POLICYFORUM
N U C L E A R
Weak authority and largely voluntary
standards limit global institutions’ impact
on nuclear safety and security.
S A F E T Y
Preventing the Next
Fukushima
safety regime, such as the Convention onIAE A. W ill Fuk us him a lead to
Nuclear Safety (CNS) and other safety ne w ac tio n to s trengt h en the
and liability treaties; an expanded safety globa l n uc lear s af et y a nd
program at the International Atomic
s ec urit y s ys t em ?
Energy Agency (IAEA), including
So far, the signs are not promising.
nonbinding safety standards and safety With competing proposals from several
peer reviews carried out when states ask countries, little understanding of which
for them; and industry efforts such as the ideas would help, and a lack of
World Association of Nuclear Operators sustained leadership focused on building
(WANO) that exchanges best practices support for key initiatives beforehand,
and carries out peer reviews ( 3 ). But
hile this year’s
little consensus emerged at June’s IAEA
these institutions still leave primarily to ministerial meeting, although the
disaster at Japan’s
each country the decisions about what ministers directed the agency to prepare
Fukushima Dai’ichi plant,
nuclear safety and security measures to a suggested action plan. That plan, a 22
t h e w o r s t s i n c e C h e r n o b y l i ntake, with only broad and largely
September United Nations conference
1 9 8 6 , was caused by the one-two voluntary international standards in place
on nuclear safety and natural disasters;
punch of a huge earthquake followed and weak authority for global institutions
reviews of the CNS; and the ongoing
by an immense tsunami—a disaster like the
WANO effort to fi nd ways to strengthen
unlikely to occur in many locations—it
its operations all represent opportunities
revealed technical and institutional
Belfer Center for Science and International
for progress.
weaknesses that must be fi xed
Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Over the long term, new reactor
around the world. If nuclear power is 02138, USA.
designs
with greater reliance on
to grow on the scale required to be a
“inherent” safety measures, e.g., not
signifi cant part of the solution to
requiring active pumps and valves to
global climate disruption or scarcity of
fossil fuels, major steps are needed to * A u t h o r f o r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . maintain safe operation, may reduce
risks. But for the next few decades,
E-mail: matthew_bunn@
rebuild confi dence that nuclear
harvard.edu
most nuclear energy will be
facilities will be safe from accidents
generated by the hundreds of
and secure against attacks ( 1).
reactors that already exist and those
I t i s t o o s o o n t o dr a w a l l t h e
that will be built with existing
l e s s o n s f r om t h e F uk us h im a
designs. Hence, the near-term focus
d i s a s t e r . B u t i t i s c l e ar t h a t t h e
should be on upgrading safety and
reactors’ abilities to maintain
security for existing and planned
cooling in the event of a
facilities and building institutional
prolonged loss of power and to
approaches that can fi nd and fi x the
vent dangerous gas buildups
facilities that pose the highest risks.
we r e i n s u f f i c i e n t , a s we r e t h e
We propose actions in six areas.
operators’ ability to respond to
l a r g e - s c a l e em e r g e nc i e s a n d t h e
HigherSafety Standards
r e g u l a t o r s ’ d e g r e e of
More stringent national regulations and
i n d e p e n d e n c e f r om t he n u c l e a r
international safety standards are needed,
i n d u s t r y ( 2 ) . O p e r a t or s a n d
covering several issues. Reactor operators
r e g u l a t o r s a r o u n d t h e wo r l d a r e
should be required to be better prepared for
r e v i e w i n g t h e i r n u c l e a r s af e t y
disasters such as fl oods and earthquakes,
m e a s ur e s a n d r es p o nd i n g t o
as well as for any events that cause a
heightened public concerns.
prolonged loss of electrical power, the key
G o v e r nm e n t s ’ c o n c l u s i o n s h a v e
factor that led to the Fukushima disaster.
r a n g e d f r om C h i n a ’ s p l a n t o
These are the kinds of issues addressed in
c o n t i n u e i t s m as s i v e nu c l e a r
the “stress tests” the European Union is
c o n s tr u c t i o n ef f o r t t o G e r m a n y’ s
conducting and that regulators in other
decision to phase out all nuclear
countries are pursuing.
energy by 2022.
But how are global institutions
responding? The Chernobyl accident led
to much of the current global nuclear
Matthew Bunn * and Olli Heinonen
W
The Fukushima earthquake and
Operators should be required to install fi fundamental part of the follow-up to
tsunami were both larger than the “design ltered vents, as some countries have
Fukushima. States should adopt rules
basis” Japanese plants were required to done, which could greatly reduce the
and practices that ensure that
protect against, as was a 2007
amount of radiation released if a
weapons-usable nuclear materials and
earthquake near the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa dangerous pressure buildup in a reactor major nuclear facilities, not just power
nuclear plant. All regulators should
forces operators to vent gases, as
reactors, are effectively protected
reassess whether design bases refl ect occurred at Fukushima ( 4). Operators
the spectrum of plausible disasters,
should also be required to put in place
requiring safety backfi ts where
measures to prevent spent fuel from
necessary, and should also require
melting or burning if a spent fuel pool
operators to plan responses to events
drains, such as installing survivable
beyond plants’ design bases.
systems to spray the fuel in the pool with
water. Ultimately, much of the fuel now
stored in spent fuel pools should be
moved to safer dry casks ( 5).
Institutionally, regulators must be
wholly independent of those they
regulate and have the authority,
resources, expertise, and culture to be
effective. For example, Japan has
decided to separate its regulator from
the ministry responsible for nuclear
power.
The IAEA should recommend that states
require steps such as these. The United
States and other countries operating and
exporting nuclear reactors, along with
industry groups such as WANO, should
press for these steps to be taken, in the
interest of both public safety and the future
of nuclear energy.
HigherSecurity Standards
There is a need for m ore
stringent standards for
protecting nuclear facilities
against terrorist sabotage—a
step both al Qaeda and
Chechen terrorists have
considered. Terrorists have
also sought m aterials to make
a crude nuclear bomb ( 6 ).
Nuclear safety and security
measures are in many ways
mutually reinforcing (although
they can som etim es conflict,
as when safety might call for
rapid emergency evacuation,
whereas security might call for
checking those who leave). A
nuclear facility cannot be
considered safe, in the sense
of posing little risk to hum ans
and the environment, unless it
is also secure ( 7 ).
Yet today, security in place at many
nuclear sites around the world is
weak, and the IAEA security
recommendations are much less
specifi c than the agency’s safety
standards. Nuclear security, ignored at
the June IAEA ministerial and in the
EU stress tests, must be a
16 SEPTEMBER 2011
Published by AAAS
VOL 333
S CI ENCE
www.sciencemag.org 1580
nuc
now
stru
ine
pol
sta
nuc
non
mu
the
sus
sec
A Saf
10.1126/science.120966
8 CREDIT: SHERWIN MCGEHEE/ISTOCKPHOTO
www.sciencemag.org
Published by AAAS
S CI ENCE
VOL 333
16 SEPTEMBER 2011 1581
A c
Fuk
tha
unl
ign
wro
kno
of h
ade
tsu
inc
pow
the
thin
pri
ach
pra
saf
wh
add
lar
cos
not
Wh
cou
pot
ste
the
aga
unl
reg
reg
org
suf
sec
att
pow
sec
ins
of
sho
now
lea
Dir
Am
major states operating and exporting nuclear plants.
References and Notes
1. M. Bunn, M. Malin, Innovations: Tech. Gov. Global. 4, 173 (2009).
2. Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety: The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima
Power Stations (Government of Japan, Tokyo, 2011).
3. R. Meserve, Daedalus 138, 100 (2009). 4. J. Beyea, F. von Hippel, Bull. At. Sci. 38, 52 (1982). 5. National Research Council, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent
Nuclear Fuel Storage (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2006). 6. M. Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years (Harvard Univ. and
the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Cambridge, MA, 2010). 7. International Nuclear Safety Group, The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-24,
against all plausible
pre-staged equipment that is
terr oris t thr ea ts. T he I AEA interoperable both
should issue
domestically and
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o p r e v e n t internationally” ( 8 ). Such a
a “s ecur it y Fuk ush im a,” an d team should probably be
the IAEA and the W orld
managed by the industry itself,
Institute for Nuclear
with its capacity for rapid
Security (W INS), the key
decision.
operatrors’ organization
f o c u s e d o n s e c u r i t y , s h o u l d Strengthened andExpandedPeer Reviews
work with operators to
Every country
ensure that nuclear security
operating major
best practices are shared
nuclear facilities
and implemented. Progress
should ask for an
on these steps could build
international team to
support for further action at
review its nuclear
the March 2012 nuclear
safety and security
security summit in Seoul.
arrangements.
Reviews to check
compliance with
Stronger Emergency Response
inadequate standards
Nuclear operators and the institutions
are not enough;
around them, e.g., local police, fi re, and
these reviews should
emergency departments, must put in place
be based on the
more effective emergency response plans
more stringent safety
and conduct regular and realistic exercises
and security
to make sure all the key players know what
standards just
to do in a crisis. Operators should have
described. WANO
redundant instrumentation and backup
and the IAEA already
control centers, in case a reactor control
provide safety peer
room stops functioning (as also occurred at
reviews, using
Fukushima). IAEA standards should call for
somewhat difeach of these steps.
The IAEA response to the
Fukushim a crisis was often too
little, too late, in sharp
contrast, for example, to the
W orld Health Organization’s
ability to respond quickly to
disease outbreaks. The IAEA
emergency response—from
providing reliable independent
inform ation and analysis to
helping the affected
state—needs radical
im provement.
Although diffi cult issues of
responsibility and liability
would have to be addressed,
the industry should pursue the
recommendation by James
Ellis, president and CEO of
the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO), who called
for creation of an
international emergency
response team “with
IAEA,
Relea
Resp
Emine
for Pe
and B
Scien
ferent
although this is not likely to
approaches.
happen quickly, given the
current lack of consensus (3 ,
But WANO
9 ). As Ellis put it, the world
reviews are
o r g a n i z e d b y needs to fi nd “the sweet spot
the industry
between national sovereignty
a n d a r e k e p t and international
c o n f i d e n t i a l , accountability” (8 ).
whereas most
r e a c t o r s h a v e Expanded InternationalCooperation
never had a
There is a clear need for
more
expanded international
transparent
nuclear safety and security
IAEA safety
cooperation. The fact that the
r e v i e w o r a n y disaster revealed a range of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l inadequacies in nuclear
r e v i e w o f t h e i rsafety in Japan, one of the
security
world’s wealthiest countries
m e a s u r e s . T h eand among those with the
IAEA might
longest experience in using
select only
nuclear energy, highlights
a fraction of facilities for t h e s t r i n g e n t d e m a n d s f o r
political and institutional
on-site reviews initially, to conserve
resources (although WANO plans safety s t a b i l i t y , r e g u l a t o r y
effectiveness, and sustained
reviews at all reactors every few years),
but the possibility of being selected would o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e x c e l l e n c e
that today’s nuclear
encourage other operators to upgrade
technologies impose. Some
standards.
Such reviews could help
rebuild public confi dence (as
an IAEA review did after the
2007 earthquake at the
Kashiwazak i-Kariwa plant) and
identif y issues that may have
been overlooked. The largest
nuclear operating and exporting
countries should offer to accept
such reviews at their civilian
facilities and should work to
convince others to do the same.
Legally Binding Requirements
Given the international
consequences of a major
release, there is a strong
case to be made for more
stringent global
requirements, although
states will insist on ultimate
control over nuclear safety
and security decisions.
Treaties governing nuclear
safety and security, such as
the CNS and the Convention
on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials and
Facilities (with its 2005
amendment), express broad
goals but include few
specific requirements.
States should negotiate
specifi c, binding standards
for both safety and security,