Document 17810667

Summary Presentation of Haiti
Norway’s Evaluation: Basic Information
Challenges Leading to Policy Level Findings
Lessons from the Norwegian Portfolio in Haiti
Lessons Learned
Socio-Economic indicators
Poorest country of the
hemisphere with a GDP: $1,155
USD and a HDI rank of 145th in
Population in 2007: approx.
Life expectancy at birth: 55
Maternal mortality rate: 523
(Norway: 10)
Youth literacy rate 2000-07: M:
76%/F: 87% largely funded by
external sources, including
transfers from the diaspora
Transparency Int. Rank: 146th in
Political variables
Small number of years under
democratic rule since
independence, which include 20
years of US occupation.
Dominant influence of
autocratic rulers in the period.
Weak central and local
institutions since the mid1980s.
Major negative effects of
embargo during military rule
Increased economic and
political influence of narcomoney after 1994.
Split between legislative and
executive branches after the
return to democracy and
throughout the Aristide period.
The purpose of the evaluation was to assess
whether Norway had, with its transitional
assistance, contributed to increased security
(and stability) in Haiti, and whether gains
achieved were likely to be sustained.
Scope: The time scope for the evaluation was
from 1998-2008. It covered all nonhumanitarian interventions in Haiti funded by
The objectives of the evaluation:
 Assess whether the Norwegian support was
successful in terms of contributing to improving the
security situation in Haiti (effectiveness, relevance,
 Determine whether the Norwegian support, and the
way it was carried out was on the right track to
contribute to sustained peace in Haiti (sustainability
and conflict sensitivity).
 Assess whether the Norwegian transitional support
added value to what other donors could offer.
 Identify lessons that could benefit the continued
Norwegian engagement in Haiti, and if possible,
Norwegian support to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding activities elsewhere.
Fragmentation of funding strategies without
clear connection to identifiable national
programmes or to Haitian counterparts
hindered the portfolio’s capacity to link with
overarching objectives.
Late production of an umbrella policy
statement capable of bringing together this
fragmented portfolio created a vacuum with
the correlated lack of clear direction
(coherence and linkage).
The balance between political objectives and
development objectives was very unstable
fluctuating from one to the other. This made
evaluation criteria of development projects
seem non pertinent.
Important tools were not developed such as
conflict analysis and context sensitive
management approaches, both weakened the
portfolio in the Haitian environment.
Consequently risk analysis came late in the
portfolio’s development cycle; it did not
inform monitoring and it relative absence was
a weak foundation for evaluation operations.
Monitoring mission agenda marked a clear
choice of discussing transparently with all
parties and stakeholders. Norway’s MFA was
viewed as a team player. It had a very positive
ripple effect on other donors.
Peacebuilding, dialogue and political processes
require flexibility, personal engagement (and
support) and risk management, within a
programme framework. Commitment (personal
or institutional) cannot be a substitute to more
organized and reflexive forms of interventions.
Emergency procedures and their shortcuts
should give way to rebuilding and
consolidating focused approaches.
Doing so requires the breaking down of
existing institutional dichotomies between
political and development stakeholders in
donor countries.
A first step towards improved accountability
and learning for stakeholders can be to
document key outputs and outcomes through
participatory monitoring. Systematic
participatory monitoring can be a transparent
tool for accountability in project management
even in conflict or emergency situations.
The challenge – not to be underestimated – is
to find ways to implement participation in
data collection and feed-back of information.
As early as possible after the intervention, the
objective of creating systems for institutional
learning, knowledge management and
transfer as well as monitoring/quality
assurance by decision makers must become a
priority. These activities must include network
building operations and information/lessons
learned sharing.
A strategy for any fragile or conflict-prone
state must address continuity of
interventions, local ownership and
sustainability of these conflict prevention and
peace building interventions.