Distributed Operations
Key Events to Date:
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March 05: DO Implementation Working Group (DOIWG) was established at
MCWL to coordinate the initial DO effort.
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Aug 06: DC, CD&I directed the establishment of a DO Transition Task Force
(w/ CDD lead) to guide the DO capabilities development process.
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Sept 06: DC, CD&I directed implementation of the Infantry Battalion
Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP) beginning with 1st Bn 5th Marines in
early 2007. ( IBEPP was considered a “first step” toward DO
implementation…with simultaneous experimentation in MCWL)
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Mar-Jun 07: 1/5 conducts first IBEPP (i.e., ISLC, IULC, T3, TSULC, etc.).
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Apr 07: DC, PP&O sponsors a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) to
identify DO capability requirements, conduct gap analysis, and generate
potential solution sets.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
Distributed Operations: IBEPP
IBEPP Concept:
- IBEPP was initially advertised as a DO enabler and force
generation model designed to synchronize the staffing,
equipping and training of infantry battalions as they prepared to
deploy. Conceptually, the program called for the following key
components:
• A narrow post-deployment fill window for officers/SNCOs/NCOs,
followed by larger cohesion fills from the schools of infantry
• A dedicated “schools priority period” that provided dedicated school
seats for each battalion to train its small unit leaders (Squad Leader
thru Platoon Sergeant)
• The timely arrival/replenishment of the battalion’s equipment suite in
sufficient time to afford full integration of new equipment into the
unit’s pre-deployment training program.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
IBEPP: Pros & Cons
Staffing…
Cons
Pros
• Unit stabilization dates have improved from D-90
during early OIF/OEF rotations to current D-150
stabilization for all deploying infantry battalions
(OIF, OEF, MEU) – a 66% increase in unit
stabilization time.
• Overarching goal is a universal stabilization date of
D-180 for all deploying battalions beginning in Jan
08 - a 100% increase in pre-deployment stabilization
time.
• TECOM’s structure has increased by ~160 billets
to include 106 Combat Instructor billets at the SOIs.
(Actually staffing of those structure spaces remains a
significant challenge owing to a low available
inventory of 0369s and competing requirements.)
• Fixed school graduation dates do not support a
narrow post-deployment fill window for officers,
SNCOs, NCOs or enlisted Marines.
• 4 fixed IOC graduations per year
• 1 fixed EWS graduation per year
• 42 fixed SOI graduations per year
• School houses have limited flexibility when
feeding deploying units due to annual course
schedules.
• Staffing of infantry battalions is not
synchronized with infantry battalion deployment
cycles.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
IBEPP: Pros &Cons
Training…
Cons
Pros
• The SOIs have “raised the bar” in Infantry
Leader Courses (IOC, IULC, ISLC) with
updated/complimentary POIs, new equipment
sets, and increased staffing.
• Established Tactical Small Unit Leaders
Course (TSULC) to enhance fire team leader
training and the Train the Trainer (T3) Course
to develop small unit leader skills in planning
and executing standards-based training events.
• ISLC – Increased # of courses resulting in a
60% increase in available school seats.
• IULC – Increasing # of TEMINs enroute
students to fill school seats.
• The multiple courses that constitute “IBEPP” are
skill progression courses that focus on traditional
collective and individual training standards (e.g., mastery
of weapons, comms, and optics organic to the rifle squad) –
and not on DO capability development.
• Current operational tempo precludes full implementation
of IBEPP for all deploying infantry battalions.
• There is no requirement/incentive to attend designated
skill progression courses as they are not tied to promotion.
• Preliminary data suggests that participation in IBEPP
varies widely among infantry battalions.
• IBEPP training does not equate to an increased DO
capability.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
IBEPP: Pros & Cons
Pros
Equipping…
•$198 million for equipment approved in the
FY-06 Bridge and Main Supplemental (~ $19 m of
equipment enhancements per Infantry Battalion
with a focus on communications and optics.
•$429 million for equipment approved in the FY-07
Bridge Supplemental. (Total investment of $627.5m
in additive equipment.)
• Equipment enhancements to the Infantry Battalion
T/E may facilitate ongoing force reset efforts.
Cons
• Fielding of additive Infantry Battalion T/E equipment is
problematic as many battalions currently lack capacity to
accommodate additive T/E items.
•Currently exploring mitigation options IRT facilities impacts
at the unit level. Focus remains on examining temporary
storage (e.g., containerization).
•Currently lack coherent Infantry Battalion T/E equipment
fielding plan, particularly as it relates to IBEPP-designated
battalions.
•Current OpTempo precludes timely sourcing of additive T/E
equipment to IBEPP-designated battalions owing to
competing priorities from other units preparing to deploy.
•New infantry battalion T/E does not equate to a specific DO
capability for infantry battalions.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
DO Capabilities Based Assessment
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA):
-
April 07: PP&O sponsored a DO Capabilities Based Assessment using
contract support from Whitney, Bradley, & Brown (WBB) Inc. (~$1 million
contract).
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Jun 07: DO TTF sponsors DO Workshop hosted by WBB. Workshop
produced a prioritized list of twenty-nine DO capabilities.
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Oct 07: DO Workshop reconvened to conduct functional needs analysis
(FNA) to identify standards, conditions, and metrics for the top 7 DO
capabilities and 31 associated tasks.
-

The top seven capabilities included :(1) communicate; (2) execute & control fires; (3)
conduct logistics C2; (4) establish/exercise C2; (5) conduct offensive operations; (6)
provide health services; and (7) conduct supply operations.

The FNA utilized a MEU-sized MAGTF as a baseline
The FNA concluded that moderate to significant gaps exist for all top 7
DO capabilities when forces were distributed/disaggregated below the
rifle company level.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
Conclusions
Conclusions re IBEPP:
- Many improvements made on the margins
- End-state of synchronized staffing, equipping and training can not be
realized without major changes to long-standing formal training and
education programs and assignment policies for officer/enlisted
personnel.
 More IOC/EWS classes per year
 Elevate ISLC/IULC to PME equivalency for infantrymen
 Reduce number of infantrymen filling Special Duty Assignments
- The current pre-deployment battle-rhythm is unlikely to improve
appreciably without a significant reduction in operational tempo.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
Conclusions
Conclusions re DO effort to date:
• There is still a lack of a clear definition and common
understanding of Distributed Operations beyond enhanced
small unit capabilities.
• There is still a lack of measurable long-term objectives or
USMC end-state at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels re DO capability implementation.
• Simultaneous experimentation and implementation lack
synergy and have not appreciably enabled advancement of
a substantive DO capability.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration
Recommendations re DO
• Develop a collection plan and deploy Marine Corps Center
for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection team to evaluate
1/5 IOT determine the impact and utility of IBEPP training.
• Continue ongoing CBA in order to refine the DO capabilities
list, identify potential gaps/shortfalls, and identify possible
materiel/non-materiel solution sets.
• Sponsor a modeling effort to accurately determine the
impacts of time, distance, and increased number of
maneuver units performing DO and the ability of a MEUsized MAGTF to conduct, execute or support the
disaggregated force.
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration