Culture and Organizations
Author(s): Geert Hofstede
Source: International Studies of Management & Organization, Vol. 10, No. 4, Organizations and
Societies (Winter, 1980/1981), pp. 15-41
Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
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Int. Studiesof Man, & Org., Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 15-41
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1981
CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS
Geert Hofstede(The Netherlands)
Social systems can exist only because humanbehavior is not
random,butto some extentpredictable. For each predictionof
behaviorwe tryto take boththe person and the situationinto
account. We assume thateach person carries a certain amount
of mentalprogrammingthatis stable over time and causes that
person to display more or less the same behaviorin similar
situations. Our predictionis never completelysure; butthe
more accurately we knowa personfs mentalprogrammingand
the more accurately we knowthe situation,the more sure our
predictionwill be.
It is possible thatour mentalprograms are physicallydeterminedby states of our brain cells. We cannotdirectlyobserve
mentalprograms; whatwe can observe is only behavior,words
or deeds. Whenwe observe behavior,we inferfromit the
presence of stable mentalprograms. This typeof inferenceis
not unique to the social sciences; it exists, for example, in
physics as well, where the intangibleconceptof "forces" is
inferredfromits manifestationsin the movementof objects. (1)
Like forces" in physics, "mentalprograms" are intangibles,
and the terms we use in social science to describe themare
This article is a modifiedversion of the first chapterof the
author's book Culture's Consequences (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage Publications, 1980).
Dr. Hofstedeis now Director, HumanResources, Fasson
Europe, Leyden,the Netherlands.
15
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16
GeertHofstede(Netherlands)
is "notdirectlyaccessible to observaconstructs,A construct
andotherbehaviors
tionbutinferablefromverbalstatements
andusefulin predicting
still otherobservableandmeasurable
verbalandnonverbalbehaviorM
(Levitin,1973. P. 492). Constructsdo not"exist"in an absolutesense: we definetheminto
didto his Nasobem.(2)
existence,as ChristianMorgenstern
Whatwe actuallydo whenwe tryto understand
social systemsis use models. Modelsare lower-levelsystemsthatwe
andthatwe substitute
can betterunderstand
forwhatwe cannot
becausewe haveno otherchoice. It
understand.We simplify
enterstheprocess.
thatour subjectivity
is in thissimplification
of
Whatit meansfortheuse of constructsis thatthedefinition
constructsin social science reflectsnotonlyits objectbutalso
thespecificmentalprogramming
ofthescholarwhomakesor
borrowstheparticularconstructs.Therefore,no singledefinitionofa construct
in social scienceis likelyto do justiceto its
(Williams,1968. P. 283).
complexity
A cursoryinventory
in social science literature(anthropology,economics,politicalscience,psychology,
sociology)ofconstructsdealingwithhumanmentalprogramsin somewayor
anotheryieldedthefollowing
terms:
fifty
aspirations
attitudes
beliefs
cathexes
culture
derivations
desires
dispositions
drives
emotions
ethics
ethos
expectancies
goals
habits
ideas
ideologies
instinct
intentions
interests
lifestyles
models
morale
morals
mores
motivation
motives
myths
needs
norms
objectives
obligations
opinions
paradigms
perceptions
personality
philosophies
preferences
purposes
residues
rulés
satisfaction
sentiments
standards
stereotypes
temperament
traits
utilities
valences
values
No twoofthesetermsare exactlysynonymous,
butmanyover-
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CultureandOrganizations
17
lap to some extent.Severalofthetermsare used to meandif- or
ferentthingsin different
subdisciplinesandbydifferent
eventhesame authors;andevenif theyare meantto refer
to thesame thing,definitions
vary.
terms,some can be appliedto themental
Amongthefifty
programsofindividuals(e.g., personality);some applyonlyto
collectivities(e.g., culture);andsome,to both. In fact,every
person's mentalprogramis partlyuniqueandpartlyshared
at least threelevels ofuniquewithothers. We can distinguish
ness in mentalprograms,as picturedin Figure1.
/
/
/
Individual '
Collective
'
Universal
"'
Figure1. Threelevels ofuniquenessin humanmentalprogramming.
The least uniquebutmostbasic is theuniversallevel of mental programming,
whichis sharedbyall, or almostall, man-
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18
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
kind. This is the biological ''operatingsystem" of the human
body;butit includes a range of expressive behaviors, such as
laughingand weeping,and associative and aggressive behaviors,
whichare also foundto some extentin higheranimals.
The collective level of mentalprogrammingis shared with
some butnot all otherpeople; it is commonto people belonging
to a certain groupor category,but different
fromthe programof
other
or
to
ming people belonging
groups categories. The
whole area of subjective humanculture (called "subjective" to
distinguishit from "objective" artifacts; see Triandis, 1972.
P. 4) belongs to this level. It includes the languagein whichwe
express ourselves; the deferencewe show to our elders; the
physical distance betweenourselves and otherpeople thatwe
maintainin order to feel comfortable;and the way we eat, make
love, and defecate.
The individuallevel of humanprogrammingis the trulyunique
part: no twopeople are programmedexactly alike, even if they
are identical twinsreared together. This is the level of individual personality;it provides for a wide range of alternativebehaviors withinthe same collective culture.
Mentalprograms can be inherited- transferredin our genes
- or theycan be learned afterour birth. From the three levels
in Figure 1, the bottom,"universal" level is most likely entirely
inherited: it is thatpart of our geneticinformationthatis common to the entire humanspecies. At the top, "individual"level,
at least part of our programmingmust be inherited;it is difficult to explain otherwisethe differencesin capabilities and
temperamentamongchildrenreared in very similar environments. It is at the middle, collective, level thatmost or all of
our mentalprogrammingis learned, whichis already shownby
the fact thatwe share it withpeople whowentthroughthe same
learningprocess butdo nothave the same genes. The existence
of the Americanpeople as a phenomenonis one of the clearest
imaginable illustrationsof the force of learning: witha multitude of genetic roots, it demonstratesa collective mentalprogrammingthatis strikingto the non-American. The transfer
of collective mentalprograms is a social phenomenon,which,
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19
Culture and Organizations
according to Durkheim(1895. P. 107), we should tryto explain
socially and not reduce to somethingelse, like race. Societies,
organizations,and groups have ways of conservingand passing
on mentalprograms fromgenerationto generation,withan obstinacythatmanypeople tendto underestimate.(3)
The learningand transferringof collective mentalprograms
ourlives, butwe learn mostandmosteasily
continuesthroughout
whenwe are veryyoung: whenour minds are still relatively
empty,programs are most easily registered. Intelligence
versus age curves usually show a very rapid developmentof
intelligencein the early years, fromtwo to about seven, with
a slowingdownafterage nine (Bloom, 1964. P. 64). Adequate
measures of personalitydevelopmentare harder to get at; but
such characteristics as intellectualinterest,dependency,and
aggression seem to a considerable extentto be developed before age five (Bloom, 1964. P. 177). Whatapplies to these individual characteristics should apply equally to learned collective characteristics: most of themare developed early in a
person1s life.
Values
Two key constructsare values and culture. Values are an
attributeof bothindividualsand collectivities; culturepresupposes a collectivity. I definea value as "a broad tendencyto
n
prefer certain states of affairsover others. This is a simplified version of the more precise anthropologicaldefinition
by Kluckhohn(1951b. P. 395): "A value is a conception,explicit or implicit,distinctiveof an individualor characteristic
of a group,of the desirable whichinfluencesthe selection from
available modes, means and ends of actions." It is also in line
withthe definitionof Rokeach (1968. Pp. 159-60): "To say
thata person 'has a valuefis to say thathe has an enduring
belief thata specific mode of conductor end-state of existence
is personally and socially preferable to alternativemodes of
conductor end-states of existence." These definitionsreserve
the word "value" for mentalprograms thatare relativelynon-
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20
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
specific: the same "value can be activated in a varietyof situations." Rokeach thinksthatan adult possesses "onlyseveral
dozens of instrumentalvalues and perhaps onlya handfulof
terminalvalues" (Rokeach, 1968. P. 162). For mentalprograms thatare more specific, Rokeach and others use the
terms "attitudes"and "beliefs."
Because our values are programmedearly in our lives, they
are norirational(althoughwe may subjectivelyfeel ours to be
perfectlyrational!). In fact, values determineour subjective
definitionof rationality. ftValuesare ends, not means, and their
desirabilityis either nonconsciouslytakenfor granted(a zeroorder belief) or seen as a direct derivationfromone's experience or fromsome external authority(a first-orderbelief)"
(Bern, 1970. P. 16). Our values are mutuallyrelated and form
value systems or hierarchies; butthese systems need not be in
a state of harmony: most people hold simultaneouslyseveral
conflictingvalues, such as "freedom"and "equality." Our internal value conflictsare one of the sources of uncertaintyin
social systems: events in one sphere of life may activate latent
values thatsuddenlyaffectour behavior in other spheres of life.
A change in our perceptionof a situationmay swingthe balance
in an internalvalue conflict,in particular, the extentto which
we perceive a situationas "favorable" or "critical."
Values have bothintensityand direction (Kluckhohn,1951b.
Pp. 413-14. He refers to "intensity"and "modality."). Mathematically,values have a size and a sign; theycan be represented by arrows along a line. If we "hold" a value, this means
thatthe issue involvedhas a certain relevance for us (intensity)
and thatwe identifycertain outcomes as "good" and others as
"bad" (direction). For example, "the amountof moneywe have"
may be highlyrelevantto us (intensity),and we may consider
"more" as good and "less" as bad (direction); but someone else
may differfrom us with regard to this value in intensity,
direction,or both. A person who takes the ChristianBible (St.
Mark 10: 21-25) seriously could consider havingmoneyequally
relevant,butwitha reversed directionsign, "more" beingbad,
and "less" being good. For still anotherperson, the entire
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Culture and Organizations
21
issue of havingmoneymay be less relevant. In some primitive
societies, "witchcraft"is bothrelevantand good; in medieval
Europe, it was relevantand bad; to most of us today,it is simply irrelevant.
We shouldfurtherdistinguishbetweenvalues as the desired
and values as the desirable: whatpeople actually desire versus
whattheythinkoughtto be desired. Althoughthe two are, of
course, notindependent,theyshould not be equated. Equating
themis a "positivisticfallacy" (Levitin, 1973. P. 497); in research it leads to confusionbetweenreality and social desirability. In most psychological and sociological research literature, "social desirability"is treated as somethingundesirable
for the researcher. The term is used in twoways: as a quality
of certain measurementitems, or as a personalityconstructof
the respondents(Phillips and Clancy, 1972. P. 923). In both
senses it usually represents T'noise" in the measurement. In
the studyof values, however,asking for the desirable is perfectlyrespectable; it is part and parcel of the phenomenon
studied. So in this case "social desirability"in our measurementsis not undesirable; we just have to realize thatwe are
dealing withtwo differentkinds of values.
Avoidingthe positivistic fallacy is especially importantif we
tryto relate values to behavior. Respondingto questionnaires
or interviewsis also a formof behavior,but I shall distinguish
"words" (questionnaires,interviews,meetings,speeches) from
"deeds" (nonverbalbehavior). Values should never be equated
withdeeds, for the simple reason thatbehavior depends on both
the person and the situation;but values as the desired are at
least closer to deeds thanvalues as the desirable. The desired-desirable distinctionrelates to several other distinctions, as illustratedin the accompanyingtable.
This table referstonormsofvalue; we can speak ofnormsas
soon as we deal witha collectivity. Inthecase ofthedesired, the
normis statistical: itindicatesthevalues actuallyheldbythemajority.(4) Inthecase ofthedesirable, thenormis absoluteor deontological(pertainingtowhatis ethicallyright).The desired relates more to pragmatic issues, the desirable, to ideology.
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Geert Hofstede (Netherlands)
22
The Distinctionbetweenthe Desired and the Desirable
and Associated Distinctions
Nature of the value
Distinguishing
characteristics
The desired
The desirable
Dimensions of
the value
Intensity
Direction
Nature of correspondingnorms of
value
Statistical,phenom- Absolute,deontological, ideological
enological,pragmatic
Corresponding
behavior
Choice anddifieren- Approvalor distial effortallocation approval*
Dominantoutcome
Deeds and/orwords
Words
Terms used in measuringinstrument
Important,successful,attractive,preferred
Good,right,agree,
ought,should
Affectivemeaning
of these terms
Activityplus evaluation
Evaluation only
Person referredtoin Me, you
measuringinstrument
People in general
*The distinctionbetweenapproval and choice, etc., is based
on Kluckhohn(1951b. Pp. 404-405).
The association amongthevarious rowsin thetable shouldbe
seen as probabilistic,notrigid;forexample,we mayapprovewith
deeds ratherthanwords,or whatis desired mayneverbecomeexpressed indeeds. There remainsa discrepancybetweenactual behavior (deeds) andthedesired, butthereis anotherdiscrepancybetweenthedesired andthedesirable. Normsforthedesirable
can be completelydetachedfrombehavior(Adler,1956. P. 277).
The tolerable size ofthediscrepancies maydifferfromperson
to person and from group to group, dependingon both
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23
Culture and Organizations
personalityandculture. InCatholicism,thepractice ofconfessing
can be seen as a device forcopingwithbothdiscrepancies andthus
will moreeasily
makingthemtolerable. Ideological indoctrination
affectthedesirable thanthedesired; itis possible thatitwidens
the gap betweenthe twowithoutchangingthe desired.
A related issue is whetherthere are absolute values at all
or only relative ones. Anthropologistshave tried to identify
absolute values in the formof culturaluniversais froma phenomenologicalaspect (Bidney,1962. P. 450). The systems
philosopherErvin Laszlo (1973) concludes thatsuch cultural
universais exist and argues fromthe deontologicalaspect that
"good" in absolute terms is whatcontributesto the survival of
the world system,and thaterror tolerance for the worldhas
become so small thatrelativism is obsolete. His position,however, itself reflects a value choice. The problem is thatman
is at the same time the source of values and their instrumenta problemfor which,as far as I know,systems theoryhas no
solution. A comparativestudyof humanvalues in any case presupposes in the studenta certain amountof relativism, or at
least tolerance of deviantvalues.
Culture
Culturehas been definedin manyways. Kluckhohn(1951a.
P . 86,note5) quotes thefollowingas a consensus ofanthropological definitions: "Culture consists in patternedways of thinking, feelingand reacting,acquired and transmittedmainlyby
symbols, constitutingthe distinctiveachievementsof human
groups, includingtheir embodimentsin artifacts; the essential
core of culture consists of traditional(i.e. historicallyderived
and selected) ideas and especially their attachedvalues." Kroeber and Parsons (1958. P. 583) arrive at a cross -disciplinary
definitionof culture as "transmittedand created contentand
patternsof values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningfulsystems as factors in the shapingof humanbehavior and the artifacts producedthroughbehavior." Triandis (1972. P. 4) distinguishes"subjective" culturefromits expression in "objec-
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24
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
tive" artifactsand definesthe formeras na cultural groupfs
characteristic way of perceivingthe man-madepart of its environment." Mypersonal definitionis thatcultureis the collective programmingof the humanmindthatdistinguishesthe
members of one humangroupfromthose of another. Culture,
in this sense, is a system of collectivelyheld values.
Cultureis to a humancollectivitywhatpersonalityis to an
individual. Personality is definedby Guilford(1959) as the interactive aggregateof personal characteristics thatinfluence
an individual's response to the environment.Culture could be
definedas the interactiveaggregateof commoncharacteristics
thatinfluencea humangroup's response to its environment.
Culture determinesthe identityof a humangroupin the same
way thatpersonalitydeterminesthe identityof an individual.
Moreover, the two interact; culture and personalityis a classic
term for psychological anthropology(Barnouw,1973). Cultural
traits can sometimes be measured bypersonalitytests.
The word culture is most commonlyreserved for societies
(in the modernworld we speak of "nations") or for ethnicor regional groups, butit can also be applied to otherhumancollectivities or categories: an organization,a profession,a family.
In this paper, to avoid confusion,I shall reserve the word culture for societies, and in other cases use subculture. The degree of culturalintegrationvaries fromone society to another,
and may be especially low for some of the newer nations. Most
subcultureswithina nation,however,still share commontraits
thatmake their members recognizable to foreignersas belonging to their society.
There must be mechanismsin societies thatpermitthe maintenance of stabilityin culturepatternsacross manygenerations.
I suggest thatsuch mechanisms operate as in Figure 2 (in which
the terminologyis takenpartlyfromBerry, 1975, and elements
can be recognized from the cybernetichierarchy of Parsons, 1977. P. 10).
In the center is a systemof societal norms, consistingof the
value systems (the mentalprograms) shared by most of the population (Parsons would call this the cultural system). Their
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Culture and Organizations
25
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES
Forces of nature
Forces of man:
Trade, conquest
Scientificdiscovery
^
ORIGINS
SOCIETAL NORMS CONSEQUENCES
Structureand
Ecological factors:
of
Value
Geographic
systems
functioning
Economic
shared by
institutions:
Demographic
majority
Family patterns
Role
differentiation
Genetic/hygienic
s
Historical
Social
stratification
>
Socialization emTechnological
Urbanization
phases
Education
Religion
Political structure
Legislation
Architecture
Theory develop-
II
I 1 ment
Reinforcement ^
^
^
Figure 2. The stabilizing of culturepatterns.
origins are a varietyof ecological factors (in the sense of factors affectingthephysical environment).The societal norms
have led to the developmentand patternmaintenanceof social
institutionswitha particular structureand way of functioning.
These include the family,educationsystems, politics, and legislation. These institutions,once theyhave become facts, reinforcethe societal norms and the ecological conditionsthatled
to them. Institutionsmay be changed,butthis does not necessarily affectthe societal norms; and whenthese norms remain
unchanged,the persistentinfluenceof a majorityvalue system
patientlymolds the new institutionsuntiltheir structureand
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26
Geert Hofstede (Netherlands)
are again adapted to the societal norms. An examfunctioning
ple of this process is the historyof France since Louis XIV
(Peyrefitte,1976). Change comes mainlyfromthe outside,
throughforces of nature (changes of climate, siltingup of harbors) or forces of man (trade, conquest, colonization). The arrow of outside influencesis deliberatelydirected at the origins,
not at the societal norms themselves. I believe thatnorms
change rarely by direct adoptionof outside values, but rather
througha shiftin ecological conditions: technological,economic, hygienic. In general, norm shiftswill be gradual, unless
the outside influencesare particularlyviolent (as in the case
of militaryconquestor deportation).
Oneofthemosteffectivewaysofchangingmentalprogramsof
individualsis changingbehaviorfirst(Bern,1970. P. 60). Thatvalue changehas toprecede behaviorchangeis a naïve (idealistic) as ofthesituationtoactual besumptionthatneglectsthecontribution
havior. This applies onthelevel ofsocieties as well. Kunkel(1970.
P. 76), dealingwiththeeconomicdevelopmentofsocieties, concludes that"The major problemofeconomicdevelopmentis notthe
alterationofcharacter,values or attitudes,butthechangeofthose
selected aspects ofman's social environment
whichare relevant
to the learningof new behavior patterns." I wouldin this case
omit "social."
The systemin Figure 3 is in a homeostatic (self-regulating)
quasi -equilibrium. Historyhas showncases of peoples that,
throughsuch a system,have maintainedan identityover hundreds and thousandsof years, even in the face of such sweeping
changes as loss of independence,deportation,or loss of language; examples are Jews, Gypsies, and Basques (Spicer, 1971).
Otherpeoples in similar conditionshave disappeared, however,
whentheir self-regulatingcycle was too muchdisturbedby outside influences. Obviously,boththe strengthof the existing
self-regulationand the strengthof the outside forces have
played a role in these cases.
Culture and Organization
As nearly all our mentalprograms are affectedby values,
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Culture and Organizations
27
nearly all are affectedby culture, and this is reflectedby our
behavior. The cultural componentin all kinds of behavioris
difficultto grasp for people who remain embeddedin the same
cultural environment;it takes a prolongedstay abroad and mixing withthe people there to recognize the numerousand often
subtle differencesin the way theyand we behave because that
is how our society has programmedus. It has been said that
the last thinga fish will discover is water; it findsout about
water onlywhenit has landed in a fisherman's net. If I take the
train fromBrussels to Rotterdam,I can tell the Belgian passengers fromthe Dutch: most Dutchpeople greet strangers when
enteringa small, closed space such as a train compartment,
elevator, or doctor's waitingroom; most Belgians do not.
Even clearer thancultural differencesin individualbehavior
are cultural differencesin institutionalbehavior: in families
and in organizationssuch as schools, churches,public services,
businesses. The subcultureof an organizationreflectsnational
culture,professional subculture,and the organization's own
history. Professional subculturesare to some extentinternational: there is somethingcommonin the behavior of bankemployees, journalists, policemen, or universityprofessors from
one countryto another.
The influenceof an organization's ownhistoryon its subculture has long been neglectedby organizationsociology (Pettigrew, 1977); butit is a fact thatas soon as an organizationhas
a history,the optionsfor organizationalbehavior thereafterare
constrainedby it. Beyondthe historyof individualorganizations
in the forms and techthere is a strikinghistorical continuity
structured
control
to
used
organizations,
hierarchically
niques
whichgo back even to pre -industrialstate and churchbureaucracies (Luhmann,1976. P. 102). The rules of behaviorin industrial workshopsin the nineteenthcenturywere modeled after
those in armies and monasteries. The structureand functioning
of organizationsare determinednot merely by rationality,or,
if theyare, by rationalitythatvaries according to the cultural
environment.Technologycontributesto the shapingof organifor explaininghow theywork.
zations, butit is insufficient
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28
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
There is no Monebest wayMthatcan be deduced fromtechnicaleconomic logic (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977. P. 168). Harrison (1972) speaks of "organizationalideologies" thatvary not
only amongorganizationsbuteven amongparts of organizations.
Culture affectsorganizationsin a varietyofways. First, it
affectsthemthroughits influenceon the distributionof power.
Whereas social systemsin generalcan exist because humanbehavior is predictable,organizationscan exist because thatbehavioris
controllable. The controlofhumanbehaviornecessary fororganiofpower. Any
zations is achievedthroughanunequaldistribution
its
other
and
its
coalitions
has
dominant
members;
organization
butthe relative size of the dominantcoalition, the fixityof its
composition,and the distributionof power betweenit and the
other members can vary widelyunderthe influenceof, among
other things,culture.
Second, culture affectsorganizationsfor various reasons and
in various ways, throughits influenceon the values of the dominant coalitions:
1. Because the dominantcoalition definesorganizationgoals
and objectives and identifiesthe stakeholderswhose interests
have to be respected. Business organizations,for example, face
a value issue withregard to social responsibilityversus economic success to whichtheywill respond according to the values
of their elites (Lindstedt-Axhamreand Stymne,1977). In Western countries "success" is usually seen as the satisfactionof
more demands,whichleads to goals differentfromthose of societies thatfollowthe Buddhistview of success as a reduction
in demands.
2. In decision-makingprocesses, boththroughthe alternatives thatare considered and the actual choice amongthem.
These include values in the formof economic utilities and indifference curves but also valuation criteria in accounting- for
example,in thefactthatmachinesare usually considered"invest"
ments, butpeople are not. Decision -makingprocesses lead tothe
attribution
ofscarce resources amongcompetingapplications.
3. In shapingthe organizationstructureand its formalprocedures. For example, U.S. subsidiaries of business firmsin
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Culture and Organizations
29
India have fewerhierarchical levels thancomparable local Indian firms (Negandhiand Prasad, 1971. P. 158). French firms
tendto use differentinternaltransferpricingprocedures than
British ones (Granick,1975).
4, In reward systems. Bothin schools (Hofstede,1978) and
in business organizations (Senger, 1971), members of dominant
coalitions have been shownto rate people withsimilar value
systems higherin competence. This has consequences for financial rewards and promotion,and it is one of the processes
of the dominantvalue system in the orby whichthe continuity
is
ganization guaranteed.
Third, the values of the nonelitesthatformthe majorityof
an organization's members have an indirectbutprofoundimpact
on the functioning
of organizations:
1. By determiningthe members1reasons for complyingwith
organizationalrequirements. A well-knowndistinctionhas been
introducedby Etzioni (1975. Pp. 12 ff.): Members' involvement
withan organizationcan be alienative, calculative, or moral;
the kindof power commonlyused withinthe organizationcan be
coercive, remunerative,or normative. Members will comply
best withorganizationalrequirementsif there is congruence
betweentypeof power and typeof involvement- coercive power
for alienative involvement(as in a prison), remunerativepower
for calculative involvement(as in a business firm),normative
power for moral involvement(as in a church). Business organizations assuming calculative involvementof workers and, consequently,using remunerativepower may meet withgrowing
alienationin more-educatedworkers valuingjob-contentfactors
besides money.
2. By determiningwhat regulationard controlprocesses are
necessary to guaranteedesired behavior. If people cooperate
spontaneously,rules for cooperationcan be minimal;if conflict
is frequent,there should be rules for conflictresolution (Vickers, 1970. P. 142; 1973. P. 171).
3. Generally,by determiningmembersTzone of manageability.
Laaksonen (1977) has shownhow in present-dayChina, work
organizationscan functionwithrelativelylittle supervision be-
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30
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
cause members are very manageable. It should be noted,however, thatgreateffortsare spentinideological trainingtoassure
thatthezone ofmanageabilityis notreducedbya shiftin values .
4. Byaffecting,
throughvalue consensus betweenthedominant
coalition and other members and amongmembers themselves,
the accuracy of communicationgoingon withinthe organization
(Connorand Becker, 1975. P. 556).
5. By determiningmembersTsupportto competingelites in
alternativeorganizations,such as labor unions,or in pressure
groups thatdirectlyaffectthe organization's functioning.
Fourth,culture affectsorganizationsthroughthe values of
nonmembersof the organization: values of members of competingorganizations,interactingorganizations,and governments,and of representativesof the press and of the public at
large. The values dominantin the environmentof the organization to a large extentdeterminewhatan organizationcan and
cannotdo. Shiftingvalues in society may lead to a legitimacy
crisis for organizations (Habermas, 1975. P. 96).
Culture and OrganizationTheory
The cultural relativityof the laws thatgovernhumanbehavior
was recognized as early as the 16thcenturyin the skepticism
of Montaigne(1533-1592): "Quelle vérité que ces montagnes
bornent,qui est mensongeau mondequi se tientau delà?"
[ Whatkindof truthis it thatis boundedby these mountainsand
is a lie to people livingelsewhere?] .(5)
The founding
fathersofthetheoryofmodernorganizations,such
as Tolstoy(1828-1910), Fayol (1841-1925), Taylor (1856-1915),
Weber (1864-1920), and Follett (1868-1933), and most of their
successors up until the present day have nottakenMontaigneTs
wisdom to heart, buthave typicallylooked for universal principles. The paradox is thatin their theories, the influenceof
their own cultural environmentis clearly discernible.
Let us take the issue of the exercise of authority.Weber, who
was German (and, as his otherwork shows, quite sensitive about
the role of values in society), whoteabout authorityin a bureau-
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Culture and Organizations
31
cracy - by whichhe meantany large organization,public, voluntary,or private: "The authorityto give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributedin a stable way and is strictlydelimitedby rules concerningthe coercive means. . .whichmay be placed at the disposal of officials"
undGesellschaft 1921. Partili, eh. 6, p. 650;
(fromWirtschaft
version
in
English
Weber, 1958. P. 196). For Weber, authority
the man.
not
in
the
is
office,
Fayol, who was French, puts it differently:"We distinguish
in a managerhis statutoryauthority,whichis in the office,and
his personal authority,whichconsists of his intelligence,his
knowledge,his experience, his moral value, his leadership, his
service record, etc. For a good manager,personal authority
is the indispensable complementof statutoryauthority"
(Fayol, 1916. P. 21 [my translation- G.H.]).
MaryParker Follettwas American. She wrote:"Howcan we
avoidthetwoextremes: toogreatbossism in givingorders, and
practicallynoorders given? ... Mysolutionis todepersonalize
thegivingoforders, touniteall concernedin a studyofthesituation,
One perto discover the law of the situationand obey that
son should not give orders to anotherperson, but bothshould
agree to take their orders fromthe situation" (froma paper
presentedin 1925; in Metcalfand Urwick, 1940. Pp. 58-59).
Withregard to the same issue of the exercise of authority,
Weber stresses the office; Fayol, the person; Follett, the situation. Betweenthe American and the French view, a direct dispute was started elsewhere by Fayol whenhe tookissue with
Taylor's propositionof eightfunctionallyspecialized superiors
for one person. Fayol (1916. P. 84) calls this idea "wrongand
dangerous" because it flagrantly violates" the principle of unity
of command. This principle, however,is muchmore sacred in
France thanin the UnitedStates. It must be admittedthatU.S.
practitionerswere not too eager to trythis idea of Taylor's
either; but some of it can be recognized in the modernmodel
of matrixmanagement,whichwas developed in the UnitedStates
and, not surprisingly,is notpopular in France (Laurent, 1978).
Whatis available as organizationtheorytodayis written
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32
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
mostlyby Americans and hence reflects the cultural contextof
one specific society. A collection of fifteenrecent contributions
by leading European scholars (Hofstedeand Kassem, 1976)
shows remarkabledifferencesin focus according to culture
area. Authorsfrom Latin Europe focus on power; fromCentral
Europe, includingGermany,on truth;fromEastern Europe, on
efficiency;fromNorthernEurope, on change; and, the Western
Europeans, in this case British and Dutch,have a bit of all of
these, butmore thanthe others display a concern withdata collection,whichwe also findin the UnitedStates.
Theorizingis only a semirational activity. "There are large
sections of culturethatact as a bar to the free exercise of rationality"(Kluckhohn,1951a. P. 91 [after E. Sapir] ). Or, as I
shouldprefer to put it, there is no such thingas absolute rationality: there are differentrationalities colored by different
culturallyinfluencedvalues, your rationalitydiffersfrommine,
and there is no standardby whichto determinewhichof the two
is more "rational." Cultureparticularlyaffectsideas thatare
takenfor grantedwithoutfurtherproof,because nobodyin our
environmentever challenges them. Onlycomparison of cultures
can show thatother ideas are possible. Douglas (1973) has collected documentaryevidence on the relevance of an "anthropology of everydayknowledge": our reality is man-made. We also
have a naturaltendencyto choose our environmentso thatcertain of our basic ideas are not challenged. Ideas are entangled
withour values and our interests (6), a truthwe recognize more
easily in others thanin ourselves. Ideas and theories become
popular or unpopularat a certain time not because theyare
more or less "true," but because the value systems thatsupport
themare activatedor suppressed by ecological and institutional
developments(more or less in the way picturedby the diagram
in Figure 2). Bartell (1976) has shownwhythe tThuman
relations
ideology" in the UnitedStates developed there at the time it did
(the 1930s), puttingit in the contextof such factors as traditional American values, labor-unionexpansion,the economic
depression, the New Deal, and the bureaucratizationof industrial organizations.
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Culture and Organizations
33
The claim for universal principles in organizationtheorywas
weakenedin the nopensystems" and Contingencyn theories of
organization,whichgrew around 1950 withthe workof the Tavistock Institutein Great Britain (Miller, 1976). Whereas earlier theories tendedto treat organizationsas closed systems,
able to controlall relevant variables inside themselves, nopen
systems'1models recognize explicitlythatorganizations respond continuouslyto changes in their environment,and "conn
tingency models acknowledgethatthe applicabilityof organization principles depends on specific outside factors ("contingencies") thatmay or may not occur. Initially,open systems and
contingencyorganizationtheoristswere more concernedwith
contextfactors such as technologyand marketuncertainty(on
whichresearch data were more readily available) thanwith
culture. As studies of organizationstructurewere repeated in
differentcountries,the factor culture got some attention,but
the notionsof "culture" used have been vague. A general theory
of the componentsof culture and theirimpact on organizations
has been missing. Research has usually been done withouta
priori hypothesesabout the kindof cultural effectsexpected culture beingtreated as a "variable x" thatshould accountfor
the variance leftunexplainedby otherfactors. Whereas contingencytheories formallyhave droppedthe claims for "one best
way," in practice this idea is sometimes reintroducedthrough
the back door: "Tell me whatyour contingenciesare and I will
tell you the one best way." For culturalfactors this is difficult,
whichmay explain the unpopularityof culture as a contingency.
Anothersource of cultural relativism in organizationtheory
could have been the "comparativemanagement"studies conductedin the 1950s and f60s,mainlyby U.S. business-school
of U.S.
professors underthe influenceof the internationalization
business organizations.Managementpractices inothercountries
were comparedwithU.S . practices; butthese studieslookedat
commonalitiesratherthandifferencesand,moreover,assumed
thatwheredifferencesexisted,theywouldbecomesmaller over
time - the so-called "convergencetheory"(Harbison and
Myers, 1959. P. 117;Inkeles, 1960;Kerretal., 1960; Likert,1963).
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34
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
Explicit emphasis on the cultural relativityof organization
principles is recent. A seminal article was publishedin 1974
by Brossard and Maurice: using data comparingstructuresof
matchedGermanand French business organizations,they
showedthatuniversalist models of organizationstructuresdo
not exist butthatsocietal influencesdeterminewhatworks in
a certain country. The way we organize ourselves depends not
onlyon the task at hand but also on our mentalprogramming.
Lammers and Hickson (1979) have undertakento develop the
beginningof a general theoryof Mcultureand organization/'
They argue thatcomparativestudies of organizationstendto
have a bias towardshowingsimilarities ("organizationsalike")
or differences(T'organizationsunlike"), butthatscientificintegrityimplies thatwe can show similarities onlyby tryingto
finddifferences,and vice versa. A general theoryneeds to explain similarities and differencesin terms of something,so we
have to be more specific aboutwhatit is in culturethatmakes
organizationsalike or unlike.
Resistances to Cultural Relativism
I regularlytake part in internationaldiscussion groups at
scholarly meetings;and havingbecome sensitized to it, I cannot
help but recognize the cultural influenceson the interestareas
and pointsof view takenby Scandinavian,French, American,
German,British, Italian, and Dutchparticipants - not to mention the culturalinfluenceon their way of presentingtheir ideas.
Yet I have noticedthatdrawingattentionto the cultural componentin our points of view is a risky strategythatpolarizes the
audience. Some thinkit highlyenlightening- an "Aha-erlebnis" [a revealing experience -the Mahaphenomenon'']that
suddenlyputs the entire discussion into perspective. Others, however,rigorouslyreject the notionof a cultural component,become upset, and seem to feel threatenedby it. "Possibly one of the manyreasons whythe culture concepthas been
resisted," Hall (1959. P. 50) writes, "is thatit throwsdoubton
manyestablished beliefs. Fundamentalbeliefs. . .are shownto
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Culture and Organizations
35
vary widelyfromone cultureto the next. It is easier to avoid
the idea of the culture conceptthanto face up to it." Andfurther on (P. 165)n.. .the concepts of culture.. .touchupon such
intimatemattersthattheyare oftenbrushedaside at the very
pointwherepeople begin to comprehendtheir implications."
Nevertheless, I believe thatthe battlefor recognitionof the
cultural componentin our ideas is worthwaging. First of all,
now more thana generationago, most of us meet people with
cultural backgroundsdifferent
fromours, and are expectedto
workwiththem. If we stick to the naive assumptionthatbecause theylook just like us, theyalso thinkjust like us, our
joint effortswill not get veryfar. Second, fromthe moment
we start to realize thatour ownideas are culturallylimited,
we need the others - we can never be self-sufficientanymore:
onlyotherpeople withdifferentmentalprograms can help us
discover the limitationsof our own. Once we have realized we
are the blindconfronting
the elephant,we welcome the exchange
withother blindpersons.
Acceptance of cultural relativism is in itself easier in some
cultures thanin others. On the level of intellectualdiscourse
(notnecessarily on the level of practice), the French have little
troublewithit. I knowof no other countrywhere a violent
criticism of national values like Alain Peyrefitte's Le Mal
Français (1976) could be writtenat all, especially by a cabinet
ministerof the majoritypartywho,instead of beingpublicly
rebuked,was thenadmittedto the country'smost illustrious intellectual club, the Académie Française. Perhaps the French's
sublime giftfor separatingtheoryand practice allows themto
react this way. In Germany,by contrast,any typeof relativism
is digestedwithdifficulty;
the Germantraditionis to search for
absolute truth;and in the sciences of man, most of the great
theorists of the Westernworld have been fromthe Germanculture area - Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Weber, Lewin. Germans
can, however,accept the relativityof their ideas as part of an
absolute truthof a higherorder - some "UnzulänglichkeitmenschlichenStrebens." [ "Insufficiency
of HumanEndeavor"] .(T)
Sex was the great taboo of the Victorian age. At least in the
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36
Geert Hofstede(Netherlands)
organization literature,power was the great taboo until
the 1960s. Bothtaboos have since been more or less lifted.
Culturein the organizationliteraturemay be the great taboo
of today. In all three cases, the taboo is about somethingwe
are all involvedin, butnot supposed to speak about. To the extentthatit breaks the culturetaboo, cross-cultural research
is deliberatelysubversive.
Notes
1) This analogyis borrowedfromKluckhohn(1951b. P. 405).
2) This refers to a famous little Germanpoem by Christian
Morgenstern(1871-1914), who created a magical animal by definingit.
3) Those witha vested interestin societal inequalityare fond
of theories tryingto prove thatcollective differencesin behavior are due to heredity. The GermanNazis had their race theories; in the UnitedStates not so long ago a professor froma
respectable universitytried to prove thatNegroes were genetically less intelligentthanWhites (Jensen,1969), against which
the American AnthropologicalAssociation took a public stand
(forcritiques of Jensen,see the articles followinghis article
in the Harvard Educational Review and also Brace and Livingstone, 1974). In Great Britain the heredityversus environmentissue led to the disgrace of a once-glorifiedpsychologist's being suspected of havingmanipulatedhis data in favor
of heredity(Sir Cyril Burt: see Wilmott,1977). The opposite
extremehas been foundin the Soviet Union,where the dominantideologyfavors playingdownheredityin favor of environmentalfactors, whichled to the now-refutedbiological theories
OfLysenko.
4) Dale (1974) and Dale and Spencer (1977) have furtherdisentangledthe definitionsof norms. They show thatthe statistical normof a nsentimentTt
such as a value may be different
fromthe perceptionof this norm by the majority: there is such
a thingas pluralistic ignorance.
5) Montaigne,Essais, II, XII, 34.
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Culture and Organizations
37
6) The stress on interests as the source of ideas is found
the works of Marx and Engels, buttheyfocus almost
throughout
exclusively on the modes of production;Merton(1968. Pp. 516
ff.) shows how Marx's ideas have been broadenedby Scheler
and Mannheimto include otherinstitutionalstructuresand
groupformationsas existential bases of ideas.
7) The title of a song in Bertolt Brecht's ThreepennyOpera.
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