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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Supreme Court Case
No.
Complainant.
The Florida Bar File
Nos. 2003-50,485(15C)
2004-50,149(15C)
2004-50,521(15C)
v.
STEVEN M. BUSCH,
Respondent.
COMPLAINT
The Florida Bar, by and through undersigned counsel and pursuant to R.
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-3.2(b), hereby files its complaint against Steven M. Busch,
and states as follows:
AS TO ALL COUNTS
1.
Respondent is, and at all times material to this action was, a member
of The Florida Bar and subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of the
Supreme Court of Florida.
2.
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee "C," at a duly
constituted meeting, and by majority vote of the eligible members present, found
probable cause for respondent's violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar,
as set forth herein.
PUBLIC RECORD
SEP 14
MDS
COUNT I
The Florida Bar File No. 2003-50,485(150)
3.
Respondent agreed to represent Yves Hubert (Hubert) in a bankruptcy
4.
After accepting Hubert's case, respondent failed to competently
case.
advise his client before and after filing his petition for bankruptcy.
5.
First, respondent failed to advise his client that all of the client's
federal income tax returns had to be filed in advance of his petition for bankruptcy
protection.
6.
Hubert had not filed all of his income tax returns at the time that
respondent filed the petition for bankruptcy on Hubert's behalf.
7.
After filing the bankruptcy case on behalf of Hubert, respondent was
forced to file a motion to dismiss, based on the unfilled tax returns.
8.
Such motion to dismiss was granted and Hubert was barred from
filing another bankruptcy petition for 180 days.
9.
After the 180 day period passed, Hubert again requested that
respondent file a petition for bankruptcy on his behalf.
10.
At that time, Hubert had investments in commercial property and
owned a business.
11.
Hubert expressly advised respondent that he did not want to turn over
his business or his commercial property to a bankruptcy trustee.
12.
Despite his knowledge of Hubert's desire to retain possession of his
business and his commercial property, respondent advised Hubert to file a Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition.
13.
In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee may take possession of
commercial property and/or businesses owned by the debtor, and may sell such
property to pay off debt.
14.
In order to resolve this problem, respondent filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on behalf of Hubert, but did not disclose Hubert's commercial
property nor his business on the financial schedules he filed with the court.
15.
When the bankruptcy trustee discovered Hubert's commercial
property and his business, and included these among the assets subject to sale,
respondent swiftly moved to convert the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding to a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding ~ to protect Hubert's business interests and
property.
16.
Although respondent's conversion motion was granted, a Rule 2004
meeting was nevertheless scheduled before the Chapter 7 trustee.
17.
Respondent failed to take any action to oppose such meeting, although
the Chapter 7 trustee had, by then, been divested of his authority.
18.
Respondent and his client appeared at the Rule 2004 meeting and
again, respondent failed to object to the meeting.
19.
Thereafter, when the trustee began to ask Hubert about his interest in
his business, respondent advised his client to abruptly leave the meeting.
20.
Hubert followed respondent's advice and both he and respondent
refused to answer the trustee's questions and abruptly left the Rule 2004 meeting.
21.
Thereafter, the trustee filed a motion objecting to the conversion of
the bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
22.
Ultimately, the conversion was disallowed.
23.
Based on the incomplete financial schedules filed by respondent and
respondent's actions in advising his client to leave the Rule 2004 meeting without
answering the questions of the trustee, Hubert was unable to convert his Chapter 7
bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, was forced to dismiss the Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition, forced to pay the trustee's costs, and barred from filing any
petition for bankruptcy for a period of five (5) years.
24.
By the conduct set forth above, respondent violated R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 3-4.2 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules
governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline]; 4-1.1 [A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.]; 4-8.4(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another.]; and 4-8.4(d) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.. .].
COUNT II
25.
The Florida Bar restates and realleges paragraphs 3 through 23, as if
fully set forth herein.
26.
When Hubert met with respondent to prepare a bankruptcy petition on
his behalf, after the expiration of the 180 day period discussed in paragraphs 8 and
9 herein, respondent advised Hubert to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
27.
Despite Hubert's questions about filing under Chapter 7, as opposed
to Chapter 13, respondent failed to properly explain the differences to his client.
28.
Respondent failed to give Hubert enough accurate information to
allow him to make an informed decision regarding which bankruptcy chapter was
best suited to his needs.
29.
After Hubert hired respondent and agreed to file for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7, respondent failed to properly complete the financial schedules required.
30.
Respondent also failed to review such schedules with his client before
filing same with the court.
31.
After the bankruptcy was filed, the Chapter 7 trustee took control of
Hubert's assets, including his commercial property and his business.
32.
When Hubert made numerous calls to respondent trying to ascertain
why the trustee had taken control of his commercial property and his business,
respondent failed to return such calls and failed to keep Hubert properly informed.
33.
Thereafter, respondent attempted to convert the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
34.
Although such motion was granted, a Rule 2004 meeting was
scheduled before the Chapter 7 trustee.
35.
Respondent failed to properly explain to Hubert the kinds of
information that would be required at such meeting.
36.
When the trustee began to inquire about Hubert's business, respondent
advised Hubert that they should simply leave the meeting, to avoid the trustee's
questioning.
37.
Respondent failed to explain the possible consequences of Hubert's
failure/refusal to answer the trustee's questions.
38.
Hubert followed respondent's advice and left the meeting with
respondent.
39.
Such failure to answer all questions posed by the trustee became a key
factor in the eventual dismissal of Hubert's bankruptcy, and the entry of an order
prohibiting Hubert from filing any petition for bankruptcy for a period of five (5)
years.
40.
By the conduct set forth above, respondent violated R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 3-4.2 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules
governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline]; 4-1.4(a) [A lawyer shall keep
a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.]; 4-1.4(b) [A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.]; and 4-8.4(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.].
COUNT III
41.
On or about June 17, 2004, respondent gave a sworn statement to
Florida Bar Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee "C."
42.
During such statement, respondent was directed to provide a physical
address where he practiced law and could be reached, as certified letters sent to his
record bar address (a post office box) and his last known physical address had been
returned unclaimed.
43.
On or about June 22, 2004, The Florida Bar sent a letter to respondent,
reminding him to correct his record bar address and telephone number, providing a
physical address where he regularly practiced law.
44.
Respondent failed and refused to update and correct his record bar
address.
45.
On or about August 27, 2004, The Florida Bar sent to respondent, by
certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, a Notice of Finding Probable Cause
for Further Disciplinary Proceedings.
46.
Such notice was sent to respondent's record bar address (a post office
box) and his last known physical address.
47.
Both letters were returned to The Florida Bar, marked "Unclaimed."
48.
To this date, respondent has failed and refused to update his record
bar address and provide The Florida Bar with a physical address where he practices
law.
49.
By the conduct set forth above, respondent has violated R. Regulating
Fla. Bar 1-3.3 [Each member of The Florida Bar shall designate an official bar
name, mailing address and business telephone number. If the address given is not
the physical location or street address of the principal place of employment, then
such information shall also be given. Each member shall promptly notify the
executive director of any changes in any information required by this rule.]; 3-4.2
[Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules governing
The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline]; 4-8.4(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or
8
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.];
COUNT IV
The Florida Bar File No. 2004-50,149(150)
50.
On or about May 22, 2003, respondent was contacted by Joseph
Kuruvila (Kuruvila), a real estate broker.
51.
Kuruvila was not related to and did not have power of attorney for
Leroy Washington (Washington).
52.
Kuruvila directed respondent to file a petition for Chapter 13
bankruptcy on behalf of Washington.
53.
Respondent had never met Washington, did not have his power of
attorney, and was not hired by him to file a bankruptcy petition on his behalf.
54.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondent prepared a bankruptcy
petition, as directed by Kuruvila, and signed it as counsel for the debtor, Leroy
Washington.
55.
Such petition bears a signature which purports to be that of Leroy
Washington.
56.
In truth and in fact, Washington's signature was forged by Kuruvila.
57.
Respondent filed the forged petition with the bankruptcy court. Such
case was styled In Re: Lerov Washington, Debtor, Case No. 03-15345-BKC-RAM.
58.
At the time that he filed the unauthorized bankruptcy petition on
behalf of Washington, respondent knew that it was unauthorized.
59.
At the time that he filed the unauthorized bankruptcy petition on
behalf of Washington, respondent knew that it was forged.
60.
After the case was filed, Washington hired counsel and filed a motion
to dismiss.
61.
On or about August 4, 2004, the Honorable Robert A. Mark, Chief
United States Bankruptcy Judge entered an Order that (1) dismissed the bankruptcy
case; (2) expunged the case, and (3) sanctioned both respondent and Kuruvila. A
true copy of the order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
62.
Specifically, the Court found that respondent knew that Washington's
signature had been forged.
63.
The court further found that respondent had failed to file a Rule 2016
Statement, indicating the amount of attorneys fees collected and by whom those
fees were paid.
64.
Had such a statement been filed, it would have reflected that Kuruvila,
not Washington, paid respondent's fees.
65.
Respondent failed to file the Rule 2016 statement in order to conceal
his conspiracy to file a false bankruptcy petition on behalf of Washington, to
benefit Kuruvila.
10
66.
Based on respondent's intentional filing of a false bankruptcy petition
which contained a forged signature, and his failure to file a Rule 2016 Statement,
respondent was sanctioned in the amount of $1004.80.
67.
By filing a false bankruptcy petition which respondent knew
contained a forged signature, respondent made a material misrepresentation to the
court.
68.
By failing to file a Rule 2016 Statement, which would have revealed
who paid respondent's fees, respondent made a material misrepresentation to the
court by omission.
69.
By the conduct set forth above, respondent violated R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 3-4.2 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules
governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline]; 4-3.3(a)(l) [A lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.];
4-8.4(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another.]; 4-8.4(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.]; and 4-8.4(d) [A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. ..].
11
COUNT V
The Florida Bar File No. 2004-50,521(150)
70.
Respondent was hired by Mike Green (Green) and Brian Pavlow
(Pavlow) to represent South Florida Remodeling and Building Corporation (South
Florida Remodeling) in a suit against the BellSouth Yellow Pages.
71.
Green and Pavlow were employees of South Florida Remodeling.
72.
After a settlement was reached in which a judgment was entered
against South Florida Remodeling, respondent was contacted by the owner of
South Florida Remodeling, Vic George (George).
73.
George knew nothing of the suit against BellSouth.
74.
George requested that respondent represent him in an action against
Green and Pavlow, respondent's former clients.
75.
Respondent agreed to the representation, despite the fact that
respondent's representation of George would be directly adverse to the interests of
respondent's former clients, Green and Pavlow.
76.
Respondent collected a fee of $3500 for the representation.
77.
Respondent never explained to George that such representation would
(or even could) present a conflict of interest.
78.
Respondent never requested or received the consent of Green and
Pavlow, respondent's former clients, to represent George.
12
79.
Respondent filed the action on George's behalf, against Green and
Pavlow.
80.
Shortly thereafter, respondent was forced to withdraw from the case,
based on his conflict of interest.
81.
After respondent withdrew from the case, George made numerous
attempts to have respondent return his documents, files, and unearned fees to him.
82.
Despite these attempts, respondent failed and refused to return any of
the documents, files and unearned fees to George.
83.
By the conduct set forth above, respondent violated R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 3-4.2 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules
governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline]; 4-1.9(a) [A lawyer who has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
consents after consultation.]; 4-1.9(b) [A lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter use information relating to the representation
to the disadvantage of the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with
respect to a client or when the information has become generally known. For
purposes of this rule, "generally known" shall mean information of the type that a
reasonably prudent lawyer would obtain from public records or though authorized
13
processes for discovery of evidence.]; 4-1.16(d) [Upon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect a client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing
time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned.]; 4-8.4(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another.]; and 4-8.4(d) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice...].
WHEREFORE, The Florida Bar, complainant, respectfully requests that
Steven M. Busch, respondent, be disciplined appropriately.
Respectfully submitted,
LOkRAINE CHRISTINE HOFFMANN #612669
Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar
5900 N. Andrews Ave., Suite 900
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309
(954) 772-2245
14
RACHELDE MCBRIDE, #72801
Chair, Fiftyenth Circuit Grievance
Committee "C"
Sachs, Sax, & Klein, P.A.
301 Yamato Road, Suite 4150
Boca Raton, Florida 33431
(561)994-4499
HN NTHONY BOGGS, #253347
Staff Counsel
The Florida Bar
651 E. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300
(850)561-5600
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing Complaint has
been furnished by regular U.S. mail to The Honorable Thomas D. Hall, Clerk,
The Supreme Court of Florida, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida
32399-1927, a true and correct copy by Certified Mail, return receipt requested #
7005 1160 0002 0633 4260, and regular U.S. mail to Steven M. Busch,
respondent, P.O. Box 630202, Miami, Florida 33163-0202 and to Steven M.
Busch, respondent, at his physical address of 3900 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 302,
Hollywood, Florida 33021-6761 by Certified Mail, return receipt requested # 7005
0390 0003 2759 3524, and regular U.S. mail; and by regular U.S. mail to Lorraine
Christine Hoffmann, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, 5900 North Andrews
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309, on this J3'
day
2005.
ANTHONY BOGGS
15
NOTICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the trial counsel in this matter is Lorraine Christine
Hoffmann, Esq., whose address and telephone number are: The Florida Bar, 5900
N. Andrews Avenue, Suite 900, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309, telephone number
(954) 772-2245. Respondent need not address pleadings, correspondence, etc. in
this matter to anyone other than trial counsel and to Staff Counsel, The Florida
Bar. 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300.
MANDATORY ANSWER NOTICE
RULE 3-7.6 (h)(2), RULES OF DISCIPLINE, PROVIDES THAT A
RESPONDENT SHALL ANSWER A COMPLAINT.
J:\users\DMACHA\CMP\Busch.doc
16
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
In re
)
CASE NO.
) CHAPTER
LEROY WASHINGTON,
Debtor.
ORDER (1) DISMISSING
BANKRUPTCY CASE; (2) EXPUNGING
CASE; AND (3) SANCTIONING ATTORNEY STEVEN M.
BUSCH AND REAL ESTATE BROKER, JOSEPH KURUVILA
This Chapter 13 case presents the disturbing situation in
which a debtor's signature is forged on the bankruptcy petition.
The facts were presented in a Motion to Dismiss for Fraudulent
Filing (the "Motion to Dismiss") filed by the above-named debtor,
Leroy Washington ("Washington" or the "Debtor"). For the reasons
that follow, the Court finds that the case should be dismissed,
the Court record of the filing expunged, and the participants in
the fraud sanctioned.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case was commenced by the filing of a Chapter 13
petition
(the "Petition") on May 22, 2003.
The petition was
signed by Steven M. Busch, Esquire ("Busch")/ as counsel for the
Debtor, and also bears the signature "Leroy Washington."
The
case was filed on the day scheduled for a foreclosure sale of the
Debtor's property in Case Number 03-637-CA-05, Circuit Court,
Miami-Dade County, Florida (the "Foreclosure Case").
Attorney
THE FLORIDA BAR'S
EXHIBIT
A.
Busch also signed and filed on May 22, 2003, a Suggestion of
Bankruptcy in the Foreclosure Case.
The timing of the bankruptcy filing is not uncommon.
Many
Chapter 13 cases are filed to stop foreclosure sales with the
intention of curing or paying off the mortgage in a Chapter 13
plan.
The important and troublesome distinction here is that
this Debtor did not sign the Petition.
As discussed in greater
detail below, the Debtor's signature was forged by a real estate
broker, Joe Kuruvila ("Kuruvila")
On June 17, 2003, Attorney Sabrina Chassagne ("Chassagne")
filed the Motion to Dismiss. On June 23, 2003, the Court entered
its Order Setting Hearing to Investigate Claim of Fraudulent
Filing, scheduling a hearing on July 8, 2003, to consider the
Motion to Dismiss.
Since Attorney Busch filed the case, the
Order Setting Hearing required Busch to appear at the July 8th
hearing to address the allegation in the Motion to Dismiss that
Washington did not sign the Petition.
The Debtor, who resides in Georgia, drove to Miami to attend
the hearing at which he was represented by Chassagne. Busch also
appeared at the July 8th hearing, together with Kuruvila.
Busch
introduced into evidence a Power of Attorney allegedly executed
by Leroy and Gloria Washington, appointing Kuruvila attorney-infact for purposes of a possible sale of their home, and "to file
bankruptcy to stop foreclosure sale." Respondent Busch's Exhibit
2.
Kuruvila testified that he^signed Washington's name on the
Petition.
Busch argued that based upon the authority granted in
the
of Attorney, Kuruvila was authorized
Power
to sign the
Petition and the filing of the case was proper.
The Debtor testified and denied executing the Power of
Attorney.
His testimony seemed confused on this point and, more
likely than not, the Debtor did execute the Power of Attorney.
Washington did admit that he had retained Kuruvila at some point
to pursue a sale of his house which was the subject of the
Foreclosure Case.
Kuruvila claimed that he filed the bankruptcy case with
Washington's knowledge and consent to stop the foreclosure sale.
The Court did not find this testimony credible.
Instead, the
Court-believed Washington's testimony that he did not authorize
Kuruvila to file the bankruptcy case on his behalf, since it
appeared that a sale of the home would not realize any proceeds
over and above the existing mortgage.
Therefore, the Debtor was
prepared to allow the foreclosure sale to be completed.
Discussion
Even if the Power of Attorney was executed by the Debtor,
Busch and Kuruvila acted improperly.
Although an attorney-in-
fact can execute a bankruptcy petition on behalf of a debtor,
under Fed.R.Bank.P. 9010, the attorney-in-fact must execute it as
attorney-in-fact.
In this case, Kuruvila simply forged the
Debtor's
on
signature
the Petition.
Busch
then
filed the
Petition with the forged signature, knowing that it was signed by
Kuruvila and not by Washington.
Busch also violated Rule 2016,
Fed.R.Bankr.P. , by his failure to file a Rule 2016 Statement,
indicating the amount of fees he received and who paid them.
Had
Busch filed an accurate 2016 Statement, it would have reflected
that Kuruvila, not the Debtor, paid his attorney fee.
When a case
is commenced by
the filing of
a petition
executed by an individual acting for the debtor under a Power of
Attorney,
certain minimum requirements must
ensure that the petition is properly filed.
be
satisfied to
In particular, the
petition must be properly executed by the attorney-in-fact in a
manner
which
reflects
attorney-in-fact.
the
representative
capacity
of
the
In re Hurt. 234 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999).
A petition is a legal nullity if the signature on the petition is
forged, even if the party forging the signature had a Power of
Attorney, if there was no indication that the document was signed
in a representative capacity.
See, In re Brown, 163 B.R. 596,
598 (Bankr. N.D.Fla. 1993); In re Harrison, 158 B.R. 246, 248
(Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1993).
In this case, Kuruvila did not sign his name as attorney-infact.
filed
Instead, he simply forged the Debtor's name.
Busch then
the Petition with no indication in any document
Kuruvila,
not the Debtor, signed
attorneys fees.
that
the Petition and paid the
Therefore, based upon the law discussed above,
the filing was a legal nullity.
The
Motion to Dismiss
wj.ll
be granted
and
the
filing
expunged.
The Court also finds it appropriate to sanction both
Attorney
Busch
for,
among other
things,
knowingly
filing a
petition with a forged signature, and Kuruvila, for forging the
Debtor's signature rather than signing his name as attorney-infact for the Debtor.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court
announced that it was imposing sanctions and directed Chassagne
to
file a
preparing,
statement
setting
forth
her
attorneys
filing and prosecuting the Motion
listing any costs
incurred by the Debtor
fees
for
to Dismiss and
in traveling
from
Georgia to attend the hearing.
On July 17, 2003, Chassagne filed a Notice of Filing Invoice
Containing
Client
Fees
and
Expenses.
The
"invoice"
lists
Attorney's fees of $750, a $55.00 charge for service of a witness
subpoena, and $199.80 in travel expenses incurred by Washington
consisting of $36.00 in tolls, $50.00 for food, and $113.80 for
gas.
The fees and travel expenses total $1,004.80.
The Court
finds all of these fees and expenses to be reasonable.
Based
upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.
This case is dismissed.
2.
Absent further order, the Court file for this case is
SEALED.
3.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to expunge this case
from the Court's automated systems.
4.
Attorney Chassagne is directed to furnish a copy of
this
Order,
on
behalf
of
Leroy
Washington,
to
all credit
reporting agencies listed below and to any other party who may
otherwise have relied on the filing of this bankruptcy case in
connection with credit decisions or credit information concerning
Leroy Washington.
Any such party receiving a copy of this Order
shall specifically correct its records to delete any reference in
Leroy Washington's
credit history
to
this improperly
filed
bankruptcy case:
A.
Experien
Profile Maintenance
P.O. Box 9558
Allen, Texas 75013
B.
Trans Union Corporation
Attn: Public Records Dept.
555 West Adams Street
Chicago, IL 60661
C.
Equifax
P.O. Box 144717
Orlando, Florida 32814
5.
Attorney Steven M. Busch, Esquire, and Joseph Kuruvila
are sanctioned $1,004.80.
Judgment is hereby entered against
them jointly and severally for this amount in favor of Leroy
Washington, for which let execution issue.
6.
In addition to the monetary sanction, the Court will be
transmitting a copy of this Order with the appropriate forms to
the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division
of Real Estate, Bureau of Enforcement, to consider whether the
conduct of Broker, Joseph Kuruvila, should be investigated.
A
•*i_
copy of this Order will also be forwarded to the Florida Bar to
conduct whatever inquiry it deems appropriate with respect to the
conduct of Attorney Steven Busch.
,-X
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida, this /
day
of August, 2003.
ROBERT A. MARK
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
COPIES TO:
Sabrina Chassagne, Esq.
The White Building
One N.E. Second Avenue, Suite 208
Miami, Florida 33132
(Counsel for Leroy Washington)
Steven M. Busch, Esq.
1930 Tyler Street
Hollywood, Florida 33020
Joseph Kuruvila, Broker
6053 Miramar Parkway
Hollywood, Fla. 33023
Nancy Herkert, Chapter 13 Trustee
P.O. Box 279809
Miramar, Florida 33027
Leroy Washington
Kathy Gould-Feldman, Chief Deputy Clerk
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