Denial of Convenience Attack to Smartphones Erich Dondyk, Cliff C. Zou

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Denial of Convenience Attack to Smartphones

Using a Fake Wi-Fi Access Point

Erich Dondyk, Cliff C. Zou

University of Central Florida

Background

A smartphone can connect to the Internet through only one broadband channel at any particular time

Cellular Channel (e.g. 3G) Wi-Fi Channel

Wi-Fi Advantages

Users are encouraged to use the Wi-Fi channel when available because:

1) It is usually faster

2) Does not consume the user’s data plan

3) Does not consume the cellular provider’s bandwidth

Wi-Fi Protocol Vulnerability

The following two characteristics of the Android and iPhone Wi-Fi protocol allow for exploit:

1) Wi-Fi protocol automatically connects (or asks the user to connect) to an open Wi-Fi APs

2) Wi-Fi protocol never checks if a Wi-Fi access point has a functioning Internet connection or not

• Could stop Internet access if the AP does not work

• Users have to know how to disable WiFi to get back

3G broadband access

Motivation

 Currently, more than one third of all adults in the

United States own a smartphone.

 Many of these users are not technologically savvy to diagnose this type of attack and/or take corrective actions.

 Mounting a successful Denial-of-Convinience (DoC) attack can be achieved with simple hardware device.

Attack 1: Simple Passive Wi-Fi Access

Point

Setup a Wi-Fi AP without an internet connection

Implementations:

 Wireless router without an Internet connection

- OR -

 Laptop/smartphone configured as a Wi-Fi AP

Fake AP Internet

Prototype

Fake AP implementation using a Linux netbook with an external ALFA network adapter costing less than $30

The adapter has a higher power (30dBm) than normal APs (20dBm): It could bury real AP that has the same SSID!

Experiment of Attack 1

The result of Attack 1 on an Android phone: (a) the connection status of the fake AP and (b) the smartphone does not have a working Internet connection because of its Wi-Fi connection with the fake AP.

Defense 1: Static Identifier Validation

1) Sends a challenge to a validation server

2) Receives a response from the validation server

3) Compares a key in the validation response against a key stored in the device

Valid AP

Key

Internet

Validation

Server

Experiment of Defense 1

 The simple validation procedure can detect fake AP used in Attack 1

 If the AP is invalid, Wi-Fi stack shows that the fake AP has been disabled by Wi-Fi Authenticator

Attack 2: Fake Validation Response

Redirect validation challenge to a fake validation server

1) Setup a fake Wi-Fi AP

2) Setup a local fake validation server (e.g., on the same laptop/smartphone)

3) Forward all probing packages to local validation server

Fake AP

Fake Validation

Server

Internet

Defense 2: Dual Channel Validation

1) Before connecting to a Wi-Fi AP, send a randomly generated validation key to the validation server through the cellular 3G network

In WiFi channel:

2) Send a challenge to the validation server

3) Receive a response from validation server

4) Compare the random key in the validation response against the key stored in the device

Valid AP

Key

Wi-Fi

Channel

Validation

Server

Key

Cellular

Channel

Key

Attack 3: Selective Internet Traffic

Throttling

1) Allow probing packages to reach the validation server

2) Block or throttle all other data traffic

Internet

Fake AP

Validation

Server

Defense 3: Network Performance

Monitoring

1) After connecting to a Wi-Fi AP, measure the performance of the connection

2) If below a predetermine threshold, transition back automatically to the cellular network

Internet

Network

Metrics

Analyzer

Valid AP

Time used for Authentication

Conclusion

 DoC attacks are a threat against the two most popular smartphone operating systems, Android and iOS.

 There are several approaches to implement a DoC attacks.

 Defenses can be implemented to counteract each type of DoC attack considered.

Questions?

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