___________________________________
___________________________________
Tolerance, Loyalty to Values and Respect for the Law
1
Herman De Dijn
The Liberal-pragmatic Idea of Tolerance
The modern idea of the right to freedom of
each human being can be briefly described as
follows: it is the right to personal judgment in
matters of what is true and good and to selfdetermination of one’s life and actions in view
of this judgment. Today this right is considered
as the most basic, or one of the most basic,
unquestionable rights of the individual. At the
same time, our present situation is characterized
by an undeniable pluralism. We have practically
given up the hope that individuals, through their
own judgment, will come to an agreement as to
what are the central values in life, as to what is
the good life. On the contrary, too much unity
and agreement immediately raises the suspicion
of more or less hidden constraint or indoctrination. In a pluralistic, free society, every
defense of what is the good can only be seen as
the defense of a particular conception of the
good, which is potentially threatening for the
self-determination of other individuals. The
combination of the stress on freedom and the
fact (and supposed value) of pluralism, leads to
an extreme importance being given to tolerance.
Tolerance, together with the multiplicity of
life-styles, seems to be something positive in
itself.
Within this perspective, the real question
does not seem to be whether tolerance is
something positive in itself, but whether it has
any limitations.2 One limitation seems almost
self-evident: my freedom to think and do what I
want, must go together with my recognition of
the right of others as to their self-determination.
This implies, at the very least, that, in
exercising my rights, I certainly should not
harm others. I should not, in furthering my aims
and preferences, kill, injure or in general do
real harm to others, because thereby I take
away or diminish the very basis of their
freedom.
Within a liberal-pragmatic perspective, further restrictions of the freedom of individuals
can be envisaged, in other words, further
limitations as to toleration: those which have to
do with the inevitable pragmatic organization of
individual freedoms (e.g. traffic-rules, taxation,
etc.). Some liberal authors even deny the individual the right to freely engage in acts
seriously endangering his own life, if the consequences of these acts are liable to put a heavy
burden on the general community (e.g. the
obligation to wear safety-belts in cars, etc.).
Finally, there are restrictions, even within
the law of very liberal states, which it seems
impossible to defend from a liberal perspective:
certain legal restrictions (on blasphemy,
pornography, euthanasia, etc.). Nevertheless,
even these restrictions can be upheld within the
liberal perspective, not on the ground that
anybody engaging in these acts goes against
truth or morality, but on the ground that these
acts seriously offend deep-seated sensitivities of
(large) groups of individuals. The reason invoked is considered as an extension of the noharm principle3 to psychic or moral distress.
This whole liberal-pragmatic conception of
tolerance, and of its possible restrictions,
betrays a certain conception of man4 and of
society: what one could call a ‘sentimentalist’
conception of man, and a pragmatic conception
of society and of the State. Man is seen here
not primarily as a being geared towards
goodness and truth, but as a being trying first
and foremost to avoid pain, but also to acquire
pleasure as much as possible; it is in line with
this sensitivity, that man develops all sorts of
subjective preferences which he wants to
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 27
___________________________________
implement freely. Restrictions on this freedom
can only be accepted because of possible harm
to another’s sensitivity. Society, more
particularly the State, is seen here as a sort of
mega-machine which pragmatically organizes
the coordination of all these sensitivities with
the least possible interference.
The consequence of this liberal-pragmatic
view and practice is the relegation of
fundamental religious and ethical values to the
purely private realm. Since nobody can claim
possession of the truth and of the criteria of
what is morally good, opinions are only the
opinions of private individuals, and values can
only be taken seriously in terms of subjective
preferences and sensibilities. The upshot of this
is the by now well-known loss of
value-awareness. It is not really astonishing that
this liberal mentality also leads to the
paradoxical consequences of growing
indifference and even intolerance. Indeed, if
what others are interested in is simply a
question of private opinion or subjective
preference, why should one be interested in
their interests? If what has to be respected is
simply individual sensitivities, why should one
attach so much value to them, especially if one
regards oneself as superior, exceptional, or invulnerable? Tolerance demands a pragmatic organization of sensibilities. Normally this must
lead to an inflation of sensitivity: people will be
asked more and more to be tolerant to others
and not to impose ‘unreasonable’ demands on
others. This inflation in turn may lead to eruptions of intolerance under the stress of the requirements of social adaptation. Finally, if tolerance is reduced to ‘letting everybody think
and do as he likes’, it is not astonishing that
tolerance as a positive virtue, i.e. as the ability
to bear what is really unacceptable, would be
lost.
Tolerance and Recognition
___________________________________
It has been claimed earlier that there is a close
connection between the liberal-pragmatic view
on tolerance and a ‘sentimentalist’ conception
of man. In this conception, the other is
basically considered as a sensibility, first of all
characterized by a desire to escape pain, and in
the second place by a desire to freely look for
whatever sort of satisfaction he prefers. Implied
in this is the idea that the only thing which is
really and evidently valuable is the absence of
pain and, in the second order, the presence of
pleasure, and that it is this which is behind all
human desire and activity. In this context, the
crucial human desire for respect and for recognition by others can only be interpreted in a
peculiar way: as respect for and recognition of
the rights of individual sensibilities to freedom
and to no-harm. So, ultimately, these rights are
to be understood in terms of the advantages
derived from this respect and recognition, and
there is really nothing more to them. The
advantages are: not to be harmed by others, and
to be able to acquire the pleasures of one’s
liking freely. Again it turns out that the only
real values are considered to be absence of pain
and presence (as much as possible) of pleasure.
It is the task of society to ensure that everyone
gets this sort of respect and recognition, in
other words the advantages related to them, in
an equal way.
The question is whether the fundamental desire of recognition can be interpreted in this
way: whether people will really consider themselves recognized if their equal rights as to
no-harm and free acquisition of pleasure are
recognized. In the above-mentioned discussions
concerning the limitation of tolerance in matters
of pornography, blasphemy, etc., something
strange happened: precisely those people whose
sensitivity was supposed to need protection
from interference by the freedom of others,
were dissatisfied with the reasons offered for
the limitation of freedom of these others.
According to certain women-representatives, the
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 28
___________________________________
prohibition of pornography was not justified
primarily in view of the prevention of nasty
consequences, i.e. the psychological harm done
to women; pornography was considered as
being intrinsically wrong, incompatible with the
dignity of women as such. In their view,
recognition of the individual is linked with the
respect of values with which one identifies or
strongly associates oneself, and which one
would like to be respected not primarily in view
of the advantages or disadvantages for one’s
sensibility. These values are such: 1) that
recognition related to them cannot be
distributed equally and 2) that ‘deep’ conflicts
concerning them are practically inevitable.
If one desires recognition as a woman, or as
a father, or as an excellent sportsman, because
one sees this as something intrinsically valuable
(and not valuable simply in terms of desirable
consequences), one wants a very special form
of recognition. It is a form of recognition which
cannot be understood only in terms of noninterference with the freedom of action of
certain sensibilities; what one wants is not the
advantages causally following from such
recognition, not even the pleasure through the
recognition, but the pleasure of real
recognition.5 This, however, is a kind of
recognition which cannot be partitioned equally.
Such ‘real’ recognition requires a system, or
systems, of oppositions (between man and
woman, parents and children, good and bad
writers, ...) which are such that the positions
involved cannot be occupied purely by the
effort of the individual, nor can they be
assigned purely in view of the possible
acquisition of personal satisfaction. A system in
which everyone could obtain a certain ‘title’
(and recognition) simply because he wanted so,
or in which ‘titles’ are evenly assigned simply
in order to satisfy needs or appease
sensibilities, would destroy itself as a system of
real recognition.
The possibility to obtain recognition as an
___________________________________
individual in function of intrinsic values presupposes a context in which real conflict is in
principle always possible and in practice unavoidable. It is indeed always possible that
these intrinsic values are not seen as intrinsic
values by others, or that their interpretation
differs, or even that they are seen as evils. The
desire to be recognized in terms of a certain
title, or to see certain values with which one is
associated respected, can be thwarted in many
ways. What is valuable to one party can always
be unrecognizable as a value by another party;
or even worse, it can be seen as evil, as the
negation of what is a fundamental value for this
other party.
It is within the context of real recognition
that the idea of moral respect for each human
being as a human being is ultimately to be
understood. The consideration of each human
being as intrinsically valuable and respectable is
not reducible to the ‘sentimentalist’ idea that
pain must not be inflicted, and that room must
be made for the acquisition of as much pleasure
as possible. The prohibition of harm must be
understood as deriving from the incompatibility
of inflicting harm and of paying due respect to
human beings. The moral prohibition of harm
derives from the obligation to honour each
human being as having the special title of
‘human being’. This honour is due even though
this human being may appear to us as the most
uninteresting or useless being, and even though
it may be associated with values which are
incomprehensible, ridiculous or even abominable to us. It is as if the less a human being is
capable of participating fully in the game of
real recognition, the more it is obligatory to
respect it simply as a human being. Moral
respect is due, as everybody knows, especially
to the weak, the prisoner, the foreigner, the
dead.
But why should a human being be respected
in a special, moral, way simply because it is a
human being; why especially respect ‘the
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 29
___________________________________
widow and the orphan’? And what is the
relationship between this peculiar, moral,
respect and the game of real recognition?
It seems clear that the respect due to human
beings, simply because they are human beings,
is related to the awareness of a certain
boundary which should not be crossed (which,
of course, is not to say that it will not be
crossed). The ‘sacredness’ of this boundary
cannot be accounted for on strictly rational
grounds (appealing to elements like the rational
nature of man, or the principle of no-harm of
conscious sensibilities). Ultimately it can only
function as a kind of fundamental taboo. This is
probably why it is more easily preserved in the
context of, and in association with religion
(which is not to say that all sorts of rational
arguments cannot play a certain role in
upholding the taboo, nor that religion cannot be
the cause or reason of transgressing the
boundary).
The functioning of the taboo of the sacredness of each human being must be related
somehow to the game of real recognition itself.
I cannot at this moment give a full account of
this relationship. I, however, expect the
following considerations to be part of such an
account. The game of real recognition of values
cannot be played unless there is a community
of people sharing these values. Such a
community cannot exist unless its members are
themselves somehow valued for themselves.
Things which are valued for themselves do not
always shine in their full value (human beings
cannot be continuously fully receptive to the
shining of their values). This is why we need a
sign indicating the value even when this value
is not shining, a sign telling us what not to
touch, and what to especially care for. In the
case of human beings, such a sign is “the naked
face of the other.”6 Even when human beings
are not yet capable, or even if they will never
be capable, of playing the game of real
recognition, they must be respected (not
___________________________________
harmed, not dishonoured, but honoured in one
or other form of respectful caring).7
Tolerance and Respect for the Law
It is within the context of the acceptance of
intrinsic values, and the system of recognition
and respect related to it, that the real problem
of tolerance can be discerned. This problem can
be formulated as follows: why and how to
tolerate behaviour which jeopardizes, offends or
abuses fundamental values (whether this be the
honour of a human being as such, or any other
fundamental value), especially if one has the
power not to tolerate? The real problem is how
to tolerate the intolerable.8 Real tolerance, as
Gabriel Marcel rightly said, is ‘contra-intolerance’.9
This problem can arise in every society, but
inevitably arises in a pluralistic society. Here it
is inescapable that what is honourable, intrinsically valuable and good to one party, turns out
to be uninteresting, ridiculous or even abominable to another party.10 The problem is a
real one, because the conflict will be both
fundamental and inevitable. How is it possible
to play the game of real recognition with others
and of real respect for intrinsic values, and yet
to tolerate that these values and the respect due
to them are not always safe-guarded because
certain groups or individuals do not accept or
do not even understand the fundamental values,
and therefore feel free to publicly disregard,
deny, offend or abuse them?
My contention is that the present-day parliamentary democratic system can be interpreted
in such a way as to provide the
possibility-condition for handling such conflicts,
in accordance with the idea of real tolerance (as
‘contra-intolerance’). This is so because it
provides a suitable context in which such
conflicts can be settled without explicitly or
implicitly denying that there is a realm of
intrinsic values to be respected in themselves.
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 30
___________________________________
The parliamentary system provides the arena in
which fundamental conflicts concerning values
can be expressed. In this arena the conflicts
concerning how different values are to be
respected in society can also be settled in a
non-violent way. They are fought out in a
procedurally organized debate, and settled by
majority voting, leading to laws which then are
to be enforced effectively. By their prohibitions,
the laws establish the public respect due to
certain values. (In this way there is a certain
partial link between society and its values, and
political law). The aim of the parliamentary
procedure is not simply to pragmatically
organize the highest possible harmony between
different sensibilities. The aim is primarily to
settle the fundamental conflicts honourably, and
in this way to establish the minimal
requirements of respect for certain values, so
that tolerance of the intolerable becomes, in
fact, possible.
Of course, within pluralistic society, it is
very unlikely that legislation will determine the
minimal respect concerning the whole range of
fundamental values of all groups or individuals.
This implies that certain forms of intolerable
behaviour will be legally accepted and will
have to be tolerated. On the other hand, certain
restrictions on behaviour will be imposed
concerning public respect for values which one
does not understand or which one cannot accept
as values. Nevertheless, within a parliamentary
democratic system it is implied that it is always
possible, within certain procedural limits, to
re-open the debate concerning the (non-)expression of certain values within the Law.
Tolerance of the intolerable is closely
connected with respect for the Law which
makes this tolerance possible. This respect is
more than
___________________________________
the appreciation of a pragmatic machinery. This
respect for the Law is itself respect for something transcending all pragmatic considerations,
for something valuable in itself. (Simone Weil
even speaks of “the holy majesty of the
laws”).11 This respect is closely related to the
awareness which we can and should have, in
our toleration of the intolerable, that the value
of intrinsic values somehow always transcends
all our considerations and endeavours, that we
cannot be the self-appointed guardians and
interpreters of these values. In and through the
allegiance of all to a Law which does not
perfectly match each group’s vision of the
good, citizens somehow express there
acceptance that fundamental values transcend
all appropriation. Paradoxically, it is this
respect for the Law, and the tolerance made
possible by it, which allow for a future in
which values, as well as man himself as a
value, can survive in unexpected ways.
The greatest danger, both for freedom and
tolerance, and for the survival of values (and
therefore of man as man), is not only to be
found in the intolerance of dogmatic fundamentalism which puts itself above the Law; it is
equally to be found in the liberal-pragmatic attitude which would, if left to itself, eradicate
not only all understanding and practice of
values, but also of the Law itself.12
Notes
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 31
___________________________________
___________________________________
1.This
text is a revised and shortened version of: Herman DE DIJN, ‘Trouw, tolerantie en democratie’, in Onze
Alma Mater 46 (1992), p. 301-317. It was presented at the Conference on ‘Christian Universities and European
Culture’-Antwerp, UFSIA, 11 November 1993.
2.For a discussion of these limitations, see J. HORTON & S. MENDUS (eds.), Aspects of Toleration. (Philosophical
Studies). London & New York, Methuen, 1985, especially the papers by Albert Weave, Peter Jones, Susan
Mendus and John Horton.
3.Concerning the ‘no-harm principle’, see. Joel FEINBERG, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Vol. I-IV).
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984-1988 (especially Vol. I. Harm to Others).
4.[Editor’s note: When the author uses ‘man’ or ‘he’, he means the general concept to include ‘man and woman’
or ‘he and she’.]
5.Cf. Adam Smith: what human beings want is not the pleasure accidentally related to praise, but the pleasure
involved in knowing oneself to be really praise-worthy. See Adam SMITH, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Edited by D.D. Raphael en A.L. Macfie. Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, reprint 1982, p. 114.
6.I borrow this phrase from Levinas. I suspect, however, that my understanding of ethics is not the same as
Levinas’s account.
7.On the distinction between caring and recognition, see: Arnold BURMS, ‘Helping and Appreciating’, in: S.
GRIFFIOEN (ed.), What Right does Ethics Have? Public Philosophy in a Pluralistic Culture. Amsterdam, VU
Univ. Press, p. 67-77.
8.I borrow this expression from D.D. Raphael’s paper with the same title in: Susan MENDUS (ed.), Justifying
Toleration. Conceptual and Historical Perspectives. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 137-153.
12
9.See: Gabriël MARCEL, Du refus à l’invocation. Paris, Gallimard, 1956 , p. 270.
10.The party may today even be a party holding a liberal-pragmatic view.
11.See: Simone WEIL, The Need for Roots. Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind. Preface by T.S.
Eliot. London & New York, Ark Paperbacks, 1987, p. 171-2.
12.With thanks to my colleague Arnold Burms (especially concerning part 2 of this paper) and to the participants
of the Antwerp-Conference.
________________________________________________________________________________________
Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994)1, p. 32