Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA

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Test di sicurezza in ambienti
Smart Grid e SCADA
Simone Riccetti, IBM Italy
simone.riccetti@it.ibm.com
Agenda
SCADA/Smart Grid overview
SCADA/Smart Grid security issues
Security test challenges
Testing approaches
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Evolution of the Electricity Sector
The energy industry uses
“Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)” networks.
SCADA systems are complex event
driven systems with centralized
monitoring of thousands of remotely
managed points of process control
equipment.
This information infrastructure forms
a grid of its own- a control grid.
Control Grids are rapidly adopting IP
addressable solutions to promote
corporate connectivity for remote
access of equipment
Smart Grid implies overhauling
both the Power system
infrastructure and the Information
Control Grid
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
EPCIP: EU Program for Protecting Critical Infrastructures
The EU Context Summarized
Strategy
4
The general objective of EPCIP (European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection) is to improve the
protection of critical infrastructure in the European
Union (EU). The legislative framework for the EPCIP
consists of the following:
a procedure for identifying and designating
European critical infrastructure and a common
approach to assessing the need to improve the protection
of such infrastructure. This will be implemented by means
of a directive;
measures designed to facilitate the implementation
of EPCIP, including an EPCIP action plan, the Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), CIP
information sharing processes, and the identification and
analysis of interdependencies;
support for EU countries regarding National Critical
Infrastructures (NCIs) that may optionally be used by a
particular EU country, and contingency planning
EU Funding available
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Smart Grid Macro Components
Cyber security of the Smart Grids – European Commission (work package 1.1)
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Substation Technologies Evolution
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
www.wikipedia.com, www.pacw.org , www.abb.com
6
A TCP/IP Enabled World
Process Control Systems (PCS) migrating to TCP/IP networks
SCADA and DCS typically rely upon “wrapped” protocols
Analog control and reporting protocols embedded in digital
protocols
Encryption and command integrity limitations
Poor selection of TCP/IP protocols
Problems with patching embedded
operating systems
Controllers typically running outdated OS’s
Security patches and updates not applied
Difficulty patching the controllers
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Proliferation of Networked Devices
Switch from analog to digital controls
Incorporation of network standards
TCP/IP communications
Wireless
integration
Wireless communications
Replacement SKU parts
include new features
“free”
Additional features
may be “on” by
default
May be turned on
by engineers
From analog
to digital
(+ networked)
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Bridging Networks
Softest targets appear to be the
control centers
Greatest use of “PC” systems
Frequent external connectivity
Entry-point to critical plant systems
Bridging control centers and the
plant operational framework
Network connectivity for ease of
operational control
Vulnerable to malware - proxy
remote attacks
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
ICS-ALERT-10-301-01
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) ha
emesso un alert riguardo al motore di ricerca SHODAN, che può essere
utilizzato per identificare I sistemi SCADA che sono connessi a Internet. Questo
può essere sfruttato da parte di attacker per compromettere questi sistemi. ICSALERT-10-301-01 descrive una serie di raccomandazioni per ridurre questo
rischio.
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Motivated activists..not only Anonymous
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Vulnerabilities disclosed in ICS/SCADA systems
in 2012 affected over 2,600 products from 1,330 vendors
Infosecurity Europe, 5/2/2013
Vulnerabilities in IT systems that underpin critical infrastructure
like the energy grid, water supply facilities, oil and gas systems
and transportation have skyrocketed 600% since 2010, NSS
Labs reported – a concerning state of affairs that may add yet
more wind to the public rhetoric surrounding the potential for a
major cyber-terrorist attack.
The nation’s infrastructure, largely administered by IT systems
knows as SCADA, is firmly in the crosshairs of our enemies,
public officials have increasingly warned. Last autumn, US
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta talked about an impending
“Cyber Pearl Harbor,” while newly confirmed US Secretary of
State John Kerry commented last month that cyber-attacks are
the equivalent of modern-day nuclear weapons. Meanwhile,
Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, warned that a “cyber- 9/11” is a very real possibility.
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Impact of a breach to power control systems
could be severe
Serious disruption to national
critical infrastructure
Loss of system availability
Process interruption
Equipment damage
Asset mis-configuration
Loss of data and confidentiality
Personal injury
Penalties resulting from
regulatory violations
Loss of customer and public
trust
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Where are the specific areas concerns?
Investors:
downtime, fines, cost, investment and
related impact on revenue
Operators:
optimization of asset management
… and, specifically:
Emerging Smart Grid Issues
•
•
Millions of new end points
Massive amounts of data
System security
•
•
•
Vulnerable software
Lack of access control
Mis-configuration of options
Data Vulnerability
•
•
•
Weak/No encryption
Inappropriate storage
Installation of malcode
Potential Fraud
Cyber security of the Smart Grids –
European Commission (work package 1.1)
•
•
•
•
Invalid credentials
Weak authorization
Insufficient tamper protection
Smart Meters fraud
Downtime
•
•
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Denial of service risk
System corruption
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Smart Grid typical critical areas
C u s to m e r
P r e m is e
M e te r s /H A N
M e te r
C o m m u n ic a tio n
N e tw o r k
SCE
C e n tr a l
D a ta C e n te r s
`
W e b S e rv e r
M e te r
D a ta
U sa ge
N e ig h b o r h o o d
A g g r e g a to r
P U B L IC
W IR E L E S S
NETW O RK
E
C u s to m e r
Load
C o n tro l
A
DCA
MDMS
I
B illin g &
C u s to m e r
C a re
O u ta g e
M angem ent
www.nist.gov
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
SCADA: technolgies and protocols
Field Devices
Communication Technologies
RTU – Remote Terminal Unit
PLC – Programmable Logic Controller
IED – Integrated Electronic Device
PAC – Programmable Automation Controller
Serial connections (hardwire & dial-up)
Ethernet & TCP/IP / Wireless
RF & Microwave
Cell: CDMA
ZigBee HAN
Protocols
Modbus
DNP3
DeviceNet
IEC 61850
100+ proprietary protocols
Middleware
MS IIS, .Net
SCADA Control Center
HMI – Human Machine Interface
SCADA Controller – Real time processing
Historian – database of events
Control Center Protocols (es. OPC, ICCP, IEC
101/103 etc..)
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Security for Industrial Control Systems (SCADA)
ICS Security based on IEC 62443
Air-gap
networks,
apps and
control data
with
firewalls,
proxies
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Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
SCADA Security Comparisons
A comparison of Security used in U.S. companies vs.
Security used in process systems:
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Topic
Corporate IT
Process Systems
Anti Virus
Widely used
Used with care
Lifetime
3-5 years
5-20 years
Outsourcing
Widely used
Rarely used for operations
Patching
Frequent
Slow (requires vendor approval or extensive testing)
Change
Frequent
Rare
Security Skills & Awareness
Medium to High
Poor IT security, no awareness training
Security Testing
Widely used
Must be used with care
Physical Security
Usually secure & manned
Good controls but often remote & unmanned
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Security tests challenges
-
Systems fragility
Non standard/unknown protocols
Non IP based protocols
Embedded devices
Unusual «IT» wireless spectrum
SCADA Applications knowledge
Critical Infrastructure threats
Specialized tools (even opensource but often need to be
customized)
- Specialized skills
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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This is a possible approach
•
Requirements analysis
•
Threat modeling
•
Scope definition
•
Attack surface
•
Fragility/criticality analysis
•
Test selection
•
Attack scenarious
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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Target definition
The goal of this activity is to identify which are the critical systems
that, if compromised, can lead to major power outage:
As an example:
SCADA core systems
DMS/OMS/EMS systems
Real-time systems
Batch systems
Process critical applications
Non critical process application (but critical for security!)
Phone lines, LAN/WAN/HAN Networks
Sensors, embedded systems
And many others
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Threat modeling
The goal of threat modeling is to identify potential risks or attacks
against your software and to make decisions about how to
address these risks.
I. Identify the attack surface
II. Identify the potential threats
III. Assign an impact for each threat
IV. Determine the probability of compromise
It is paramount to have a deep knowledge of the attack vectors
and…..
think as an attacker
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Typical assessment
findings
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
Common Security Assessment Findings
•
Weak protocols leave systems vulnerable
•
PCS networks lack overall segmentation
•
PCS networks lack antivirus protection
•
Standard operating systems leave the
device open to well known security vulnerabilities
•
Most IP-based communications within the PCS network
are not encrypted
•
Most PCS systems have limited-to-no logging enabled
•
Patches are not, or cannot be installed on SCADA systems
•
No host based security controls are configured on these
devices
•
Many organizations still rely heavily on physical security
measures
Test di sicurezza in ambienti Smart Grid e SCADA
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