,OOHJDOO\REWDLQHGHYLGHQFHDQGGHPRFUDF\
*HUWMDQ%RXOHW
Onder wetenschappelijke leiding van Prof. Dr. M. Adams
³0HIDFHEHYLUSHQDGRWDOLEUHFDSWLYLGDW´1
,1752'8&7,21
In this paper, I will research, from a comparative angle, on the question: to
what extent do the American and Belgian democracies have their power
critical ³SHRSOH´ reflected in their exclusionary rules concerning illegally
obtained (criminal) evidence? In other words, to what extent do those rules
allow for a balancing of the different interests at stake? Exclusionary rules can
be considered as a procedural continuation of human rights protection. Since
human rights historically have a vertical effect, i.e. the protection against
abuses of power by the state, I will have to make a distinction between
illegally obtained evidence by the public police on the one hand and the private
police on the other.
0(7+2'2/2*<
For methodological purposes, I already would like to refer to my conclusion of
this paper. First of all, I will conclude that it is important that the United States
and Belgium are ready to learn from each other. Secondly, I will ask a new
research question: “To what extent could a ³WUDQVQDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO VRFLHW\´
add to legitimate decisions and solutions concerning the international exchange
of evidence?”
³'HPRFUDF\´ is a highly cultural bounded concept. Accordingly, the
achievement of democracy does not necessarily depend on specific choices,
i.e. specific decisions and solutions. That is to say, the Belgian and American
democracy may make GLIIHUHQW choices which, in fact, give VLPLODU
democratic results. Nonetheless, the ideal of ³GHPRFUDF\´ as a ³WHUWLXP
1 "#%$
&&')(*,+ -.$
&/0 $
1+ -032
(E%/ EF($3+ -:
: J. M. REIJNTJES,
, Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 1989, 49.
!
4
(& 56( 567989$:)&$3;<(=3&$>'!&?$&@ 10 + &60 89/
/
&3-A0 (&B+ CD)0%&-
417
GERTJAN BOULET
FRPSDUDWLRQLV´2, i.e. as a common point of departure for my comparison, aims
at the avoidance of unbalances of power in general (cf infra: 3. Democracy)
and, therefore, could be achieved in a much more fruitful way by inter-national
cooperation.
My aim in this paper is, more concretely, to focus on the extent to which the
Belgian and the American choices concerning illegally obtained (criminal)
evidence are democratic choices. Since the major part of the Law of Evidence
is a product of case law, I will mainly focus on the legitimacy of judicial
choices concerning illegally obtained (criminal) evidence. Let me first of all,
for a better understanding of how democratic choices should be conceived of,
have a look at how democracy works.
'(02&5$&<3
3.1. THE “PEOPLE”
Metaphorically speaking, the ³SHRSOH´ stand not for the sum of individual’s
private interests, but for the public interest. Accordingly they aim at
developing individual freedom, which is inextricably bound up with the
avoidance of concentrations of power on a legislative and executive level as
well as on an adjudicative level. In other words, the ³SHRSOH´ stand for what
IAN SHAPIRO calls ³WKHVSLULWRIGHPRFUDWLFRSSRVLWLRQDOLVP´.4
3.2. HUMAN RIGHTS
The power-critical ³SHRSOH´ reveal themselves in the conceptions of human
rights5, which also logically aim at protecting against concentrations of power,
i.e. unbalances of power in the relation between citizens themselves
2
D9&IH<*J&$+ C19-LK9(89$
-91)@( 5LMI(*NEO1!$10 + =&<PQ19R
J. C. REITZ, “How to Do Comparative Law”, G
1998,
(617) 622.
3
This section of my paper
is based on two other papers of mine, respectively written
for another
-0 &$
'+ /CT+ EI@ + -91!$ UWV)0 8'U?( 5XPY1!R62
"#I(89-9'910 + (T-9/
methodological
course “S
and for the thematic course
( 5ZPQ19R62
"V!&C389$3+ 0 UW[F(!@ + C+ &/I19-9'>\]&*L(C3$
1!C UJ2
"9^9&9+ @ + :!D!&+ '!/7&T@ &+ '
. They are respectively titled
and
&-_\]&*L(C3$10 + &%2
. My thanks go to Professor RENÉ FOQUÉ for the useful cooperation and
comments.
H<*J&$3+ C319-WM%$3+ *>+ -91@TPQ1!Ra`%&=+ &3R
4
D. A. SKLANSKY, “Private Police and Democracy”,
2006, (89)
96 and 97.
`%&TCD0]&3-b'9&*L(C3$
1)0 + &c0 &$d'+ /C389/
/3+ &TeXf%/
/1U/.(=3&$d'!&*](9C3$10 + /CD!&g$
&C3D)0 /
=T($
*>+ -:
5
,
M. ADAMS,
"#<+ @ (/( 5!+ /CDa:)&B+ &3-h+ /i'!&j*J&&/0k(9($
/ E%$(-9l&@ + ml&
Leuven,
Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2006, 173:
+ '9&&>1!C3D)0 &$X'9&>*J&-!/&3-!$
&TCD)0 &3-?'+ &>=19-?D!&T0Y/(C+ 1@ &iCT(T-0 $1)C0 e2;Q#%$(*n1XEOD+ @ (/( EOD+ C31)@EF()+ -0Q( 5i=9+ &R
0 D9&o*L(/0O/
&*>+ -91@F+ '9&1.7&3D+ -9'dD!89*X1!-6$3+ :!D0 /i+ /i0 D!&j+ '9&31a( 560 D!&o/(9CT+ 1)@%C(T-0 $1)C0 e
The most" EOseminal
&( EI@ &%2
idea behind the social contract and consequently, behind human rights, is the idea of the
who aim at the avoidance of unjustified unbalances of power.
418
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
(horizontal effect of human rights) as well as between citizens and the state
(vertical effect of human rights).6
3.3. DEMOCRACY
Democracy stands for a society in which the ³SHRSOH´ govern.7 In a
democracy the ³SHRSOH´, symbolized8 in a social contract developed within the
public sphere9, give birth to and consequently legitimate the state (republic)10
as an emanation of the public interest.11 That is to say, a rational citizen, in
order to be free, has to give up VRPH12 freedom to the state13 as a platform on
which the ³SHRSOH´ as a metaphor for the general interest can transcend
private interests.14
6
During a discussion with Professor PAUL LEMMENS, he pointed to me that the Belgian
Constitutional Court in a very recent judgment deemed the obligation to respect the right to nondiscrimination
not only to aim at the state but also at private individuals who because of their
EI(/+ 0 + (T-?( 5%EF(RI&$Y2
significant “
are more likely to violate other people’s
rights in a discriminating
D0 0 E<; p p RIRIRke 1!$7!+ 0 $1:)&Te 7&
p
, B.10.4,
way. Constitutional Court February 12th 2009, nr. 17/2009,
B.17.2, B.18.2, B.19.2, B.20.2, B.22.6, B.29.3. "'!q*L(Tl$10 + 1k2 "'9q*L(/Y2
"l$
1)0 + 1<2
7
Democracy is derived from the Greek word
:
(people) and
(rule).
8
R. FOQUÉ, “ CriminalMF$3Justice
in a Democracy: Towards a Relational" Conception
of Criminal
+ *L+ -91)@PY1!RZ19-!'W[OD+ @ (/( E%DU
(W/
89*L79(!@ 1+ (T-6+ -jrk$
&3&3l
Law
and Punishment” ,
2008, (207) 222: G
*J&19-!/J0 (>'!&31@RJ+ 0 Dj(90 D!&$
/X(-?0 D!&>7T1!/3+ /J( 5L/
D91!$
&3'?0 &$
*J/X( 5>$&TC(:)-+ 0 + (T-)eTH<-9'W/89*L79(9@ (T-o*J&319-!/kRID91)0
7&T@ (T-:)/<0 (]&31)CD)e -L1>/(9C+ &0 UW1>/ U*L79(!@ + CJ($'9&$IC(-!/0 + 0 8!0 &/FCT(*J*J89-+ 0 UsO+ 0E%$(T=9+ '!&/T5($%1W@ 1!-:)891:)&J( 5
S
CT(*J*L(T->/3+ :)-9/<( 5J$
&CT(:!-+ 0 + (-9t( 5]C(*X*L(-FE%$(9C&3')89$&/F19-!'o+ -!/0 + 0 8!0 + (-!/
e3H<-9'>-(90(T-@ U?0 D+ /
t78)0+ 0!1)@ /(
$
& 5T&$
/J0 (W/D!19$
&3'?=1)@ 89&Tu ($+ &3-0 1)0 + (-!/k19-!'j(EO&-j0 &v90 89$
&3'?*J&19-+ -:)/XRID+ C3Do1!$&iCT(T-!/0 + 0 8!0 + =3&W( 5i/(C+ &T0 Ue
wk-@ Uo7
Uo@ + =9+ -:?+ ->1>/D91!$
&3'>/ U*]79(!@ + CX(T$
'!&$I( 5X1iC(*J*]8-+ 0 U)t!$
&CT(:!-+ 0 + (-L19-!'L$
&/ EO&TCT0 xg( 5](T-!&/&@ 5X19-!'
0 D9&J(!0 D!&$xg7&TC(*J&YEF(/
/+ 79@ &Te2
&Rzr<&$
*J19-gMF$+ 0 + {!89&
9
J. HABERMAS, “ The Public Sphere:
An encyclopedia Article” , y
1974,
"$
&1@ *_( 5L(989$I/(9CT+ 1)@@ + 5&>+ -iRID+ CDi/(T*J&0 D+ -9:i1
E9E%$(1!C3D+ -9:i1
vol.
3,
(49)
49:
The
public
sphere
as
a
EF8!7!@ + CL( E<+ -+ (T-?C19-?7&59($
*X&'!e2
D!&L*J&3'+ 1W19-!'o*](T'!&$-+ 0 UQ;Y1o/(9C+ 1)@Q0 D!&T($ U6( 5
; J. B. THOMPSON, G
0 D9&|*J&'+ 1
,"+ Cambridge,
Cambridge
Polity
press,
1995,
70: The public sphere described by
/F1W79(89$:!&(!+ /)EF8!79@ + Ck/ EOD9&$
&XR<D+ CDWC(T-!/3+ /0 &3'W( 5NE%$+ =310 &>+ -9'+ =9+ '!891)@ /FR<D)(LC31!*X&L0 (:)&0 D9&$
Habermas
0 (W'9&7T1)0 &>1!*](-:d0 D!&*J/
&T@ =3&/]0 D9&i$&3:)8!@ 1)0 + (-j( 5WC+ =9+ @Q/(9CT+ &T0 U619-9'60 D9&iCT(T-9')89C0N( 5o0 D!&>/0 10 &Te D+ /X-!&3R
G
EF8!7!@ + CX/ EOD!&$
&XR<1!/F-)(!0
E%1!$0( 5>0 D!&J/0 1)0 &L78)0)RI1!/
t(T-o0 D9&]C(-)0 $1!$ Ut!1i/ EOD!&3$
&>+ -iRID+ C3Do0 D9&J1)C0 + =9+ 0 + &/k( 5
0 D9&j/0 1)0 &jCT(8!@ 'A7T&6C(T- 5T$(T-0 &'.19-9'a/
8!7 m&TCT0 &3'g0 (dC3$3+ 0 + C+ /
*]e
D9&j*J&3'+ 89*}( 5d0 D + /WC(T- 5T$(T-0 10 + (T-.RI1!/
G
+ 0 /
&T@ 5>/3+ :!-+ 5!+ C319-0 ;%+ 0R<1!/X0 D9&%EF8!79@ + C]89/&i( 5>$
&31!/(T-!t1!/k1!$0 + C38!@ )
1 0 &3'j7
UXE%$3+ =31)0 &i+ -!
' + =+ '!81@ /k&3-:)1:)&3'6+ -
1!$:)89*J&3-0)0 D9109RI1!/k+ -%E%$+ -!C+ EI@ &J(EO&-L19-!'>8-)C(T-!/0 $1+ -9&'!e2
"$
&/ E%8!7!@ + C1k2
10
"$
&/Y2
" EF8!79@ + C1k2
Republic is"
Cderived
from the Latin word
:
(good) and
(common).
(*J*L(T-]:(!(T'k2
e
In short: the
\]&@ + 7T&$10 + =&
11
J. BOHMAN and W. REHG, “ Introduction” , J. BOHMAN and W. REHG " PQ&3:Y+ 0 + *J1)0 &
\]&*L(9C3$1)C UeJf%/
/1U/a(-b`O&1!/(T-_19-!'Z[I(!@ + 0 + C3/
,
Cambridge,
MITT
press,
1997,
IX:
:(T=&$-!*J&3-09/
D)(8)@ 'L&*L79('Uo0 D9&a~ RX+ @ @)( 5L0 D!&YEO&( EF@ &F e2
`I€X`
12
M. ADAMS, “ Lettres Persanes 12. Populisme en representatieve
democratie” ,
2008, (267)
1)C3C3& EI0 &'
274 and 276: Professor
Adams distinguishes between an
gap between citizen and state on
8- mT89/0 + 5!+ &3'
1@ + &3-!1)0 + (Tthe one hand and an
gap which comes down to an
between citizen and state
on the other.
-!'+ 19-91iK!(89$-!1)@Q( 5
13
M. TIRARD, “ Privatization and Public Law
Values: A View from France” , S
rJ@ (971)@kPQ&:!1@XV)0 8'+ &/
D!&A/0 1)0 &c+ /j-)(!0]0 D!&.:(=3&$-!*J&-)0 t]78)0J$1)0 D9&$d0 D9&A$
&/
G
2008,
(285)
288:
“
EF8!7!@ + C1)e2
-0 $('!8!C0 + (T(A[%8)79@ + CdPY1!RJ;kHMI(*NEO1!$10 + =3&AV)0 8'U
G
; E. ZOLLER, S
, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2008, 199.
14
R. FOQUÉ, “ Criminal MFJustice
in a Democracy: Towards a Relational Conception
of Criminal
$+ *>+ -!1)@>PQ1!R‚19-9'n[%D+ @ (/(EODU
" H‚'!&*](9C3$10 + C
Law and Punishment” ,
2008, (207) 211-216:
!
419
GERTJAN BOULET
*29(510(17
The result of a power-free dialogue on the level of the government will show,
among other things, to what extent a rational citizen wants to assign security
policies to the state and/or to citizens15 and to what extent such policies can
justify that infringing measures of human rights are not punishable.16 The same
CT(T-)C& EF0 + (-i( 5NEF(RI&$I/D(8!@ '>-9&=3&$<7&X'+ /
CT(T-9-!&TC0 &3'Q5T$(*ƒ0 D!&QEF@ 8$
1)@ + 0 U?( 5LC@ 1+ *J/k(T-W0 $
8)0 D>19-!'QmT89/0 + C&
1!*L(T-:WC+ 0 + B&-9/e
8)0+ 0!/D)(98!@ 'L-!&+ 0 D!&$I7&k'+ /
CT(T-9-!&TC0 &3'Q5$(*h1>/
D91!$&'>CT(T-)C&$->1!/I0 (L0 D!&k'!&3=&@ ( E%*J&3-)0
4
1!-9'i0 D9&XCT(T-0 &v90 81)@ + /10 + (T-i( 5X1L/D!1!$&'LCT(T-)C& EF0 + (-i( 5
0 D9&dE%8!7!@ + Cƒ+ -)0 &$&/0 e
(90 D!tIEI@ 89$
1)@ + 0 U„1!-9'„0 D9&dE%8!7!@ + C_+ -)0 &$&/0 ti1!$&n+ -…0 D!&ZD!19-9'!/h( 5_$
&3/ EF(T-!/3+ 7!@ &
4
D9&i/
&@ 5u+ -!/0 + 0 8)0 + -:dC1
EO1)CT+ 0 U.( 5W1j'9&*L(C3$
1)0 + CW@ &:!1@O($'!&$J/D(8)@ 'JE%$(=9+ '9&WC+ 0 + B&3-!/JRX+ 0 D
G
RX($l1)7!@ &†1!-9'‡/0 $(T-:ˆ+ -!/0 + 0 8!0 + (-9/|1!-9'|E%$(9C3&3'!89$
&/|RID+ CD‡C319-‰1!-9'‡/D(8)@ '‰&-91)7!@ &0 D!&*Š+ C+ 0 + B&3-!/D+ EFe
E%1!$0 + C+ EO10 + -:n1!/.1)8!0 (T-)(*L(89/a1:)&3-)0 /g+ -|0 D!&?E%$(C3&/
/A( 56EF(9@ + 0 + C1)@>RJ+ @ @ u 59($*J10 + (T-)e ‹ŒI„Ž]D910?‹ŒI
MFD91!$@ &/
1U@ ($xc+ -gD+ ?
/ 19-91@ U/3+ /6( 5g0 D!&.*L(T'!&$-c/(89$C&/6( 5g0 D9&./
&@ 5xaD91!/o$
&TC3&3-0 @ UbC1@ @ &3'c/0 $(T-:
G
&=1)@ 891)0 + (T-!/?‹ŒId+ />C(9u !
1 CT0 + -:aC+ 0 + B&3-!/tO1)C0 + =&T@ Ug($+ &3-0 + -:A0 D!&*J/
&T@ =3&/W0 (d(T-!&o19-(90 D!&$
tO19-9'a7
Ug0 D!&+ $
C31E%1!C+ 0 Uo( 5]7!+ -9'+ -:o0 D!&*J/&@ =&/I0 (]C3&$0 1+ ->/D!1!$&'L=31@ 89&Tu ($3+ &-)0 1)0 + (T-!/e‹ŒIFHX0+ /
/8&XD9&$
&3t0 D!&3-!t+ /<0 D910
~ D+ :)D9&$ƒ/0 19-!'EF()+ -0 ta0 D91)0./
&0a( 5z=31)@ 8&Tu ($+ &3-0 10 + (T-!/_R<D+ CD‰0 $19-!/C3&3-9'!/|0 D!&„D)89/0 @ &…19-9'‰789/0 @ &
&vEO&$3+ &-!C3&3'b7U_C+ 0 + B&-!/.+ -b0 D!&+ $j&=&3$ U'91Uƒ@ + 5&Te%H<-9'_+ 0]( 5 5T&$
/d0 D9&$
&T7
U_C3$+ 0 &$3+ 1h19-9'jE%$3+ -!C+ EI@ &/d0 (
@ &:Y+ 0 + *J1)0 &>0 D9&9+ $<1)C0 + (T-!/k19-9'?8!0 0 &$19-)C&3/
t1!/kRI&@ @1!/959($X0 D9&L*L($&>C(-!C3$
&T0 &L$
8!@ &/J7UjRID+ CDj0 D!&U?RJ+ /D
0 (A($:)19-+ /
&.0 D9&9+ $W/(C+ &0 Ue
D+ /j+ /WRID910IJ1)7&$
*X1!/
tX+ -AD+ /?0 D9&($ UZ( a
5 0 D!&6'9&*L(9C3$1)0 + Cj$8!@ &.( 5A@ 19R<t
G
C31)@ @ &3'g0 $1!-!/
C3&3-!'9&3-)C3&I5T$(*†RJ+ 0 D+ -!eX‹ŒI.0 D!&d0 $19'+ 0 + (-J5T$(*‡‹ŒI.0 (
1 U@ ($i19-!'.]1)7&$
*X1!/WC319-g7&
G
C3D91!$
1!CT0 &$3+ /&'o7U?1i/ EO&TC+ 5!+ CJ$
&T@ 10 + (T-!/D+ Eg7&T0 RI&&3-o7!(90 DWC+ 0 + B&-i19-9'?( 5 59+ CT+ 1)@Y0 (i0 D9&OEF(9@ + 0 + C1)@/(C+ &0 U6( 5
0 D9&%EI(9@ + /
e
D+ /k$
&@ 1)0 + (-!/D+ EcC1!-j7T&L'!&3/C3$3+ 7&3'o1!/J7&+ -:?$
& 5@ &v)+ =&TeYMI(9u ( E%&$1)0 + (T-o1!*L(T-:6CT+ 0 + B&3-!/k19-!'
G
( 5 5!+ C+ 1@ /W+ /i(-)@ UiEF(/
/3+ 7!@ &tI+ -a0 D!&%58!@ @ &3/0%/
&3-!/
&j( 5d0 D910ORX($'!tORID!&3-A0 D910%C(T(EO&$
1)0 + (T-d'(T&/L-(90O:!&0
7!(:9:)&3'b')(RI-ƒ($d'9&$
1+ @ &'ƒ+ -ƒ0 D!&Z+ *X*J1!-9&-!C3&h( 5Z0 D9&Z+ -0 &3$ EF@ 1Uƒ1!*](-:_‘ ’“9‘ ”‘ “9•Y–—>‘ ’˜ ™3š™›
˜ ›t>78)0
+ -!/0 &31!'Y59+ -9'!/<+ 0 /!EF@ 1)C3&]+ -i0 D9&J0 $
19-!/C&-9'+ -9:FEO&$
/ E%&TC0 + =&J( 5]0 D9&Yœ%•Y— ‘ žk‘ ’˜ ™3š
™›˜ e2
(my own emphasis)
Some countries consider the police function as an exclusive government function.
For France,
-!'+ 1!-91WK9(989$-91)@
see:
M. TIRARD, “ Privatization and Public Law
Values: A View from France” , S
"_‹
ŒInC($
$
&/ EF(-9'+ -:ZE%8!7!@ + C_/
&$=9+ C3&/ZC19-!-)(!0j7&
( 5„rJ@ (971)@WPQ&:)1)@?V)0 8'+ &/
2008, (285) 292:
E%$3+ =1)0 + B&'j7T&TC1)8/
&i0 D9&Uj'9&$3+ =&Y5T$(*|0 D!&iMI(-!/0 + 0 8!0 + (T-)e D!&/&%EF8!79@ + C]/
&$=9+ C3&3/
tQC1@ @ &3'ƒ~ C(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (T-91@
15
G
EF8!7!@ + C</
&$=9+ C&/
tŸ
+ -)CT@ 8'!&!mT89/0 + C3&3tœF — ‘ ž3™3t9'!& 5T&3-!/
&t9&3'!8!C10 + (T-!t919-9'LD!&31@ 0 D>C1!$
&e2
(my own emphasis)
R. FOQUÉ, “ Criminal MFJustice
in
a
Democracy:
Towards
a
Relational
Conception
of Criminal
$3+ *L+ -91)@>PY1!R¡19-9'n[OD+ @ (/( EODU
"MF$+ *>+ -!1)@i1)C0 /A1!$
&
2008, (207) 216:
Law and Punishment” ,
59($&*L(/0<CD!1!$1)C0 &$+ /
&3'g7
UZ0 D!&+ $i'+ /
$
8EF0 + -:g& 5 5T&CT0<(-g0 D9&6$
& 59@ &v!+ =&6$&@ 10 + (T-!/
D+ E„7T&0 R<&&3-g( 5 5T&3-!'9&3$
16
1!-9'6=9+ CT0 + *JtN1!/LC(9u C+ 0 + B&-!/i+ -.0 D!&<E%8!7!@ + CW/ EOD!&$&TeY¢d($
&T(=&3$
tO/
8!CD61!CT0 + (T-!/LC1!89/
&W16$8EF0 89$&?7&T0 RI&&30 D9&]( 5 5T&3-!'9&$F1!-9'W0 D!&)5T89-9'91!*J&-)0 1@!=31@ 8&Tu ($3+ &-)0 10 + (T-!/<( 5L0 D!&QEF(9@ + /e
D9&]@ &:Y+ 0 + *J1)C U?( 5NE%89-+ /
D!*X&-)0!D91!/
G
0 (i7T&5(89-9'?+ -o0 D9&i+ -)0 &3-!/3+ 0 Uo19-9'W& 5 59+ C1!C Uj7
UoRID+ C3Do0 D!&J$
&/ EF(-!/&L( 5>0 !
D &L@ &3:!1@($
'9&$<C319-WCT(T-)0 $3+ 798!0 &L0 (
0 D9&J$
& E%1+ $3+ -:?( 5>0 D!&J$& 5@ &v!+ =3&J$
&T@ 1)0 + (-9/D+ Eg( 5>79(90 DW0 D9&J=+ CT0 + *b19-9'o0 D!&]( 5 5T&3-9'!&3$k0 (>0 D9&NE%8!7!@ + C<:(9(T'!t0 (
0 D9&d/
D91!$
&3'g=31@ 89&Tu ($3+ &-)0 1)0 + (T-!/j( 5A0 D!&9+ $o/(9C+ &0 Ue2
(98)0 D9tI[I(9@ + C+ -:c19-!'A\]&*](9C3$1!C U
; I. LOADER, £
;W">‹
ŒIo0 D!&FEI(9@ + C3&i1)@ /(kEI@ 1U616C3$
8!C+ 1)@Q19-!'XEI(90 &3-0 + 1)@ @ Ud&3-!1)7!@ + -9:
Basingstoke,
Macmillan, 1996, 37
$(!@ &_+ -|0 D!&h*J&3'+ 1)0 + (-n( 5Z/(9CT+ 1@iC(T-
,
59@ + CT0 eo‹
ŒIc[F(!@ + CT+ -:n'9&TCT+ /3+ (T-!/a1!$&to+ -ƒ/
D)($0 tFEF(9@ + 0 + C1)@W(T-!&/
CT(T-)C&$
-9&'?RJ+ 0 D60 D9&i1)@ @ (9C10 + (T-6( 5i1j/3+ :)-+ 59+ C1!-)0TE%8!7!@ + C]:(9(T')e2
; J. WOOD, “ Why public
opinion of
[F8!7!@ + CowYEI+ -+ (the
criminal justice system is important” , in J. WOOD and T."VGANNON
(eds.),
+ -!C3&W0 D!&%E%8)79@ + CLD91!/]0 D+ /X=+ 0 1)@Y$(!@ &
1!-9'6MF$+ *>+ -!1)@K89/0 + C&
, Portland, Willan Publishing, 2009, 33:
+ -„0 D9&Z1!'!*L+ -+ /0 $10 + (-„( 5omT89/0 + C3&Z19-U†@ 1)C3l_( 5ƒC(T- 5!+ '9&-!C3&_0 D9&U…*X1U„D!19=3&n+ -…0 D!&b/ U/0 &*¤C(98!@ '
89-9'!&$
*L+ -9&]($F/
&$+ (89/@ UW'+ /
$8EI00 D9&)m89/0 + C&QE%$(9C3&3/
/e)MI(-!/&{!8&-)0 @ Ut0 (OE%$
&3=&3-0)0 D!&QE%8!7!@ + C!5T$(*_@ (/+ -T:
5T1+ 0 Da+ -.0 D!&W/ U/0 &*†+ 0F+ /J-!&C3&/
/1!$ Ua0 D910O0 D9&$
&?+ /]1)0%@ &1!/0N/(*J&oC(T-9:)$
89&3-)C&o7&T0 R<&3&3-]E%8!7!@ + CW(EI+ -+ (1!-9'†C3$+ *>+ -!1)@ImT89/0 + C&n1!$
$19-9:!&*J&3-0 /h1!-9'z1!$
$19-9:!&*J&3-0 /
e2
s
[I(!@ + C+ -:
*J19:!&/e
S
R. C. MAWBY,
, Portland, Willan Publishing, 2002, 57-59:
Quoting H.
wk-Z^+ (9@ &3-)C&
" Hk8)0 D)($3+ 0 Ug+ /J1!ARENDT,
, Londen, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970, 106 p.:
10 0 $3+ 798!0 &ƒ( 5ƒ/(9C+ 1)@j($:!1!-+ B10 + (T-|1!-9'…C19-z7T&_=3&/0 &'z+ -gE%&$
/(-!/t?( 5 5!+ C&3/Z($h($:!19-+ B10 + (-!/
e
0/
[I(!@ + CT+ -:)tIC(*J*]8-+ C10 + (T-a19-9'g@ &:Y+ 0 + *X1)C U
S
~ D!1)@ @ *X1!$
lg+ /j8-9{)8&/0 + (T-+ -:h$
&TC(:)-+ 0 + (-h7
U_0 D(/&.R<D)(A1!$&.1!/
l3&3'Z0 (c(97T&UY;J-!&9+ 0 D!&$jC(T&$C+ (T-c-)($
E%&$
/
81!/3+ (-?+ /<-!&3&3'!&3'X‹ H<$
&-9'j¥T¦Y§T¨!; ©9ªTe!#I(T$C3&]C319-?7T&L89/&'j+ -W/
8E9EF($0( 5L1!8)0 D(T$3+ 0 U?19-9'?0 (>&vT&$C+ /&
EI(TR<&$
e<PQ&:Y+ 0 + *X1)C Ub1!'9'!/j1i5T89$0 D!&$j'+ *J&-!/+ (-b0 (h0 D9&/
&a$
&@ 1)0 + (-!/D+ E%/t]7&9+ -9:Z1!/
/(C+ 10 &'hRX+ 0 Db0 D&
$3+ :!D0 58!@X&vT&$CT+ /
&g( 5A1!8)0 D)($3+ 0 Uƒ($j89/
&A( 5WEF(RI&$e2
420
Quoting D. BEETHAM,
G
D9&dPQ&3:+ 0 + *J1)0 + (-Z( 5
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
dialogue will equally show to what extent formal restrictions (as stipulated in a
code of criminal procedure) should not only apply to the public police but
equally to the private police. Logically, the reasonable expectations of a citizen
will vary depending on the purpose of security policies, i.e. security policies
serving the public interest (the finding of truth) and/or merely private
interests.17
-8',&,$5<
The result of a power-free dialogue on the level of the judiciary will show,
among other things, to what extent a rational citizen would like to remedy
illegally obtained (criminal) evidence with the exclusion of the evidence
and/or with the punishment of the person who gathered the evidence.
[I(RI&$
" (
&&T0 D!1!*ˆ‹ŒIgC3$3+ 0 &$+ 1i5(T$.@ &:Y+ 0 + *X1)C Ub1!$&c@ &:!1@
, Londen, Macmillan, 2003, 267 p.: G 4
=1)@ + '+ 0 Ut/
D91!$&'W=31@ 89&/<19-9'o&v E%$
&/
/
&3'oCT(T-!/&-)0 e!PY&3:!1)@=31@ + '+ 0 Ud+ /kCT(T-)C&$-!&3'WRJ+ 0 DW$8!@ &/
e)]&$&OEI(TR<&$
+ /i@ &:Y+ 0 + *X10 &j+ 5d+ 0I+ /L1)C{!8+ $&'d19-9'd&vT&$C+ /&'a+ -d1!CC($'!19-)C&oRJ+ 0 Dd&/0 179@ + /D9&'d$8!@ &/tOR<D+ CDd*J1UA7T&
0 $
19'+ 0 + (T-!1)@]19-9'_8-9R<$3+ 0 0 &-_($<59($
*X1@ + B&3'n+ -ƒ@ 1!R<ei‹
ŒI
D!&g/&TC(-9'Z&@ &*X&3-0>+ /a0 D!&A'+ *X&-!/+ (-_( 5
G
m89/0 + 5UY+ -:…0 D9&b$
8)@ &/c7
U…$& 5&$
&3-)C&ƒ0 (n7&T@ + & 5T/A/
D91!$
&3'„7U†0 D)(/
&ƒ+ -…0 D!&6EF(TR<&$g$&@ 10 + (-!/D+ E%to79(90 D
'(*L+ -919-019-!'o/
8!7!($'+ -910 &Te)#F($X0 D+ /k&T@ &*J&3-0Y0 (W( E%&$10 &tY0 D9&$
&L*J89/0Y7T&L1o*L+ -+ *J89*nC(*J*L(T-!1)@ + 0 U6( 5
1
E9E%$(E%$+ 10 &L7&T@ + & 5T/]‹
ŒIi+ -?0 D!&]$+ :!D0 5T8!@/(89$C3&L( 5]1)8!0 D($+ 0 U?19-!'iR<D910CT(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 &/X0 D9&LC(*J*L(T-i:(!(T')e
‹
ŒI
D+ $'@ U)t%0 D9&O5!+ -91@N&@ &*J&3-0F+ /]&3=9+ '!&3-)C&?( 5?C(-!/&3-0%(T-.0 D9&<EO1!$0%( 5j0 D!&o/
8)79($'+ -910 &IE%1!$0 Ug+ -.0 D&
G
EI(TR<&$k$
&T@ 1)0 + (T-!/
D+ EFe2
s
M<+ =9+ @ + B+ -9:?V9&TC389$3+ 0 U
I. LOADER
and N. WALKER,
, Cambridge, Cambridge
"3‹
ŒIi0 D!&]'9&*L(9C3$1)0 + C]/0 10 &LD91!/<1o-9&TC3&3/
/
1!$ Uj19-9'W=9+ $0 8!(989/EO1!$0Y0 (FEF@ 1U.+ University
Press, 2007, 5:
/
&&l+ -:A0 (j$
&1)@ + B&j0 D9&W:(!(T'a( 5?/
&TC389$3+ 0 Uh‹
ŒI6+ -d/
&3&l+ -:c‹
ŒIj0 (6CT+ =+ @ + B&o/
&TC389$3+ 0 Ua19-9'a0 (j$
&T@ &31!/
&6+ 0 /
C+ =+ @ + BT+ -:<EI(90 &3-0 + 1@32
, i.e. the state has to
"1!'9'!$
&/
/I19-9'o0 D9&($+ B&5T8!@ @ Uj0 D!&J=+ $0 89&/I19-9'i/(9CT+ 1)@7&3-9& 59+ 0 /
0 D910IC19-J59@ (TR.5T$(*†*J&*L7&$/o( 5j1iEF(9@ + 0 + C1@FCT(*J*J89-+ 0 Uh7T&9+ -9:a179@ &60 (]EF8!0%1!-9'iE%89$
/
89&j/
&C389$3+ 0 UZ+ CT(*J*L(T-)e2
H<*J&$+ C19-gMF$+ *>+ -91@OPY1!Rn`%&3=9+ &R
17
D. A. SKLANSKY,
“ Private Police and Democracy” ,
2006,
" 8!0k0 D9&a+ -0 &$
&/0 /?( 5d*J&$CD91!-)0 /W'9& EO1!$0X+ -iE%$
&3'+ CT0 1)7!@ &6RI1U/O5T$(T*0 D!&a+ -)0 &$
&/0 /?( 5a0 D!&+ $
4
(89)
98:
EI(9($
&3/0!-!&9+ :!D79($
/J‹ŒIJ19-!'FE%$3+ =1)0 &J/&C89$+ 0 UO5!+ $
*J/T59(C89/J‹ŒIL(T-o0 D!&L+ -)0 &$&/0 /<( 5>0 D!&QE%&T( EI@ &JRID(]D+ $&
0 D9&*]e2
s
H9590 &$]V)(9CT+ 1)@N\]&*](9C3$1)C UQ;%[I(9@ + 0 + C3/eOMF1EI+ 0 1@ + /
*…19-9'a0 D!&oM<(*J*](-jPO+ 5&t
J. GRAY, "¢j1!$
l3&0N+ -9/0 + 0 8)0 + (T-!/XRX+ @ @Q7&%EF(!@ + 0 + C1@ @ Ud@ &:Y+ 0 + *X10 &i(T-@ U.+ -?/(O51!$k1!/]0 D9&U6Londen,
$&/ EO&TC0
Demos,
1996,
11:
1!-9'j$& 5@ &TC0N0 D9&i-)($
*J/X19-!'60 $1!'+ 0 + (T-!/
tO+ -!CT@ 8'+ -9:d0 D!&i/&-!/&W( 5N51+ $-!&/
/tO( 5o0 D9&WC38)@ 0 89$&/XR<D)(/
&>-9&&3'9/
0 D9&U.&v)+ /0%0 (?/
&$
=3&TePQ&:Y+ 0 + *X10 + -:a0 D!&i*J1!$
l&T0N$
&3{)8)+ $
&/L0 D91)0F+ 0O7&oC389$7&3'.($J$
&*L(=3&'.+ -.+ -!/0 + 0 8)0 + (T-9/
1!-9'b1!$&1!/a( 5h/(9CT+ 1@>@ + 5T&gRID!&$&cCT(*X*L(-_8-9'!&$
/0 19-9'+ -9:)/6'!&*J19-9'ƒ0 D91)0J:(!(T'!/a7T&g'+ /0 $3+ 78)0 &3'n+ 1)CC($'91!-!C3&>RJ+ 0 D?&0 D+ C1@Y-)($
*J/L0 D!1)0N0 D!&i*X1!$
l3&0Y-!&C3&/
/1!$3+ @ U6'+ /
$
&:)19$
'!/
e2
s
I. LOADER, “ Thinking
K!(89$-!1)@N( 5>PY1!Rb1!-9'?V(C+ &0 U
Normatively About
Private Security” ,
1997, (377) 386-388: Quoting
`%&31!/(-91)7!@ &>'9&*L(C3$1)C UQ;YK«9$:!&-o]1)7&$
*X1!/X19-!'60 D!&FEF(!@ + 0 + C3/L( 5i'+ /
C(989$
/&
S. CHAMBERS,
, Ithaca,
"i‹
ŒI?0 D!&WC3&3-0 $1@Q$
&3{)8)+ $
&*J&3-)0%( 5kEF(!@ + CT+ -:A+ -j16'9&*L(C3$
1!C U
Cornell
university
press,
1996,
250
p:
‹ + / ?0 D!1)0F+ 0NC319-6/&TC389$
&o7$(T1!'d@ &3=&T@ /L( 5W1)C3C3& EI0 19-)C3&i1!C3$(/
/L7!(90 Dj')(*>+ -91!-)0Q19-!'j/8!79($
'+ -!1)0 &>:)$(98E%/e
HX@ @ (9C10 + (-h7Uh1!-9'g1)C3CT(8-0 17!+ @ + 0 U_0 (g0 D9&.*J1!$l&T0X(98T:!D0X0 D!89/o-9&=&$j0 (a'(*L+ -910 &g+ -h0 D9&./ EOD!&$
&a( 5
/
&TC389$3+ 0 Us
5($
t91!/%V+ *](-9&]M%D91!*L7T&$
/F$
&3*>+ -9'!/I89/3;]~ 0 D9&X*L($&]0 D!&]+ /
/
89&L+ /F19-o+ //
89&J( 5)m89/0 + C3&J0 D91)0!1 5 5&TC0 /
89/<1@ @3uN1!-9'j+ 5L/
&TC389$+ 0 Ud+ /
-X 0/8!CDW19-j+ /
/89&>0 D!&3'(T-X 0l3-(TRhRID!1)0Q+ /kuW~ 0 D!&J*L($
&>0 D!&5($89*_/D(8)@ '
S
$
& EF@ 1!C3&h0 D!&g*X1!$
l3&0 e ‹ŒIg'!&*](9C3$1)0 + Ca'!&@ + 7&$10 + T
( -n+ /6179@ &b‹ŒIh0 (h$&TC(T:!-+ B&h0 D910>0 D!&h+ *NEO1)C0>( 5
/
&TC389$3+ 0 UJE%$(=+ /3+ (T-j(-<E%&T(EF@ &F /k{!81@ + 0 U6( 5W@ + 5T&]:+ =3&/k1@ @YC+ 0 + B&-!/L‹ 19-9'o-)(!0mT89/0Y0 D(/&L1)7!@ &i0 (WC(T-0 $1)C0
+ -)0 (%E%$+ =310 &J1!$
$
19-:)&*J&3-)0 / ]1i/0 1!l3&>+ ->¬Y 9­c‘ ˜‘ ›<˜ i!™J“!™— ‘ ”T™3š
™“i–9’“i9š
9•!®¬˜˜ i–9žž3 9•’˜
.” (my own
V
EOD9&$
&/j( 5JmT89/0 + C&9;J1g'!& 5T&3-!/
&a( 5iEF@ 89$
1)@ + /
*,19-9'c&3{!891)@ + 0 U
emphasis); M. WALZER,"\]&*](9C3$1)C Uc+ /]16RI1UA( 5o1@ @ (C31)0 + -:LEI(TR<&$]19-9'.@ &3:+ 0 + *J10 + -9:A
, New
York,
+ 0 /L89/
&?uk($
Basis
Books, 1983, 304:
7&T0 0 &$tQ+ 0Q+ /X0 D!&NEI(9@ + 0 + C31)@RI1Uj( 5]1@ @ (C31)0 + -9:<EI(TR<&$
e!f%=3&$ U?&v!0 $+ -!/+ CJ$&1!/(T-j+ /I$8)@ &'o(98!0 eOŽ]D910CT(8-0 /
+ /L1!$:89*X&-)0O1!*](-:aCT+ 0 + B&3-!/eQ\]&*](9C3$1)C U>E%8)0 /]1LE%$&*>+ 89*†(T-d/ EO&&TCD!tE%&$
/
891!/+ (-9tO$
D!&T0 ($3+ C31)@O/
l9+ @ @ e
S
'!&31@ @ Ut0 D!&JC+ 0 + B&->RID)(L*X1!l&/<0 D!&X*L(T/0
E%&$
/
891!/+ =3&X1!$:89*J&3-)0uN0 D910+ /t0 D9&X19$:89*X&-)00 D910
EO&$
/
8919'!&/
0 D9&]@ 1!$:)&/09-)89*]7&$I( 5JC+ 0 + B&3-!/Iu:!&0 /%D+ /FRI1Ue2
!
421
GERTJAN BOULET
The exclusion of illegally obtained (criminal) evidence essentially serves three
purposes: (1) the SUHYHQWLRQ of illegally obtained evidence (purpose of
prevention), (2) the GHPRQVWUDWLRQ of the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence (purpose of demonstration) and (3) the UHSDUDWLRQ for the victim of
the illegally obtained evidence (purpose of reparation).18
On further consideration, those three purposes also serve as purposes for
punishment: (1) the SUHYHQWLRQ of new violations of the penal law (purpose of
prevention), (2) the GHPRQVWUDWLRQ of the punishment of a violation of the
penal law (purpose of demonstration) and (3) the UHSDUDWLRQ for the victim of
the violation of the penal law (purpose of reparation).
On further consideration, those three purposes have their own personal fields
of application. The purpose of prevention is directed at the person who
illegally obtained the evidence, the purpose of demonstration is directed at the
“ SHRSOH´ and the purpose of reparation is directed at the victim.
385326(65(0('<
(;&/86,21
35(9(17,21
SXEOLF SULYDWH
([HFXWLYH
3RZHU
SROLFH
0DUNHW
5(3$5$7,21
YLFWLP
&LYLO6RFLHW\
'(021675$7,21
7KH ³3HRSOH´ 6WDWH ³SHRSOH´
&LYLO6RFLHW\0DUNHW
381,6+0(17
SXEOLFSULYDWHSROLFH
YLFWLP
³SHRSOH´
The public and the private police desire exclusion and/or punishment as
remedies for an illegal finding of evidence while the victim does not. In my
view, the judge should prefer the remedy that the ³SHRSOH´ desire, i.e. the
remedy which balances at best the different interests at stake and therefore is
acceptable for a rational citizen. Indeed, one could question how a remedy not
acceptable for the ³SHRSOH´, i.e. a remedy of which the purpose of
demonstration is not achieved, can go for an emanation of the public interest.
In other words, I estimate the purpose of demonstration as superior to the two
other purposes, especially because the ³SHRSOH´ will have their choice for a
certain remedy depending, DPRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV, but QRW H[FOXVLYHO\ on the
extent to which a remedy balances the purposes of prevention and reparation.
As far as the purpose of SUHYHQWLRQ is concerned, a rational citizen has to
realize that the exclusion of evidence, in case it should not even have any
+ 0 /@ 8)+ 0 /
&@‰(=3&$°7T&RX+ mT/
8+ 0 /@ 8+ 0 + - :Y;‡&&3-Š(-9'!&$ B(T&l±-9191!$²'9&
M. C. D. EMBREGTS, ¯
0 (T&@ 1!1)0 7T191!$D!&9+ 'b=319-ƒ(T-!$
&CD0 *X10 + :_=3&$
l$
&:)&3-_7&3RJ+ mT/A+ -bD9&0]/0 $
1 T
5 $
&C3D)0 tJD9&0LCT+ =+ &@ &g$
&C3D)0]&3-bD9&0
18
7&/0 8989$
/
$&TCD0
422
, Tilburg, Universiteit van Tilburg, 2003, 105.
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
preventative effect on the public police19, D IRUWLRUL would not have a
preventative effect on the private police. Unlike the former who are
representatives of the general interest and accordingly intend to summon a
suspect in order to hear him being tried, the latter are merely representatives of
their private interests. An employer who spies upon his employee because of
suspicions of criminal facts indeed does not intend in the first place a
prosecution of the employee but rather his potential dismissal.
As far as the purpose of UHSDUDWLRQ is concerned, a rational citizen has to
realize that a victim would prefer the exclusion of evidence when the evidence
provides the only incriminating proof against him, whereas he or she would
prefer punishment when the evidence fails to provide the only incriminating
proof.
As I have already stated, the ³SHRSOH´ will opt for the remedy which does not
only provide the best balance between the purpose of prevention and the
purpose of reparation. Moreover, they will also take into account other
interests, like the finding of truth as pursued by the public police on the one
hand and the private interests of the private police on the other.
My aforementioned reasoning comes down to a ³FODVK EHWZHHQ WKH GXH
SURFHVV DQG FULPH FRQWURO PRGHOV RI ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW´. Consequently, the
main task of the judiciary in a democracy is not …
“ (…) to try and prevent this clash, which would be futile, but to ensure that it
LVDLUHGLQSXEOLF.” 20 (my own italics)
The doctrine of illegally obtained evidence is essentially a constitutional
doctrine, more concretely the procedural continuation of human rights'
protection. That is why, in a next step, I will focus on the extent to which the
Belgian and the American (judicial) choices concerning illegally obtained
evidence are democratic choices, i.e. choices that reflect the ³SHRSOH´ who are
aimed at the avoidance of unbalances of power and accordingly at a balancing
of the different interests at stake. Thereto, I will first of all have a look at the
Belgian and American WKHRUHWLFDO scopes of human rights and, then, at the
Belgian and American legal SUDFWLFHVconcerning illegally obtained (criminal)
evidence.
wkD+ (iV0 10 &]K9(89$
-91)@N( 5WMF$3+ *>+ -91@PY1R
19
D.A. SKLANSKY, “ Is the Exclusionary
Rule Obsolete?” ,
"\>(T&3/W+ 0O*J&319-dR<&WD91!=&?(8)0 :)$(RI-a0 D!&W&vCT@ 89/3+ (T-!1!$ Ua$8!@ &!³>K89/0 + C&
2007,
(567) 579, 581 and 582:
V)C1@ + 1|R<$(!0 &n+ -|L8'!/(T-„toC+ =9+ @j@ + 1)7)+ @ + 0 U,+ /g-)(R‚1@ @j0 D!&b'9&0 &$$
&3-0o& 5 5&CT0oRI&_-9&&3'.5($oEI(9@ + C3&
+ @ @ &:)1)@ + 0 Ue ‹ŒI 0Q+ /k-)(90&vT1!CT0 @ U?-!&3R</J0 D910Y0 D9&L&v9C@ 89/+ (T-91!$ Uj$
8!@ &>C19-?(-)@ U?'!&T0 &3$J0 D9&%EF(9@ + C&]R<D9&-?0 D!&U
S
C31!$&d1)7!(8!0X0 D!&d19'!*>+ //3+ 7)+ @ + 0 Ub( 5A0 D!&6&=9+ '!&3-)C&a0 D!& Ub(97!0 1+ -)e2
" 0 D9&d-9&&3'h0 (
Consequently, there is
/8E9EF@ &*J&3-00 D9&J&vCT@ 89/3+ (T-!1!$ Uo$8!@ &XRJ+ 0 DW(!0 D!&$I$
&*X&'+ &/tEO1!$0 + C38)@ 1!$@ U%5($I˜ ¬–9˜”T–›
˜Yž–˜ ™® 9š ´? µIœ% 9— ‘ ž™
ž 9’“9•Yž3˜)˜ ¬–9˜)‘ ›F’Y ˜–9‘ ¶o™3“L–˜ !˜ –9‘ ’‘ ’9®?™”‘ “!™3’ž™!µ! 9šF•›™k‘ ’ož3 9•š
˜ e2
S
20
(my own emphasis)
B. DAWSON, “ The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study” ,
, 1982, (513) 515.
-0 &$-910 + (T-91@919-!'iMI(*QE%1!$10 + =3&<PY1!Rc·X891!$0 &$@ U
!
G
D9&
423
GERTJAN BOULET
+80$15,*+76
6.1. UNITED STATES
The ³%LOO RI 5LJKWV´ is the name by which the first ten amendments to the
United States’ Constitution are known. The Fourth Amendment which is
relevant to this paper reads as follows:
“ The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”
The Fourth Amendment only holds for the public police, not for the private
police.21 This means that it only has a vertical but no horizontal effect.
Analogously, American legal practice determines the prevention of illegal
government conduct as the most important purpose of the exclusionary rule,
which is the main enforcement mechanism of the Fourth Amendment.22 That is
why the United States Supreme Court in its ³%XUGHDX YV 0F'RZHOO´
judgment decided that the Fourth Amendment did not require the suppression
of illegally obtained evidence by private citizens and accordingly by private
security personnel.23
In other words, the American ³SHRSOH´ VHHP to aim at the avoidance of
unbalances of power in the vertical relations, i.e. the relations between the
citizen and the state, and not in the horizontal relations, i.e. the relations
between citizens themselves. However, one cannot jump too fast to such a
conclusion. That is to say, the American ³SHRSOH´ are equally directed at the
avoidance of concentrations of power within the private sphere. First of all,
they are reflected in the legal conception of human rights, i.e. the way in which
the violations of human rights by citizens are punishable by law. Besides, they
are reflected in those judicial decisions, which stretch the law concerning
³VWDWHDFWLRQ´ in order to apply the exclusionary rule to private searches.
[%$3+ -!C+ EI@ &/j( 5
21
R. L. WEAVER, L. W. ABRAMSON, J. M. BURKOFF and C. HANCOCK,
, Thomson/West, 2008, 259.
22
Y. MA, “ Comparative
analysis of exclusionary
rules in the United States, England, France,
[I(!@ + CT+ -9:
"M<(*QE%1!$+ /(-d( 5?0 D!&JH<*J&$+ C1!-j&v9CT@ 89/+ (T-91!$ Ud$8!@ &
1999, (280) 296:
Germany,
and Italy” ,
RJ+ 0 Dj0 D!1)0Q( 5i(!0 D!&$XC(98-0 $3+ &/k$
&3=&31@ /J0 D!1)0Q0 D9&
-+ 0 &3'oV0 10 &/]+ /J0 D!&i(T-@ UdC(89-)0 $ Ud0 D!1)0Y$&@ + &/X/(9@ &@ Ud(MF$3+ *>+ -91@[%$(9C3&3'!89$
&
¯
0 D9&X$
8)@ &F /%'9&0 &$
$
&3-09& 5 5T&CT091!/<+ 0 /TmT89/0 + 5UY+ -:L:)$(98-9')e2
D9&
23
B. DAWSON, “ The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study” , G
S
, 1982, (513) 516 and 517; S. EULLER, “ Private
]1!$
=31!$
'iM<+ =9+ @9`I+ :)D)0 /u M<+ =9+ @PO+ 7T&$0 + &/OPY1!Ra`%&3=9+ &3R
Security and the Exclusionary Rule” ,
1980, (649)
649 and 653.
-0 &$-910 + (T-91@O19-!'aMI(*NEO1!$10 + =&iPQ19R„·X891!$0 &$@ U
424
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
6.2. BELGIUM
Contrary to the Belgian Constitution but like the American Fourth
Amendment, the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (which has no
equivalence on the American federal level) only holds for the public police,
that is, it only has a vertical effect.
However, contrary to the American legal practice, the Belgian legal practice
also determines the purpose of demonstration and reparation, in addition to the
purpose of prevention, as purposes of the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence. Consequently, the exclusionary rules will theoretically also apply to
the private police.24
,//(*$//<2%7$,1('(9,'(1&(
7.1. UNITED STATES
3XEOLF3ROLFH
The American judge theoretically will exclude illegally obtained evidence by
the public police. Nonetheless, I would like to nuance that principle in a double
sense. American legal practice first of all gives a broad interpretation to the
³JRRG IDLWK H[FHSWLRQ´, which precludes the exclusion in case the public
police gathered the evidence in good faith. Moreover, the capability of the
exclusionary rule to reach its purpose of prevention has been debated.25
-!'+ 19-91iK!(89$-!1)@Q( 5
24
M. TIRARD, “ Privatization and Public Law Values:
A View from France” , S
" -j0 D!&>C(*J*L(T-j@ 1!Rb0 $
19'+ 0 + (-9tQ0 D!&i7T1!/+ C]*L(T'!&T@Q( 5
2008, (285) 288 and 297: S
CT(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (-91@ + /
*„'!&3-(90 &/]’Y™®Y–˜ ‘ ”T™i— ‘ ¶W‘ ˜ ›> 9’a›
˜ –9˜ ™W–9ž3˜ ‘ 9’eQ`O& 5@ &TC0 + -:A0 D+ /LCT@ 1!/
/3+ C31)@N'+ /0 $89/0%( 5j0 D!&
rJ@ (971)@)PQ&:)1)@V)0 8'+ &/
/0 1)0 &t?0 D!&ƒM<(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (-…( 5n0 D!&
-+ 0 &3'„V)0 1)0 &/Z+ *NEF(/&/c=31!$3+ (89/c$
&/0 $3+ CT0 + (T-!/Z(T-…0 D9&_&vT&$CT+ /
&ƒ( 5
¯
:(T=&$-!*J&3-0 1@YEI(TR<&$
e%H<'!*L+ -+ /0 $
1)0 + =&A@ 1!R†D91!/j1@ /(L5(9@ @ (RI&'Z0 D9&/
&g(8!0 @ + -9&/e
D9&$
& 5($&t]0 D!&
e V)e
G
¯
:(T=&$-!*J&3-0D91!/k=3&$ UF5T&3RZ/8!7/0 19-0 + =3&]$3+ :!D0 /
e)[%8)79@ + C>@ 1!Rh19-9'6+ 0 /k=31@ 89&/k/
89C3DW1!/<1)CC(89-)0 1)7!+ @ + 0 U)t'!8&
E%$(C3&/
/tc19-9'ƒ51+ $-!&/
/tc1!$&,*J1+ -)@ UzE%$(C3&3')8$
1)@ eA#%89$0 D!&3$
*L($&tZ7T&TC1!89/&,/0 10 &}1)C0 ($
/†0 $+ :9:)&$
CT(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (-91@<1!-9'c19'!*>+ -+ /0 $10 + =3&>E%$(!0 &TCT0 + (-!/oR<D+ @ &.-)(-)u /0 1)0 &d1)CT0 ($
/?89/81@ @ UZ')(A-)(90 tJ0 D!&.89/
&a( 5
E%$3+ =1)0 &QEO1!$0 + &/<0 (OE%&3$ 5($
*6EF8!7!@ + C!5T8-)C0 + (-!/j~ (97/0 $
89CT0 /<0 D!&QE%$(!0 &TC0 + (-i( 5L0 D!&/&J=31@ 89&3/e3 >
- #%$19-)C3&3t7
U
S
CT(T-0 $1!/0 tQ0 D9&L/0 10 &]D!1!/<1)@ RI1U/X7T&&3-?C(-!/+ '!&$
&3'j+ -9'+ / EO&-!/1)7!@ &i7T&TC1!89/
&>( 5W+ 0 /k$(!@ &i+ -<E%$(!0 &TC0 + -9:o19-9'
'!&=3&@ ( E<+ -9:o0 D9&J$
&3/ E%8!7!@ + C1)e)MI(-!/&{!89&3-)0 @ U)t+ 0!D91!/)œ% ›‘ ˜ ‘ ”T™kš
‘ ®¬˜ ›<–9’“>“9•˜ ‘ ™›e
D+ /)EO1!$0 + C38!@ 1!$+ /
*b*J89/0
G
7&J89-9'!&$
/0 (!(T'iRX+ 0 D+ -W0 D9&X#%$
&3-)CD>`O& E%8)79@ + C319-i*L(T'9&@!1!-9'?+ 0 /<C(-!C3& EI0 + (-W( 5g~EF8!7!@ + C]+ -)0 &$&/0T‹
ŒIX19-!'
~EF8!7!@ + Ca/
&$=9+ C&FI‹
ŒITe 0J&v EI@ 1+ -!/6RIDU.EF8!7!@ + Cg@ 1!R,=31)@ 8&/<5T$(*‡1h#%$&-!C3DjE%&$
/ EO&TC0 + =&A1!$&A*L($&
S
/8)7/0 1!-)0 + =&?0 D!19-]E%$(9C&'!89$1@N19-9'6$
& 5&3$>0 (60 D9&W*L(!0 0 (j( 5j0 D!&i`%& E%8)79@ + C;?~ @ + 7T&$0 UtN&3{)81)@ + 0 Ut5T$1)0 &$-+ 0 U]
‹
ŒIL]&3-)C3&3t3E%8)79@ + Ci@ 19RZ-($
*J/k*J1Uj1
E9EI@ U.0 (IE%$+ =310 &%E%1!$0 + &/eN‹
ŒI -!'9&&3'!tN+ 5W(-9&i(!7 mT&CT0 + =3&i( 5FE%8!7!@ + C
S
@ 19R|+ /]0 (<E%$(!0 &TC0O0 D!&o+ -)0 &$&/0 /X19-!'?$3+ :!D0 /]( 5?+ -!'+ =+ '!81@ /X1:)1+ -!/0%+ -!=31!/+ (T-67
U.0 D9&>:(=3&$-!*J&-)0 tY1!/L+ /
0 D9&oC1!/
&?+ -d0 D!&
-+ 0 &3'6V)0 10 &3/
tF+ 0Q1@ /(oD!1!/L0 (67T&W$
&CT(T-)CT+ @ &'jRX+ 0 D61?›™3’›™i µj˜ ¬Y™Wž3 ¶i¶W•’‘ ˜ ´Ye2
(my
own emphasis)
D9&
25
B. DAWSON, “ The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence:
A Comparative Study” , G
-0 &$-910 + (T-91@%19-9'AMI(*NEO1!$
1)0 + =&WPQ19R„·X891!$0 &$@ U
" D!&?*J1 m($3+ 0 UA-)(TR|1!$:8&60 D91)0
S
, 1982, (513) 518: G
R<D910>+ /6-!&3&'9&'_+ /61‰~E%$19:)*X10 + C.1!-91@ U/3+ /.( 5h0 D!&A&v9CT@ 89/+ (T-91!$ U_$
8)@ &Ÿ /689/
& 58!@ -9&/
/a+ -Z16EO1!$0 + C38)@ 19$
¯
CT(T-0 &v901!-9'o0 (i0 D+ /I&3-9'iD91!/I19')(EF0 &3'>1o7T1@ 19-)C+ -:W1E!EO$(T1)CD)e
->'!&C+ '+ -:WRID!&T0 D9&$k0 (L&v90 &3-!'W0 D9&J$8!@ &
S
0 (>1W-!&3RZ/3+ 0 810 + (-?($959($
89*JtL~ 0 D9&L19-!/R<&$J+ /J0 (W7&59(8-!'?7
U?R<&+ :!D+ -:60 D9&>8!0 + @ + 0 U6( 5W0 D!&]&v9C@ 89/3+ (-91!$ U
!
425
GERTJAN BOULET
Punishment of the public police could therefore be considered by the ³SHRSOH´
as more legitimate.
3ULYDWH3ROLFH
The American judge theoretically will not exclude illegally obtained evidence
by the private police. Nonetheless, I would equally like to nuance that
principle in a double sense. First of all, the penal law does also preclude
violations of human rights by the private police.26 Moreover, American legal
practice gives a broad interpretation to the concept of ³VWDWHDFWLRQ´It means
that (certain) acts of (certain types of) the private police are to be considered as
acts of the public police, i.e. acts of the government. Building on my second
nuance of the exclusionary rule in relation to the public police, I see that the
new ³VWDWH DFWLRQ´ doctrine can have a paradoxical result: that is, the
punishment of the private police could be perceived as more legitimate than
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence by the private police.
In my view, the broad interpretation of “ VWDWHDFWLRQ´ points to an increasing
consciousness within the American society (i.e. the American ³SHRSOH´)
concerning the potential abuses of power and the violations of human rights by
the civil society.27 In that respect, it is noteworthy to read the Preamble of the
United States’ Constitution:
³:HWKH3HRSOHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQ2UGHUWRIRUPDPRUHSHUIHFW8QLRQ
HVWDEOLVK-XVWLFHLQVXUHGRPHVWLF7UDQTXLOLW\SURYLGHIRUWKHFRPPRQGHIHQVH
SURPRWHWKHJHQHUDO:HOIDUHDQGVHFXUHWKH%OHVVLQJVRI/LEHUW\WRRXUVHOYHV
DQG RXU 3RVWHULW\ GR RUGDLQ DQG HVWDEOLVK WKLV &RQVWLWXWLRQ IRU WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHVRI$PHULFD´P\RZQHPSKDVLV
Consequently, such an increasing consciousness within American (democratic)
society in the long run will be manifested in the jurisprudence of the highest
American judicial court, i.e. the United States Supreme Court. In that respect, I
would like to have a closer look at a judgment of the State of New Mexico’s
$8)@ &61:!1+ -!/0<0 D9&dC(/0 /o( 5d&v90 &3-9'+ -9:h+ 0 e3
(!0I/
89$ E%$3+ /+ -:@ Ut<0 D9&jV)8E%$
&*X&.MI(89$0FD91!/O5(98-9'c0 D910<0 D9&
y
+ -!C3$
&*J&3-0 1)@N'9&0 &3$
$
&3-0Q& 5 5&TC0%( 5W1<5T89$0 D!&$J&v!0 &-9/3+ (-d( 5?0 D!&W$
8)@ &j+ /]89-!C3&$0 1+ -.+ -j&1!C3D6C31!/&W19-9'.0 D!89/
(98!0 RI&9+ :!D!&3'i7
Uo0 D9&k'!&*X1!-9'!/I( 5L0 D9&]0 $
8!0 D)u /
&&3l9+ -:FE%$(C3&/
/
e2
26
J.
S.
KAKALIK
and
S.
WILDHORN,
“ Law
and
private
police” ,
1971, 220 p.
27
Cf D. MAYER,
“ Workplace
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment:"f%an
End to Reasonable
H<*J&$+ C1!89/+ -9&/
/.PQ1!R‡K9(89$
-91)@
=3&-…0 D)(98T:!D…0 D!&o5(89$0 D
4
Expectations?”
,
1992, (625) 629:
1!*J&3-!'!*X&-)0?')(&/c-)(!0o'+ $&TC0 @ Uz:(=3&$-hE%$+ =310 &ƒ/
&CT0 ($h&*QEI@ (
U)&$
/
t6+ 0 />m8'+ C+ 1)@d+ -0 &$ E%$&0 10 + (T-†+ /
D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke $1!-9')e ($:p E%8)7/ p $
& EF($0 / p ¸¨9¨§p `%¹Y§¸!e EO' 5
+ - 59@ 89&3-0 + 1)@k+ -iE%$(=+ '+ -9:.:8)+ '919-)C3&60 (dCT(89$0 /tF1!$7)+ 0 $
1)0 ($
/
tF19-9'a1)@ @F&*QEI@ (
U)&$/?+ -g0 D!&JEO$3+ =31)0 &j/
&CT0 ($
179(8)0b0 D9&‰l+ -9'!/}( 5|E%$+ =31)C U²+ -0 &3$
&3/0 /,0 D!1)0h'!&/&$
=&nE%$(!0 &TC0 + (-!ec¢d($
&T(=&3$
th-)89*X&$(89/†/0 1)0 &
CT(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (-!/JD!19=&IE%$(T=9+ /+ (T-!/>0 D910EO19$
1@ @ &T@%0 D9&O5(989$0 D61!*J&3-9'!*J&-)0 eF‹ŒI?M<(T-!/0 + 0 8)0 + (T-91@TE%$(90 &CT0 + (T-9/
1@ /(LE%$(=+ '9&j/(C+ &0 1@I7&3-)CD!*J1!$l/u /0 19-!'91!$'!/o0 D!1)0F1!$&j1EI0<0 (a7T&jD)(-)($
&3'g7Ug=1!$+ (89/i/
&:)*J&3-0 /W( 5
/(9CT+ &0 Ue
D)89/tQ0 D!&]V!8E%$&*J&iMI(89$0Ÿ /!5(89$0 Do1!*X&-9'!*J&3-0'!&C+ /+ (-!/k*J&$+ 0CT@ (/&L10 0 &3-)0 + (-!e D9&Uj$
&3=&31@
G
G
0 D9&>@ + -9&>( O
5 E%$3+ =1!C UkE%$(!0 &CT0 + (T-o7& UY(T-9'iR<D+ CDIEF8!7!@ + CX&*NEF@ (U&$
/<C319-9-(90)— ™®Y–— — ´?:(L1!-9'o7& UYT
( -9'WRID+ C3D
E%$3+ =1)0 &k&*NEF@ (
U&$
/%/D(8)@ 'L-)(!0!™3˜ ¬‘ ž3–9— — ´W:(9e2<‹ *%Uo(RI-L&*NEOD!19/3+ / 
426
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
Court of Appeal about the search of a citizen by private security guards.28 In
my opinion, the view of law expressed by the victim of the search equally
expresses the ³VSLULWRIGHPRFUDWLFRSSRVLWLRQDOLVP´:
“ I was yelling at him to stop because, I mean, I thought it wasn’ t OHJDO to
search anybody, you know, without any consent, you know.” (my own
emphasis)
The Court of Appeal interpreted ³VWDWH DFWLRQ´ in such broad terms that it
encompasses much more than actions by private security companies which
pursue evidence in preparation for criminal prosecutions29:
“ (… ) we have held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches effected by
a private party who is acting ‘as an instrument or agent of the Government.’
We therefore determine whether the mall security guards in this case were
acting ‘as an instrument or agent of the Government’ when they seized and
searched Defendant.
This requires an analysis to determine whether, and to what extent, police
officers of the State were involved with, or connected to, the conduct of the
mall security guards. If that involvement or connection is sufficient to
conclude that the State was involved, then the conduct will be deemed ‘state
action’ with the consequence that its validity will be scrutinized by Fourth
Amendment standards.
D6WDWH$FWLRQ8QGHU7KH0XULOOR7HVW
0XULOOR involved a search conducted by an off-duty investigator. (… ) Under
these circumstances, we concluded that the burden is on the State to show that
the officer was acting in a truly private capacity, and to make this
determination, we considered the four factors enunciated by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in &RPPRQZHDOWKY/HRQH (… ) Those factors
are: µ ZKHWKHU WKH JXDUG DFWHG XQGHU WKH FRQWURO RI KLV SULYDWH
HPSOR\HU ZKHWKHU WKH JXDUG¶V DFWLRQV FOHDUO\ UHODWHG WR KLV SULYDWH
HPSOR\HU¶V SULYDWH SXUSRVHV ZKHWKHU WKH VHDUFK ZDV FRQGXFWHG DV D
OHJLWLPDWH PHDQV RI SURWHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SULYDWH SURSHUW\ DQG ZKHWKHU WKH PHWKRGV DQG PDQQHU RI WKH VHDUFK ZHUH UHDVRQDEOH DQG QR
PRUHLQWUXVLYHWKDQQHFHVVDU\.’ In this case, however, there is no indication
in the record that any of the Coronado Mall security guards were off-duty
police officers. (… ) Thus, while the factors to be considered by 0XULOOR are
helpful, they are not dispositive in answering the question posed in this case.
28
Mexico,
31st
January
2008,
.
]1!$
=31!$'oMk+ =9+ @9`<+ :!D)0 /u Mk+ =9+ @9P%+ 7&$0 + &/
29
S. EULLER, “ Private Security"3‹
and
the Exclusionary Rule” ,
ŒI?0 D!&$&j+ /]/0 1)0 &W1!CT0 + (T-jR<D9&-JE%$3+ =1)0 &W/&TC389$3+ 0 ULE%&$
/(-9-9&@ tQ1)C0 + -:
PQ1!R_`O&=+ &3R
1980,
(649)
651:
+ -9'!& E%&3-9'!&3-0 @ Ut+ -!=3&/0 + :!10 &XC3$3+ *J&/%19-9'%E%89$
/8&k&=9+ '9&-!C3&]+ -%EO$
& E%1!$10 + (-Y5($FC3$+ *>+ -91)@E%$(/&TC38)0 + (T-!/
e2
Court
of
Appeal
State
of
New
D0 0 E<; p p C(T1)e -!*]C(989$0 /e :(=p ')(9C389*J&3-0 / p( E<+ -+ (T-!/ p V!19-)0 + 19:()ºi¸¨#IwXe EO' 5
!
427
GERTJAN BOULET
Nevertheless, we do consider them for guidance in resolving the ultimate issue
before us.
The first /HRQHfactor is whether the guard acts under the control of his private
employer (… ) If the investigation exceeds the guard’ s private duties or
authorization, he may be considered a government actor. (… ) most courts
reason that ‘the primary function and concern of privately employed security
officers is protection of their employers’ property, rather than conviction of
wrongdoers.’ (… ) The mall security guards exceeded their private duties by
chasing Defendant, throwing him to the ground, handcuffing him, and
searching him. When they engaged in these activities the mall security guards
were not doing anything to safeguard mall property or patrons. (… )
Secondly, we consider whether the actions of the mall security guards clearly
related to the private employer’ s private purposes. (… ). The conduct of the
mall security guards in this case clearly exceeded any private legitimate needs
of the Coronado Mall. No legitimate private purpose was being served by
chasing Defendant, throwing him to the ground, handcuffing him, and
searching him.
Third, ‘the investigation must be a legitimate means of protecting the
employer’ s property, and so must be reasonable in light of the circumstances
surrounding it.’ «. In this case, Defendant posed no threat to the Coronado
Mall property, Defendant had not damaged or destroyed any mall property,
and the mall security guards did not suspect him of shoplifting.
Finally, we consider whether the method and manner of the search performed
by the mall security guards was reasonable and no more intrusive than
necessary (… ) There was no justification for macing and throwing Defendant
to the ground simplybecause he did not obey their order to get to the ground.
(… ) Furthermore,the search performed by the mall security guards was clearly
more intrusive thannecessary.
E6WDWH$FWLRQ8QGHUWKH3XEOLF)XQFWLRQDQG*RYHUQPHQW$JHQW7HVWV
The conduct of private security guards who are not off-duty police officers
may also be measured under Fourth Amendment constitutional standards in
appropriate cases. µ:KHQWKH\SHUIRUPDSXEOLFIXQFWLRQRUDFWDVDJHQWVRI
D JRYHUQPHQW LQYHVWLJDWLRQ WKHLU DFWLYLWLHV PD\ WKHUHIRUH EHFRPH VWDWH
DFWLRQ IRU FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SXUSRVHV¶ (… ) Whether the private officers are
performing a public function or are acting as agents of the government is
determined as a question of fact. (… )
We conclude the evidence supports a finding that the mall security guards
were performing public, police functions in this case. It is evident that
‘[s]ecurity personnel hired to protect private business premises are performing
428
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
traditional police functions when they arrest, question, and search for evidence
against criminal suspects.’ (… ) We have recognized, as have other courts, that
the use of private security forces is expanding in the United States (… ) (‘We
are mindful, however, of the increasing reliance placed upon private security
personnel by local law enforcement authorities for the prevention of crime
and enforcement of the criminal law and the increasing threat to privacy rights
posed thereby’ ) (… ). One study of private policing has recently concluded that
today, ‘private police participate in much of the policing work that their public
counterparts do.’ Elizabeth E. Joh, 7KH3DUDGR[RI3ULYDWH3ROLFLQJ (… ). It is
clear that, like the public police, private security guards have the potential to
violate citizens’ constitutional rights. (… ) It is also evident that a serious
danger to constitutional liberties would result if private security guards were
allowed to perform these traditional police functions such as arresting,
questioning, and searching for evidence, without applying any constitutional
protections. 6HH 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 6HDUFK DQG 6HL]XUH (… ); David Alan
Sklansky, 3ULYDWH 3ROLFH DQG 'HPRFUDF\ (… ). We therefore align New
Mexico with other courts that have expressed realistic concerns about
safeguarding our constitutional rights where private police forces are used.
(… ) These few concerned courts have fashioned a realistic ‘public function or
acting in the public interest test’ which maintains that where organized and
structured private security entities or agents assert the power of the state to
investigate or make an arrest, or detain persons for subsequent transfer of
custody to the state, or subsequent state law enforcement and the state has
acquiesced or allowed such use of public power, such private organized action,
in contemplation of state involvement, is sufficient to enable a court to apply
constitutional restraints (… ) We therefore conclude the totality of the
circumstances support a finding that the mall security guards were performing
public, police functions.” (my own emphasis)
Although ³VWDWH DFWLRQ´ traditionally required the active involvement of the
public police in the acts of the private police30, such a precondition does not
seem to be necessary anymore in light of the aforementioned ³VWDWH DFWLRQ´
and ³SXEOLF IXQFWLRQ´»3¼ tests. In my view, those tests will add greatly to an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in light of present social
circumstances32, rather than in light of its original intent. Consequently it could
add greatly to more legitimate case law.
]1!$
=31!$'oMk+ =9+ @9`<+ :!D)0 /u Mk+ =9+ @9P%+ 7&$0 + &/
30
S. EULLER, “ Private Security and the Exclusionary
Rule” ,
"rJ(=&$-!*J&3-)0j+ -9=(9@ =3&*J&3-0iD!1!/c7&&3-d5(98-9'!tW19-9'…0 D9&
1980, (649) 654 and 656:
&v9C@ 89/+ (-91!$ UW$
8)@ &k1
E9EF@ + &3'!t+ -W0 D!$
&3&X$
&@ 10 &'iC@ 1!/
/&/<( 5]C31!/&/k+ -9=(9@ =+ -:i/
&+ B389$&]( 5J&=+ '!&3-)C3&J7
U<E%$+ =310 &
PQ1!R¡`O&=9+ &R
/
&TC389$3+ 0 UA( 5 59+ C3&$
/
eY#<+ $
/0 tN'+ $
&CT0N1!/
/+ /0 19-)C3&O5$(*cE%8!7!@ + CIEF(!@ + C&?( 5 5!+ C3&$
/]D91!/>7T&&-<5(89-9'.0 (jCT(T-!/0 + 0 8!0 &
/0 1)0 &.1)C0 + (-!eL‹
ŒI.V!&TC(T-!'9tX/0 10 &a1!CT0 + (-cD91!/d7T&&3-i5(89-9'hRID!&3$
&>E%$3+ =31)0 &a/&TC8$3+ 0 U6E%&$
/(-9-!&T@k1)CT0 &3'
1@ (-9&tY78)01)0Y0 D9&]'+ $&TC0 + (-?(T$k/
8:9:)&/0 + (-?( 5%EF(!@ + C3&>( 5 59+ C&$
/eN‹ŒI
D+ $'!t/0 10 &]1)C0 + (T-WD!1!/X7T&&3-O59(8-!'
G
R<D9&$
&YE%$+ =310 &X/
&C89$+ 0 Uo( 5 5!+ C3&$
/%D91!=3&J7T&&-]:+ =3&-L/ EO&TCT+ 1)@9{!891!/+ u EF(!@ + C&X/0 1)0 89/
e2
]1!$
=31!$'oMk+ =9+ @9`<+ :!D)0 /u Mk+ =9+ @9P%+ 7&$0 + &/
31
S. EULLER, “ Private Security and the Exclusionary Rule” ,
1980, (649) 657-665.
M<(9@ (*]7!+ 1LPY1!RA`%&3=9+ &R
32
D. A. SKLANSKY, “ The
Fourth Amendment and Common Law” ,
2000,
" (h+ '!&3-0 + 5U~ /
&1!$CD!&/o1!-9'c/
&9+ B389$&/Q:(=&$-!&3'Z7U_0 D9&?H<*J&3-!'!*J&3-)0 tJ0 D9&
(1739) 1739 and 1740: G
PQ1!Ra`%&3=9+ &3R
!
429
GERTJAN BOULET
7.2. BELGIUM
,OOHJDOO\REWDLQHGHYLGHQFH
According to Belgian law, evidence will be considered illegal when it is
gathered (1) by the government or a private citizen with the intention to use it
at trial and (2) by means of (i) the commitment of a criminal offence, (ii) a
violation of the law of criminal procedure, (iii) a violation of the right to
privacy, (iv) a violation of the right to a defense or (v) a violation of the right
to human dignity.33
([FOXVLRQRIHYLGHQFH
Three judgments of the Belgian Court of Cassation concerning the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence are noteworthy.
First of all, the Court deemed in a judgment of -DQXDU\ WK 34 the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence to be necessary in case of the
cumulative fulfillment of two conditions: (i) in case the evidence was illegally
REWDLQHGby the one (public or private police) who XVHV it at trial; (ii) in case
the evidence was illegally obtained with the intention to use it in criminal
proceedings.
Subsequently, the Court supplemented those conditions in its ³$QWLJRRQ´
judgment of 2FWREHU WK 35 by judging that the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is only necessary in particular circumstances. Thus the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will not be an automatic sanction
anymore. I would like to stress once more that such decisions manifesting a
decline in legal protection for the suspect are legitimate as long as they are
“ DLUHGLQSXEOLF” .36
The Court deemed that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is only
necessary in the following three cases: (i) in case the fulfillment of certain
procedural rules is laid down in the law on penalty of nullity, (ii) in case the
V)8E%$
&*X&>MI(989$0/3+ -)C3&X½k1)0 BX=Te
-+ 0 &'iV0 10 &/<D91!/<1!/l&3'WR<D9&0 D!&3$<1<EO1!$0 + C38)@ 1!$X+ -!=3&/0 + :!10 + =3&>0 &C3D9-+ {!89&
¯
+ -9=19'!&/o19-,~ &v E%&CT0 10 + (T-h( 5>E%$3+ = 1!C Ub0 D!1)0<› 9ž3‘ ™3˜ ´b‘ ›Xœ%š™ œ%–9š™3“g˜ gš™3ž 3®’‘ ¾™d–›Z¿ š
™–› 9’–!— ™¿
. (… )
#<+ 0 0 + -:@ U)t%0 D!&?MI(89$0Ÿ /]$
&31!/(T-+ -:A+ -j½<10 B?‹
ŒIO5(C89/&'d(-d0 D9&W$
&1)@ + 0 + &/>( 5o*L('9&$
-d@ 19Rƒ&3- 5($C&*J&3-)0
$
10 D!&$I0 D!19-i0 D!&k&9+ :!D0 &3&3-0 D)u C3&3-0 89$ Uo($3+ :Y+ -!/I( 5]0 D!&<#I(89$0 DkH<*J&3-9'!*J&-)0 e2
(my own emphasis)
V0 $
1 5T$
&C3D)0N&-6/0 $1 5 E%$(9C3&3/
$&TC3D)0N=(9($>7T1)CD!&T@ ($
/J
F. VERBRUGGEN and R. VERSTRAETEN,
, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2007,
336.
D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke C31!/
/
e 7T&
34
Court of Cassation 17th January 1990, D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke C31!/
/
e 7T& .
35
Court of Cassation 14th October 2003,
.
D9&
36
B. DAWSON, “ The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study” , G
-0 &$-910 + (T-91@919-!'iMI(*QE%1!$10 + =3&<PY1!Rc·X891!$0 &$@ U
S
, 1982, (513) 515.
33
'!&&T@9¸
430
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
illegality has affected the reliability of the evidence, and (iii) in case the use of
the evidence at trial would breach the right to a fair trial.37
I would like to have a closer look at the last case in which a judge has to
exclude illegally obtained evidence. The notion of a fair trial is inextricably
linked to article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The
Belgian Court of Cassation deemed in a judgment of 0DUFKWKÀ3Á that
the instance of a fair trial depends on the circumstances of the case, for
example: the fact that the JRYHUQPHQW intentionally committed the illegality,
the fact that the severity of the crime goes far beyond the committed illegality,
the fact that the illegally obtained evidence only points to a material element of
the crime or the fact that the illegality only has a small impact on the right to
freedom that is protected by the violated rule.
A closer look at the first assessment criterion brings us back to the ³$QWLJRRQ´
case in which the Court of Cassation agreed upon the reasoning of the Court of
Appeal except for one part, i.e. to the extent that the Court of Appeal
prohibited the LQWHQWLRQDO disregard of the interests of the accused, but not to
the extent that the Court of Appeal prohibited to disregard his interests LQ D
UXGHZD\.
7.3. EVALUATION
3XEOLFSROLFH
The American as well as the Belgian judge will base their decisions as to
whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence on the ³JRRG IDLWK´ of the
public police. Nonetheless, contrary to the American judge, the first step of the
Belgian judge will not be the verification of the ³JRRGIDLWK´; rather, it will
verify whether the public police gathered the evidence with the LQWHQWLRQ to use
it at trial. If so, the Belgian judge will then verify in a second step whether the
public police LQWHQWLRQDOO\ violated the interests of the accused, i.e. whether the
public police did not act in ³JRRGIDLWK´.
In the same manner, contrary to the American judge, the Belgian judge will
have his decision to exclude illegally obtained evidence not H[FOXVLYHO\ based
on the ³JRRGIDLWK´ of the public police, but also on RWKHU criteria. In my view,
such a decision allows for a much better balancing (cf supra: 3. Democracy)
between the interest of the finding of truth on the one hand and the legal
protection of the accused on the other than the American judge’ s decision,
which excludes the illegally obtained evidence as a quasi-automatic sanction
(except in case of the public police’ s good faith).
V0 $
1 5T$
&C3D)0N&-6/0 $1 5 E%$(9C3&3/
$&TC3D)0N=(9($>7T1)CD!&T@ ($
/J
37
F. VERBRUGGEN and R. VERSTRAETEN,
, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2007,
339.
D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke C31!/
/
e 7T&
38
Court of Cassation 23th March 2004,
.
'!&&T@9¸
!
431
GERTJAN BOULET
3ULYDWHSROLFH
The $PHULFDQ judge has the possibility to exclude illegally obtained evidence
by the private police through a broad interpretation of the concept of ³VWDWH
DFWLRQ´.
The %HOJLDQ judge on his part will verify whether, in order to conclude to the
(il)legality of the produced evidence, the private police gathered the evidence
with the LQWHQWLRQ to use it at trial. Nonetheless, he will not verify whether, in
order to conclude to the ex- or inclusion of the produced evidence, the private
police LQWHQWLRQDOO\ violated the interests of the accused. In fact, the Court of
Cassation in its aforementioned 2004 judgment determined that criterion to
solely aim at the public police. Consequently, the decision to exclude illegally
obtained evidence by the private police will (i) be independent of an
LQWHQWLRQDO or UXGH violation of the interests of the accused, but merely (ii)
dependent on the other assessment criteria, unless the private police’ s acts
would be considered as government’ s acts by means of ³VWDWHDFWLRQ´. In my
opinion, a broad interpretation of ³VWDWH DFWLRQ´ could and should influence
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which has so
far ascribed the acts of the private police to the government RQO\WRWKHH[WHQW
that the latter played an active role in those acts.39
Besides, just as the QRQDSSOLFDWLRQ of the first assessment criterion
unjustifiably (i.e. illegitimately) could reduce the protection of the accused, so
the DSSOLFDWLRQ of the other assessment criteria unjustifiably could reduce the
interests of a private individual who illegally gathered the evidence, but who
has no significant position of power in relation to the victim.
That is why I would like to stress that compared to Belgium, the United States
are more democratic because they use a public function test in order to qualify
private security acts as government’ s acts. But they are less democratic when
they connect exclusion as a quasi-automatic sanction to illegally obtained
evidence by the public police.
However, I also have to stress that compared to the United States, Belgium is
more democratic with respect to its introduction of specific legislation for
private detectives as one of the very first countries.40 Although the United
States has licensed private detectives for a very long time, it never considered
such licensing to come down to enough government involvement in order to
make the licensees government actors.41 Nonetheless, the existence of ³VWDWH
DFWLRQ´ is independent of some kind of state regulation of private policing
39
D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke &CD!$e C(&e + -0 p &TCD!$ p L(*J& EO19:!&3Â9f
y ;
Cf ECHR November 23th 1993, A. vs. France,
D)0 0 E<; p p RIR<Rke &TCD!$e CT(T&Te + -)0 p &TC3D9$ p L(*J& EO1:)&Â!f
e
y
ECHR April 8th 2003, M.M. vs. The Netherlands,
e V!e
40
4
Wet 19 JULI 1991 tot regeling van het beroep van privé-detective,
2 oktober 1991.
]1!$
=31!$'oMk+ =9+ @9`<+ :!D)0 /u Mk+ =9+ @9P%+ 7&$0 + &/
41
S.
EULLER,
“
Private
Security
and
the
Exclusionary
Rule”
,
PQ1!Ra`%&3=9+ &3R
1980, (649) 656.
432
!
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
since the state’ s failure to regulate comes down to the encouragement of
private policing and subsequently also involves ³VWDWHDFWLRQ´.42
In short, there is no reason for the United States nor for Belgium not to learn
from one another so that they can reach the most legitimate or democratic
decisions and solutions, on a governmental and an adjudicative level
respectively.
&21&/86,21
My conclusion does not really come at a surprise: First of all, I would like to
draw the general conclusion: it is important that the United States and Belgium
are ready to learn from each other. During a discussion with Professor PAUL
LEMMENS, he pointed to me that the Belgian Constitutional Court in a very
recent judgment deemed the obligation to respect the right to nondiscrimination not only to aim at the state but also at private individuals who
because of their significant “ SRVLWLRQRISRZHU´ are more likely to violate other
people’ s rights in a discriminating way.43 In my opinion, the broad
interpretation of ³VWDWHDFWLRQ´ is based on the same power critical ³VSLULWRI
GHPRFUDWLFRSSRVLWLRQDOLVP´.
Secondly, I believe that the principles I have developed in this paper give me
the opportunity to formulate another research question: to what extent could
international or European regulations concerning the international exchange of
evidence be legitimated by the international or European ³SHRSOH´, i.e., the
³WUDQVQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOVRFLHW\´or ³(XURSHDQSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\´?44
-9'+ 19-!1JK9(89$
-91)@( 5LrX@ (97T1@PY&3:!1@
42
E. JOH, “ The Forgotten Threat:
Private Policing and the State” , S
"[%$3+ =1)0 &iEI(9@ + C+ -9:ƒ+ /j-)(!0X1!CC389$
1)0 &T@ Ub'9&/C3$+ 7T&'h1!/d(T-!&g( 5h+ -0 &$
*>+ 0 0 &3-!0
2006,
(357)
357:
$
&3:)8)@ 10 + (-!eoŽJD!&0 D9&$a+ 0X&-!C(989$1:)&/d7U|+ -91!CT0 + (T-!t]($6'+ /C(89$
1:)&/d0 D!$(8T:)Db@ &:Y+ /@ 1)0 + (T-Z19-!'jE%8)79@ + C
V0 89'+ &/
C3$3+ 0 + {)8&tN0 D!&>/0 1)0 &o+ /X1@ RI1U/L+ *QEI@ + C10 &3'd+ -60 D!&>'9&=3&@ (E%*X&-)0N( 5IE%$+ =310 &FEF(!@ + CT+ -9:)e
D!89/
tYRID+ @ W
& + 0Y*X1U
G
7&WCT(T-9=&3-+ &-)0%0 (?/ EO&19lo( 5W1j-)(!0 1)7!@ &o@ 1)C3lo( 5o$&3:)8!@ 1)0 + (-d(T=&$NE%$+ =310 &IEF(!@ + C3&i1!/J16$&:8!@ 1)0 (T$ a
U @ 1E%/&3t
0 D9&X/0 1)0 &kD!&$&]+ /%1@ /(L0 19l9+ -:>1>/0 19-)C&]0 (RI1!$'%E%$3+ =1)0 &YEF(!@ + CT+ -:)t)0 D!$(8T:)DW+ 0 /
5T1+ @ 89$
&J0 (J1)C0 e2
D0 0 E<; p p R<RIRke 1!$7)+ 0 $
1:!&Te 7T&p
43
Constitutional Court February 12th 2009, nr. 17/2009,
, B.10.4, B.17.2,
B.18.2, B.19.2, B.20.2, B.22.6, B.29.3,
44
D. HALBERSTAM, “ Comparative Federalism and the Role
of the Judiciary” , in K. E.
D!&dwIv 59($
'.D!1!-9')7!(9(Tld( 5.@ 1!R|1!-'
WHITTINGTON, D. R. KELEMEN and G. A. CALDEIRA, G " H<$:)89*J&3-0 /ƒ179(8)0g0 D!&†C&3-0 $1@
EI(9@ + 0 + C3/
, Oxford, Oxford university press, 2008, (142) 155:
:(T=&$-!*J&3-0 /?/
8E%&$3+ ($?*]($
1)@<1!-9'oEF(!@ + 0 + C1@kCT@ 1+ *‰0 (a1!8)0 D($+ 0 Un‹
ŒId1!$
&a71!/&'h(T-Z0 D!&A+ '!&31Z( 5a1
EI(9@ + 0 + C31)@oCT(*J*J89-+ 0 U†0 D!1)0oCT(*QE%$(*>+ /
&/Z+ -9'+ =9+ '!891)@ /g1)C$(/
/h0 D!&b=31!$+ (89/gCT(T-!/0 + 0 89&3-0W/0 1)0 &/e2
HABERMAS, “ Towards a European political community” ,
!
V)(9C+ &0 U
2002, 58-62.
; J.
433