized
firms credit available to them has remained broadly unchanged whereas larger firms have seen
increases over all three quarters. The only positive is that the Bank reported ‘an increased appetite for
risk’ during Q1 of 2014, which suggests that confidence is improving, which could be attributed partly
to QE. Although this is encouraging the growing cash balances of large firms suggest a lack of
investment opportunities suggesting that consumers are still wary and that although an appetite is
growing confidence is still far from pre-recession levels. Furthermore, despite the encouraging
employment statistics the low productivity growth and low wage inflation suggest that the economy
has still not fully recovered.
Overall, it’s hard to tell if QE has worked but we can look at the indicators. Personally I think QE is
working but it still has some work to do especially on the confidence front as without it small firms
will not see the benefits and as they control 70% of employment it may prove vital to ensure they
benefit from the policy. However, it’s better to look at what QE has helped avoid in judging its success
and this includes deflation and also helped stabilize the financial sector, which has saved the UK from
suffering a much worse recession even if it wasn’t quick enough to help avoid a double dip recession.
And if we look at growth as well the UK is predicted around 3% this year whilst the Eurozone is
looking at around 1% and with the European Central Bank look to carry out QE itself under the
International Monetary Fund’s encouragement maybe that is a sign of how important QE was for the
UK economy. For now though it is time to turn our attention away from the question of the
effectiveness of QE and towards the question of when and how to end it.
As we have recently heard the Bank of England has kept QE on hold in the after the MPC met on
August 7th7, and they will have been looking at reports on the economy and economic indicators to
help it decide whether or when the time is right to begin to sell off some of the £375bn worth of
assets. The main figure that has been at the centre of attention is productivity. UK productivity
growth is ‘still abysmal’ according to the National Institute of for Economic and Social Research
(NIESR) and this is backed up by the Bank of England in its latest inflation report, where figures
show how much higher UK GDP would have been had it not been for the financial crisis8. This helps
suggest that now is definitely not the time to begin to sell back government bonds to the market as
the likely outcome is to see unemployment rise due to QE no longer keeping interest rates low. The
low productivity also suggests the existence of spare capacity within the economy and whilst the
Monetary Policy Committee predicts it to be around 1-1.5% of GDP9 and NIESR predicts that it
could be even bigger than that if this is the case, then ending QE could potentially start later than
5
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24614016
Why QE is the only game in town
7 Bank of England keeps rates and QE programme on hold.
8 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q201.pdf
9 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/2014/ir14may3.pdf
109
6
expected. The slack allows for a period of non-inflationary growth for the UK economy, which could
be capitalized on with low interest rates to encourage investment within the economy, which in turn
could lead to increases in productivity, falling unemployment and rising real wages. These three
indicators that I have just mentioned are at the centre of the decision and it has been made clear by
the MPC that without increases in productivity and hints of real wages beginning to rise steadily
there will be no changes to QE or the rest of monetary policy. With unemployment now around 6.5%10
and continuing to fall with vacancies rising sharply over the last year a rise in real wages may not be
too far away as the demand for labour rises we could see wages start to be pushed up as the unemployed
figure falls below 6%. If this is the case then selling off government bonds could start as around
August next year as long as we see productivity growth begin to rise although the best indicator will
be short term interest rates being raised first by the MPC. However, if productivity doesn’t rise then
ending QE could cause a rise in unemployment and so doing this would only be used if inflation
needed to be controlled yet this is unlikely due to the estimated size of the output gap.
So although this appears to make it simple there is a major problem that the MPC must consider and
that is the issue of household debt. Debt is once again on the rise, fueled by low interest rates, and the
savings ratio is falling. This could pose to be a problem and the Bank of England labelled it ‘a serious
threat to the UK recovery’11. This is because if interest rates start to rise as QE is ended it will hurt
those who have high levels of debt or have mortgages and considering that consumers have been the
backbone of the recovery it could be damaging for the UK economy if consumers had to cut their
spending to address high levels of personal debt. The low savings ratio could make this even worse
as debtors have even less reserves to fall back on if interest rates hit them hard. This could all be a
problem if interest rates stay low for too long allowing debt to rise to a high level where there is the
potential for the scenario I’ve just outlined to take place. So this makes it a balancing act for the MPC,
they have to get the timing right or it could have a negative long-term impact on the economy.
Whilst the timing is important there is also the process that the MPC will choose to sell back its bonds
and it will be impossible to do this without a reaction from the stock market, ever the mere talk of
tapering QE caused markets to react violently and sell off equities. Although it is almost a certainty
to see a fall in equity values as the Bank of England begin to sell bonds back to the market the fall can
be controlled by releasing bonds at a slow rate to avoid a large volatile reaction. To easy the reaction
further the MPC are likely to raise interest rates first beforehand which will make monetary policy
more ‘flexible’ if quick changes have to be made. Mark Carney announced last year that there would
be several rounds of raised interest rates before he considered selling off the £375bn of assets12.
This will allow the MPC to gauge the likely market reaction and reduce any negative impact that
selling back government bonds to the market may have.
What does the future of QE look like? It’s hard to know; predicting the movements and reaction of
60 million people over the next few years is difficult. Whilst we can expect to see interest rates rise
next year once the MPC see productivity, wages and employment improve we can expect to see
government bonds being released in the years afterwards However, with the tiny reaction recently in
the USA to the Federal Reserve ending QE this coming October it is reasonable to assume that
investors will be expecting the end and so markets will not be too volatile in response but there is
never any certainty of this.
Overall, I think that QE has helped the UK economy in its recovery; however, we will never know the
resulting effect had we not taken the experiment of using quantitative easing. That is they key point,
no matter how much research or investigating we do we will never know the exact extent to which it
has boosted the economy, whilst I think it has helped others will disagree. Unfortunately, this
uncertainty and divided opinion will continue beyond the end of QE; whilst the how is clear, the when,
10
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_361188.pdf
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/03/housing-market-house-prices-economy-bank-ofengland
12 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/mark-carney/10524205/Bank-of-England-likely-to-hold-on-to-assetpurchases-for-several-years-says-Mark-Carney.html
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11
is difficult to tell. Nevertheless my prediction is the we won’t see government bonds being sold off
before this time next year and that won’t happen unless productivity is on the rise along with wages.
But for now we wait to see what happens over the next few months before we see the beginning of
the end of quantitative easing, the biggest monetary policy of experiment of the modern era.
Bibliography
Bank of England
• Quantitative Easing Explained,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/default.aspx
• Output and Supply extract from May 2014 Inflation Report,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/2014/ir14may3.pdf
• The UK Productivity Puzzle, UK Quarterly Bulletin Q2 2014,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q201.pdf
Financial Times:
• Bank of England keeps rates and QE program on hold, Emily Cadman, August 7th 2014
• UK productivity still abysmal, Emily Cadman, August 5th 2014
• Why quantitative easing is the only game in town, Martin Wolf, March 15th 2012
• Eurozone needs quantitative easing, July 20th 2014
• The case for truly bold monetary policy, Martin Wolf, June 28th 2012
Office for National Statistics:
• Labour Market Statistics, May 2014, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_361188.pdf
BBC:
•
UK QE has failed, says quantitative easing inventor, October 22nd 2013
Guardian:
• Household debt serious threat to UK recovery, says Bank of England deputy, Julia Kollewe, 3rd July
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/03/housing-market-house-prices-economybank-of-england
Telegraph:
• Bank of England likely to hold on to asset purchases for several years, Szu Ping Chan, 17th December
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/mark-carney/10524205/Bank-of-England-likely-to-holdon-to-asset-purchases-for-several-years-says-Mark-Carney.html
Books:
•
‘The Undercover Economist Strikes Back: How to run or ruin an economy’ By Tim Harford.
111
Private equity
Charlie Sparkes
Introduction
Private equity firms - those that leverage the buyout of struggling companies, (supposedly) make them
class leaders and then sell them for profit – have long been looked upon unfavourably by the general
public of the UK. The typical view of these companies normally is founded upon the notion that
private equity firms are run by the self-centred fat-cats of the city whose vast remuneration stems
from firing honest workers then selling the company in question for a profit on the basis that it is
more efficient/productive. I will embark on my investigation by looking into the relative merits of
private equity firms for businesses owned by private equity firms (which I will call target businesses),
and for the general public tooiii.
One of the main questions I will be answering is therefore: are private equity firms the catalysts hard
at work in Schumpeter’s theory of ‘creative destruction’ (Coy, 2012) or do they needlessly harm an
innocent worker in their quest to make profit? It is worth noting too that there is no debate regarding
whether private equity companies themselves reap enough rewards to justify their practices. On the
24th January 2007, many of the City’s top private equity partners (otherwise known as general
partners or ‘GPs’) gathered at The Roundhouse in a celebration of all the is good about the industry.
They launched the Private Equity Foundation which was funded by the leading firms of the city in a
bid to improve the image of these ultra-capitalist plutocrats (Peston, 2008). The start-up fund totalled
£5.1 million that evening which seems like a lot, however the total net worth of the individuals there
was in excess of £10bn, in other words they gave 0.051% of their net worth to charity. Put into
context, that same measure of generosity translates to a normal person on an average UK salary
giving £1.13 to charity every month, or around 2 first class stamps, which is borderline rude given
the objective of this charity and lavish ball in which it was conceived. Whilst these facts aren’t crucial
to the debate here, it is worth considering how and why private equity is currently viewed in a rather
unsavoury light in the UK.
Nevertheless, how the public perceive private equity GPs shouldn’t sway our judgement when
deciding on whether their work benefits society or not. You only need to acknowledge one of Thomas
Piketty’s conclusions in his new bestseller ‘Capital in the Twenty First Century’ to assert that the
talent and management expertise at a target company’s disposal could act as an egalitarian force in an
economy; ‘over a long period of time, the main force in favour of greater equality has been the diffusion of
knowledge and skills’ (Piketty, 2013). This is perhaps a paradoxical concept given the astronomical
profits taken home by leading GPs at the UK’s leading private equity firms.
How Do Leveraged Buyout Deals Work?
Before I begin to make conclusions regarding the expected outcome of a target business, I will
examine the structure and details of a typical leveraged buyout of an undervalued firm by a private
equity company.
First of all, a private equity (PE) firm will assemble an extensive list of a hundred or so potential
companies that they are looking to invest in. Analysts and economists are then employed to whittle
the list down to one or two companies that they believe have the largest potential for improvement
whilst being undervalued. After selecting the final target company, the PE firm would invest money
from the LPs (limited partners who invest in PE fundraising pools) and also some of their own capital
in order to execute the leverage buyout (Private Equity Growth Capital Council, 2007).
In the words of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council; ‘the essence of private equity is the alignment
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of the interests and incentives of management with that of the owners’1, this is ultimately achieved by
encouraging all parties involved in the takeover to invest a portion of their private capital into the
business. The added benefit of private equity ownership is that there are no conflicting goals that have
to be dealt with or compromises that have to be made to add value to the target business. A normal
publicly listed or family owned business would have to worry about quarterly profit statements,
investor speculation, media engagements and large advertising bills in an attempt to compensate for
a lack of efficiency. A PE owned company however focuses more on long-term goals given the view
that long term stability and structural efficiency add more value to a company than short term bubbles.
A PE acquisition would normally last between 3 and 7 years in which time they would hope to
encourage investment to increase the productivity of the firm. At the same time, the GPs would sell
underused assets belonging to the target firm to rid them of any unnecessary interest/rent payments
which yield less benefit than costs would seemingly suggest (Campbell & Campbell, 2008).
Many more incentivizing mechanisms are found though when it comes to the sale of a target company.
The general structure of payments for GPs follows that of Hedge Funds and other investment
institutions, the ‘2 and 20’ rule. This basically states that LPs pay a 2% management fee (that is, 2%
of the LP’s investment) to GPs and then they pay 20% of the profits, otherwise known as carried
interest (given the profit exceeds a hurdle, normally around 8%-10% of the initial investment), to the
GPs. If the target company is sold for a loss though, the GPs receive no carried interest and they also
lose their personal stake in the acquisition, they may also be forced to use previous carried interest
payments to satisfy the unquestionably very annoyed LPs. What’s worse though is the tarnish left on
the reputation of the PE firm, not only have they lost the faith of potential investors – reducing
account liquidity – but as mentioned before, they lose the respect of the public since the media often
use a one-off failure of a leveraged buyout to criminalize the PE industry as a whole.
Past Research and Validity of Data
The following arguments do include the use of data from recent research into this field, and I feel it’s
appropriate to comment on the validity of such data for the purposes of my investigation. Research
into the effects of PE firms on target businesses does exist however my only criticism of it is a lack
of timescale, as regardless of how many target businesses a study may investigate over, say, a 5 year
period, the structural bias due to economic conditions (for example interest and tax rates) will restrict
any long term patterns from emerging. This is problematic as PE firms aim to increase the long term
prospects of target companies and as there is not much data for the long run performance, it is harder
to judge PE firm’s success.
However, I hasten to add that this is not entirely the fault of researchers, the PE ‘boom’ picked up
pace in the mid 1980’s and thus many acquisitions have taken place after this time, furthermore it
would be unreasonable to expect meticulous data books to have been created at the birth of this new
industry, so the only accessible data is from the last 20 or so years. Even with this in mind though, the
lack of long term data shouldn’t provide too much of a hurdle as my investigation focuses on the
effects of PE firms in the UK today and the medium term data is satisfactory for this purpose. In any
case, I intend to use data sets covering the largest period of time possible to increase the validity of
my investigation.
I should also say that statistical analyses have been carried out on all pieces of data (by Popov &
Roosenboom) which confirms that the relationship between PE activity and innovation is due to
causation, not correlation. In other words, the increase in number of patents and productivity is a
result of PE investment; we should not interpret the results in such a way that we assume they show
cases where PE companies invest in companies that already possess vast patent orientated wealth or
highly productive capital.
1
http://www.pegcc.org/education/how-does-private-equity-work/
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How Does Private Equity Ownership Affect Target Businesses?
As mentioned before, the main aim of PE ownership is to increase investment and productivity; hence
a good way to evaluate the success of a leveraged buyout would be to look at the number and value
of patents issued by target companies compared to non-PE owned companies.
It is estimated that in the 5 years building up to 2011, the patents granted by PE backed firms had a
market value of €350bn which is roughly 1.5 times the total amount of PE investment in the same
time period, this alone suggests that the target company in question should expect to be 50% more
wealthy as a result of patent laws alone by the end of a PE firms acquisition (Frontier Economics
Limited, 2013). This though does assume that the PE firms pays off the all the debt it initially loaded
up the target firm with as debt, being a liability, counts as negative wealth. These figures are
corroborated by the European Central Bank; the economists there calculated that between 1991 and
2004, private equity spending accounted for 8% of industrial investment in Europe but 12% of
industrial innovation in the same time period. That’s a large progression which is magnified when one
considers the other investments PE firms bring, such as technology designed to improve efficiency
and allocation of resources (otherwise known as ‘yield management system’).
Furthermore, when we combine these figures with the expertise GPs bring to target businesses, the
macroeconomic benefits of these leveraged buyout deals become all the more clear, benefits which
include increased national income and increased productivity. Regardless though of the impact on the
wider economy, this rise in the value of industrial capital raises the value of the company by increasing
the long term productivity, which is without doubt a benefitiv.
Additional research carried out by the European Central Bank claims (using data) that the ratio (b) of
the impact of £1 of private equity finance relative to the impact of £1 of industrial research and
development on productivity was 2.6 in Europe between 1991 and 2004 (Popov & Roosenboom, 2009).
In some sectors of the economy though, like biotechnology, where technological advancement is a far
more important factor in determining productivity, the b value was as high as 9. This adds weight to
the argument that GPs do actually make profit by providing sustainable impetus to a target firm,
instead of the often false notion that they make personal profit by cutting costs (think asset stripping
and redundancies).
Even with this thought in consideration, one of the main criticisms by the public of private equity
firms is their tendency to sell target firms assets to make a quick profit (or more likely to pay off debt)
and leave the sick company in long term disarray. There are countless examples I could draw upon,
many of them though are reported in such a way that seems to disproportionately demonize the
principle of the free market allocation of capital.
Why is this? Well, I feel that the main reason is that the (vast majority of the) British public has a
desire to righteously maintain a nationalistic sense of decorum. This may sound a bit abstract at first
but it is worth considering that many news corporations wouldn’t print stories about banker’s bonuses,
asset stripping and tax avoidance unless they knew the public would react to it. Furthermore, none of
the listed topics are in any way illegal and they don’t directly impact the average workers way of life
(if so, possibly very slightly negatively in some cases, but the detrimental effects are still arguable).
The point of my argument here is that there is often a fair amount of unfounded scepticism
surrounding asset sales by private equity firms born from its seeming lack of ‘fairness’, yet by
analysing the dynamics of such sales, I intend to show that they are for the greater good.
I will start by looking at what circumstances would force a GP into selling an asset (for example some
freehold property in a hotel chain, take Permira’s acquisition of Travelodge in 2003 (Peston, 2008)
for example). To start with, let us accept the premise that the GP would only want to sell to make
personal gain, and personal gain here is in the form of profits which are only achievable if the target
firm is stronger than it was when it was acquired. Hence, given the market for assets in the UK is as
good as ‘free’, the PE firm will sell the asset if it is likely to yield a greater profit by being sold on the
free market as opposed to being sold together with the rest of the target company when the PE firm
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sells its stake. Further to this, if we look at an asset sale from the perspective of a classical economist,
we can say that an economy would be closer to an optimal allocation of resources as a result of such
a transaction. This is courtesy of the fact that the agent buying the asset would, by definition, value
it more than the seller and would utilize it in such a way that they yield a higher output per unit input
from the asset than its previous owners did. The firm that sold the asset (that may have become
comparatively less productive over time as a business restructures) can then spend the money on an
asset that is better tailored to the firm in question and one that would hence benefit the efficiency of
their operations. This theory though, of course, relies heavily on the quality of information supplied
to the market regarding an assets uses.
The classic example here of asset stripping working to the benefit of both parties is when Permira
bought Travelodge (which owned Little Chef) in 2003 for £712m. After only a couple of years
Permira sold the Irish contingent of its hotels for £15m and raised £400m from the sale of 135
freehold properties to property entrepreneurs. It then sold Little Chef to another PE firm for £52m
shortly before it ran into trouble. So, one would expect, using simple division, that when sold to Dubai
International Capital, Travelodge was worth around £245m. It actually sold in 2006 for £675m and
thanks to the leveraged nature of the buyout Permira made a profit of £450m over 3 years on this
one project.
I’m not going to generalize and assert that stripping assets is always a valid technique; only when it
is done in good faith is this most likely to be true. This scenario though does highlight a mechanism
that ensures many capital streamlining techniques benefit the wider economy too: The fact that an
asset is sold means someone else values its service more than the target company and hence is able to
put it to better use, thus increasing productivity, as explained above. The same applies for the usual
batch of redundancies just after an acquisition; the workers are no longer needed by the firm as they
have been replaced by technology or more efficient practices. Using the previous case study, under
Permira’s management, Travelodge reduced the cleaning time for each room from 40 minutes to 25
minutes using a specially made DVD, subsequently allowing each hotel to reduce cleaning costs by
40%. Not only does this increase the target firms profits, but the workers no longer needed would be
on the labour market looking for employment (potentially at lower wages than beforev to increase their
chances of being employed). Consequently, more firms can now benefit from cheaper labour as there
is a larger pool of workers probably willing to work at a wage slightly less than that of employed
workers. This may seem a rather crude assessment but one that would occur to the betterment of an
economy in a totally free market, as Adam Smith proclaimed; ‘By pursuing his own interest he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it’2.
I will now set upon trying to denounce the myth that GPs enter a target business, take a machine gun
approach to the employment register, and then leave with a profit. It is often true that they leave with
a profit but not for the cost cutting reason mentioned. Much research has been conducted in this
controversial field, however, I shall use work commissioned by the National Bureau of Economic
Research in the US as it uses, in my opinion, the most complete and well detailed data with respect to
other reports of its kind. It uses data from 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 respective
establishments over the period from 1980 to 2005.
It concludes that ‘net job losses from target firms are less than 1% of initial employment’, furthermore
it concluded that the sum of gross job losses and gross job gains over the period exceeded that of
control firms by 13.5%. This figure represents an increase in job turnaround after a PE buyout, so
whilst a there may be more redundancies there are also a large (but slightly lower) amount of new
jobs being created to cushion the impact on society of the redundancies. Of the rise in position
reallocations, the research suggested that 43% of them were a direct result of ‘a more rapid pace of
employment adjustments’3 whilst the rest were credited to acquisitions and divestments (Picker, 2011).
Relating this to an issue raised in the introduction about Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction,
2
3
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN13.html
http://www.nber.org/digest/jan12/w17399.html
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I feel this evidence is strong enough to conclude that PE buyouts catalyse the process of creative
destruction in an economy. Or, perhaps more aptly, we could characterize this evidence as a
demonstration of ‘destructive creation’ whereby jobs are lost, costs are cut then other (more
productive) jobs are created on the back of the loss (Weissmann, 2012). I would also like to draw
attention to a figure I cited earlier, that is, the b value in the research conducted by Popov &
Roosenboom. It suggested that PE finance was 2.6 times more effective in increasing productivity
than the control firms in the study. Hence, given widely accepted economic theory in this sector, we
can say that we would expect employment to decrease anyway in the short run as an increase in
productivity means less people are needed to produce a certain level of output. The effects on
employment in the long run though are yet to be confirmed by data, although based on my arguments
I would expect them to be positive.
The 3 Conflicting Ps; Private Equity, Public Finances and Pensions
It would be impossible to carry out a meaningful discussion by solely concentrating on the stated 3
entities; PE firms, public finances and pensions. In order to accurately gauge the impact that PE firms
have on society, it is important to constantly apply the reasoning and link the impacts back to the UK
taxpayer who is probably worried about their pension.
PE as an industry, as previously stated, has had a lot of grief from the media and general public of
late. The main concern is that the rewards (indeed only if there are any) are being split in an
inegalitarian manner, with the vast majority of profits going to GPs whilst very little benefit is being
felt by target firm employees who are often exposed to low job security during a PE firms reign at the
helms. What is worth bearing in mind though at this point is that GPs ‘only’ take home 20% of the
profit, as mentioned before, which means the other 80% of profits (directed at LPs) could in some way
be being felt by employees country-wide. PE firms often jump to their own defence when these issues
are raised by claiming that pension funds are large investors and hence the profits made by PE firms
are benefiting the average British worker via healthier pension payouts.
Unfortunately, this is not quite the case. Taking Permira’s most recent funds, Permira IV & V, as an
example, 36% of investment in the £7.8bn fund that started in 2006 (Permira IV) and 39% of the
£4.5bn Permira V (that hasn’t paid out yet) fund came from pension schemes (Permira, 2012). Given
the profits they make (generally on the scale of 40-60% of an investment depending on the economic
climate) this seems to imply that quite a healthy pile of cash will directly make a contribution to the
happy retirement of UK workers. However, again there is a downside. Research by the British Venture
Capital Association shows that between 2002 and 2008 over 70% of funds flowing into UK PE firms
came from foreign institutions (Peston, 2008). This means that only roughly 10%vi of the benefits
derived from Permira IV increasing its portfolio companies’ EBITDAvii by 12% per year and sales by
11% per year (Permira, 2012) was felt by UK pension holders. Robert Peston summed this effect up
succinctly in his book ‘Who Runs Britain?’ saying ‘the purchase by private equity of British businesses
represents a transfer of ownership to foreign interests’4.
What is worth mentioning though is that this is largely not GPs fault, they can’t make pension funds
invest. Instead, it is the UK pension fund managers who are possibly more to blame. Their (rightly)
cautious attitude towards millions of peoples savings meant they generally lacked confidence in this
unpopular industry, what must also be considered though is the fact that they are more reluctant than
their American counterparts to hire executives to carry out the time consuming (and hence expensive)
task of monitoring the performance of PE funds. Furthermore, pension funds tend to be wary of
short term measures of success like quarterly or yearly performance, contrary to PE firms in their
approach to business, as they rely on new companies or individuals investing in their fund on a
continuous basis. Thus, the high levels of debt that PE firms often operate with can be a major worry
for pension funds, which is a pity for UK workers as the value of any business, at least in the long run,
is not affected by their levels of debt. Hence, UK pensioners could have a more lavish retirement if
pension funds were a little more forthcoming to the PE industry.
4
Robert Peston – Who Runs Britain? – p.49 – 2008
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Tax rates and who pays what amount is often at the heart of UK policy debate, where the cases of
private equity firms add rather volatile fuel to the fire, regardless of the fact that they all reduce their
tax bill legally. Put simply, a caveat in the UK tax laws means that the interest on debts is tax
deductable against profits. So GPs astutely load up a target company with just enough debt which is
paid off using the profits from current investments, hence eradicating a PE company’s liability to pay
tax.
In terms of personal tax rates for the very wealthy GPs, carried interest (the 20% GPs make from an
investment) is classed as capital gains tax and hence, given the current laws, we would expect this to
incur a 28% tax. However, there are many reasons why they won’t pay this amount. One reason is that
they can potentially claim a relief to cut their rate down to a figure around the 10% mark, they do this
by hiring a very good lawyer to exploit the vagueness in some clauses set out by HMRC regarding
who is entitled to what. Here is a brief extract from the HMRC website; ‘If you own your business, are
a partner in a business, or own shares in a business, you may be entitled to tax reliefs that reduce your Capital
Gains Tax bill. Capital Gains Tax is due when you sell, give away, exchange or otherwise dispose of business
assets’5.
However, the main reason why GPs end up not paying very much tax in the UK is because they have
their accounts set up offshore. As John Moulton, an influential venture capitalist, told the Treasury
Select Committee in 2007; ‘we have large amounts of debt providers having their interest deducted in the UK
and the people who receive that interest are being taxed somewhere else, that is a statement of fact’. Some people
would characterize this as demonstrating the fiscal failures of the UK’s relatively liberal view towards
capitalism, others would say that this monetary incentive encourages the ultra-wealthy to increase
their capital investments hence reducing unemployment.
There are many interpretations of economic theory that would lead to different conclusions being
drawn about what effect this would have on the UK economy. One line of reasoning would be that the
economy could suffer (given the Chancellor doesn’t decrease public spending) as there is effectively a
transfer of wealth from the taxpayer to the rich investors, where the investors lower marginal
propensity to consume goods than the average man means less money would be spent and hence the
level of aggregate demand in the economy decreases. On the contrary, the increased savings the
investor makes may increase investment in an economy; either through the increased liquidity of
banks (where the money is saved) or more directly through an increase in capital spending by the
investor himself stemming from the ‘wealth effect’.
Prospects and Policy Recommendations
There is no denying the fact that GPs have the expertise to improve the efficiency and productivity
of firms, so is there a way that this can be used to perhaps enhance the image of private equity whilst
providing some more tangible benefits for the British population?
There are 2 types of firms in the UK that are often targeted for operating well below their productive
capacity; monopolies and public organizations. For example, Thames Water has an almost complete
monopoly over all water supplies to the capital and it has a well-documented history of pipe leakages
and mismanagement. It has also recently been estimated that the public sector tendering inefficiencies
(inefficiencies in awarding contracts to private companies) has cost the UK £22bn over the last 5
years6. Profit motivated management would lead to improvements in both these sectors and hence
would improve the welfare of the average UK citizen.
A possible problem with employing GPs/executives to guide these underperforming companies to
their productive potential would be the source of their profit or income when dealing with public
5
6
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cgt/businesses/reliefs.htm
http://www.publicprocurementinsider.com/2014/03/11/economy-starved-of-22bn-thanks-to-inefficiency-of-publicsector-tendering-system/
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companies because they aren’t run to make profit and because it would take a very long time to fix the
structural problems and inherent uncompetitive nature of monopolies. Therefore, my suggestion
would be to provide the PE firms with further tax breaks on future deals to act as a motive to improve
the state of these struggling firms.
Conclusion
In light of my findings, I shall conclude my debate as concisely as possible. Quite simply, I feel private
equity firms are misrepresented in the UK. All the evidence I have collected suggests that their
expertise brings great benefits to target companies and it is only on the odd occasion that a transaction
is carried out in bad faith, maybe where employees are fired by a PE firm not to cut costs but to make
extortionate personal profit, that it is reported in the news and rightly so. Even so, this is normally
offset by the investment into the firm to create jobs in the medium term.
Regarding the large pay packets GPs receive, I would like to defend the reputation of the industry by
asking critics to take into account the fact that the GPs have to be the best in the business. It is near
impossible to earn (in some cases tens of) millions of pounds a year in this sector without having a
combination of the best knowledge, experience and social dexterity. The reason being – this is often
something people forget – that there are many performance and regulatory hurdles for GPs to
overcome on the way to improving a company’s performance, in other words they aren’t just some
greedy city wide-boys making a buck out of another man’s misery. The very fact that investors over
the years have trusted these firms with hundreds of billions of pounds of their own money says
something for the sectors integrity and stability, doesn’t it?
Ever since the industry was born in the 1980’s, it has been the subject of scrutiny from regulators,
independent analysts, newspapers and governments to name a few and whilst many of their reports
have said that PE firms are acting only for personal gain and record ‘severe compliance shortfalls’7, none
of them have stopped the undisputed rise of the leveraged buyout industry. As much as it would be
wrong for me to imply that industry growth is a sign of innocent, meritocratic remuneration, it would
also be equally wrong of me to imply that these reports and articles weren’t written in a way to please
the private equity sceptic population who read them. Nevertheless, I can only convey to you what I
see through my eyes; my personal belief is that if these GPs have been making huge profits for over
35 years now, then there’s been enough time for lawsuits to inflict massive structural, financial and
moral blows to the heart of the private equity industry. There’s also been sufficient time for
governments to introduce legislation to block these practices. You would think that any Prime
Minister worth his while would pounce at the opportunity to round up public support and gain
countless votes by restricting the powers and profits of the ‘bully-boy partners’ of private equity, so
why haven’t they? It’s simple; the often neglected, long term benefits of private equity buyouts often
outweigh the over-exaggerated, short term costs.
Bibliography
Campbell, D., & Campbell, A. (2008). The Economic Impact of Private Equity. Hertfordshire: Ashridge Business
School.
Coy, P. (2012, January 11). Private Equity: Hero or Villain? Retrieved July 23, 2014, from Bloomberg Bussiness
Week Magazine: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/private-equity-hero-or-villain01112012.html
Permira. (2012). Investing in Growth. London: Permira.
Peston, R. (2008). Who Runs Britain? . London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Picker, L. (2011). Private Equity and Employment. Massachusetts: The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Piketty, T. (2013). Capital in the Twenty First Century. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Popov, A., & Roosenboom, P. (2009). Does Private Equity Innovation Spur Innovation? Frankfurt: ECB.
Private Equity Growth Capital Council. (2007). Private Equity at Work. Retrieved July 23, 2014, from PEGCC:
http://www.pegcc.org/education/how-does-private-equity-work/
Weissmann, J. (2012). Is Private Equity Bad for the Economy. The Atlantic
7
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-08/three-signs-the-best-days-of-private-equity-are-over
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Re-evaluating Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History?’
Edmund Stutter
In the summer of 1989 Francis Fukuyama, the deputy director of the U.S. State Department’s policy
planning staff, published an essay entitled ‘The End of History?’ on the eve of the USSR’s collapse.
Fukuyama’s fundamental point in this work, further expounded upon in his 1992 book ‘The End of
History and the Last Man’, is that in the battle of political ideologies, so-called ‘western liberal
democracy’ has won. The author’s argument is that this western Liberalism is the essential end to
man’s societal evolution, that it what will eventually form this political ‘homogenous state’. In the
quarter of a century since its publication, not only has Fukuyama’s thesis been questioned on a purely
theoretical basis, but also separate events have triggered waves of newfound criticism. It is to be
decided whether such new criticism holds true to the nature of the thesis, or whether the faults of the
essay lie within its philosophical reasoning.
2: How events within the last 25 years have helped to support or hinder Fukuyama’s thesis
2.1 The Arab World
Fukuyama clearly distinguishes that his argument is not one caught up in material history. That past
events, the most basic form of history as we understand it, serve only as evidence for the evolution of
world ideology. Thus in judging the validity of the author’s observations, the events in this 25 year
period serve as markers for the progression, or regression, of western liberalism forming a
homogenous political state. What has brought Fukuyama’s essay (and subsequent book) into the public
consciousness once again is recent events surrounding the Arab world and fundamentalist Muslims.
Whilst many used 9/11 as a single example, at the time, with which to counter Fukuyama’s assumed
assertion that there will be no further battles over political ideology, the more recent rise of ISIS and
the conclusion of the Arab Spring have caused many to disagree with the essay and Fukuyama. What
this modern ‘history’ in the Arab world shows us is that there is a strong call for a unified state formed
purely on the basis of religion and culture. If ISIS succeeds in becoming a caliphate then, to many,
that would suggest that Fukuyama’s theory potentially does not apply to the 1.6 billions Muslims
around the world [1]. Fukuyama denounces the ability of a theocratic Muslim state to change the
world’s landscape because it does not hold ‘appeal’ to non-Muslims. Despite the truth in this,
Fukuyama does not allow for the considerable size of the Islamic faith itself and that amongst this
faith there is growing support for this caliphate [2]. The Arab spring also saw the overthrow of
authoritarian or corrupted regimes and in their place instead of seeing the ‘triumph’ of Western
liberalism, the power vacuum was instead filled with near, theocratic regimes [3]. The Arab Spring,
when examined, indeed turns into a useful piece of evidence for Fukuyama’s argument. We saw the
toppling of an essentially authoritarian regime with the initial hope of seeing a ‘democratic’ system
set in place, something that would widely conform to western liberalism [4]. Indeed, if the events of
Egypt are examined what becomes apparent is that this struggle with the authoritarian power was
born out of the people’s inherent belief that a western liberal democracy was the ‘best’ way of
governance for them. This, if anything, supports Fukuyama’s idea that slowly but surely the world’s
populace, after exposure to external nations benefitting under this democracy, want to appropriate
that form of government. But, taking Egypt as the example, when they sought to enact this change,
the people were met with a second wave of corruption, and, again, fought it to try to reach this ‘holy
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-mightthink/
2 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/who-are-isis-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-thelevant-9541421.html
3 http://www.iop.harvard.edu/muslim-brotherhood-and-political-power
4 https://www.opendemocracy.net/david-hayes/arab-spring-protest-power-prospect
1
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land’ of western liberalism [5]. Indeed Fukuyama openly states that conflicts will continue, but that
ultimately there will be an acceptance that western liberalism has no superior. So the Arab spring does
not constitute an argument against Fukuyama. However, the prospect of a unified Islamic state may
offer legitimate, material proof of inherent fallacies in Fukuyama’s theory. Despite his quick dismissal,
some find it irrelevant that non-Muslims would not initially want to emulate the proposed state. If
the Islamic state did come into being it would represent another, alternate form of government.
However, for this to comprehensively reject Fukuyama’s theory then there must first be a massive
increase in popularity for the proposed Islamic state to the point where it cannot be merely rejected
as a small group of idealists failing to win over public support. As without a uniform acceptance of
this state across a majority of the Islamic faith then the proposal and indeed ISIS, alongside traditional
fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda, can be dismissed as not a complete ideological
contender, but just an event that ‘The End of History?’ is not forced to regard under its argument.
Then, even if the movement achieved this, it can still be dismissed by the Fukuyama as, again, not
having the characteristics to constitute a global ideology due to the limitations of its appeal. Though
here is where Fukuyama’s thesis presents an uncomfortable paradox. The essay states ‘it is not
necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological
pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.’ If an Islamic state were to
exist, in the hypothetical size that it would be, it would surely offer a society that deems itself superior
by virtue of its religious nature, that as its people would undoubtedly consider Islam the most
important aspect of their lives and their society would conform most strictly to its principles. Thus
the prospect of an Islamic state, whether it comes in the form of a caliphate or not, raises the issue
that perhaps Fukuyama dismissed the issue of religion all too prematurely.
2.2 China and its continued growth
As for the continued development of China, still a single party ‘communist’ state, many consider it
also to counter Fukuyama’s thesis through its economic success and current stability. Though
Fukuyama countered these thoughts with the example of Chinese economic reform, indeed this
reform has continued to this day where the Chinese ‘Socialist market economy’ has moved even further
towards the free markets of the West [6]. He suggested that despite the efforts of the Chinese
government ‘the pull of liberal ideas’ was dragging China, slowly but surely, towards an eventual
homogenous western liberal state. However, with China’s economic growth, there has not been a
gradual slide into multi-party democracy. Instead in recent years China has taken steps to solidify its
communist single party base [7], even cracking down on Hong Kong’s rights to democracy [8]. It is
difficult to see where this fits into Fukuyama’s thesis, whether a stronger Chinese dedication to
communism is a direct challenge to the western liberal ideals or whether it fits into Fukuyama’s vague
category of not having ‘pretensions of representing’ a ‘different or higher’ society. While the Chinese
communist party has indeed abandoned and shown resentment towards Maoism, the nation has clung
to its own brand of Communism almost in a manner of defiance [9]. So instead of Fukuyama’s initial
response to the ‘problem’ of China, the current alternative, which once again demonstrates how ‘The
End of History?’ is still correct in its idea, is that China’s cracking down on the more liberal aspects
of its society in recent times is as a result of the fear of succumbing to western liberal democracy
[10]. The Chinese ‘Big Chill’ policy came into place in mid-2011 [11], just as the Arab Spring had
caught the world’s attention. Despite the lack of actual success achieved by many Arab revolts, the
Chinese communist party perceived that it was still under threat from a possible revolution aimed at
bringing democracy. So whilst Fukuyama may have been wrong about the response to the gradual
pull of western liberalism, it could be argued that it has been in effect.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012%E2%80%9313_Egyptian_protests
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/januaryfebruary-2013/how-china-became-capitalist
7 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8373060/China-will-never-be-a-multiparty-democracy.html
8 http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/31/6668782/hong-kongs-democracy-in-peril.html
9 http://itself.wordpress.com/2014/04/25/is-china-a-communist-country/
10 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/how-china-the-worlds-oldest-marxist-state-proves-marxwrong/255390/
11 http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/china-the-big-chill
5
6
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2.3 How events in China and the Arab world support cultural-conflict based reading of the future
Both of these cases add to the cause of many critics of Fukuyama’s thesis. Principally, Fukuyama’s
former professor Samuel Huntington published an essay entitled ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ in
Foreign Affairs, 1993 [12]. Huntington argues that what the new ‘source of conflict’ will be due to
cultural divisions rather than Fukuyama’s proposed economic based conflicts. In both the rise of the
Islamic state and the Chinese development there is evidence to contradict ‘The End of History?’. The
Islamic state forms an obvious point of support of Huntington, with Huntington himself stating
Islam to be one of the ‘blocks’ between which altercations will arise. Whilst it remains hypothetical
for now, such an existence would demonstrate that our entrenched cultural groups are modus operandi
for self-identification, rather than political ideology. The situation in Gaza also helps to stoke the
proverbial fire against Fukuyama, as there is a clearly defined conflict, which is escalating [13], not
based on political ideology, which has brought the western ‘block’ into indirect conflict with the
Islamic through Israel. China is another point of contention in this respect, as the nation forms the
largest part of the ‘Sinic’ block mentioned by Huntington. Thus it raises the concern that perhaps
China’s choice of government is not purely the political one that Fukuyama suggests, but rather a
choice that is made to fall in line with the Chinese cultural properties [14]. China has always had a
undeniably massive working class, combined with the individual ethnic and cultural sects within the
country then China and the fact that swathes of China had been ruled (at different times) by foreign
authoritarian powers then, in theory, China makes itself the perfect country to adopt the political
ideology that promotes , superficially, the clearest equality, communism. Thus, seeing that China has
clung to its way of government without major lapses twenty-five years after ‘The End of History?’
it is possible to consider that this is a cultural facet of the country, rather than a delay in the forming
of a western liberal democracy.
2.4 The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis
To a great degree Fukuyama’s argument hinges upon the market as a generator of change, that it is
not only a chief advertisement for the benefit of western liberalism, but also is a key facet to the entire
political construct, that the market is a natural evolution in this form of government and intrinsic to
ultimate homogeneity. The 2007 global economic crisis came to show that this free market was not
only capable of spectacular failures, but that a key cause of its collapse was the political handling, as
Paul Krugman argues the western governments’ deregulation was to blame [15] , and that even more
worryingly, the latest collapse is evidence of a repetition of history, that this form of economy is
prone to ups and downs [16], and that despite the possibility of garnering an astronomic wealth, there
is the possibility of a rapid decline into poverty. The free market of the west was in the fall-out of the
crash no longer an exponent of this political ideology, but the opposite. Depending upon
interpretation, Fukuyama’s thesis can be viewed as stating that the economy is what causes the
homogenous political state because western liberalism is what facilitates the free market. The 20072008 financial crisis showed that this form of economy has the possibility of complete failure. And in
reaction to this financial crisis, with mass protests such as ‘Occupy Wall Street’ [17], it became
apparent that there was a public resentment to the government handling of ‘big business’. If there
were to be a financial crisis even more devastating than that of 2007, the pressure from the public to
change the nature of the economy and alter an inherent part of the western liberal democracy.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilization? Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/25/world/meast/mideast-crisis/
14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_social_structure
15 http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/moral-decay-or-deregulation/
16 http://www.nationwide.com/ups-and-downs.jsp
17 http://occupywallst.org/about/
12
13
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3: Inherent fallacies in the thesis
A great portion of people would see communism as the ultimate form of government [18]. In essence
it is the fairest system of government, where each man is truly equal, no discrimination in terms of
sex or race and no class system. Thus to dismiss it as the final port of call for ideological evolution
seems almost impossible. Jacques Derrida in ‘Spectres of Marx’ noted that Fukuyama does not allow
for the huge amount of civic unrest and misery still apparent in this western liberalism [19]. Though
it may simply be inferred that Fukuyama means that due to human nature, western liberal democracy
is the least imperfect option. Similarly, a great number of people would find it wrong of Fukuyama to
suppose that this form of government is the final solution when today in countries operating as
western liberal democracies there are still fundamental failings which produce poverty, high crime
rates and rioting [20]. Thus critics such as Allan Bloom conceded that whilst western liberalism
appeared to have won-out, it was unsatisfactory [21]. Fukuyama’s own stance on the unsatisfactory
nature of the result is to blame the failings upon an incomplete realization of liberalism, which, in
turn, re-ignite the question of communism, and why Fukuyama can dismiss it as a whole, without
seeing that it was a victim of its own implementation. Obviously, in presenting such a controversial
thesis, Fukuyama did not take into account and variety of possible global changes, but his argument
lies on the observations of man in its current state and the evolution of what has governed him. In
the subsequent novel ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, Fukuyama clearly states ‘We cannot
picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one, and at the same time
better’[22]. Indeed Fukuyama also concedes that ‘there can be no end of history without an end of
modern natural science and technology’ [23].
4: Conclusion
Events within the last twenty-five years have exposed frailties with Fukuyama’s thesis, though not to
the point of abandonment. However, hypotheticals posed by such events such as the rise of ISIS do
help to undermine ‘The End of History?’ further still. Ultimately the argument for and against it is a
theoretical and philosophical one. Whilst there is a valid realm of thought that the ‘supreme’ form of
government would be a perfectly functioning communist society, it is impossible to picture one.
Fukuyama alludes to this with his quotation ‘We cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially
different, and at the same time better’, because in this he includes picturing a world without the very
basic evils inherent in human nature that render any pure form of government impossible. Thus it
appears that western liberalism remains the best alternative and this realization will eventually
become known and acted upon by enough peoples to prove Fukuyama in essence correct.
5. Bibliography
Books
Derrida, Jacques Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. 2006
Fukuyama, Francis The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press: Simon & Schuster 2006
Fukuyama, Francis Our Posthuman Future. Picador 2002
Huntington, Samuel P The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster 1996
Articles/Essays
Bloom, Allan Responses to Fukuyama The National Interest, Summer 1989
Doyle, Michael W Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs Wiley, Autumn 1983
Fukuyama, Francis The End of History The National Interest, Summer 1989
http://www.debate.org/opinions/communism-and-socialism-in-theory-are-ideal-forms-of-government
Derrida (1993) Spectres of Marx
20 http://www.povertyusa.org/
21 Bloom, Allan Responses to Fukuyama The National Interest, Summer 1989
22 Fukuyama (1992) The End of History and the Last Man
23 Fukuyama (2002) Our Posthuman Future
18
19
122
Glaser, Eliane Bring back ideology: Fukuyama's 'end of history' 25 years on The Guardian 2014
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilization? Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993
Kimball, Roger Francis Fukuyama and the End of History The New Criterion, February 1992
123
Can western human rights ever be universal in such a diverse
world?
Charlie Swinburn
Since its introduction in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)1 has received
both criticism and praise. A central debate is an apparent paradox at the heart of human rights; the
idea that rights are a western concept but are considered by the west to be universal. This calls into
question whether claims of universality are merely an attempt to impose western values upon the rest
of the world. Although it is important to note that the UDHR continues to receive near universal
acceptance by governments, controversies persist, especially in relation to cultural relativism,
individualism and traditional Islamic teachings. Without trying to sound hackneyed: in preventing a
gentleman dressed in traditional clothing from beating his wife, are you protecting her human rights
or violating his? This anecdote - although fabricated - highlight the depth of the diversity between
cultures. The differences run so deep between allegedly ‘universal’ human rights and non-western
cultures that some governments argue that the UDHR is contradictory to their traditional societal
values, thus isolating certain states.
The historical traditions and cultural influences of human rights are important, not only because
there is now almost total acceptance of the UDHR as a ‘standard of control’ to regulate the morality
of states’ actions but also because not all cultures share the same beliefs and traditions. The first legal
mention of human rights appeared in around 1920, but to grasp the concept of individual rights and
moral codes one must look back to Ancient Greece. Early western philosophers such as Socrates and
Aristotle began to use reason to investigate what they thought to be ‘right according to nature’. This
ideology of what was ‘good’ then was introduced into law - fusing morality and legality. This ethic
together with the concept of the Judeo-Christian God as the omnipotent legislator became the
bedrock of divine natural law. This law was judged to be superior to state law. Natural law’s flexibility
gave it formidable power and was used as a doctrine to justify state power. Many philosophers believe
natural law to be the closest early comparison to modern day human rights.
Subsequent writings of political philosophers such as Locke, Paine and Rousseau, drew upon the
conflicts within natural law, which transformed the legal and political landscape of the time.
Rousseau’s ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen’ (August 1789)2 was a major influence on
the French revolutionaries. Once they gained power, they had his writing entrenched into their
constitution. Similarly American revolutionaries used the ideas of Thomas Paine and basic natural
law theory to formulate the Declaration of Independence4 and the Bill of Rights5. These writings
were the first bills to compile a set of personal liberties and rights based upon human nature. However,
quickly the idea of individual rights became out-dated following the works of Marx, Weber and
Durkheim, which primarily focused of sociology and economics. These texts challenged the previous
constructs and questioned whether certain rights were intrinsic, which in turn lead to the decay of
natural rights. It was only following the turmoil in 1940s Europe, and specifically during the
Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals, that the concept of rights was re-kindled and importantly
signalled the beginning of a ‘human rights culture’. The Nazi’s on trial, for crimes such as genocide,
claimed to have operated within the limits of German statute – the only valid law at the time. To
overcome this challenge the court argued that the extermination of an entire race had violated ‘the
customary law and principles of civilized nations’. The Nuremberg trials suggested that there must
be some universal code that, irrespective of domestic law, must prevail. This code, expressing the
rights to which each human is inherently entitled, was enshrined in the UDHR, adopted by the United
Nations on the 10th December 1948. However many of the rights found in the UDHR have since been
challenged.
The first challenge to the universality of the UDHR is the distinction between the communitarian
124
ethic associated with many non-western societies, as opposed to the focus on individuality and
protection of each person’s rights against state hegemony in the West. The communitarian ethic
believes society to be more than just a sum of its individual members, and considers that achievement
of duties takes precedence over the security of one’s rights6. The notion behind prioritizing individual
rights in the UDHR is an attempt to surpass cultural bias, so that the declaration becomes pertinent
to all. Yet critics continue to argue that the UDHR is a neo-colonialist attempt by the west to control
the lives of the non-western world they once ruled. Scholar S.P Sinha (1978) 7 wrote ‘to the extent these
kinds of rights are concerned. We have the scenario of one particular culture, or one particular ideology,
claiming to be imposed upon the entire world’. A slightly contrasting example of one culture attempting
to inflict its ideology on others is the current declaration of a ‘caliphate’ Middle East. The Islamic
State claim that they are building a new supreme state spanning Iraq and Syria ‘untainted by corruption,
or western influence’.8 This has involved the banning of western products such as Coca-Cola and
returning to vindictive forms of sharia law – including public flogging of thieves. The caliphate, like
the UDHR, does not recognize national borders and believes itself to be the definitive moral authority.
Perhaps the most controversial article in the UDHR is Article 2, which states
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex …’
This Article outlines how we, as humans, are all equal. Particularly contentious is the fact that this, of
course, includes women. There are cultures, especially Islamic societies, where gender inequality is
enshrined through patriarchal domination. With extensive divergences of cultural practice, how can
women’s rights be universal?
Saudi Arabia withdrew from the vote over the adoption of the UDHR, claiming that both Articles 16
and 18 (the Articles which outline the rights for men and women to marry who they choose and the
right to freedom of religion) were not in accordance with the dictats of Islam. Like Saudi Arabia,
many other ‘non-western’ cultures place far more emphasis on the importance of religion to society
than the west. This leads many to argue that a community can only accept human rights if they are
legitimated by their respective deity or religious leaders. However, the UDHR claims no such heritage;
a drafted reference to ‘a creator’ was consciously left out of the final document, in an attempt to obtain
universal acceptance. But, it has been equally been criticized for this very reason.
Much of the cultural practice in such Arab states involves the severe repression of women, such as
denying them the right to leave the home without being accompanied by a male, or denying every
woman the right to education, obviously not compliant to various articles of the UDHR. In
Afghanistan, in May 2010, the Taliban ordered a young mother to be stoned to death for adultery,
before an audience of over 3,000 rapturous men and children.9 This practice is only one of the many
traditional punishments carried out under sharia law, admittedly a particularly punitive version. Not
only is this form of severe, radical sharia law being practiced and spread to other Arab states by the
Taliban, they also demand to implement their religious and cultural values without international
intervention. Taliban leaders claim cultural exceptionalism; they should not be judged against
Western customs.
However, it is important to remember that it is not only non-western cultures which are under
scrutiny. It is only recently in Florida, that the faulty electric chair – which lead to significant suffering
amongst prisoners on death row – was replaced by lethal injection, in an attempt to make capital
punishment as painless and quick as possible. This, like the Taliban’s sharia law, had been dubbed
‘barbaric and brutal’ by many legislators across the US and abroad. Mimicking the Taliban response,
the local politicians claim that it is their business and should be ignored by outsiders, often citing Old
Testament doctrines, such as ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ [Exodus 21]10 as justification.
Likewise, radical Islamic leaders across many middle-eastern nations argue that their moral codes,
originating from similar passages found in the Qur’an, have reintroduced family and social cohesion
into societies that have been corrupted by globalization. The Taliban rebuff such accusation and
instead point, in disgust, to the degradation of women in western culture through pornography and
125
prostitution.
Those who claim cultural exceptionalism are accused, often correctly, of using it as a fragile disguise
for dictatorial tendencies. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan, by suppressing women and
preventing education, are centralizing and perpetuating their power. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN
expert on rights of women, maintains that practices such as stoning, female genital mutilation and
the general repression of women, ‘are all inauthentic perversions of religious dogmas.’11 She concludes
that they do not have roots in Islamic scholarship, but as Professor Nasr Abu-Zaid writes ‘it is the
militants who are hijacking Islam’.12 Interestingly, from a different angle, if given the chance, would
Afghan women choose total equality and freedom over subordination and traditional values? Though
the answer may seem obvious to us, we are unlikely ever to find out.
In trying to understand what ‘western values’ would be; if you look closely, even Taliban practices
begin to look western. Western civilization formally practised many of things we now regard as
abhorrent. Socrates, one of the great western philosophers, was famously stoned for impiety13, as
recommended in ‘Leviticus 24’ in the Old Testament14, making us (the West) sound somewhat
hypocritical. This demonstrates there is nothing fixed about culture; cultures and societies are largely
flexible and pragmatic, therefore constantly evolving. Is it right for societies to defend, in the name of
their culture, routine practices if they are questioned by other cultures? Slavery was accepted in the
West until only 150 years ago. The subsequent abolition15 exemplifies the positive effect of cultural
transparency and the imperative of self-reflection.
The lack of specificity in the UDHR permits interpretation for each culture and thus allows for some
autonomy whilst still protecting basic humanitarian values. However, this can also open the way for
countries to interfere in the affairs of other nations, justifying their transcending of national borders
in the name of international law.
Nonetheless, the UDHR was written and codified by representatives all over the world including
countries that would be deemed non-western such as; India, Egypt, Pakistan, China, Lebanon and
Chile. Furthermore, over 60% of the ratifying votes of the UDHR came from non-western countries.
From a practical point of view I believe that the UDHR cannot apply universally due to the divergence
in the culture of nations, such as Iran and Afghanistan. However states must continue to stress the
importance of minimum international humanitarian standards to prevent the re-occurrence of
atrocities that we have seen in the last century across Europe and South America. Each culture can
pursue its vision to achieve its utopian society as long as, in doing so, it does not encroach on the
rights of others. What really matters is the purpose of the UDHR, not its origins – the ability to
protect individuals – in all cultures. Shashi Tharoor states ‘the challenge of human rights is to identify the
common denominators rather than to throw up one’s hands at the impossibility of universalism’.16 From a
personal perspective, I would argue that human rights are fully compatible with religion, faith and the
diversity that exists between cultures. I believe the common universal values that can be applied to
humanitarian beliefs include; justice, truth, peace, love and compassion. Societies must be open minded
and able to look objectively at both familiar and unfamiliar values in an attempt to reconcile their
perceptions of these denominators with those of others.
References
1
United Nations Human Rights Council (1948) ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)’
JJ Rousseau (1789) ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen’
4 T Jefferson (1776) ‘Declaration of Independence’
5 J Madison (1791)‘Bill of Rights’
6 S Tharoor (2001) ‘Are rights universal?’, ‘Third World Traveller’
7 S.P Sinha (1978) ‘Human rights philosophically.’ ‘Indian Journal of International Law 18’
8 H Maass (2014) ‘ISIS declares Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria’ ‘The Week’
9 TM Franck (2001) ‘Are Human Rights Universal’
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56666/thomas-m-franck/are-rights-universal
10 Exodus 21 ‘New Revised Standard Version’
2
126
11
R Coomaraswamy (1994) ‘Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences,’
12 N Abu-Zaid (1998) ‘Islam and Human Rights’
13 Plato (399BC) ‘Apology’
14 Leviticus 24 ‘New Revised Standard Version’
15 (1865) The Thirteenth Amendment to the ‘United States Constitution’
16 S Tharoor (2000) Are Human Rights Universal? World Policy Journal, Volume XVI, No4, WINTER
Bibliography
J Donnelly (1984), ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly
M Ignatieff (2001) ‘The attack on human rights’ Foreign Affairs
127
Three-parent babies
Jack Teh
In the UK alone, around one in 200 babies born has various forms of dysfunctional mitochondria; it is a vital
organelle that generates chemical energy for the cell1. The existence of dysfunctional mitochondria in the cells
will cause mitochondrial disease, which is a group of disorders that will lead to heart failure, visual problems,
neurological problems, muscle weakness and even death2. Currently, there is no cure for this genetically inherited
disease. However, scientists proposed that they could use healthy mitochondria from another donor woman to
replace the unhealthy ones from the mother’s egg to prevent severe genetic defects on the baby3. Since
mitochondria contain their own mitochondrial DNA, the baby will have DNA from three people; thus, the baby
is called the ‘three-parent baby’. The technique called three-parent in vitro fertilization (TPIVF) is currently
banned in all European countries and the United States, but there is possibility that UK will be the first country
to legalize this technology. In this essay, I will write about three-parent IVF including a case study, as well as
giving arguments on both sides addressing the implication of legalizing three-parent IVF.
All cells in the human body except reproductive cells have 23 pairs of chromosome. Each chromosome contains
hundreds or even thousands of genes. One of each pair of chromosomes is inherited from each parent, meaning
that there are two copies of each gene in each cell. Mitochondria, which contain their own mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA), are inherited exclusively from the maternal side because even though the sperm’s mitochondria enter
the egg, they are almost always destroyed by autophagy (cell degradation)4. Therefore, any dysfunctional
mitochondria will only be passed from the mother to the baby.
Mitochondrial disorder is caused by mitochondrial DNA mutations that happen regularly due to the lack of
error checking capability that normal nuclear DNA has; the disorders may occur randomly and relatively often5.
If some of the mtDNA copies inherited from the mother are defective, the faulty copies will divide in the cells
of the embryo. Not only are mitochondria involved in many of the important internal functions of the body,
such as generating most of our cells’ chemical energy and signalling between cells leading to cellular
differentiation or cell death, but also controlling the cell cycle and cell growth6. As the number of defective
mitochondria reaches a certain level, the physical deficiencies will become apparent.
Sharon Bernadi, from Sunderland, suffers from Leigh’s disease and lost all seven of her children three years
ago7. During the first three pregnancies, she felt perfectly well but her three babies died hours after birth. It was
suspected by doctors that the deaths were not coincidental; she wasn’t diagnosed with Leigh’s disease until after
her fifth baby had died within hours. However, her fourth child, Edward, who fortunately survived, was also
diagnosed of Leigh’s disease when he had his first seizure at the age of four. Everything seemed like a miracle
for Edward, but he had to be monitored and taken care constantly. Edward fought through all the years with the
disease and survived until he was 218.
Leigh disease is a common example of mitochondrial disease. It is a rare, inherited progressive
neurodegenerative disorder that usually presents in infancy or early childhood; it particularly affects the brain
and the central nervous system9. Severe muscle and movement problems are common in Leigh disease. Babies
would normally die in a couple of years usually due to respiratory failure. Some affected individuals develop
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy; this is when the muscle wall of the heart becomes thickened and forces the heart
to pump blood harder10. Sharon was desperate to have normal children as the other mothers would want but her
dream never came true. It sparked her urge to find a cure so that her children would not suffer from Leigh’s
disease anymore.
1
Mundasad, 2014
Knapton,2014
3 Gallagher, 2014a
4 Mitochondrion, Wikipedia, 2014
5 Mitochondrial disease, Wikipedia, 2014
6 Mitochondrion, Wikipedia, 2014
7 Dicker, 2012
8 Banerji, 2012
9 Ibid.
10 Leigh syndrome, Genetics Home Reference, 2011
2
128
Over the past few years, scientists in Newcastle have been developing techniques that would allow them to
prevent mothers who risk them passing on certain mitochondrial genetic disease from passing on to their
children11. Two techniques were proposed and the effectiveness of both measures is still under evaluation and
review. The first method, which is the maternal spindle technique (MST), involves transferring the genetic
material from the mother’s egg into the donor’s egg, which its nuclear genetic material has been removed12.
13
The second method, which is the pronuclear transfer technique (PNT) involves extracting the pronuclei (before
the sperm and the egg cell fuse) but leaving the faulty mitochondria behind. The extracted pronuclei will replace
the fertilized egg of the donor, whose pronuclei was removed. This new fertilized egg contains the DNA of the
father and mother, and the mitochondria from the donor.
14
Overall, PNT appeared more efficient than MST due to the uncertainty in transferring all the maternal
chromosomes to the donor’s egg15. Over the past three years, a scientific panel, including members from the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Medical Research Council (MRC) has been
reviewing the safety and efficacy of mitochondrial donation to avoid mitochondrial disorder through assisted
11
Welcome Trust, 2010
Human Fertilization Embryology Authority (HFEA), 2014, p.14
13 Gallagher, 2014b
14 Ibid.
15 HFEA, op. cit., p.18
12
129
contraception. The progress has been optimistic; however, moving from the research stage into clinical practice
and the acceptance from the public implicates some degree of uncertainty.
A frequently heard objection to three-parent IVF is that this technique would result in babies carrying DNA
from three different people on the first occasion in a large scale. Not only is this technique highly dangerous and
unnecessary, but also sets an exemplar for allowing the creation of genetically modified designer babies16. This
is extremely risky since this technique has not been tried on human beings before. Bringing in a third person’s
DNA, scientists are at risk of introducing a new element to the population, which will stay in the population at
large for generations down the line forever17. Dr. David King, the director of Human Genetics Alert, maintained
that three-parent IVF has the potential to cross ‘what is normally considered the most important ethical line in
the prevention of a new eugenics’ and create a slippery slope, which people can genetically design their own
‘babies’18. Once the ethical line has been crossed, it is very unlikely to reverse the situation. In addition, further
complications on three-parent IVF sparked such as when the children should be told and what is the legal status
of women who donate the mitochondrial DNA19.
However, before proceeding to the discussion on whether three-parent IVF should be legalized, it is of
importance to look at transplantation and IVF first20. Organs are transplanted to patients with failing organs to
prolong their lifespan; fertilized egg is transferred to the uterus to enable unconventional couples to have
children. IVF itself, once sparkled massive debate on the legality issues, was legalized in UK for all couples in
2009 and changed massively the initial notion of reproduction. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD),
together with IVF, is allowed and also available for couples to screen against genetic abnormalities as well as to
select the sex of the children to prevent passing on severe sex-linked disease21.
If we move from PGD with IVF to three-parent IVF, the same analogy applies, except that in three-parent IVF,
it screens out dysfunctional mitochondria DNA and prevents them from passing on. Both practices are similar
in the sense that they provide the opportunity to screen against the faulty genes from the parents, so that the
children are not destined to inherit them. The legalization of three-parent IVF has its own merits as well.
Although it captures the impression from the public that the resulting baby will contain DNA from three people,
the fact is that mitochondrial DNA is a minute quantity of DNA: the resulting embryo contains all the genes
from the nucleus of the parents (more than 20,000) plus a few dozen genes from the donated mitochondrial
DNA, which takes up of 0.1% of the whole genome22. The nuclear DNA from the two parents solely determines
the physical properties and traits. In addition, the legal mother of a child is the woman who carries and gives
birth to the child. It is argued that the principle remains true even where the child is the result of egg or embryo
donation. Furthermore, looking at this issue in a utilitarian manner, the act of manipulating the dysfunctional
mitochondria reduces the suffering of the parents and the potential baby with mitochondrial disorder
significantly23. It will enable families who possess the faulty mitochondria to have healthy children which are
genetically their own.
A piece of recent news explored the history of cytoplasmic transfer, which is a technique developed in the late
1990s by a clinical embryologist Dr. Jacques Cohen and him team in the US24. Due to ethical and safety concerns,
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) asked private infertility clinics to stop the procedure in 2002.
Cytoplasmic transfer is slightly different compared to the three-parent IVF treatment. In cytoplasmic transfer,
the cytoplasm and the mitochondria are injected into mother’s egg from the donor’s egg. Thus, the mother’s egg
(having the mother’s and the donor’s mitochondria mixed together) is fertilized with sperm from the father25.
In fact, 17 babies were born using the technique at that time; two of the babies had Turner syndrome, meaning
having one missing X chromosome. Another one was found to have pervasive early developmental disorder;
however, since the study group is extremely small, there is a higher uncertainty that those abnormalities
occurred by chance or due to the procedure26. Besides, there had been no follow-up of the 17 children to find
out whether they had developed any long-term health problems as a result. Recently, the news focused on Alana
16
Margalit and Hirano and D. Loike, 2013
New Scientist, Don't fear babies made with genes from three parents, 2013
18 Gallagher, 2012a
19 Gallagher, 2012b
20 Walsh, 2012
21 Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 2014
22 Mitochondrial donation consultation launched, Government, 2014
23 Wilcockson, 2008
24 Connor, 2014b
25 Connor, 2014a
26 Pritchard, 2014
17
130
Saarinen, a girl who was conceived by the cytoplasmic transfer treatment thirteen years ago27. She is like normal
teenage girls around the world, having her own interests and hobbies. After more than a decade, the UK
scientists have pioneered new mitochondrial replacement technique; aimed to be the first country to legalize this
procedure that would cure these debilitating diseases.
One in 200 women has faulty mitochondria and of those, by no means all of them, might cause severe
complications for the child if the faulty mitochondria are not replaced. Mitochondria act as tiny energygenerating batteries inside cells; three-parent IVF is like changing the battery of the laptop28. Legalizing threeparent In Vitro Fertilization is a very fundamental change, as it will involve the minister in changing the law in
order to help the very tiny group of people. It is a practice that will alter human genetic inheritance for the very
first time. However, as other medical practices such as use of stem cells and assisted suicide, three-parent IVF
is continued to face vigorous debate and extensive research before it is legalized in the UK.
Bibliography
Banerji, R. (2012) The woman who lost all seven children. [Accessed on 19 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19648992
Connor, S. (2014a) Medical dilemma of 'three-parent babies': Fertility clinic investigates health of teenagers it
helped to be conceived through controversial IVF technique. [Accessed on 30 August 2014]
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/medical-dilemma-of-threeparent-babies-fertility-clinicinvestigates-health-of-teenagers-it-helped-to-be-conceived-through-controversial-ivf-technique- 9690058.html
Connor, S. (2014b) Three-parent babies: ‘As long as she’s healthy, I don’t care’, says mother of IVF child.
[Accessed on 30 August 2014]
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/threechild-babies--the-mothers-view-as-long-as-sheshealthy-i-dont-care-9690059.html
Dicker, R. (2012) Sharon Bernardi Loses 7 Children To Leigh's Disease -- But Hopes For Cure. [Accessed on 19
August 2014]
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/20/sharon-bernardi_n_1900248.html
Gallagher, J. (2012a) Three-person IVF 'is ethical' to treat mitochondrial disease. [Accessed on 23 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-18393682
Gallagher, J. (2012b) 'Three people, one baby' public consultation begins. [Accessed on 20 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-19597856
Gallagher, J. (2014a) Three-person babies 'in two years' - says science review. [Accessed on 18 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-27678464
Gallagher, J. (2014b) Three-person baby details announced. [Accessed on 18 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-26367220
Grant, B. (2014) Three-Parent Babies in ‘Two Years’. [Accessed on 21 August 2014]
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/40145/title/Three-Parent-Babies-in--Two-Years-/
Human Fertilization Embryology Authority (2014) ‘Third scientific review of the safety and efficacy of methods
to avoid mitochondrial disease through assisted conception: update, 2014’ [online]. [Accessed on 20
August 2014]
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Third_Mitochondrial_replacement_scientific_review.pdf
Knapton, S. (2014) 'Three-parent babies' could be born in Britain next year. [Accessed on 18 August 2014]
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/sarah-knapton/10665553/Three-parent-babies-could-beborn-in-Britain-next-year.html
‘Leigh Syndrome’ (2011) Genetics Home Reference.
[Accessed on 19 August 2014] http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/leigh-syndrome
Margalit, Y. and Hirano, M. and D. Loike, J. (2013) Three-Way Parenthood [Accessed on 20 August 2014]
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/37594/title/Three-Way-Parenthood/
‘Mitochondrial disease’ (2014) Wikipedia.
[Accessed on 18 August 2014] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitochondrial_disease
‘Mitochondrial donation consultation launched’ (2014) [Accessed on 24 August 2014]
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mitochondrial-donation-consultation-launched
‘Mitochondrion’ (2014) Wikipedia. [Accessed on 18 August 2014] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitochondrion
Mundasad, S. (2014) Three person IVF plans 'progress' in UK. [Accessed on 18 August 2014]
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-28417860
New Scientist (2013) Don't fear babies made with genes from three parents. [Accessed on 26 August 2014]
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729093.400-dont-fear-babies-made-with-genes-from-
27
28
Weintraub, 2013
Walsh, 2010
131
three-parents.html#.U_FJrLySzBx
‘Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)’ (2014) Human Fertilization Embryology Authority.
[Accessed on 24 August 2014]
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[Accessed on 20 August 2014]
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132
Are human rights universal?
Ben Tudor
What are human rights?
Human rights are things that people are entitled to, and that the state is obliged to provide to its
people, whether or not these rights are actually fulfilled. Almost all western definitions of human
rights have described them as being universal and inalienable. It has been a tradition passed down
from the classical era, to the renaissance to the modern day – but perhaps this common conception of
them as being inalienable is old fashioned?
The main attempt at putting into writing and law what had previously just been guided by morality
was in 1948 with the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) by the United Nations (UN). I
will be taking the UDHR to be what most western cultures believe to be human rights, and it certainly
states that every state should have equal obligations to every individual on the planet:
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.’
I will not define what a human right as this is simply an impossible task, but I hope that the rest of
this essay will help you make your own conclusion on this matter. The very fact that the definition of
human rights is hard to define stumbles across a very important point regarding their universality –
is it possible to define everyone’s moral conscience in a list of universal rules?
Why do we have human rights?
The fundamental origin of these rights is clearly necessary to ascertain in order to find out whether
or not they are universal. A common stance is that these rights emerge from natural law – a kind of
list of behaviours defined by human nature. It is from these behaviours that one can extract ‘natural
rights’ – for example, in our natural state, possibly because of evolution, nobody wants to be killed.
Because of this, killing contravenes natural law and therefore all humans have an inherent right not
to be killed, in a land where society doesn’t exist. Locke strongly believed that rights come from
natural law. He described it like this:
A state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see
fit, within the bounds of the laws of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any
other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection....
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that
law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.... (Second Treatise of Government 1690)
I, however, have an issue with the term ‘inherent right’ – the very nature of rights means that they
arise from human interaction, and so are not something that can be inherent. There are even problems
with the idea that no-one wants to be killed. While this may be generally true, it does not explain why
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we are a naturally war-like species, and have done awful things to each other, even in our ‘natural
state’. In fact, there simply are no rights without society, which is the world which Locke proposes in
which we are all nice to each other, as there is no-one for these rights to be broken by or any
comparative to make. We must consider rights of people within society, as, generally speaking,
everyone lives within society. Before society, this ‘natural law’ would have been violent and loose.
So instead I propose that having human rights in our minds is right because it is simply the most
utilitarian thing to do. Whether we put these rights into law or not it doesn’t matter, as long as we
remind ourselves what causes the most people to be happy in today’s societies– after all, the universal
declaration was made after the horrors of world war two – if they are necessary to stop ourselves
hurting each other, we must have them even if there is no logical reason for their existence other than
the utilitarian argument that lots of people being happy is good.
Why human rights are universal
One can easily argue that our human rights need to be given to everyone equally. Because every human
on earth has a natural human nature which tells that that they will feel bad if certain things are done
to them, then every other human should respect those rights that they themselves feel. This is often
known as the ‘ethic of reciprocity’, something found in many religions, laws and in our natural
morality. I believe that this inner morality does exist to some extent: arising out of the fact that, as
animals that live in groups, humans need to be told a certain set of laws so that they don’t all kill each
other and threaten the future of the species. Even if two people live under different social
environments, their feeling towards a certain set of things is almost certainly the same. For example,
no matter where you go in the world, or even into the depths of history, death is regarded as a bad
thing to experience: a product of our evolution. Therefore, surely every human should be guarded
from this if they want to, and anyone who attempts to break this rule is breaking a universal human
right.
By living in a society, there is a contractual obligation to respect other people’s human rights, and it
is the state’s basic role to make sure that this happens. This existence of a ‘social contract’ was first
postured by Thomas Hobbes. We can see from history that man’s morals are not sufficient to prevent
us from doing terrible things to each other, and this often stems from a disrespect of a group’s human
rights. Whether or not human rights are actually universal is irrelevant if not reaffirming their
universality leads to one group of people being punished by the dangerous lack of natural morality
that some other groups have.
By denying that human rights are universal surely leads to discrimination: especially if this idea or
declaration that they are not comes from one group and is used by the state to promote an agenda that
may include violence to champion over other groups. This is clearly evident in the horrors of the
Holocaust during the Second World War: human rights not being universal could clearly lead to a less
happy world to live in. The natural state of man, as I mentioned earlier, is to not respect other people’s
feelings, and so we need universal human rights to work in alliance with the state’s laws to protect
people. Without the idea of human rights applying to everyone, society could break down very quickly
and all of our rights could be lost.
If the reason that we have human rights is because we are human, then, as we are all human, our
rights must be universal.
The role of the state in universal human rights
Human rights mean almost nothing if they are not put in to force by some actor in some way, and this
actor is usually the state and the way is usually by passing laws, democratic or undemocratic. Many
of these laws are made to protect others from suffering human rights violations, but I have a big
problem with the fact that a state usually makes these grand declaration of universal human rights.
By doing this, it becomes the source of morality for effectively every human alive, an impossible task
that clearly leads to a division between the natural or desired morality of the people towards other
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people, and the attitude of the state towards the people’s human rights. This is wrong, as the human
rights that the state pledges to protect arise fundamentally from the people that it governs, not from
such abstract and authoritarian beginnings. How can a group of fallible individuals (the state) decide
the best actions of everyone? Surely the state should not be given total power over right and wrong.
But Hobbes thought that the contract between people and state was such that, despite individual
freedom being relinquished, the state is right to protect its people from infringements of their rights:
if it didn’t do this, then the people have a right, once more, to their natural morality and liberty
(overthrowing the state).
Moral Relativism
Relativism states that nothing can ever be true in every situation possible - a rather scary thought that
it is hard not to agree with to some extent. This view is incompatible with the idea of ‘universal’
human rights. The right to life, as I have mentioned earlier, is a key thing that most people really don’t
want to experience most of the time (again, this is a generalization which simply adds to the
complication of universality). However, this must not mean that everyone has a right to live. It goes
against human morality that no-one ever deserves to die – for example, if someone has killed many
people, or will kill many people, it makes natural moral sense that they deserve to die, or at least have
their liberty infringed. Because of this, it is incorrect to say that killing is always wrong, and so no
universal rule can be made about this. The same can be said of most other human rights.
This problem occurs on a massive scale around the whole world and throughout history: we just seem
to love locking people up if they have done things that most other people deem wrong. It is evidently
true, that, sticking to what we feel naturally, killing or removing liberties and rights isn’t always
wrong, and that means surely that some people deserve more rights than others. One main feature of
the universal declaration is the right to equality under the law: the very fact that laws imply
punishments that break the human right to liberty or life is a massive contradiction between actual
and idealized morality. If killing one person saves ten, then it is surely, on a utilitarian principle,
morally and rationally correct to kill that person, even if they are innocent. Complete freedom in all
scenarios is clearly not a very good idea.
The same is true of the age-old right to property: article 17 of the universal declaration. This reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
The fact is that, in a world where property is effectively randomly allotted to the rich, this really
should not be anyone’s right. This right to property often deprives other people’s rights to other
things. It is very difficult to justify the existence of ‘property’ – it is effectively just a way that has
been used to perpetuate poverty. If one person has lots of property and makes a lot of money, while
one person has almost none, and is starving, it is wrong to protect the right to property of the rich
man when someone else clearly needs it more.
But perhaps this thing that seems in-built into our consciousness – the necessity of punishment – is
something that should be overridden by better thinking and put into practice by things like the
universal declaration of human rights.
Cultural relativism
Cultural relativism is the idea that all people’s beliefs and rights must be understood through the
prism of their social environment. Surely no one rule can apply to all human beings when all human
beings are effected by their different cultures. Most of the arguments for the universality of human
rights begin with the assumption that all humans are the same, and experience the same things. This
simply cannot be true: all individuals see their rights and obligations differently, and this is specifically
influenced by culture. Take, for example, the universal declaration of human rights – a long document
which claims to state all of the rights that every human can expect to have. Notice that it has been
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based almost solely off western schools of thought – other cultures think very different things about
rights, and so the individuals in them do too. Therefore every individual has different human rights
depending on their culture.
Some cultures believe that women are inferior to men: something that seems completely abhorrent to
us, but is something that many people believe currently and have believed even more so in the past.
Even in some western schools of thought – particularly religious ones – some of these thoughts are
still held. Sharia law is practiced and respected by many in the world today, again advocating
punishments and beliefs that are simply incompatible with other views.
It seems very patronizing to call the predominantly western idea of written down human rights as
universal. In fact: due to the nature and fluidity of human rights, as soon as they are written down
they are out of date. Not only are things relative to culture, but they are relative to time too – rights
that we think all humans should have now have been very different in the past and so it seems that our
perceptions and ideas of rights will change into the future – another key part of the idea of
‘universalism’. Not long ago, we thought that slavery was morally justifiable – could it be that some
of our current culture’s ideals could be violently changed in the future, making these rights relative
to time and therefore not universal?
Because of the basic fact that all people are affected by the time and culture in which they live, it is
very difficult to find any rights that can span these differences. Human rights need to be fluid, arising
out of the interactions that take place, isolated in the time and place that they are happening. It appears
from both the subjects of moral and cultural relativism that human rights, rather than being universal,
are very subjective and fluid – no one rule can pertain to a group of many individuals all with very
different feelings and ideas.
Conclusion
While I feel that universal human rights are something that we need to have in our laws and morals
as something to aspire to, due to the simple utilitarian benefits that keeping this idea in our society
has, no right can ever be truly universal. To all people that are the same, human rights should be the
same, but the problem is that not everyone is the same. In an ideal world, we wouldn’t need these
rights to protect ourselves from each other, but the sad truth is that we do and the concept of human
rights today is such that it is much worse for society if we do not view them as universal. Even if they
are not truly universal, due to cultural or moral relativism, or due to the simple fact that we have no
way of proving for sure that they exist in the first place (other than for utilitarian reasons, which, as
I have stated, is incompatible with universal rights), then we need to keep the idea of universal human
rights in our society. I believe that deluding ourselves that they’re universal is necessary to prevent
atrocities and keep together the fabric of society which protects everyone. The fact is that it is
impossible to define human rights without them being universal (you can’t make solid rules to abide
by that aren’t definite and universal), and I think that defining them is very important.
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How do their differing conceptions of the 'state of nature'
influence the philosophy of government of Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau?
Anamay Viswanathan
Imagining a time before society is hard. Yet these three political thinkers all tried to imagine such a
time, using their versions of the state of nature to shape original and provocative thoughts not only
on how a state should be run, but also on what legitimates government to run a state. The fact that
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau wrote independently of each other helps to explain the drastic
differences in their conceptions of the state of nature. What is more interesting, however, is the fact
that these differences led to different adaptations of the same philosophical concept, the social
contract. Accordingly, to fully gauge their views on government, we must first look at how each
imagined life before society.
The state of nature, for Hobbes, is a state of anarchy. This is because there is no complete authority
to limit the actions of men. Man is thus driven by his desires, and because all men are fundamentally
free, he pursues his desires at the cost of other men. Though all men have the same basic desires, not
everyone has the ability to realize them because resources are limited. Hobbes calls the resulting state
a war “of every man against every man” (Leviathan, p. 62). His pessimistic outlook on human nature
and the state of nature can best be summarized by his assertion that “the life of man is solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish and short’ (Leviathan, p. 62). Humans are encouraged to attack another human in three
ways under the state of nature: for safety, for gain, and for glory. Morality does not figure in Hobbes’
theory, because everything is necessarily justifiable in a state of nature.
Locke holds quite a different view to Hobbes. Locke’s state of nature is a state of complete freedom, a
state of complete equality assured by the Law of Nature. When it comes to the notion of liberty, he
believes we are given the freedom to do what is morally acceptable. Nevertheless, Locke reasons that
everyone would be required to enforce the Law of Nature in a state of nature. Among the many rights
that need to be secured, for Locke, the most essential is that of private property. He asserts we must
have land that is rightfully ours since God would not put us on this earth to starve. In all, Locke’s
portrayal of the state of nature is more optimistic than Hobbes’, mostly because he believes that man
can live and survive in this state.
Rousseau’s state of nature is unlike those of his predecessors. He agrees with Hobbes and Locke that
within a state of nature men’s principal desire is self-preservation. He does however believe that they
both overstated the possibility of falling in to a state of war. For Rousseau, a man is like a savage in
the state of nature, whose actions are dictated by immediate needs, like food. He also states that
humans have “an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer’ (Rousseau, p. 50), and so a man’s
natural aversion to suffering and pain causes him to avoid harming others. However, Rousseau’s point
on morality is dramatically different form Locke’s one. He thinks there is no room for right, law and
morality in a state of nature. Moreover, he sees the concept of private property (which is so crucial
for Locke) as a source of inequality and jealousy and thus undermines his notion that all men are equal
in the state of nature.
One major point of contention between these three versions of the state of nature is the concept of
property and ownership, which naturally transcends into an aspect of what constitutes legitimate
governance. Hobbes is very clear that every man has a right to everything, even to another’s body,
since the notion of self-preservation justifies a man’s need to kill another man. As a result, in a land
where there are no rights of property, or even rights of self, the idea that an over-arching, powerful
sovereign is required (the head of the Leviathan) to organize the brutal anarchy seems like quite a
natural inference to draw. Indeed, Locke’s theological view is incompatible with Hobbes’ materialist
philosophy, as he states that we have a clear duty not to harm others since we are all creatures of God.
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In fact, he goes on to state that we even have a duty to actively help others under the state of nature,
for the same reason. Thus for Locke, the idea that a Law of Nature, derived from the wishes of God,
exists in the state of nature implies that a law-enforcer is required to oversee the law, otherwise it
would be an empty notion. Thus, Hobbes and Locke both seem to agree that a sovereign body is
required to govern and enforce laws.
Moreover, Locke believed that man entered into a social contract to preserve his property, since no
property was guaranteed in a peaceful, yet lawless state of nature. He encouraged each man to take
only as much land as he required (by mixing their labour, given to them by God, with the natural
resources, also given to them by God), so that every man has some land to live off. However, the
increasing scarcity of resources and the invention of money pushed man, in Locke’s view, towards the
creation of a state. Money, as a non-perishable means of exchange, allowed humans to accumulate
wealth without the risk of yields getting spoilt. Consequently, some accumulated more than others,
creating imbalances that lead to Hobbes’ idea of a state of war. According to Rousseau, the creation
of private property was part of the downfall of man, leading them to fall out of his idyllic state of
nature and form a people characterized by inequality, competition and corruption. Yet, in order to
maintain their safety and freedom, and return to the state of nature, humans surrendered their rights
not to a single person but to the community as a whole. Rousseau called this the ‘general will’, and
this concept forms the basis for his beliefs on the legitimacy of the sovereign’s political power.
Another area of disagreement, between Hobbes and Rousseau, lies in whether legitimate political
authority can be found in nature. Hobbes argues that it can, within the relationship of a father and a
son. He states that the father has authority over his son and that this dynamic only exists for the
preservation of the son. He believed that the relationship between a ruler and a subject follows a
similar structure - since the ruler aims to act in the best interests of his subjects and cares for them,
he deserves to have unrestricted power over them. Such reasoning very quickly assumes the natural
superiority of rulers over the ruled, but Rousseau believed that all men are equal in the state of nature.
Furthermore, Rousseau states that such superiority is sustained by force, not by nature, thus political
authority has no origin in nature. Rousseau uses this attack on Hobbes’ state of nature to question the
right of force in maintaining political authority. He asserts that if might is the only determinant of
right, then people obey rules not because they should, but because they have to. Likewise, under the
same logic, it would be perfectly legitimate for the people to overthrow their ruler, since they are
exercising greater might. As a result, Rousseau reached the conclusion that there can be no political
authority upheld by force since people do simply whatever is within their power. Accordingly,
Rousseau’s concept of a ‘general will’ is born as an answer to the issue of legitimate rule.
Likewise, Hobbes thought that man, due to self-preservation, would be willing to surrender their
freedom to an authority in exchange for order and security within a contract. The difference with
Hobbes’ philosophy of government is that he asserts the need for absolute obedience of the subjects
and absolute power of the authority under this contract. Thus, he constructed the concept of a ‘ruler’
or ‘monarch’, and he believed that such an authority would be trustworthy since he would be bound
by natural law. This ruler would be the decisive arbiter in all cases. As Hobbes argues, to recognize
alternative sources of power would be to risk a return to anarchy and the state of nature, since the
two heads of the Leviathan (representing the split sovereignty) would contend with one another,
risking the life of the Leviathan itself. The same instability is true of sovereignty shared across the
divisions of government. Consequently, Hobbes’ belief that sovereignty has to be absolute is derived
from the severe behavioural precepts that he constructs in his state of nature.
Locke, conversely, states that unlimited sovereignty goes against natural law and he argues for a
constitutionally limited government. This is because he believed that man did not surrender all their
rights to one single individual under the contract, but instead they only surrendered the right to
maintain order and enforce the law of nature. He was adamant that man could not surrender any other
rights, such as the right to life or the right to liberty, because he thought these rights were the natural
rights of men. Under a newly created political society (established through the contract), men gained
laws, judges to arbitrate laws, and the executive power needed to enforce these laws. In Locke’s view,
these laws serve to secure man’s position and man’s property, which are the main reasons why man
decided to build this compact and escape the survivable, yet uncertain state of nature. Moreover, as
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soon as Government ceases to carry out its primary duty of upholding the natural rights of men, its
laws become invalid and thus the people, according to Locke, have the right to topple the defunct
Government.
Rousseau, however, favoured people’s sovereignty. In his view, there reaches a stage in the state of
nature where people must unite in order to survive. His social contract allows people to bind
themselves to one another and still hold on to their freedom. In essence, contrary to the views of
Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau believes that the social contract states that each man ought to surrender
himself unconditionally to the community as a whole. Rousseau thinks that modern society has lost
the freedom and equality enjoyed in the state of nature. Yet, via the social contract, the state is formed
to assure freedom, rights and equality. The theory of general will forms the basis for the state and its
laws and if the government and laws do not follow the general will, they will be toppled. Although
man loses his natural rights under Rousseau’s theory, unlike Locke’s, in return he receives civil
liberties such as freedom of speech. Each man is not subject to any other man, unlike Hobbes’ belief
in an absolute monarch, but to the general will and to observe this is to observe himself. Thus,
Rousseau asserts the infallible, indivisible sovereignty of every man.
The differing ideas on the state of nature dictate the differing aspects of the political theories of
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Hobbes’ state of nature, characterized by the self-serving nature of man
and the subsequent state of war, provides the conditions for the adoption of an absolute sovereign as
the only way to escape the state of nature. Locke’s belief that man can survive in the state of nature
with complete freedom and morality, yet without any certainty of owning or preserving property,
permits him to construct a social contract that binds man to a set of laws overseen by a government
limited by God’s will. Finally, Rousseau’s assertion that the state of nature is an ideal that man should
strive to return to allows him to build a social contract whereby sovereignty is shared across the
people through a general will, as everyone should work as one to return to the state of nature. Thus,
each characterisation of the state of nature is completely fundamental to each claim of what form
sovereignty should take and who it should lie with.
Bibliography
Dunn, John. Locke: A Very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Locke, John. The Second Treatise on Civil Government, London: Prometheus, 1986.
Rosen, Michael. Wolff, Jonathan. Political Thought, London: Oxford Paperbacks, 1999.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract, London: Penguin Books, 2004.
Wolff, Jonathan. An introduction to Political Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007
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