FLYING LESSONS for June 19, 2014

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FLYING LESSONS for June 19, 2014
suggested by this week’s aircraft mishap reports
FLYING LESSONS uses the past week’s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make
better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model
airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane
you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and
recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.
FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com
This week’s lessons:
The large corporate jet accelerated down the runway. Four passengers, a flight attendant
and a crew of two were departing into the night.
A witness observed the airplane on the takeoff roll at a "high speed" with "little to no altitude
gained." The airplane subsequently “rolled off the end of the runway, on to a runway safety area,
and then on to grass. The airplane continued on the grass, where it struck approach lighting and
a localizer antenna assembly, before coming to rest in a gully, on about runway heading, about
1,850 feet from the end of the runway. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the airplane….
Tire marks consistent with braking were observed to begin about 1,300 feet from the end of
runway 11. The tire marks continued for about another 1,000 feet through the paved runway
safety area.”
The airplane was equipped with a mechanical gust lock system, which could be utilized to lock
the ailerons and rudder in the neutral position, and the elevator in the down position to protect the
control surfaces from wind gusts while parked. A mechanical interlock was incorporated in the
gust lock handle mechanism to restrict the movement of the throttle levers to a minimal amount
(6-percent) when the gust lock handle was engaged.
[Flight data recorder] data revealed the elevator control surface position during the taxi
and takeoff was consistent with its position if the gust lock was engaged. The gust lock handle,
located on the right side of the control pedestal, was found in the forward (OFF) position, and the
elevator gust lock latch was found not engaged.
Review of FDR data parameters associated with the flight control surface positions did not
reveal any movement consistent with a flight control check prior to the commencement of
the takeoff roll. The flap handle in the cockpit was observed in the 10 degree detent. FDR data
indicated a flap setting of 20 degrees during the takeoff attempt.
See http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20140531X32035&key=1
“Controls: Free and Correct” is an ubiquitous step on airplane Before Takeoff checklists.
My experience instructing many hundreds of experienced pilots, however, is that many do not
perform a control freedom check until prompted (even if they’re using a printed checklist). Many
more do not seem to be comfortable (read: practiced) at doing the control check when they reach
that step on the checklist, and when to do perform the check almost nobody performs it correctly.
The purpose of the control check is twofold:
1. To determine that the controls move freely throughout their entire range of motion,
without restriction or “snags”—the free part of the check; and
2. To confirm that the controls have been connected properly, so they move as expected
when the cockpit controls are moved—the correct part of the test.
Not only is it vital to perform a controls check before takeoff, it’s equally important to perform
the check correctly—something that, at least in my instructional experience, is not widely done.
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
To be sure, many pilots are performing control checks. I’ve personally spoken with more than
one pilot of the airplane type I’m most experienced with, who have discovered “snags” or “hard
spots” in the flight control movement that were found, on investigation, to be the result of misrouted control cables. Others’ controls hung up because of interference with wire bundles from
improperly installed avionics, portions of the control mechanism themselves (e.g., control
scissors; elevator bobweights), or other airplane systems like heater/defroster ducts. Sometimes
a wrench, or some loose bolts or a shop rag was left behind in the maintenance shop, and found
its way into the flight control system. In all these cases, the pilot sensed something was wrong
during a preflight controls check, and had the presence of mind to cancel the flight and have the
checklist failure indications investigated by a mechanic.
I’ve spoken with one pilot whose pre-departure controls check revealed the aileron
controls had been installed backward after the airplane was painted, such that rolling the control
wheel left made the ailerons command a right turn and vice versa.
I’ve flown with a couple of pilots who found, during our Before Takeoff checklist, that
the portable avionics semi-permanently affixed to their control column prevented moving the
controls to their extreme range of motion (in these cases we cut tie-wraps or removed clamps to
remove the portable obstruction before flight).
Our friends and FLYING LESSONS readers Down Under are subject to some control cable
Airworthiness Directives concerning issues found by an alert pilot during his “Free and correct”
pre-takeoff check; mechanics and airplane owners around the world are reminded of the vital
need to check the entire length of control cables for fraying or corrosion as part of every required
maintenance inspection.
Yet as I said, if my own instruction experience is any measure, many pilots—like the corporate
jet crew that died tragically with their passengers and cabin attendant—do not appear to do the
Controls: Free and Correct check at all or, if they do, they perform something that may make
them think they have checked the full range of control motion, but they have not.
I like to do this check twice: first, when boarding the aircraft (no need to taxi away from the ramp
or hangar if there’s a control problem), and second, at the end of the Before Takeoff checklist,
just before taxiing onto the runway for departure—your last defense in case something got blown
into a control hinge line that obstructs movement, or (less likely but “it-has-happened”) if a cable
snaps or snags, a pulley hangs up or something else has happened between the ramp and the
end of the runway.
I teach a simple “box check” of the controls:
1. With the yoke fully forward (its usual resting position on the ground), rotate the control
wheel all the way to the left.
a. Grasping the wheel with either
hand, if you extend that hand’s
thumb it will point at the aileron
that goes UP. The other aileron
goes DOWN.
b. Looking aft (if it’s possible to see
the elevator), check that the
control is deflected fully DOWN.
Sometimes you can’t see the
elevator itself but you can see its shadow on the ground. Any confirmation is
better than none.
2. Now, with the yoke still held fully to the left, pull the controls all the way aft.
a. If it’s possible to see the elevator (or its shadow), confirm it has deflected all the
way UP.
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
3. Still holding the yoke all the way aft, roll the control wheel until it is all the way to the
right.
a. Your extended thumb now points at the right aileron, which is UP. The left
aileron is now DOWN.
4. With the control wheel held all the way to the right, move the controls fully forward.
a. The elevator, if you can see it, now deflects fully DOWN.
5. Move the rudder pedals alternately to their stops, first the left and then the right (or
vice versa).
a. If you can see the rudder (or its shadow), confirm that it moves LEFT when the
left rudder pedal is forward, and RIGHT when the right rudder pedal is forward.
See www.mastery-flight-training.com/control-check.html
The box check moves the controls through their extremes of motion. A common “half-fast”
(this is a family blog) method of control check, a wiggle left and right, followed by a wiggle fore
and aft, may miss something that interferes with control movement somewhere in the myriad
combinations of left/right/fore/aft that a full box check will detect.
In a stick-controlled airplane do the same “box check” by moving the stick to the forward,
left corner (nose down and to the left; your extended thumb points at the UP aileron and the other
aileron is DOWN). While holding the stick left, pull the stick all the way back; then with the stick
back move it fully to the right; and then while keeping the stick to the right move the controls all
the way forward. This is sometimes called “mixing” the controls (think of the motions of mixing
cake batter in a bowl). Finally, wiggle the rudder pedals.
In airplanes with less traditional controls, like a Cirrus’ sidestick or a Cessna
Skycatcher’s “floating” stick, trace a similar motion that applies in all cases:
•
All the way forward
•
All the way left
•
All the way aft
•
All the way right
•
All the way forward
•
Wiggle the rudder
Check the proper movement of the controls through their entire range of motion, and visually
confirm (to the extent possible from the pilot’s seat, or with the help of passengers) that the
controls move in the direction they’re intended to move with control deflections.
If there is any blockage of the controls such that they will not reach the extremes of travel, or
there is anything that hangs up the controls or requires a little extra push to move them past a
point in their motion, or even simply does not feel right—even if the snag only happens once, but
not on a second control check—take the airplane back to the ramp right away and get the
condition checked before further flight.
There’s too much riding on the proper motion of the flight controls to think that something
that doesn’t feel right is OK, at least for now, or to hope that whatever was binding up the controls
had cleared itself and won’t reappear during flight.
And check controls are “free and correct” every time you line up for takeoff, even on
multiple times around the pattern or on the second, third of seventh takeoff of the day. My initial
tailwheel instructor frequently reminded me about a time his WWII War Training Service (WTS)
Navy cadet-training Waco biplane picked up a rock in its elevator gap during taxi, an obstruction
that would have limited control authority on takeoff or in flight.
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
Although the NTSB preliminary report reveals some details, we don’t yet know for certain
exactly what happened in the case of the Gulfstream jet crash. It may be that a Controls: Free
and Correct check, even if done, might not have made a locked condition obvious given the
apparent failure mode and inability to see most or all of the airplane’s moving surfaces from the
cockpit of the long-bodied jet. And a discussion of aborting a takeoff at the first sign of the
airplane’s failure to respond to control inputs on takeoff may be a discussion for a later day.
See www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20140531X32035&key=1
But do the “C” in the oft-cited CIGARTIPS Before Takeoff mnemonic checklist: “Controls:
FREE and CORRECT.” Don’t be so complacent that you ignore quickly checking your very ability
to control the airplane. Do a quick but thoughtful, methodical and skeptical controls check before
taxiing out, and again just before every takeoff.
Comments? Questions? Suggestions? Email Mastery.flight.training@cox.net.
See www.pilotworkshop.com/concrete5/index.php?cID=651
An article appeared this week in the popular newspaper USA Today. The article puts the general
aviation safety record squarely in its author’s gunsights and focuses public opinion in solid
opposition to those of us who fly, especially personal aviation. It attempts to dispel the
established record that the vast majority of lightplane crashes are the result of pilot error. It
ignores the published and well-known limitations on aircraft operation that are often overlooked or
ignored by a very few pilots who pay the price for this omission (sadly, often taking trusting
passengers with them). Instead, the author claims, most accidents are the result of faulty and
negligent manufacturers, and are perpetuated by a massive industry and government cover-up.
The author provides no evidence to back up his claim—he appears to be confusing the results of
civil litigation and jury trials for objective and scientific accident investigation. I personally know
people who say they provided an informed counterpoint in interviews by the author that took
place as he wrote the story, but who were not quoted in the published report.
The aviation “alphabet groups” are already publishing responses and the original report is the hot
topic on the aviation-related chat lines and social media. I’ll leave it to the more eloquent and
better politically connected to provide the formal rebuttals…FLYING LESSONS tries to remain
apolitical and focus solely on the safety LESSONS of aircraft accidents. In a way, however, the
USA Today article is a mishap report, and it does provide some data for reflection. From this
standpoint, then—the safety LESSONS of this article, I’ll briefly comment.
Many of the issues raised in the article have been resolved by mandatory Airworthiness
Directives (ADs) years ago. ADs are the aviation world's version of a recall, which the author
says is lacking in the industry. The big difference from the automotive world is that in aviation the
airplane owner, not the manufacturer, pays to accomplish the requirements of an AD. Other
issues have been gone away through attrition—a company was litigated out of the market. In yet
more cases, manufacturers have created voluntary inspection protocols and engineering repair
kits for isolated conditions that nonetheless have contributed to loss of life.
I do agree some of the author’s points have merit. For example, I've been on a public, personal
crusade about installation of shoulder harnesses for many years—one of those voluntary
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
measures that, if taken, has a proven record of saving lives. For another example, which the
writer did not make but that knowledgeable people can infer, the regulatory hurdles a
manufacturer must leap over in order to add safety updates to existing airplanes are far too great,
although regulators and industry are making great leaps of their own in amending these
requirements with safety improvements specifically mentioned as a primary goal.
Whereas in automobiles, where many safety updates are mandated by law and made acceptable
because the economies of auto production make it possible for manufacturers, not owners, to pay
for updates in recalls, equipment turnover is measured in years. Defects, if that’s what they are,
are weeded out of the system fairly quickly. In general aviation, by contrast, equipment turnover
is measured in decades, and the aforementioned ownership costs and regulatory difficulties of
upgrading safety equipment make progress slow in the fleet as a whole. The voluntary nature of
many safety updates makes it even more challenging for the industry to move forward. I wish
pilots would be as quick to spend a couple hundred dollars on training more often or a thousand
dollars to add shoulder harnesses, as they are to spend $5000 on a new hand-held device or
$30,000 on the latest popular panel display that adds no real utility or safety to the aircraft. Yet,
without those big-dollar upgrades the airplane service industry would be even harder pressed to
survive. It’s a challenge when it’s expensive enough already to fly an airplane, let alone own one.
I wonder what the specific motivation or imperative the USA Today authors of these articles have
to have made this front-page news just now. Not that I don't agree with the need to improve the
fatal crash record--I spend a great deal of my personal time trying to solve that issue. But what
prompted this to displace wars and diseases and politics from today’s front page?
FLYING LESSONS readers John and Martha King have likened the general aviation record, in
terms of fatalities per mile, to about the same as that of motorcycles. But with apologizes to my
motorcycle-riding friends and readers, I wonder when we'll see similar coverage of the fatal
motorcycle death rate as a result of the lack of crash protection, laws that permit riding
motorcycles between lanes of freeway traffic (as is the case in California), and the voluntary
nature of personal protective equipment such as leathers, boots, gloves and helmets, merit the
same front-page, given special report treatment in USA Today. My point is not to direct attention
to another target. It’s simply that the general aviation record is (unfortunately) not entirely unique
in the realm of mostly-recreational activity. Why the added scrutiny?
Just as FLYING LESSONS attempts to draw positive LESSONS from mostly preliminary accident
reports, so too I believe there are a few things we can learn from the USA Today report. Among
them:
•
One-sided journalism doesn’t help anyone, and is especially harmful to an industry already divided
on how to reduce the number of deaths among its participants.
•
Any crash, no matter what the cause, makes it harder for the general aviation industry to attract
new participants or even maintain the current level of activity…or to avoid the ire of the masses and
the adverse attentions of those in power.
•
Accept, even embrace, that ours is a high-risk activity…and that you personally have the power to
manage that risk. Hundreds if not thousands of us do it successfully every day. As the report
cites, on average three of us every day do not.
•
The best way to help personal aviation thrive is to be seen flying more, and do what it takes
to reduce the fatal accident rate. Train more, practice more, equip your airplane better, downsize
to a more affordable airplane if you must (so you can afford to fly more and equip and maintain the
airplane as you should), follow the rules (most which are written to prevent the last fatal crash), and
make sound decisions. Most pilots I’ve spoken with who have survived an accident tell me they
knew things weren’t going right well before the crash occurred, in many cases before they ever
took off because they knew they were taking a risk they should not be taking. Paraphrasing the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, if you feel something, decide something.
•
No amount of letters-to-the-editor writing or alphabet-group politicizing can have the positive public
relations effect of a sustained, significantly reduced total number of fatal accidents during a period
of demonstrably greater flying activity. Sometimes, as the saying goes, the best revenge is living
well. That should be our response to this article.
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
Put another way, when you accept a flying risk you accept it not only for yourself, your
passengers and your family, you accept if for the very future of general aviation. Make
your decisions as if your life, your passengers’ lives and all of flying are riding on it...because they
are.
It’s been said, “there’s no such thing as bad publicity.” Today’s USA Today article busts that
myth. Only with our actions over time can we prove USA Today wrong.
See http://usat.ly/1ielZQ5
Comments? Let us know…at mastery.flight.training@cox.net.
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AOPA Flight Training Excellence Awards
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has opened its popular flight training poll, a
survey that allows student pilots to offer feedback on their flight training experiences. This is the
third year for the poll, which provides valuable data on the performance – good and bad – of flight
schools and instructors as a means of adopting best practices and improving the customer
experience. Last year, 3,375 individuals completed the poll, resulting in reviews of 508 different
flight schools and 956 instructors.
Survey results determine AOPA’s annual Flight Training Excellence Awards, which recognize
exceptional flight instructors and schools. Answer 32 questions on flight schools and 26
questions on flight instructors. Poll responses are anonymous, and participants do not have to be
AOPA members. The poll will close at midnight on Aug. 23, 2014.
Flight Training Excellence Award Categories include:
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Best Flight School
Best Flight Instructor
Outstanding Flight School
Outstanding Flight Instructor
Honor Roll Flight School
Honor Roll Flight Instructor
President’s Choice Award
Student’s Choice Award
Learn more, and take The 2014 AOPA Flight Training Excellence Poll.
See www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/June/12/Share-your-training-experience-in-AOPA-poll.aspx
Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend.
Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility.
Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI
2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year
2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year
FLYING LESSONS is ©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see www.mastery-flight-training.com, or
contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net.
©2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.
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