Liberalism and the Art of Separation
Author(s): Michael Walzer
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 315-330
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THE RESOURCES OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM
I. LIBERALISM AND THE
ART OF SEPARATION
MICHAEL WALZER
The Institute
for AdvancedStudy
I suggestthatwe thinkofliberalismas a certainwayofdrawingthe
map ofthesocial and politicalworld.The old,preliberalmap showeda
landmass,withriversand mountains,
citiesand
largelyundifferentiated
as John
towns,butno borders."Everymanis a pieceofthecontinent,"
Donne wrote-and the continentwas all of a piece. Society was
conceivedas an organicand integrated
whole.It mightbe viewedunder
the aspectof religion,or politics,or economy,or family,but all these
interpenetrated
one anotherand constituted
a singlereality.Churchand
civilsocietyand politicalcommunity,
and university,
state,church-state
officeand property,
dynastyand government,
publiclifeand private
life,home and shop: each pair was, mysteriously
or unmysteriously,
two-in-one,inseparable. Confrontingthis world, liberal theorists
preachedand practicedan artof separation.Theydrewlines,marked
offdifferent
realms,and createdthesociopoliticalmap withwhichwe
arestillfamiliar.The mostfamouslineis the"wall"betweenchurchand
state,buttherearemanyothers.Liberalismis a worldofwalls,and each
one createsa newliberty.
This is thewaytheartofseparationworks.The wallbetweenchurch
and statecreatesa sphereof religiousactivity,of public and private
worship,congregationsand consciences,into whichpoliticiansand
bureaucratsmay not intrude.Queen Elizabeth was speakinglike a
liberal,thougha minimalistone, when she said that she would not
"make a windowintomen'ssouls,to pinchthemthere."'Believersare
setfreefromeverysortof officialor legalcoercion.Theycan findtheir
own wayto salvation,privatelyor collectively;
or theycan failto find
theirway;or theycan refuseto look fora way.The decisionis entirely
theirown;thisis whatwecall freedomofconscienceorreligiousliberty.
Similarly,the linethatliberalsdrewbetweenthe old church-state
(or
state-church)and the universities
createsacademic freedom,leaving
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 12 No. 3, August1984315-330
? 1984Sage Publications,Inc.
315
316
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
professorsas freeto professas believersare to believe.The university
takes shape as a kind of walled city.In the hierarchicalworldof the
middle ages, universitieswere legally walled, that is, studentsand
professorswere a privilegedgroup, protectedfrom penalties and
punishments
metedout to ordinarymen.Butthiswas a functionofthe
integration
of theuniversities
and thechurch(studentsand professors
had clerical status) and then of the churchand the state. Precisely
because of this integration,scholars did not enjoy the privilegeof
hereticalthought.Today theuniversities
are intellectually
thoughnot
legallywalled;studentsand professors
haveno legalprivileges,
butthey
are, in principleat least,absolutelyfreein the sphereof knowledge.2
Privatelyorcollectively,
theycan criticize,
question,doubt,orrejectthe
establishedcreeds of theirsociety.Or, what is more likelyin any
relatively
stablesociety,theycan elaboratetheestablishedcreeds,most
oftenin conventional,but sometimesin noveland experimental
ways.
Similarly,again, the separationof civil societyand politicalcommunitycreatesthesphereofeconomiccompetitionand freeenterprise,
themarketin commodities,labor,and capital.I willfocusfornow on
thefirstofthesethreeand adoptthelargestviewofmarketfreedom.On
thisview,thebuyersand sellersofcommoditiesareentirely
to
at liberty
strikeanybargaintheywish,buyinganything,
at any
sellinganything,
pricetheycan agreeupon, withoutthe interference
of stateofficials.
Thereis no suchthingas a just price,or at leastthereis no enforcement
of a just price; and, similarly,there are not sumptuarylaws, no
restrictions
on usury,no qualityorsafetystandards,no minimum
wage,
and so on. The maximcaveatemptor,letthebuyerbeware,suggeststhat
marketfreedomentails certain risks for consumers.But so does
religiousfreedom.Some people buyunsafeproductsand some people
are convertedto falsedoctrines.Free menand womenmustbear such
risks.I have mydoubtsabout theanalogy,sinceunsafeproductspose
actual,and falsedoctrinesonlyspeculative,risks,butI won'tpursuethis
argumenthere.My immediatepurposeis not to criticizebut onlyto
describethemaptheliberalsdrew,and on thatmapthecommodity
was
givenat least as muchroom as thecreed.
Anotherexample: the abolitionof dynasticgovernment
separates
familyand stateand makespossiblethepoliticalversionofthe"career
open to talents,"thehighestform,we mightsay, of thelabor market.
Onlytheeldestmalein a certainlinecan be a king,butanyonecan be a
presidentor primeminister.More generally,the line that marksoff
politicaland socialpositionfromfamilialproperty
createsthesphereof
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
317
officeand thenthe freedomto competeforbureaucraticand professional place, to lay claim to a vocation, apply for an appointment,
developa specialty,and so on. The notionofone's lifeas one's project
probablyhas its originhere.It is to be contrastedwiththe notionof
one'slifeas one'sinheritance-ontheone hand,thepredetermination
of
birthand blood; on the other,the self-determination
of struggleand
achievement.
Finally,theseparationofpublicand privatelifecreatesthesphereof
Mostrecently,
individualandfamilialfreedom,
privacyanddomesticity.
thishas beendescribedas a sphereofsexualfreedom;so itis,butitisn't
originallyor primarilythat; it is designedto encompassa verywide
rangeof interestsand activities-whateverwe choose to do, shortof
incest,rape, and murder,in our own homesor amongour friendsand
relatives:readingbooks, talkingpolitics,keepinga journal, teaching
what we know to our children,cultivating(or, for that matter,
ourgardens.Ourhomesareourcastles,andtherewearefree
neglecting)
fromofficialsurveillance.This is, perhaps,thefreedomthatwe most
takeforgranted-thetwo-waytelevisionscreensofOrwell's1984are a
particularly
frightening
pieceofsciencefiction-so itis worthstressing
how rarea freedomitis in humanhistory."Our homesare ourcastles"
was firstofall theclaimofpeoplewhosecastlesweretheirhomes,and it
was fora verylongtimean effective
claimonlyforthem.Now itsdenial
is an occasion for indignationand outrage even among ordinary
citizens.We greatlyvalue our privacy,whetheror notwe do odd and
excitingthingsin private.3
IH
The art of separationhas neverbeen highlyregardedon the left,
especiallytheMarxistleft,whereitis commonlyseenas an ideological
ratherthana practicalenterprise.
Leftistshave generallystressedboth
theradicalinterdependence
ofthedifferent
socialspheresand thedirect
and indirectcausal linksthatradiateoutwardsfromtheeconomy.The
liberalmap is a pretense,on theMarxistview,an elaborateexercisein
forin facttheprevailingreligiouscreedsare adaptedto the
hypocrisy,
of a capitalistsociety;and theuniversities
ideologicalrequirements
are
organizedto reproducethehigherechelonsofthecapitalistworkforce;
and the marketpositionof thelargestcompaniesand corporationsis
subsidizedand guaranteedby the capitaliststate;and offices,though
318
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
arenevertheless
notlegallyinheritable,
passedon and exchangedwithin
a capitalistpowerelite;and we arefreeinourhomesonlyso longas what
we do thereis harmlessand withoutprejudiceto the capitalistorder.
Liberalsdrawlinesand call themwalls,as iftheyhad thematerialforce
of brickor stone,but theyare onlylines,one-dimensional,
doctrinal,
insubstantial.The contemporary
social worldis stillan organicwhole,
less different
fromfeudalismthan we mightthink.Land has been
replaced by moveable wealth as the dominantgood, and whilethat
replacement
reverberates
throughall thespheresofsociallife,itdoesn't
altertheirdeep connectedness.
And yetMarx also believedthattheliberalartofseparationhad been
all too successful,creating,as he wrotein his essay on the Jewish
question,"an individualseparatedfromthecommunity,
withdrawn
into
himself,whollypre-occupiedwithhis privateinterestand actingin
accordancewithhisprivatecaprice.'" I shallwantto come back to this
argumentlateron foritmakesan important
pointaboutthetheoretical
foundationsoftheliberalenterprise.
For now,however,itis enoughto
saythatin Marx'seyeseventheegotismoftheseparatedindividualwas
a social product-required,indeed,bytherelationsofproductionand
thenreproducedinall thespheresofsocialactivity.
Societyremainedan
organizedwholeevenifitsmembershad losttheirsenseofconnection.
It was thegoal of Marxistpoliticsto restorethatsense,or, better,to
bringmenand womento a new understanding
of theirconnectedness
and so enable themto take controlof theircommonlife.For Marx,
separation,insofaras itwas real,was something
to be overcome.Separatedinstitutions-churches,
universities,
evenfamilies-haveno part
in hisprogram;theirdistinctive
problemswillbe solvedonlybya social
revolution.Society,forMarx,is alwaysruledas a whole,nowbya single
class,ultimately
by all of itsmembersworkingtogether.
The leftistcritiqueof liberal separationmight,however,take a
different
form,holdingthatliberalismservedparticularsocial interests
and limitedand adapted itsartto thatservice.Whatis necessaryis to
maketheartimpartial-or,ifthatis a utopianproject,at leastto makeit
servea widerrangeofinterests.
As theinstitutions
ofcivilsocietywere
protectedfromstatepower,so nowtheymustbe protected,
andthestate
too,fromthenewpowerthatariseswithincivilsocietyitself,thepower
of wealth.The point is not to rejectseparationas Marx did but to
endorse and extend it, to enlist liberal artfulnessin the serviceof
socialism.The mostimportant
exampleoftheextendedartofseparation
has to do withprivategovernmentand industrialdemocracy,and I
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
319
mean to defendthatextensionat some length.But it is importantto
insistfirstthat the separationsalreadyachieved,in principleif not
alwaysin fact,havetheirvalue too. Even thecareeropen to talentsis a
leftistas well as a liberalrequirement.For socialismwill neverbe a
successso longas socialistpartiesand movementsare led,as in Robert
Michel'saccount,bya gerontocratic
oligarchywhosemembers,drawn
fromthe educated and professionalmiddle class, coopt theirown
successors.5One wants energetic,politicallyskillfulworkersand
intellectuals
to riseto positionsofleadership,and so theremustbe room
forsuch people to develop theirtalentsand plan theircareers.More
visionof individualand collectiveself-determination
generally,Marx's
requires(thoughhe himselfdid not understandthe requirement)
the
existenceof a protectedspace withinwhichmeaningful
choicescan be
made. But space of that sort can onlyexist if wealthand power are
walledin and limited.
Societyis indeedall of a piece,at leastin thissense:thatitsvarious
partsbear a familyresemblanceto one another,theoutwardreflection
of an internalgenetic(sociological,not biological)determination.
But
thisfamilyresemblanceleavesa greatdeal ofroomforthesociological
versionsof siblingrivalryand maritaldiscordand grown-upchildren
withapartmentsof theirown. So the bishops of the churchcriticize
nationaldefensepolicy,the universities
harborradicaldissidents,the
statesubsidizesbutalso regulatescorporateactivity,
and so on. In each
case, institutions
are responsiveto theirown internallogic evenwhile
theyarealso responsiveto systemic
determinations.
The playofinternal
logic can only be repressedby tyrannicalforce,crossingthe lines,
breaking throughthe walls established by the art of separation.
Liberalismis best understoodas an argumentagainst that sort of
repression.It would be a meaninglessargument,and tyrannya
superfluouspolitics,unlessindependent
churchesand universities,
and
autonomousstates,reallyexistedor mightreallyexistintheworld.But
theycan and sometimesdo exist.The artofseparationis notan illusory
orfantastic
enterprise;
itis a morallyandpolitically
necessary
adaptation
to thecomplexitiesofmodernlife.Liberaltheoryreflects
and reinforces
a long-term
processofsocial differentiation.
I shallwantto arguethat
liberal theoristsoftenmisunderstand
this process,but at least they
recognizeitssignificance.
Marxistwriterstendto denythesignificance
oftheprocess.It is, on
theirview,a transformation
thatdoesn'tmakea substantialdifference,
an eventor a seriesof eventsthattakes place largelyin the worldof
320
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
appearances.Liberalfreedomsare, all ofthem,unreal.As theformal
freedomof the workeris only a mask forwage slavery,so religious
liberty,academic freedom,free enterprise,self-determination,
and
privacyare masksforcontinuedor reiterated
subjection:theformsare
withthisviewis thatitdoesn't
new,butthecontentis old. The difficulty
connectinanyplausiblewaywiththeactualexperienceofcontemporary
No
politics;it has a qualityof abstractionand theoreticalwillfulness.
one whohas livedin an illiberalstateis goingto acceptthisdevaluation
of therangeof liberalfreedoms.The achievementof liberalismis real
even if it is incomplete.But the recognitionof this achievementis
forthecommitment
to organic
withina Marxistframework:
difficult
transformation
doesn'treadilyaccommowholenessanddeepstructural
date separated spheresand autonomous institutions.Nor is it my
purposehereto tryto workoutsuchan accommodation.I wantinstead
to pursuethe alternativecriticismthatliberalshave not been serious
enoughabouttheirownart.And I wantto suggestthatwheretheyhave
been serioustheyhave been guidedby an inadequateand misleading
theory.As withotherformsofsocial lifeand politicalaction,theliberal
lendsitselfto morethanone interpretation.
enterprise
III
The art of separationdoesn't make only for libertybut also for
equality.Consideragain,one byone,theexampleswithwhichI 6egan.
Religiousliberty
annulsthecoercivepowerofpoliticalandecclesiastical
officials.Hence it creates,in principle,thepriesthoodof all believers,
thatis,itleavesall believersequallyfreeto seektheirownsalvation;and
ittendsto create,inpractice,churchesdominatedbylaymenratherthan
by priests. Academic freedomprovides theoretical,if not always
practical,protectionfor autonomousuniversities,
withinwhichit is
difficult
to sustaintheprivileged
positionofrichoraristocratic
children.
The freemarketis open to all comers,withoutregardto race or creed;
alienand pariahgroupscommonlyexploititsopportunities;
and though
it yields unequal results,these resultsnever simplyreproducethe
of blood or caste or,forthatmatter,of"merit."The "career
hierarchy
open to talents,"if it is reallyopen, providesequal opportunities
to
equallytalentedindividuals.The idea ofprivacypresupposestheequal
value,at leastso faras theauthoritiesareconcerned,ofall privatelives;
whatgoes on in an ordinaryhomeis as muchentitledto protection,
and
is entitledto as muchprotection,
as whatgoes on in a castle.
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
321
Under the aegis of the art of separation,libertyand equalitygo
together.Indeed, theyinvitea single definition:we can say that a
(modern,complex,and differentiated)
societyenjoysbothfreedomand
equalitywhensuccessin one institutional
settingisn'tconvertibleinto
successin another,thatis, whenthe separationshold, whenpolitical
powerdoesn'tshape thechurchor religiouszeal thestate,and so on.
There are, of course,constraintsand inequalitieswithineach institutionalsetting,butwe willhavelittlereasonto worryabout theseifthey
reflectthe internallogic of institutionsand practices(or, as I have
alreadyarguedin Spheresof Justice,ifsocial goods likegrace,knowledge, wealth,and officeare distributedin accordance withshared
understandings
of whattheyare and whattheyare for).6But, all too
has been to
often,theseparationsdon'thold. The liberalachievement
protecta numberofimportantinstitutions
and practicesfrompolitical
power,to limitthereachof government.
Liberalsare quick to see the
dangerto freedomand equalitywhen the police repressa minority
religionin thenameoftheoreticaltruth,or shutdownpetty-bourgeois
in thenameofeconomicplanning,or invadeprivatehomes
enterprises
in the name of moralityor law and order.They are rightin all these
cases, but theseare not the onlycases, or the onlykindsof cases, in
whichlibertyandequalityarethreatened.
We needto look closelyat the
waysinwhichwealth,oncepoliticaltyranny
is abolished,itselftakeson
tyrannicalforms.Limitedgovernment
is thegreatsuccessoftheartof
separation,but that verysuccess opens the way for what political
scientistscallprivategovernment,
and it is withthecritiqueof private
government
thattheleftist
complaintagainstliberalism
properly
begins.
The linebetweenpoliticalcommunity
and civilsocietywas meantto
markoffcoercivedecisionmakingfromfreeexchange.That'swhythe
sale of officeswas bannedand theold baronialrightto do justiceand
conscriptsoldierswas transferred
to stateofficials.
Andthat'swhythose
same officialsweredeniedtherightto interfere
in markettransactions.
Butitis a falseviewofcivilsociety,a bad sociology,to claimthatall that
goes on inthemarketplace
is freeexchangeand thatcoercionis neveran
issue there.Marketsuccessoverridesthelimitsofthe(free)marketin
threecloselyrelatedways. First of all, radical inequalitiesof wealth
generatetheirown coerciveness,so that many exchangesare only
formally
free.Second,certainsortsofmarketpower,organized,say,in
corporatestructures,
generatepatternsof commandand obediencein
whicheventheformalities
ofexchangegivewayto something
thatlooks
verymuchlike government.
And third,vast wealthand ownershipor
controlofproductive
forcesconvertreadilyintogovernment
inthestrict
322
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
callsuponthecoercivepowerof
sense:capitalregularly
and successfully
thestate.7
a failureofnervethana failure
The problemhereis less importantly
of perception.Liberaltheoristsliterally
did not"see" individualwealth
and corporatepoweras social forces,witha politicalweight,as itwere,
different
fromtheirmarketvalue. Theyaimedto createa freemarket,
and thoughtthat they had done enough when theyopposed state
free.But a freemarket,in whichthe
intervention
and setentrepreneurs
threekinds of coercion that I listed above are (largely)ineffective,
requiresa positivestructure.Free exchangewon't maintainitself;it
needs to be maintainedby institutions,
rules,mores,and customary
practices.Considerfor a momentthe religiousanalogy. The art of
separationworkedagainststatechurchesand churchstatesnotonlyby
thechurchbutalso bydivesting
itofmaterialwealthand
disestablishing
power.Nor did itdo thisin thenameofprivatefaithalone,butalso in
thename of congregationalself-government.
is by
Congregationalism
no means the naturalor the only possible institutional
arrangement
once churchand statehave been separated,but it is theculturalform
bestadaptedto and mostlikelyto reinforce
theseparation.Similarlyin
theeconomicsphere:The art of separationshouldworkagainstboth
statecapitalismand thecapitaliststate,but it won'tworksuccessfully
unless it is accompanied by disestablishment
and divestment-and
unlessappropriateculturalformsdevelopwithintheeconomicsphere.
The analogueto privateconscienceis individualenterprise;
theanalogue
to congregational
self-government
is cooperativeownership.
Withoutdivestment
and withoutcooperativeownership,
themarket
is bound to take shape in ways thatdefythe art of separation.New
connectionsare quicklyestablished.As I have alreadyindicated,these
are mostimportantly
connectionswiththestate,originating
nowfrom
the marketside ratherthan the state side, but deep and powerful
nonetheless.In addition,unlimitedwealththreatensall theinstitutions
and practicesof civil society-academic freedom,the careeropen to
talents,the equalityof "homes" and "castles." It is less overt,more
insidious than state coercion, but no one can doubt the ready
ofwealthintopower,privilege,and position.Whereare
convertability
the walls thatwall in the market?In principle,perhaps,theyalready
exist, but theywill neverbe effectiveuntilprivategovernments
are
socialized,just as establishedchurchesweresocialized,thatis, turned
overto theirparticipants.
Religiousdemocracymustfinditsparallelin
industrialdemocracy.I won'ttryhereto specifyany particularset of
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
323
institutionalarrangements;there are many possible arrangements
thatthereshouldbe room
compatiblewiththetwocrucialrequirements:
and thenewcompany,just as thereis roomforthe
fortheentrepreneur
evangelistand the"gathered"church;and thatthereshouldnotbe room
for the kind of economic power that shapes and determinespublic
thatroutinely
policy,anymorethanforthehighecclesiasticalauthority
calls upon the"seculararm."
Withthisanalogy,we can glimpsea consistentliberalism-thatis,
one that passes over into democraticsocialism. But this is still a
democraticsocialismofa liberalsort;itdoes notrequiretheabolitionof
themarket(nordoes it requiretheabolitionofreligion)butratherthe
confinementof the marketto its proper space. Given an illiberal
socialism,wherethestatetakestotalcontrolofeconomiclife,thesame
imperativewouldworkin theoppositeway,notto confinethemarket
butto reassertitsindependencefromthepoliticalrealm.In theUnited
and transformaStates,then,theartofseparationrequirestherestraint
tionofcorporatepower.In theSovietUnionthesameartwouldrequire,
amongotherthings,theliberationof individualenterprise.
IV
Distributive
justiceis (largely)a matterofgettingthelinesright.But
howdo we do that?How do we drawthemap ofthesocial worldso that
churchesand schools,statesand markets,bureaucraciesand families
each findtheirproperplace? How do we protectthe participantsin
thesedifferent
institutional
settings
fromthetyrannical
intrusions
ofthe
powerful,thewealthy,thewell born,and so on? Historically,liberals
have takenas theirfoundationa theoryof individualismand natural
rights.Theymarkout thelinesso as to guaranteethesecureexistence
and freeactivityof the individual.Conceived in thisway, the art of
separationlooks like a veryradicalproject:It givesriseto a worldin
whicheveryperson,everysingleman and woman,is separatedfrom
everyother.Thus Marx: "theso-calledrightsofman ... are simplythe
rights. . . of egoisticman, separatedfromothermen and fromthe
community.'"Institutionalautonomyis an intermediate,
not an end
pointin theprocessofseparation.The end is theindividual,freewithin
his or her circle of rights,protectedfrom every sort of external
interference.
Liberal society,ideally,is simplya collectionof these
324
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
circles,held togetherby all the tangentialconnectionsand actual
overlappingsthat their solitaryinhabitantsvoluntarilyestablish.9
Churches,schools,markets,and familiesare all theproductsofwillful
agreements
amongindividuals,valuablebecause oftheagreement
they
embodybut at thesame timesubjectto schism,withdrawal,cancellation,and divorce.Religiousfreedomis the rightof the individualto
worshiphisGod (thepronounis important,
notbecauseitis masculine,
it can as easilybe feminine,
but because it is singularand possessive)
publiclyor privately,
howeverand withwhomeverelsehechooses;ithas
nothingto do, nothingin particularto do, with the doctrinaland
institutional
characterofJudeo-Christian
religiosity.
Academicfreedom
has nothinginparticularto do withtheuniversity
as a socialsetting;itis
simplytherightoftheindividualto study,to speak,to listenas he orshe
pleases. All otherfreedomsare accountedforin similarways.
Individualagreementis indeedan importantsourceof our institutions,and individualrightsof our freedoms.But takentogether,with
nothingmoresaid, theymake again fora bad sociology.Theydo not
provideeithera richor a realisticunderstanding
ofsocial cohesion;nor
do theymake senseofthelivesindividualsactuallylive,and therights
ofon-goinginstitutions.
theyactuallyenjoy,withintheframework
The
goal thatliberalismsetsfortheartofseparation-everypersonwithin
his or her own circle-is literallyunattainable.The individualwho
stands whollyoutside institutionsand relationshipsand entersinto
them only when he or she chooses and as he or she chooses: This
individualdoes not exist and cannot exist in any conceivablesocial
world.I once wrotethatwe could understanda person'sobligationsby
studyinghis or herbiography,thehistoryofhisor heragreements
and
Thatis right,butonlyso longas one acknowledgesthat
relationships.'0
personalhistory
is partofsocialhistory;
biographieshavecontexts.The
individualdoes notcreatetheinstitutions
thathe orshejoins;norcan he
or she whollyshape theobligationshe or she assumes.The individual
liveswithina worldhe or she did not make.
The liberal hero, author of self and of social roles, is a mythic
invention:It is Shakespeare'sCoriolanus,thataristocratic
warriorand
who claims(and fails)to live"as ifhe weretheauthorof
anti-citizen,
himselfand knewno otherkin."" Turnedintoa philosophicalidealand
a social policy,thisclaimhas frightening
implications,
foritis endlessly
disintegrative,
reachinga kind of culmination,perhaps, in recent
discussionsabout the rightsof childrento divorcetheirparentsand
parentstheirchildren.But this is individualismin extremisand not
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
325
likely,I think,to be sustainedfor long. The liberal hero is more
importantas a sociologicalpretensethanas a philosophicalideal. He or
she opensthewayforshamdescriptions
ofchurches,schools,markets,
andfamilies,as ifinstitutions
ofthissortwereinfactcreated,andwholly
created,throughthevoluntaryacts of individuals.The sham servesa
practicalpurpose:It rulesoutstateinterference
ininstitutional
life,since
the state is in its naturecoercive;and it makes it verydifficultto
recognize other, more subtle sorts of interference
(includingthat
imitationof the state that I have already referredto as private
government).
More concretely,
itlimitstheuses ofpoliticalpowerand
sets money free, for what power takes by force, money merely
purchases, and the purchase has the appearance of a voluntary
agreementbetweenindividuals.In fact,it is oftensomethingdifferent
than that,as we can see if we place the purchasein its contextand
examineitsmotivesand effects.
Andthenwe arelikelyto concludethat,
just as therearethingsthestatecannotdo, so theremustbe thingsthat
moneycannotbuy: votes,offices,jurydecisions,uiniversity
placesthesearerelatively
easy-and also thevarioussortsofnationalinfluence
and local dominationthatgo alongwiththecontrolofcapital.Butto get
the limitsrightrequiresan understanding
of institutional
life more
complexthantheone thatliberalindividualism
provides.
Churches,schools,markets,and familiesare social institutions
with
particularhistories.They take different
formsin different
societies,
formsthatreflectdifferent
understandings
of faith,knowledge,commodities,and kinshipobligations.In no case aretheyshapedwhollyby
individualagreements,
fortheseagreementsalwaystakeplace within,
and arealwaysconstrained
by,particularpatterns
ofrules,customs,and
cooperativearrangements.
It followsfromthisthattheartofseparation
is not rooted in or warrantedby individualseparateness(whichis a
biological,not a social,phenomenon);itis rootedin and warrantedby
social complexity.We do notseparateindividuals;we separateinstitutions, practices,relationshipsof different
sorts. The lines we draw
encirclechurchesand schoolsand marketsandfamilies,
notyouandme.
We aim,or we shouldaim,notat thefreedomofthesolitaryindividual
butat whatcan bestbe calledinstitutional
integrity.
Individualsshould
be free,indeed, in all sorts of ways, but we don't set themfreeby
separatingthemfromtheirfellows.
And yet the separatedindividuallooks more fundamentalthan
institutionsand relationships,a firmerfoundationfor politicaland
social philosophy.When we build fromthe individualwe build,so it
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POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
seemsto theliberaleye,fromthegroundup. But in factthegroundis
not persons-by-themselves.
always social: persons-in-societies,
We
and theeffort
to inventthem,a
neverencounterpersons-by-themselves,
strenuousexercise,has no agreed-uponoutcome. We do not know
to one another,absolutealiens,or isolates,and
ourselvesas strangers
thereis no way to specifyor understandwhatit would meanforsuch
"individuals"to be free.Men and womenare freewhentheylivewithin
autonomousinstitutions.
We mighttakeas ourmodeltheidea ofa free
a
state,one thatis not colony or a conqueredland, a stateruledby
internalratherthanexternalforces.The inhabitantsofsucha stateare
freeonlyina specialand limitedsense,butthatsense,as anyonewhohas
endureda military
And ifthose
conquestknows,is realand important.
sameindividualslivewithina statethatis internally
free(I willtryto say
whatthatmeansin a moment)and iftheyparticipatein freechurches,
freeuniversities,
freefirmsand enterprises,
and so on, we willat some
pointwantto say thattheyare freegenerally.Freedomis additive;it
consistsofrightswithinsettings,and we mustunderstandthesettings,
one by one, ifwe are to guaranteethe rights.Similarly,each freedom
entailsa specificformof equalityor, better,the absenceof a speciflc
inequality-ofconquerorsand subjects,believersand infidels,trustees
and teachers,ownersand workers-and thesumoftheabsencesmakes
an egalitariansociety.
V
On theliberalview,menand womenare notfreeinthestateso much
as fromit;and theyareequal underthelaw. So theyare protectedfrom
politicalpower,conceivedas a monopolyofphysicalforce,immensely
to thesolitaryindividual.It is immensely
threatening
threatening,
and I
wantto say again thatthe limitationof poweris liberalism'shistoric
achievement.But ifwe turnfromindividualsto institutions,
it is clear
thatpoliticalpoweritselfrequiresprotection-notonlyagainstforeign
conquest but also againstdomesticseizure.The stateis unfreewhen
poweris seized and held by a set of familymembers,or clergymen,
or
office-holders,
or wealthycitizens.Dynastic,theocratic,bureaucratic,
and plutocraticcontrolall makeforunfreedom-andforinequalitytoo.
Meritocratic
controlwouldhavethesameeffect,
thoughI don'tbelieve
it has ever been realized. Compared to family,church,office,and
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
327
and professionalschoolsare relatively
weak,
corporation,universities
though the men and women theylicense are not withoutpolitical
pretensions.A freestate,in a complexsociety,is one thatis separated
thatis to say,a statethatis inthehandsofits
fromall otherinstitutions,
a free
citizensgenerally-justas a freechurchis inthehandsofbelievers,
in thehandsof scholars,a freefirmin thehandsofworkers
university
and managers.Andthencitizensarefreeinthestateas wellas fromit(in
fact,itis notas citizensthattheyarefreefromthestatebutas believers,
scholars,entrepreneurs,
workers,
parents,and so on); and theyareequal
in themakingofthelaw and not onlyunderthelaw.
The artofseparationworksto isolatesocialsettings.Butitobviously
liketotalisolation,forthen
doesn'tachieve,and can'tachieve,anything
there would be no society at all. Writingin defense of religious
toleration,
JohnLocke claimedthat"thechurch... is a thingabsolutely
The boundaries... are
separateand distinctfromthecommonwealth.
I think,
fixedand immovable."'2Butthisis too radicala claim,deriving,
more from a theory of the individual conscience than from an
ofchurchesand religiouspractices.Whatgoes on in one
understanding
institutional
settinginfluencesall theothers;thesamepeople,afterall,
inhabitthedifferent
settings,
and theysharea historyand a culture-in
whichreligionplaysa greaterorlesserrole.The state,moreover,always
has a specialinfluence,
foritis theagentofseparationand thedefender,
as it were, of the social map. It is not so much a nightwatchman
protectingindividualsfromcoercionand physicalassault as it is the
builderand guardianof the walls, protectingchurches,universities,
families,and so on fromtyrannical
interference.
The membersofthese
institutions
also, ofcource,protectthemselves
as besttheycan,buttheir
ultimateresortwhentheyarethreatened
is an appeal to thestate.Thisis
so even whenthethreatcomes fromthe stateitelf:Then theyappeal
fromone groupofofficialsor one branchofgovernment
to another,or
theyappeal againstthegovernment
as a wholeto thebodyof citizens.
One way ofjudgingthe actionsof the stateis to ask whetherthey
theintegrity
upholdinstitutional
ofthestateitself.
integrity-including
Consider the relativelyminorexample of safetyregulation.Caveat
emptor,letthebuyerbeware,is,as I saidearlier,a ruleofthemarket,but
itcoversonlya certainrangeofwariness.It has to do withdisappointment("I don'tlook as handsomeas I thoughtI wouldlook in mynew
clothes"),frustration
("The blurbsays this book is 'accessibleto the
intelligent
layman,'so I boughtit,butnow I can'tseemto understand
it"), and even known and foreseeablerisks ("These cigarettesare
328
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
dangerous to my health'). Clothes and books and cigarettesare
properlymarketcommodities.Buttherangeofwarinessdoesn'textend
to unknownand unforeseeablerisksor to collectiverisks-as in the
case,say,ofunsafecarsorofcarsthatcontaminate
theair.The degreeof
riskthatwe livewithon ourhighwaysand in ourcommonenvironment
is a matterforpoliticaldecision;itbelongs,so to speak,to thestateand
itscitizens,nottothemarketand itsbuyersand sellers.Atleastthatis so
on ourcurrentunderstanding,
as I understandit,ofstatesand markets.
The artofseparationis properlyartfulwhenitdrawsa linethatleaves
theriskof disappointment
on one side and theriskof disasteron the
other.
But this artfulness,when it comes to concretecases, is always
controversial.There are problemsof informationand problemsof
interpretation.
Whatgoes on in thisor thatinstitutional
setting?And
whatis theinternallogic of whatgoes on? These questionshave to be
debated,firstin particularinstitutional
settingsand thenin thegeneral
settingof thestate.The artof separationis a popular,not an esoteric,
art.Liberals,however,have not alwaysrecognizeditspopularcharacter,forifindividualrightsareat stakethenphilosophersandjudgescan
claim some special understanding
of its requirements.
It is the courts
thatdefineand patrolthe circleof rights.'3To focuson institutions,
practices,and relationships
is to shiftthelocationofagency,to socialize
theartofseparation.Believers,scholars,workers,and parentsestablish
and guardthelines-and thenthecitizensas a bodydo so, throughthe
politicalprocess.Liberalismpassesdefinitively
intodemocraticsocialismwhenthemap of societyis sociallydetermined.
Butwhatifsomepoliticalmajoritymisunderstands
or overridesthe
autonomyof thisor thatinstitutional
setting?That is theunavoidable
riskof democracy.Since the linesdo not have the clear and distinct
characterthatLocke thoughtthemto have,theywillbe drawnhereand
there,experimentally
and sometimeswrongly.The linebetweenpolitics
and exchangehas, as I have suggested,beenwronglydrawnfora long
timenow: And we sufferfromtheabuse ofmarketpower.We haveto
argue,then,aboutthelocationofthelineand fight(democratically)
to
draw it differently.
Probablywe willnevergetit exactlyright,and the
changingcharacterof states and marketrequires,in any case, its
continualrevisions,so thearguingand thefighting
have no visibleend.
And whatiftyrantsseizecontrolofthisor thatchurchor university
or companyor family?Michel Foucaulthas recently
contendedthata
darkand rigiddisciplinehas beenclampeddownupon a wholeseriesof
Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION
329
institutions-andthatthisis the workof internalelites,professional
men and womenwithclaims to scientificknowledge,not of political
14 But I thinkthathe exaggerates
thesuccessoftheseelitesand
officials.
theirabilityto sustaintheirdisciplinewithoutcallinguponstatepower.
It is onlyin authoritarian
violateinstitustates,whichsystematically
tional integrity,
that Foucault's "disciplinarysociety"is likelyto be
liketheformthathe describes.Amongourselves,
realizedin anything
the risksare of a different
sort; theyinclude but are not limitedto
professionalpretensionand aggrandizement;
we also have to worry
about internalcorruption,
bureaucraticprivilege,popularfearfulness,
and passivity.
All of theseriskswill be reduced,perhaps,insofaras the different
institutionalsettingshave themselvesbeen socialized, so that their
participants
enjoya roughequalityand no groupofbelievers,knowers,
-orownersis capable ofreachingforpoliticalpower.Ifmenand women
enjoy theirdifferent
social roles,theyare more likelyto respectthe
settings
withinwhichtherolesareplayed.Thisis thesocialistformofthe
old liberalhopethatindividualssecureintheirowncircleswon'tinvade
the circlesof others.It is stilla problematicbut also I thinka more
realistichope, forit is lonelyin thosecircles;thelifeof institutions
is
morelivelyand moresatisfying.
NOTES
1. J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,1934) p.
174.
2. Draftexemptionsforcollegestudentsrepresentperhaps,a modem versionof the
medievalliberties.Theybreachtheliberalwallbetweenstateand universtiy-notbecause
theyviolateacademicfreedombutratherbecausetheyviolatepoliticalintegrity
(theequal
standingof citizens).
3. The artofseparationremainsan important
featureofcontemporary
liberalism,
as in
Rawls' Theoryof Justice.His two principles,Rawls writes,"presupposethatthesocial
structure
can be dividedintotwomoreor lessdistinctparts,the
firstprincipleapplyingto
the one, the second to the other.They distinguishbetweenthose aspectsof the social
systemthatdefineand securetheequal libertiesofcitizenshipand thosethatspecifyand
establishsocial and economicinequalities,"in A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge:Harvard
University
Press,1971),p. 61. Rawlsredrawstheold linebetweenthestateand themarket,
thoughin a ratherdifferent
waythanI shall suggestbelow.
4. Marx, Early Writings,
trans.T. B. Bottomore(London: C. A. Watts,1963),p. 26.
5. RobertMichels,PoliticalParties,trans.Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover,
1959).
330
POLITICAL THEORY
/ AUGUST 1984
6. Walzer,SpheresofJustice:A Defenseof Pluralismand Equality(New York: Basic
Books, 1983).
7. The best recentaccountofthetransformation
ofmarketpowerintopoliticalpower
is CharlesE. Lindblom,Politicsand Markets(New York:Basic Books, 1977),esp. PartV.
8. Marx, 1963,p.24.
9. I omithereanydiscussionoftheearlytwentieth-century
of whom
pluralists,some
are plausiblycalled liberals,sincetheirargumentsneverattainedthehighphilosophical
respectability
of thedoctrineof individualrights.
10. Obligations:Essayson Disobedience,War,and Citizenship
(Cambridge:Harvard
University
Press, 1970),p. x.
11. Coriolanus,Act V, sceneiii.
12. Locke, A LetterConcerningToleration,ed. PatrickRomanell (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill,1950),p. 27.
13. For a strongstatementof the role of courtsin defenseof rights,see Ronald
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1977).
14. See especiallyFoucault's Disciplineand Punish: The Birthof thePrison,trans.
Alan Sheridan(New York: Vintage,1979).The argumentworksbestforinstitutions
like
prisons,hospitals,and asylums,wherethesubjectsofdisciplinearecivically,
physically,
or
mentallyincapacitated,but Foucault meansitto applyalso to schoolsand factories:pp.
293ff.
Michael Walzeris a Professorof Social Science at the Institute
for Advanced
Study in Princeton.He is the author,most recently,of Spheresof Justice:A
Defense of Pluralismand Equality(1983) and of theforthcomingExodus and
Revolution.