French Space Law Implementation
“Protect people, goods, public health and the
environment”
Isabelle RONGIER
CNES Inspector General
IAASS President
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Table of contents
Why a space law ?
How authorization process works?
Rulemaking
Organization and competencies for
supervision
Safety and environmental requirements
Lessons learned
Conclusion
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Why a Space Law ?
The purpose of the FSOA is to set up a secured national regime of authorization and
control of Space operations under the French jurisdiction or for which the French
Government bears international liability, in accordance with UN Treaties principles
 Outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration
and use by all States ….
 States Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national
activities in outer space…
 The activities of non-governmental entities
in outer space… shall require authorization
and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State….
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Space Law basics
To set up a liability regime for
damage caused to third parties
To deal with all aspects and phases
from launch to reentry, including in-orbit
delivery, control in-orbit and end-of-life
management

Safety of third parties

Public health

Environmental protection

Space debris mitigation
Long Term Sustainability of
Space Activities
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4
audit energetique

State guarantee attached with the authorization: limitation
of the operator’s liability for damage to third parties
occurring on the surface of the earth or in Air space
limited to a fixed amount of approximately 60M€, except
in case of willful misconduct. If compensation for damage
caused goes beyond this amount, the State supersedes
the operator’s obligation to indemnify.

If the French State is sued under UN Space Treaties
(1972 Convention…): right of recourse against the Space
operator limited to the fixed ceiling of 60M€

Contractors, subcontractors, customers or insurers can
also benefit from this guarantee for damage caused
during the Launching phase.
Fair competition for
operators in a legal frame
How it works ?
Shall obtain an authorization:



Act no. 2008-518 of 3 June
2008 on space operations
(FSOA) entry in force 10th
of December 2010
Any operator intending to launch a
space object from the French territory,
or from facilities under French
jurisdiction
Any French operator that launch a
space object from the territory of a
foreign State or from a place that is
not under any State’s sovereignty
Decree no.2009-643 of 9
June 2009 on authorisations
granted in application of the
LOS (Authorisation decree)
Any person having French nationality
or company which are located in
France, that aims at launching a space
object, or any French operator that
commands such an object during its
mission in outer space.
Decree concerning
Technical Regulations
31th March 2011
Decree no.2009-644 of 9
June 2009 amending Decree
no.24-510 of 28 June 1984
on CNES
(CNES Decree)
Decree regulating
operations in Guiana Space
Center facilities
Decree concerning space
objects identification
12th August 2011
Space systems
Best practices for Technical
regulations implementation
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CNES/P
MESR
Operators
•Compliance certificates
•Authorization Decrees
•Operational data
CNES Technical
Departments
French national authorisation procedure
Principle of prior authorization for:
• any operator, irrespective of nationality,
intending to launch or bring back to Earth a
space object on French territory.
• any French operator intending to launch or
bring back to Earth a space object
• any person of French nationality intending
to launch a space object
• any French operator intending to control
such an object in space
Supervision to ensure that
prescriptions are fulfilled
The French Space Agency (CNES) is
mandated by the law to ensure that systems
and procedures implemented by space
operators comply with technical
regulations”
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Conditions for get
authorizations
 The applicant must supply moral,
financial and professional
guarantees.
 The systems and processes
implemented must comply with
technical regulations.
Safety measures
The Minister and the President of
CNES are empowered to take all
necessary measures to ensure the
safety of people, property, public
health and the environment
Some basis for rulemaking process
Consider public safety
main drivers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
How is “safe enough” defined or determined?
How is the safety of this launch or reentry
assessed?
How are risk factors identified for launch
safety?
How are assessments conducted?
What numerical metrics are used to assess
risk?
What approaches are used to reduce risk?
How and who accepts the risk?
What computer modeling approaches are
used?
How are risk uncertainties treated?
How are modeling (epistemic) uncertainties
and real-world (aleatory) variations
evaluated?
What statistical confidence level is used in
the calculations feeding the risk acceptance
decision?
Analyze existing standards / practices
COPUOS :



Principles for the use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
Space debris mitigation guidelines of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
…and future results of Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities
ISO :


24113 Standard “Space debris mitigation” was an important step in the
harmonization process
Writing of some news important standard ISO (Prevention of break-up of
unmanned spacecraft for example) is on going
IADC:
 IADC mitigations guidelines and
 Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
On going works on Launch and Re-entry Safety
COSPAR : Planetary protection policy
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Technical regulations rulemaking process
 Identify realistic ways of compliance with regulations
 Consult stakeholders early during rulemaking process
 Define appropriate interim provisions: time and money
are needed to adapt space systems to reach full
compliance
“Quality System” requirements
+ Technical dossier





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Description of the operation,
Hazard analysis
Impact studies
Risk mitigation measures
Demonstration of compliance with requirements
Quality
manual
Processes
Procedures
Instructions
Records
Specific safety objectives
LAUNCHES

“Worst case” approach in near field


Collective risk for people (maximum
acceptable probability):
 2 10-5/operation in far field
Collective risk for the population (maximum acceptable
probability):  2 10-5/operation

Nominal impact zones outside landmasses and
territorial waters

Information to the air and maritime traffic authorities
about impact zones for transmission of appropriate
notifications

In the event of fully justified impossibility of proceeding
with controlled atmospheric re-entry, the operator must
make its best efforts to respect a quantitative objective
of 10-4.

Nominal impact zones outside landmasses
and territorial waters

Information to the air and maritime traffic
authorities about impact zones for
transmission of appropriate notifications

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REENTRIES / DEORBITATIONS
Criteria for launch collision avoidance with
manned vehicles
Common safety / environment objectives
Protection of public health and the environment :
Mitigating risk of dangerous contamination during launch or re-entry
(qualitative characterization of impact of combustions gases, ozone
layer depletion, sea pollution, nuclear material)
Space debris mitigation requirements
Do not generate debris during nominal operations
Minimise the probability of accidental break up
Prevent collisions with satellites whose orbital parameters are
known
 Remove space vehicles and orbital stages from protected
regions after the end of the mission
(no interference in B region > 1 year + no come back during 100 years
linked to perturbation effect)
 Live spacecraft in passive condition after the end of mission



Planetary protection :
Avoid harmful contamination and
adverse changes in the environment of
the Earth resulting from the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter
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NUCLEAR
SAFETY
Supervision : Behavior and competencies
Ethics Charter

Impartial opinions, giving no grounds for
criticism

Independent evaluation concerning the
design and implementation of the process


Transparency regarding the authority and
operators
Insure confidentiality of information :
Inspectors are empowered by legal Court
after swear

Professional secrecy

Full control of internal and external
communication
Expertise

Space System architecture

Satellite and Launch System management

Quality, reliability and safety management

Hazards analysis

Command and control

Space dynamics
» Mission analysis,
» End-of-life strategy,
» Collision avoidance

Operations
Organisation aspects
 Clear segregation from Project role / FSOA technical compliance assessment
 End of commercial in orbit positioning and operations in CNES premises
 End of product insurance management shared with operator (CNES subsidy)
 End of ground safety operations inside operator’s properties
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FSOA application since December 2010
CNES sets the example: all its satellites
have been verified for compliance and
received a favourable decision from the
President of CNES
Under the Act or ESA-CNES agreements
20 authorisations for Ariane 5 ECA
4 authorisations for Ariane 5 ES-ATV
10 authorisations for Soyuz - 1 authorisation for Vega
1 licence for A5-ECA (analysis under way)
3 certificates of compliance for Vega
1 preliminary certificate of compliance for A5-ES Galileo
1 preliminary certificate of compliance for A5-ME
Orbital systems: 3 certificate for ATV - 1 certificate for Galileo
COROT
CALIPSO
SMOS
1 licence for the EuroStar 3000
and SpaceBus 4000 platforms
1 licence constituting authorisation for control in orbit for satellites
already launched
1 authorisation for control in orbit for Eutelsat 25B
ELISA
SPOT 4 and 5
PARASOL
1 authorisation for control in orbit for the first
24 satellites in the Globalstar 2 constellation
1 authorisation for control in orbit for Robusta
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JASON 1 and 2
TELECOM 2D
PLEIADES 1A-1B
ATHENA-FIDUS
PICARD
4 authorisations for launch for Yahsat 1A and 1B, and
Spot 6 and 7
3 authorisations for orbit acquisition and/or control for VNREDSAT-1,
MEASAT-3B, DZZ-HR
1 preliminary certificate of compliance for the ALPHABUS PF
1 preliminary certificate of compliance for the ALPHABUS PF
1 authorisation for control in orbit for Turkmenistan NSSC
1 authorisation for launch for Turkmenistan NSSC
Lessons learned from rulemaking process
Interim provisions
 Two sticking issues for space operations :
 Uncontrolled re entry risk
 Debris mitigation in LEO orbit region
 Full compliance will be meet in 2020….but :
 Dedicated R&D program in progress is
challenging
 Sustainable practices are costly
Technical regulations shall not be static
 Orbital lifetime prediction is not entirely deterministic


Long-Duration Solar Flux Prediction
Significant Moon-Sun perturbation for GTO orbit
 Compliance with “25 years” rules can be only probabilistic objective
(>0,9)
 New design of GEO satellite includes jettisonable auxiliary motor
module  add specific requirements for disposal and passivation of
these devices
 Probability of successful disposal  requirement too stringent
considering the state of the art 0,9>>>0,85
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Lessons learned from rulemaking process :
Do not to take aim at the wrong target
■
Mission success and safety of third party are
separate objectives
■
State of the art reliability of space systems is
not enough to guarantee public safety and
debris mitigation
■
■
Operator is in the best position to
manage safety risks : Impose objectives
than implementation solutions
■
The quality system of the organization
with authority over operations must allow
it to ensure safety for the entire system it
implements, and thus to manage all of
its components and interfaces.
■
Only accurate knowledge of the
associated hazards and potential
vulnerabilities inherent in the system, its
operations and its environment makes it
possible to take appropriate decisions
with regard to the acceptance of risks.
■
Human factors, which are largely
informal in nature, must be the subject of
appropriate measures for their
management.
Dedicated requirements are needed for
public safety and debris mitigation
help operators with providing relevant tools
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And beyond National borders,
need for a global convergence
Why?
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
Make reachable debris mitigation
objectives

Define common public risk limits
applicable both for domestic and
international populations

Keep the competition fair between
commercial Space Operators

Balance between safety, environment
protection and cost at a global level
IAASS
IAASS Technical Committees
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Launch & Re-entry Safety
Space Hazards
Commercial Human Spaceflight
Human Factors & Performance for
Safety
Space Safety Laws and Regulations