COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Middlesex, ss. Superior Court Department Civil Action No. 1681CV01933 GEORGE CAPLAN, et al., thirteen taxable inhabitants, citizens-taxpayers of Acton, Massachusetts, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF ACTON, MASSACHUSETTS, inclusive of its instrumentalities and the Community Preservation Committee, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DEFENDANT TOWN OF ACTON’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 65(a), the Defendant Town of Acton (the “Town”) opposes the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the Town from paying three historic preservation grants appropriated by the 2016 Annual Town Meeting from the Town’s Community Preservation Act (“CPA”) fund. The Town appropriated CPA funds for historic preservation projects at two historic churches in historic districts in return for permanent historic preservation restrictions. The Plaintiffs have not shown any likelihood of success on their claim that these grants violate the Anti-Aid Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution or that a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. Their motion should be denied. FACTS I. The Community Preservation Act The CPA was enacted to enable municipalities to fund projects involving open space, recreational use, historic resources and community housing. G.L. c. 44B, §§3-7; see Seideman v. City of Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 473-474 (2008). The CPA took effect in Acton “upon the {A0378024.12 } 1 approval by the legislative body [Town Meeting] and [its] acceptance by the voters of a ballot question” pursuant to G.L. c. 44B, § 3. Affidavit of Roland Bartl (“Bartl Aff.”) ¶ 2, Ex. 1. After accepting the CPA, the Town established a Community Preservation Committee (“CPC”) to “study the needs, possibilities and resources of the city or town regarding community preservation.” G.L. c. 44B, §§ 5(a), (b)(1); Bartl Aff. ¶ 16, Ex. 12. The CPC gathers information, consults with municipal boards, holds public informational hearings, and “make[s] recommendations to [Town Meeting] ... for [among other things] the acquisition, preservation, rehabilitation and restoration of historic resources.” G.L. c. 44B, § 5(b)(2). It incorporates its overall findings in the Town’s Community Preservation Plan (the “CPA Plan”). Bartl Aff. ¶ 17, Ex. 13. After receiving the CPC's recommendations, Town Meeting makes appropriations from the Community Preservation Fund and other sources as it deems appropriate. G.L. c. 44B, § 5(d). II. The Town’s Historic Districts and the Historic Resources at Issue in this Case The buildings at issue in this case are located in the Acton Center and South Acton Historic Districts, established by the Town pursuant to G.L. c. 40C. Bartl Aff. ¶ 6. A. The Acton Center Historic District and Acton Congregational Church The Acton Center Historic District is listed on the National and State Registers of Historic Places. Bartl Aff. ¶ 9, Exs. 2-5; see 950 CMR 71.03 (definition of State Register). Beginning with the Town’s creation in 1735,1 Acton Center “has been the location of the Town Common, the training field, and the First Meeting House.” Bartl Aff. Ex. 4, p. 4. In 1806, “Acton Centre began to develop as a nucleus for civic and religious activities” and became “the 1 See Province Laws, 1735-36, 1st Sess., Chapter 10, titled “An Act for Dividing the Town of Concord, and Erecting a New Town There by the Name of Acton” (the “1735 Act”). Attachment A. The 1735 Act established that “the said north-westerly part of Concord, together with the said farms, be and hereby are set off, constituted and erected into a distinct and [separate] township, by the name of Acton” provide that “the inhabitants of the said town of Acton do, within the space of three years from the publication of this act, erect and finish a suitable house for the publick worship of God, and procure and settle a learned, orthodox minister, of good conversation, and make provision for his comfortable and honourable support.” Id., §§ 1, 3. {A0378024.12 } 2 geographic center of the large sprawling town … characterized by 19th century dwellings and civic buildings lining the Main Street with an oblong Common at the cross roads of Main Street, Concord Road[.]” Id. “Three mid to late 19th century institutional buildings[,] … the Congregational Church (1846) …, the Town Hall (1863) …, and the Acton Memorial Library (1889)” are situated on or around the Town Common at the heart of the Acton Center Historic District. Bartl Aff. ¶ 10, Exs. 4, pp. 4, 5. The Acton Congregational Church and its associated buildings, the Abner Hosmer House and the John Fletcher House, are located in the Acton Centre National Register Historic District and the Local Historic District, contributed to the District’s listing on the National and State Registers and designation as a Local Historic District, are listed on the Massachusetts Historical Commission’s (“MHC”) Inventory of Historic Assets of the Commonwealth, and have been determined by the Acton Historical Commission to be significant in the history, architecture or culture of the Town. Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 8, 11-12, Exs. 2-8. The current church was built in 1846 and extensively remodeled in 1898. Bartl Aff. Ex. 6, p. 6. Its stained glass windows date from the 1898 remodeling and feature prominently in the building’s inventory of historic resources. Id. B. The South Acton Historic District and South Acton Congregational Church The South Acton Village Historic District is also included on the State Register of Historic Places. Bartl Aff. ¶ 13, Exs. 3, 9, 10. The District has been determined by the Acton Historic Commission to be significant in the history, architecture and culture of the Town. Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 8, 13, Ex. 9. Portions of it are also eligible for listing on the National Register. Id. South Acton Village “developed as a result of the available mill privileges on Fort Pond Brook and Mill Pond, and the coming of the railroad in 1844.” Bartl Aff. Ex. 9. “Commercial and institutional architecture is located at the center of the village,” with extant buildings built {A0378024.12 } 3 specifically for non-residential use dating to the mid 19th century. Id. There are “two churches in South Acton, both of which are late 19th century ... and reflect architectural styles for which there are very few examples in Acton and none in South Acton.” Id. “The 1878 Universalist Church (140 Main Street) is a Stick Style building while the 1892 Congregational Church (29 School Street) is representative of Shingle Style.” Id. The “growth and development of the schools and religious societies [in South Acton] are important in that they reflect the growth and self-contained aspect of South Acton Village[.]” Id. The 1892 South Acton Congregational Church is separately listed on MHC’s Massachusetts Cultural Resource Information System (“MACRIS”) Inventory (Bartl Aff. ¶ 15, Ex. 11), is centrally located on School Street in heart of the South Acton Village Historic District (Bartl Aff. ¶ 15, Ex. 10), and contributed to the creation of the South Acton Village Historic District and its listing on the State Register (Bartl Aff. ¶ 15, Ex. 9). The church has been determined by the Acton Historical Commission to be significant in the history, architecture or culture of the Town and “eligible for National Register nomination as part of the School RiverMain Mill and Commercial Historic District” because of its “association with the development of the railroad community from the 1840s … [and] its representation of the one of two church properties in South Acton and the only Queen Anne institutional building in the proposed district” (Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 8, 15, Ex. 11, p. 3). Indeed, the church is “one of the best examples in Acton of the Queen Anne/Shingle Style” and “the only local example of an institutional building in the Queen Anne/Shingle Style of architecture”. Bartl Ex. 11 at pp. 4, 8. Its variety of shapes and roof lines feature prominently in its inventory of historic resources. Id. at pp. 4-5. {A0378024.12 } 4 III. The CPA Grants in this Case A. The Acton Congregational Church Projects On November 15, 2015, the Acton Congregational Church applied for two CPA grants for preservation, rehabilitation and restoration of historic resources: 1. $49,500 to fund a Master Plan for the preservation of three historic properties located at 8, 12, and 20 Concord Road to evaluate and identify critical needs and set restoration and rehabilitation priorities to preserve these historic assets for future years (Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 2122, Ex. 14); and 2. $41,000 (later revised to $51,237) to fund the rehabilitation and restoration of eight (later revised to 11) 120±-year-old stained glass windows installed in the sanctuary building honoring members of the church (Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 21, 23 26, Ex. 16). The master plan project covers the John Fletcher and Abner Hosmer Houses as well as the church itself, and will involve hiring an architectural consultant to “thoroughly investigate each of the 3 historic buildings to identify all the needs of each building in order to protect and preserve these historic assets for further generations.” Bartl Aff. Ex. 14. For the sanctuary building, this investigation includes an evaluation of the bell tower, stained glass windows and building envelope (windows, doors, siding, and roof); for the John Fletcher and Abner Hosmer Houses, it includes evaluation of the building envelopes, insulation, wiring, heating, plumbing and fire code issues. Id. This project constitutes the comprehensive planning “for the preservation, rehabilitation and restoration of historic resources” to the Standards for Rehabilitation stated in the United States Secretary of the Interior's Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties. See G.L. c. 44B, §§ 2 and 5(b)(2). Because of ongoing deterioration, the stained glass window project will immediately stabilize and protect the stained glass windows from further harm. Bartl Aff. Ex. 16, pp. 4, 6. Currently, the wood around the windows is rotting and not weathertight; and the existing exterior Plexiglas is installed directly into the windows’ wood framing, trapping moisture and causing the {A0378024.12 } 5 accumulation of a powdered lead substance on the windows and the deterioration of the lead strips. Id. The project will remove the old plastic covers, repair wood damage, replace missing or broken glass, seal the glass, scrape and paint the wood, and install new glazing/caming. Id. All three historic buildings and eleven stained glass windows are visible from the Concord Road public way or sidewalk, the Town Green, the publicly accessible foot path from the Church to the parking lot, or the parking lot. Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 22-23, Exs. 15, 17. B. The South Acton Congregational Church Project On November 19, 2015, the South Acton Congregational Church requested $15,000 to perform work on the roof “to prevent ice dam formation … to preserve an historic structure.” Bartl Aff. ¶ 24, Ex. 18. Without these repairs, “ice dams will continue to form each winter resulting water backing up into the roof and leaking into the building, damaging the ceilings, walls, and eventually rotting the structure.” Id. The “work sought to be done through CPA funds will meet the CPC’s Historic Preservation Goals by protecting and preserving a historic property and helping to preserve the existing historical character of the town.” Id. The historic building is visible from the School Street public way and sidewalk. Bartl Aff. ¶ 24, Ex. 19. C. The CPC Process On December 17, 2015, the CPC held a public hearing on the churches’ applications and deliberated on the applications at subsequent meetings. Bartl Aff. ¶ 25-26, Ex. 20. At the CPC meetings, no Acton taxpayer opposed CPA funding for any of these three projects based on the Anti-Aid Amendment. Bartl Aff. ¶ 28. On February 25, 2016, the CPC “voted unanimously to approve for recommendation at Town Meeting the appropriations schedule.” Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 2627, Exs. 21-22. The CPC based its determination on the significance of the historic resources, the eligibility of the projects for funding under the CPA, and the availability of CPA funds, not on the identity or motives (financial or otherwise) of the applicants. Bartl Aff. ¶ 28. {A0378024.12 } 6 On April 5, 2016, based on the favorable recommendations of the CPC, the Selectmen and the Finance Committee, Town Meeting voted to approve the CPA warrant article, including the grants for these three projects. Bartl Aff. ¶ 28-30, Ex. 23-24. The Town then issued grant award letters to each church, with standard conditions, including (Bartl Aff. ¶ 31, Exs. 25-27):2 “Execution, conveyance to the Town, and recording of a historic preservation restriction for the property … [that] shall be perpetual to the extent permitted by law”; “All CPA fund disbursements shall be made as reimbursements … after receipt by the Planning Director of [the churches’] invoices”; and “All invoices shall include ... [s]tatements ... certifying that all work items listed in the invoice have been completed ... consistent with the project scope presented in [the] funding application.” Upon completion, all work on the roof and the windows must be certified by the Acton Historic District Commission as meeting “the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties, 36 C.F.R. Part 68,” and any unused funds must be returned to the Town. Id. IV. Consistency with other Historic Preservation Grants at the Local and State Level The CPA grants challenged in this case are entirely consistent with previous funding approvals by the Town, other towns across Massachusetts and the state. Over the years, Acton Town Meeting has approved CPA projects for 14 historic resources similar to those here, as summarized in the following table (Bartl Aff. ¶ 37): Historic Building/ Resource Town Hall Memorial Library West Acton Citizens’ Library Windsor Avenue Antique Fire House 468 Main Street Historic District Center Center West West Center 2 Ownership Windows Town Town Town Town Town X X X X X Roof Master Planning X X To the extent that acceptance of the grant award letters already obligates the Town to provide the CPA funding at issue, Bartl Exs. 26-27, the accepted grants may be beyond the reach of a 10 taxpayer suit under G.L. c. 40, § 53, which applies only if the Town is “about to raise or expend money or incur obligations purporting to bind said town” (emphasis added). {A0378024.12 } 7 Historic Building/ Resource Morrison Farm Jonathan & Simon Hosmer House Jonathan & Simon Hosmer House complex (Jenks Library and Mowry Storage Shed) Jones Tavern Theatre III (former church) Acton Women’s Club West Acton Baptist Church John Robbins House Exchange Hall Historic District N/A N/A N/A Ownership Windows Town Nonprofit Nonprofit South West Center West N/A South Nonprofit Nonprofit Nonprofit Religious Private Private Roof Master Planning X X X X X X X X X X X Other X Acton is one of 161 cities and towns in Massachusetts that has voted to accept the CPA and utilize its funding mechanism for eligible projects. Of the 8,459 approved CPA projects, approximately 4,134 of those involve historic resources. Fowler Aff. ¶ 4. CPA funding is not limited to public sector recipients; private entities have received a significant portion of CPA funding for historic preservation and other projects across the state. Saginor Aff. ¶ 7-8. In fact, Massachusetts municipalities have approved at least 307 CPA projects involving religious institutions, including 35 for stained glass windows, 77 for roofs and associated structures, and 4 for master planning for historic preservation. Fowler Aff. ¶ 5. In addition, MHC administers a variety of federal and state grant programs for historic preservation of publicly and privately owned resources. Holtz Aff. ¶ 4. In recent years, MHC has approved funding for 38 projects (16.5% of the projects) involving preservation of historic resources of active religious institutions through its Massachusetts Preservation Projects Fund, including Vilna Shul in Beacon Hill, Trinity Church in Boston, and St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Springfield. Id. at ¶ 7. These numbers reflect the importance of religious buildings to preserving the history of the Commonwealth. See Saginor Aff. ¶¶ 9-10; Holtz Aff. ¶ 4. {A0378024.12 } 8 V. This Suit and Preliminary Injunction Motion On July 7, 2016, 13 Acton taxpayers filed the Complaint under G.L. c. 40, § 53.3 Their only claim is that payment of public funds for these projects would violate art. 18, as amended by arts. 46 and 103, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth (the “AntiAid Amendment” or “Art. 46”). Complaint ¶¶ 8, 68. On July 8, they served their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to prohibit the Town “from paying three grants to Acton Congregational Church and South Acton Congregational Church[.]” Pl. Motion at 1. ARGUMENT I. The Standard for a Preliminary Injunction in a Ten-Taxpayer Suit To obtain a preliminary injunction in a 10-taxpayer suit under G.L. c. 40, § 53, the plaintiffs “must show a likelihood of success on the merits and that the requested relief would be in the public interest”; irreparable harm is not required. Fordyce v. Town of Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 255 n. 10 (2010). The Plaintiffs fail both prongs of that test.4 This is particularly so since the Town is afforded “every presumption in favor of the honesty and sufficiency of the motives actuating public officers in actions ostensibly taken for the general welfare.” LaPointe v. License Board of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 459 (1983). 3 The Town accepts the Plaintiffs’ allegations of their addresses and taxpayers status for purposes of this motion only, see Complaint, Exhibit N, but reserves its rights on that issue. According to a pre-suit letter from counsel at Venable, LLP (Complaint Exhibit K), the moving force behind this suit is Americans United for Separation of Church and State, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. Because Americans United does not itself satisfy the jurisdictional requirement to sue under G.L. c. 40, § 53, see Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 621-622 (1981), it solicited the plaintiffs in this case. Indeed, according to its press release, “Americans United … has filed a lawsuit to stop the town of Acton, Mass., from spending taxpayer funds to support two local churches.” See https://www.au.org/media/pressreleases/mass-town-should-not-use-public-funds-to-support-its-churches-americans-united. 4 Except for Complaint Ex. N (one-page affidavits on the Plaintiffs’ status), the Plaintiffs have neither verified the Complaint nor submitted any affidavits in support of their motion as required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 65(a). The motion should be denied for that reason alone. See Eaton v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assoc., 462 Mass. 569, 590 (2012). {A0378024.12 } 9 II. The Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of historic preservation grants under the CPA solely because the owners of the buildings are active religious congregations. They cannot show a likelihood of success where nothing in the Anti-Aid Amendment prohibits “preservation, restoration or rehabilitation of historic structures of active churches” (Complaint ¶67) through the neutral criteria of the CPA and neutral implementation by the Town. The Amendment provides (emphasis added): No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, hospital, institution, primary or secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or public agents authorized by the Commonwealth or federal authority or both [except for the Soldiers' Home in Massachusetts, public libraries, and existing legal obligations]; and no such grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made or authorized for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or society. “In an art. 46 inquiry, as in any constitutional adjudication, [the court] must begin with the familiar principle of statutory construction that affords a statute a presumption of constitutional validity.” Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 674675 (1981) (citation omitted). “Unless the specific constitutional provision requires a heightened standard of scrutiny, one attacking a statute upon a constitutional ground bears the heavy burden of proving the absence of any conceivable basis upon which the statute may be supported.” Id.5 The Supreme Judicial Court has “listed three guidelines to analysis in deciding whether a particular expenditure of public funds would violate art. 46”: 5 Although couched as a challenge to three particular grants, the plaintiffs are in essence arguing that the CPA, insofar as it funds churches and other non-public entities, violates the Anti-Aid Amendment. Such constitutional challenges require notice to the Attorney General’s Office under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24(d). The plaintiffs do not claim that they have provided any such notice. {A0378024.12 } 10 (1) whether the purpose of the challenged statute is to aid [a private charity]; (2) whether the statute does in fact substantially aid [a private charity]; and (3) whether the statute avoids the political and economic abuses which prompted the passage of art. 46. Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 873, 876 (1990); Springfield, 382 Mass. at 675 (noting that the factors are “cumulative and interrelated, and that [its] conclusion results from a balancing of the various interests at stake”). These guidelines apply under both clauses of the Amendment. The plaintiffs attempt to bifurcate the Amendment into what they call a “General Prohibition” and a more specific “Religious Prohibition,” claiming that these CPA grants violate both. Pl. Memo. at 9-16. They admit that the guidelines apply to the “General Prohibition” (Pl. Memo. at 13) but contend that the guidelines do not apply to the “Religious Prohibition” (id. at 10-12). However, neither the plain language of the Amendment nor the case law supports such a distinction. The two clauses apply to the same funds (a “grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of credit”) and for the same purposes (“founding, maintaining or aiding”) whether to various private entities or a “church, religious denomination or society.” See Bloom v. School Comm., 376 Mass. 35, 39 (1978) (the “anti-aid amendment marks no difference between ‘aids,’ whether religious or secular),” cited in Pl. Memo at 13. The plaintiffs’ attempt to evade the SJC’s guidelines for an action under the Amendment fails. The SJC’s decisions under the Anti-Aid Amendment compel the conclusion that Acton’s CPA grants fully comply with the Amendment. In Helmes, 24 taxpayers sued the state under G.L. c. 29, § 63 (the state analog of a 10-taxpayer suit under G.L. c. 40, § 53) to enjoin the state from appropriating $6 million dollars to a private charitable corporation to rehabilitate the USS Massachusetts. Applying the guidelines, the SJC concluded that the payment was lawful and upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction because the taxpayers had not demonstrated a {A0378024.12 } 11 likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. 406 Mass. at 876-877. It found that there was “no evidence of a purpose to aid the [private entity] as such” simply because the state was appropriating funds to it for a dedicated public purpose. Id. In Springfield, the Commonwealth sued the school committee to require compliance with G.L. c. 71B, including payment of the special education expenses of certain public school students at private schools (subject to receipt of some state and federal aid). 382 Mass. at 667. The school committee argued that the statutory requirement violated art. 46. Id. at 667. Despite the article’s “clear and peremptory” language, the SJC rejected that argument based on the three guidelines. Id. at 673, 683 (citations omitted). See also Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 335 (1982) (“G.L. c. 76, § 1, guaranteeing that those attending private schools in fulfillment of the compulsory attendance requirements shall be entitled to transportation to the same extent as public school students, does not violate art. 46.”). A. The CPA’s Purpose Has Nothing to Do with Funding Religious Activities. The plaintiffs assert that the “principal purpose of the grant is to aid the churches.” Pl. Memo at 14. That argument fails.6 The CPA authorizes municipalities to award grants for “the acquisition, preservation, rehabilitation and restoration of historic resources.” G.L. c. 44B, § 5(b)(2). Acton’s CPA Plan specifically recognizes that the “rural, agricultural, and historic character of Acton is currently threatened by the rapid rise of local land values” and adopts a series of “Historic Preservation Goals,” the primary one being to “[p]rotect, preserve, and/or restore historic properties and sites throughout Acton, which are of historical, architectural, archeological, and cultural significance.” Bartl Aff. ¶ 17, Ex. 13 (19-20). Nothing in the CPA suggests that its purpose is to found, 6 The Plaintiffs misstate the issue under the first Helmes guideline; it focuses on the purpose of the statute, not the specific grant. In any event, nothing suggests that the purpose of these grants is for anything other than the historic preservation described above. {A0378024.12 } 12 maintain or aid religious activities. See Springfield, 382 Mass. at 677 (nothing in the statutory scheme suggests a purpose to aid private schools in violation of Art. 46). Nor do the Plaintiffs even argue that. The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”) has confirmed that appropriating CPA funds to a private, non-profit organization for the rehabilitation or restoration of historic properties is an allowable purpose under the Anti-Aid Amendment. Bartl Aff. ¶ 34, Ex. 28. “There is nothing in the CPA that prohibits the use of funds for this project simply because the property is privately owned,” and while under the Anti-Aid Amendment any expenditure of public funds “must be to advance a public purpose,” the “preservation of historic assets is generally understood to have legitimate public purposes.” Id. Both the federal and state governments “have various historic grant programs, which include grants to non-profit organizations” that typically “result in the public acquiring an historic preservation restriction or receiving some other benefit to ensure that the grant is for public rather than private purposes.” Id. Where a town “will acquire an historic preservation restriction and the organization must use the funds received in exchange to finance the rehabilitation … the town is receiving an interest in the property to ensure that its investment of public funds benefits the public through the preservation of a piece of the town’s history.” Id. Under this guideline, the plaintiffs rely solely on City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc., 2000 WL 782971 (Hampden Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000), Pl. Memo at 14, but that reliance is misplaced. In Dreison, the court invalidated eminent domain takings for the purpose of leasing the property to a private entity to attract a minor league baseball team. Id. Addressing the Anti-Aid Amendment in two paragraphs at the end of a 50-page decision, the court identified two major distinctions between the permissible funding in Helmes and the taking {A0378024.12 } 13 in that case. First, it found that the primary purpose of the taking, to grant “a leasehold estate to a private entity so that entity can build a stadium for its baseball team,” lacked any public purpose, contrasted with the sole purpose of the funding and the nonprofit entity in Helmes was to preserve a historic relic for the public. Id. at *50. It did not (and as a lower court could not), as the plaintiffs argue (Pl. Memo at 14), announce a new standard under which funding of private entities is permissible under the Anti-Aid Amendment “only if the charity serves solely public purposes.” Second, the recipient’s “bad faith” and “misrepresentations” were a major factor in finding the Anti-Aid Amendment violation. 2000 WL 782971, at *50. There is no suggestion of any such improprieties by the churches here. Dreison does not support the plaintiffs’ claim. B. The Effect of the CPA and These Grants is to Promote Historic Preservation. The CPA grants in this case do not substantially aid the churches within the meaning of the Anti-Aid Amendment. Rather, the two historic districts, four historic buildings, and 11 stained glass windows all constitute significant historic resources significant to the Town. The Town has appropriated CPA funds to preserve those resources and will acquire historic preservation restrictions, consistent with the CPA, G.L. c. 44B, § 12(a), and DOR’s opinion, and subject to MHC’s oversight under G.L. c. 184, §§ 31-32. The CPA funds do not “found, maintain or aid” either church’s mission; they are expressly limited solely to reimburse expenses actually incurred in the historic preservation projects. Bartl Aff. ¶ 31, Exs. 25-27 (award letters requiring invoices, receipts and certifications of the work). With the historic preservation restrictions, the public will have the benefit of the intact historic resource for generations, regardless of who owns the buildings. The plaintiffs argue that by “[improving] a church building,” the CPA funding “undeniably serves a church’s religious mission.” Pl. Memo at 15. They cite no legal support for this bald assertion. Instead, they highlight one sentence from the Acton Congregational {A0378024.12 } 14 Church’s application describing the financial strain on the church and the need for public assistance in preserving the property. Id. According to the plaintiffs, this sentence proves a prohibited connection between the funding of these projects and the programmatic needs of the church, namely, that the funding frees up other church funds for religious use. Id. at 11, 15. This argument fails.7 Providing public funding to a private organization may or may not free up some of that organization’s funds for other uses (the recipient may lack funds for its other needs even with the funding or, even without the funding, the recipient may decide that its other needs are paramount and forego the preservation work). In any event, whether and how the recipient spends other money is entirely up to it; the Town does not take into account such consideration in awarding CPA funds. Bartl Aff. ¶ 28. The recipient’s decision cannot be a basis for invalidating a CPA grant under the Amendment. Even if the funding were to provide some incidental or secondary benefit to the churches, that does not render it contrary to Art. 46. See Springfield, 382 Mass. at 680-681 (the secondary and indirect benefits to private schools does not qualify as “substantial aid” under the Anti-Aid Amendment). Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attenuated funding argument has been squarely rejected. DOR has specifically declined the request of Americans United to issue a rule or regulation under G.L. c. 44B, § 17, “to clarify that government funds may not be used to renovate buildings 7 The plaintiffs rely on Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 836, 844 (1970) (the “1970 Opinion”) and Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 401 Mass. 1201 (1987) (the “1987 Opinion”). Those Opinions have no precedential value, Tobias v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 665, 675 (1995), and the SJC “most sedulously guard[s] against any influence” such opinions might have, Perkins v. Inhabitants of Town of Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 272 (1917). In any event, the Opinions are readily distinguishable because the proposed funding lacked any public benefits. The 1970 Opinion involved a proposed statutory program to use public monies to fund the operational budgets of private schools, which could be used for supplying a wide array of school services. Thus, the funding directly aided the schools’ mission and daily functions without providing a benefit to members of the public who did not attend the schools. Similarly, the 1987 Opinion involved a proposed bill for tax deductions for education-related expenditures like tuition, textbooks, and transportation incurred in attending public or nonprofit schools, as well as for certain tutoring and related expenses. Because public school students “receive their education, including textbooks, from municipalities in the Commonwealth free of charge,” the benefits of these proposed tax deductions “would flow exclusively to those taxpayers whose dependents attend private schools and, as a result, to the private schools themselves.” Id. at 1209 (citations omitted). {A0378024.12 } 15 used for religious worship." Bartl Aff. ¶ 35, Ex. 29. It observed that Americans United did “not cite any state or federal case expressly holding that providing historic preservation grants to rehabilitate historically significant church buildings is unconstitutional either under the United States or the Massachusetts Constitutions.” Id. To the contrary, DOR cited with approval the Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice (Bartl Aff. ¶ 36, Ex. 30) approving grants to religious institutions, including the Old North Church in Boston.8 In Hughes v. Town of Oak Bluffs, Duke's County Super. Ct. C.A. No. 1374CV00042, the plaintiffs made the same argument – with the CPA grant funds to preserve stained glass windows in a historic church building, the recipient “will be able to dedicate other church revenue for religious worship activities that otherwise would have been used for the restoration and maintenance of the church building.” Plaintiff’s Response (Docket #11, filed November 14, 2013). The court rejected that argument and denied a preliminary injunction. Attachment B. As long as the public funds are used for the designated purpose, the funding is permissible. See Helmes, 406 Mass. at 877 (where the appropriation imposes a requirement that the public funds be used only for the designated public purpose of rehabbing the historic vessel, there is “no evidence of a purpose to aid the [private entity] as such”). Even more stringent funding restrictions are in place here. Bartl Aff. Exs. 25-27 (reimbursement with proof of expenditures, grant of historic preservation restriction, and certification that funds were used as proposed). 8 The Town’s historic preservation grants to the churches are consistent with these criteria. They are awarded for the secular purpose of historic preservation, including the acquisition of a perpetual historic preservation restriction. They were available to a broad class of potential recipients (religious and secular), as evidenced by the Town’s CPA grants for similar historic preservation projects regardless of ownership – including six Town-owned projects, five non-profit-owned projects (including Theatre III in the former building of the West Acton Universalist Church and the Acton Women’s Club in the former building of the Acton Congregational Church), one religious-owned project and two privately-owned projects. Bartl Aff. ¶¶ 37-40. And they are administered neutrally, neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, as evidenced by the grant conditions in the CPA grant award letters. Bartl Aff. ¶ 31, Exs. 25-27. {A0378024.12 } 16 Even courts addressing First Amendment challenges have determined that government funding of the preservation of historic churches does not have “primary effect of advancing religion.”9 For example, in American Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F. 3d 278 (6th Cir. 2009), the plaintiff challenged under the Establishment Clause and its state analog the public funding of a church through a downtown revitalization program. Id. at 284 (the work included exterior façade improvements, including stained glass repair and parking lot improvements). The court upheld the funding because the revitalization program made “grants available to a wide spectrum of religious, nonreligious and areligious groups alike and employs neutral, secular criteria to determine an applicant’s eligibility[.]” Id. at 289-291. Accord, Taunton Eastern Little League v. City of Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 726 (1983) (“allowing religious use of State facilities or benefits as part of a neutral policy does not result in the impermissible State sponsorship of religion[.] The fundamental requirement is that the government must treat religious and nonreligious groups equally.”).10 Where the primary (and, indeed, only) effect of the CPA and these grants is to further historic preservation, not the churches’ religious programs, they are valid under this second Helmes guideline. 9 “[T]he ‘hermetic separation’ of church and State is an impossibility which the Constitution has never required.” Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 560 (1979) (citation omitted) (denying taxpayers’ request for an injunction, declaring that paying public monies for the salaries of legislative chaplains and the statute authorizing such payment are constitutional). The SJC cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1952), that the First Amendment “does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.” Otherwise, municipalities “would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.” Colo, 378 Mass. at 560-561. 10 Taylor v. Town of Cabot, Vt. Super Ct. No. 329-6-16 (July 1, 2016) (Attachment C), also supports the Town. The court granted a preliminary injunction against funding of interior improvements to a church. However, it “accepts that the ‘mere fact that public funds are expended to an institution operated by a religious enterprise does not establish the fact that the proceeds are used to support the religion professed by the recipient.” Id. at 12 (citations omitted). Besides addressing interior renovations under a different constitutional and statutory scheme, the court identified the key problem with the funding in that case: it was not administered pursuant to a program with neutral and objective funding criteria. Id. at 15-16. Such criteria are precisely what the CPA provides. {A0378024.12 } 17 C. The CPA Avoids the Abuses that Prompted the Anti-Aid Amendment. The third Helmes guideline is “the avoidance of the political and economic abuses that prompted adoption of art. 46.” 406 Mass. at 877. The SJC found “no abuse or unfairness, political or economic, in using public funds to preserve an historic memorial to war dead in circumstances in which no private person appears likely to benefit specially from the expenditure.” Id. Similarly, the plaintiffs have not pointed and cannot point to any such abuse or unfairness in this case. The historic preservation restrictions ensure that the public, not any private person, will benefit from the funding. The CPA funding is not dependent on the user or the use of the buildings; and the restrictions will run with the land and preserve the historic resources for the benefit of the public regardless of who own them. The plaintiffs’ contention that the funding of churches could be “politically divisive” (Pl. Memo. at 16) misses the mark. Where the CPA applies to non-public entities and does not exclude churches, the Legislature saw no such risk. The plaintiffs offer nothing but sheer speculation of religious favoritism by Acton. That speculation is disproved by the 14 other approved CPA projects in the Town. Page 8, supra. In fact, the only potential for abuse comes from the plaintiffs’ position. They claim that the grants are “financially wasteful” because the churches have not shown a financial need. Pl. Memo at 16. Yet, neither the CPA nor the Town requires applicants to prove need. Such a requirement would deter applicants and frustrate the purpose of the CPA to promote preservation of historic community assets. Either the plaintiffs are arguing for a means test to apply only to active religious applicants (which would violate constitutional principles of neutrality and require the Town to analyze the motives and religious beliefs of CPA applicants in determining {A0378024.12 } 18 eligibility)11 or they are suggesting that the Town means test all applicants (which is wholly unsupported by the CPA and antithetical to the Legislature’s intent in funding CPA projects). III. A Preliminary Injunction Would Contravene, not Serve, the Public Interest. By any rational test, these historic resources are significant and worth preserving. In fact, the plaintiffs never question these buildings’ historic significance. Yet they would have the Court forbid the use of CPA funds to protect any of these resources merely because the buildings are owned by religious institutions. The Anti-Aid Amendment compels no such result. The CPA’s focus is on preserving historic resources, not on who happens to be the custodian of those resources at any particular time. Put another way, the CPA is agnostic: whether a significant historic resource is owned by the Town, a religious institution, a nonprofit or a private party, the ravages of time are equally destructive, the need for protection is equally compelling, and the irreplaceable loss caused by failure to do so is equally unforgiving. Strong and well-established public interest supports the CPA grants in this case. A preliminary injunction would be inimical to that public interest. In fact, the disservice to the CPA and the public interest from an injunction would extend well beyond Acton and these particular resources. The plaintiffs’ argument would jeopardize CPA funding for all nonprofit, charitable and other private entities. Where the prohibitions against funding of private entities and churches in the Anti-Aid Amendment are enunciated identically, there would be no basis to limit the effect of an injunction to religious recipients. Such a ruling would undercut a significant portion of the CPA program, severely limiting the 11 Doing so would push municipalities into the very forbidden territory the plaintiffs assert must be avoided. Cf. Martin v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 150 (2001) (“It is not for judges to determine whether the inclusion of a particular architectural feature is "necessary" for a particular religion.”). See also Pl. Memo. at 11 (warning against “intrusive governmental inquiries about how they spend their funds”). {A0378024.12 } 19 impact of this important legis lation. Saginor Aff. ~ 9. 12 It would also jeopardize analogous state funding of historic preservation projects of nonprofit organizations (including religious institutions) throughout the state. See Holtz Aff. ~~ 4-7. A greater impailment of the public interest in historic preservation across Massachusetts can hardly be imagined. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for temporary or prelimil1ary injunctive relief should be denied. If the Court nevertheless grants injunctive relief, it should require the plaintiffs to post a bond in the amount of the Town's anticipated damages. Mass. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Those damages would be at least $250,000. See Financial Acceptance Cmp. v. Garvey, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 9697 (1980) (the Town will be entitled to the legal fees incwTed as a result of the preliminary injunction, which would i~clude any fees to appeal or dissolve the injw1ction, if it wins at trial). By its attorneys, Dated: July 29, 2016 . Kreger, B akreiger@andersonkreiger.com N ina Pickering-Cook, BBO # 668030 npickeringcook@andersonkreiger.com ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP One Canal Park, Suite 200 Cambridge, MA 02141 (617) 621-6500 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE G llh... p,.__.. N~ickeripook tJ.... I certifY that I served tllis document on counsel for plaintiffs by email and Federal Express on this 29th day of July, 2016. 12 Of the thousands of CPA historic prese1vation projects across the state, public projects represent only a fraction . The rest are projects involving historic resources owned by non-profit, religious and other private entities. In Acton, for example, of the 14 historic preservation projects approved prior to the current projects, there were 6 town-owned, 5 nonprofit-owned, 2 privately-owned, and I church-owned. Bartl Aff. ~ 37. Statewide, nonpublic entities, such as non-profits, museums, and religious institutions, have received a significant portion of the over 4,000 historic preservation grants included in the state database. Saginor Aff. ~ 7-8. Of these, over 300 projects involving historic preservation of historic resources owned by religious institutions. Fowler Aff. ~ 5. {A0378024.12) 20 Attachment A Province Laws.— 1735-36. [1st Sess.] 763 mortgager himself had or ought to have and an acknowledgement of satisfaction in the margin of the record of such mortgages, by the mortgagee or his heirs, shall be as sufficient a discharge thereof, to the creditor who hath redeemed or shall hereafter redeem the same, or to his heirs, as it would haA-e been to the mortgager himself, or his heirs provided^ that if the said right shall, by apprizement in due form of law, happen to exceed the sum to be levied, with the necessary charges, the overplus shall be paid by the creditor to the debtor Avithin three months after levying the execution, or publication of this act. lands, as the ; : Overplus to be ptuYto the"** debtor. — Provided, cdso^ And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That all executions that shall hereafter be levied on Executions [Sect. 2.] lands or tenements, and the proceedings thereon, shall, at the chai-ge of enterecHn^the the creditor, within three months after such levying, be entred in the registry of office of the register of deeds for the county where such lands ![''"] [y]e. 15 Mass., 201. spicii., 334. And it is further provided and enacted, That the debtor, whose right in equit}'' as aforesaid is Debtor allowed [Sect. 3,] taken b}^ execution as aforesaid, shall have liberty, for the space of one ^e^^f^^Ms right. year next after levying such execution, of redeeming such his right, b}^ paying the full sum levied by execution on such right, with lawful [1] interest, and all charges arising thereon, and such other sum or sums as the creditor, at whose suit the execution was levied, shall have paid to the person or persons to whom it was before mortgaged, or to the mortffager himself. And it is further enacted, That such person or persons, at whose suit such lands [Sect. 4.] or right by equity of redeeming an}' mortgaged lands, have been, are, or shall be taken by execution as aforesaid, shall be as legally and fully entitled to the said lauds, or right of redeeming the mortgage or mortgages thereof, as the original mortgager, at the time of levyi'ng the execution, was and the said lands, or right of redeeming the same, shall be and remain to the said creditor, and his heirs and assigns, forever, unless redeemed by the mortgager within one year, as aforesaid. \_Passed arid published July 3. Creditor to have *° the"iand?^^ ; CHAPTEE 10. AN ACT FOR DIVIDING THE TOWN OF CONCORD, AND ERECTING A NEW TOWN THERE BY THE NAME OF ACTON. Wherea«5 the inhabitants and proprietors of the north-westerly part Preamble, of Concord, in the county of Middlesex, called " The Village," or " New Grant," have represented to this court that they lal)Our under great difficulties bj' reason of their remoteness from the place of publick worship, and therefore desired that they and their estates, together with the farms called Willard's Farms, ma}^ be set off a distinct and sep[a][e]rate township, for which they have also obtained the consent of the town of Concord, Be — therefore enacted by His Excellency the Governor, Council and Representatives in Genercd Court assembled, and by the autlwrity of it same, [Sect. 1.] That the said north-westerly part of Concord, together with the said farms, be and hereby are set off, constituted and erected into a distinct and sep[r^][e]rate township, by the name of Acton, and agre[e]able to the following boundaries namely, beginning at the southwest corner of Concord old bounds, then^ south-westerly, on Sudbury the ; A new town ^ the name^of -^c^o"- ^Tnliescribe^d. — ; Province Laws.— 1735-36. 764 [Chap. 11.] and Stow lines, till it conies to the south-west corner of Concord village then, north-westerly, by Stow line, till it comes to Littleton line then then, Ibounded, northerly, by Littleton, Westford and Chelmsford easterly, by Billerica line, till it comes to the north-east corner of Concord old bounds then, easterly, by Concord old bounds. And that the inhabitants of the lands before described [Sect. 2.] and bounded, be and hereby are vested with all the powers, privileges and immunities that the inhabitants of the other towns within this province are or by law ought to be vested with. ; ; ; ; Provided, That the inhabitants of the said town of Acton do, [Sect. 3.] within the space of three years from the publication of this act, erect and finish a suitable house for the publick worship of God, and procure and settle a learned, orthodox minister, of good conversation, and make provision for his comfortable and honourable support. Provided, also, A7id be it further enncted, That the inhabitants of the ^aid town of Acton shall be [Sect. 4.] liable and subject, notwithstanding their being set[t] off and constituted a township as aforesaid, to pay their proportion of all province and county rates, for this present year, in the town of Concord, and shall be accordingly assessed in the same manner they would have been if this act had never been made. [Passed and published July 3. Proviso. — Proviso. CHAPTER 11. AN ACT FOR DIVIDING THE TOWNS OF MENDON, SUTTON, UXBRIDGE AND HOPKINTON, AND ERECTING A NEW TOWN IN THE COUNTY OF WORCESTER, BY THE NAME OF UPTON. Whereas the out-lands of the several towns of Mendon, Sutton, Uxbridge and Hopkinton are competently filled with inhabitants, who labour under difficulties by reason of their remoteness from the places of publick worship in the said tov.ns, and have thereupon addressed this court that they may be set off a distinct and sep[rt][c]rate township, and vested with all the powers and privile[d]ges that other towns Preamble. in this province are vested with, Be it therefore enacted by His Excellency the Governoiir, Council and liepresentatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, The bounds of a new town scribed. de- [Sect. 1.] That all the out-lands of the aforesaid towns of Mendon, Sutton, Uxbridge and Hopkinton, comprised within the following bounds, containing in the whole, twelve thousand nine hundred and forty -three acres, together with one hundred and fift3"-one acres, taken ofi" [./Vowi] Mr. John Rockwood's farm, bounded as follows vizt., beginning at a pine tree, being the south-east corner of Grafton, and from thence, extending north, bounding west on Grafton, till it comes to the north-east corner thereof; and from thence, bounding by Westborough line till it meets with Hopkinton line from thence, extending southerly, two hundred and twelve perch in the bounds between Sutton and Hopkinton from thence, south, nine degrees east, four hundred and ninety perch, to a stake and heap of stones from thence, south, thirty-one degrees and thirty minutes east, one hundred and forty perch from thence, south, sixty-one degrees and thirty minutes east, two hundred perch, to a heap of stones at Haven-Meadow from thence, easterly, one hundred \_and'\ thirty-four perch, to the north end of a pond called ; ; ; ; ; Attachment B Attachment C