Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes
Author(s): Stephen John Stedman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-53
Published by: The MIT Press
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Spoiler Problems in
Peace Processes
Stephen
John
Stedman
The wars of the 1990s
confirma basic findingfromthe studyof civil war termination:"peacemaking
is a riskybusiness."' The greatestsource of riskcomes fromspoilers-leaders
and partieswho believe thatpeace emergingfromnegotiationsthreatenstheir
power, worldview,and interests,and use violence to undermine attemptsto
achieve it.2By signinga peace agreement,leaders put themselvesat riskfrom
adversarieswho may take advantage of a settlement,fromdisgruntledfollowers who see peace as a betrayalof key values, and fromexcluded partieswho
seek either to alter the process or to destroy it. By implementinga peace
agreement,peacemakers are vulnerableto attackfromthose who oppose their
efforts.And most important,the risksof peacemaking increase the insecurity
and uncertaintyof average citizens who have the most to lose if war is
renewed.
When spoilers succeed, as theydid in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994,
the resultsare catastrophic.In both cases, the casualties of failed peace were
infinitelyhigher than the casualties of war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to
accept the outcome of UN-monitoredelections in 1992 and plunged Angola
back into civil war, approximately300,000people died. When Hutu extremists
in Rwanda rejected the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 and launched a campaign of genocide, over 1 million Rwandans died in less than threemonths.3
andArmsControl
Stephen
John
Stedman
is Senior
Research
Scholar
attheCenter
forInternational
Security
at Stanford
University.
This paper was commissioned by the Committee on InternationalConflictResolution of the
National Research Council. A different
version will be published by the council. I would like to
thank the followingfortheircomments,criticisms,and suggestions:Howard Adelman, Cynthia
Chataway, JuergenDedring, Michael Doyle, Daniel Druckman, William Durch, Alexander L.
George, Charles L. Glaser, Robert Jervis,Stephen Low, Michael OHanlon, JerroldPost, Tonya
Putnam,Donald Rothchild,TimothyD. Sisk, JaniceGross Stein,Paul Stern,and Saadia Touval. I
would also like to thankthe currentand formerpolicymakersand diplomats who spoke with me
offthe recordabout theirpeacemaking experiences.
1. StephenJohnStedman,Peacemaking
in Civil Wars:International
Mediationin Zimbabwe,1974-1980
(Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner,1991), p. 231. For analysis of various risks,see pp. 14-16, 231-232.
2. StephenJohnStedman,"Negotiationand Mediation in InternalConflicts,"in Michael E. Brown,
ed., The International
DimensionsofInternalConflict(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 369371.
3. Until now, the most widely cited figurefor deaths in the Rwandan genocide is 800,000from
Gerard Prunier,The Rwanda Crisis:Historyofa Genocide(New York: Columbia UniversityPress,
1995). In a forthcomingbook on the subject,Howard Adelman estimatesthe figureto be over 1
million.
International
Security,
Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53
? 1997 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.
5
International
Security22:2 | 6
If all spoilers succeeded, then the quest for peace in civil wars would be
dangerously counterproductive.But not all spoilers do succeed. In Mozambique theMozambique National Resistance(RENAMO), a partyknown as "the
Khmer Rouge of Africa,"stalled in meeting its commitmentsto peace, and
threatened to boycott elections and return to war. In the end, however,
RENAMO joined parliamentarypolitics,accepted losing an election,and disarmed, thus ending a civil war thathad taken 800,000lives. In Cambodia the
peace process was able to overcomeresistancefromthe real KhmerRouge, the
party with the distinctionof providing the sobriquet for fanaticparties elsewhere.
The crucial differencebetween the success and failureof spoilers is the role
played by internationalactors as custodians of peace. Where international
custodians have created and implemented coherent,effectivestrategiesfor
protectingpeace and managing spoilers,damage has been limitedand peace
has triumphed.Where internationalcustodians have failed to develop and
implementsuch strategies,spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of
thousands of lives.
This study begins to develop a typologicaltheoryof spoiler management
and pursues the following research objectives: (1) to create a typology of
spoilersthatcan help custodians choose robuststrategiesforkeeping peace on
track;(2) to describe various strategiesthat custodians have used to manage
spoilers; (3) to propose strategiesthat will be most effectivefor particular
spoiler types; (4) to sensitize policymakersto the complexitiesand uncertainties of correctlydiagnosing the type of spoiler; and (5) to compare several
successful and failed cases of spoiler management in order to refineand
elaborate my initialpropositionsabout strategies.
This research is a firststep toward understandingthe spoiler problem in
peace processes and evaluating the appropriatenessand effectivenessof differentstrategiesof spoiler management.The findingsthat emerge fromthis
studyare provisional.As more case studies of spoiler managementemerge,as
new research develops on the case studies below, and as more theoretical
attentionis trained on the problem, some of the findingswill need to be
reconsideredand revised. Moreover,this study addresses only the strategies
and actions of externalactorswho oversee peace processes; the topic of spoiler
management fromthe perspectiveof domestic parties committedto peace is
beyond the scope of this study.
The article argues that spoilers differby the goals they seek and their
commitmentto achievingthose goals. Some spoilershave limitedgoals; others
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 7
see the worldin all-or-nothing
termsand pursuetotalpower.Furthermore,
thecosts
some spoilersare willingto make reasonedjudgmentsconcerning
to costs
and benefitsof theiractions,whereasothersshow highinsensitivity
Custodianshave a rangeof
and risks,and mayhold immutablepreferences.
to
to deal withspoilers,fromones thatrelyheavilyon conciliation
strategies
on theuse ofcoercion.Thecase studiesbelowsuggest
onesthatdependgreatly
requiresthe
First,thechoiceof an appropriatestrategy
threemajorfindings.
consideration
of concorrectdiagnosisof thetypeof spoilerand thoughtful
straintsposed by otherpartiesin the peace process.Second,to make good
diagnoses,policymakersmust overcomeorganizationalblindersthat lead
and motivations.
Third,theimplementation
of a
themto misreadintentions
successfulstrategydepends on the custodian'sabilityto createan external
coalitionforpeace,theresourcesthatthecoalitionbringsto itsresponsibility,
and the consensusthat the coalitionformsabout the legitimacy(or lack
thereof)
ofspoilerdemandsand behavior.
A Preliminary
Typology
Spoilers:
aboutdefinition
and cauPeace processescreatespoilers.Thisis a statement
in myriadways-for
who canbe identified
sality.In warthereare combatants,
not as spoilers.
example,rebels,bandits,pariahs,rogues,or terrorists-but
thatis, after
Spoilersexistonlywhenthereis a peace processto undermine,
themselves
at leasttwo warringpartieshave committed
publiclyto a pactor
Peace createsspoilersbecause
peace agreement.4
havesigneda comprehensive
it is rarein civilwars forall leadersand factionsto see peace as beneficial.
and
Evenifall partiescometo value peace,theyrarelydo so simultaneously,
disagreeoverthetermsof an acceptablepeace. A negotitheyoftenstrongly
who do notachievetheirwar
atedpeace oftenhas losers:leadersand factions
aims.Nor can everywar finda compromisesolutionthataddressesthedecrafted
mands of all the warringparties.For example,the mostperfectly
in theworldare uselessifone of thepartiesdoes
institutions
power-sharing
4. For example,in South Africapriorto 1990 therewas no public agreementamong the antagonists
to peacefullyresolve theirconflict.Only afterthe release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and after
several public agreementswere reached thatcommittedthe AfricanNational Congress (ANC) and
the South Africangovernmentto a process of negotiationcan one speak of a South Africanpeace
process.Similarly,in the case of Cambodia, even thoughnegotiationsdragged on forseveral years,
the Cambodian peace process began only afterthe parties formallycommittedthemselvesto the
Paris Peace Accords.
22:2 | 8
International
Security
not want to share power.5 Even the best-designed settlementsmust be prepared forviolence fromleaders and organizationswho decide thatthe kind of
peace in question is not in theirinterest.
Custodians of peace processes confrontseveral differentspoiler problems
thatdifferon the dimensions of the positionof the spoiler (inside or outside of
an agreement);numberof spoilers;typeof spoiler (limited,greedy,or total);and
locus of the spoiler problem (leader or followers,or both).
POSITION
OF THE SPOILER
Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler signs a
peace agreement,signals a willingnessto implementa settlement,and yetfails
to fulfillkey obligationsto the agreement.Examples include PresidentJuvenal
Habyarimana ofRwanda, who failedto implementkeymeasures of theArusha
Accords to end his country'sinternalwar; theKhmerRouge (KR) in Cambodia,
which signed the Paris Peace Accords then refusedto demobilize its soldiers
and chose to boycottelections; and the Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), which signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991, but returnedto
war in 1992 when it lost the election. Outside spoilers are parties who are
excluded froma peace process or who exclude themselves,and use violence
to attack the peace process-for example, the Committee for the Defense of
the Revolution (CDR) in Rwanda, which committedgenocide to preventthe
implementationof the Arusha Accords.
Inside spoilers tend to use strategiesof stealth;outside spoilers oftenuse
strategiesof violence. Spoilers who have signed peace agreementsfortactical
reasons have an incentiveto keep theirthreathidden and thus minimize the
amount of violence theyuse; theywant the peace process to continueas long
as it promises to advantage themagainst theiradversary.Inside spoilers need
to comply enough to convince othersof theirgoodwill, but not so much that
it weakens their offensive
militarycapability.Outside spoilers, on the other
hand, tend to use overt violence as a strategytoward underminingpeace.
Favoritetacticsinclude the assassination of moderates who stand fora negotiated peace, massacres that coincide with any progressin reachinga negoti5. TimothyD. Sisk, in Power Sharingand International
Mediationin EthnicConflicts(Washington,
D.C.: United States Instituteof Peace [USIP], 1996), concludes that successful power sharing
depends on "a core of moderate, integratedelites [that]has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny,"p. 117. Most recommendationsforpower sharingin
civil wars simply assume parties are willing to share power.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 9
ated settlement,and the creationof alliances with conservativemembersin the
armed forcesand police to sabotage any agreement.
NUMBER
OF SPOILERS
The presence of more than one spoiler creates a compound challenge for
custodians. Any strategya custodian chooses to deal with one spoiler has
implicationsforthe strategyselected to deal with otherspoilers.Actionstaken
to marginalize one spoiler may inadvertentlystrengthenanother.To give an
example fromthe case studies: in Rwanda the stabilityof the peace process
was endangered because Habyarimana refusedto fulfillhis obligationsto the
peace agreementhe had signed. The United Nations threatenedto withdraw
its peacekeeping operation in order to coerce him into implementingthe
agreement.Yet Habyarimana was only one of two spoilers. The CDR, former
members of Habyarimana's regime, rejected the peace agreement and conspired against the peace process fromoutside. The UN strategysucceeded in
pressuringHabyarimana,but emboldened theCDR to attackthepeace process.
TYPE OF SPOILERS
Recent work on civil war terminationsuffersfroma flawed, attenuatedportrayal of combatantsand theiraims. At one extremeare analyses that posit
that parties are solely motivatedby insecurityand only seek partysurvival.6
Accordingto thisview, the only reason forpartiesin civil wars to fightis their
fearthatiftheymake peace and disarm,thentheiradversarywill take advantage and eliminatethem.The lack of an overarchingauthoritythatcan enforce
a political settlementin civil war means thatwarringparties cannot credibly
committo makingpeace, eitherin the shortterm(throughdisarmament)or in
the long term(througha constitution).Thus any partywho violates or opposes
a peace agreementdoes so out of fear,not some other motivation.Scholars
who embrace thisview believe thatspoilerbehavior can be addressed only by
reducingthe spoiler's fearsthroughinternationalguarantees.Like those international relations theoristssteeped in the securitydilemma, these writers
believe thatthecentralthemeofcivilwar termination"is not evil but tragedy."7
6. Barbara F. Walter,"The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. dissertation,
Universityof Chicago, 1994, passim.
7. This is a paraphrase of a quotation fromRobertJervis,Perceptionand Misperception
in InternationalPolitics(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976), p. 66.
International
Security22:2 | 10
At another extremeare those who assert that all parties in civil war seek
total power.8This, however, is too facile; all parties in civil war seek power,
but not all parties seek total power. Some parties desire exclusive power and
recognitionof authority;some want dominantpower; some seek a significant
share of power; and some desire to exercise power subject to democratic
controls.This should not be surprising:power is a means or resourceto realize
othergoals. Some goals-for instance,the permanentsubjugationor elimination of an ethnicgroup, race, or socioeconomic class-need more power than
goals of creatinga democraticpoliticalregimeor gainingrecognitionof political equality among races or ethnicgroups. That partiesdifferin theirgoals and
commitmentto totalpower can be seen by all of the partiesthathave accepted
and lived with compromise solutions to civil wars (in Colombia, Zimbabwe,
Namibia, El Salvador, South Africa,and Mozambique). Similarly,not every
winnerof a civil war createsa totalitarianregimeor slaughtersits opponents.9
A thoughtexperimentmakes the point: If you had to be on the losing side of
a civil war, would you rather surrenderto Abraham Lincoln or to Hafez
al-Assad, to Nelson Mandela or to Mao Zedong?
The firststep toward successful management of spoiler problems in civil
wars is to recognize thatpartiesin civil wars differin theirgoals and commitment-dimensions thatare crucialforunderstandingwhy some partiesundermine peace agreements.Spoilers varyby type:limited,greedy,and total.These
typesdifferprimarilyon the goals thatthe spoiler pursues and secondarilyon
the spoiler's commitmentto achieving its goals. At one end of the spectrum
are limited spoilers, who have limited goals-for example, recognitionand
redressof a grievance,a share of power or the exercise of power constrained
by a constitutionand opposition,and basic securityof followers.Limitedgoals
do not implylimitedcommitmentto achievingthose goals, however.They can
be nonnegotiableand hence subjectto heavy sacrifice.
At the otherend of the spectrumare total spoilers,who pursue totalpower
and exclusive recognitionof authorityand hold immutablepreferences:that
is, theirgoals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals
who see the world in all-or-nothingtermsand oftensufferfrompathological
8. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,"ForeignAffairs,Vol. 73, No. 6
(November/December1994), pp. 20-33.
9. Roy Lickliderestimatesthat81 percentof civil wars in the twentiethcenturythatwere fought
over identityissues and ended throughthe victoryof one side did not result in genocide. Roy
Licklider,"The Consequences of Negotiated Settlementsin Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American
PoliticalScienceReview,Vol. 89, No. 3 (September1995), pp. 681-690.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace ProcessesI 11
tendenciesthatpreventthe pragmatismnecessaryforcompromisesettlements
of conflict.Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a
means forachieving such goals as the violent transformation
of society.
The greedy spoiler lies between the limited spoiler and the total spoiler.10
The greedy spoiler holds goals that expand or contractbased on calculations
of cost and risk. A greedy spoiler may have limitedgoals that expand when
faced with low costs and risks; alternatively,it may have total goals that
contractwhen faced with high costs and risks.
The spoiler type poses different
problemsforpeace processes. Total spoilers
are irreconcilablyopposed to any compromise peace; any commitmentto
peace by a total spoiler is tactical-a move to gain advantage in a struggleto
the death. Limited spoilers can conceivablybe included in peace processes,if
theirlimited nonnegotiabledemands can be accommodated by other parties
to theconflict.Greedyspoilerscan be accommodated in peace processesiftheir
limited goals are met and high costs constrain them from making added
demands.
LOCUS
OF THE SPOILER
PROBLEM
A key issue concernsthe possibilityof change in type.For example, can a total
spoiler become a limitedspoiler? The answer depends on the locus of spoiler
behavior-that is, whetherit is the leader or the followers.If the impetus for
spoiler behavior comes from the leader, then parties can alter type if their
leadership changes. This seems particularlyrelevantfortotal spoilers because
theirtotal goals and commitmentare so extreme.A change in leadership may
be enough to transforma party froma total spoiler to a limited spoiler. For
instance,a negotiatedsettlementto Zimbabwe's civilwar became possible only
when Abel Muzorewa replaced Ian Smith as leader of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Likewise, the willingness of the South Africangovernmentto implementthe
Namibian peace process was aided by the incapacitationand replacementof
PresidentP.W. Botha. Longtime observers of Cambodia and Sri Lanka argue
thata negotiatedpeace remainsunlikelyin those countriesas long as Pol Pot
leads the KR, and Velupillai Prabakaran leads the Tamil Liberation Tigers.
10. The appellation of "greedy" comes fromCharles L. Glaser, but differsfromhis definition.
Charles L. Glaser,"Political Consequences of MilitaryStrategy:Expanding and Refiningthe Spiral
and DeterrenceModels," WorldPolitics,Vol. 44, No. 4 (July1992),pp. 497-538. Glaser uses "greedy"
to referto parties' motivationforaggressive behavior.In my use of the term,"greedy" does not
imply thatthe spoiler acts out of greed, but ratherthatit expands its goals and is willingto incur
high costs and risksto achieve them.
International
Security22:2 | 12
Othercases, however,suggestthatthereare timeswhen followersare the locus
of spoiler behavior. As one of the cases below suggests, in Rwanda in 1994,
Habyarimana was reluctantto fulfillhis commitmentsto the Arusha Accords
forfearthathis followerswould attackhim.
Strategies
ofSpoilerManagement
Custodians of peace processes are defined here as internationalactors whose
task is to oversee the implementationof peace agreements.Implicitin their
role is the cultivationand protectionof peace and the managementof spoilers.
Internationalcustodians can be internationalorganizations,individual states,
or formal or ad hoc groups of concerned third parties. Custodians can be
tightlyorganized or loosely coordinated.Withthe exceptionof the implementation of the Dayton peace agreementon Bosnia, and the implementationof
the South Africanpeace settlement,the chiefcustodian of peace processes in
the 1990s has been the United Nations.
Custodians of peace processes in the 1990s have pursued threemajor strategies to manage spoilers. In order of conciliationto coercion,the strategiesare:
(1) inducement,or givingthe spoiler what it wants; (2) socialization,or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of establishednorms;and (3)
coercion,or punishingspoiler behavior or reducingthe capacityof the spoiler
to destroythe peace process. These strategiesare general conceptual types;in
practice, each strategytakes on a specific configurationlikely to be more
complex than the general version of it identifiedhere. It should also be noted,
as will be evidentin some of the cases to be examined,thatinternationalactors
can employ more than one strategy-either simultaneously (with different
priorityand emphasis) or in sequence.
INDUCEMENT
Inducementas a strategyformanaging spoilers entails takingpositive measures to address the grievances of factionswho obstructpeace. Custodians
attempt to induce the spoiler into joining a peace process or fulfillingits
obligationsto an existingagreementby meetingthe spoiler's demands, which
can be of several types.Spoilers may insistthattheirbehavior is based on (1)
fear,and demand greaterprotection;(2) fairness,and demand greaterbenefits;
or (3) justice, and demand legitimationor recognitionof theirposition. The
custodian must assess the veracityand significanceof such claims.
Inducementcan be rigorouslyapplied by meetingthe costlydemands made
by spoilers,as the United Nations did in Mozambique in 1993-94. Or it can be
| 13
in PeaceProcesses
SpoilerProblems
a spoilera continuedrole in
somethingas lax and questionableas offering
even when the spoilerhas returnedto war as in the case of
negotiations,
Angolain 1992,or whenthespoilerhas engagedin genocideas in Rwandain
attemptsin peace processessugof inducement
1994.Indeed,the frequency
thatis applied
strategy
geststhatit is a "defaultmode,"thatis, a convenient
forthe
whetherit is an appropriatestrategy
withoutadequateconsideration
typeofspoilerin question.
SOCIALIZATION
The strategy
ofsocializationrequirescustodiansto establisha setofnormsfor
parties
partieswhocommittopeaceorexternal
acceptablebehaviorbyinternal
who seek to join a peace process.These normsthenbecome the basis for
judgingthe demands of the parties(are theylegitimateor not?) and the
In
framework?).
behaviorsoftheparties(aretheyacceptablein thenormative
two
to
elicit
normatively
acceptable
relies
on
components
this
strategy
turn,
The materialcomponentinvolves
behavior:thematerialand theintellectual.
thesupplyofcarrotsand sticksto rewardand
custodianscarefully
calibrating
emphasizesregularpersuasion
component
punishthespoiler.The intellectual
by custodiansof the value of the desirednormativebehavior.Normative
and
competition
to therulesofdemocratic
standardscan includecommitment
of humanrights.The intellectual
componentcan
adherenceto theprotection
be aimed at bothelites(theattemptto inculcateappropriatevalues) and at
citizens(the attemptto educate the mass of citizensinto normsof good
as a meansof presand accountability,
democraticcompetition,
governance,
suringelites).
COERCION
to deteror
A strategy
of coercionrelieson the use or threatof punishment
alterunacceptablespoilerbehavioror reducethecapabilityof the spoilerto
Coercivediplohas severalvariations.
disruptthepeace process.Thisstrategy
against
macy,ortheuse ofthreatand demand,hasbeenemployedinfrequently
spoilersin peace processes,thenotableexceptionbeingtheuse ofNATO air
offorcetodefeat
strikesagainstBosnianSerbsin 1995.11Likewise,theapplication
thespoilerhas been attemptedinfrequently-most
notably,
in Somalia,when
theUnitedNationsdecidedto holdSomaliwarlordMohammedFarahAideed
11. Using my definition,it is a tough call whetherthe Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point.
One could argue thatthe public peace process had achieved the commitmentof the Bosnian and
Bosnian Croat parties and thereforethe Bosnian Serbs were spoilers.
22:2 | 14
International
Security
responsibleforan ambushby his forcesagainstPakistanipeacekeepers,and
to forcibly
disarm
in SriLanka,whenan Indianpeacekeepingforceattempted
Tamilrebelsand capturetheirleader,VelupillaiPrabakaran.12
are whatI call the
Two morecommonvariationsof the coercionstrategy
The departingtrain
and the"withdrawal"strategy.
"departingtrain"strategy
strategycombinesa judgmentthatthe spoiler'sdemandsand behaviorare
willgo irrevocably
forward,
withtheassertionthatthepeaceprocess
illegitimate
In
was
regardlessof whetherthespoilerjoins or not. Cambodiathestrategy
settinga deadlineforjoiningthe
linkedto theholdingofan election,thereby
processand promisinga changein thestatusquo. The departingtrainmetaphorimpliesthatthepeace processis a trainleavingthe stationat a preordainedtime:oncesetin motion,anyonenoton boardwillbe leftbehind.The
mayrequireactivemeasuresto limittheabilityofthe
departingtrainstrategy
spoilerto attackthepeace processand to protectthepartiesofpeace.
assumesthatthespoiler
The withdrawalvariationof thecoercivestrategy
aimsto
wantsan international
presenceduringthepeace process;thestrategy
to withdrawinternational
supportand
punish the spoilerby threatening
fromthepeace process.Thiswas thedominantstrategy
pursued
peacekeepers
in
Force
(IFOR)
Implementation
in
Rwanda
and
by
the
by theUnitedNations
is
mannerin Mozambique.The strategy
Bosnia;it was also used in a tertiary
in thatthe punishment-withdrawal-promises
to hurt
a bluntinstrument
partieswho have fulfilledtheirobligationsand rewardsany spoilerwho
engagement.
opposesinternational
to TypeofSpoiler
Strategies
Matching
A correctdiagnosisof spoilertypeis crucialforthechoiceof an appropriate
in a
Totalspoilerscannotbe accommodated
of spoilermanagement.
strategy
thattheycan do
theymustbe defeatedor so marginalized
peace settlement;
littledamage.A greedyspoilerwithtotalgoals can conceivablybe brought
ifthecostsofwar are sufficiently
high.A limitedspoilercan
intoa settlement
demands.A greedylimited
be accommodatedby meetingits nonnegotiable
12. Again, it is difficultto determinewhetherAideed was a spoiler by my definition.One could
argue that the Addis Ababa agreementsbetween the various clan factionsin Somalia constituted
a formalpeace process and thereforeAideed was a spoiler.Likewise, although Indian diplomats
claimed thatPrabakaranprovided his consentto the peace agreementin 1987,he never signed the
agreement.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 15
maywhetitsappetite
spoilermaybe accommodated,
butsuchaccommodation
to demandmoreconcessions.
A totalspoiler,becauseit definesthewar in all-or-nothing
termsand holds
norcan it
immutablepreferences,
cannotbe appeased throughinducements,
bothinducement
and socializationriskstrengthening
be socialized;moreover,
the spoilerby rewardingit. Two versionsof the coercivestrategyare also
formanagingtotalspoilers.Coercivediplodangerouslycounterproductive
oftotalspoilers;they
macyis unlikelyto succeed,giventhecostinsensitivity
call bluffsand testwill.Ifcustodiansfailto carrythroughon threatsor failto
establishescalationdominance,
thespoiler'spositionmaybe strengthened.
By
force,thespoileradds to itsdomestic
showingtheinadequacyofinternational
forcoercivestrength.
Thewithdrawal
strategy
also backfires
against
reputation
a totalspoiler,who has everything
to gain if custodiansabandonthe peace
process.
Two strategies
formanaginga totalspoiler:theuse offorce
are appropriate
trainstrategy.
Becausefewcustodiansare
to defeatthespoilerorthedeparting
theparties
willingto use forceto defeata totalspoiler,theyshouldstrengthen
The departingtrainstrategy
ofpeace so thattheycan defendthemselves.
can
thespoiler,by
do thisby legitimizing
thepartiesofpeace and delegitimizing
deprivingthe spoilerof resources-bothcapitaland weapons-that can be
used to underminepeace, and by redeployingpeacekeepersto protectthe
partiesofpeace.
A limitedspoilercan be includedin a peace processif its demandsare
otherparties.Thissuggeststhatinducement
is an
acceptableto theconflict's
formanaginga limitedspoiler,butthestrategy
depends
appropriate
strategy
on the bargainingrangeestablishedby the otherpartieswho have already
to peace. If the demandsof thelimitedspoilercannotbe accomcommitted
modatedthroughinclusion,thenthecustodianmayhave to choosesocializationor coercion.The dangeris thatthethreator use of forcemayprompta
ofviolenceby thelimitedspoiler.
counterescalation
Thegreedyspoilerrequiresa long-term
strategy
ofsocialization.
Becausethe
at
it
thepeace
is
not
there
is
a
of
into
least possibility bringing
spoiler
total,
process.In theshortterm,thegreedyspoilerpresentsa seriousdilemma.As
inducements
alone will serveonlyto whettheappetiteofthegreedyspoiler,
thelegitimacy
ofitsdemandsmustbe clearlydistinguished.
and illegitimacy
of the spoiler,
and risk-taking
Moreover,dependingon the costinsensitivity
theuse ofcoercivesticksmaybe necessaryto imposecostsand createa strong
senseof limitsto thespoiler'sdemands.On theotherhand,a reliancesolely
International
Security22:2 | 16
on a coercivestrategy
will ignorethateven thegreedyspoilerhas legitimate
security
goals thatcan onlybe metthroughinducements.
LIMITATIONS
OF THE CUSTODIAN
Policymakers
oftenhave concernsotherthan a specificconflictat hand; a
thatmaybe bestfroma perspectiveof solelymanagingtheconflict
strategy
may not be best fora policymaker
consideringa rangeof interests.
This is
truewhen it comesto conflict
resolutionin small,unimportant
certainly
(to
U.S. nationalinterest),
and farawaycountries.Even theUnitedNationsconsidersits actionsin particularcases in lightof its corporateinterest
and the
need to protectthe reputation
and institution
of peacekeeping.The optimal
to end a conflict
strategy
and managea spoilermaybe too costlyor riskyfor
externalactors.As a U.S. defenseofficialtold me, "One shouldnot confuse
withwhattheUnitedStatesis prepared
whatis neededto end theseconflicts
to do."13
The UnitedNationshas speciallimitations
as a peace custodian.Although
it possesses formalauthority,
its agent on the ground(the special representative
ofthesecretary-general)
is constrained
bythedirection,
commitment,
and willoftheSecurity
Council.Specialrepresentatives
have to borrowleverage throughcoalitionbuilding;theirabilityto induceor punish,even their
or illegitimacy
ofdemands,depends
abilityto rulecrediblyon thelegitimacy
on thesupportof memberstates.In some cases,such as theSalvadoranand
Cambodian peace processes,the United Nations has relied on groups of
friends-thatis, formalassociationsofall memberstatesthathave an interest
in thepeace processand therefore
to
bringtheirpower,energy,
and attention
implementing
peace.In othercases,thespecialrepresentative
has reliedon ad
hoc groupingsof interestedstates,usually workingwith theirdiplomatic
on site.
representatives
The biggestpotentialliability(yetsourceofpossibleleverage)in managing
a spoilerare memberstatesthatare patronsofthespoiler.On theone hand,
in makingpeace,maysupplythe
suchpatrons,iftheyare sincerely
interested
withassets of leverage,credibility,
and trust.On the
special representative
otherhand,suchpatronsmaybe slowtoacknowledgethattheirclientis acting
to declaretheirclient'sdemandsillegitimate.
as a spoilerand maybe reluctant
Withinalmosteverypatronof a spoilerare personalnetworksand domestic
groupsthatsupportthespoiler.Pressuresfromthesegroups,as well as prior
13. Confidentialinterview.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 17
to thespoiler,can lead thepatronto continueto support
policycommitments
thespoiler,even in thefaceofoutrageousbehavior.
TheFogofPeacemaking
The typologyof spoilerproblemsdescribedso farreflects
two fundamental
attributes
ofpeace processes:immensecomplexity
and uncertainty.
The typologysuggeststhatcustodiansfacenumerousuncertainties
thatrequireskilled
diagnosis;theyinclude:(1) thegoal ofthespoiler;(2) theintentbehindactsof
noncooperation
or aggression;(3) thedegreeofcommitment
ofthespoiler;(4)
thedegreeofleadershipcommandand controloffollowers;
(5) thedegreeof
of custodialactionon the
unitywithinthe spoiler;and (6) the likelyeffects
spoiler'swillingnessto continueaggression,
on theotherpartiesto thepeace
process,and on interested
externalactors.
Custodiansmustinterpret
whya particular
partyattacksa peace processor
refusesto meetitsobligationsto implement
a peace agreement.
Severalinterpretations
are possible.A partythathas signedan agreement
but refusesto
fulfillits obligationsmay be motivatedby fear.It may see an agreementas
desirable,but fearsputtingits securityintothehands of its adversary.
This
causes it to stallon its commitments
or cheaton agreements
by creatinga
fail-safe
option.A partythathas signedan agreement
maycheatbecauseit is
greedyand desiresa betterdeal; it may want a negotiatedsettlement
to
succeed,but wants to increaseits chancesof maximizingits returnin the
A failureto fulfillits obligationsmay be a means of seeking
settlement.
advantagein an electionthatcould determine
partiallythedivisionof spoils
and power of the settlement;
alternatively,
holdingback fromcommitments
itsbargainingpositionin theresultof losingan
maybe a way to strengthen
election.Finally,a partymay cheatbecause it has signeda peace agreement
fortacticalreasons;iftheagreement
seemsas thoughitwillbringthepartyto
power,thenitwillabidebytheagreement;
however,iftheagreement
appears
as if it will not bringthe partyto power,thenit will cheatto overturnthe
In sucha case,thespoileris motivatedby totalgoals and defines
agreement.
thestakesas all or nothing.
Whena partyis outsideof a peace processand uses violenceto attackthe
behindtheviolence.Is it
partieswithin,a custodianmustjudge theintention
an attempt
by thespoilerto forceitsway intonegotiations-toaltera process
so thatitsdemandsareincludedin a settlement?
Or is itan attempt
toweaken
the commitment
of the internalpartiesas a means to destroya negotiated
International
Security22:2 | 18
settlement?
Again,the actionmustbe connectedto a judgmentabout the
Is itmotivated
by limitedgrievancesthatcan be incorpospoiler'smotivation.
Or is itmotivatedby totalgoals thatare unalterably
ratedintoan agreement?
Custodiansofpeace processesmustmakejudgments
opposed to agreement?
ofa spoilerto itspreference.
Spoilersmayvaryin their
aboutthecommitment
to costsand risks;greedypartiesmayseekonlylimitedopportunisensitivity
tiesto maximizetheirgoals,or theymaybe willingto incurhighcostsand
takelargerisksto improvetheirposition.
Theaboveinterpretations
assumea unifiedparty-thattheleader'sbehavior
reflects
a groupconsensusaboutits aims.But ifuncertainty
existsaboutthe
extentto whicha leadercan deliverhis followers,
thena leadermaysignan
butbe reluctant
itforfearthatanyactofcompromise
to implement
agreement
a party'sact ofaggrescould prompta rebellionby hard-liners.
Alternatively,
sion may or maynotbe evidenceof a leader'swillingnessto makepeace; it
and seekto
couldbe theactofrogueelementswho are opposedto settlement
wreckan agreement.
of actionstheytake
abouttheeffects
Custodiansof peace faceuncertainty
the
towarda spoiler.Willtheyencouragethespoilerto desistfromattacking
peace process?Or will theyencouragethespoilerto continueits resistance?
withinthespoiler
ifdivisionsbetweenhard-liners
and moderates
Furthermore,
becomeevident,therecouldbe uncertainty
abouthow one'sactionswillaffect
A custodian'sactionslikewisewill have
therelativestrengths
of thefactions.
on
The developmentof an
effects
the
other
uncertain
partiesto a conflict.
is made difficult
becauseone'sactiontowarda spoileraffects
effective
strategy
Custodiansmay
and is affected
by thebehaviorofotherpartiesin theconflict.
a fragile
havetolimittheiruse ofcoercionagainsta spoilerforfearofupsetting
balanceof powerthatcould lead otherinternalpartiesto eschewa peaceful
in theuse of inducements
Custodiansmaybe constrained
by the
settlement.
A custodian's
by theotherpartiesto theconflict.
bargainingrangepermitted
failureto respondto spoilerbehaviorby one partymay triggera mimetic
If a custodianis lenienttowarda
responseby otherpartiesto the conflict.
spoiler,will it encourageotherpartiesto cheatas well?If it actsaggressively
in the
towarda spoiler,mightit encourageotherpartiesto act aggressively,
beliefthattheyhave an allythattipsthebalanceofpoweragainstthespoiler?
All of thisis to say thatthestrategy
thatcustodianspursuetowarda specific
spoilermusttake intoaccountthe positionsof otherinternalpartiesto the
conflict
and perhapseven theneed to workwiththosepartiesto coordinate
action.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace ProcessesI 19
Case StudiesofSpoilerManagement
This articleis a firststep in developing a typologicaltheoryof spoiler management. The initialframeworkdiscussed above posits a typologyof spoilers
based on theirintentions-limited,greedy,and total;it then describes a range
of strategiesavailable for managing spoilers-inducement, socialization,and
coercion, with several variations of the latter strategy.It suggests that the
general appropriatenessof a strategydepends on the type of spoiler: inducementforlimitedspoilers,socializationforgreedyspoilers,and departingtrain
for total spoilers. The frameworkplaces a heavy burden on the ability of
custodians to diagnose correctlythe type of spoiler theyface.
The followingsection examines five case studies of spoiler managementin
the 1990s as a way of refining,elaborating,and modifyingthe initial theory.
complexitiesof various kinds
The case studies serve thefunctionof identifying
that affectsuccess or failure in dealing with spoiler problems that are not
anticipated or explainable by the initial theory.Several criteriaguided case
selection.First,I have chosen only cases that have reached an outcome; thus
ongoing peace processes where the outcome is uncertain,such as Northern
Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia, have been avoided. Second, the cases
include variation in outcome-successful management of the spoiler
(RENAMO in Mozambique, and the KR in Cambodia) and failedmanagement
of the spoiler (the CDR in Rwanda, UNITA in Angola, and the State of
Cambodia [SOC] in Cambodia). The judgment of successfuland failed management of the spoiler is based on whether the spoiler has been relatively
weakened or strengthenedvis-a-visits opponents.Third,the cases vary on the
two principal independent variables: the mix of strategieschosen to manage
the spoiler and the type of spoiler. In terms of primarystrategy,Cambodia
(against the KR) is an example of the departingtrainversion of the coercion
strategy.Angola and Cambodia (against SOC) are examples of inducement;
Mozambique is an example of a mixed inducementand socialization strategy.
Rwanda is an example of the withdrawal version of the coercive strategy.In
termsof spoiler type,the KR and CDR are examples of total spoilers; UNITA
and SOC are greedyspoilers; and RENAMO is a limitedspoiler.My judgment
of spoiler type is based on evidence of intentionsat the time.
Several limitationsof the cases should be pointed out. First,thecases all took
place afterthe end of the Cold War. Although this increases the relevance of
of peacemaklessons forpolicymakerswho must grapple with the difficulties
International
Security22:2 | 20
ing unconstrainedby superpowerrivalry,the findingsare nonetheless
boundedby historical
era.Second,theprimary
custodianin all ofthecases is
theUnitedNations.Thereis variationamongthecases,however,in theroles
who support
playedby individualstatesas interested
actorsor subcustodians
ofstrategy
thepeace process.Third,notall combinations
and spoilertypeare
in
coveredin thecases,giventherelatively
fewcases of spoilermanagement
the 1990s.For instance,neithercoercivediplomacynoruse of forceto defeat
thespoileris included.Fourth,thesecases are notcompletely
of
independent
one another.Strategies
formanaginga particular
spoilerweresometimesthe
resultof lessonsderivedfromanothercase. Some UN personnelworkedon
morethanone case. Some spoilersthemselveslikelydrew lessonsfortheir
ofcustodiansin othercases.
strategy
based on evaluatingtheefficacy
FollowingAlexanderGeorge'smethodofstructured,
focusedcomparison,14
thecase studiesaddressthefollowinggeneralquestions:
1. What was the spoiler'sbehavior?What demandsdid the spoilermake?
Whatwas therhetoric
ofthespoiler?
2. How did external
partiesinterpret
theempirically
of
verifiable
observations
thespoiler?Whatwerethecustodian'sjudgmentsabouttheintentions
and
ofthespoiler?
motivations
3. Whatevidenceexistedforinterpreting
spoilerintentions
and evaluatingthe
organizational
unityofthespoiler?Whatevidencedid thecustodianhave?
Whatevidencedid itciteto supportitsinterpretations?
Was otherevidence
ignoredor disregarded?
4. Whatstrategy
did thecustodianchooseto managethespoiler?Whatwas
thetheorybehindthestrategy?
5. Did thecustodianimplement
thestrategy
effectively?
Whatwas theeffect
ofthestrategy-onthespoilerand on theotherpartiesin theconflict?
6. Did thecustodianreevaluatethe strategy
Did
duringits implementation?
thecustodianreconsider
itsinitialdiagnosisof spoilertype?
CASE 1. RWANDA: THREATENED WITHDRAWAL
The Arusha Peace Accords,signed in August 1993 by PresidentJuvenal
ofRwandaand officials
Habyarimana
fromtheRwandanPatriotic
Front(RPF),
14. Alexander L. George,"Case Studies and TheoryDevelopment,"paper presentedto the Second
Annual Symposium on InformationProcessing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University,
Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania,October 15-16, 1982.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 21
a rebelforcecomposedof mostlyTutsiexiles,promisedto end a three-year
civilwar in whichapproximately
10,000people had been killed.The accords
attemptedto end violentconflictbetweenthe Hutu ethnicgroup,which
formedapproximately
70percentofthepopulation,
and theTutsiethnicgroup,
whichcomprisednearly30 percent.15
the accordssoughtto
Simultaneously,
endHutupoliticalhegemony
overtheTutsi,integrate
thousandsofTutsiexiles
into Rwandanlife,and democratizethe Rwandangovernment,
whichhad
been dominatedforovertwentyyearsby a smallelitegroupof Hutus close
toHabyarimana.
Theaccordscontainedelaborateprovisions
forpowersharing
in government;
ofthetwoarmies;a detailedplan forthereturnof
integration
some soldiersto civilianlife;proceduresfordemocratization
of Rwandan
ofa coalitiontransition
politics;and theestablishment
theBroad
government,
Based TransitionalGovernment(BBTG). The accords culminatedfourteen
monthsof negotiation
in conand mediationby theTanzaniangovernment,
of
junctionwith the Organizationof AfricanUnityand the governments
France,Belgium,and theUnitedStates.TheUnitedNationswas tooverseethe
accords'implementation.
The mediatorsoftheagreement
apparently
foresawthattheywould likely
meetresistance
fromHutu extremists
in thearmyand government,
who had
ralliedunderthebanneroftheCDR.16The RPF vetoedprovisionsthatwould
have giventheCDR a rolein a newRwandangovernment,
arguingthatitwas
notan independent
politicalpartyand thatitsextremebeliefin ethnicsupeA further
riority
was contrary
to thespiritof settlement.
pointof contention
concernedrepresentation
in thearmy:Arushaallotted50 percentoftheofficer
corpsand 40 percentoftherestofthearmyto theRPF.Althoughtheformula
alleviatedRPF securityfears,it was contestedby theCDR. Nonetheless,
the
withtheRPF on
Rwandangovernment
negotiating
teamreachedagreement
thoseterms.
The accordscontainedone majorflaw:theylackeda strategy
to deal with
theCDR. The UnitedStatesand Franceadvocatedinclusionof theCDR into
the peace process.Insteadthe RPF and the government
signatoriesto the
15. Anothergroup, the Twa, comprises 1 percentof Rwanda's population. A common figurefor
the respectivepopulations is 85 percentHutu and 14 percentTutsi. Based on new calculations,
Howard Adelman estimatesthatthe percentageof Tutsiwas greatlyunderreported,hence the 70
percent/30percentfigurehere. Private communication,Howard Adelman, October 10, 1996.
16. Howard Adelman and AstriSuhrke,withBruceJones,TheInternational
Responseto Conflict
and
Genocide:
LessonsfromtheRwandaExperience,
Study2, EarlyWarning
and Conflict
Management
(Copenhagen: JointEvaluation of EmergencyAssistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 25.
International
Security22:2 | 22
accords hoped fora robustUN peacekeeping forcethat"would neutralizethe
extremists."17
Chastened by its recent experience in Somalia, however, the
United Nations had no intentionof robust peacekeeping. Indeed, some UN
diplomatsforesawimplementationas a relativelyeasy task.The forcethatwas
deployed to Rwanda was not only less than the partieshad agreed to,but also
less than what the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) forcecommander,General Romeo Dallaire, believed necessary.
Between the signing of the peace accords in August 1993 and the full
deploymentof UNAMIR in February1994, tension and uncertaintywere rife
in Rwanda. The accords provided room for the growth of moderate Hutu
politicianswho could provide an ethnicbridge to the mostlyTutsiRPF. Habyarimana's partyitselfwas undergoing splits; the CDR, resolutelyopposed to
compromisewith the RPF, emerged as a possible competitorto Habyarimana.
In October 1993 a coup attempt in neighboringBurundi by Tutsi officers
against its recentlyelected Hutu presidenttriggeredacts of genocide in that
country.Between 50,000 and 100,000people died, including Burundi's president. In Rwanda the coup increased Hutu extremistantipathyforthe Arusha
compromise,sowed suspicion and doubt among Hutu moderate politicians
toward the RPF, and emboldened the Hutu extremiststo advocate openly
exterminationof the Tutsi as a finalsolution to Rwanda's ethnicproblem.18
UNAMIR's top officials,Special RepresentativeJacques-RogerBooh-Booh
and Dallaire, confrontedseveral challenges: Habyarimana's unwillingnessto
carryout his obligationsto the Arusha Accords and formthe BBTG, low-level
political violence and ethnic killings, growing public incitementof ethnic
hatred-especially by the popular radio station Radio Mille Collines-and
increasing evidence of a CDR plan to commit genocide if the BBTG were
installed.On January11, 1994, Dallaire sent a cable to the UN Departmentof
Peacekeeping, which stated that a high-level governmentdefectorhad told
UNAMIR about the formationof specially trained militias to carry out a
genocide, the creationof lists of Hutu moderates targetedforassassination,a
plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers in the hope of drivingthe United Nations
out of Rwanda, and a specificthreatthat the BBTG would be attacked upon
installation.
17. Howard Adelman, "PreventingPost-Cold War Conflicts,What Have We Learned? The Case
of Rwanda," paper presented to the InternationalStudies Association Meeting,San Diego, California,April 17, 1996,p. 7.
18. Prunier,The RwandaCrisis,pp. 198-203.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 23
Although Dallaire requested better equipment that would improve
UNAMIR's capacity to respond in the case of crisis,his request was ignored.
He also sought permissionto begin independentsearches forarms caches,but
was told to do so only in conjunctionwith local authorities-some of whom
were implicated in the January11 warning. In the words of the definitive
account of thisperiod, UN headquarterswas only prepared to approve "what
the trafficwould bear."19
Habyarimana's role in the plottingand his motivationsfor stallingon implementingArusha were uncertain;analysts disagreed on whetherHabyarimana was himselfan extremistonly tacticallycommittedto the peace process,
or a pragmaticpeacemaker whom ethnicextremistshad boxed in. The faction
that was implicated in the Januarywarning to Dallaire included membersof
Habyarimana's own elite troops, the PresidentialGuard, several close presidential advisers, and the president'swife. Habyarimana's behavior could be
construed as supporting either interpretation.His prevaricationmight have
been evidence that he hoped events would provide the extremistswith an
opportunityto return to war in a strongerposition. Alternatively,it was
possible thathe fearedforhis lifeifhe implementedthe accords,and therefore
"buying time,withoutknowing exactlyfor what purpose, became a kind of
survival reflex."20U.S. officialsclose to the implementationprocess believed
that there was no split between Habyarimana and the extremists;therefore,
the key to dealing with the extremistswas to get Habyarimana to install the
BBTG. They assumed that he would deliver his followersto the peace process.21
No coordinated,unifiedinternationalapproach was taken vis-a-visthe extremists.Booh-Booh adamantly opposed CDR demands for inclusion in the
peace process,only to reversehimselfand argue fortheirparticipation.France
continued to have cordial relationswith both Habyarimana and officialsimplicatedin theJanuarywarning.Arms supplies fromFrancearrivedin Rwanda
in January1994 in violationoftheArusha Accords,and, accordingto UNAMIR
officials,again in April afterthe beginningof the genocide. Representativesof
donor nations in Kigali failed to send a clear, consistentmessage regarding
19. Adelman, Suhrke,with Jones,The International
Response,p. 68.
20. Prunier,The RwandanCrisis,p. 203.
21. Anthony Marley, U.S. Department of State, presentationat the FourteenthAnnual Africa
Conference,thePaul H. Nitze School ofAdvanced InternationalStudies,JohnsHopkins University,
Washington,D.C., April 7, 1995. LieutenantColonel Marley (retired)was the U.S. militaryattach6
to the Arusha process.
International
Security22:2 | 24
theirconcerns about the government'sviolence and human rightsviolations.
Even the radio broadcast of genocidal threatsdid not yield a consensus toward
the extremists.The failure of internationalactors to assert unified,minimal
standardsof human rights"probablysucceeded only in erodingthe credibility
of diplomatic suasion."22
In late March 1994, a strategyemerged for dealing with the stalled implementation that proved completely counterproductive.The United Nations
threatenedto withdraw its peacekeeping mission unless the warringparties
committed to fulfillingtheir obligations to the peace plan. Pushed by the
United States and endorsed by the United Nations, the strategybore little
connectionto any of the problemsin Rwanda: the presence of extremistswho
had pledged to attack the parties of peace, the uncertaintyabout whether
Habyarimana was allied to the extremists,or Habyarimana's reluctance to
carry out Arusha. Although the U.S. governmentclearly saw the Rwandan
governmentas the main culprit,23
the strategythreatenedto punish all of the
partiesforits obstruction.On April 5 the UN SecurityCouncil announced that
the mandate for UNAMIR would be extended,but warned that its patience
had worn out; if the parties did not comply with Arusha, the United Nations
would leave.
On April 6 the strategy,combined with growing diplomatic pressure,
wrested fromHabyarimana a commitmentto install the BBTG. In a meeting
in Arusha with the regional mediatorsand representativesof France and the
United States,he agreed to implementthe accords, only to be assassinated on
his returnto Kigali later that night.Immediately,the PresidentialGuard and
CDR assassinated almost all of the Hutu moderates,and theirmilitiasbegan
killing Tutsi throughoutthe country.In addition to assassinating the Hutu
moderate prime minister,Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Presidential Guard
killed ten Belgian peacekeepers who were attemptingto protecther.
In the ensuing two monthsof genocide,the United Nations and its member
states reduced the number of peacekeepers in Rwanda. The essence of its
approach became appeasement by inaction.For two months,the United Nations and the United States urged the RPF and the Presidential Guard to
establisha cease-fireand returnto negotiations.In so doing, theyconveyed a
22. Adelman, Suhrke,with Jones,TheInternational
Response,p. 32.
23. Michael Bamett, "The Politics of Indifferenceat the United Nations: The SecurityCouncil,
Peacekeeping, and Genocide in Rwanda," Journalof CulturalAnthropology
(forthcoming).At the
time, Bamett was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow with the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 25
clear message: committinggenocide was not enough to disqualifya partyin
Rwanda froma legitimateplace at the bargainingtable.
The United Nations' failure to manage the spoiler problem in Rwanda
resulted from poor diagnosis, which was caused in part by organizational
blinders.The poor diagnosis was threefold:incorrectassessmentofthenumber
of spoilers, their types, and the locus of the spoiler problem. The United
Nations targetedHabyarimana,who was a spoiler,but a limitedspoiler,whose
hesitationsstemmed fromfear of his formerfollowers.Habyarimana did not
controlthe CDR, a total spoiler thatsought to destroythe entireprocess. The
threat of withdrawal forced Habyarimana to reveal that he was a limited
spoiler who preferredpeace. But the same threathad no leverage on the CDR;
in fact,the threatsignaled to it a basic lack of internationalcommitmentto the
implementation.
The onlystrategythatmighthave avoided the cataclysmofApril 1994 would
have been one thatcombined protectionforthepartiesof peace-the moderate
Hutu parties, the RPF, and Habyarimana-through a larger,more proactive
peacekeeping force,clear crediblethreatsagainsttheuse ofviolence by extremists,and the defangingof the extremistsby reducingtheircapabilityto attack
the peace process. The internationalcommunitywould have had to diagnose
that there were two spoilers, not one, that the CDR was a total spoiler,and
that the locus of the spoiler problem resided with Habyarimana's followers.
The goal then would have been to protectthe coalitionforpeace, marginalize
the extremistHutus, and create the opportunityforHabyarimana to distance
himselffromthe extremesto join the middle.
That such a strategywas not articulatedand attemptedwas overdetermined.
Beyond the obvious intelligencefailurein detectingHabyarimana's position,
therewere myriad reasons that led to an absence of criticaljudgment.Right
fromthe planning for implementation,the United Nations and its member
stateswere only minimallycommittedto the peace process. The choice of the
withdrawalstrategystemmedfromtheClintonadministration'sdesire to show
Congress thatthe United Nations had the disciplineto say no to peacekeeping
operations that seemed troubled.24Organizational politics and the frailtyof
individual decision making combined to ignore the warningsof spoilers committedto genocide. Mediators could not overcome the basic contradictionin
theiranalysis: on the one hand, Arusha excluded Hutu extremistswho threatened the peace process, but on the otherhand, those same extremistswould
24. Bamett,"The Politics of Indifference,"
p. 35. On flawed judgment,see Alan Kuperman,"The
Lessons of Rwanda," SAIS Review,Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter1996), pp. 221-240.
International
Security22:2 | 26
not really act when the peace process was implemented.The United Nations
and its memberstatesdid not want to faceup to theimplicationsofan accurate
diagnosis of the problem and failed to even create a unified, disciplined
message of disapproval to the extremists.
CASE 2. CAMBODIA
I: THE KHMER
ROUGE
AND THE DEPARTING
TRAIN
The Paris Peace Accords,signed on October23, 1991,culminatedfouryears of
negotiationsaimed at ending Cambodia's civil war. Several factorscontributed
to the settlement.The war had reached a stalemateamong the major combatants-the National United Frontfor an Independent,Neutral, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the royalistpartyof Prince Norodom
Sihanouk; the Khmer Rouge (KR); the State of Cambodia (SOC); and the
Khmer People's National LiberationFront (KPNLF). The externalpatrons of
the warringparties (China, Russia, Vietnam,and the United States) had tired
of the stalemateand wished to divest themselvesof theirclients.The countries
of the region coalesced around a frameworkthat called for multipartyelections,demobilizationand disarmamentof the parties,and UN implementation
of the agreement.The warringparties consented to the agreementas a result
of theirsponsors' coercion,and remained deeply suspicious of one another,as
well as distrustful
of the internationalconsortium-the Core Group, consisting
of thepermanentfiveof theUN SecurityCouncil and interestedregionalstates,
includingJapan and Australia-that brokeredthe agreement.
The partyto the settlementthatcommanded the most scrutinywas the KR.
Responsible forthe deaths of nearly2 millionCambodian citizensduringtheir
threeyears in power,the KR survivedbecause of its militaryprowess,support
from China, and diplomatic recognitionfrom the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States. The inclusionof the KR in the
peace process evolved fromthe recognitionby the United States and others
that the KR could not be defeated militarilyand the hope that peace would
marginalizeit.25
Between November 1991 and May 1992,the KR complied sporadicallywith
the Paris settlement.Immediatelyafterthe accords were signed,but beforethe
deployment of the UN TransitionalAuthorityin Cambodia (UNTAC), a KR
spokesman, Khieu Samphan, attemptedto open a political officein Phnom
Penh, only to be attacked by SOC-inspired rioters. Samphan retreatedto
25. Stephen Solarz, "Cambodia and the InternationalCommunity,"ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 69, No. 2
(Spring 1990), pp. 99-115.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 27
Bangkok, and the KR demanded 1,000 peacekeepers to provide securityin
Phnom Penh. At about the same time,Sihanouk proposed a SOC-FUNCINPEC
coalitiongovernmentas a means of isolatingthe KR, which was a violation of
the spiritand law of the Paris Accords. As a result of these two incidents,a
lobby was createdthatargued the KR was ready to implementthe accords but
was frightenedinto noncomplianceby its antagonists.Some expertssuggested
therewere two KhmerRouges: "moderate" KR who wanted peace, and "hardline" KR who wanted war. Other analystsargued thatKR commitmentto the
accords was always tacticaland the belligerenceof theiradversariesprovided
them with a convenient excuse for their spoiler behavior. Evidence of KR
intentions,based on interviewsof theirtop officialsand lowly foot soldiers,
suggests that the party was committed to the peace process insofar as it
promised to returnit to power.26The KR interpretedthe Paris Accords as
givingUNTAC therightto dismantleSOC's administrationand expel all ethnic
Vietnamese fromCambodia. If UNTAC carried out such a program,then the
KR would benefitfromthe crisisthatwould ensue forSOC.
The KR's inconsistentbehavior between November 1991 and May 1992
provided evidence for differentinterpretationsabout its intentions.The KR
frequentlyviolated the cease-fire,restrictedUN mobilityin its areas, boycotted
joint militaryconsultations,and attacked a UN helicopterin February 1992,
wounding a peacekeeper. When UNTAC began in March 1992,27the KR
"adopted a posture of cautious cooperation, despite engaging in numerous
ceasefireviolations."28On the positive side, it allowed some UNTAC civilians
in its areas. Samphan actively representedthe KR on the Supreme National
Council (SNC), a transitionalbody composed of representativesof the warring
parties, and cooperated on several humanitarianinitiativeswith the United
Nations.29On the negative side, the few militaryobserversallowed into KR
26. See especially Steven Heder, "The Resumptionof Armed Struggleby the Partyof Democratic
Kampuchea: Evidence fromNational Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers,' in
Steven Heder and JudyLedgerwood, eds., Propaganda,Politics,and Violencein Cambodia:Democratic
Transition
underUnitedNationsPeacekeeping
(Armonk,N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 73-113.
27. Although the Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, the operational plan for
UNTAC was not presented to the SecurityCouncil for approval until February 19, 1992. On
February28 the SecurityCouncil approved the mission,and on March 15 the secretary-general's
special representativeto Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, arrivedin Phnom Penh. A small UN holding
operation was deployed as a bridge between the signingof the Paris Accords and the arrival of
UNTAC.
28. JamesA. Schear,"Beyond TraditionalPeacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia," in Donald C.F.
Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., BeyondTraditional
Peacekeeping
(New York: St. Martin's,1995),
p. 253. Schear was an assistantto Akashi in Cambodia.
29. Ibid.
International
Security22:2 | 28
territorywere so limited in theiractivitiesthat "at times they seemed more
hostages than monitors."30
The issue of KR noncompliancesurfacedpubliclyin May and June1992. On
May 30, 1992, a group of KR soldiers refused to allow a UN armed convoy,
Yasushi Akashi,
accompanied by the secretary-general's
special representative,
and his force commander,General JohnSanderson, to enter KR territoryin
western Cambodia. Instead of insisting on UNTAC's right of passage and
challengingthe soldiers,Akashi retreated.When cantonment,demobilization,
and disarmamentof all of the warringparties began in June,the KR stalled.
It insistedthatit would not cantonits soldiers,because Vietnameseforceswere
stillpresentin Cambodia in violationof theParis Accords and because UNTAC
had not established effectivecontrolover SOC. The KR insistedthatit would
comply with demobilizationonly if UNTAC dismantledexistingSOC administrativestructuresand vested the SNC with the power to run the country.
UNTAC officialsdebated the use of force to gain KR compliance. French
general Michel Loridon, UNTAC's deputy militarycommander,believed that
a show of strengthwould compel the KR to meet its obligations and would
establisha reputationamong the otherfactionsthatthe United Nations would
enforcecompliance. If the United Nations did not act, Loridon maintained,it
would lose credibilitywith the KR and the other parties. He asserted that
UNTAC had the legal authorityto enforcecompliance, and did not need to
seek a Chapter 7 mandate to do so.31 Human rightsorganizationsand nongovernmentalhumanitarianorganizationsin Cambodia supported Loridon's
call fortoughnessagainst the KR.32
Akashi and Sanderson opposed the use or threatof forceagainst the KR for
several reasons. First,Sanderson drew no distinctionbetween threateningthe
KR with force to gain compliance and going to war with the KR.33 This
dovetailed withAkashi's assessmentthatthe troopcontributorsto themission,
as well as the Core Group, would oppose fightinga war. Second, Sanderson
30. TrevorFindlay,Cambodia:The Legacyand LessonsofUNTAC (Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1995), p. 51.
31. Under the UN Charter,a Chapter 7 operation permitsenforcementagainst identifiedthreats
to peace and does not requirethe warringparties' consent.
aftertheCold War
BuildingPeace in LandsofConflict
32. Steven R. Ratner,TheNew UN Peacekeeping:
(New York:St. Martin'sand the Council on ForeignRelations,1995), pp. 170-171; Michael Doyle,
UN Peacekeepingin Cambodia:UNTAC's Civil Mandate,InternationalPeace Academy Occasional
Paper Series (Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner,1995), p. 67; and Findlay,Cambodia,pp. 37-38.
Peacekeeping:
33. JohnSanderson,"UNTAC: Successes and Failures,"in H. Smith,ed., International
Buildingon theCambodianExperience(Canberra: AustralianDefence Studies Centre,1994), pp. 1631.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 29
feltthat UNTAC was not organized foroffensiveoperations and would thus
prove ineffective.
Third,both Akashi and Sanderson argued thatany attempt
to use forcewould destroythe Core Group's consensus; it was unlikelythat
the group would immediatelyagree to condemn KR behavior and condone
the use or threatof force.Fourth,theybelieved thatif the Core Group disintegrated,the operationwould collapse. Fifth,theythoughtthatany use offorce
would undermine the attemptto negotiate compliance, which was Akashi's
preferredapproach and which meshed with Sanderson's belief in the "good
Khmer Rouge-bad Khmer Rouge" line; as long as therewere good KR, there
was a possibilityof earning theirvoluntarycompliance. Sixth,Akashi feared
thatusing forceagainst the KR would upset the balance of the peace process.
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF derived some of theirpower fromthe KR counterbalance to SOC; to weaken theKR mighttemptSOC to seek an outrightvictory.
Akashi chose to eschew forceand instead sought to discuss with the KR its
noncompliance.He quickly realized that the KR interpretedtwo key componentsof theParis Accords in ways counterto theirspirit.First,the KR believed
thatan injunctionforthe removal of all "foreignforces"meant all foreigners,
regardless of theirstatus as combatants.At stake was the political status of
non-KhmerCambodians, especiallyethnicVietnamesewho lived in Cambodia.
Second, the KR insisted thatthe accords required the complete destructionof
SOC administrativestructures.Akashi realized thatmeetingthe firstdemand
would violate human rightsand pander to ethnicextremism,and thatmeeting
the second demand was impossible: UNTAC did not have the administrative
personnel or know-how to replace SOC. The likely result would be chaos,
which,although satisfyingKR aspirations,would destroythe peace process.34
Akashi chose not to appease KR demands and began to build a strategyfor
managing the party'sspoilerbehavior.He met withlocal representativesof KR
patrons-Thailand and China-to create a unified approach to the problem,
privatelycondemned KR noncomplianceat SNC meetings,and warned thenUN Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghalithatpressure would likelyhave
to be applied in the future.
In diagnosing the problem in a letterto Boutros-Ghalion July27, 1992,
Akashi describes the KR rejectionof UNTAC's effortsto address its concerns
and states that KR behavior had demonstratedthatit was not sincerelycommittedto the peace process. He attributesKR noncomplianceto its attempt"to
gain what it could not get eitherin the battlefieldor in the Paris negotiations,
34. Heder, "The Resumptionof Armed Struggle,"passim.
International
Security22:2 | 30
that is, to improve its political and militarypower to such an extentthat the
otherpartieswill be placed at a distinctdisadvantage when UNTAC leaves."35
Akashi thenchroniclesKR acts of bad faithand assertsthatSamphan "is little
more than a glorifiedmouthpieceof ... Pol Pot," who "seems to be dedicated
He argues thatthe circumto the doctrineof simultaneously'talk and fight."'36
stances dictate a strategyof "patient persuasion" and "sustained pressure,"
and insists that UNTAC "will adhere to an impartialstand, while criticizing
any acts in violation of the Paris Agreement."Although doubting KR good
faith,Akashi assertsthatkeeping an open door to its participationwill prevent
turningits followersinto a "permanentdisgruntledminority."37
Akashi points out thatleverage over the KR could come fromThailand and
China. He expresses skepticismabout the formerbecause of the Thai government'sunwillingnessto controlseveral army generals who collaborated with
the KR in illegal timberand gem tradingacross the Thai border.Akashi also
argues thatChina's influenceover the KR waned afterthe signingof the peace
accords and its cessation of assistance to the KR. He requests that if KR
noncompliancecontinues,thenBoutros-Ghalishould mobilize economic pressure againsttheKR: "This should not,however,involve any spectacularaction,
but rathera steady strengthening
of our bordercheckpointsadjacent to the DK
[KR] zones, in order to control the inflow of arms and petroleum and the
outflowof gems and logs, a major source of DK's [KR's] income."38
By leaving open the door to theKR to rejointhe peace process,Akashi hoped
to contain its dispute with UNTAC and to limit its hostilityto the peace
process. An aggressive stance toward the KR would make targets of all
UNTAC's personnel. If KR opposition could be contained, UNTAC could
redeploy its peacekeepers to protectthe election,which would go forward
without the KR. The Australian foreignministrypromoted Akashi's strategy
in a September 1992 policy paper that became the basis of the international
response to the KR.39It sought a concertedresponse fromthe Core Group,
35. "Document 43: Letter dated 27 July1992 fromthe Special Representativeof the SecretaryGeneral for Cambodia to the Secretary-GeneralConcerning the Situation in Cambodia," in The
UnitedNationsand Cambodia-1991-1995,UN Blue Books Series,Vol. 2 (New York:UN Department
of Public Information,1995), p. 206.
36. Ibid., p. 207.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. "Document 44: 'Cambodia: Next Steps,' Australian Paper Dated 16 September 1992," in The
United
NationsandCambodia,
p. 208.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 31
based on the judgment that KR "demands are not in strictaccord with the
actual termsof the Paris Agreements."40
Although Sanderson was loathe to tryto enforceKR compliance with the
peace process,he reconfiguredthe peacekeepers to protectthe strategicobjective of holding the elections.He redeployed his battalionsin ways that could
contain KR attacksand reinterpretedthe traditionalpeacekeeping doctrineof
going so far as to use militaryunits of all of the
neutralityand impartiality,
factions (save the KR) to assist UNTAC in providing security during the
election.Sanderson justifiedusing soldiers fromthe otherpartiesby insisting
thatthese armies were not deployed against the KR per se, but ratheragainst
any forcedeterminedto disruptthe election.In a ratheringeniousformulation,
he described the changed militarymission as "an interpositionstrategy,but
not between opposing forces.Rather,it was between a highlymoral act sanctioned under internationallaw and supportedby internationalconsensus,and
any person or group which mightthreatenit."'41
To help establish an atmospherewhere civilians would feel secure in participatingin an election,UNTAC created a radio station in December 1992.
Although its purpose was to convince voters of ballot secrecyand to explain
UNTAC's mission and activities,it also aimed to neutralize KR propaganda.
The establishmentof Radio UNTAC overcameobjectionsof theUN Secretariat,
among others,that an independent media outlet would endanger UNTAC's
perceived neutrality.
From September 1992 to May 1993, the scheduled month for elections,
UNTAC held firmin its strategy.The Core Group clearly signaled that the
peace process would go forwardwithoutKR participation.China and Thailand
acceded to a nonbinding Security Council resolution to impose economic
sanctions on the KR. And as the election date drew near, both China and
Thailand explicitlysupported the elections. Although the KR increased its
attacks against UNTAC during March and April 1993, it did not unleash a
militaryoffensiveagainst the elections,which were held as planned.
UNTAC's strategyfor dealing with the KR was imaginativeand effective,
and serves as the prototype of the departing train strategyfor managing
spoilers. When faced with KR attemptsto underminepeace, UNTAC emphasized that the peace process would not exclude the KR, nor would it be held
40. Ibid.
41. General JohnSanderson, as quoted in JianweiWang, ManagingArmsin Peace Processes:Cambodia(Geneva: UN InstituteforDisarmamentResearch [UNIDIR], 1996), p. 71.
International
Security22:2 | 32
hostage by it. UNTAC tried firstto address the KR's specific demands, but
when such demands threatened the core agreement of the peace process,
UNTAC sought internationalconsensus to delegitimizeKR demands and to
approve the strategyof continuingthe peace process in its absence. UNTAC
reconfigureditselfmilitarilyto protectthe electoral process fromKR attack,
but leftopen the door to the KR if it wanted to reengage the peace process.
CASE 3. CAMBODIA
II: SOC AND INDUCEMENT
The motivationof the Khmer Rouge was difficultto gauge because its grievance toward UNTAC's lack of controlover SOC had some merit.UNTAC faced
an ongoing problem of SOC obstructionof its mandate; and it never established controlof SOC's administrativestructures,given the lack of qualified
personnel in the numbers that were needed, SOC's tendencyto ignore and
sabotage UNTAC directives,and UNTAC's unwillingnessto assert its administrativeprerogativesas outlined in the Paris Accords. An equally pressing
matter of control concerned SOC's police and securityforces. Throughout
UNTAC's life span, SOC police intimidatedcivil society organizations and
physicallyassaulted and assassinated membersof the opposition. While UNTAC reconfiguredits militarymission to protectthe electionfromKR attack,
SOC securitypersonnel waged a low-level reign of terroragainst its party's
electoralcompetition.
Despite warnings and protest by some UNTAC human rights officials,
Akashi did not perceive SOC as a potentialspoiler and was unpreparedwhen
it attemptedto underminethe peace process immediatelyafterthe May 1993
election.The election resultsdevastated SOC; despite SOC's use of intimidation, assassination, and fraud, FUNCINPEC beat SOC's political party,the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which disputed the election results and
attemptedto grab power. The president of SOC, Hun Sen, charged that the
electionwas fraudulent;some CPP officialsdeclared secession forone region
of the country;and SOC-orchestratedriots throughoutCambodia threatened
UNTAC officials.At the very moment that UNTAC had seeminglyachieved
success, SOC threatenedto tear down the whole edificeof peace in Cambodia.
From the beginningof the implementationof the Paris Accords,Akashi, the
United Nations, and the Core Group focused mostlyon the KR as a threatto
peace and ignored the potentialforSOC to be a spoiler.Moreover,KR spoiler
behavior created incentives and excuses for SOC to undermine the peace
process. Unless both spoilers carried out their commitmentsto the peace
process, each could claim that their behavior was a functionof the other.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 33
Witnessingviolence or lack of commitmentby theiropponent, they asserted
that playing by the rules would leave them vulnerable. This rationale can
become a barrierforpeacemakers who seek to determinethe real motivation
behind acts of violence and subversion. In cases of mimeticspoilers, peacemakers tend to accept a situationalexplanation for spoiler behavior-an explanation that may be correctand will seem reasonable-and overlook the
possibilitythat such an explanation may also be a facade fora partyalready
committedto tacticalsubversion of the peace process.
The departingtrain strategytoward the KR increased Akashi's perception
that UNTAC was dependent on SOC and was thus limitedin its options for
controllingit. That UNTAC was dependent on SOC is not in doubt; ifSOC left
the peace process, therewould be no elections and the parties would return
to war. But Akashi failed to comprehend SOC's dependence on UNTAC.
UNTAC had greatly strengthenedSOC, which had a stake in holding the
electionand gaininginternationallegitimacyand support.If SOC had to wage
another war against the KR, it would do so froma strongerposition with
internationalsupport and FUNCINPEC's abandonmentof its formercoalition
partner.Akashi also misread command-and-controlrelationswithinSOC. He
told aides of his fearthatHun Sen had only tenuous controlover hard-liners,
who ifpushed too farwould rebel againstHun Sen and returnto war. Akashi's
staff,however,believed Hun Sen to be firmlyin controlof his followers.
Althoughthe accords containednumerous referencesto administrativecontrol, the United Nations interpretedUNTAC's mandate in a limited way.
UNTAC was "urged to rely on 'codes of conduct and guidelines formanagement"' and to eschew issuing bindingdirectives.42
Akashi,under the advice of
Boutros-Ghali,envisioned UNTAC exertingcontrolthroughmonitoringand
supervising existing administrativestructures.43
Moreover, Akashi worried
about UNTAC's lack of domestic legitimacy;he envisioned the SNC as a
governingbody thatcould make hard decisions,refereethe peace process,and
thereforeprovide domestic legitimacyfor actions against spoilers. Although
the SNC did assist the strategyagainst the KR by rulingthatits demands were
illegitimate,it proved much less effectivetoward SOC.
For the most part,UNTAC restrainedfromattemptingto enforcecompliance
with its administrativedirectives.Akashi did not want to use the prerogative
of replacingor repositioningSOC bureaucrats.His restraintin the face of SOC
42. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping
in Cambodia,
p. 37.
43. Ibid.
International
Security22:2 | 34
obstructionprompted the head of UNTAC administration,Gerald Porcell,to
resignin February1993. At the time,Porcell lamented thatas long as UNTAC
did not "have the political will to apply the peace accords, its controlcannot
but be ineffective."44
UNTAC was also lax in holding SOC accountable forhuman rightsviolations. AlthoughUNTAC's mandate forcreatingan environmentconducive to
human rightswas the most ambitious ever fora UN peacekeeping operation,
its enforcementof violations was "dilatory, sporadic, and improvised."45
Akashi interpretedUNTAC's human rightsmandate narrowly.He believed
that rigorousaction to enforcehuman rightswould endanger UNTAC's neuof human rights"seemed
trality;moreover,he feltthata broad interpretation
to be based on unrealisticallyhigh standards in the context of Cambodia's
reality."46
As violence increased and the political climate deterioratedat the end of
1992,Akashi acceded to the establishmentof a special prosecutor'soffice.But
as William Shawcross notes,"the officelanguished as Akashi, Sanderson,and
otherUNTAC officialsbegan to fearthatprosecutorialzeal mightdestroythe
entire mission's fragile links with the Phnom Penh regime."47Akashi was
indirectlysupportedin thisin February1993 when ASEAN and China exerted
pressure to limit the human rightscomponent of UNTAC to education and
training.48
Between May 1992 and May 1993, UNTAC pursued a de facto policy of
inducementagainst SOC. It usually did not act against SOC violations;when
it did, it sought to deter SOC obstructionthroughprivate persuasion. Akashi
asserted that the parties need not adhere strictlyto all of theircommitments.
As he laterwrote,"too rigid,legalisticinterpretations
of the agreementswould
have hinderedmy work."49He believed thatalthoughthe accords were "based
on the conceptsof Westerndemocracy,Asian methods and proceduresshould
be used in the negotiations."50Such methods found public reprimand (or
acknowledgmentof violation of agreements)distasteful.
44. Gerald Porcell,as quoted in Findlay,Cambodia,p. 63.
45. Ibid., p. 64.
46. Ibid., p. 66.
47. WilliamShawcross,Cambodia'sNew Deal, ContemporaryIssues Paper No. 1 (Washington,D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment forInternationalPeace, 1994), p. 59.
48. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
49. Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons forU.N. Peace-keeping,"the Charles Rostov
Annual Lecture on Asian Affairs,the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudies,
JohnsHopkins University,Washington,D.C., October 14, 1993, p. 12.
50. Ibid., p. 13.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 35
In May 1993 UNTAC's tacit strategyof inducementbecame explicitin its
response to SOC's attacksimmediatelyafterthe election.UNTAC's supportof
the election resultswas less than steadfast.Withinthe firstforty-eight
hours,
Akashi attemptedto console Hun Sen and promised to investigatefullyhis
charges of electoral fraud. He also sought out the leader of FUNCINPEC,
Prince Norodom Ranariddh,to urge him to be conciliatorytoward the CPP.
In the two weeks afterthe election,the CPP resortedto violence "to blackmail both FUNCINPEC and UNTAC in an attemptto reverse the election
results."51As Shawcross writes, the CPP attempt at blackmail was largely
successful.52Fearing a returnto open civil war, the United Nations acceded to
a power-sharingarrangementmediated by Sihanouk thatprovided SOC with
more power and cabinet positions than its electoral performancedeserved.
Akashi acknowledged thatthe deal was "unorthodoxby universaldemocratic
principles," but he defended it on the basis of the "practical wisdom" of
combiningFUNCINPEC's political appeal with the administrativeexperience
and power of the CPP.53
Akashi believed that compliance on most of the dimensions of the peace
process,includingdemobilizationand disarmament,and human rightsprotection, was secondary to compliance with holding an election. The election
became a "holy grail" forUNTAC; Akashi definedthe mission's success solely
on the basis of achieving it,and the myriadgoals of UNTAC's mandate-promotionand protectionof human rights,disarmamentand demobilization,and
administrativecontrolduring the transition-were made subservientto this
quest. In the end, thiseven included rejectinga "strictadherence" to theresults
of the election;Akashi and UNTAC did not insistthatthe politicaloutcome of
the election accurately reflectthe electoral outcome, for fear that it would
underminethe triumphof holding the election.
In hindsight,it is possible to hazard a tentativejudgment about the effectiveness of UNTAC's strategies for managing the spoiler problems in the
Cambodian peace process. The strategyit chose to deal with the KR has been
vindicated.The KR's power declined; in the summerof 1996,a severe factional
split decimated the party;and in June 1997 an internalrebellionby soldiers
51. Shawcross, Cambodia'sNew Deal, p. 26.
52. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
53. Yasushi Akashi,"The Challenge of Peace-keepingin Cambodia: Lessons to Be Learned," paper
presented to the School of Internationaland Public Affairs,Columbia University,November 29,
1993, p. 8.
International
Security22:2 | 36
who wanted to end the war deposed Pol Pot. Time has not been so kind in
evaluating UNTAC's strategytoward SOC. For instance,SOC's steadily increasinggrip on power since 1993 caused several expertson Cambodia in 1996
to warn of a "creeping coup."54Such warringturned propheticin July1997
when Hun Sen and SOC attacked FUNCINPEC, sent Prince Ranariddh into
exile, and assassinated FUNCINPEC officialsand pro-democracyadvocates.
As the United States,the United Nations, and ASEAN engaged in collective
hand-wringing,SOC skillfullymanipulated an internationally
negotiatedand
implementedpeace process to triumphin a war that it could not win on the
battlefield.
CASE 4. ANGOLA:
UNITA
AND THE FAILURE
OF INDUCEMENT
In May 1991 the two main antagonistsin the Angolan civil war, the government of Angola and UNITA, signed a peace agreementat Bicesse, Portugal.
The agreement,mediated by Portugal,theUnited States,and the Soviet Union,
called foran eighteen-month
transitionperiod duringwhich each partywould
canton its troops,demobilize some of them,and then join the remainderin a
unified Angolan army.At the end of this period, elections would determine
the presidencyand composition of a national assembly.The agreementcontained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the
election'sloser to receive a share of ministerialportfoliosor provincialgovernorships in the highly centralized state structure.Although each party had
been urged to consider various power-sharingoptions, both vetoed them in
the beliefthattheywould win the elections.
The governmentofAngola reluctantlyaccepted a role fortheUnited Nations
to monitorand assist implementationof the peace agreement.The role and
size of the UN presence was the result of hard bargainingbetween UNITA,
which wanted a large UN force with an active mandate to implementthe
agreement,and the governmentof Angola, which perceived a large UN presence as an infringement
of its sovereignty.
The UN operation in Angola was done on a small budget with littleindependent latitude. The parties themselveswere leftto carryout the demobilization, and theyfailed.By May 1992 about 70 percentof the estimated160,000
soldiers had been processed at assembly points, but only 6,000 had been
demobilized. By the electionson September29-30, substantiallymore govern54. Michael Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," Occasional Paper,InternationalPeace Academy,
New York,January1997.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 37
ment troops had demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless,both
sides had intact armies. Between Januaryand September 1992, there were
numerous violations of the cease-fire,with UN monitorsestimatingthat at
least sixteen skirmishescould have escalated into major combat between the
parties.55That theydid not was attributedto the parties' determinationto see
the process throughto elections and their command and controlover their
armed forces.
Untillate summer1992,the United Statesand theUnited Nations were more
apprehensive about the Angolan government'swillingness to abide by the
peace process than they were about UNITA's. The biggest worry for U.S.
policymakerson Angola was thatthegovernmentmightnot accept an electoral
defeatand would throwthe peace process into crisis.56Nonetheless,UNITA's
president,Jonas Savimbi, provided a sign that he might be the obstacle to
ending the war. Under cover of the agreement,UNITA stationed soldiers
throughoutthe country-especially in areas it had previouslynot engagedand it cached arms forquick access. In addition,rumorssuggestedthatUNITA
was holding back armed battalionsacross the Zaire border.A top Savimbi aide
defected and informedthe United States of UNITA's plan for a quick-strike
offensiveto take the countryby force.
The transitionperiod had upset the balance of power between the two
militaries.The cantonmentprocess had worked decisively in UNITA's favor;
UNITA's army maintained its discipline and remained a unified force that
could be mobilized quickly forfightingpurposes. The government'sarmy,on
the otherhand, sufferedfrompoor morale; desertionand drunkennesswere
rife.Savimbi's generalsinformedhim thatAngola could be takenby a military
surpriseattack-a sentimentthatSavimbi relayed to officialsin Washingtonin
August, two monthsbeforethe elections.57
As elections drew near, U.S. policymakersgrew alarmed about Savimbi's
potential as a spoiler. Reports circulated that his standing among Angolan
voters was in decline, raising the possibility that Savimbi would lose the
election.Then-AssistantSecretaryof State forAfricaHerman Cohen and his
Portuguese counterparttraveled to Angola at the beginningof Septemberto
persuade Savimbi and Angolan PresidentJose Eduardo dos Santos to share
55. Thomas Ohlson and Stephen JohnStedman, with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born:
ConflictResolutionin SouthernAfrica(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1994), p. 111.
56. Confidentialinterview.
57. Confidentialinterview.
International
Security22:2 | 38
power afterthe elections. While Savimbi responded enthusiasticallyto the
plan, dos Santos privatelyexpressed interestbut felthe could not publicly
committo such a deal. In the end, no contingencyplan was formedin case
Savimbi lost the election.
The elections were peaceful. The United Nations took multiple, intricate
precautions to prevent fraud: representativesof the competing parties were
present at the 5,800 polling stationsand at every municipal, provincial,and
national electoral center.Partyrepresentativessigned offon results sheets at
each level, a process thatadded days to the vote counting.There were numerous logisticalfoul-ups,but internationalobserversjudged the elections to be
freefromintimidationand fraud.The resultsjibed with the UN electoralunit's
quick count, thus confirmingthat fraud did not occur.58In the legislative
elections,the rulingMovement forthe Popular Liberationof Angola (MPLA)
outpolled UNITA by a five to three margin. Dos Santos received about 49
percentto Savimbi's 40 percentforthe presidency;as no candidate received50
percentof the vote, a runoffelectionwould have to be held in thirtydays.
Problemsemergedas soon as thepreliminaryresultswere reported.The first
resultscame fromLuanda, an MPLA stronghold;not surprisingly,
theyshowed
the MPLA and dos Santos with a large majority.Savimbi and UNITA immediately cried foul and issued a bombasticfive-pagememo (in English) declaring
that the MPLA was engaged in massive fraud and warning in veiled terms
that UNITA would resume the war if it lost the election.When returnsfrom
the centralprovinces (UNITA's stronghold)did not offsetMPLA's early lead,
UNITA withdrewits generalsfromthejointcommand of thenewlyestablished
united Angolan army.Savimbi retreatedto a redoubt, refused to meet any
foreign officialsor take a phone call from Cohen, denounced the United
Nations, and repeatedly ignored internationalcalls for reasonableness. His
army then launched attacks throughoutthe Angolan countryside,quickly
and destroyinggovernmentarms depots.
seizing large amounts of territory
The internationalresponse to Savimbi was scattershot.The United Nations
at firstinsisted on the primacyof the elections and condemned Savimbi for
obstructingthem. The United States initiallyurged Savimbi to use the established mechanismsforinvestigatinghis electoralgrievances,makingitsappeal
over Voice of America because Savimbi would not speak withU.S. officials.As
the United Nations attemptedto press Savimbi to honor the election results
and participatein a presidentialrunoffelection,South Africa'sforeignminister,
58. Margaret Anstee, Orphanof the Cold War: The Inside Storyof theCollapseof theAngolanPeace
Process,1992-1993 (New York:St. Martin's,1996), p. 205.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 39
Pik Botha, visited Savimbi and unilaterallyput forwarda plan to shelve new
elections and to provide fora governmentof national unity.Policymakersin
Washingtonquickly chose a similaroption: to press the MPLA into a powersharingagreementto appease Savimbi.
The U.S. response establishedthe internationalstrategytoward Savimbi. By
initiallyequivocating,the United States failed to challenge him; then,by interpretinghis actions as understandableand reasonable,it chose a strategyof
inducement,which served only to encourage furtheraggression.Savimbi continued his attemptsto defeat the Angolan governmentand to avoid serious
negotiations.A year laterin November 1993,Savimbi returnedto negotiations,
but only afterthe rearmed Angolan militaryhad rolled back UNITA's gains,
the United States had granteddiplomaticrecognitionto the Angolan government,the United Nations had imposed sanctionsagainst UNITA, and 300,000
Angolans had been killed.
Washington'sstrategyof inducementtoward Savimbi was disputed by U.S.
officialsin Angola, including Ambassador-designate Edmund De Jarnette.
From the beginningof the crisis,he and othersstationedin Luanda diagnosed
the problem as stemming from Savimbi's personalityand ambitions. They
believed he was motivatedby a desire to win completepower in Angola. These
officialscounseled givingSavimbi an ultimatumto returnto the peace process,
backed by a threatof use of U.S. militaryforce.From the onset of the crisis
through1993,De Jarnetteargued thatan inducementstrategytoward Savimbi
would fail.
U.S. officialsin Washington,however,believed that Savimbi did not want
to overturnthe peace process,but simplydesired a betterdeal. Long-standing
ties between Savimbi and the Defense Departmentand intelligenceagencies
were part of the problem; individuals who knew Savimbi and had been
romanced by him could not bring themselvesto findhim at fault.Likewise,
negotiatorswho had worked hard to get an agreementcould not believe that
one of the signatorieswas rejectinga compromisesolutionoutright.And those
in Washingtonwho were swayed by the analysis of the U.S. diplomats in
Luanda were stymiedby the tightconnectionsbetween Savimbi's Washington
lobbyistsand the Bush administration.
In retrospect,a top U.S. policymakeradmits thatthe.strategyof inducement
toward Savimbi was "clutchingat straws," but insists that a tougher policy
was out of the question.59The Bush administrationwas preoccupied with the
November 1992 presidentialelectionand thenwiththe humanitariancrisisand
59. Confidentialinterview.
International
Security22:2 | 40
interventionin Somalia in December.Moreover,Savimbi's Washingtonconnections precluded any use of the stick.Inducementfailedin Angola because U.S.
policymakers erroneously believed that limited incentives would satisfy
Savimbi. Furthermore,
theywere not prepared when inducementemboldened
Savimbi to continuehis spoilerbehavior.In part,Savimbi's personalitydefined
the conflictin all-or-nothingterms; a combinationof racism, paranoia, and
megalomania led him to believe that the MPLA had stolen the election from
him and that he had the rightto rule all of Angola. In October 1992, at the
time that he rejectedthe elections,anythingless than an absolute firmstand
against his pursuitof war and a credible threatof forceand sanctionsagainst
UNITA had littlechance of persuading him to returnto the peace process. The
initialchoice of inducementconvinced Savimbi thatthe internationalcommunitywould likelydeferto his returnto war. Inducementproved thatthe U.S.
and South Africangovernmentssaw Savimbi's demands and actions as legitimate. There was littleinternationalsupport forrallyingbehind the sanctityof
the Bicesse process.
The change in power positions of the two main players, the MPLA and
UNITA, also worked against the inducement strategy.By October 1992 the
peace process had greatlystrengthenedUNITA; Savimbi was confidentthat
UNITA could win the war and he underestimatedthe resolve and capability
of the MPLA to fight.It is possible that if Savimbi had been in a position of
militaryweakness in October 1992, and the internationalcommunityheld a
monopoly of rewards,inducementmighthave broughthim back into the fold.
Savimbi, however, continued to have uninterruptedsources of revenue
throughUNITA's control of diamond mines and support fromsome of his
neighbors-Mobutu in Zaire and rogue elementsin the South Africandefense
forces-who would continueto supply him with arms, ammunition,and fuel
to aggressivelyfightthe war.
CASE 5. MOZAMBIQUE:
RENAMO
AND
SUCCESSFUL
INDUCEMENT
In October 1992 the governmentof Mozambique signed a peace agreement
with RENAMO, a South African-trainedand assisted guerrilla movement.
AlthoughRENAMO was unable to defeatthe Mozambican government,it had
renderedmuch of the countryungovernable.RENAMO's use of terror,indiscriminatekillingof civilians,press-gangingof child soldiers,and itsdestructive
capacity had earned it the appellation "the Khmer Rouge of Africa." Upon
assuming the task of implementingthe peace accords, the United Nations,
having witnessed Savimbi's returnto war in Angola and being concerned
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 41
about the characterof RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, doubted
the sincerityof RENAMO's commitmentto the negotiatedsettlement.60
The tardydeploymentof UN peacekeepers and establishmentof an administrativecapacity to oversee cantonmentand demobilization of troops provided RENAMO and the governmentan excuse to stall on theirobligations
under the peace treaty.61But as the necessaryUN units and personnelarrived
in Mozambique and eliminated the excuse, UN Special RepresentativeAldo
Ajello found himselfstymiedby the warringparties' continuingnoncooperation-especially RENAMO, which embarked on a three-monthboycottof the
implementationprocess.62
To bringRENAMO back into the fold,Ajello pursued two policies. First,the
peace accord's mediatorsstressedthatDhlakama, in addition to searchingfor
securityassurances,placed a high priorityon the issue of legitimacy-thathis
movementhad foughtfora just cause, had domesticroots,and was not simply
a puppet of South Africa-and hungered for recognitionas a Mozambican
nationalistwho had foughtfor democracy.63Much of RENAMO's behavior
belied such a self-image,and Dhlakama's vision of democracywas not multipartypluralism where parties do not returnto war if they lose, or eliminate
theiradversary if they win. A key task for Ajello thereforewas to socialize
RENAMO into the rules of democraticcompetition,and to make its legitimacy
contingenton fulfillingits commitmentto peace. The subcustodians of the
peace process-the representativesof the countriessupportingthe UN Observation Mission in Mozambique-assisted Ajello by continuouslyreinforcing
Dhlakama's desire forlegitimacy.Leaders of neighboringcountriesovercame
theirdistaste forRENAMO, met with Dhlakama, and treatedhim as a legitimate national leader.
Second, Ajello understood that it was crucial to wean RENAMO fromits
militaryraison d'etre.To do so, he fulfilleda promise thatmediatorsmade to
Dhlakama to provide financialassistance to RENAMO to transformit into a
democraticparty.Italy,Ajello's home country,gave him a $15 million fund to
60. Eric Berman,ManagingArmsin Peace Processes:Mozambique(Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996), p. 81.
61. Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflictin Mozambique," Journalof Modern
AfricanStudies,Vol. 33, No. 1 (1995), pp. 112-114;and Stephen M. Hill, "Disarmamentin Mozambique: LearningtheLessons ofExperience,"Contemporary
Security
Policy,Vol. 17,No. 1 (April 1996),
pp. 133-134.
62. Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict,"pp. 113-114.
63. This is an ongoing themeof Cameron Hume, EndingMozambique'sWar:TheRoleofGoodOffices
(Washington,D.C.: USIP, 1995). Hume was the U.S. State Departmentdelegate to the Rome peace
talks.
International
Security22:2 | 42
to use
assist RENAMO's renovation.This fund,combined with the flexibility
it in conjunctionwith gaining incrementalcompliance to the accords, gave
Ajello enormous leverage with RENAMO. This leverage was amplified because of the unique contextof the Mozambican case. Unlike Angola, where
Savimbi bankrolledhis spoiler behavior throughthe illegal diamond trade,or
Cambodia, where the KhmerRouge replenishedits weapons and ammunition
through illicit gem and timber deals, Mozambique's paucity of accessible
valuable commodities deprived RENAMO of resources if it chose to reject
peace.
AlthoughAjello's use of inducementskept RENAMO engaged in the peace
process, it also encouraged Dhlakama to continue voicing grievances and
making demands on the United Nations. Ajello resolved several incidents
involvingcantonmentand demobilizationby acceding to RENAMO demands
that were not contained in the peace accords.64Eventually,Ajello grew frustratedwith RENAMO's tacticsand threatenedwithdrawal.Ajello used a visit
by Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Ghalito Mozambique in October 1993 to convince RENAMO thatthe continuationof the peace process was conditionalon
RENAMO meetingits obligations.The withdrawal threatyielded short-term
results;RENAMO pledged anew its commitmentto peace, and UN officials
reportedprogresson implementingkey provisionsof the agreement.
Ajello discovered, however, that the closer the peace process came to the
election in October 1994, the more the United Nations' threatof withdrawal
declined in credibility.Having spent $800 million on the peace process, the
United Nations could not convince RENAMO of its pledge to walk away
without at least holding elections.65Ajello thereforerelied increasinglyon
inducement,even thoughthe riskof whettingDhlakama's appetitegrew more
dangerous as the elections drew near. What would happen, for example, if
RENAMO lost the electionsand demanded thatthe resultsbe annulled in the
hope of being rewarded forits obstructionist
behavior?
The United Nations had soughtto make the actionsof a post-electionspoiler
irrelevantby fullydemobilizingboth armies and creatinga new unifiedarmy.
Demobilization, however, was incomplete;both RENAMO and the govern64. Mats Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization afterCivil Wars," Adelphi Paper No. 303
(London: InstituteforInternationaland StrategicStudies and OxfordUniversityPress,1996), p. 43.
65. Michael Doyle refersto this problemas the "obsolescing bargain of peacekeeping": as long as
few resources are committed,UN influence is high; as soon as the United Nations commits
substantial resources and personnel, its influencewanes. Doyle, ULNPeacekeepingin Cambodia,
pp. 82-83.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 43
ment had armies at the time of the elections in October 1994. Neither side,
however,had anythingclose to the amount of troops wielded by the parties
in Angola in October 1992; RENAMO and the governmenthad several thousand troops held in reserve.66If the loser decided to defectfromthe peace
process,it would stillpossess a destructivecapacity,but not a forcecapable of
winningthe civil war in a shortperiod.
Given the UN and U.S. experienceof Savimbi's overturnof the electionsin
Angola in 1992, as well as the use of violence by SOC to blackmail UNTAC
afterthe Cambodian elections,it is remarkablethatas late as June1994, four
monthsbeforethe Mozambican elections,neitherthe United Nations nor the
U.S. embassy in Maputo had contingencyplans in case the loser of the election
refused to accept the results.67Instead of thinkingstrategicallyabout the
possibility,the United States unsuccessfullyurged the parties to consider a
power-sharingpact thatwould establisha South African-stylegovernmentof
national unityafterthe elections.On the otherhand, the governmentsof states
in theregion,verymuch chastenedby theexperienceofSavimbi in 1992,began
consultationson responses if Dhlakama threatenedto returnto war.
RENAMO did attemptto boycottthe electionsand rejectthe results.Because
the United Nations had not set a limit on how far inducement would go,
diplomats fromthe neighboringcountriesof Zimbabwe and South Africahad
to meet with Dhlakama and warn in no uncertaintermsthat theywould not
accept any obstructionof the elections. The United Nations and the United
States followed the warningboth with an appeal to Dhlakama's desire to be a
legitimatenational actor and democratand with a promise to investigateany
alleged electoralfraud.RENAMO rejoined the elections,withdrewits charges
of fraud,and took its seats in the newly elected Mozambican parliament.
SuccessandFailure
SpoilerManagement:
Evaluating
The case studies suggest several general findingsabout managing spoilers in
peace processes. First,theyillustratethatspoiler type,numberof spoilers,and
66. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique," p. 137.
67. My impressionfrominterviewswith UN and U.S. officialsin Maputo at the time is of the
unwillingnessto consider seriously the possibilitythat a loser mightoverturnthe election. The
refrainthatI received fromboth UN and U.S. officialswas "this is not Angola." When pushed to
describe the differencesthatmitigatedagainst a Savimbi-typeoutcome, the same officialsstated
that the elections would take place in October only if both armies were fullydemobilized, thus
renderingmoot any obstructionist
behavior.In the end, this proved not to be the case.
International
Security22:2 | 44
locus of the spoiler problem are key variables that affectthe robustness of
strategiesfor managing spoilers. Second, the cases underscore the need for
custodians to diagnose correctlythe spoiler problem,a task made difficultby
the fog of peacemaking. Third,the cases show thatquite oftenthe very rules,
beliefs,and framesthat custodians use to cope with the complexityof peace
processes defeat them. Fourth, the cases of successful spoiler management
demonstratethatspoilers need not destroypeace-if custodians createrobust
strategies,seek internationalconsensus behind the strategy,and recognize the
much maligned forceof normativepower.
DIAGNOSIS
AND TREATMENT
The case studies demonstratethatthe creationofan effectivestrategyof spoiler
managementrestsfirston the correctdiagnosis of the spoiler problem,a good
diagnosis, and the selection of an appropriate strategyto treatthe problem.
Choice of strategydepends on judgment about the intentionsof the spoiler
and awareness of constraintsposed by otherparties to the conflict.
The failureto manage spoilers in Rwanda, Angola, and Cambodia (SOC)
stemmedfrompoor diagnosis and the choice of a strategythatwas inadequate
to the problemat hand. In contrast,common to the successfulcases-Cambodia (KR) and Mozambique-was early identificationof a potentialproblem,a
good diagnosis, and the selectionof an appropriatestrategyto treatthe problem. By examining the specific strategies-withdrawal, departing train,and
inducement-we can begin to understandthe conditionsthatfavoror mitigate
against theireffectiveness.
WITHDRAWAL
Custodians used the threatof withdrawalas a primarystrategy in Rwanda and as a secondary strategyin Mozambique. In Rwanda the
strategypressured Habyarimana, a limited spoiler, into implementingthe
Arusha Accords, but provided a green light for the CDR, a total spoiler,to
commitgenocide to stop them. In Mozambique the strategycreated a shorttermsense of urgencyamong the warringparties to fulfilltheirobligationsto
peace beforethe opportunityto end the war disappeared.
These two cases suggestthatthewithdrawalstrategy'seffectiveness
depends
in part on the type of spoiler at which it is aimed, the number of spoilers in
the peace process,and the credibilityof the threat.The withdrawalstrategyis
a coercive strategythat aims to punish recalcitranceby taking away the opportunityforpeace. For the strategyto have its intended effect,the targethas
to view the withdrawal of internationalengagementas a punishment.Moreto the
over, forthe threatto be credible,the custodian must seem indifferent
in PeaceProcesses
SpoilerProblems
| 45
endingofthewar.Againsta totalspoilerliketheCDR in Rwanda,thestrategy
cannotwork,because the spoilerdoes not view withdrawalas punishment.
Indeed, the strategycan backfireif it signalsto the totalspoilerthatthe
to peace.
custodianlacksa commitment
The
ofspoilermanagement.
The withdrawalstrategy
is a bluntinstrument
are equallyculpablein
can workonlyifall partiesto an agreement
strategy
and all spoilersare limitedspoilerswho wanta settlefailingtheirobligations
mentto succeed.The threatofwithdrawalcan thenprovidea testofmotivation:ifthepartiesare committed
to thepeace process,thepossibility
oflosing
theimplementation
international
supportmightprovokethemintobeginning
process.Wherenotall partiesare spoilers,as in Rwanda,thestrategy
punishes
to peace. Whereone partyis a totalspoiler,as
even thosepartiescommitted
in Rwanda,thewithdrawalstrategy
givesit a vetoon thepeace process.
THE DEPARTING TRAIN The departing
trainstrategy
was successfulin Cambodia againsttheKR, a totalspoiler.Successderivedfromthe abilityof the
thestrongdegreeofinternational
custodiansto learnthespoiler'sintentions;
consensusand unitybehind a judgmentthatthe spoiler'sdemands were
illegitimate;
the deploymentof forceto protectthe peace process;and the
custodian'swillingness
to standfirmin implementing
thepeace process.
Thedeparting
trainstrategy
was developedbyUNTACin Cambodiato deal
withtheKR. Evidencethenand now suggeststhattheKR was a totalspoiler
and thata coercivestrategywas necessary,
but UNTAC judged thatit was
constrained
fromusingeitherforceto defeattheKR or coercivediplomacyto
threatenit. The use of forceagainsttheKR ran theriskof escalation,which
couldhaveendangeredtheoverallUNTACmission.Moreover,
theuse offorce
againsttheKR could have weakenedFUNCINPEC,whichused theexistence
of theKR as leverageagainstSOC. The departingtrainstrategy
held out the
ofcontinuing
thepeaceprocesswhilemarginalizing
theKR.UNTAC
possibility
ruledthatKR demandswereillegitimate,
continuedthepeace processwithout
the KR, and establisheda deadline-the election-forit to join the process.
UNTAC thenredeployeditsforceto protecttheelection.
The departing
trainstrategy
requiresthatexternalactorstakea standon the
spoiler'sdemands:Are theylegitimateand importantenough to halt the
progressat compromise
thattheotherpartieshave made?Forthestrategy
to
work,externalactors(includingcurrentand formerpatronsof the spoiler)
mustconcurthatifthespoiler'sdemandsare met,peace maybe unattainable.
Havingmade a decisionthatthepeace processwillgo on withoutthespoiler,
externalactorsmustfindwaysto protect
thepartiesofpeace.Attempts
canbe
International
Security22:2 | 46
ifit
made throughthespoiler'spatronto warnthespoilerofdireimplications
forcesto protect
escalatesits attacks;and the custodiancan deploymilitary
people and processessuchas elections.
The departingtrainstrategyalso depends on the custodian'sabilityto
convinceall partiesthatthepeace processwill proceedwithouteveryoneon
In
board. International
consensusis crucialforsustainingsuch credibility.
of China and Thailandto the electiontimetable
Cambodia the commitment
clearlyconveyedto theKR thatthepeace trainwas departing.
First,the
The Cambodiancase suggeststwo limitationsof the strategy.
is a gamblethatthepartiesto thepeace processwillbe strengthened
strategy
to deal withthespoileron theirown afterinternational
disengagesufficiently
mentfromtheprocess.The strategy's
long-term
successrestson theabilityof
thepartiesfavoring
peace to forma strongenoughfrontto withstandfuture
challenges.Forexample,whenUNTAC departedin 1993,theKR had notbeen
eliminated,but it had been marginalized.Subsequentdevelopmentshave
vindicatedthestrategy:
a majorfactionoftheKR brokeaway fromtheparty
in 1996,leavingit in crisis.Second,the strategycan make the custodian
dependenton thepartieswho geton thetrain.In Cambodia,forexample,the
strategyagainstthe KR requiredthatSOC be part of the peace process.
it fromopposingSOC's
UNTAC's sense of dependenceon SOC constrained
behavioras an insidegreedyspoiler.
INDUCEMENT Inducement
was attempted
againstSOC in Cambodia,UNITA
in Angola,and RENAMO in Mozambique.Althoughthestrategy
failedin the
firsttwo cases, inducementtowardRENAMO largelysucceeded,albeitin
witha heavyemphasison thesocializationofRENAMO and an
conjunction
impliedthreatby regionalactorsthatestablishedthelimitsofinducement.
The threecases of inducement
suggestthatthisstrategy
can onlysucceed
withlimitedspoilers.TowardSOC, a greedyspoiler,theinducement
strategy
SOC and weakeningFUNCINPEC.The onlystratbackfired
by strengthening
egy thatmighthave managedSOC would have been a strongsocialization
effort
thatwould have establishedstrongnormsofhumanrights,
democracy,
as well as a systematic
use ofcarrotsand sticksto gain
and good governance,
In thecase ofUNITA,anothergreedyspoiler,inducement
whetted
compliance.
werecorrect
its appetiteforpower.Thus,even ifUN and U.S. policymakers
in 1992 thatSavimbiwas not a totalspoiler,but simplygreedy,the only
strategythatwould have managed him would have been a socialization
witha heavydose of coercion.This relatesto the secondaspectof
strategy
toriskand
toachievinggoals.Savimbi'sinsensitivity
spoilertype:commitment
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 47
costmeantthathe would fulfill
his obligations
to thepeace processonlyifthe
priceofnotdoingso was extremely
high.
The Angolanand Mozambicancases suggestthatleadershippersonality
is
a keyvariablebehindsuccessfulinducement.
UnlikeSavimbi,Dhlakamadid
notcharacterize
hisconflict
in all-or-nothing
terms.UN and U.S. policymakers
came to believethatDhlakama'sgoal was notto achievetotalpowerin Mozambique,but ratherto gain legitimacyforhis movement,forthe war he
waged,and forthepeople and regionthatsupportedhim.Whenfacedwith
Dhlakama'scontinuousdemandsformoneyand recognition
ofvariousgrievances,UN SpecialRepresentative
Ajellobelievedthatoffering
incenfinancial
tiveswould keep Dhlakamaand RENAMO in the peace process.Moreover,
theneighboring
countries(especiallyZimbabweand SouthAfrica),
theUnited
States,and theUnitedNationscontinuedto focuson thelegitimacy
theme-to
tryto socializeDhlakamaand RENAMO intoplayingby therulesand transformingthemselvesinto democraticpoliticians.The message was clear:
to meet
Dhlakama'snewlyrecognizedlegitimacy
dependedon hiswillingness
hisobligations.
Whenthemomentoftruthcame,and Dhlakama'scommitment
wavered,the neighboring
states,the UnitedNations,and the UnitedStates
delivereda strong,
wouldbe lostand there
unambiguoussignal:hislegitimacy
would be a highcostto pay.
TheMozambicancase suggestsseveralrequirements
fora successful
inducementstrategy.
First,thespoilermustbe a limitedtype.DiagnosingDhlakama's
typewas not easy,however;theview thathe soughtlimitedgoals was disputed by veteranMozambiquewatchersand was at odds withRENAMO's
past brutalbehavior.Second,externalactorsmustbe unifiedin establishing
of spoilerdemandsand behavior.Again,this
thelegitimacy
and illegitimacy
seemsdeceptively
simple.At thetime,manyin thehumanrightscommunity
ofRENAMOas an actor.TheUnitedStates,theUnited
disputedthelegitimacy
countries
all had toreversetheircharacterization
Nations,and theneighboring
ofDhlakamabothas a puppetoftheformer
apartheidregimein SouthAfrica
and as a leaderwithno domesticconstituency.68
is aided if
Third,inducement
the custodian,by actingin coordination
with others,is the sole sourceof
rewardsto the spoiler.UnlikeSavimbiin Angola,Dhlakamahad no inde68. Donald Rothchild'srecentwork on mediationemphasizes thatthe grantingof legitimacycan
be an effectivetool in resolving internalconflicts,but that there are oftenhigh domestic and
internationalcosts for actors to declare previously rogue leaders or factionslegitimate.Donald
Rothchild,ManagingEthnicConflictin Africa:Pressuresand IncentivesforCooperation
(Washington,
D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,forthcoming1997), chap. 9.
International
Security22:2 | 48
pendentsourceof capitalif he chose to returnto war.Fourth,in civilwars
wherethe goal is the establishment
of sustainedpeace, inducement
is most
likelybestcarriedout in conjunction
witha concertedinternational
effort
to
socializethe spoilerintoacceptingthe basic rules of good governanceand
ifnecessary,
democracy.
Fifth,
inducement
mustbe accompanied,
bya credible
threatto establishits limits,and breakany cycleof grievance,reward,new
grievance,reward,new grievance.Even in the case of a limitedspoilerlike
RENAMO,inducement
can encourageincreasedobstructionist
behaviorin the
hope of gettingmorerewards.If a limitedspoilercontinuesto undermine
peace,itwillruntheriskofprompting
itsopponenttoviewitas a totalspoiler
forwhomno concessionwill gainitscommitment.
ORGANIZATIONAL
BLINDERS
In additionto pointingto the crucialrole of good diagnosisand choiceof
thecase studiesprovidea vividreminder
oftheuncerappropriate
treatment,
tainties,
complexity,
and ambiguity
ofpeace processes-whatI referto earlier
as the"fogof peacemaking."Butthecase studiesalso provideevidencethat
severalorganizational
rules,beliefs,and framesthatcustodiansuse to cope
withuncertainty
can contribute
to poor diagnosis,and in extremecases, to
blindersinclude:(1) prior
avoidingthespoilerproblem.Such organizational
commitments
oftheorganization
to thespoiler,(2) organizational
doctrine,
(3)
and (5) organizational
organizational
"holygrails,"(4) organizational
interests,
roles.
PRIOR COMMITMENTS. In severalof the cases, priorcommitments
between
oftheintention
individualstatesand spoilersblockeda correct
interpretation
had
and behaviorof the spoiler.In thecase of Angola,theU.S. government
him
been
of
with
long
a patron Savimbi,had supplied
armsand supplies,and
WhenSavimbirejectedtheelectionresultsand
had cultivatedhis friendship.
returned
to war in late1992,theUnitedStates'initialtendency
was to believe
Savimbi'sversionsofevents,to discountinterpretations
thatSavimbiintended
towincompletepower,and to emphasizethatevenhandedness
was stillcalled
forbecause theMPLA was no betterthanUNITA. Savimbi'simpressivenetin Washington
workoffriends,
the
and representatives
buttressed
supporters,
commitment
to him.Whilethiscommitment
led U.S. policymakpsychological
ersto benigninterpretations
ofSavimbi'sactions,or at leastto assertionsthat
the personalnetworksservedto
therewere no good guys in the conflict,
theinfluence
ofthosewho soughta moreaggressivepolicytoward
constrain
Savimbi.
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 49
to theCDR and PresiThe Angolancase is similarto France'srelationship
in
dentialGuard Rwanda. First,the Frenchmilitary's
priororganizational
commitment
to thePresidential
Guardled themto demonizetheRPF-to see
it as the all-or-nothing
party,a "KhmerNoir,"an imagethatreinforced
and
legitimized
theHutu extremist
versionof theconflict.
Second,thepriorrelationshipbetweentheFrenchand theCDR caused themto ignoreclearsigns
thattheCDR was planninggenocide.Third,thepersonalnetworkofrelationshipsextendedhighintotheMitterand
thusparalyzingconflictgovernment,
ingpolicytendenciesin theFrenchforeignministry.
DOCTRINE. Beyondpriorties to the spoiler,the abilityof organizations
to
interpret
the intentions
and behaviorof spoilersand to fashioneffective
responses is constrainedby theirdoctrine.The UnitedNations,forexample,
approaches its custodial role with several assumptions.First,its representativesassumethatthepartiesare actingin good faithwhentheysigna
Thisleads UN personnelto downplayviolationsby signapeace agreement.
toriesto agreements.
Second,its representatives
tend to be slavishin their
devotionto thetroikaof traditional
peacekeepingvalues:neutrality,
impartito
constrainattempts
ality,and consent.Such values,whenfollowedblindly,
challengespoilerbehavior,as custodiansfearbeing seen as partialto the
victim.Even whenspoilerbehavioris recognizedas such,thedoctrineinsists
on reestablishing
violations.
consent,and notforcefully
challenging
In thesuccessfulcases of spoilermanagement,
custodianstooka standon
themeritsof issues underdispute.In Cambodia,UNTAC rejectedKR grievances as illegitimate.
UNCTAC's successstemmedfromits abilityto garner
international
consensusagainstKR interpretations
oftheParisPeace Accords.
In the case of Mozambique,the regionalcustodiansof the peace process
confronted
RENAMO whenitattempted
to withdrawfromtheelectionat the
lastmomentand threatened
to returnto war.
The successfulcases of spoilermanagement,
however,do notdiminishthe
moresignificant
pointthatdoctrineposes constraints;
theysimplyshow that
custodianshad to reinterpret
theiractionsso as notto appearto be in conflict
withtheirprinciplesand had to triumphin intra-organizational
battlesover
thedoctrinalimplications
oftheiractions.Forinstance,in CambodiaGeneral
Sandersonsucceededin employingsoldiersfromthewarringfactionsto protecttheelectionagainsttheKR,byredefining
themeaningofimpartiality
and
Radio UNTAC,whichearneduniversalpraiseforits rolein comneutrality.
batingKR propaganda,was establishedonlyoverstrenuousobjectionsfrom
UN headquarters
thatsucha stationwould imperilUNTAC'sneutrality.
International
Security22:2 | 50
HOLY GRAILS. A thirdorganizational
blinderis the tendencyof custodians
whenfacedwithcomplexity
and uncertainty
to redefine
theirgoals and standardofsuccesstoone overriding
accomplishment,
thatis,a "holygrail."When
implementing
peace,theUnitedNationsoftendropsitscommitments
to various componentsof the peace agreementin orderto focuson holdingan
election.Whenspoilersplungetheircountriesintowar,the UnitedNations
focuseson obtaininga cease-fire.
For example,when faced with KR intransigence
in Cambodia,UNTAC
narrowedits missionto holdingan electionratherthanfulfilling
complete
implementation
of the Paris Accords.This redefinition
of missionwas an
Yet
appropriateresponseto a spoiler'sattemptto vetotheParisagreements.
UNTAC became so focusedon attainingthe electionthatit ignoredSOC
violenceand obstruction
duringtheelectoralcampaign.The need to reachan
electiontook precedenceover how the partiesgot there.When an election
finallytookplace,UNTAC acquiescedto SOC blackmailand encouragedits
to its electoralresult.
demandfora coalitiondeal thatwas disproportionate
UNTACfearedthatSOC's threatwouldnullify
theachievement
oftheelection,
so it compromised
thequalityoftheelectionto appease SOC.
Whenspoilersin Rwandaand Angolaattackedand plungedtheircountries
backintocivilwar,theUnitedNationsrespondedby insisting
on a cease-fire
In bothcases,spoilerswerewillingto killhunand a returnto negotiations.
dredsofthousandsofpeopleto demonstrate
thattheydid notwantpeace,yet
the responseof the UnitedNationswas to plead withthemto returnto
negotiations.
An overriding
interest
ORGANIZATIONAL
INTERESTS.
senseof organizational
can also preventcustodiansfromrecognizing
and effectively
managingspoilers.In Rwanda,likeAngolabeforeit,theUnitedNations'interpretation
ofthe
ofan appropriate
conflict
and itsconsideration
responsewas based heavilyon
would bear."Facedwithinformation
thatrequirescostlyand
"whatthetraffic
riskyaction,the UnitedNationsand manyof its memberstateschoose to
ignoretheinformation.
ORGANIZATIONAL
ROLES. The conceptions
thatmediatorsand UN special
evidenceof
representatives
have oftheirrolescan blindthemto interpreting
investenormous
Bothmediatorsand specialrepresentatives
spoilerintention.
timeand energyintonegotiating
and implementing
peace. Whenfacedwith
and behavioras negospoilerbehavior,theytendto see spoilermotivation
thattheirfunctionas peacemakeris irrelevant.
tiable,not as inferring
They
oftheparties
tendto seekoutanyevidencethatconfirms
thebasicwillingness
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 51
to stillreachagreement
and to ignorecompellingevidencethatsuggestsone
ofthepartiesmayrejectpeace completely.
Theytendto grabat anystrawthat
seemsto holdoutthepromiseofa settlement;
whenconfronted
bycompelling
evidenceofbad faithand thepreference
ofone or moreofthepartiesforwar,
In some
theyare likelyto insistthatthereare no alternatives
to negotiation.
seem unwillingto place the
cases, the mediatorsor special representatives
and instead
responsibility
forcontinuedhostilities
on thepartiesthemselves,
fornotprovidingtheone requestthatwould
blametheirown organizations
have madethedifference
betweenwarand peace.Finally,
thereis theperverse
tendencyof custodiansto so value an agreement
thattheyblamethevictim
ratherthanthespoiler.
THE NEED
FOR INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT
AND
COORDINATION
A commondenominator
is
amongthesuccessful
cases ofspoilermanagement
theproblem,estabunityand coordination
amongexternalpartiesin defining
forthestrategy,
Althoughthisis
lishinglegitimacy
and applyingthestrategy.
it is nonetheless
nota surprising
finding,
a robustone and externalpartiesto
a peace processignoreit at theirperil.
Spoilersoftenexistbecause externalpatronsprovidethemwithguns,ammunition,capital,and sanctuary.Externalpatronsmay also help internal
thatcan
spoilerssurviveby supportingtheirclaimsto legitimacy-support
suchas thedeparting
playhavocwitha strategy
train,wherethekeytoputting
and to insist
pressureon thespoileris to declaretheirgrievancesillegitimate
thatthepeace processitselfembodiesthebestchanceforresolvingtheconflict.
In thecases ofsuccessful
externalsupportforthespoiler
spoilermanagement,
Inducement
succeededwith
eitherhad driedup orhad beenseverelycurtailed.
RENAMO becauseitsexternalpatron,SouthAfrica,wanteda peacefulsettlementto thewar.UnlikeUNITAor theKR,RENAMOdid nothaveeasyaccess
ofthewar.
to illegalmarketsto financea continuation
and
time,resources,
International
unityand cooperation
requirecultivation,
in thepeace process,
betteriftheyare institutionalized
pressure.It is therefore
as withtheCore Groupin Cambodia.69
69. This is the thrustof much of Michael Doyle's latestwork on peacekeeping. Michael W. Doyle,
"Strategiesof Enhanced Consent,"in Abram Chayes and AntoniaHandler Chayes, eds., Preventing
and RegionalOrganizations(WashingWorld:MobilizingInternational
Conflictin thePost-Communist
ton, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1996), pp. 483-506.
International
Security22:2 | 52
THE LEGITIMATING
FUNCTION
OF SPOILER
MANAGEMENT
Anotherkeyaspectto spoilermanagement
is thedevelopment
ofan international consensusabout what are legitimateand illegitimate
solutionsto a
of spoilermanagement
civilwar.The successfulstrategies
all have
country's
in commona unifiedstanceby externalactorsaboutwhichspoilerdemands
shouldbe metand whichshouldbe rejected.Forexample,thedeparting
train
in Cambodiadependedon thewillingnessof international
strategy
actorsto
definelimitsofaccommodation
forthespoiler.In Cambodiaeven theformer
and that
patronsoftheKR agreedthattheirclient'sdemandswereillegitimate
In
thepeace processcouldmoveforward
withoutthem. Mozambiqueexternal
actorsagreedto legitimate
RENAMO as a nationalist
socializeitintoan
party,
agreedset of rulesof behavior,and establishlimitson how farit would be
appeased.
no international
By contrast,in the failedcases of spoilermanagement,
consensusformedaboutlegitimate
solutionsto thecivilwars.
and illegitimate
In Rwandaexternalactorsfailedto createa commonstancetowardtheHutu
extremists
and waveredaboutthecontentof theArushaAccords.In Angola
littleattemptwas made to rallyinternational
supportagainstUNITA'sreturn
to war.Indeed,thestrategy
thatemergedfromtheUnitedStatesinsistedthat
to endingthewar,and proceededto pressurethe
legitimacy
was irrelevant
had
won
the
election.
that
party
The findingthatlegitimization
is an integralpartofspoilermanagement
is
in tworegards.First,itcounterstheadage thatsolutionsto internal
important
In thisstudysuccessful
conflicts
mustcomefromtheparticipants
themselves.
ofinternalconflict
ofexternal
has resultedfromthewillingness
management
actorsto takesides as to whichdemandsand grievancesare legitimate
and
which are not. Second,it shows thatwhen externalconsensusis used in
witha coherent
thesetting
ofa normative
standard
conjunction
largerstrategy,
toolforconflict
Thislastpointis crucial.For
can be an effective
management.
whenit comes
all thelip servicethattheypay to thepowerofnorm-setting,
to protecting
peace and managingspoilersthememberstatesand manyUN
personnelseldomact liketheymeanit.
Conclusion
The periodaftera peace agreementis reachedis a timeof uncertainty
and
forpeacemakersand citizensalike.International
actorswho seek
vulnerability
to bringdeadly,protracted
civilwars to a close mustanticipateviolentchal-
SpoilerProblemsin Peace Processes| 53
lengesto peace processes.Insteadof thinkinggenerallyabout the possible
threats
to peace,theymustask," Whoarethethreats
to peace?"Thecustodians
of peace mustconstantly
of warringparties:theymust
probethe intentions
look forevidencethatpartieswho signpeace agreements
are sincerein their
to peace,and theymustseek and makegood use ofintelligence
commitment
aboutthewarringparties'goals,strategies,
and tactics.Custodiansmustalso
judge what is rightor wrong,just or unjust,and fairor unfairin peace
processes.Theycan do so eitherexplicitly
bycreating
an international
consensus aboutwhatis appropriateforthewarringpartiesor tactlyby nottaking
actionin the faceof violentattacksand spoilerbehavior.The researchpresented here stronglysuggeststhat international
consensusabout norms,
of
behind
a
coordination
strategy aggressivemanagementof spoilers,and
unambiguoussignalsto peace supporters
and spoilersprovidethedifference
betweensuccessfuland failedimplementation
ofpeace agreements.