China Policy Institute Policy Paper 2015: No 1
Dealing with the ISIS Challenge: What China Might Do and Its
Implications for China’s Anti-terrorism Policy
Dingding Chen
Significance
The rise of ISIS poses a potential serious challenge to China’s national security at both domestic and
international levels. Thus, the international community may be encouraging China to undertake
serious efforts to deal with the ISIS non-state challenge by cooperating with other powers. China can
benefit from gradually changing its long-held non-intervention policy, as its overseas interests
continue to expand. In the end, a more active anti-terrorism policy would enhance China’s domestic
security, overseas interests, and international image.
What we need to know
Perhaps most analysts would agree that the rise of ISIS in 2014 was one of the most important
international events in recent years, one that has both regional and international implications.
Armed with an extreme ideology and brutal methods of killing, ISIS is now the principal driver of
global anti-terrorism efforts. Although China so far has not been a direct target of ISIS activities, the
spillover effects on China’s national security cannot be underestimated, particularly as ISIS has
spread into North Africa and Central Asia now.1
Why is ISIS a potential serious threat to China? There are three main reasons for this. First, ISIS has
openly declared its territorial ambition toward China’s Xinjiang province, which is increasingly restive
because of the tensions between local Uyghurs and Han people. Second, the spread of ISIS could
threaten China’s oil investments in Iraq and nearby regions. Third, ISIS’s growth and expansion could
encourage domestic terrorist groups within China and lead to more terrorist attacks against the
Chinese government.
Thus, it will be in China’s interests to actively engage in containing the rise and spread of ISIS. To
achieve this goal, China must gradually abandon its long-held non-intervention policy and enhance
international cooperation with other key players such as the U.S. through deeper intelligence sharing.
By strengthening international cooperation, China could, in the long run, eliminate the negative
influence of ISIS on China’s restive Xinjiang region in particular and on other regions within China.
Detailed Analysis
Reasons for China to join the global coalition
Briefly speaking, there are five good reasons for China to join an international coalition to fight ISIS.
First and foremost, it is in China’s security interests to destroy ISIS, which is already a threat to
China’s national security and could become a very serious threat if they gain more power and
influence. ISIS has proven to be a brutal organisation, willing to kill innocent people who do not
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share their radical religious views. After beheading two innocent American journalists in 2014 and
two more Japanese nationals in 2015, it is not inconceivable that one day ISIS could do the same to
Chinese nationals. ISIS also has territorial ambitions toward China’s Xinjiang province and
unconfirmed reports suggest that it might have recruited Chinese nationals already. If true, then this
is a serious problem as it shows that domestic terrorism in China is now closely connected to
international terrorism. Given the series of terrorist attacks within China in recent years, there is
evidence that Chinese leaders would be very worried that domestic terrorists could gain support
from international terrorists, thus further complicating anti-terrorism efforts in China.
A second reason for China to join the international coalition to fight ISIS is the invaluable combat
experience that the Chinese military can gain in doing so. Despite the quick increase of China’s
military power in recent years, many questions still remain when it comes to the People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) actual fighting capabilities because the PLA has not fought a real war in about 30 years.
If the “Chinese military can assemble as soon as summoned, fight any battle, and win,” as China’s
minister of defense recently said, then it desperately needs better training in areas like logistics,
coordination, intelligence, and so forth. How can you gain real combat experience if you never
participate in war? Although fighting pirates (Gulf of Aden, 2008) has some useful functions, fighting
a real war is what matters the most for the PLA.
The third benefit is that joining the fight against ISIS would entrench Chinese power more deeply in
the Middle East. Now that China imports more oil from the Middle East than the U.S. does, it cannot
sit on the sidelines even if it wants to. Even if China does not want any part of the trouble in the
Middle East, it seems logical to posit that the trouble there will eventually find its way to China.
Given China’s heavy dependence on the Middle East for its energy security, Chinese military
presence there aimed at protecting its expanding economic interests is not inconceivable.
The fourth benefit is that fighting ISIS is good for China’s aspirational leadership narrative and global
image. Considering the widespread negative press and hatred of ISIS, the reputational risk for China
once it gets involved is limited since fighting ISIS is essentially providing a global public good. The
international community has complained that China is not doing enough in terms of its international
responsibility. Although this view is arguably unfair, what matters most are perceptions (or
misperceptions, as the case might be).2 Fighting ISIS would give China a good opportunity to clarify
its position and enhance its international image and reputation.
Last but not least, fighting ISIS could improve U.S.-China relations at a volatile moment when SinoJapanese rivalry is rising. The U.S. is limited in fighting ISIS fully (for example, with boots on the
ground) because of domestic political factors and past failures in Iraq; thus Washington needs
greater help from other powers. Arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world, the
Sino-U.S. relationship needs stability and cooperation. Fighting ISIS together provides such an
opportunity. Moreover, as the U.S. shifts its attention to Asia Pacific through its ‘Pivot to Asia’
strategy, cooperating with the U.S. in the Middle East could reduce the U.S.’s pressures on China in
Asia. Such cooperation could also lead to more strategic trust between the two militaries, which is
seriously lacking due to a series of structural factors.3
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Reasons against China joining a global coalition
There are, however, four factors weighing against China’s participation in a global coalition to fight
ISIS.
The biggest worry and concern for many Chinese observers is that the American blandishments
toward China are simply a trap in order to get China embroiled in a big mess in Iraq. According to
this argument, China should not fight the war for the United States. This kind of conspiracy theory is
always popular in some quarters in China. The interesting thing is that we cannot tell whether the
conspiracy on the part of the U.S. is real or not, but it does not really matter. Whether China will be
trapped in Iraq or not depends on China’s own strategic goals and actions. The reason the U.S. was
trapped in Iraq for many years was because it had unrealistic and overly ambitious goals, i.e.,
reforming the whole Middle East through military occupation. China would not pursue such goals as
its objectives are much narrower, like peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and protecting its own interests.
One related worry in Beijing is that China’s involvement in Iraq might generate anti-China feelings
among terrorist groups and in some Arab countries. This concern may be exaggerated because,
unlike the U.S., China’s goals are limited. The U.S. went into Iraq for the purpose of regime change,
which historically generates hatred and resentment. Terrorist groups and some countries in the
Middle East hate the U.S. mainly because it has a tendency to impose its own values and systems on
others through military occupation, and it maintains a special relationship with Israel, which is the
root cause of the Palestinian problem. China does not face any of the above issues, thus making
itself an unlikely target of Arab anger. In addition, ISIS is also regarded by Arab countries as a cancer
to regional stability and peace, further increasing China’s legitimacy in the fight against ISIS. If some
groups in the Middle East shift their resentment to China, then it might suggest that those groups
are already hostile toward China. The best response to such hostilities, then, is to confront them
rather than running away from them.
Another concern is that China’s PLA has very limited capabilities to fight overseas. However, it is
precisely because of this shortcoming that China can benefit from joining the campaign against ISIS.
By doing so, China can improve its fighting capabilities. Given China’s deteriorating security
environment, a military conflict with others cannot be entirely ruled out. In order to win a war, there
is no better preparation than participating in a real war. More importantly, a military presence in
Iraq could provide solid security for Chinese investment there. Imagine how much more of China’s
investment could have been saved during the Libyan Civil War if Chinese troops had been stationed
there. China lost about $20 billion in Libya and its stake in Iraq is much bigger (although most of
China’s investments are in southern Iraq, far away from ISIS-controlled territory).
Finally, there is the concern over China’s long-held non-intervention policy if China actively engages
in the Middle East. China has traditionally maintained a non-intervention policy to avoid getting
involved in other countries’ internal affairs. But times have changed. China’s growing interests and
power in Africa and Latin America, for example, simply mean that China will need to find a way to
protect its own commercial interests and increase its international influences in those regions.4
Indeed, some Chinese scholars have already called for a ‘creative engagement’ policy toward other
regions. And Chinese leaders have realized that some form of intervention is unavoidable. Thus, the
key is not what term China adopts to justify its policies toward some unstable countries; whether
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China’s intervention on the ground can bring benefits to China and the local countries is more
important. As long as China does not try to impose its own values and model of development on
other developing countries, one could argue that some degree of intervention is harmless and would
be welcomed by others.
Conclusion
In the end, whether or not China joins the international coalition to send troops overseas to fight ISIS
is hard to predict. Beijing will find it harder to strike a balance between non-interventionism
principles, humanitarian ideals and economic interests. Certainly, it would be unwise for China to be
dragged into the messy Middle East, as China currently does not wield enough power to bring peace
and stability to the region.
Nevertheless, directly engaging with ISIS would bring multiple benefits to China in the short run,
including a demonstration of China’s new global leadership role; it is one that many within the
international community still understate.5 China can afford to bear more international
responsibilities as its economic enmeshment with other parts of the world deepens.
Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University
of Macau and Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. His
research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights.
He can be found on Twitter at@ChenDingding.
Views and assessments articulated in the CPI Policy Papers are that of the author/s. They do not
necessarily represent the views of the CPI at the University of Nottingham.
Endnotes
1
http://cn.dailyeconomic.com/2015/02/16/28648/
2
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-is-no-international-security-free-rider/
3
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal
4
http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151713-71922.shtml
5
For China’s new efforts to play the role of a global leader, see http://theconversation.com/afghanovertures-show-china-getting-comfortable-with-life-as-a-us-deputy-37426
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