The responsibility to protect in the case of humanitarian crises: an emerging norm
of international law?
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the principle of the responsibility to protect, commonly
1
referred to as ‘R2P’, in 2005. The basic premise of the responsibility to protect is that the international
2
community has a duty to collectively protect civilian populations from certain categories of atrocities. In the
version endorsed by the General Assembly, the responsibility to protect is triggered by four specific
3
categories: genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The protection of civilians
from natural or environmental catastrophes is not expressly included within this endorsement of the
4
responsibility to protect. Arguments have been put forward advocating action to protect citizens from natural
and environmental catastrophes, but under the current definition of the doctrine as accepted by the General
Assembly, they would need to be made within the context of these four recognised categories. The one most
likely to be of use in the context of natural and environmental catastrophes would be crimes against
humanity.
If a government’s calculated disregard for its citizens amounts to a crime against humanity, methods of
prevention should be employed if reasonably possible given the situation. All non-military coercive measures
should first be exhausted (as military intervention would be as a last resort under Security Council authority).
Background
I.
•
The evolution of the principle of responsibility to protect
In the 1990s, controversy arose over a series of military ‘humanitarian interventions’ into states in
conflict, from which the principle of the responsibility to protect developed. This controversy revolved
around arguments supporting state sovereignty and a strict policy of non-intervention into the internal
affairs of a sovereign state, and alternative arguments supporting the right of military intervention in
5
situations of humanitarian crisis.
1
World Summit Outcome Document, UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 at paras 138–139
[hereinafter ‘Outcome Document’].
2
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (report) (International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) [hereinafter ‘ICISS Report’] available at www.iciss.ca/menu-en-asp.
3
Outcome Document, supra note 1.
4
Ibid.
5
See Responsibility to Protect, International Crisis Group, at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1 (last
accessed 2 October 2008).
•
In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a challenge in his Millennium Report to the General
Assembly: ‘[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
offend every precept of our common humanity?’
•
6
In 2001, as a response to Kofi Annan’s challenge, the Government of Canada sponsored the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent commission
7
charged with the task of clarifying the scope and objectives of the responsibility to protect. The ICSS’s
comprehensive report, The Responsibility to Protect, is widely cited and is an influential reference. The
report is detailed below.
•
In 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released a
report to the General Assembly entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. The panel
recommended acceptance of the responsibility to protect as an ‘emerging norm’ exercisable ‘in the event
of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.’
•
8
In 2005, the Secretary-General submitted the report In Larger Freedom to the UN General Assembly at
9
the opening of the 2005 World Summit session. The report recommended the endorsement of
responsibility to protect as an emerging norm for the international community to embrace.
•
In 2005, the General Assembly adopted the 2005 Outcome Document of the World Summit. The
adoption of paragraphs 138–139 represents a commitment on the part of the General Assembly to the
basic principle of the responsibility to protect, though this is limited in scope to ‘genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’
•
10
The Security Council recently passed two resolutions confirming a commitment to the principles of the
responsibility to protect. The UN Security Council Resolution 1674, concerning the protection of civilian
11
populations in armed conflict,
reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document
regarding the responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
12
Security Council Resolution 1706, concerning the situation in Sudan and the establishment of an
6
The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, chap 4, at 48,
delivered to the General Assembly, (3 April 2000) UN Doc No A/54/2000, available at
www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm.
7
ICISS Report, supra note 2.
8
UNGA A more secure world: our shared responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (2 December 2004) 59th Session (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 available at www.un.org/secureworld; see
Appendix A.
9
UNGA In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all – Report of the Secretary-General (21
March 2005) 59th Session (2005) UN Doc A/59/2005 available at: www.un.org/largerfreedom, see Appendix B.
10
Outcome Document, supra note 1, Appendix C.
11
It should be noted that Resolution 1674 does not make a distinction between international and non-international armed
conflicts.
12
UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement [‘Reaffirms the provisions
of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’].
2
international peacekeeping mission, recalled the previous Resolution 1674 reaffirming paragraphs
13
138 and 139 of the Outcome Document.
•
On 21 February 2008, the Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck of the United States as Special
Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect. Mr Luck’s role will be to continue to
develop the concept as well as assist the General Assembly in building a consensus on the responsibility
14
to protect as set out by paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome document.
II.
The ICISS report on the responsibility to protect
The ICISS report
15
should be taken only as a framework and working guide to the principles of the
responsibility to protect as the UN General Assembly did not expressly endorse it. However, the report is
16
often cited in discussions and is a helpful reference to the principles of the doctrine
This section will provide
a brief overview to the ICISS report and the framework of the responsibility to protect that the International
Commission has offered.
The basic principle of the responsibility to protect is that state sovereignty implies state responsibility for the
protection of the people living within a given state. However, if a population within a state is suffering serious
harm, and the respective state is either unable or unwilling to protect that population, then the responsibility
falls on the international community to intervene and provide protection to the harmed population.
Intervention does not always imply military intervention, which should be used only as a last resort.
The existence of the responsibility to protect as a collective responsibility on all states is grounded in:
obligations inherent to the concept of sovereignty; UN Security Council’s responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security; specific legal obligations under human rights law, humanitarian law and
national law; and the developing practice of states, regional organisations and the Security Council. The
three elements of the responsibility to protect, as identified by ICISS, are responsibilities to prevent, to react
and to rebuild. Prevention is the paramount element and all prevention options should be exhausted before a
more drastic military strategy is taken.
a. Responsibility to prevent
If the international community finds that a population of citizens is suffering one of the identified types of
harm, and the state in question is either unable or unwilling to protect the population, then the international
community is obligated to commence with protective measures. If the conflict is such that prevention is still
13
UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706, [‘Recalling also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on
women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005)
on children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter alia
the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document, as well as the
report of its Mission to the Sudan and Chad from 4 to 10 June 2006’].
14
UNSG, ‘The Secretary-General Appoints Edward Luck of the United States as Special Advisor’, (21 February 2008)
UN Doc SG/A/1120, BIO/3963.
15
Supra note 2
16
R J Hamilton, ‘The responsibility to protect: from document to doctrine – but what of implementation?’ (2006) 19
Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 289 at 293.
3
an option, then the international community should apply all possible measures of prevention, short of
military intervention. Sanctions, political and diplomatic pressure, and other coercive measures should be
exhausted first, with military intervention as a last resort and after careful consideration of all facts and
implications.
According to the ICISS report, effective prevention should address ‘both the root causes and direct causes of
17
internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.’
Prevention measures aimed at the
‘root causes’ of conflict may address political and economic needs, and legal protections such as
strengthening the rule of law and domestic legal institutions. Prevention measures aimed at ‘direct causes’
may include political and economic measures in the form of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, suspension of
organisation memberships and ‘naming and shaming’. They may also include legal measures such as
mediation and arbitration, ad hoc tribunals and human rights monitors. Military sanctions could include arms
embargoes and ending military cooperation.
b. Responsibility to react – principles for military intervention
1. JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD
To warrant a military intervention there must be ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or
imminently likely to occur’. This comes in the form of either:
•
‘Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product
18
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation’ ; or
•
Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended.
2. PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES
The ICISS Report adds that four other conditions need to be met in addition to the just cause threshold to
ensure that the use of military intervention will be strictly limited to human protection purposes.
•
Right intention: the primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states
may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral
operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.
•
Last resort: military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
•
Proportional means: the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be
the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.
•
Reasonable prospects: there must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the
suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse
than the consequences of inaction.
3. RIGHT AUTHORITY
17
18
ICISS report, supra note 2, synopsis at p xi.
Ibid at 32.
4
Having established these criteria, the Commission then examined the issue of the right authority to
determine whether a military intervention is warranted. After analysing the provisions of the UN Charter
and the role of the Security Council, it drew the following conclusions:
•
The Security Council is the best forum for military actions. The five permanent members, if not
actively supporting intervention, must be willing to abstain and not veto the resolution.
•
If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative
options may be:
o
consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under
the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure; or
o
action by a regional or sub-regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
subject to the organisation’s seeking prior authorisation from the Security Council. However,
the ICISS Report notes that in some cases, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, intervention
was authorised retroactively.
c.
Responsibility to rebuild
The responsibility to rebuild includes the responsibility to provide full assistance with recovery, reconstruction
and reconciliation, particularly after a military intervention. Attention should be addressed to the root causes
of the intervention and what the intervention was meant to halt or prevent.
If military intervention is contemplated, a reconstruction and reconciliation plan should be in place before
action is taken. There should be commitment of funds and resources and a close commitment to working
with the local population. The security of the population should be assured, and an exit strategy should be
contemplated for intervening troops.
III.
The denial of humanitarian relief as an emerging norm of the responsibility to protect
The ICISS report included the responsibility to protect civilian populations from the catastrophic effects of
natural and environmental disasters. This possible scenario was identified by the Commission as a potential
situation that could trigger a military intervention. The Commission noted that military intervention should be
used only in the most extreme situations and as a last resort. In order to justify intervention it must be found
that there is ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur’.
19
One
situation identified was ‘overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is
either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or
threatened’.
20
However, when the responsibility to protect was debated at the 2005 World Summit, the issue
of environmental and natural catastrophes was deleted and the scope of responsibility was confined to the
presently accepted four specific situations; genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic
cleansing. Genocide means acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group.
21
War crimes are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or other serious
19
Ibid at 32.
Ibid at 33.
21
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2; 9 Dec 1948: 78 UNTS 277.
20
5
22
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.
Ethnic cleansing is a term
used for the death or displacement of members of an ethnic group in order to change the ethnic composition
of a region. Crimes against humanity are acts committed with knowledge, in a widespread or systematic
manner, against a civilian population, including murder, deportation, torture, persecution, or ‘other inhumane
acts’.
23
For the responsibility to protect to be applied to include denial of humanitarian relief after a natural
disaster under the norms accepted by the General Assembly, it would have to be argued that such a denial
falls within one of the four accepted categories of protection. The most likely category for such denial would
be crimes against humanity.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines crimes against humanity as acts such as
murder, enslavement, deportation, torture, sexual offences, discriminatory persecution of groups and ‘other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or mental
or physical health’.
24
The definition further requires that the crime be ‘committed as part of a widespread and
25
systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack’.
The attack itself is
further defined as ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts […] pursuant to or in
26
furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such attack’.
It would therefore appear that mere
negligence would not be sufficient to amount to a crime against humanity. However, it is open to
interpretation whether an active decision taken to refuse aid which was otherwise reasonably available,
which has a widespread effect of an inhumane nature as part of a systematic persecution of particular
groups might satisfy the definition.
IV.
27
Burma/Myanmar as a case study
If a catastrophe like that in Burma arose again, any action based on the responsibility to protect would be
most effective in the form of prevention efforts and coercive measures short of any use of force. A military
invasion would have to be authorised by the UN Security Council and would only be applied as a last resort
and in an extreme situation. Given the current politics of the Security Council, it is unlikely that a Chapter VII
intervention resolution would succeed. Since the 2003 Iraq invasion, the international community is generally
28
wary of a military intervention into a sovereign state.
Furthermore, China and Indonesia have already
expressed their disagreement with any Security Council-initiated intervention action during the Burma crisis
when this was mooted.
29
The international community would be more accepting of an approach focusing on prevention of large scale
suffering, or focusing on sanctions and other non-military coercive measures. This is especially important to
22
Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 17; 12 Aug 1949: 75 UNTS
287.
23
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 7.
Ibid article 7(1)(k).
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid article 7(2)(a)
27
For opinion pieces on the applicability of the responsibility to protect in the case of Burma, see Crisis in Burma,
Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society, at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/latest_news/1653.
28
Hamilton, supra note 16 at 293.
24
6
the Burma scenario because the situation does not neatly fit into one of the four currently recognised
categories of application of the responsibility to protect. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure are the most
common forms of prevention tactics, but any creative and case-specific measures could be employed.
Currently, most commentary concerning the responsibility to protect and the denial of humanitarian aid in
Burma takes the position that this was not a situation justifying military action, and some argue that the
responsibility to protect label should not be applied to responses to it at all.
30
Nevertheless, some scholars
31
are of the opinion that the government’s reaction in Burma actually amounted to crimes against humanity .
Advocates of the responsibility to protect fear that by stretching the principle to include this category of harm,
it will be diminished and lose its acceptance within the international community.
Most believe that the scope of the responsibility to protect should stay narrow, so that it remains acceptable
as an option for the international community to use in extremely dire situations and not suffer a backlash
32
similar to that after the Iraq invasion and other unauthorised invasions.
Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the ICISS report, stated that ‘intervention in the case of a natural disaster is only
possible under the aegis of R2P if a government's calculated disregard for its citizens amounts to a crime
against humanity. The doctrine was not intended as a shortcut for the international community to provide
relief in desperate cases of natural disaster’.
33
But, he nevertheless adds: ‘If what the generals are now
doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death,
can itself be characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does
indeed cut in’.
34
Edward Luck, the UN Special Advisor on the responsibility to protect to the Secretary-General, has also
35
expressed concern in the stretching of the responsibility to protect to include the situation in Burma.
Ramesh Thakur, a member of the ICISS committee, did, however, offer some recommendations on possible
actions: direct exchanges with the Burmese authorities; making encouraging but not threatening resolutions
and statements by the Secretary-General, General Assembly and Security Council; help from the major
Asian powers and the regional organisation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
36
The international community is slowly coming to terms with the fact that states have a collective duty to
protect civilian populations who are not being protected by their host state from certain situations. But as it is
29
Reuters, ‘China, Indonesia reject France's Myanmar push’ (8 May 2008) at
www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSN08518240.
30
See generally, Crisis in Burma, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society’, at
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/latest_news/1653 (provides a commentary of recent debates and articles
concerning Burma and responsibility to protect and a list of media sources and writings from noted scholars). See also R
Thakur, ‘Crisis and Response Part I’ Yale Global Online (19 May 2008) available at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10824; G Evans, ‘Facing up to our Responsibilities’, The Guardian (12
May 2008) at www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/12/facinguptoourresponsbilities.
31
M A Newton, ‘Seeking Justice for Burma – A Case for Revoking the Credentials of SPDC’, Vanderbilt University, 2008.
The author argues that the government has committed the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, forced
transfer and inhumane acts.
32
Crisis in Burma, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society’, supra note 30.
33
Evans, supra note 30.
34
Ibid.
35
‘World wrestles with Burma aid issue’ BBC News (9 May 2008) at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asiapacific/7392662.stm.
7
difficult to encourage the international community to commit to protective actions even in the most
extreme emergencies, there is genuine concern that the expansion of the principle of the responsibility to
protect to include situations other than those expressly agreed upon might diminish the doctrine’s
effectiveness. However, if it is found that a particular situation does fit within the accepted category of crimes
against humanity, then the international community should act to protect the citizens of the world. Moreover,
there is nothing to prevent NGOs encouraging the relevant stakeholders to expand the purview of the law,
which is always an evolving and organic entity.
V.
Risks of misuse of the responsibility to protect doctrine
As the responsibility to protect is still an emerging concept, not yet defined by any binding international
instrument, there is a risk for the doctrine to be given inaccurate interpretation by states wishing to justify
unilateral action in another state. At the time of the introduction of the concept of responsibility to protect
some resistance was expressed, particularly by developing countries which feared that it could be used to
justify intervention by powerful states on their territory or in their internal affairs. The controversial military
intervention in Iraq in 2003 further reinforced these concerns. Statements made by the United States and
British Governments to justify this intervention ex post facto as humanitarian provide an example of the real
risk of manipulation of the doctrine.
The Secretary-General report and the Outcome Document frame the contours of the responsibility to protect
and specify that any action should be taken through the Security Council. However, the conflict between
Georgia and Russia recently illustrated that this has not eliminated the risk of misuse of the doctrine. In his
explanation of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, the Russian Foreign Minister stated that in the
circumstances, Russia had to exercise its responsibility to protect, as a concept enshrined in the Russian
constitution and agreed upon by the UN and the international community.
As explained by researchers of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, to comply with the terms
of the World Summit Outcome document, Russia, if it had evidence of serious crimes potentially being
37
committed in Georgia, should have worked through the UN and first use diplomatic measures.
The use of
military force should have only been envisaged as a last resort and not without approval of the Security
Council.
The international community has yet to reach an agreement on the limits and the extent of the responsibility
to protect. The idea of stretching the meaning of the doctrine to include intervention in cases of natural
disasters, such as in Burma/Myanmar, raises concerns among supporters of the responsibility to protect.
Similarly, widening the concept to include intervention to put an end to a dictatorial regime, as was argued by
the United States to justify its presence in Iraq, does not draw international consensus, particularly if the
intervention is not authorised by the Security Council.
36
R Thakur, ‘Should the UN invoke the responsibility to protect?’ The Globe and Mail (8 May 2008).
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect:
Background Note’ (19 August 2008) at http://globalr2p.org/pdf/related/GeorgiaRussia.pdf.
37
8
As one commentator notes, the concept of responsibility to protect gained international notoriety
extremely fast.
38
If used properly, this doctrine has the potential of creating a real collective responsibility to
prevent serious violations of human rights. It is crucial that the UN’s message regarding the definition and
the use of the responsibility to protect be clear and consistent so as to safeguard the credibility of the
doctrine and its acceptance among the international community.
38
Author Thomas Weiss notes that ‘[w]ith the possible exception of the prevention of genocide after World War II, no
idea has moved faster or farther in the international normative arena than the Responsibility to Protect’. T G Weiss, ‘R2P
after 9/11 and the World Summit’ (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal 741 at 741.
9
Appendix A
UNGA ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility - Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change’ (2 December 2004) 59th Session (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 [Relevant Sections]
201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now
Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign governments but their
responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international community. There is a growing
recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to intervene’ of any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect’ of every
State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic
cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. There is also a
growing acceptance that while sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own
citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be
taken up by the wider international community – with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response
to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the
cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures
as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be
deployed as a last resort.
202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing with these
cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by step, the Council and the wider
international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of
a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorise military action to redress
catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the situation is a ‘threat to international peace
and security’, not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved.
203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,
exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide
and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which
sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
10
Appendix B
UNGA ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change’ (2 December 2004) 59th Session (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 [extract] [emphasis
added].
135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its 16 members from all around the world, endorsed what
they described as an ‘emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect’ (see A/59/565, para
203). While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I
believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This
responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d'être and duty is to
protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the
responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help
protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the
Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations,
including enforcement action, if so required. In this case, as in others, it should follow the principles set out in
section III above.
11
Appendix C
World Summit Outcome Document, UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 [extracts].
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in
accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,
to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
12
Appendix D
Important Resources
a. 2001 Report of the International Commissions on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp
b. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (endorsed by UN General Assembly) – Final Version
www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html
c.
List of United Nations reports, statements and resolutions referencing R2P
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/united_nations/
d. Responsibility to Protect, Engaging Civil Society, Crisis in Burma – NGO
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/pages/1182
e. A Threat to the Peace, A call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma,
www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/Burmaunscreport.pdf
i. 2005 comprehensive report calling the UN Security Council to act in the case of Burma.
Prepared by the law firm DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, commissioned by Honourable
Vaclav Havel, Former President of Czech Republic and Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.
ii. Identifies five factors, of which one or more have caused the UN Security Council to act
in the past, and concludes that are all five factors are present in Burma’s case, preCyclone Nargis:
1. overthrow of democratically elected government;
2. conflict among factions;
3. major humanitarian and human rights violations;
4. refugee outflows; and
5. drugs and HIV/AIDS
f.
The Burma Campaign UK – NGO www.burmacampaign.org.uk/unitednations.php
13