Achieving Trusted Systems by Providing Security and Reliability Motivations

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Achieving Trusted Systems by Providing Security and Reliability
A Finite State Machine Methodology for Analyzing Security Vulnerabilities
Shuo Chen, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Jun Xu, Ravishankar K. Iyer
Statistical Analysis: Bugtraq
Vulnerability Classification
In-depth Analysis of Vulnerability Reports
• Observations
5925 reports of security vulnerabilities (Nov.30 2002)
3%
Unknow n
6%
2%
Access Validation
Error
10%
Observation 1: exploits must pass through multiple elementary
activities
Observation 2: exploiting a vulnerability involves multiple vulnerable
operations on several objects.
Observation 3: for each elementary activity, the vulnerability data
and corresponding code inspections allow us to define a
predicate, which if violated, naturally results in a security
vulnerability.
Access Validation Error
Atomicity Error
Boundary Condition Error
Boundary Condition
Error
21%
Input Validation
Error
23%
Configuration Error
Design Error
Environment Error
Failure to Handle
Exceptional Conditions
Input Validation Error
Configuration Error
5%
Failure to Handle
Exceptional
Conditions
11%
1%
• These observations motivate development of a
FSM model to depict security vulnerabilities.
Origin Validation Error
Race Condition Error
Design Error
18%
– Statistical study on Bugtraq database
– In-depth study on vulnerability reports and
corresponding source codes.
– Develop a FSM (finite state machine) methodology to
model the vulnerabilities, based on the observations,
from the analyzed data.
Serialization Error
Case 2: NULL HTTPD Heap Overflow
Common pFSM Types
Operation 1:
get (contentLen, input)
contentLen is an integer,
input is an text string to be
read from a socket
Heap Layout
X

<0 
ntLen
conte

pFSM1
con
te
ntL
e n>
=0

th(
ng
e
l
)<
ata
-Calloc PostData[1024+contentLen]

Siz
D
ost
e( P
Calloc is called
Allocate and free the buffer PostData
Note: addr_free is the .GOT
entry of function free
Manipulate the
.GOT entry of
function free
(i.e., addr_free)
- Copy input from the socket
to PostData by recv() call
FIN
B->fd=&addr_free-(offset of field bk)
B->bk=Mcode 
B->fd and B->bk
unchanged -
- When buf is freed,
execute B->fd->bk = B->bk
FIN
.GOT entry of function
free points to MCode
Operation 3:
Free chunk C

pFSM2
pFSM3
Used chunk PostData
Free chunk B
fd=A
bk=C
?
B->fd=&addr_free-(offset of field bk)
B->bk=Mcode
- B->fd=A
B->bk=C
Free chunk A
ut)
p
n
i
length(input) <= Size(PostData) -
Operation 2:
- Load addr_free
to the memory during
program initialization
Three common pFSM types are identified, corresponding
to three common reasoning flaws in programs
Type of pFSM
Example
Vulnerabilities
Sendmail Signed Integer
Overflow
Object Type
Check
pFSM1: Does the
input represent a
long integer?
NULL HTTPD Heap
Overflow
Rwall File Corruption
pFSM2 : Is the
target file a
terminal?
Content and Attribute
Check
pFSM4 
- Execute addr_free when
function free is called
FIN
Mcode is executed
Reference Consistency
Check
pFSM2: Is the integer in the
interval [0 , 100] ?
pFSM3: Is GOT entry of
setuid()unchanged?
pFSM1: contentLen 0?
pFSM2 : length(input) 
size(buffer)
pFSM3 : Are free-chunk links
unchanged?
pFSM4: Is GOT entry of free()
unchanged?
pFSM1: Does the user have a root
privilege?
IIS Filename Decoding
Vulnerability
Xterm File Race
Condtion
pFSM1: Does the filename
contain “../”?
pFSM1: Does the user have a
write permission to the file?
GHTTPD Buffer
overflow on Stack
rpc.statd format string
vulnerability
pFSM1: size(message)  200 ?
addr_free changed addr_free
unchanged -
Case 1: Sendmail Debugging Function
Signed Integer Overflow
Reject State
Operation 1: Write debug level i to
tTvect[x]
?
231 
Elementary
_x) >
r
t
s
y
Activity 1
(IMPL_REJ)
ted b
resen
er rep
g
)
e
t
J
n
(i
C_RE
(SPE
-(SP
pFSM1
EC
( in
_AC
tege
PT)
by s
r
tr_x repres
)  3 ente
2 1
-convert str_i and str_x
- d
to integer i and x
-get text strings
str_x and str_i
Elementary
Activity 2
Accept State
SPEC Check State
x > 100 -
0 -
> 10
or x
x<0
J)
C_RE
(SPE
(SP
EC pFSM2
_AC
0
PT)
x
100
-
(IMPL_REJ)
x  100 -
- tTvect[x]=i
FIN
.GOT entry of function setuid (i.e.,
pSetuid ) points to Mcode
Elementary
Activity 3
Operation 2: Manipulate the
GOT entry of
function setuid
(i.e., pSetuid)
- Load pSetuid to
the memory during
program initialization
Starting
sendmail
program
anged
id ch
u
t
e
S
p
J)
C_RE
(SPE
pFSM3
(SPE
C_AC
pSetu
PT)
id un
chang
ed 
-
?
(IMPL_REJ)
--
 Execute code referred FIN
by pSetuid
Execute MCode
Unknow n
Read postdata from socket to
an allocated buffer PostData
• E.g., a new remotely exploitable heap overflow vulnerability, which is
now published in Bugtraq, has been discovered using this approach.
)
– How are security vulnerabilities distributed among
different categories?
– What are the limitations of existing techniques of
security vulnerability analysis?
– How to develop a new analysis technique to overcome
the limitations.
Three steps of the analysis
CP
T
Specific Objectives
– Data in Bugtraq are well organized and suitable for
statistical analysis.
(IM
PL
_A
– Understand the characteristics of security vulnerabilities
– Identification of root causes of security vulnerabilities
can help us prevent and detect them
– Enables modeling a variety of security vulnerabilities,
including stack overflow, heap overflow, signed integer
overflow, format string vulnerability, and file race
conditions.
– Identify reasoning flaws as root causes of the analyzed
security vulnerabilities.
– Helps uncovering application vulnerabilities.
(IMPL_ACPT)
Major Data Source: Bugtraq
General Objectives
Effectiveness of the FSM methodology
)
Overview of the Analysis Approach
(IM
PL
_A
CP
T
Motivations
pFSM1: Does the filename
contain format directives (e.g.,
%n, %d)?
pFSM2: Does the filename
refer to another unverified
file?
pFSM2: Is the return address
unchanged?
pFSM2: Is the return address
unchanged?
Future Directions
• Automate the FSM analysis of
vulnerabilities
• Each pFSM indicates a vulnerability, also
an opportunity of detection. How to build
protection mechanisms based on FSM?
• Study the common impacts of security
vulnerabilities, e.g., what are common
activities of viruses?
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