A DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT NSC? PRESIDENT OBAMA’S USE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
Michael Gordon Jackson
Department of Political Science
Regis College
College Hall
Weston, MA. 02493-1571
Michael.Jackson@regiscollege.edu
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science
Association, Portland, Oregon, March 22-24, 2012
Abstract: There were expectations that President Obama’s National Security Council would be
‘dramatically different’ in tone and substance from previous administrations. With a
presidential directive, the NSC was indeed structurally modified. However, Obama’s first NSC
Adviser failed to satisfy the president’s expectations or vision about how the NSC would be
used. With a new NSC adviser, the president would now manage the NSC in ways that would
both reflect continuities with past NSC practices and his own priorities and personality.
Obama’s management style of the NSC is orderly, calm, rational and pragmatic, with the
president expecting focus, energy, and commitment from its staff members. The management
model closely follows what is known as the ‘Scowcroft Model’ of NSC stewardship.
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Introduction
Promising change and new beginnings for America, Barack Obama’s administration took over
the levers of power with great expectations in January 2009. How would the new president
reform and streamline the organization and conduct of foreign policy? It was anticipated by
many that Obama’s incoming foreign policy team would institute a sharp departure from the
foreign policies of the Bush administration. There would be more changes than continuities
associated with the administration’s global initiatives.
One key issue was whether he would utilize the policy-making machinery of the National
Security Council (NSC) in significant ways. In 1947, the NSC was first established by statute (The
NSA 1947). It rapidly became clear that the president was prepared to authorize significant
changes in relation to the NSC’s membership, structure, internal processes, and mission.
Indeed, retired ex-Marine general, James Jones, Obama’s choice to be his first NSC Adviser,
confidently asserted in the winter of 2009 that the NSC would be “dramatically different” from
that of the Bush administration or any other administration’s NSC. In an interview, Jones
stressed that the context for decision-making had changed. “The world that we live in has
changed so dramatically in this decade that organizations that were created to meet a certain
set of criteria no longer are terribly useful” (De Young 2009).
As we near the end of Obama’s first term, there is enough evidence available to offer some
preliminary analysis of whether Jones’ promise has been fulfilled. The purpose of this paper is
to investigate the question by examining whether the president has truly changed the structure
of the NSC, its staffing patterns, access channels and interagency processes. How does Obama
use the NSC for decision-making? What is his “management style” in regards to the NSC? As
will be demonstrated, the NSC has evolved in interesting ways, but not quite as “dramatically”
as General Jones predicted.
Let us first briefly review the broader question of the role of the NSC, the NSC Adviser, and how
various presidents in the past chose to work with its policy-making and decision-making
machinery.
Background
In the aftermath of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the Truman administration
concluded that its national security policy institutions had to be updated to meet the new
international challenges that the US was now facing. Indeed, there was an emerging consensus
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that President Roosevelt had coordinated war efforts within the US by a leadership style
characterized as “competitive chaos” between himself and players within the foreign policy
bureaucracy (Inderfurth 2004: 2). With FDR, there was more ‘art’ than managerial science in his
methods. There was recognition that more formal structures and processes for managing
national security should be adopted and implemented. Truman in his memoirs observed, “I
wanted one top level permanent setting in the government to concern itself with advising the
president on high policy decisions concerning the security of the nation” (Truman 1956: 49).
Instead of the ad hoc and at times inefficient tools used by President Roosevelt, a new agency
infrastructure needed to be created that would fit the troubled and complicated Cold War era
facing the Truman administration. As noted before; the National Security Act was passed in
1947. Along with other actions such as the establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD),
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and a new US Air Force, the
act also created the NSC. It was initially envisioned as becoming the focal point for senior policy
coordination for foreign and defense policy making. But the NSC rapidly began to transform
itself in keeping with the managerial preferences of subsequent presidents.
Beyond being placed inside the Executive Office of the President (EOP), by National Security Act
Amendments of 1949, its basic mission, structure, standard operating procedures, and staffing
have evolved and been modified by presidents during the intervening 60 years. The NSC would
be a dynamic institution that would change in line with the administrative styles of differing
presidents. It certainly was not static in nature.
There is also a modest, but important, body of scholarship which has described and analyzed
the development, evolution, and history of the NSC. Though much of the record about the NSC
remains generally classified beyond the Nixon administration, a substantial amount of analysis
and discussion about the NSC has been generated by journalists and academics over the years.
In one way or another, each president’s management style and use of the NSC has been
covered in the literature since the Truman administration. A key generalization that has been
advanced, not surprisingly, is that while the basic structure and mission of NSC has been a
constant, how presidents actually choose to utilize it has varied over time. For example,
Greenstein wrote extensively about Eisenhower’s style (Greenstein & Immerman 2000). Prados
surveyed the institution of the NSC (Prados 1991). Burke has written a recent analysis of the
role of NSC adviser and decision-making by presidents (Burke 2009). Two other influential
works are by Inderfurth and Johnson (2004) and Rothkopf (2005). Daalder & Destler have also
published an excellent investigation of the NSC adviser role (2009). Indeed, Daalder and Destler,
have been coordinating the National Security Council Project associated with the Brookings
Institution for an extended period of time, making available to scholars publications, facts,
statistics, oral histories, and various media about the NSC.
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It is a literature which is both critical and positive about how presidents have chosen to use the
institution and potential of the NSC. A key point which unifies much of the scholarship is the
fundamental issue of whether the relations between the NSC, the NSC advisers and their
presidents are effective or dysfunctional. As Pfiffner notes, it usually boils down to three
empirical and theoretical questions: “Political scientists who study presidential decision making
have come to consider several factors as central to understanding White House organization
and process: the level of centralization, the extent of multiple advocacy, and the use of honest
brokers to manage advice to the president” (Phiffner 2011).
The question of the extent to which a president chooses to centralize or decentralize the
machinery of the NSC is a major one. In general, there is a trend for presidents, even when fully
using the NSC, to ultimately concentrate final decision-making within small groups of advisers.
Though Eisenhower once said to members of his cabinet, “You are my advisers. I want you to
speak freely” and publicly talked about the importance of the NSC process for debate and
creating policy options, the fact was that he preferred in the end to usually depend on small
groups of advisers that he favored (2011).
The second school of thought emphasizes the dynamics of “multiple advocacy” and presidential
policy outcomes. According to Alexander George (1980/1972), the best decision-making flows
from institutional structures and processes which strive to present the president with a full
range of alternative options and contingencies for him to evaluate. “…the mere presence of
differing views among White House staffers (does) not guarantee the effective presentation of
alternatives to the president.” For a system of multiple advocacy to succeed, a structure had to
be created for the purpose of facilitating the communication of differing points of view to the
president. (2011).
A third popular approach that has been used by scholars to analyze the NSC has been the
“honest brokers” model. In following this style, the NSC advisers must not only ensure that the
president receives multiple levels of advocacy from the foreign policy making bureaucracy, it
must also be “balanced” when presented to the president. Presidents must have someone
manage and filter information and differing options, in a thorough, fair, and effective way. As
an “honest broker” the NSC adviser was not “just another policy advocate.” Rather, he must
also be prepared and able to provide a “fair and balanced” presentation of information to the
president and those other advisers serving him (Burke 2009)
However, one approach since the Eisenhower administration that has often been cited as the
template for how the NSC should be run effectively is the “Scowcroft” Model”. President
George H. W. Bush appointed Lt. General Scowcroft as his NSC adviser. Scowcroft was greatly
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respected for his bureaucratic prowess, collegiality, and ability to manage the NSC. Bush and
Scowcroft in 1988 restructured the NSC. It would now have a Principals Committee, Deputies
Committee and eight policy coordinating committees. Scowcroft’s goal was to create a system
in which he would function as “honest broker” and coordinator of policy-making within the
executive branch. His performance as NSC adviser has been praised. “The basic structural
organization of interagency working groups, department deputies, and department principles
organized in the George H.W. Bush administration has been retained for every succeeding
presidential administration” up to and including, as will be shown, some key innovations
introduced by the Obama administration in 2009 (Whittaker 2011). Another very important
reason for the success of the “Scowcroft Model” of NSC advising, to be examined later, revolves
around the question of how much the president trusts, and is willing to give access to, his NSC
adviser. Here again, Bush and Scowcroft were extremely compatible with each other.1
At the start of the Obama administration, which approach (or approaches) about how to
manage the institution of the NSC, did the new president prefer and adopt? Certainly the
president had a wide range of recommendations to consider for how to use, if not reform, the
NSC. There was no shortage of options that Obama could use to guide him in formulating his
own views about how important the NSC was and how he should manage it.
Reform of the NSC – Recommendations
Ideas for reform of the NSC, before the Obama administration took office, were made
available by journalists, business groups, academics, and “blue ribbon” commissions. One
prominent defense policy analyst urged Obama to adopt the successful Eisenhower “model” for
structuring and utilizing the NSC. “Under this structure, the president (Eisenhower) chaired the
NSC meetings and, in leading the discussion, made a point of bringing out conflicts and
differences by having everyone air their opinions.” Eisenhower demanded mandatory
attendance at NSC meetings. During a four year period, President Eisenhower missed only six of
1
In an extensive interview with Brian Lamb of CSPAN in 1998, former president George H.W. Bush and his NSC adviser Gen.
Brent Scowcroft, talked about how much respect and trust between them resulted in a strong bond between them. When
asked by Lamb why he had co-authored his memoir A World Transformed with Scowcroft, Bush recalled: “Well, because Brent
was such an integral part of the decision-making process as head of the National Security Council, the coordinator as well,
bringing together very able but very different cabinet officers: Dick Cheney, Jimmy Baker, you name it. An NSC adviser has to
coordinate and try to work out the differences between strong-willed cabinet people before the president has to decide
everything. And so he is an integral part of everything I tried to do, and it just seemed like it would be a better, more thorough
book if we collaborated. And so I asked him, and that was the genesis. That's how it happened.” Later in the interview, he was
asked when he realized that the former general was someone he wanted to work with. Bush replied: “Well, ever since I can
remember working with him--clearly, the time we started really working together was when he was running the NSC and I was
at CIA. And I came in there from China with no professional intelligence experience. I'd been a consumer of intelligence. But
Brent had lived through all the Church committee hearings and these turbulent times, and I just was dependent on him in order
to have the confidence or the closeness to the White House that any director needs, and also to help me navigate through the
mine fields. So it was there that I saw him working 1,000 hours a day, as he does, and that's where the respect started growing,
right there” (Lamb 1998).
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179 NSC meetings. The president created a Planning Board which issued policy papers to be
weighed by the NSC. This Board’s mission was not “to reach solutions which represent merely a
compromise of departmental positions.” In addition, Eisenhower organized “Study Groups” of
senior officials to develop strategic insights. And, to assist those NSC decisions that advanced
through the Planning Board, an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established. Its task
was to move and expedite decisions that seemed to be bogged down by bureaucratic inertia.
In keeping with the form and spirit of Eisenhower’s NSC, Obama was urged to follow the
precedent set by the former president, a model “characterized by the persistent involvement of
the president and his senior decision makers, supported by a smart, tight knit group of
strategists able to tap into a team of dedicated and informed subordinates and advisers.”
Obama’s involvement had to be “direct” in formulating strategy within the institution of the
NSC (Krepevich 2009).
The incoming administration received advice from research centers such as the IBM Center for
the Business of Government (Worley 2008). This report noted that in general, the NSC engages
in three different functions: policy formation, oversight of policy implementation, and policy
implementation itself. Without equivocation, their report advised the new president, “The
National Security Council (NSC) is your principal mechanism for orchestrating the instruments
of national power.” They recommended a series of steps: issue a presidential directive on
Inauguration Day announcing what the structure of his NSC would consist of; avoid a “clean
sweep” of Bush’s NSC organization by maintaining its staffing patterns until at least the second
year of the administration; create a series of policy reviews to set the agenda and build
interagency teams that Obama would use and support during periods of future crisis
management; thoroughly use the NSC interagency process to take advantage of the “expertise
resident in the executive branch”; “direct its energies”; be prepared to seek advice, when
appropriate, beyond the confines of the NSC itself; and lead the NSC and other national security
organs as directly as possible by himself. The report also urged President Obama to avoid
“destructive competitions, between principals for who takes the lead role in foreign policy
formulation and presentation. He should Issue clear assignments of roles and missions within
the NSC system.
During this same period, another commission – The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR),
a group consisting of over three hundred national security officials, scholars, and professionals
presented recommendations, in general, about how to reform the conduct, structures, and
direction of US national security. The report was written by twenty principal contributors.
Subsequently, a fair number of them would serve within the national security team of the new
administration. The report bluntly concluded:
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“…the basic deficiency of the current national system is that parochial departmental and agency interests,
reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging
security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system. …the bottleneck….makes it all but
impossible to bring human and material assets together into a coherent operational ensemble”
The commission recommended that it would be a mistake for the “White House to centralize
interagency missions. More than twenty-nine agencies or special groups report directly to the
president.” With this situation, there might be the real possibility for “burn out” among the NSC
staff. The commission then presents key recommendations; including establishing a Presidents
Security Council (PSC) that would replace the NSC and Homeland Security Councils; establish by
statute a new Director for National Security (DNS) within the EOP; mandate national security
reviews; initiate effective interagency national security budget processes; and transform bad
“knowledge-management systems” within the government (PNSR 2008).
These recommendations/suggestions were a menu of choices that President Obama might
choose to adopt and implement in his first term. As will be seen, though, the President, while
influenced by some of these ideas, would rapidly restructure and use the NSC machinery in
ways that fitted his own management style and his own expectations regarding interagency
processes and who ultimately the right individual would be who could serve him as NSC adviser.
Out of the Starting Gate – Obama’s NSC in the First Year
As noted previously, General James Jones, Obama’s designated National Security adviser
unequivocally declared that the NSC would be “dramatically different “from previous
administrations. In an interview on Feb. 8, 2008, Jones outlined in some detail what the
changes were that was being planned for the “new” NSC (De Young 2009). He stressed that he
would run the NSC process and be the president’s primary conduit for information about
national security. Communication by “back channels”, by other principals in government would
be strictly controlled. He would give his advice to the president and make sure “minority
opinion” would be represented to Obama, too. Most importantly, in keeping with the demands
of the 21st century, the NSC would be elastic and cover more issue areas:
“The whole concept of what of constitutes the membership of the national security community…which, historically
has been, let’s face it, the Defense Department, the NSC itself and a little bit of the State Department, to the
exclusion perhaps of the Energy Department, Commerce Department and Treasury, all the law enforcement
agencies, the Drug Enforcement Administration, all of those things…especially in the moment we’re currently in,
has got to embrace a broader membership.”
To Jones, the NSC would deal with issues ranging from cyber security, global warming and
energy sufficiency, to nation building. “We are going to reflect in the NSC all the regions of the
world along some map line we can all agree on”. Powerful political players such as now
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or re-appointed Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, would be
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welcome in this new structure for national security policy making. Instead of a “team of rivals”
Jones reportedly describes the new national security team as “colleagues” instead of
competitors. Jones also noted that he intended to bring “military like discipline” to the NSC.
He would chair meetings of the Principal’s group. In a meeting with Obama, Jones emphasized
that the President fully agreed that he (Jones) would be in charge. “He (Obama) was clear
about the role of the national security adviser.” Real innovation within the NSC was being
promised by Jones. As will be seen, though for different reasons, the NSC would change in
interesting ways, though not in the specific ways described by the first NSC adviser.
On Feb. 13, 2009, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1). In PPD-1, he
described the structure and mission of the NSC as it would exist in his administration. The NSC
would be the “principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring
Presidential determination”. So far, this represented little change from precedents established
by past administrations, especially Brent Scowcroft’s term as NSC adviser in the first Bush
administration. The PDD stated there would be a Principals Committee “the senior interagency
forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security” chaired by the NSC adviser,
a Deputies Committee that “will review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process”
and “shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management”, chaired by the Deputy NSC
adviser. There also would be new Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) that would be given the
major mission for inter-agency coordination of national security issues. The NSC/IPCs would
replace the existing system of Policy Coordination Committees. (PDD-1 2009)
In addition, the NSC would expand statutory limitations on membership, increasing the number
to eleven Obama principals, including the Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General and
Secretary of Homeland Security. Furthermore, when either economic issues, domestic security,
counterterrorism, science and technology problems and others, were being considered, key
officials from relevant and affected departments could be asked to participate.
How different was President Obama’s NSC structure in contrast to previous administrations?
NSC scholar John P. Burke, in an analysis of the first six months of the Obama NSC, was correct
to note at the time - not very much. Similar to other administrations, formal meetings of the
NSC would be superseded by having the president also meeting with small groups of principals
in important meetings. In the opinion of Burke, “Adoption of this meeting structure (in PDD1)
plus the rest of the Scowcroft model was the centerpiece of the February 13 directive.
Organizational continuity rather change was the more important order of the day” (Burke
2009).
This is not to say that structural changes within the NSC were not adopted and implemented. In
keeping with the Obama administration’s broader interpretation of the scope of national
security, in May 2009 the White House Office of Homeland Security was subsumed within the
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NSC. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) would now report to the NSC adviser. The staffs of
the HSC and NSC would be combined and merged.
What was the purpose of this restructuring? To end, “The artificial divide between White
House staff who have been dealing with national security and homeland security issues”.
Obama also not reluctant to establish new national security groups, such as the White House
“cybersecurity” office. Members of the NSC would, when required, work closely with staff of
office such as the National Economic Council (NEC). The new NSC could now deal more
effectively with issues such as terrorism, cross border crime, pandemics, disasters, and other
“non-traditional” threats to national security. Moreover, the assistant to the President for
Homeland Security would have direct access to the President but would also report to the NSC
adviser.
These organizational changes demonstrated the president’s desire to include key domestic
issues within the purview of the NSC and national security in general. “The integration of NSC
and Homeland Security Council staffs may work to overcome the intelligence and law
enforcement divide that many observers believe existed prior to 9/11. It may also facilitate
closer cooperation of federal agencies and state, local, and tribal entities in dealing with
homeland security issues” (Best, 2012, p. 23-24).
Right from the start of the Obama administration, a new NSC team, with a broader mandate,
had been established by the President, headed by General Jones as NSC adviser. The president
had created NSC machinery very much respectful of past precedents but with some new
structural adaptations created to avoid backchannel tensions and to more effectively respond
to the new dimensions of 21st century national security. Obama would be fully engaged with
the NSC. And it would reflect his world view regarding the challenges facing the US.
However, some analysts and observers, even at the beginning of the administration, were
skeptical about whether Obama’s NSC would be effective. Their doubts did not center on
questions about the new structure or mission of the NSC. Rather, right from the beginning
there were doubts about the leadership of the NSC. In short, was General Jones the right man
to be Obama’s NSC adviser?
One top NSC scholar, wondered whether Jones would be able to develop a management style
“that is consistent with President Obama’s informal, substantively intense, and rapid decision
making” style. Looking at the past record of those NSC advisers who were judged to be the
best, he noted that the most successful NSC advisers “were effective thanks to strong personal
and policy relationships with their presidents”. Was it a good match between the ex-marine
general and the change agent personified by Barack Obama? It was known that Jones was not
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personally close to Obama and had met with him before his appointment only a few times
before (Destler 2009).
Burke was also uneasy about Jones’ appointment. Though he was fair in outlining some of
Jones’ strengths, he was quite prescient in anticipating some of the problems that characterized
future relations between the president and his NSC adviser. He speculated about whether
Jones was trying to be an “honest broker” in respect to powerful cabinet chiefs such as Clinton
or Gates. Would he be too weak “more a passive coordinator” than a true honest broker?
Burke describes troubling charges in the press, for example, such as the assertion that Jones
seemed to “attend meetings” rather than “lead them”. One reporter described how during a
meeting about Afghanistan policy, “officials in the room” noted that the general “seldom voiced
his own opinions…Instead he preferred to go around the table collecting the views of others”
(Burke 2009).
Was Jones’ reported reticence simply an example of how he viewed his role as NSC adviser?
Or, was there a deeper issue? Naturally, much of this could have been typical Washington
“beltway” gossip or a manifestation of interdepartmental jealousies. As will be seen, though,
the problem appeared not to be the new structure of the NSC, but the issue of whether the
managerial skills and personality of the NSC adviser matched and complemented those of the
president. This “human factor” would prove to be decisive in this case.
The Resignation of General Jones – NSC Reshuffling
Within a year, the importance of the “human factor” was front and center. Articles in the press
and other forums about the Obama administration began to paint a negative picture in which
more and more, Jones was described as exerting too little authority as NSC adviser. Nor was he
up to the fast pace and give and take associated with the post. Most damaging, it was
perceived that Jones in reality did not have a direct line to President Obama; other advisers did.
As a result, not having a direct line to President seemed to encourage other advisers to bypass
him. In Bob Woodward’s depiction of the decision-making process about waging war in the
Obama White House, he noted how Jones resented being ignored by other advisers, calling
them “waterbugs”. In one incident, when the Chief of Staff walked pass his office and entered
the Oval House first, Jones said, “I’m the national security adviser…When you come down here,
come see me” (Lee 2010).
In a fast paced White House environment, it was observed that the NSC adviser lacked energy
and passion for the job. Unlike others, he did not put in regular 18 hour work days, seven days a
week. Indeed, Jones often left his office around 7:00PM and finished work for the day; or, he
would bicycle home for lunch. In addition, key players felt that too often he was simply absent,
engaging in ceremonial duties having little to do with NSC management. I.M. Destler was quite
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critical about Jones work habits and performance. “He’s not very visible. I’m a skeptic on
whether Jones has the sort of flexibility and ability” to keep up. Throwing fuel upon the fire,
Jones himself noted “I’m only an outsider…but I’m a 20 years-older-than-anybody-around
outsider (Lee 2010).
More seriously, some in the press made the charge that Jones had little interest in managing
the “inter-agency” process, a key task for any NSC adviser. He would travel frequently, be
absent from Principals meetings with the president himself having to chair the meeting, not the
NSC adviser. Jones would later state he did not have a taste for bureaucratic maneuvering.
Indeed, in a speech to the Atlantic Council, Jones perhaps ruefully recalled, “I fondly remember
the (Atlantic Council) as a place where people actually did what you asked them to do. In my
new role (NSC adviser) I’m finding out that an order is a basis for negotiation” (Luce and
Dombey 2010).
The president shared these widening concerns about his NSC adviser. And, Obama was willing
to cut his loses sooner rather than later. For different reasons, Obama earlier had sacked
Admiral Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence. And in the case of the general, the
president would not hesitate to act and make changes in this case, either. In October 2010,
General Jones announced his resignation as NSC adviser. Because of differences in work ethic,
conceptions about the role of NSC adviser, and increasing lack of confidence and access to the
president, President Obama’s first choice of NSC adviser was a failure.
But immediately, his replacement, Deputy NSC adviser Thomas Donilon, was named to replace
General Jones. Soon after this, the outline and content of how the president really intended to
use and manage his NSC became apparent. Donilon would turn out to be the perfect choice.
President Obama and His New NSC Adviser Thomas Donilon – A Meeting of Minds
and Philosophy
Who was this new NSC adviser? The announcement was not made without some controversy.
Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly said at one time that if Donilon became NSC adviser it
would be “disastrous” (Luce 2010). Nevertheless, Gates would come to express his support for
the new NSC Adviser. And Donilon’s management style, background, political savvy,
bureaucratic expertise, tone, and energy levels, would match those of the president and other
members of his NSC team. And, he would be perceived and admired for his effectiveness and
compatibility with the expectations of President Obama.
With the initial exception of Gates, Donilon’s appointment was praised. He was described by
one administration official as having a “lawyer-like, aggressive style” (Lee 2010). Strobe
Talbott, a prominent foreign policy analyst, declared that he was an “excellent choice” for the
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role of NSC adviser “He (Donilon) has an acutely attuned ear for how things work, knows all the
players and, crucially, understands the need for domestic political support to move foreign
policy goals forward” (Luce 2010).
From the beginning, there was a general consensus that Donilon’s bureaucratic skills, hyperenergy, management style, focus, and access to the president, would be a plus. And, most
importantly, he was, according to President Obama “one of my closest advisers” (Destler 2010).
Furthermore, in keeping with the Scowcroft model for optimal presidential-NSC adviser
relations, both Obama and Donilon strongly respected and trusted one another.2
The Donilon NSC became a changed institution with the departure of Jones. Donilon would get
things done in the manner the president wanted. Indeed, Donilon was described by one insider
as “the most powerful man in the White House whose name isn’t widely known.” The new NSC
adviser made the institution and processes work. His workload was described as “clinically
insane”. 270 Deputies meetings were chaired by Donilon. Four to six hours a day would be
spent within Deputies and Principles meetings. (Luce and Demby 2010). The NSC became more
organized and disciplined, with effective paper trails being created, and a network of effective
oral communications between members being instituted. It was noted during the Libyan crisis
of 2011 that Donilon did what he was expected to do by Obama. He set up decision-making and
policy-making processes for the president to make his choices and in ways that would allow his
orders to be properly implemented. Donilon was described as not being a “strategic thinker”
about national security. He left that to the president and other principals. Instead the NSC
adviser provided “process, enforcing order and structure for a president who deeply values
both”. Donilon would manage a systematic process for the president to separate chaos from
impeding his decision-making (Nicholas and Parsons 2011). Both Donilon and Obama had been
trained as lawyers. Both of them valued the application of logic and order in making decisions.
2
In 1999, as part of Brookings Institution ongoing series of oral history roundtables about the NSC, Scowcroft talked about the
importance of any NSC adviser having to gain the trust and confidence of those working with him.
“SCOWCROFT: I’ll start. First, some general remarks. Mine would be that it’s always more
exciting to be the adviser, but if you are not the honest broker, you don’t have the confidence
of the other members of the NSC. If you don’t have their confidence, then the system
doesn’t work, because they will go around you to get to the president and then you fracture
the system.
My sense is that in order for the system to work, you first have to establish yourself in
the confidence of your colleagues to convince them you are not going to pull fast ones on
them. That means when you are in there with the president alone, which you are more than
anybody else, that you will represent them fairly.
And if you begin with that, I don’t know that there is much conflict. It seems to me
that the first responsibility is to present what you know of the community views. And after
you have done that, then you are free to be an adviser.”
Scowcroft also described the incredible amount of work that has to be done in the NSC. “Scowcroft: No. The work is terrible. I
told everybody I hired that I would be amazed if they could stay longer than two years, because I was going to work them seven
days a week, sixteen hours a day.” (Daalder and Destler 1999: 2,27).
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Donilon’s privilege of access to Obama was assured. Every morning at 9:30AM, the NSC adviser
would brief the president about national security. In September 2011, speaking before the
Economic Club of Washington DC, Donilon described in some detail how the NSC worked and
what his role was. After observing that many people around the president were not shy about
expressing themselves, he recalled how the NSC machinery and routine functioned in the
weeks leading up to the Bin Laden raid. He told the audience that twenty-four interagency
meetings were held before the final raid in May of 2011. In addition, another six meetings
between the Principals Group took place in the month before the raid into Pakistan. There was
“robust debate”. Ultimately, at the end of discussions, “The President makes the decisions”.
And, Donilon noted, there were no leaks! To Donilon, this demonstrated the commitment and
seriousness of the NSC groups. “We put in place a system and a process which I think has been
really essential to our success in the foreign policy, national security side. And, it has these
elements to it”:
“One process, the National Security Council process…not competing processes. There were not back doors to
the President. There were no other national security processes over here that compete. One process. And
everybody signed up at the beginning to that being the exclusive process by which national security decisions
will be made, number one.
Number two, that the decisions made would be executed by this group faithfully.
Number three, that when you came to the table, you came to the table with a view and the view of your
building [Cabinet department].
Number four, that I would commit on our side that decisions of each meeting would be published in writing in
24 hours so that people could see what their assignments were and they could object if they disagreed with it
so there’s absolute clarity at the end of the day. “
Later during his talk, Donilon was asked whether he followed any particular management
model for the NSC. He replied:
“Now, you ask about models. There are different models. I think in terms of process management (emphasis
mine), I do think that there’s one person who’s had the job twice and did put in place kind of this committee
system…this decision-making system..in the late ‘80s that we follow today. That’s Brent Scowcroft, who I think
did a tremendous job.”
Asked about he conducted his daily morning NSC briefing of the president, Donilon
characterized it as a combination of intelligence and a policy briefing. The President and
Vice President are the two principal people he addresses. First, either the Director of
National Intelligence or head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) present a briefing
about the latest intelligence about national security. Donilon then noted:
13
“And then we will have kind a policy briefing that I lead, with an analysis of the intelligence and its
implications, and then the three or four or five or six most important things going on in the world that day.
There may be three of four decisions that we want to reach during the course of the briefing about issues that
have come up during the course of the 24 hours since the last briefing”.
And, Donilon also made it clear how much the principle player in the NSC process was the
president himself. Asked if the president prefers to read things or just be only briefed like
some past presidents “We respect to that, the President has read all the materials before
we meet with him…If you start briefing on things that are in the newspaper, it’s not going to
be a long career as briefer to President Obama “ (Economic Club 2011)
Because his president is prepared, Donilon established procedures that in turn demand
preparation from all other participants during NSC meetings. Other players in the federal
bureaucracy are aware that decisions are made efficiently and as promptly as possible by
the NSC, that Donilon has the ear of the president and can get the president to respond to
requests in real time. Even with the usual issues of competing and bruised egos associated
with every NSC, the Obama team had developed a comparatively high functioning
relationship with one another. In the opinion of David Rothkopf, author of a recent book
about the NSC, Obama’s NSC ranks “…among the best since the Scowcroft era.” (Rothkopf
2011).
It is clear that President Obama views the NSC machinery and right personal chemistry and
trust with the NSC adviser as a very important component for his own decision-making
about national security options and issues. The question to be addressed now is what the
president’s own management skills are in relation to the NSC.
President Obama’s Management Style & the NSC
By the end of President Obama’s first term, it is now possible to offer some generalizations
about his use of NSC and management style. As noted earlier, primary sources are hard to
come by and no memoirs by key actors have been published. But, the following points can
reasonably be made.
The NSC Machinery is Heavily Used and Valued by the President
It is apparent that the president uses the NSC machinery frequently for his foreign policy
and national security decision-making. With hundreds of meetings taking place within the
NSC system, with meetings of the Principals and Deputies groups, in which, at times, even
he will chair, the President appears to value the information, options offered, and forum,
provided by his NSC. The NSC is not a marginal player in the Obama administration.
14
Indeed, looking at a chronology of the decision-making that led up to the Bin Laden raid, it is
quite evident how important the NSC and process is to President Obama.
Centralized and Multiple Advocacies
Foreign policy and national security issues are weighed within a centralized structure in the
Obama White House. All of the players, whether authorized by statute or involved because
of issue areas they are associated with, are expected to participate in the key forums of the
NSC. “Back channel” communications and bureaucratic end runs around the NSC process
are frowned upon by the president. To assist him in his decision-making, participants are
expected to fully present both their own opinions and those of their department or
agencies. Vigorous, but orderly, debate among the advocates would be standard operating
procedure. But, it would not necessarily be a “team of rivals”. Instead, a team of advocates
would also be committed to abide by the NSC process, and goals of the administration or,
as General Jones earlier put it, a “team of colleagues”. And, once the president makes the
decision, all are expected to fully implement the action points set forth by Obama.
Lawrence Summers, former head of the National Economic Council (NEC) during the first
years of the Obama administration, was once asked about comparing Obama’s and Bill
Clinton’s management styles (Isaacson 2011). Perhaps with a bit tongue in cheek, he
reflects:
“Let's do it the other way. You're working for Barack Obama. If you have a meeting
scheduled at ten
o'clock, there's a 25% chance that the meeting will begin before ten o'clock, and there's a -- you know what's
coming, and there's a 70% chance that the meeting will have begun by 10:15.
If you wrote Barack Obama a memo before the meeting, it is a virtual certainty that he will have read it. If you
seek to explain the memo you wrote to him during the meeting, he will cut you off, and he will be irritated. He,
as the leader of the meeting, will ask one or two questions to kick the tires, but will basically focus on how
whatever subject you're talking about fits with the broad vision and approaches of his presidency.
He will basically take the attitude if you're his financial adviser, that if you can't -- it's up to you to figure out
whether preferred stock or subordinated debt is the appropriate financial instrument for your bailout, and that if
he doesn't trust you to figure it out, he'll get a new financial adviser, but that is not the question on which he is
going to spend time.
So it's a very focused executive, big picture guidance, disciplined approach. At the appointed time, his secretary
will come in and will bring a card that says it's time for his next meeting, and you will be out of that office
within five minutes. It is a certainty. That's working for Barack Obama, and it is a wonderful experience.”
15
Summers added that Clinton’s management style was wonderful too, but quite different in
how it operated.3
Regular Order & Proper Procedures
Orderly process and routines are very much valued by President Obama. Time management
is important. With the exception of a few close aides and a small circle of principals who
have call up or walk in privileges to the Oval Office, the president expects the NSC adviser to
manage the machinery of national security decision-making, help prepare and formulate a
range of options for the president to consider, and in general manage the flow of access to
him. Donilon knows what his president wants and expects from the NSC system. Obama did
not want an NSC adviser who is a “show boater” or superstar, such as a Henry Kissinger or
Zbigniew Brzezinski. The president works best with a variant of the Scowcroft model, in
which the adviser is low profile, committed to the president, has earned his trust, and
manages the NSC effectively and orderly. You have not seen too many appearances by
Donilon on political shows such as “Hardball” or “Meet the Press”. Proper order would be
expected for working groups, Deputies and Principals meetings. Like the Scowcroft team, it
was anticipated that the NSC would work “as an effective policy-options producer,
interagency-coordination process, and final decision mechanism for the principals and the
president’. According to Michael Crowley “process is not simply the poor cousin of
strategy”. Regular order within the NSC was essential to please the president. “...a system
that gives the president a diversity of views with minimal infighting and back-channel
maneuvering, little leaking to the press, and public airing of dirty laundry” (Burke 2009).
President Obama is Not Reluctant to Make Personnel Changes
Some presidents try to avoid unpleasant actions like changing personnel that do not work
out or disappoint them. One thinks of the famous incident in which President Reagan
3
On the other hand, according to Summers, it was a different experience working for Bill Clinton. “Working for Bill Clinton is
also a wonderful experience. It is a different experience.The probability that your meeting will begin before ten o'clock is
zero.The probability that there is compensation for the fact that your meeting will begin late, it is virtually certain to end late. Bill
Clinton has a 30% chance of having read your memo before the meeting. Bill Clinton will, however, with near certainty, have
some set of quite detailed and thoughtful perspectives to offer on your topic. He will say things like "I was in the White House
library reading the Journal of Finance, and there's some really interesting thinking about the role of dividends in the system." "I
went to a conference at the Brookings Institution 11 years ago, and do you know that there's a really interesting experiment with
providing credit access in Tennessee?" "Did you read the latest issue of -- the Asian edition of The Economist? It had a
perspective on Thailand that you might want to think about." There was a stunning, I mean you know, while he wasn't reading
your memo, it wasn't that he wasn't doing anything about it. So it was a very different kind of experience that was also
extraordinary in its way. I think the nation has been fortunate to have two such thoughtful, purposeful, highly intelligent and
focused people, who have served as President, and it’s certainly been my good fortune to work for both of them, with their rather
different styles” (Isaacscon 2011).
16
supposedly took one of his staff to the “wood shed” to express his displeasure. In contrast,
Obama has demonstrated with his firings of his first NSC adviser General Jones and other
officials, that if he is not satisfied with their performance, he will change staff in order to
provide the process, energy, and commitment he seeks. He will insist on structuring a team
that suits him and his goals. And, he demands results.
The President is His Own ‘Honest Broker” He is in Charge
The NSC is the president’s machine to use. It doesn’t control him; it serves him. For
example, during the debate about whether to approve a “surge” of American forces into
Afghanistan, President Obama was not satisfied with the options being given to him. In
turn, he wrote a memo that outlined his thinking in precise detail. Cerebral and calm, the
president has a management style in which he seeks out advice, weighs differing opinions,
but let’s all know that the buck stops with him. There is a story that the president,
frustrated with his then Chief of Staff, told him to push for more options”. “Get me some
other people’s opinions on this…I want more than what’s in this room” (Rudalevige 2009, p.
19).
Furthermore, Obama strives for consensus among those who participate in the NSC
process. His style of decision-making is not from the “gut”; the constitutional lawyer in him
wants options that are logical and rational, not driven by emotions of the moment. His hair
will not be “on fire” nor does he want anyone else in his administration running around with
their hair on fire. In his search for options to consider, he is calmly assertive – cautious,
pragmatic, not ideological.
In different forums, he president himself confirms this portrait of his decision-making and
managerial style. According to Obama, a priority was putting “together the best people and
have them work as a team; insisting on analytical rigor in evaluating the nature of the
problem; making sure that dissenting voices are heard and that a range of options are (sic)
explored”. To Obama, he has to make decisions based on “information and not emotions”.
Bob Woodward describes Obama’s style during the deliberations about the war in
Afghanistan (Woodward 2010). Should the mission be to defeat or degrade the Taliban?
Should there be a “surge” of 30,000 or 40,000 US combat troops into Afghanistan
Obama took his time making up his mind over several months. Former Vice-President
Cheney accused the president of “dithering” and not being able to act decisively. Obama
stated “I welcome debate among my team, but I won’t tolerate division”. At one point,
Obama chastised the military for giving him four options, but only one that was realistic.
The president wanted more. To make it clear, Obama himself specified in writing what he
wanted, i.e., initiate a surge of only 30,000 personnel, not 40,000 as some in the Pentagon
17
pushed for. As one general described, in admiring terms, the President’s style for making
hard decisions and his willingness to outline options himself was impressive, “There’s not a
president in history that’s dictated five single-spaced pages in his life. That’s what the staff
gets paid to do” (Pfiffner 2011)
Is this micromanaging in action? This not a persuasive criticism. As Phfiffer put it, not
wanting an honest broker per se, “Obama himself delved deeply into the major policies of
his administration”. When not satisfied with the options being presented to him, as with
the debate about the surge in Afghanistan, he produced a memo that specified exactly what
he wanted. In essence, Obama is a president who can separate the analytical policy wheat
from the chaff. Nor does he tolerate fools and those who do not meet his high expectations
regarding performance and output.
Final thoughts
The first term of the Obama administration has grappled with a wide range of foreign policy
and national security issues. He approved of “resets” regarding US-Russian relations. He
has skillfully managed ties with China while beginning the process of shifting US assets back
to the Pacific region. Obama has been in the midst of creating a sanctions regime against
Iran, working with the NATO intervention into Libya, formally ending US combat in Iraq,
attempting to balance US national interests with the upheavals associated with the Arab
Spring, forming a coalition to defeat Bin Laden’s Al Queda and its international franchises.
He has had his hands full trying to help manage the turbulence within global financial,
monetary, and trading relations. Indeed, he has been an engaged and assertive president in
regards to global policy issues.
The appraisal of how successful Obama foreign policy is continuing. Brent Scowcroft,
participating in a series of oral history roundtables about the NSC, put it best when he
commented about how the NSC can be successful. “The NSC system was really developed to
serve an activist president in foreign policy…I don’t know that the system works all that well
when you don’t have the president there all the time, because by himself the national
security adviser can’t really do it. He’s junior to all the other people. He needs that moral
authority (Daalder and Destler 1999: 35).
It can be asserted, then, that President Obama has created a NSC system, with the right mix
of personnel, that works well with his management style. Whether he is reelected in 2012,
it is a safe assumption that the president will continue to preside, and manage, his NSC
team with the same calm and logic that he has exhibited during his first team. But,
especially if he is a one-term president, more memoirs, analysis, and opportunities for
interviews with ex-NSC staff, will become available for scholars to either validate the
18
argument that his management of the NSC has been effective, or challenge and refute the
case with a negative assessment based on new evidence.
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