Design and application of Fiscal Rules Matthias Witt

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Design and application of Fiscal Rules

- a comment to Anderson and Minarik -

Matthias Witt

German Technical Cooperation (gtz)

Public Finance Reform

Comments: Outline

Introduction

The devil’s in the details – Germany’s experiences with Fiscal Rules

Why stick to the rules? A comment on embeddedness

Fiscal Rules – reaking the debt cycle Third World

Development?

Public Finance Reform

GTZ – Partner for the Future. Worldwide.

The Organisation

The German Technical Cooperation (gtz) is a federal enterprise, founded in 1975 and based close to Frankfurt am Main gtz provides advisory services for political, economic, ecological and social development, thereby promoting complex reforms and change processes

The corporate objective is to improve people ´s living conditions on a sustainable basis

Our Clients

Major client is the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

The GTZ also operates commissioned by other German ministries, partner-country governments, and international clients (European Commission, World Bank)

Worldwide operations for sustainable development

Activities in 130 countries, 9.400 employees

Resident representatives in 66 countries, mostly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern

Europe

Public Finance Reform

The devil‘s in the details – German experiences struggling with fiscal rules

Two different fiscal rules applied

Golden rule in the German Basic Law and European SGP

Design of the national rule

Investment is defined as gross capital formation; no incentive to repay debt during booms

Debt service at 14.5% of recurrent expenditure; implicit debt at 270% of GDP

Help to limit deficit in ad times, fail to boost budget discipline in boom times

Fiscal Rule and the budget process

Cascading budgetary negotiations, no ceilings

Medium-term limits to fiscal discipline

Cost of German unification 17 years ago still considerable

Net transfers to Eastern Germany in 2003 at 6% of recurrent expenditure

Public Finance Reform

Why stick to the rules?

A note on embeddedness

Credible sanctions raise politicians‘ respect for fiscal discipline

Political sanctions: German voters dislike lack of fiscal discipline

Legal enforcement – independent judgement on government policy

Conclusion: FRs must be transparent, easily understandble, and tight to a strict enforcement process

Harmonisation with monetary policy

Europe: Different economic spaces for fiscal and monetary policy

Way out: creating autonomous fiscal agencies?

Objective: Separate budget execution fom party politics

Examples from India, Malasia, Nigeria etc. show that

Public Finance Reform

Fiscal Rules – breaking the debt cycle in the Third World?

Third World Debt currently low priority on the political agenda

Credibility of fiscal rules depends on institutional framework … and political room for manoeuver

Rise of Fiscal rules in Latin America

Structural surplus rule for the budget (Chile)

Commodity Stabilization Funds (Colombia, Chile)

Fiscal Responsibility Laws (Brazil, Argentina, Peru)

Limited experiences with fiscal rules in low income countries

Institutional capacity?

High dependency on international tranfers; aid in average 3050% of gov‘t expenditure (est.)

Recommendation to SBO: Consider fiscal rules in middle-income countries

Count on promising examples from Latin America

Countries in transition: Central and Eastern Europe

Middle East and Northern Africa

Public Finance Reform

Thank you!

For more information on gtz please visit us: www.gtz.de/public-finance

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